

# Merger Control 2021

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
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# Merger Control 2021

**Cosulting editor****Thomas Janssens**

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Lexology Getting The Deal Through is delighted to publish the twenty-fifth edition of *Merger Control*, which is available in print and online at [www.lexology.com/gtdt](http://www.lexology.com/gtdt).

Lexology Getting The Deal Through provides international expert analysis in key areas of law, practice and regulation for corporate counsel, cross-border legal practitioners, and company directors and officers.

Throughout this edition, and following the unique Lexology Getting The Deal Through format, the same key questions are answered by leading practitioners in each of the jurisdictions featured. Our coverage this year includes new chapters on New Zealand and Vietnam.

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Every effort has been made to cover all matters of concern to readers. However, specific legal advice should always be sought from experienced local advisers.

Lexology Getting The Deal Through gratefully acknowledges the efforts of all the contributors to this volume, who were chosen for their recognised expertise. We also extend special thanks to the contributing editor, Thomas Janssens of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, for his continued assistance with this volume.



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# The future of merger control



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Global M&A is facing extraordinary challenges as economies grapple to recover from the covid-19 pandemic. The health crisis and ensuing economic slowdown have affected the volume and nature of transactions, with an initial decline in dealmaking and an uptick in the sale of distressed assets. We expect that global uncertainties will continue to exacerbate protectionist tendencies, as governments focus on restoring their local economies. As a result, competition authorities may come under increasing pressure to take account of industrial policy considerations when reviewing mergers. Deals risk facing heightened scrutiny, particularly where they involve foreign investment in strategic assets or benefit from foreign crisis-related subsidies. At the same time, competition authorities are facing increased scrutiny in court, forcing them to rethink certain aspects of their decisional practice. We expect that the economic and regulatory uncertainties will persist in the future, making careful deal-planning with due regard to regulatory hurdles all the more crucial. We set out below a few developments that we consider to be key for the future of merger control.

## **The global pandemic will leave a mark on merger control**

Overall, competition authorities were relatively successful in maintaining 'business as usual' despite lockdown measures in several jurisdictions by adapting their working practices. For example, in China, the time frame for simplified filings even reduced slightly, in part due to the State Administration for Market Regulation's (SAMR) decision to accept electronic filings and submissions. In the EU, for the first time ever, an oral hearing was held virtually in the *PKN Orlen/Grupa Lotos* deal. In the US, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued final versions of their new joint Vertical Merger Guidelines, while other jurisdictions (eg, Vietnam), proceeded to adopt new competition rules undaunted by the health, social and economic priorities of the day.

Several competition authorities have prioritised critical transactions, especially those in the healthcare and life sciences sector. The pandemic has led to the resurgence of joint ventures and other forms of collaborations, as competitors and other industry participants join forces to develop vaccines and develop strategies to combat the effects of the pandemic. Several competition authorities have issued guidance on the approach to covid-19 related deals.

The crisis has caused and will in the future lead to deals being reviewed against the backdrop of significant economic distress. The most enduring impact is perhaps that the politicisation of merger control is becoming even more prevalent, making it harder for global transactions to successfully navigate the merger review process.

## **Increased politicisation of merger control**

As countries emerge from the health crisis and economic slowdown, protectionism is likely to accelerate as governments focus on local economic recovery and shielding national companies from opportunistic

purchasing by foreign acquirers. Governments pay closer attention to foreign investment in their strategic assets – particularly in the healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors – and are more wary of unfair competition from beneficiaries of foreign (crisis-related) subsidies.

Driven by these concerns, the EU issued guidelines urging member states to use foreign investment screening to avoid the loss of critical assets and technology, notably in industries such as healthcare, medical research and biotechnology. In an interview, Executive Vice President of the European Commission Margrethe Vestager (who is also responsible for EU competition policy) called on EU countries to block Chinese takeovers, including by taking defensive stakes in European businesses that are struggling to survive because of the covid-19 pandemic and that might be vulnerable to acquisition. Several EU member states (including Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain) introduced stricter foreign investment rules. France built a fund worth €20 billion to inject capital in strategic industries and tech companies at risk of foreign takeover.

Australia announced that, for an indefinite period, all foreign bids will be scrutinised by its Foreign Investment Review Board regardless of the size of the investment. The review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) – which has long been a challenging hurdle for Chinese acquisitions across a number of sectors – may present a challenge to such investment in a broader range of healthcare and pharmaceutical companies as more products and services come to be viewed as essential to national security in light of the crisis. Japan has recently broadened the scope of its foreign investment review by expanding the sectors subject to review and by lowering the filing threshold from shareholdings of 10 per cent to those of 1 per cent.

Beyond formal foreign investment screenings by governments, we expect that competition authorities will come under increasing pressure to take protectionist and industrial policy considerations into account. In the EU, the crisis gives further ammunition to countries who, in the context of the *Siemens/Alstom* deal, called for a reform of EU merger control to allow for industrial policy concerns such as the self-sufficiency of the European economy and the ability of European companies (or 'champions') to compete with foreign-owned firms. As part of its Industrial Strategy for Europe, the European Commission proposed new regulatory tools that will allow EU member states and the European Commission to address the distortive effects caused by foreign subsidies within the EU and safeguard a global level playing field, inter alia, by scrutinising and potentially prohibiting subsidised acquisitions.

In China, while foreign investment rules were recently relaxed with the adoption of a new Foreign Investment Law, the merger control regime has continued to serve as a route for close scrutiny of deals in sectors that are sensitive or of strategic importance in China. Deals in the healthcare, life sciences and semiconductor sectors as well as generally in the IT and technology space account for most of the deals



cleared with remedies to date in China (eg, *Danaher/GE BioPharma*, *Nvidia/Mellanox*, *Infineon/Cypress* and *ZF Friedrichshafen/Wabco* in the first half of 2020 alone). SAMR is expected to continue to scrutinise such deals, and, as other countries tighten national security regimes, it is not inconceivable that China could begin to flex its seldom utilised national security review powers.

### Changed economic circumstances

As many industries are severely impacted by the crisis and the sales of distressed assets becomes more common, agencies will increasingly be asked to consider changed economic circumstances when assessing merger effects.

In cases where distressed companies seek to merge with a competitor to safeguard their long-term financial stability, they may invoke the failing firm defence if the deal would otherwise raise material competition concerns. The conditions for successfully invoking the failing firm defence are typically high. Competition authorities generally require compelling evidence to support the parties' case that market exit by the failing firm and its assets in the near future is inevitable if not acquired; and that there is no less anticompetitive alternative to the deal. Several competition authorities have signalled that the covid-19 crisis will not lower their investigational standards or make it materially easier for distressed firms to invoke the failing firm defence. For example, a commissioner of the US FTC stated that the agency must be 'particularly vigilant' about merger defences, such as the failing firm defence, following the pandemic. Jurisdictions that have less experience with the failing firm defence may be encouraged by the current extraordinary circumstances to accept such a defence – such as China, where the SAMR has suggested that it will treat covid-19 badged deals favourably.

Where the failing firm standard is not met, merging parties can argue that their competitive position is weakened by the crisis or that changed market circumstances (such as an increase in overcapacity) make anticompetitive merger effects less likely. Merging parties have been and are expected to push competition authorities to consider the changed economic backdrop in their assessment of deals. Several jurisdictions allow for a 'weakened competitor' or 'failing firm' defence, if parties can show that merger-specific effects are less likely because market conditions are expected to erode the competitive significance of the merging firms. Alternatively, parties might argue that the merger is necessary to boost markets as they emerge from the crisis, creating efficiencies that will benefit consumers. In such cases, parties will need to present strong pro-consumer deal rationales, as our experience from the 2007–2009 financial crisis suggests that competition authorities will not simply accept deals that may have a long-lasting structural impact. As former EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said in 2009 regarding the merger of troubled banks: 'two turkeys do not make an eagle.'

Finally, where a divestment remedy is required, the merging parties should be prepared to demonstrate that, despite the challenging economic circumstances and the absence of dealmaking, a potential remedy taker in fact exists, is financially viable and has the capability and industry expertise to successfully run the divestment business. To an even greater extent than usual, we expect competition authorities to require their pre-approval of the purchaser before clearing a transaction or permitting it to close. The FTC's Director of the Bureau of Competition, Ian Connor, warned that the FTC will not, as a consequence of the current pandemic, loosen its 'usual rigorous approach to ferreting out anticompetitive harm and seeking appropriate relief, even in the face of uncertainty', and stated that now more than ever it will make sure to vet potential buyers, taking 'full account of current financial and economic realities'.

### Heightened scrutiny of mergers in the digital space

The impact of digitalisation on merger control remains a hot topic. We have seen increasingly heightened scrutiny of mergers in the digital space and several jurisdictions are evaluating if they need to change their merger regimes to capture potentially harmful deals that slip through the net as currently cast.

For example, the European Commission is examining whether it should amend its merger thresholds to make more deals subject to its review in order to safeguard digital innovation. This is partially inspired by the 2019 report on Competition Policy for the Digital Era authored by special advisors appointed by the EU, as it called for heightened scrutiny of acquisitions of start-ups by dominant platforms or ecosystems. Former chief competition economist, Tommaso Valletti, went as far as suggesting a reversal of the burden of proof in scenarios where 'super large' companies acquire small innovators, requiring them to justify their transaction on the basis of efficiencies. Within its new digital strategy, the Commission furthermore focuses on the competitive role of data. The EU's 2020 European Strategy for Data largely centres around the concept of data sharing as a means to spur innovation. It is therefore not inconceivable that the Commission will in the future explore data access remedies as a means to resolve potential anticompetitive effects resulting from digital mergers.

In the US, statements from top enforcement officials at both the US DOJ and FTC have consistently pointed to technology mergers as a continuing priority. In February 2020, the FTC issued special orders to Alphabet, Amazon.com, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft, requiring each of the five tech giants to provide information on their non-reportable transactions between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2019, for an FTC retrospective study into technology acquisitions of new or smaller companies. This announcement followed the DOJ's litigation challenge to Sabre's proposed acquisition of Farelogix, tried in federal court in January and February 2020, which Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim described as 'a dominant firm's attempt to take out a disruptive competitor that has been an important source of competition and innovation'. While the DOJ lost the challenge in district court, the parties abandoned the transaction following the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)'s prohibition.

Several jurisdictions in Asia have also signalled heightened focus on technology. For example, in Japan, parliament recently adopted new digital legislation and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry recently established a new digital agency. The Japanese competition authority is also visibly stepping up scrutiny of the digital industry. It recently amended the merger guidelines in relation to the substantive review of mergers and procedure to elaborate on the treatment of data and to capture large digital deals exceeding ¥40 billion yen in transaction value even if the parties' turnover thresholds are not met. Similarly, in China, technology mergers as noted above continue to attract close attention from SAMR. SAMR is currently considering the adoption of a new competition law including, reportedly, the possibility of new jurisdictional thresholds to address so-called 'killer acquisitions' in the technology sphere.

### Environmental concerns increasingly become part of merger assessments

Environmental considerations are not typically considered in the merger review process, with agencies instead focusing on economic aspects of consumer welfare to assess merger effects. Recent decisions have shown that this is changing. We have seen competition authorities in several jurisdictions take account of environmental factors in merger control and expect this trend to accelerate in the future as sustainability concerns become ever more pressing. With the focus on environmental goals expected to increase, parties will need to consider the ecological profile of their deal (and possible remedies) when assessing regulatory risks.



A notable example of the environment playing a decisive role in merger control is the approval of the joint venture between Miba and Zollern – active in hydrodynamic plain bearings that play a key role in reducing emissions – by the German Economics and Energy Minister, Peter Altmaier, overruling an earlier prohibition by the German Federal Cartel Office. Altmaier approved the joint venture on the basis that its positive impact on the environment outweighed its adverse impact on competition.

The European Commission has yet to approve a merger on the basis that it would further sustainability goals. However, while in the past the Commission expressly dispelled environmental concerns as falling outside the scope of merger control, the Commission has clearly opened the door to at least consider the environmental impact of mergers. As recently as 2018, the Commission chose not to pursue concerns raised by various NGOs and environmental groups in relation to environmental and product safety standards in *Bayer/Monsanto*. However, at the end of 2019, the Commission opened a Phase II investigation in the merger between copper refiners Aurubis and Metallo, citing, inter alia, concerns relating to the significant role copper plays in electric mobility and digitisation. The Commission referred to the importance of a well-functioning circular economy in copper to ensure a sustainable usage of resources, and its role achieving objectives set out in the European Green Deal, which aims to make the EU 'carbon neutral' by 2050. The Commission also raised preliminary concerns in the merger of US aluminium producers Novelis and Aleris, noting that their light-weight aluminium automotive body sheets are necessary to produce vehicles that are more fuel-efficient and reduce emissions. Although the Commission ultimately cleared these deals (the latter with conditions), the reference to environmental considerations presents a shift away from previous decisional practice. It remains to be seen whether other jurisdictions will similarly take sustainability issues into account.

### Behavioural remedies are on the rise

In the past year, competition authorities have increasingly cleared mergers subject to behavioural commitments. Certain jurisdictions tend to be more open to behavioural remedies compared to their peers in the US and EU. Such remedies are commonly used in a number of jurisdictions, such as Brazil, China, India, Japan, South Africa and South Korea. However, even jurisdictions that typically favour structural remedies, such as the EU and the US, have cleared several high-profile deals subject to behavioural remedies in the past year. We expect that competition authorities in the future will remain open to alternative remedy structures.

With the rise of attention to vertical issues, especially in the digital and generally the tech sector, several competition authorities in, for example, Japan and South Korea – already active users of behavioural remedies in the past few decades – are becoming even more flexible and are exploring creative remedies to address new issues. In China, behavioural remedies (sometimes alongside a structural or quasi-structural remedy) have been imposed in roughly 50 per cent of deals cleared to date subject to conditions to address China-specific concerns.

For example, in the past year, in *Nvidia/Mellanox*, SAMR acknowledged the largely complementary nature of the parties' products and services but pointed to foreclosure risks in certain adjacent markets where the parties are active owing to, among other factors, high market shares, the perceived ability to control prices and high barriers to entry. SAMR imposed behavioural remedies to guarantee access to and security of supply of certain products and services in China, including no tying, interoperability and confidentiality commitments. It also required the parties' relevant products to be supplied in China on FRAND terms and that existing open source commitments are maintained. In an unusual move, the decision includes two confidential remedies and it is unclear whether this is solely to protect the parties' business secrets

or potentially to address other concerns (given the possible dual use of some of the products in issue). In *Infineon/Cypress*, SAMR similarly found foreclosure concerns and imposed commitments not to tie, force sales on customers or refuse to supply Chinese customers the relevant products individually if requested. SAMR also required one of the relevant products supplied in China to comply with relevant industry standards and others to be supplied in China on FRAND terms. In order to dispel vertical foreclosure concerns in *ZF Friedrichshafen/Wabco*, the parties committed to continue supplying the upstream product to existing customers and on terms that afford security of supply in terms of price, quality, quantity, delivery time, technology level and after-sales service level – and to do so having regard to FRAND principles. SAMR also required the parties to commit to offer Chinese customers the opportunity to develop the upstream product to aid access to future supplies.

In the EU, the Commission in the past year has also cleared several deals subject to behavioural remedies. Most notably, the Commission cleared Vodafone's acquisition of certain Liberty Global assets subject to commitments such as providing a remedy taker access to the merged entity's cable network in Germany, providing downstream competitors access to certain TV channels, and several commitments to protect upstream broadcasters from the merged entity's increased buyer power. Furthermore, the Commission cleared Telia's acquisition of Bonnier Broadcasting subject to the parties giving downstream competitors access to certain TV channels, streaming services, and advertising space and commitments to protect confidential information. The same trend can be seen at national competition authorities within the EU. For example, in the Netherlands, the ACM last year cleared an acquisition of a dominant platform for the distribution of digital educational materials by publisher Sanoma subject to behavioural remedies, such as measures to promote interoperability with other publishers, ensure access to the platform on FRAND terms and measures to reduce the risk of the exchange of commercially sensitive information.

Although the US agencies have in the past clearly stated their preference for structural commitments over behavioural remedies, in *T-Mobile/Sprint*, the DOJ accepted behavioural commitments – T-Mobile granting the remedy taker Dish access to its mobile network and 5G roll-out targets – alongside more structural commitments, consisting of the divestment of spectrum and certain network infrastructure.

### Merger litigation gains significance

The ever-increasing appetite of parties and others affected by merger outcomes to challenge regulators in court has, in the past year, led to landmark rulings, which will force competition authorities to rethink certain aspects of their decisional practice. Competition authorities will be kept on their toes as we expect this litigation trend to persist in the coming years.

In the EU, the General Court has handed down a clear and comprehensive restatement of EU merger control law. In a landmark ruling, it upheld an appeal brought by CK Hutchison Holdings against the Commission's prohibition of its acquisition of rival company O2 UK. The judgment is only the second successful appeal against an EU merger prohibition in the last 18 years and the first judgment to address the legal test of 'significant impediment to effective competition' (SIEC) under the EU merger regulation (EUMR) introduced in 2004. The Court ruled that the introduction of the SIEC-test did not lower the threshold for intervention, allowing the Commission to intervene in mergers in concentrated markets only where it can demonstrate merger effects that are equivalent to those resulting from the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The Court found that the Commission did not meet this standard as it had interpreted the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in a way that would lead to de facto powers to prohibit all mergers in concentrated markets and had failed to conduct any overall assessment

of whether the non-coordinated merger effects would be significant and thus constitute a SIEC. The judgment will require the Commission to reconsider its practice under the EUMR, as the Court set clear limits to the Commission's powers to intervene in mergers in concentrated markets. We therefore expect the judgment to create an opportunity for deals in several sectors (including beyond telecommunications) that would not have been pursued owing to the risk of a prohibition or synergy neutralising remedies. The judgment is also expected to have a disciplining effect on the Commission's recent pursuit of innovation and other novel theories of harm, particularly in digital markets.

Furthermore, last year the European Court of Justice upheld the General Court's annulment of the Commission's prohibition of *UPS/TNT*, confirming that where the Commission intends to base its decision on econometric models, the notifying party must be given the opportunity to make its views known in relation to the model used by the Commission to substantiate its decision.

CK Hutchison also prevailed in the Australian Federal Court which overruled the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's decision to block the merger between Vodafone Hutchison Australia and TPG, holding that the merger would not reduce competition on the retail mobile market. In addition, the Court accepted evidence that the merger would create efficiencies that would benefit Australian consumer.

In the UK, the CMA will face scrutiny of its decisional practice as Sabre filed an appeal over the blocked Farelogix merger, arguing that the CMA has wrongfully seized jurisdiction based on an overly expansive interpretation of the share of supply test. Sabre also claims the CMA made errors in finding that the deal would significantly lessen competition.

The US has seen two notable defence victories in merger litigation, both focused on market definition questions. Evonik prevailed against the FTC's preliminary injunction motion that would have blocked its acquisition of Philadelphia-based chemical manufacturer PeroxyChem LLC in the US District Court. This marks a rare loss for the FTC and breaks the agency's seven-case winning streak in litigated merger challenges. The FTC claimed that the tie-up would result in Evonik controlling roughly half of alleged markets for hydrogen peroxide in the Pacific Northwest and the Southern and Central United States. Judge Kelly held that the FTC had oversimplified the approach to market definition. Likewise, Sabre, a global distribution system, successfully fended off the DOJ's attempt to enjoin its proposed acquisition of Farelogix, an airline technology company involved in distribution and merchandising solutions. The district court judge concluded that 'the DOJ has failed to meet its burden of proof' because it did 'not identif[y] a proper relevant market.' The decision is rare in that it depends on prior law, not fact, to make this determination regarding the proposed relevant market, explaining '[a]s a matter of antitrust law, Sabre, a two-sided transaction platform, only competes with other two-sided platforms, but Farelogix only operates on the airline's side of Sabre's platform.'

Merging parties furthermore increasingly face challenges after achieving traditional regulatory approval. In the US, the state attorneys general sought (but failed) to block T-Mobile's acquisition of Sprint following conditional approval by the DOJ. In the EU, interested parties lodged appeals against the *Vodafone/Liberty Global* and *Vodafone/Ziggo* clearances (the latter being KPN's second challenge as the Commission reissued a clearance because the General Court annulled the initial clearance following a successful first appeal by KPN).

## Conclusion

Recent developments demonstrate that practitioners must continue to watch astutely in an ever-evolving regulatory landscape. Unsurprisingly, in the beginning of 2020, antitrust practitioners needed to adapt to covid-19 alongside businesses, particularly as many countries started to adopt more protectionist regulations in response to the crisis. However, even before the onset of covid-19, competition authorities were actively



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adapting their enforcement efforts to reflect shifting priorities, including increased enforcement efforts related to the digital economy and, in some jurisdictions, an incorporation of environmental considerations into merger analysis. These shifts in enforcement activity bring uncertainty to regulatory outcomes as well, as enforcer victories may prove less *fait accompli* in litigated mergers than they were even a year ago given the tone struck in the successful challenges mounted by Sabre and Evonik in the US and CK Hutchison in the EU. We expect that economic and regulatory risk and enforcement focus will persist throughout the next few years, making careful deal-planning with due regard to potential regulatory hurdles all the more crucial.

# Non-standard counterfactuals in merger control

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## Introduction

Although merger review is inherently forward-looking, the standard counterfactual in merger control is the pre-existing conditions of competition. For example, the European Commission (EC) Horizontal Guidelines (HG) state that, 'In most cases the competitive conditions existing at the time of the merger constitute the relevant comparison for evaluating the effects of a merger.' However, there are circumstances when non-standard counterfactuals are adopted by competition agencies, including:

- A potential competition counterfactual involving a scenario that, absent the merger, one of the merging parties would introduce new products or services or otherwise expand its competitive significance. Under the heading of 'loss of a potential entrant scenario', the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) describes that it 'will consider whether the counterfactual situation should include the entry by one of the merger firms into the market of the other firm or, if already within the market, whether the firm would have expanded had the merger not taken place.'
- A failing firm counterfactual involving a scenario that, absent the merger, one of the merging parties would close either the entire firm or the relevant division. In each case, the non-standard counterfactual is necessary when the pre-merger competitive landscape would not provide a good indication of how the merging parties would likely continue to compete absent the merger.

While the topic of nascent acquisitions has drawn a great deal of attention in merger control circles during the last few years and placed a heavy focus on potential competition counterfactuals, competition agencies' attention is now necessarily shifting to consider failing firm cases following the covid-19 pandemic. This period of transition provides a suitable moment to compare and contrast competition agencies' approaches to the counterfactual in each type of case.

The starting points for this discussion are the observations that the substantive legal test does not depend on the nature of the counterfactual, and the consequences of different approaches to uncertainty about the counterfactual in these two types of cases can be profound. The following sections begin with the failing firm and then consider both the positive and normative aspects of competition agency practice in respect of the counterfactual to uncertainty, and the types of evidence. The paper then considers agencies' approaches to assessing the extent of competition in the counterfactual.

## Failing firm counterfactuals

Table 1 outlines the tests that competition agencies in the European Union, United Kingdom and the United States apply to the failing firm counterfactual. The tests, which must each be passed, are briefly discussed in turn.

Table 1: Summary of EU, UK and US guidance

Limb	European Union	United Kingdom	United States
1	'The allegedly failing firm would be forced out of the market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another undertaking.'	Would the firm have exited the market absent the transaction ('Likelihood of exit')?	'The allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future.' 'It would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.'
2	'There is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase than the notified merger.'	Would there have been any substantially less anti-competitive purchaser for the business or its assets ('Alternative buyer')?	'It has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.'
3	'In the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market.'	What would the impact of exit be on competition compared to the competitive outcome that would arise from the acquisition?	

Source: EU HG, paragraph 90; UK MAG, paragraphs 4.3.8, 4.3.12-4.3.18; UK FF;<sup>1</sup> US HMG,<sup>2</sup> page 32.

Under the first limb, all three guidelines emphasise financial difficulties in the near future. For example, the EU HG describe that 'Under the first limb of the test, financial difficulties, it has to be demonstrated that the company is unlikely to meet its financial obligations in the near future.'<sup>3</sup> Restructuring forms the basis of a second question in the US HMG. However, since both the UK MAG and EU HG emphasises restructuring under their first limb, the first two US questions have been placed under the first limb. The US HMG emphasises a particular form of restructuring through Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The EU HG highlights the potential for equity or other financial investors: 'Such [financial] difficulties are at hand when no shareholder or other financial investor would be willing to provide the necessary capital for the business to remain in the market as a going concern.'<sup>4</sup> In principle, the CMA allows reasons for an exit other than financial failure: 'The exiting firm scenario is most

commonly considered when one of the firms is said to be failing financially. However, exit may also be for other reasons, for example because the selling firm's corporate strategy has changed.<sup>5</sup>

The second limb examines the existence of alternative less anti-competitive purchasers. The consideration of alternative offers forms part of a third question in the US HMG, which is placed under the second limb in Table 1 above.<sup>6</sup> The US HMG highlights the evidence that US authorities will look for when evaluating submissions describing that there were no such alternatives.<sup>7</sup> For the EU HG:

*it has to be assessed whether the production assets are likely to remain in the market in their current use or liquidated and re-allocated for another more efficient use. The rationale for this part of the test is [to] address the possibility of a take-over by third parties of the various production assets of the failing firm in the course of bankruptcy proceedings. If these production assets remain in the market, the effects on competition may be similar to (or more beneficial than) the takeover of the entire failed business by an alternative purchaser.<sup>8</sup>*

The third limb of the test discusses exit of assets. In the EC's submission to the OECD for its discussion paper on the topic of failing firms, the EC describes that 'it has to be assessed whether the production assets are likely . . . liquidated and re-allocated for another more efficient use.'<sup>9</sup> In the UK FF, a very recent publication during the 2020 covid-19 crisis, the CMA has clarified that in practice it has applied the third limb 'less mechanically' than the UK MAG's wording suggests.<sup>10</sup> The CMA describes that

*Depending on the nature of the markets at issue, the CMA will not only consider what might happen to the sales of the merging party but will also consider the impact that the merger is likely to have on competition more broadly. More specifically, the CMA is likely to consider the impact that the exit of the failing firm would have on competition within the markets at issue (looking at the overall market structure and taking all relevant parameters of competition into account) compared to the competitive outcome that would arise from the acquisition.<sup>11</sup>*

At present, there is no equivalent to this limb of the UK test explicitly described in the US guidelines.

### Uncertainty

The US HMG describe that there is an 'inherent need for prediction'<sup>12</sup> in merger control and that 'certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible'.<sup>13</sup> While certainty about the future is indeed unlikely, the legal standard in most jurisdictions is markedly lower than certainty. Indeed, the US HMG describe that certainty is 'not required for a merger to be illegal'.<sup>14</sup> In the UK, the CMA must believe only that there is a 'realistic prospect' (ie, a likelihood that is 'greater than fanciful')<sup>15</sup> of a significant lessening of competition (SLC) at Phase I to refer a merger for a Phase II investigation. At Phase II, the CMA must believe that a merger is 'more likely than not' to result in an SLC finding, by the civil standard of proof.

Although the challenge of uncertainty is inherent in any prediction exercise, the sources and nature of the uncertainty differ across types of cases. In a failing firm case, firms argue they will fail absent the merger, and the required evidence will relate primarily to the short-term future status of the target firm. In contrast, in some potential competition cases the required evidence must potentially be marshalled to inform the medium- or long-term future status of the target firm. It may be very difficult to know at the time of acquisition whether the acquired firm is likely to develop into a competitor.<sup>16</sup>

The acceptance of uncertainty in a potential competition non-standard counterfactual is sometimes in significant contrast with at least the tone of failing firm argument guidelines. For example, under the EU HG, the third limb requires that 'in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market'.<sup>17</sup> Inevitability is a high hurdle. It is also one that cannot always be strictly necessary to achieve a 'more likely than not' standard of proof.

### Inherent uncertainty

Guidance documents currently propose to define a counterfactual only by reference to sufficiently likely events. For example, the CMA describes that it must be 'sufficiently certain' to include an event or circumstance in a counterfactual.<sup>18</sup> The EU HG mentions that 'the Commission may take into account future changes to the market that can reasonably be predicted',<sup>19</sup> while the US HMG similarly describes the need to identify 'what will likely happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will likely happen if it does not'.<sup>20</sup> In contrast, the CMA's report on past digital mergers describes that 'there will always be a certain degree of uncertainty as to the counterfactual chosen for the assessment of a merger. Future plans, no matter how carefully set out, are always subject to being unmade by unforeseen market events'.<sup>21</sup>

In practice, there is typically a finding of the counterfactual, and then competition agencies evaluate the SLC. But is that a coherent framework when the counterfactual is itself uncertain? Statistics suggest not – for reasons now described using an illustrative example.

Suppose one could determine that a company that currently has no sales has a 90 per cent probability of developing a product that can be taken to market (and so a 10 per cent chance that its research and development efforts do not pan out and so no marketable product is developed). Suppose further that, if this company develops the product, there is a 55 per cent chance that it will grow into a significant competitor (and so a 45 per cent chance it will not be of any future competitive significance). It would be wrong to follow a chain of argumentation that found, on the balance of probabilities, that it is more likely than not that the company will develop the product (because 90 per cent outweighs 10 per cent) and then simply proceed to say it is, therefore, more likely than not there will be a lessening of competition (because 55 per cent outweighs 45 per cent). The reason is that doing so artificially ignores the 10 per cent risk in the first part of the example. The correct calculation instead would reason that while the company would develop a product to take to market 90 per cent of the time, it only becomes a significant competitor 55 per cent of the time even when it does develop a marketable product, that is, that the probability of a significant lessening of competition is only 49.5 per cent (90 per cent of 55 per cent).<sup>22</sup> The likelihood of an SLC would therefore not meet the more-likely-than-not standard.

Note, in particular, that making a finding of 'fact' about what is, in reality, an uncertain counterfactual, risks misapplying the legal test for an SLC. It would do so if in practice an agency made a finding of fact about the counterfactual and then simply pretended that a counterfactual was certain for the overall evaluation of the likelihood of an SLC. The numerical example above illustrates that in some circumstances this may not be a legitimate approach.<sup>23</sup>

In Phase I, the risk of such misdirection is reduced. In *Amazon/Deliveroo*,<sup>24</sup> before the financial difficulties encountered by Deliveroo during the pandemic, the CMA noted that 'Amazon has a strong continued interest in the restaurant delivery sector'<sup>25</sup> and found 'There appear to be significant barriers to entry including the need to build relationships with restaurants, couriers and consumers, and to develop the necessary technology to power the logistics',<sup>26</sup> which Amazon, given 'its previous experience, financial resources and customer relationships, may be well-placed to overcome'<sup>27</sup> to provide significant competition in future. Thus, the CMA considered the uncertain counterfactual of potential

re-entry of Amazon and believed that 'there is a realistic prospect that Amazon would have re-entered in the supply of online food platforms in the UK in the near future'<sup>28</sup> absent the merger. The CMA concluded that it 'appears realistic that Amazon would have invested in an alternative online food platform (or similar business) that would enable it or a company it has invested in to re-enter in the UK.'<sup>29</sup> At Phase I, realistic prospect is a low hurdle and an agency or appeal court may judge that a realistic prospect of potential future competition combined with a likelihood that there would be an SLC in such a counterfactual is, for all practical purposes, sufficient to make a finding that there is a realistic prospect of an SLC. The realistic prospect test can mean, therefore, that an overall SLC assessment is markedly less acutely impacted by the proper treatment of uncertainty than a Phase II assessment.

In contrast, when the likelihood of a counterfactual in a potential competition case is too low, the more-likely-than-not civil standard of proof will not be met by a competition authority. The CMA past digital mergers report, for example, recently argued that 'A more speculative counterfactual may result in the Authorities falling short of the burden of proof they are required to satisfy to block a merger'.<sup>30</sup>

### The foreseeable future

The UK MAG state: 'The description of the counterfactual is affected by the extent to which events or circumstances and their consequences are foreseeable, enabling the [CMA] to predict with some confidence. The foreseeable period can sometimes be relatively short.'<sup>31</sup>

For example, in *PayPal/iZettle*,<sup>32</sup> the CMA concluded that some aspects of the counterfactual were foreseeable. Specifically, the CMA describes its view that iZettle on its own would have focused on bettering its existing services, rather than expanding into omnichannel, and 'iZettle's expansion into online payments offering would have remained relatively less developed and therefore that its omni-channel services would have proceeded and developed only at a slow rate'.<sup>33</sup> The CMA's view was also that PayPal would have 'substantially improved or replaced'<sup>34</sup> its PayPal Here service or in the shorter term made 'incremental improvements to its existing mPOS [mobile point of sale] offering (for example through improvements to pricing, marketing, or product hardware)<sup>35</sup> and would challenge iZettle more effectively on the mPOS side by being a stronger competitor.

However, a future counterfactual may not always be foreseeable. In *PayPal/iZettle* the CMA acknowledges that 'payment technologies can and do develop quickly, and technological or regulatory changes and developments in consumer habits can result in substantial market changes. . . . However, the likelihood and extent of any such impact from future technologies is unforeseeable'.<sup>36</sup>

A reasonable question is when is it conceptually correct to define the counterfactual in a way that ensures 'events or circumstances and their consequences are foreseeable, enabling the [CMA] to predict with some confidence?'<sup>37</sup> Although that approach can sometimes be very helpful, defining the counterfactual in such a constrained way will sometimes make it less useful as an analytical tool. The reason is that the uncertainty inherent in predicting the future cannot be made to vanish. Removing uncertainty from the counterfactual means it must instead be taken into account when assessing the SLC.

To illustrate, consider a case involving potential competition wherein a short-term approach to the time horizon will not always be appropriate. Doing so involves adopting a less certain counterfactual but has the advantage of potentially simplifying the analysis of the SLC. For example, an SLC may be very likely given the evidence and assuming a counterfactual in which the target grows into a significant future competitor. If the counterfactual includes only foreseeable events, the uncertainty for an SLC assessment does not vanish. Instead, this example demonstrates that agencies have a choice in structuring their analysis of a transaction: in some cases, it will make sense to place the uncertainty

in the counterfactual, while in other cases it will make sense to place the uncertainty in the SLC assessment (by requiring a more certain counterfactual). Whichever approach is adopted, competition agencies cannot escape the fact of uncertainty or the consequences of that uncertainty for their decision-making under the current legal framework.

### Types of evidence

Collecting relevant evidence reduces uncertainty. Competition agencies will examine internal documents, market evidence, and evidence on both the ability and incentive of firms to undertake a strategy envisioned in a counterfactual. Each type is discussed in turn.

#### Internal documents, external reports and management action

Agencies will review several types of internal documents. For example, the CMA describes that it 'will review contemporaneous internal documents such as board minutes, management accounts and strategic plans'.<sup>38</sup> The CMA has also examined large numbers of internal emails in past cases. For an exiting-firm scenario, the CMA 'will also consider the action the management has taken to address the firm's position'.<sup>39</sup> In terms of external reports:

*The CMA will also typically request and consider contemporaneous analysis provided by external legal, financial and insolvency advisers, as well as external auditors, in relation to the position of the company. The CMA may also request evidence from the company's debt or equity providers, such as the banks that provide its financial facilities or existing shareholders.*<sup>40</sup>

Also, the CMA's UK FF describes that, in failing firm cases, 'the CMA will carefully examine the firm's profitability over time, cash flows and its balance sheet in order to determine the profile of assets and liabilities'.<sup>41</sup>

Documentary evidence is relevant for both failing firm and potential competition cases. For example, in *PayPal/iZettle*, the CMA examined several documents regarding iZettle's intentions:

*In addition to iZettle's submissions and IPO documentation, [the CMA] examined internal papers and strategy documents and reviewed internal email communications for a period prior to the Merger. This was to assess iZettle's business strategy in relation to its online payments capability and a broader omni-channel functionality. The evidence was consistent with its stated intention [which included prioritising its offline offering development].*<sup>42</sup>

#### Market evidence

The second type of evidence that may be available is market evidence. This can take various forms, including responses to questionnaires sent to third parties, evidence from actual attempts at a sales process for the target, or evidence on market valuations in potential competition cases.

In *Aegean/Olympic II*, the EC 'sent out questionnaires to 24 European airlines in order to establish whether there [was] any interest in acquiring Olympic' (which there was not) or 'in taking over Olympic's Q400 aircraft'.<sup>43</sup> It found that there was no credible third-party interest to Olympic:

*Although the Commission found in Olympic/Aegean I that the parties had not convincingly demonstrated that there was no interested alternative purchaser, in the present case this condition is met. This is due to the facts that (i) between 1999 and 2009 the Greek State sought to divest Olympic four times and found no credible interested party except Marfin and Aegean . . . Moreover, the current and foreseeable market conditions are unlikely to be more conducive to Olympic's sale, (ii) Marfin would have had an incentive to find an alternative purchaser given that Olympic's first*



*merger with Aegean was prohibited by the Commission, and (iii) the data collected during the market investigation did not reveal the likelihood of any credible alternative purchaser of Olympic.<sup>44</sup>*

In potential competition cases, market evidence has focused on the value of the transaction:

*There is a large number of transactions being undertaken by digital incumbents. The value of the transaction may help the Authorities screen among those transactions to identify those that may warrant a more in-depth analysis of the merger, since it represents the magnitude of the effects (both beneficial and detrimental) associated to the transaction.<sup>45</sup>*

For instance, in *PayPal/iZettle*, the CMA 'examined whether the consideration paid by PayPal for iZettle (which was much higher than the expected IPO valuation) suggested that it had taken account of a potential reduction in competition'.<sup>46</sup> Also, competition agencies may consider evidence from any sales process undertaken.

The CMA notes that such market evidence must be interpreted appropriately. For example, in respect of evaluating claims in a failing firm case where there are no alternative purchasers, the CMA describes that:

*the possible unwillingness of alternative purchasers to pay the seller's asking price (or to pay as much as the purchaser [had] ultimately chosen) would not rule out a counterfactual in which there is a merger with an alternative purchaser, so long as any alternative offer would have been above liquidation value.<sup>47</sup>*

### Evidence of ability and incentives

Competition agencies have considered evidence relevant to assessing both the ability and incentive of parties to the transaction.

In failing firm cases, there is a natural focus on the financial ability and incentives of a party to continue operating in the counterfactual. Concerning ability, the CMA describes that:

*If the firm is part of a larger corporate group, the CMA will also consider the parent company's ability to provide continued financial support. In previous cases, the CMA has found that limb 1 [of a failing firm test] has not been met where a parent company would be able to provide continued financial support to a business experiencing financial difficulties.<sup>48</sup>*

Concerning incentives for a firm to continue to support a division, the US HMG contemplate whether 'such negative cash flow is not economically justified for the firm by benefits such as added sales in complementary markets or enhanced customer goodwill'.<sup>49</sup>

For example, in *Aer Lingus/CityJet*, the CMA considered CityJet would have exited, not for financial failure reasons, but for strategic reasons:

*CityJet's decision to exit the LCY-DUB route was part of a wider strategic decision (which preceded the decision to enter into the Agreement) to move towards being a wet lease provider. . . . [T]here is no realistic prospect that CityJet would have continued the provision of scheduled air passenger services on the LCY-DUB route absent the Merger.<sup>50</sup>*

Concerning potential competition cases, competition agencies must also examine evidence on ability and incentives. The fundamental question in such a merger inquiry is whether the target firm will grow, mature, and provide more competition within the relevant marketplaces with the merger or, counterfactually, without it.

In making such assessments in potential competition cases, it will be important to consider ability and incentives in a way that remains grounded in the available case-specific evidence. Superficially, in respect of the factual, large technology firms may always have the ability to launch a new product into a narrow market segment and always have an incentive to grow a successful business.

The counterfactual may, of course, involve the target persisting as an independent firm, or instead, it may be necessary to consider the target's prospects for growth following an acquisition by an alternative purchaser. For example, in *PayPal/iZettle*, the CMA found that, absent the merger, PayPal was likely to have bettered its PayPal Here service and challenged iZettle more efficiently on the mPOS side by offering 'a strong offline payments service to complement its online payments product'.<sup>51</sup> . . . Therefore, under the counterfactual it is likely that PayPal would have been a stronger competitor than it currently is, stemming the decline in PayPal Here's competitive position.<sup>52</sup>

### Assessing the loss of competition under a non-standard counterfactual

This section illustrates the approach taken by competition agencies when evaluating the loss of competition owing to a merger under a given non-standard counterfactual using select case studies.

#### Failing firm

##### Potential alternative purchasers

Under the second limb of its failing firm test, the CMA considers that even if the target firm is exiting the market, there may still be alternative buyers 'whose acquisition of the firm as a going concern, or of its assets, would produce a better outcome for competition than the merger under consideration'.<sup>53</sup> Hence, the CMA will look at available evidence supporting any claims that there was genuinely only one possible purchaser'.<sup>54</sup> In this assessment, the CMA:

*will consider the prospects of alternative offers for the business above liquidation value. . . . The fact that no other bids were ultimately received for a business may not, by itself, support the position that there were no alternative purchasers for a firm or its assets.<sup>55</sup>*

For example, in *Aer Lingus/CityJet*, the parties argued that 'it was unrealistic that CityJet would have found another airline . . . for the LCY-DUB route'.<sup>56</sup> This was due, in part, to network effects. Specifically:

*CityJet told the CMA that an airline would need to have 'frequency, scale, market awareness and sales presence, and/or the ability to offer onward connections either over Dublin or over London City onto other parts of its network to make the London City to Dublin route viable' (and that only Aer Lingus fits this profile).<sup>57</sup>*

The CMA concluded there was no realistic prospect of a less anticompetitive counterparty than Aer Lingus as 'none of the third-party airlines contacted by the CMA expressed any credible interest in entering the LCY-DUB route at this time'.<sup>58</sup> Carriers confirmed either that 'the LCY-DUB route did not fit their business models given LCY would not be able to accommodate its larger aircraft', that their strategic plans did not include wet leasing, that 'the route was not suitable to 'feed' [transatlantic carriers'] long-haul flights', that 'under a wet lease-type arrangement, it would be necessary to build market presence and brand awareness at both ends of the route' requiring 'significant' marketing expenditure, or that 'airlines, as a general rule, tend to focus on their "home markets" where the bulk of their infrastructure is located. A single route outside of that market would be unlikely to generate the required frequency'.<sup>59</sup>

**Counterfactual competition**

Under the third limb of the failing firm test, the CMA considers ‘What the impact of exit would be on competition compared to the competitive outcome that would arise from the acquisition’.<sup>60</sup> For example, in *Illumina/PacBio*, the CMA found that ‘PacBio had been searching for a strategic partner since August 2017’, but concluded alternative buyers might be interested.<sup>61</sup> The CMA stated that:

*the evidence presented to [the CMA] and the actions of each of the Parties, shows that PacBio has substantial underlying value, which would be attractive to alternative purchasers. Although any such alternative offers may not have been as attractive to PacBio shareholders as Illumina’s bid, they would have resulted in the competitive constraint between the Parties being maintained.*<sup>62</sup>

**Potential competition**

**Future alternative partners**

In *PayPal/iZettle*, the CMA examined both parties for potential other partnerships or acquisitions. The CMA ‘found no reason to consider it likely that [iZettle] would have entered into a transformative partnership or acquisition to advance its online offering in a significant way in the foreseeable future’, and concluded that:

*PayPal would have substantially improved or replaced PayPal Here but that this would have taken time with the timing and impact of such an improvement in the UK dependent upon the means by which it was achieved, [ie.] the profile of any acquisition or partnership target.*<sup>63</sup>

**Counterfactual competition**

At Phase I in *Amazon/Deliveroo*, the CMA noted that although ‘there appear to be significant barriers to entry including the need to build relationships with restaurants, couriers and consumers, and to develop the necessary technology to power the logistics’, Amazon, given ‘its previous experience, financial resources and customer relationships, may be well-placed to overcome these barriers’ and hence could provide significant competition in future.<sup>64</sup> Thus, the CMA believed ‘there is a realistic prospect that Amazon would have re-entered in the supply of online food platforms in the UK in the near future’ absent the merger, and concluded that Amazon would buy another target company: ‘[it] appears realistic that Amazon would have invested in an alternative online food platform (or similar business) that would enable it or a company it has invested in to re-enter in the UK.’<sup>65</sup>

**Conclusion**

This article considers competition agencies’ approaches to non-standard counterfactuals in different types of cases, illustrating the potential differences that can arise between cases where competition agencies emphasise the need for counterfactuals that are tightly defined to limit the risk of uncertainty in the counterfactual; and those cases where competition agencies emphasise a likely uncertain counterfactual. The failing firm counterfactual is an example of where competition agencies require that non-standard counterfactuals are highly likely. In contrast, recent reports have suggested that agencies should accept – perhaps even markedly – greater uncertainty in potential competition counterfactuals.

This article also examines the implications of such a trend for future analysis in merger cases. Competition agencies can explicitly recognise that counterfactuals may be uncertain in some cases and incorporate that fact into merger assessments directly. In addition, agencies can test the robustness of their guidance documents by examining the degree to which the approach described can be integrated into a single coherent framework, which applies across the various types of cases (and in

particular failing firm and potential competition cases). A goal of this paper is to illustrate how those cases may be evaluated in the future.

\* *The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors, who are responsible for the content, and do not necessarily represent the views of Cornerstone Research.*

**Notes**

- 1 The UK FF document is described only as a general ‘refresher’ on how the CMA is likely to approach ‘failing firm’ claims rather than explicitly as a guidance document issued under the Enterprise Act 2002, but in this paper, it has been termed as guidance since it is substantively that. See Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Summary of CMA’s Position on Mergers Involving “Failing Firms”’, April 2020 (UK FF).
- 2 US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’, 19 August 2010 (US HMG).
- 3 OECD Competition Committee, ‘Roundtable on Failing Firm Defence – Note by the Services of the European Commission Directorate-General for Competition’, 21 October 2009 (OECD Roundtable), paragraph 4.
- 4 OECD Roundtable, paragraph 4.
- 5 UK MAG, paragraph 4.3.9.
- 6 US HMG, page 32.
- 7 An example of where in the US the DOJ considered a less anticompetitive purchaser is the *Chicago Tribune/Chicago Sun-Times* transaction, where it ultimately required that the company went through a proper bankruptcy auction to find a buyer. See US Department of Justice, ‘Department of Justice Statement on the Closing of Its Investigation into the Possible Acquisition of Chicago Sun-Times by Owner of Chicago Tribune’, 12 July 2017.
- 8 OECD Roundtable, paragraph 7.
- 9 OECD Roundtable, paragraph 7.
- 10 UK FF, paragraph 21.
- 11 UK FF, paragraph 21.
- 12 US HMG, page 1.
- 13 US HMG, page 1.
- 14 US HMG, page 1.
- 15 See UK MAG, footnote 16, and *IBA Health Limited v OFT* [2004] EWCA Civ 142.
- 16 Chicago Booth Stigler Center, ‘Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms, Final Report’, September 2019, page 88, <https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf?la=en&hash=2D23583FF8BCC560B7FEF7A81E1F95C1DDC5225E>.
- 17 EU HG, paragraph 90.
- 18 ‘[The CMA] may still consider the effects of the merger in the context of an event or circumstance occurring even if that event or circumstance is not sufficiently certain to include in the counterfactual. Future changes in market conditions, such as regulation or market liberalisation, are often addressed as part of the [CMA’s] competitive assessment.’ See UK MAG, paragraph 4.3.2.
- 19 EU HG, paragraph 9.
- 20 US HMG, page 1.
- 21 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Ex-post Assessment of Merger Control Decisions in Digital Markets – Final Report’, 9 May 2019 (CMA Report), page iv, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/803576/CMA\\_past\\_digital\\_mergers\\_GOV.UK\\_version.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/803576/CMA_past_digital_mergers_GOV.UK_version.pdf). This report was developed by Lear for the CMA.
- 22 For completeness, there are also two circumstances when the transaction would have no impact on competition: when (90 per cent of the time) the company develops a marketable product that (45 per cent of the time) does not become of competitive significance; and when (10 per cent of the time) the company does not develop a product and hence



- again fails to compete. Adding the likelihood of these two circumstances gives  $0.9 \times 0.45 + 0.1 = 50.5$  per cent.
- 23 A technical discussion generalising this example is provided in the expanded variant of this paper.
- 24 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Anticipated Acquisition by Amazon of a Minority Shareholding and Certain Rights in Deliveroo – Decision on Relevant Merger Situation and Substantial Lessening of Competition', 11 December 2019 (*Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision).
- 25 *Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision, paragraph 8.
- 26 *Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision, paragraph 9.
- 27 *Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision, paragraph 9.
- 28 *Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision, paragraph 69.
- 29 *Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision, paragraphs 69, 178.
- 30 CMA Report, page xiv.
- 31 UK MAG, paragraph 4.3.2.
- 32 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Completed Acquisition by PayPal Holdings, Inc. of iZettle AB – Final Report', 12 June 2019 (*PayPal/iZettle* decision), [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5cfa74440f0b609601d0ffc/PP\\_iZ\\_final\\_report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5cfa74440f0b609601d0ffc/PP_iZ_final_report.pdf). The CMA describes that 'PayPal is a technology platform company' providing among others 'payment services that allow merchants to accept online and offline . . . card payments from end-customers' while iZettle is a 'financial technology company that provides payment (and other) services with a focus on small businesses, which mainly allow merchants to accept offline card payments from end customers.' See *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraphs 2–3. PayPal's rationale for the acquisition was to combine PayPal's online payment service solutions with iZettle's in-store/offline product offerings to enhance omnichannel payment solutions. See *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 9. The CMA concluded iZettle on its own would only develop its omnichannel services at a slow rate while PayPal would have 'substantially improved or replaced' its service, known as PayPal Here, to challenge iZettle more effectively on the mPOS side than it currently is. See *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraphs 14–22. However, the CMA concluded the acquisition is unlikely to substantially lessen competition in the provision of offline payments services or omnichannel services to smaller merchants in the UK. See *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraphs 9, 41.
- 33 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraphs 18–22.
- 34 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 17.
- 35 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 34. 'mPOS services consist of a card reader that is connected, physically or by Bluetooth, to an app downloaded onto a smartphone or tablet, which enables merchants to accept card payments.' See *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 4.
- 36 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 29.
- 37 UK MAG, paragraph 4.3.2.
- 38 UK FF, paragraph 11.
- 39 UK FF, paragraph 11.
- 40 UK FF, paragraph 11. The CMA added a footnote highlighting that it is a criminal offence for external advisers to provide information to another person that is false or misleading in material respect knowing that information is to be supplied to the CMA.
- 41 UK FF, paragraph 11.
- 42 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 20.
- 43 European Commission Case COMP/M.6797 – AEGEAN/OLYMPIC II, 9 October 2013 ('*Aegean/Olympic II* decision'), paragraphs 811, 827, [https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6796\\_20131009\\_20682\\_4044023\\_EN.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6796_20131009_20682_4044023_EN.pdf). The parties successfully argued that "absent the Transaction, Olympic would cease operating and as a result cease to be a competitor to Aegean. Consequently, with or without the Transaction, . . . Aegean would become the only operator on those overlap routes where the Commission found competition concerns." See *Aegean/Olympic II* decision, paragraphs 645, 833. The Commission cleared the transaction in Phase II without any commitments.

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- 44 *Aegean/Olympic II* decision, ¶ 816.
- 45 CMA Report, page xiv.
- 46 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 4.12.
- 47 UK FF, paragraph 16.
- 48 UK FF, paragraph 12.
- 49 US HMG, page 32.
- 50 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Completed Agreement between Aer Lingus Limited and CityJet Designated Activity Company – Decision on Relevant Merger Situation and Substantial Lessening of Competition', 21 December 2018, (*Aer Lingus/CityJet* decision), paragraphs 59, 62, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c46de96ed915d38a2f5e262/AerLingus\\_CityJet\\_Full\\_Text\\_Decision.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c46de96ed915d38a2f5e262/AerLingus_CityJet_Full_Text_Decision.pdf).
- 51 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 14.
- 52 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraph 17.
- 53 UK FF, paragraph 14.
- 54 UK FF, paragraph 15.
- 55 UK FF, paragraph 15.
- 56 *Aer Lingus/CityJet* decision, paragraph 63.
- 57 *Aer Lingus/CityJet* decision, paragraph 63.
- 58 *Aer Lingus/CityJet* decision, paragraph 71.
- 59 *Aer Lingus/CityJet* decision, paragraph 70.
- 60 UK FF, paragraph 8.
- 61 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Anticipated Acquisition by Illumina, Inc. of Pacific Biosciences of California, Inc. – Provisional Findings Report', 24 October 2019 (*Illumina/PacBio* provisional decision), paragraph 4.4, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5db1b98a40f0b609ba817d38/Illumina\\_PacBio\\_-\\_ProvFindings.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5db1b98a40f0b609ba817d38/Illumina_PacBio_-_ProvFindings.pdf). On 24 October 2019, the CMA provisionally blocked the proposed merger between Illumina Inc (Illumina) and Pacific Biosciences of California Inc (PacBio) concluding 'the Proposed Merger may be expected to result in an SLC in relation to the supply of [next generation sequencing] systems for sale in the UK'. See *Illumina/PacBio* provisional decision, paragraph 10.2. Shortly afterwards, on 3 January 2020, the parties abandoned the merger. See Competition and Markets Authority, 'Illumina/PacBio Abandon Merger', 3 January 2020, [www.gov.uk/government/news/illumina-pacbio-abandon-merger](http://www.gov.uk/government/news/illumina-pacbio-abandon-merger).
- 62 *Illumina/PacBio* provisional decision, paragraph 6.118.
- 63 *PayPal/iZettle* decision, paragraphs 21, 7.42.
- 64 *Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision, paragraphs 6–9.
- 65 *Amazon/Deliveroo* referral decision, paragraphs 69, 178.

# Timelines

Michael Bo Jaspers and Joanna Goyder

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

The timelines provide a high-level overview of the duration of the merger control process and the procedural steps in the 62 jurisdictions covered by this book. Given the complexity of some merger control regimes, it has not always been possible to cover all possible variations and exemptions. For more detailed information, the reader should turn to the relevant country chapters. The following aspects should be borne in mind when working with the timelines:

- The information regarding the filing deadline relates only to the need to file a notification within a certain period of time after a triggering event. It does not address the issue of whether the relevant jurisdiction operates a suspension obligation. Where no filing deadline exists, filing might be (and often is) required prior to implementation.
  - Furthermore, the information regarding the filing deadline does not address the triggering event or events.
  - Many jurisdictions operate rules pursuant to which a deadline is suspended in the event of an information request (until the information is supplied, for a fixed period or if the information is not supplied in a timely manner). Such suspensions are, as a rule, not taken into account.
  - In many jurisdictions, the clock only starts after a complete filing. Rules on the scope of information to be supplied and the potential confirmation of completeness by the relevant competition authority are generally not considered.
  - In some jurisdictions, deadlines are extended where the relevant periods include official holidays. In addition, deadlines are extended to the next working day where they would otherwise end on a weekend or official holiday in most jurisdictions. Such extensions of the deadlines are not taken into account.
  - The timelines often use abbreviations for the relevant competition authorities. The reader can find the full names in the relevant country chapter.
  - The timelines do not take into account the effect on timing of pre-merger contacts with the competition authority, which may be expected to occur in some jurisdictions.
  - The timelines do not take into account ministerial authorisations after a prohibition decision, which are possible in some jurisdictions.
- Some jurisdictions have a pre-merger as well as a post-merger notification requirement. In these cases, the different deadlines are dealt with in one timeline.
  - Where relevant, additional information about, for example, proposed changes to the procedure or the status of the merger control rules are explained in separate boxes next to the relevant jurisdiction's timeline.
  - In many jurisdictions, timelines for certain periods in 2020 have been affected by the covid-19 pandemic. In some cases the relevant laws have been amended and in others there has been informal guidance or de facto delays. These changes have been, or are expected to be, temporary, and so are not taken into account in the timelines.





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
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
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








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





























































# Acknowledgements for verifying contents

We would like to offer our thanks to the following competition enforcement agencies for their assistance in the verification of the factual information contained in the chapter relating to their jurisdiction.

Country	Agency	Contact
Australia	Australian Competition and Consumer Commission	Suzie Copley and Annelise Caplan
Belgium	Belgian Competition Authority	Jacques Steenbergen, President
Brazil	Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE)	Cristiane Landerdahl De Albuquerque
Colombia	Superintendency of Industry and Commerce	Carolina Liévano Liévano, Head of Mergers Unit
Croatia	Croatian Competition Agency	Mirta Kapural, PhD
Czech Republic	Office for the Protection of Competition	Lumír Břínek, Merger Department
Greece	Hellenic Competition Commission	Panagiotis Fotis, PhD, Economist, Commissioner/Rapporteur
Greenland	Danish Competition and Consumer Authority	Nidhu Sivapatham
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Italy	Italian Competition Authority	Michele Pacillo, Office for International Affairs
Liechtenstein	Office of Economic Affairs	Ute Hammermann, Head Bureau of Competition Policy
Norway	Norwegian Competition Authority	Tormod S. Johansen, Special Adviser
Poland	Department of Merger Control, Office for Competition and Consumer Protection	Mateusz Błachucki, Adviser to the President
Singapore	Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore	Ng Ming Jie, Deputy Director, Policy and Markets Division Teo En Qi, Competition Analyst, Policy and Markets Division
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Slovenia	Slovenian Competition Protection Agency	Za Mirjam Močnik
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# Albania

Denis Selimi and Günter Bauer

Wolf Theiss

## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The legal basis for regulating merger control in Albania is found mainly in Law No. 9,121 on the protection of competition dated 28 July 2003 (the Competition Act), published in Official Gazette No. 71 of 2003, which aims to protect free and effective competition. The Competition Act has been amended by Law No. 10,317 dated 16 September 2010, published in Official Gazette No. 135 on 7 October 2010. The amendments became effective as of 23 October 2010.

The Competition Authority (the Authority), with the Competition Commission as its decision-making body, is principally responsible for the enforcement of the Competition Act.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Under the Competition Act, any of the following causing a lasting change of control would constitute a merger:

- the merger of two or more undertakings, or parts of undertakings, which previously were independent of each other;
- any transaction in which an individual having control over an undertaking, or one or more undertakings, acquires, directly or indirectly, a controlling interest in all or parts of one or more undertakings; or
- the establishment of a new joint company acting as an independent economic unit.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The establishment of joint ventures is caught by the Albanian merger control rules if the new joint venture company will be acting in the market on a lasting basis as an independent economic unit.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Pursuant to the Competition Act, control may be acquired by rights, contracts or other means that, either separately or in combination, on a legal or factual basis, confer the possibility of exerting decisive influence on the activities of an undertaking, in particular by means of:

- ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; or
- rights or contracts that allow the holder to decisively influence the composition, voting, or decision-making of the corporate governance bodies of an undertaking.

Control may also be exercised by a minority shareholder if the shareholding to be acquired confers the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking in the ways described above. However, Albanian merger control is only applicable in cases of an acquisition of joint or sole control. An acquisition of non-controlling minority participations in an undertaking and other interests less than control do not fall within the scope of Albanian merger control.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A merger will be subject to Albanian merger control law and has to be notified to the Authority if the undertakings concerned generated the following turnover in the business year preceding the concentration:

- combined worldwide turnover of more than 7 billion leks and domestic turnover of at least one of the undertakings concerned of at least 200 million leks; or
- combined domestic turnover of more than 400 million leks and domestic turnover of at least one of the undertakings concerned of at least 200 million leks.

The turnover to take into account is income generated by an undertaking's ordinary activities, after deduction of taxes or fees directly related to income. There are rules specific to credit or financial institutions. If an undertaking is part of a group, the group's overall external turnover needs to be taken into account.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The notification of a merger to the Authority is mandatory if the turnover threshold criteria are met.

The Competition Act provides for an exception to the application of the Albanian merger control regime where financial, credit or insurance institutions acquire shares in undertakings for the purpose of resale, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights related to the acquired shares and the resale occurs within one year of the acquisition.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified and clearance by the Authority is required, even in cases where the undertakings involved in the merger are domiciled abroad, provided that the notification thresholds set out above are met.

The Competition Act expressly states that it applies to all undertakings, whether domestic or foreign, whose activities have a direct or indirect effect on the Albanian market. The Competition Act does not define the concept of effect. In practice, the Authority generally considers that a merger has an effect on the Albanian market even where the undertakings concerned do not have a direct presence in Albania (through subsidiaries or branch offices) or when the undertakings concerned are indirectly active in Albania (through imports or sales to independent local distributors) and thereby meet the turnover threshold test.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no specific rules on foreign investments.

Approval or at least a notification of acquisitions of interests above or below certain thresholds is required for the energy, banking and the insurance sectors, or with regard to public companies.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Notifiable concentrations must be notified within 30 days of the date the merger agreement, or the agreement pursuant to which a controlling interest is acquired, is entered into, or from the date of publication of the public offer to purchase or exchange shares.

If the undertakings that are required to notify the merger fail to duly file within the set deadline (late filing), the Authority may impose fines of up to 1 per cent of their annual turnover generated in the last completed business year. In the past, the Authority has imposed a fine on a foreign company for failure to file in time with respect to a merger that consisted of the acquisition of an Albanian company.

In recent cases, the Authority has accepted a (short) notification letter to meet the filing deadline, provided that a regular notification of the concentration was then submitted within a certain period of time allowed by the Authority.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The obligation to file the notification with the Authority rests with the merging parties and the undertaking acquiring a controlling interest in (the whole or part of) one or more other undertakings.

Upon receipt of the notification, the Authority confirms the completeness of the filing with a written certificate. If the Authority considers the notification to be incomplete, it will require the submission of any additional information that it deems necessary to review the notification within a certain period.

The Authority has issued a regulation according to which the following fees are due:

- merger filing fee: 7,500 leks or 15,000 leks, depending on whether or not the domestic turnover of the acquirer exceeds 1 billion leks;
- authorisation of a temporary implementation of a merger: 150,000 leks or 300,000 leks, depending on whether or not the domestic turnover of the acquirer exceeds 1 billion leks; and
- approval of a merger: 250,000 leks or 500,000 leks, depending on whether or not the domestic turnover of the acquirer exceeds 1 billion leks.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Mergers that meet the notification threshold criteria and thus require notification to the Authority must not be implemented prior to clearance by the Authority (suspension obligation).

The Authority assesses notified concentrations either in preliminary proceedings (Phase I) or in an in-depth investigation (Phase II).

Phase I proceedings apply to mergers that will probably not lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market or part of it. In preliminary proceedings, the Authority has to decide on the merger within two months of the working day following the confirmation of receipt of a complete notification. In June 2016, the Authority introduced fast-track proceedings for certain types of concentrations that do not raise competition concerns. These fast-track proceedings enable the Authority to clear straightforward concentrations within 25 days of the working day following the confirmation of receipt of a complete notification.

If, however, in the course of the proceedings, the Authority believes that the notified transaction raises competition law concerns, it may decide to initiate Phase II investigations, or to authorise the merger only under certain conditions. To that end, the parties may suggest (within one month of the notification) certain measures to the Authority to mitigate the possible negative effects of the merger on the market. If the parties offer commitments to the Authority, the time limit is extended by two weeks. If a decision is not issued by the Authority within two months (plus the extended term of two weeks, as the case may be), clearance is considered to be granted.

In Phase II, the Authority investigates the case and has to issue a decision within three months of the start of an in-depth investigation. The deadline can be extended by up to one month if the parties – within two months of the start of the in-depth proceeding – offer to take certain steps to mitigate the possible effects of the merger on the market.

The Authority may suspend the time frame of the proceedings if the proceedings are impeded by the undertakings concerned (in particular, if the parties do not provide the information requested by the Authority within the time limit set; the parties refuse to submit to investigations carried out by the Authority; or the parties did not inform the Authority about changes of facts contained in the merger filing).

Upon request, the Authority may also temporarily approve the merger if such request is justified as otherwise irreparable damage would be caused to the undertakings concerned or to third parties and under consideration of the overall goal of protecting competition.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The Authority may impose fines on the undertakings concerned if they close the transaction before receiving clearance and for late filing, or failure to notify.

Under Albanian merger law, late filing, failure to notify, and the submission of incorrect, incomplete or misleading information to the Authority, is considered a non-serious infringement. In such cases, the authority may impose fines up to 1 per cent of the aggregate turnover of an undertaking concerned in the previous financial year. Absent a filing, the implementation of concentrations that result in a restriction of competition in the market is considered a serious infringement and may be subject to fines of up to 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover in the previous financial year. The law does not specify any further requirement other than that the implementation of the concentration must result in a restriction of competition to qualify as a serious infringement. It remains to be seen how the Authority will interpret this requirement in practice.



In determining the amount of the fine, the Authority will take into account the financial gain resulting from the violation of the Competition Act; this amount shall be taken as the minimum amount of the fine. If a fine is imposed on a group of undertakings, the amount of the fine shall not exceed 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover generated in the market concerned by the infringement in the preceding business year.

Furthermore, the merger is deemed to be void if implemented without clearance or if conditions to which the merger authorisation is subject have not been fulfilled.

In 2009, the Authority imposed a fine of 2.6 million leks on a company that had violated the merger filing obligation. Other possible remedies, such as structural sanctions, were not imposed. In 2014, the Authority imposed a fine on a company for failure to notify amounting to 100,000 leks. That is in line with two cases in 2012 where the Authority imposed fines on two companies for failure to notify, amounting to 100,000 leks each.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for closing before clearance are applicable also in case of foreign-to-foreign mergers. In practice, however, we are not aware of these sanctions having been applied to any such mergers to date.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Authority may authorise closing before clearance on a temporary basis. A temporary clearance may be granted if the undertakings involved in the merger would otherwise suffer irreparable damage. The temporary clearance may, however, be issued subject to conditions that the Authority considers necessary to ensure effective competition. To our knowledge, there is no approved practice of carve-out solutions.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Law No. 10,236 on the takeover of public companies dated 18 February 2010 sets forth special merger control rules for the takeover of Albanian or foreign public companies seated (also) in Albania and that are listed at the Albanian stock exchange. As there is no operational stock exchange in Albania, the said law remains inapplicable to date.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The Authority requires that the notification of a merger is prepared on the basis of a standard filing form; one can further refer to the guideline issued by the Authority for the relevant filing formalities (the Guideline). The Authority issued a new Guideline on 23 June 2008.

On the basis of the Guideline, the Authority has the discretion to require a short form or a full notification.

The notification must, inter alia, provide the following:

- information on the identity of the undertakings concerned and their authorised representatives (such as names and addresses);
- turnover of the undertakings concerned in the domestic market and worldwide;
- market shares of the undertakings concerned, including information on the methods for their calculation or estimation;

- information on the form of the concentration (merger, acquisition of control, etc);
- information on the controlling interests in the undertakings concerned; and
- information on the relevant product and geographical market and, where applicable, the market affected by the concentration.

The applicant is required to submit certain documents with the notification, such as the legal basis of the acquisition or merger; certificates of incorporation; financial statements and balance sheets for the preceding financial year; and analyses, reports, studies, statistics and further supporting materials upon which the information provided in the notification is based. The documents must be originals or copies certified by a notary. Documents that are not in English or Albanian must be translated into Albanian and certified by a notary. Notarial certifications not performed in Albania require an apostille or certification (otherwise known as 'legalisation') by the Albanian embassy in the respective country.

Furthermore, the notification must be accompanied by a certificate of payment of the merger filing fee. Following the filing, the Authority may request additional documents and information. When these requests are met, the Authority will issue a confirmation that the filing is complete and will start its review process.

Fines for supplying wrong or misleading information may amount to up to 1 per cent of the previous annual turnover of the undertaking concerned, which is responsible for the infringement.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Once an application is filed, the Authority examines the notification form and the supporting evidence.

If the Authority requires more information or additional documents, it will send a request to the notifying party detailing such requests and setting a deadline for the reply.

Once its information and documentary requests have been fulfilled, the Authority will complete its examination of the notification and will set out its findings in a report in which it makes the necessary recommendations. On the basis of the report, the decision-making body within the Authority issues its decision, thereby clearing or prohibiting the notified merger.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

In Phase I proceedings, the Authority has to decide on the merger within two months of the working day following the confirmation of receipt of a complete notification. That period can be extended by another two weeks if the parties offer certain measures to the Authority to mitigate the possible negative effects of the merger on the market. In practice, it is our experience that the Authority strives to decide on the transaction within one month of the receipt of a complete notification.

In June 2016, the Authority introduced a fast-track merger control procedure for the following types of concentrations that usually do not give rise to competition concerns:

- two or more undertakings acquire joint control of a joint venture, provided that the joint venture has no actual or anticipated activities in the Republic of Albania – such cases occur when:
  - turnover of the joint venture or of the activities contributed to the joint venture is less than 300 million leks in the territory of the Republic of Albania at the time of notification; and
  - the total value of assets transferred to the joint venture is less than 300 million leks in the territory of the Republic of Albania at the time of notification;

- two or more undertakings merge, or one or more undertakings acquire sole or joint control over another undertaking, provided that none of the parties to the concentration engage in business activities in the same product and geographic market, or in a product market that is an upstream or downstream market in relation to the product markets in which any other party to the concentration is engaged;
- two or more undertakings merge, or one or more acquire sole control of an enterprise or joint company, when the two following conditions are met:
  - the combined market share of all the parties to the concentration, dealing with business activities in the same product and geographical market (horizontal relationships), is less than 15 per cent; and
  - the individual or combined market share of all parties to the concentration that are engaged in business activities in a product market that is upstream or downstream from the product market in which any other party to the concentration is engaged (vertical relationships) is less than 25 per cent; or
- upon its discretion, the Authority may also decide to apply the fast-track procedure where two or more undertakings merge, or one or more undertakings take sole control or joint control of another undertaking, and when both of the following conditions are met:
  - the combined market share of all the parties to the concentration that are in a horizontal relationship is less than 50 per cent; and
  - the increase ( $\Delta$ ) of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index resulting from the concentration is below 150.

Under the fast-track procedure, the Authority clears concentrations by way of a short-form decision within 25 days of the working day following the confirmation of receipt of a complete notification.

In in-depth proceedings (Phase II), the Authority has to issue a decision within three months of the start of such in-depth proceedings; this period can be extended by up to one month if the parties – within two months of the start of such proceeding – offer to take certain steps to mitigate the possible effects of the merger on the market.

The Competition Act provides that temporary clearance can be granted under certain circumstances.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Competition Act provides that a merger shall be prohibited if it leads to a significant impediment to effective competition in the market or part of it, especially if this results from the creation or strengthening of a dominant market position. The potential effects of the merger are assessed on the basis of diverse information and data relating to the Albanian market, including the market shares of the undertakings concerned and of their competitors, barriers to market entry, potential competition, demand substitutability, etc.

We are not aware of any decision where the Authority has applied the 'failing firm' defence.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The Competition Act does not establish a substantive test specific to joint ventures.

## Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

In general, the Authority will assess whether a merger leads to a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market or part of it. The Authority's assessment is based on a series of factors, including the market share of the companies participating in the merger and of their competitors; barriers to market entry; potential competition; the economic and financial power of the undertakings concerned; the economic dependency of suppliers and customers; the development of the distribution networks; economic relationships with other undertakings; demand substitutability, etc. Neither the Competition Act nor the Guideline (or other guidelines in Albania) specify theories of harm that the Authority investigates specifically (besides the substantial lessening of competition); however, in practice, the Authority's assessment often refers to precedents established by the European Commission. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the Authority would look at theories of harm such as coordinated effects, foreclosure, harm to innovation, etc.

## Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Competition Act does not expressly mention non-competition issues such as industrial policy or public interests as being relevant for the assessment process.

## Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

When assessing a merger, the Authority may take into account any economic efficiencies (such as rationalisation of production, economies of scale, purchasing economies, and technological progress) that may result from that merger, in particular those that bring about benefits for the consumers (which are set off against the negative effects deriving from the merger), where the same economic efficiencies cannot be achieved by less anticompetitive means, and the alleged efficiencies are measurable.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The implementation of a notifiable concentration without prior clearance from the Authority renders the transaction null and void.

Where a transaction has been implemented without the Authority's prior clearance, the Authority shall, besides the possibility of imposing fines, undertake a review of the transaction on its own initiative. The Authority may require that the undertakings concerned take the steps necessary to re-establish the situation as it existed prior to the transaction and, where relevant, may impose the separation of the merged undertakings, or the sale back of acquisitions and assets that have been transferred.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The Authority may require certain remedies for clearance of the concentration, such as the divestiture of certain parts of the undertaking, the sale of shareholdings in other undertakings, the termination of contractual relations, the granting of licences, and behavioural remedies.

### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The Competition Act does not provide, and the Authority has not elaborated, specific rules concerning the conditions for and timing of the application of remedies. Whenever the Authority imposes conditions and remedies, these must be proportionate to the anticompetitive effects of the merger.

### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Authority, to our knowledge, has not yet imposed any remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

In notifying a merger, the notifying undertakings are required to disclose restrictions related to the merger. The restraints directly related and necessary to the merger will be covered by the clearance of the Authority or may be subject to other conditions and remedies.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Competition Act requires the Authority to publish the fact that it has received a notification. On that basis, third parties may submit their comments to the Authority. In general, third parties can bring facts that they consider to be an infringement of the Competition Act to the Authority's attention.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The notifying undertakings may request that the Authority treats the information provided with the notification or obtained in the course of the review process in a confidential manner. The Authority may not disclose any commercially sensitive information or business secrets.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Authority can cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions on the basis of bilateral agreements or simply in response to their requests.

The Authority may, however, refuse requests if the cooperation is not reciprocal or compliance with the obligation to keep commercially sensitive information or business secrets confidential would not be guaranteed.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions by the Authority may be challenged before the Tirana Court. Fines imposed by the Authority have to be challenged within 30 days.

The Authority may revoke its decision if:

- it is based on incorrect or improperly obtained data; or
- the undertakings concerned breach the obligations set forth in the authorisation of the merger.

We are not aware of any recent cases where merger control-related decisions of the Authority have been subject to judicial review by the Tirana Court.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The time frame for appeal or judicial review depends greatly on the complexity of the disputed matter. In practice, taking into account the usual duration of court proceedings in general, judicial review may take as long as one or two years.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Authority has in recent years shown its general willingness to impose fines on undertakings that violate the filing obligation or the prohibition to complete concentrations prior to receipt of Albanian merger clearance (for the respective fining practice in previous years). However, no fines regarding those merger filing infringements were imposed in 2019.

Beside the area of merger control, the Authority has shown specific interest and launched investigations regarding alleged infringements of competition law, in particular in the following sectors: banking, dental services, crude oil, flour production, taxis and energy. However, no fines were imposed in 2019.

To enhance the Authority's access to information on concentrations that infringe the filing obligation, several measures have been announced in recent years, such as the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with the trade registry under which the Authority would receive more information about acquisitions or changes of control in Albanian companies. According to a statement by the Authority, this cooperation has been implemented. The Authority receives periodical updates of ownership changes on shares and verifies whether such changes qualify as a notifiable concentration.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

We are not aware of any current proposals to change the legislation.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year**

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In 2019, the Authority reviewed and cleared 24 concentrations of which eight were related to the domestic market, and 16 were related to foreign markets.

Apart from these, the Authority has shown specific interest and launched investigations related to the banking sector, dental services, crude oil, flour production, taxis and energy, etc.

The impact of the coronavirus crisis is being felt in Albania. However, we are not aware that this has had any effect on the Authority's practice in merger control cases or led to any respective policy statements.

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# Australia

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) regulates mergers affecting Australia from a competition law perspective. The merger provisions of the CCA are enforced by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Section 50 is the main merger provision in the CCA. Only the ACCC has standing to seek a Federal Court injunction to prevent a merger that would contravene section 50. Other persons, including competitors, can take action against anticompetitive mergers following completion, and may seek damages, declarations or divestiture. The ACCC may also seek these remedies following an acquisition and, in addition, may seek pecuniary penalties and an order declaring the transaction void.

In relation to transactions that occur wholly outside Australia but that affect Australia, section 50A of the CCA provides that the Commonwealth Treasurer, the ACCC or any other person may apply to the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a declaration if the acquisition of a controlling interest in a corporation that carries on business in Australia would have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market in Australia, and the acquisition would not result in a public benefit that offsets the lessening of competition.

There are a number of other important laws in Australia that relate to other aspects of merger control, in particular the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA), which is administered by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Section 50 of the CCA prohibits acquisitions of shares or assets that have the effect or are likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition in any market in Australia. The definition of 'market' includes a market for goods or services in Australia or in a region, territory or state of Australia. The market does not need to be 'substantial' and can include local markets. In addition, while section 50 refers to a market in Australia, the ACCC recognises the existence of markets that are global or regional in nature, and in such cases will examine the effect on competition in terms of the section of the global or regional market that exists within Australia.

There are no minimum turnover or other thresholds for sections 50 or 50A to apply, and acquisitions of any size (including of minority interests) could potentially be captured by the provisions.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures will be caught under the merger provisions of the CCA if they involve the acquisition of shares or assets. Other provisions of the CCA may also need to be considered in relation to joint ventures, including the provisions dealing with anticompetitive arrangements and the civil and criminal cartel offences. There are exceptions to the civil and criminal cartel offences for joint ventures for the production, supply or acquisition of goods or services; however, strict criteria must be satisfied for the exceptions to apply.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

There is no definition of 'control' in relation to section 50. Section 50 applies to all acquisitions of shares or assets, regardless of whether they deliver 'control' of the target firm, if the acquisition leads to a substantial lessening of competition.

It will generally be assumed that a corporation controls its subsidiaries. The CCA defines an entity as a 'subsidiary' if the parent:

- controls the composition of the entity's board of directors;
- is in a position to cast, or control the casting of, more than one-half of the maximum number of votes that might be cast at a general meeting of the entity's shareholders; or
- holds more than half of the allotted share capital in the entity.

Where an acquisition does not result in the target becoming a subsidiary, the acquisition of a minority shareholding may nonetheless be found to give rise to effective control. Factors that will be taken into account by the ACCC when considering whether the acquisition of a minority shareholding is sufficient to deliver control of a company or raise competition issues include:

- the ownership distribution of the remaining shares and securities;
- the likely exchange of competitively sensitive information;
- whether other shareholders are active or passive participants at company meetings;
- any other contracts or arrangements between the parties;
- the composition of the board of directors; and
- the company's constitution, including veto rights under majority or special majority matters.

Further, the ACCC may raise issues under section 50 even where no control is achieved, if it regards the transaction as leading to a substantial lessening of competition by reducing competitive tension between parties in the market or increasing the potential for coordinated conduct.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Section 50 applies to the following transactions if they have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in any market in Australia:

- any acquisition by an Australian company anywhere in the world;
- any acquisition that occurs within Australia (eg, where the purchaser acquires direct ownership of shares in an Australian company or assets in Australia are acquired, regardless of the location of the purchaser); and
- any acquisition outside Australia by bodies corporate incorporated or carrying on business within Australia, or by Australian citizens or persons ordinarily resident within Australia.

In relation to transactions that occur wholly outside Australia but result in an indirect ownership interest being obtained in a company carrying on business in Australia, section 50A provides that the Commonwealth Treasurer, the ACCC or any other person may apply to the Tribunal for a declaration if the acquisition of a controlling interest in the Australian corporation would have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market in Australia, and the acquisition would not result in a public benefit that offsets the lessening of competition.

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The notification of mergers and acquisitions in Australia is voluntary and there is no minimum turnover or other monetary threshold for notifying mergers to the ACCC. However, the ACCC's Merger Guidelines indicate that the ACCC expects to be notified of mergers in advance where the products of the merger parties are either substitutes or complements, and the merged firm will have a post-merger market share greater than 20 per cent in the relevant market (but this is not a safe harbour).

If a decision to notify the ACCC is made, there are two options for obtaining merger clearance:

- An informal clearance process under which parties approach the ACCC on an informal (and sometimes confidential) basis for clearance on the grounds that the transaction is unlikely to result in a substantial lessening of competition. There is no statutory basis or deadlines for this clearance, and it does not prevent third parties from subsequently challenging the transaction. The process followed by the ACCC in an informal review is set out in the ACCC's Informal Merger Review Process Guidelines. This is the primary method of obtaining clearance in Australia.
- A merger authorisation process that came into effect (in its current form) on 6 November 2017. The ACCC can grant merger authorisation if it is satisfied that either the proposed acquisition would be unlikely to substantially lessen competition or the likely public benefit from the proposed acquisition outweighs the likely public detriment. Where authorisation is granted and any conditions attached to the authorisation are complied with, an action cannot be brought by the ACCC or third parties on the basis that the acquisition contravenes section 50 of the CCA. The ACCC's Merger Authorisation Guidelines outline the legislative requirements and procedural steps for parties wishing to apply to the ACCC for authorisation of proposed mergers and acquisitions.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers can be captured under section 50 or section 50A. Section 50 will apply to acquisitions that occur outside Australia if they involve bodies corporate incorporated in or carrying on business within Australia, or Australian citizens or persons ordinarily resident within Australia. It may be sufficient if the acquirer 'carries on a business in Australia' through a subsidiary or other representative, even though the acquirer itself has no direct operations in Australia. Section 50A will apply if a foreign-to-foreign merger results in a controlling interest being acquired in a corporation that carries on business in Australia.

In both cases, there is a local effects or nexus test, which is whether the acquisition will have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market in Australia. In the case of section 50A, public benefits are considered in mitigation of any anticompetitive effects.

### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are a number of important laws in Australia that relate to other aspects of merger control, in particular the FATA, which is administered by FIRB. The FATA provides for mandatory notification and application for prior approval of foreign investment transactions exceeding specified thresholds. The Commonwealth Treasurer has power to prohibit such transactions if they are considered contrary to the national interest.

Among other things, the Australian government may consider both domestic and global competition issues when assessing an application for foreign investment approval.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

As there is no mandatory requirement under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) for the parties to a proposed transaction to notify the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), there are no sanctions for not filing. However, if a transaction proceeds without notification and the ACCC successfully establishes that it has the likely effect of substantially lessening competition in any market, then penalties and remedies for a contravention of the merger provisions will apply.

There is no formal deadline as filing is voluntary. However, if a decision is made to file then the timetable will depend on which of the available clearance options is chosen:

- informal clearance: there is no set deadline for filing; however, parties will commonly approach the ACCC on a confidential basis prior to the public announcement of a transaction; or
- authorisation: there is no set deadline other than the parties must lodge a filing prior to completion of the transaction. As an undertaking that the transaction will not complete until after the ACCC's decision is required to be provided, any filing should occur well in advance of completion to allow for the 90-day statutory time period.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The acquirer is usually responsible for notifying a transaction to the ACCC under the informal process, and is the party required to file under the merger authorisation process. There are no fees for informal clearances by the ACCC. There is a filing fee of A\$25,000 for authorisation



applications lodged with the ACCC. Fees are also generally payable in respect of filings required to be made to FIRB under the FATA.

### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

In relation to informal clearance, there is no set time frame for an ACCC decision. Seeking informal clearance does not require the transaction to be suspended prior to clearance, but in some cases where the ACCC identifies competition concerns, the ACCC will request the acquirer provide it with a written undertaking not to complete the acquisition during the review process, or alternatively to provide a minimum period of notice before completing the transaction. If an undertaking is not provided, the ACCC may seek an injunction to stop the transaction completing until it has completed its review.

In general, an initial assessment of a merger will be conducted to determine whether a public review will be required. Where the ACCC is satisfied, based on that initial assessment of the information provided, that there is a low risk of a merger substantially lessening competition, the ACCC may decide that it is not necessary to conduct a public review – these mergers are described as being ‘pre-assessed’. Pre-assessment can be conducted for both confidential and non-confidential mergers. A significant proportion of the mergers notified to the ACCC are able to be pre-assessed expeditiously, often within two to four weeks, some of which involve targeted market inquiries conducted by the ACCC, subject to whether the transaction is confidential. If the ACCC decides that a public review is necessary to assess a merger in the public domain, the review will typically take a further six to 12 weeks. Complex mergers that result in the publication of a statement of issues are likely to take another six to 12 weeks, but this can vary depending on factors such as the responsiveness of the merger parties to information requests and whether remedies are proposed.

In relation to merger authorisations, the ACCC must reach a determination on an application for authorisation of a merger within 90 days of receiving a valid application. This period may be extended with the consent of the applicant. If no decision is made within this period, the ACCC is taken to have refused to grant the authorisation. An application for authorisation must include an undertaking that the applicant will not complete the acquisition while the application is being considered by the ACCC.

#### Pre-clearance closing

### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If an application for authorisation is chosen to seek merger clearance, it is not possible to close before authorisation, as this would be in violation of the undertaking given to the ACCC as part of the authorisation application. Breaching an undertaking not to complete the transaction could result in a range of court orders, including an order directing the person to comply with the terms of the undertaking or any other order the court considers appropriate.

Where informal clearance is sought from the ACCC, it is usual practice to wait until the ACCC has concluded its review before completing the merger. There are no sanctions for closing a transaction before informal clearance is obtained; however, the ACCC is able to seek an injunction to prevent this from occurring. Alternatively, the ACCC might let the transaction proceed and instead seek remedies including pecuniary penalties, divestiture of the shares or assets acquired, or an order that the transaction is void and that monies should be refunded to the vendor. The ACCC has rarely sought these remedies in relation to mergers. More commonly, if the ACCC is concerned that the transaction raises serious

competition issues, it will seek an undertaking from the parties not to complete the transaction until completion of the ACCC’s review. Often this undertaking will be provided if the transaction involves complex competition issues, given the potential for the ACCC to obtain an injunction if the undertaking is refused.

If a filing has been made to FIRB under the FATA, it is a criminal offence to close without FIRB approval.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

As there is no mandatory requirement under the CCA for the parties to a proposed transaction to notify the ACCC, there are no sanctions for closing prior to clearance. However, if the ACCC subsequently establishes that the transaction has the likely effect of substantially lessening competition in any market, then the court can impose penalties and other remedies for a contravention of the merger provisions.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The ACCC strongly recommends that merger parties obtain clearance for a merger that may potentially raise competition concerns, including a foreign-to-foreign merger, prior to closing.

In limited circumstances, the ACCC may accept the following:

- if possible, a carve-out of the acquisition of shares or assets that relate to Australia from the global transaction, so completion in relation to the Australian aspects does not occur until after the rest of the transaction; or
- if a carve-out is not possible, an undertaking to the ACCC that the Australian assets will be preserved as separate and independently viable businesses via a ‘hold-separate’ arrangement while the parties await informal clearance from the ACCC. If the ACCC agrees to this, it is likely to require that an ACCC-approved independent manager manage the business, the subject of the hold-separate arrangement, while it completes its merger review. This option only exists for informal clearance as authorisation cannot be granted for acquisitions that have been completed.

#### Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) governs takeovers of listed Australian companies or other Australian companies with more than 50 members. The CCA does not contain any specific provisions dealing with public takeover bids. The ACCC’s usual processes apply.

#### Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Under the informal clearance process, the ACCC’s Informal Merger Review Process Guidelines recommend that the party lodge an initial written submission that includes:

- information about the parties to the transaction (including any relevant related bodies corporate, trading names and ownership details);
- details of the proposed transaction, including the underlying rationale;
- details of the Australian business operations, interests and assets of the acquirer and target;



- where the target and acquirer supply goods or services in the same market or have a customer-supplier relationship with one another, market shares of the suppliers for each market, the extent of imports, and evidence of future new entry or expansion; and
- for mergers that the ACCC considers require public review, a list of key customer and supplier names and contact details.

The Informal Merger Review Process Guidelines and the Merger Guidelines contain an outline of the information the ACCC may require to reach a view on how competition will be affected by the proposed transaction. The level of information required will depend on the complexity of the merger and potential competition issues raised. In an informal merger review, the parties do not need to provide a complete information package at the outset of the merger application. In simple transactions, a notification may comprise a brief courtesy letter setting out the information described above. In other transactions, a detailed submission will be required and the ACCC may request additional information throughout the review, depending on the issues raised.

Authorisation applications must be in the prescribed form approved by the ACCC (available on its website). The application must be accompanied by particulars of the proposed acquisition, the prescribed fee, an undertaking not to complete the acquisition until the ACCC has completed its review, and a declaration that the application is true, correct and complete. The application should also be accompanied by a comprehensive submission, containing an analysis of any other anti-competitive effects or other detriments resulting from the acquisition and specifying any public benefits. Applications for authorisation that do not substantially comply with the requirements of the approved form may be invalid.

Knowingly giving the ACCC false or misleading information, or omitting any matter or thing without which the information is misleading, may give rise to criminal penalties. Further, section 92 of the CCA prohibits a person from giving information to the ACCC in connection with an application for merger authorisation if the person knows or is reckless or otherwise negligent as to whether the information given is false or misleading. Breaches of this provision may attract pecuniary penalties.

The ACCC may also revisit an informal clearance decision if it determines that information provided to it was false or misleading. Similarly, the ACCC may take steps to revoke an authorisation granted on the basis of false or misleading information. The ACCC may also seek orders from the Federal Court to stop the proposed acquisition from proceeding, or divesture if the acquisition has already been completed.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The steps for clearance and the phases depend on which of the two clearance options is chosen.

Where a party seeks informal clearance:

- The ACCC will make an initial assessment based on the information available to determine whether a public review will be required. Where the ACCC is satisfied, based on the information provided and other information the ACCC has before it, that there is a low risk of a merger substantially lessening competition, the ACCC may decide that it is not necessary to conduct a public review of that merger. These mergers are described as being 'pre-assessed'. The notifying parties will be informed that the ACCC does not intend to conduct a public review.
- Where the ACCC determines that a merger requires a public review, the public review will commence once a notified transaction is publicly announced or if details of the transaction otherwise become public. The ACCC will publish the merger proposal on its website,

together with an indicative review timeline. When conducting initial market inquiries, the ACCC will liaise with interested third parties, and will generally provide the merger parties with written details of the relevant issues or concerns arising from the consultation. If the ACCC decides that no competition concerns have been identified at the end of its initial public review, the ACCC will notify the parties by way of a letter that it does not propose to oppose the merger. This decision will be posted on the ACCC's website.

- If the ACCC comes to a preliminary view that a proposed merger raises competition concerns that require further investigation, the ACCC will generally release a statement of issues that is published on its website, and a secondary timeline will be established. The parties will usually provide further information to address concerns raised in the statement of issues, or may in some cases discuss potential remedies. Following consultation on a statement of issues, the ACCC will generally provide the merger parties with written details of the relevant issues or concerns arising from the consultation. Once a final decision is made, the ACCC will notify the parties of its decision in writing and post the decision on its website. A public competition assessment or media release may be issued for certain decisions.

Where a party seeks merger authorisation:

- The party must lodge an application with the ACCC in the prescribed form approved by the ACCC. Before lodgement of the application, the ACCC encourages applicants to contact it for informal discussions and guidance. The ACCC recommends that applicants provide a draft application before any pre-lodgement meeting so that the ACCC can provide specific guidance about the issues the applicants should address in their application. The application must be accompanied by a lodgement fee of A\$25,000, an undertaking that the parties will not complete the merger before a decision is reached, a declaration that the application is true, correct and complete, and an electronic copy of any relevant information or other documents (eg, transaction documents). The ACCC must make a decision in respect of an authorisation application within 90 days of the application being validly lodged (which may be extended). If the ACCC has not made a decision within 90 days (or any extended period), the application is taken to have been refused.
- Once an application is received, the ACCC will publish it on its merger authorisation public register and conduct market enquiries. The ACCC will consult a range of parties likely to be affected by the proposed acquisition and invite interested parties to comment or lodge submissions about the proposed acquisition. The applicant will then be invited to provide a response to the issues raised in submissions lodged by interested parties. Once a final decision has been made, the ACCC will send a copy of its final determination to the applicant and place a copy on the public register.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The timetable for clearance depends on which of the two clearance options is chosen.

#### Informal clearance

There is no statutory timetable for informal clearance and the speed of the ACCC's response will vary depending on the circumstances. An initial assessment is conducted for both public and confidential mergers, where the ACCC decides whether the proposed transaction can be 'pre-assessed' (cleared without a public review). A significant proportion of the mergers notified to the ACCC are able to be pre-assessed expeditiously, often within two to four weeks. If a merger cannot be

pre-assessed, the ACCC will advise the parties that a public review is required and begin discussions with the parties about the process.

Phase I of a public review will generally be completed within six to 12 weeks (excluding time periods where information is outstanding). Phase I generally consists of three stages, which vary in duration:

- initial market enquiries, which take approximately two to five weeks from commencement of the public review;
- assessment of the information provided during market enquiries, which take approximately two to four weeks from the close of market enquiries; and
- announcement by the ACCC of its findings, upon completion of the assessment of information. This will take the form of a final decision (either opposing or not opposing the transaction) or a statement of issues.

Publication of a statement of issues indicates the commencement of Phase II of a public review. The ACCC will issue a statement of issues where it considers that the transaction may raise competition concerns. A statement of issues is a public document outlining the basis upon which the ACCC has come to a preliminary view that the transaction may raise competition concerns requiring further investigation. Publication of a statement of issues is likely to extend the timeline by six to 12 weeks (excluding time periods where information is outstanding), but this will vary on a case-by-case basis. This allows the ACCC to conduct additional consultation with the merger parties and other relevant parties (generally two to three weeks) followed by an additional period of assessment (approximately four to 10 weeks), after which it will release its final decision to oppose, not oppose, or not oppose subject to the acceptance of remedies.

While the ACCC will attempt to meet shorter deadlines, particularly where genuine commercial considerations can be demonstrated, it will not do so if this compromises its ability to make appropriate market enquiries. The ACCC publishes an indicative, non-binding timeline for each public informal clearance review at the beginning of the public review process, outlining the dates it expects each stage to be completed. The timeline may be suspended or revised if the ACCC requests additional information, or if remedies are proposed that require additional public consultation.

Parties are usually requested to respond to information requests within one to two weeks. The ACCC may require a period of time to properly consider the information provided, especially where it is voluminous. Where a remedy is proposed and is in suitable form, the ACCC may publicly consult on its content. The duration of public consultation depends on the complexity of the issues and the remedies proposed.

### Authorisation

The ACCC must make a decision in respect of an authorisation application within 90 days of the application being validly lodged (this may be extended). If the ACCC has not made a decision within 90 days (or any extended period), the application is taken to have been refused.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Under the informal review process, the substantive test that must be satisfied is that the acquisition will not result, or be likely to result, in a substantial lessening of competition in a relevant market. For merger authorisation, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) must be satisfied that either the proposed acquisition will not result, or be likely to result, in a substantial lessening of competition, or that the public benefit resulting (or likely to result) from the proposed

acquisition would outweigh the public detriment that would result, or be likely to result, from the proposed acquisition.

In evaluating whether a proposed acquisition is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition, the ACCC uses the 'with or without test' – it assesses the likely future state of competition with the merger and the likely future state of competition without the merger. In conducting this analysis, the ACCC is required to take into account various factors set out in section 50, namely:

- the actual and potential level of imports;
- barriers to entry and expansion;
- market concentration;
- countervailing power;
- the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being able to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins;
- the availability or likely availability of substitutes;
- dynamic characteristics, including growth, innovation and product differentiation;
- the likelihood that the acquisition would remove a vigorous and effective competitor from the market; and
- vertical integration.

In conducting the 'with or without test', the ACCC will take into account whether one of the merger parties is likely to exit the market in the near future (ie, whether it is a 'failing firm'). If so, the current state of competition may overstate the future state of competition without the merger. In those circumstances, it is less likely that the merger will give rise to a substantial lessening of competition. However, mere speculation that a firm may exit in the near future is insufficient. It must generally be shown that there is an imminent danger of failure, the firm is unlikely to survive or be restructured without the merger, and the assets associated with the firm will leave the industry (eg, there is no other buyer).

For both informal merger clearance and merger authorisation, the analytical and evaluative framework the ACCC will apply when assessing whether a merger is likely to give rise to a substantial lessening of competition is set out in the ACCC's Merger Guidelines. Although the Merger Guidelines do not have legal force when determining whether a proposed transaction would breach Australian merger law under sections 50 and 50A, they formally reflect the ACCC's approach and indicate the analytical and evaluative framework the ACCC applies when reviewing the competitive effects of a transaction on a market in Australia.

A merger may be authorised where it is likely to result in a public benefit that outweighs the public detriment that would result, or be likely to result, from the proposed acquisition. Although 'public benefit' is not defined in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), the CCA does provide that the ACCC should have regard to:

- a significant increase in the real value of exports;
- import replacement; and
- all other matters relating to the international competitiveness of the Australian industry.

These factors are not exhaustive and it is common for the acquirer to suggest a range of other public benefits such as increased efficiency, industry rationalisation, employment growth and protection of the environment. The ACCC Merger Authorisation Guidelines set out the analytical and evaluative framework the ACCC will apply when assessing the public benefits of a merger.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures. Joint ventures are only covered by the merger regime if they involve the acquisition of shares or assets. However, other provisions of the CCA need to be

considered in relation to joint ventures, including the civil and criminal cartel offences and the provisions dealing with anticompetitive arrangements.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The ACCC assesses prospective mergers from the viewpoint of whether or not they are likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition, and will consider the 'merger factors' listed in section 50 of the CCA as well as any other relevant factors. These merger factors provide insight as to the likely competitive pressure the merged firm will face following the merger and the possible competitive effects of the merger. The types of mergers that the ACCC will assess under sections 50 and 50A include horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. The assessment of the competitive effects is based on the traditional theories of competitive harm – namely, unilateral and coordinated effects.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Where a party seeks merger authorisation, non-competition issues may be relevant, as they are taken into account when determining whether the public benefit of the merger outweighs the public detriment. They are also relevant if the merger occurs wholly outside Australia and is subject to review under section 50A.

Otherwise, the ACCC will not accept arguments relating to non-competition issues when assessing whether a merger would or would be likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Merger Guidelines recognise that an acquisition that increases the competitiveness of the merged firm may also increase competition in the market. While the ACCC's focus in the section 50 merger analysis is the effect of the merger on competition, competitive constraints and the efficiency of markets rather than the efficiency of individual firms, it will consider how economic efficiencies may affect a firm's ability and incentives to compete in the relevant market. For example, the Merger Guidelines identify that if efficiencies are likely to result in lower (or not significantly higher) prices, increased output or higher quality goods or services, the merger may not substantially lessen competition. The ACCC generally only considers merger-related efficiencies to be relevant to the section 50 merger analysis when it involves a significant reduction in the marginal production cost of the merged firm and there is clear and compelling evidence that the resulting efficiencies directly affect the level of competition in a market and these efficiencies will not be dissipated post-merger. Economic efficiencies can be considered if the transaction is reviewable under section 50A.

Relevantly, the Merger Guidelines provide that if an acquisition is likely to result in a lessening of competition but the likely public benefit resulting from the acquisition would outweigh the public detriment, then the matter may be more appropriately dealt with by way of an authorisation application to the ACCC, where economic efficiencies are taken into account in the net public benefit analysis.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) considers that a transaction is likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition, the ACCC has standing to seek an injunction from the Federal Court to prevent a merger from proceeding. The ACCC may also seek remedies following an acquisition including damages, divestiture, pecuniary penalties and also an order declaring the transaction void. The maximum pecuniary penalty is:

- for individuals, A\$500,000; and
- for corporations, the greater of:
  - A\$10 million;
  - three times the value of the benefit obtained directly or indirectly by a body corporate that is reasonably attributable to the contravening conduct; or
  - where the value of that benefit cannot be readily calculated, 10 per cent of the annual Australian turnover of the body corporate and its related bodies corporate.

The ACCC will normally seek these remedies against the purchaser, although technically the vendor could also be liable. The ACCC does not have the power to impose these remedies itself and must apply to the Federal Court.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The ACCC may grant informal clearance subject to remedies in the form of undertakings. Where the ACCC raises concerns about a transaction, the parties may modify the proposal by providing a court-enforceable undertaking pursuant to section 87B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), which may include divestment or behavioural undertakings. The ACCC's Merger Guidelines indicate that the ACCC has a strong preference for structural (divestment) undertakings that occur on or before the completion date of a merger. Nevertheless, in practice most undertakings are post-closing. The ACCC considers that behavioural undertakings will only occasionally be appropriate, as an adjunct to a structural remedy. It is rare for the ACCC to accept behavioural undertakings that apply on a permanent basis.

The ACCC may also grant authorisation subject to conditions specified in the authorisation, which may include a condition that a person give and comply with a section 87B undertaking. When authorisation is granted subject to conditions, the authorisation will only provide protection from the operation of section 50 if the acquisition is completed in accordance with the authorisation, including any conditions attached to the authorisation.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Where divestment is negotiated as part of a remedy provided to the ACCC, the divestiture remedy will specify the period within which divestment must occur. The ACCC's preference is for divestments to occur on or before the completion of the acquisition. If this is not possible, the ACCC's general practice has been to require an independent administrator or manager to be appointed during a hold-separate period between completion of a merger and any subsequent divestment.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There have been no recent cases where the ACCC has taken action in the Federal Court in relation to a foreign-to-foreign merger. However, in the past the ACCC has in some instances required the acquirer in foreign-to-foreign merger situations to provide a court-enforceable undertaking remedy before deciding that it would not oppose the transaction. For example:

- In March 2019, the ACCC accepted an undertaking from Gebr Knauf KG (Knauf) and a number of related Australian entities in relation to Knauf's proposed acquisition of USG Corporation (USG). USG's only interest in Australia was its 50 per cent share in a joint venture with Boral International Pty Ltd and Boral Building Materials Pty Ltd. The undertaking provided that if Knauf did not divest USG's joint venture interest to an ACCC-approved purchaser within a certain period, Knauf would divest certain other assets.
- In January 2015, the ACCC accepted an undertaking from GlaxoSmithKline Plc (GSK) and Novartis AG (Novartis) in relation to GSK's proposed acquisition of Novartis' global human vaccine businesses. The undertaking provided that the merged entity would comply with its commitments to the European Commission relating to the divestiture of GSK's global MenACWY vaccines business.

The ACCC may not seek stand-alone remedies in circumstances where the remedies provided to other regulators have resolved the competition concerns in Australia. For example:

- In March 2018, the ACCC announced that it would not oppose Bayer AG's proposed acquisition of Monsanto Corporation on the basis of global divestments. The European Commission gave conditional approval to the proposed acquisition, subject to divestiture of Bayer AG's herbicide, traits and seeds businesses, along with a number of research and development functions and projects.
- In June 2017, the ACCC announced that it would not oppose the proposed merger of The Dow Chemical Company (Dow) and El Du Pont de Nemours and Company (Du Pont). The European Commission cleared the proposed merger, subject to the divestiture of parts of Du Pont's global pesticide business and global research and development organisation. The ACCC had expressed concerns that the proposed merger may substantially lessen competition in the supply of certain insecticides, seeds and materials science products and reduce competitive tension in research and development of new crop protection products. Ultimately, the ACCC considered that its competition concerns would be addressed by global divestments, including those given to the European Commission by both Dow and Du Pont.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Related and ancillary arrangements or restrictions are not specifically 'approved' by the ACCC when granting informal clearance, although they may be relevant to the competition assessment that is conducted. In some cases, the ACCC may require the parties to give court-enforceable undertakings before it will grant informal clearance of a proposed merger, and it is possible that these undertakings may include a commitment to amend, terminate or assign existing agreements. It is possible, however, to seek authorisation from the ACCC for ancillary restraints on the basis that they give rise to a public benefit. Provisions (such as non-compete arrangements) contained in a share or business sale agreement are assessable under the other provisions of the CCA, but may benefit from an exemption in certain circumstances.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

For non-confidential mergers requiring public review, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) will generally invite market participants to make submissions in relation to the proposed merger and, where applicable, in response to a statement of issues or proposed undertakings. The ACCC's inquiries may include consultations with competitors, suppliers, customers, industry associations, government agencies and departments, overseas agencies and departments and consumer groups. Information provided to the ACCC under the informal clearance process by the parties to the transaction or third parties is usually confidential, and with limited exceptions is rarely made public. The granting of informal clearance by the ACCC does not prevent any person bringing an action in the Federal Court claiming damages or seeking divestiture of the shares or assets acquired, on the basis of a contravention of section 50. There have been instances of such private litigation in the past.

Where an acquirer has applied to the ACCC for authorisation of a proposed merger, the ACCC must place a copy of the application and accompanying information and documents on the ACCC website (subject to confidentiality of specific information), and invite interested persons to make a submission to the ACCC in relation to the application. If authorisation is granted by the ACCC in relation to the proposed acquisition, then an action cannot be brought by the ACCC or third parties on the basis that the acquisition contravenes section 50 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), provided it was completed in the relevant time frame and in compliance with any conditions imposed. However, a third party with sufficient interest may apply to the Tribunal for a review of the ACCC's determination. The scope of the Tribunal's review is limited to the information before the ACCC, although it may consider new information not in existence at the time of the ACCC's determination and information sought by the Tribunal to clarify the information before the ACCC.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The informal clearance process may be undertaken by the ACCC on a confidential or non-confidential basis. If a merger is pre-assessed or an acquirer seeks a confidential assessment, no public review will be conducted and the details of the proposed merger and the ACCC's views will not be included in the mergers register on the ACCC website. If the ACCC decides that a public review is required, the ACCC will disclose its consideration of the public proposal, but information that is provided to the ACCC either by the parties to the transaction or by third parties on a confidential basis will not be disclosed unless required by law. The ACCC actively seeks to protect the confidentiality of information provided to it on a confidential basis, so that potential acquirers as well as other interested parties feel comfortable providing commercially confidential information to the ACCC. Note, however, that the ACCC may provide such information to other regulators, both in Australia and overseas, pursuant to section 155AAA of the CCA.

In terms of publicity, once public review of a transaction begins, the ACCC will list the review on its website. It may issue a general invitation for submissions from third parties, or conduct a targeted consultation process where submissions are sought directly from customers, suppliers, competitors and other potentially affected parties. If the ACCC

releases a statement of issues in relation to the transaction, it will also usually issue a media release. At the conclusion of a merger review, the ACCC will routinely issue a media release, and subsequently will either post a summary of the reasons for the decision on its website or issue a Public Competition Assessment with more detailed reasons for its decision.

The authorisation process is a public process where the ACCC is required to keep a merger authorisation register and publish on the register any lodged authorisation applications as well as any accompanying information or documents. Interested parties are invited to make submissions and, subject to any confidentiality claims, the register must include any document given to the ACCC in relation to an application and particulars of any oral submission made to the ACCC. The register must also include the ACCC's determination. There are specific grounds on which confidential information can be excluded from the ACCC's website and the merger authorisation register, including information containing: particulars of a secret formula or process, the cash consideration offered for the acquisition of shares or assets, or the current costs of manufacturing, producing or marketing goods or services. Any requests to have documents or submissions, or parts of them, excluded from the public register for confidentiality reasons must be made at the time of providing the document or making the submission to the ACCC.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The ACCC liaises with, and seeks assistance from, overseas regulators in relation to merger matters. This includes the New Zealand Commerce Commission (NZCC), with which the ACCC has a protocol for cooperative trans-Tasman merger review and cross-Commission appointments between the ACCC and NZCC, the Department of Justice (Antitrust Division) and the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, the Competition Bureau in Canada, the European Commission, and the Competition and Markets Authority in the United Kingdom. Where the ACCC seeks to engage in such exchange through the sharing of confidential information and documents obtained from the merger parties, its common practice is to obtain consent for such disclosure from the parties through its standard form waiver. Exchange of information between these regulators is subject to the confidentiality restrictions under which the regulator operates. The ACCC is also actively involved in the International Competition Network through which it is able to liaise with individual competition agencies.

The ACCC is also notified by other Australian regulators of proposed mergers. For example, FIRB refers some mergers to the ACCC for comment on the basis that competition is a relevant factor when considering the national interest. The ACCC may use this information as a starting point for conducting its own assessment of the merger. Although there is no statutory link between FIRB and the ACCC, it is common practice for FIRB to not give foreign investment approval until the ACCC provides informal clearance or otherwise indicates that it has no objections.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

There is no statutory right under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) to appeal an informal clearance decision of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). If the ACCC indicates that it will reject an application for informal clearance and oppose the merger, the acquirer may seek a declaration in the Federal Court

that the proposed acquisition does not have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition: a recent example of this is the *Vodafone/TPG* merger. If the parties decide to proceed with the transaction without clearance or a Federal Court declaration, the ACCC may seek an injunction. If the ACCC rejects an application for informal merger clearance, the applicant also has the option of instead applying to the ACCC for authorisation.

If the applicant (or another person with a sufficient interest in the application) is dissatisfied with a determination made by the ACCC in relation to a merger authorisation application, the applicant or other interested person may apply to the Tribunal for a merits review of the determination. As discussed above, the scope of the Tribunal's review is limited to the information before the ACCC, although it may consider new information not in existence at the time of the ACCC's determination and information sought by the Tribunal to clarify the information before the ACCC. Appeals on decisions of the Tribunal can be made to the Full Federal Court on a question of law.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

In relation to informal clearances, if the matter proceeds to the Federal Court then there is no set time frame for the case to be determined. Federal Court proceedings in respect of mergers can be protracted, although the court attempts to deal with such issues expeditiously.

In relation to merger authorisations, if a determination made by the ACCC is appealed to the Tribunal, the Tribunal must make a decision within 90 days of receiving the application for review. An extended period of 120 days applies for the review if the Tribunal allows new information, documents or evidence. The Tribunal may extend this period by a further 90 days if the Tribunal considers it necessary due to its complexity or other special circumstances. In relation to appeals on decisions of the Tribunal, there is no set time frame by which an appeal on a question of law would be heard by the Full Federal Court, although, as noted, the court will attempt to deal with merger matters expeditiously.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In the 12 months to April 2020, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) considered a total of 331 mergers. The majority of these mergers were pre-assessed with only 25 mergers subject to public review by the ACCC. The majority of public review mergers were unconditionally approved, two were opposed by the ACCC and five were conditionally cleared (subject to divestment undertakings). One of the opposed mergers ultimately proceeded after the parties sought a declaration from the Federal Court (*Vodafone Hutchison Australia and TPG Telecom merger*).

The ACCC is also increasingly scrutinising the broader commercial arrangements between merger parties. In July 2018 the ACCC instituted proceedings against Cryosite, Limited (Cryosite), in relation to the proposed sale of its assets to Cell Care Australia Pty Ltd (Cell Care). The ACCC alleged that Cryosite and Cell Care engaged in cartel conduct, which amounted to 'gun jumping': the parties, in preparation for their merger, had made agreements as to how to market their services and how customers would be allocated between them in the pre-completion period. The parties had not sought informal merger clearance from the ACCC. Cryosite ultimately admitted that it had engaged in cartel conduct and agreed to pay a penalty of A\$1.05 million in civil penalties.



## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are current proposals to change the legislation, however, the ACCC has recommended certain reforms.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The new merger authorisation process was tested for the first time in April 2019, when AP Eagers applied for authorisation to acquire the balance of shares in Automotive Holdings Group. Both parties supplied new and used vehicles, and associated products and services (including repairs and financing) in various locations in Australia, and were Australia's two largest automotive retailers. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) authorised the merger in July 2019, after accepting an undertaking under section 87B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), to divest particular dealerships in the affected areas. Notably, the ACCC was satisfied on the basis of the undertaking that there would be no substantial lessening of competition, so it was not required to consider the public benefit test.

In April 2020, the ACCC authorised a second merger, Gumtree AU Pty Ltd (Gumtree)'s acquisition of Cox Australia Media Solutions Pty Ltd (Cox Media), which operates the online platforms Carsguide and Autotrader. Both parties offer online automotive classified advertising to private and commercial advertisers within Australia and supply online display advertising on digital automotive content providers. Although the acquisition would remove one of the five major competitors in a relatively concentrated market, the ACCC found that the merged entity would continue to be constrained by Carsales, which is the clear market leader in terms of audience, listings and revenue, and Facebook Marketplace, which is a growing competitor. Similar to the approach in AP Eagers, as the ACCC was satisfied that there would be no substantial lessening of competition, it was not required to consider the public benefit test.

There have been two recent merger litigation cases.

In May 2020, the Full Federal Court dismissed the ACCC's appeal against the court of first instance's decision to allow Pacific National's acquisition of Acacia Ridge rail terminal owned by Aurizon. The ACCC had opposed the acquisition, and filed proceedings in July 2018 under both section 50 and section 45 (the anticompetitive agreements provision). At first instance, the trial judge allowed the merger due to Pacific National's willingness to enter into a behavioural undertaking guaranteeing other operators access to the rail terminal and fair prices. The trial judge noted that, but for the undertaking, the acquisition would have breached section 50. In June 2019, the ACCC appealed the trial judge's decision. Aurizon and Pacific National both also cross-appealed. The Full Federal Court dismissed the ACCC's appeal and allowed the cross-appeals by Aurizon and Pacific National, finding that the proposed acquisition was unlikely to substantially lessen competition in the relevant market and releasing Pacific National from the undertaking. The central issue in the appeal was whether the proposed acquisition would deter new entry of a rail line haul service provider by reason of Pacific National's ability to discriminate against that entrant. The majority of the Full Court found that the prospect of new entry was only a mere possibility and speculative. The majority of the Full Court held that the court's power to accept undertakings offered by merger parties is derived from its power to grant injunctive relief and only arises after a contravention of section 50 has been found.

In February 2020, the Federal Court declared that the merger between Vodafone Hutchison Australia (VHA) and TPG Telecom (TPG)

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would not substantially lessen competition in the retail mobile market (section 50). In granting the declaration sought by the merger parties, the Federal Court found that there was no 'real chance' that TPG would build its own mobile network or become an effective fourth mobile network operator in Australia in the relevant future. The Federal Court also considered that the merged entity would provide a more significant constraint on the incumbent network operators than if the merger did not occur. The ACCC had opposed the merger in May 2019 on the basis that the merger would remove the possibility of TPG entering the mobile network market as a fourth player. The ACCC considered that the entry of a fourth mobile network provider would increase competition in the market and lead to improved outcomes for consumers.

The ACCC is becoming increasingly focused on the impact of mergers undertaken by digital platforms (particularly with respect to the control of data), as evidenced by the recommendations in its Digital Platforms Inquiry Final Report released in July 2019. The ACCC recommended in its report that, in relation to mergers:

- the factors to be taken into account under section 50(3) of the CCA in assessing the likely competitive effects of a merger should be amended to clarify that the following are relevant factors:
  - the likelihood that an acquisition would result in the removal of a potential competitor; and
  - the amount and nature of data to which the acquirer would likely have access as a result of the acquisition; and
- the ACCC has also recommended that large digital platforms (such as Facebook and Google) provide advance notice of the acquisition of any business with activities in Australia and to provide sufficient time to enable a thorough review of the likely competitive effects of the proposed acquisition.

The federal government has committed to adopting the key recommendations from the ACCC's Final Report and has established a specific digital platforms unit within the ACCC. However, the federal government has not yet progressed the specific recommendation regarding amendments to section 50(3).

# Austria

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Substantive merger control rules, including specific rules governing media mergers, are contained in Part I, Chapter 3 of the Austrian Cartel Act 2005 (ACA).

Austrian merger control rules are enforced by the Vienna Court of Appeals as Cartel Court (acting as court of first instance) and by the Austrian Supreme Court (acting as court of appeals). The Federal Competition Authority (FCA) and the Federal Cartel Prosecutor (FCP) – together referred to as the 'statutory parties' – have the exclusive right to initiate proceedings for an in-depth review of merger cases (Phase II) before the Cartel Court, which is the sole adjudicator in competition law matters.

The FCA is an independent authority entrusted with the task of safeguarding conditions of effective competition. Merger notifications initially have to be submitted to the FCA, which, together with the FCP, decides whether a merger needs to be investigated in Phase II proceedings before the Cartel Court. The FCP is accountable to the Federal Minister of Justice and represents the public interest in competition matters.

The Competition Commission is an independent advisory body that can recommend that the FCA request a Phase II review of a merger case. Although such recommendation is not binding, the FCA has to publish a reasoned statement on its website if it does not intend to follow the recommendation.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Austrian merger control provisions apply to concentrations as defined in section 7 of the ACA. Each of the following constitutes a concentration:

- the acquisition by one undertaking of all, or a substantial part of, the assets of another undertaking, especially by merger or transformation;
- the acquisition of rights by one undertaking in the business of another undertaking by means of a management or lease agreement;
- the direct or indirect acquisition of shares in one undertaking by another undertaking if, as a result, a participation of 25 per cent or 50 per cent (in terms of capital or voting rights) is reached or exceeded (this is by far the most frequent type, also applying to most 'acquisition of control' cases);
- the establishment of interlocking directorates at the management or supervisory board level (if at least half of the management or members of the supervisory boards of two or more undertakings are identical);

- any other connection of undertakings conferring on one undertaking a direct or indirect controlling influence over another undertaking; and
- the establishment of a full-function joint venture.

Further, as the special provision on agreements between banks, particularly on mutual financial assistance in the event of a financial crisis, on common business activities or on a uniform market policy, under the Austrian Banking Act has been abandoned, such agreements now require merger clearance only if they constitute a concentration as defined above. Concentrations involving undertakings belonging to the same group as defined in the Stock Corporation Act and the Act on Limited Liability Companies are not subject to merger control.

### Bank exemption

Merger control rules do not apply if a bank temporarily acquires shares in an undertaking for the purpose of reselling them, for securing its claims against the undertaking, or in the context of a restructuring process in an insolvency scenario. The shares must be sold after one year, as soon as security is no longer required or after completion of the restructuring process. The exemption also applies to the acquisition of shares by equity participation businesses, equity fund businesses and companies whose only purpose is the acquisition of shares in other enterprises and the administration and utilisation of these shares, without directly or indirectly interfering with the administration of the respective undertaking, provided that they do not exercise their voting rights to influence the competitive conduct of the undertaking (the exercise of rights to retain the value of the investment, that is, relating to the protection of the acquirer's financial interests, is permitted).

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The formation of a joint venture that fulfils the functions of an independent business entity on a lasting basis also constitutes a merger. In line with the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), 'cooperative' joint ventures are also subject to merger control. However, unlike the EUMR in its article 2(4), the ACA does not explicitly provide for the appraisal of any anticompetitive coordination that may result from the creation of a joint venture in the merger proceedings.

Leading commentators nevertheless argue that coordinative effects of a joint venture fall to be analysed under the merger control rules (and are covered by merger clearance) to the extent that they are a necessary result of the creation of the joint venture. The Austrian courts have yet to decide on this question.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The ACA does not contain a definition of the term 'control'. As mentioned above, any connection of undertakings conferring on one undertaking a direct or indirect controlling influence over another undertaking is deemed to be a merger. In practice, the notion of control is applied according to the concept of the EUMR (in particular, the European Commission's Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice). Because of the formal approach of Austrian merger control provisions, even the acquisition of a percentage of shares that does not confer control is subject to merger control: as mentioned above, an acquisition whereby a participation of 25 per cent is reached or exceeded constitutes a merger within the meaning of the ACA.

#### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A merger must be notified prior to its completion if, in the last business year:

- the combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeded €300 million;
- the combined Austrian turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeded €30 million; and
- the individual worldwide turnover of at least two of the undertakings concerned each exceeded €5 million.

In addition, a new notification threshold based on transaction value came into force in late 2017. This means that mergers also have to be notified if:

- the combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeded €300 million;
- the combined Austrian turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeded €15 million;
- the value of consideration exceeds €200 million; and
- the target is active in Austria to a significant extent.

This new threshold is intended to catch transactions involving early stage technology targets with a high purchase price despite low turnover, but applies to all sectors. In 2017, two transactions were notified under the new threshold and 17 were notified in 2018, while in 26 cases pre-notification discussions were held with the authorities regarding a potential notification requirement.

In light of the practical uncertainties regarding the new threshold, the FCA developed a joint guidance paper with the German Federal Cartel Office on the transaction-value-based threshold (which was introduced in a very similar fashion in Germany). The final guidance paper was published in July 2018. Practice so far has shown that it can be difficult to assess whether the target is 'active in Austria to a significant extent'. The guidance discusses criteria that relate to the assessment of domestic activity, local nexus of domestic activity, market relevance and significance. Domestic activity is generally not measured on the basis of domestic turnover but rather various indicators such as production facilities, branches, sales forces, research and development activities, or (regarding the digital economy) numbers of monthly active users. Furthermore, for the new threshold to be met, the activity in Austria has to be significant. Based on its guidance paper, the FCA will generally find that there is no domestic activity if the turnover of domestic target companies is below €500,000, provided that this turnover adequately reflects the market position and the competitive potential of the target company. However, not all cases in which the target has generated

more than €500,000 automatically fall under the new threshold. The FCA has emphasised that this requires a case-by-case assessment, taking into account a number of factors such as local customer relationships. The FCA encourages companies and their advisers to reach out to the authorities and discuss the application of the new threshold in case of doubt. While not mandatory, pre-notification contact can be an option in this context, to clarify any queries the authorities may have in relation to notifiability of a transaction.

Even where the original thresholds (see first set of bullet points) are met, mergers are exempt from the notification obligation where the domestic turnover of only one of the undertakings concerned exceeded €5 million and where the worldwide combined turnover of the other undertakings concerned (typically the target) did not exceed €30 million (de minimis exception). It is not entirely clear whether this exemption shall also apply to the new threshold. While this has not been addressed by the available guidance paper or decision practice yet, the phrasing and the systematics of the law seem to exclude this.

The calculation of turnover is governed by section 22 of the ACA: the relevant turnover of an undertaking concerned also includes the turnover of all undertakings that are connected to it by one or more of the links that constitute a concentration within the meaning of section 7 of the ACA (in particular, by way of a shareholding of at least 25 per cent upstream or downstream).

Special rules apply to the calculation of the turnover of banks, where the sum of interest and similar revenues, proceeds from shares and participations, commission income, and income from financial transactions and other banking income has to be taken into account. With regard to insurance companies, the premium income is relevant. Specific rules apply to media mergers, where the turnover of the undertakings has to be multiplied by a factor of 200 or 20, depending on the type of activity in which the undertaking is engaged. In this context, the Cartel Court recently imposed a (comparatively low) fine for the violation of the statutory standstill obligation in a case where the turnover multiplication rules had been incorrectly applied and so no notification was made.

Mergers falling within the jurisdiction of the European Commission are not subject to Austrian merger control ('one-stop-shop' principle) unless the transaction constitutes a 'media concentration', in which case parallel notifications are required (the media merger may in such case, under Austrian merger control law, only be assessed as to whether it will impair media diversity, as permitted by article 21(4) of the EUMR).

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If a transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the ACA and exceeds the notification thresholds, filing is mandatory.

However, even if the thresholds are technically exceeded, no notification is required if a merger cannot have any effects whatsoever on the Austrian market.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are subject to Austrian merger control if the turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds the turnover thresholds and the transaction does not qualify for the de minimis exception. Notwithstanding the de minimis exception, the ACA still subjects a large number of foreign-to-foreign mergers to Austrian merger control, as it does not provide for a minimum Austrian turnover to be achieved by at least two parties.

Certain limits to the broad reach of the Austrian merger control provisions have, however, been recognised in case law. In its most recent judgment on the application of the Austrian merger control rules



to such mergers, the Austrian Supreme Court held that merely indirect effects on competition on the domestic market were insufficient to trigger Austrian merger control. According to the court, a transaction is not notifiable if the foreign target company neither actually nor potentially (ie, in the foreseeable future) provides services in Austria. Two caveats are, however, in order.

First, the Supreme Court explicitly limited the scope of its decision to competitive effects emanating from the acquisition of foreign targets (without any turnover in the Austrian market); in cases involving the acquisition of domestic targets by foreign acquirers, the courts will therefore obviously continue to take account of indirect effects (eg, an increase of the financial strength of the merged entity on the Austrian market, or the merged entity's IP rights portfolio).

Second, it can be assumed that the authority will continue to take a very wide view of the scope of Austrian merger control. Therefore, it may still be advisable to submit a merger notification even in cases where potential effects on Austrian markets are clearly limited. Furthermore, in a recent decision the Cartel Court confirmed that to obtain formal confirmation that a transaction is not notifiable, a precautionary notification would be required, followed by a Phase II request that the court would subsequently reject (as the FCA itself does not have the power to refuse jurisdiction).

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Following an amendment of the Foreign Trade Act (FTA) in December 2011, according to section 25a of the FTA, certain transactions (leading to control or an investment acquisition of at least 25 per cent) relating to public security and public order, including, inter alia, services of general interest (eg, military equipment, energy supply, telecommunications services), have to be notified to the Federal Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth for approval even prior to signing. This notification requirement generally applies to acquisitions of undertakings with their registered seats in Austria being subject to the domestic rules of accounting by foreign buyers that are located outside the EU/EEA or Switzerland. The Minister has to issue a formal decision within one month after submission of the application, either clearing the proposed transaction or initiating an in-depth investigation and thereby extending the review period by a further two months.

Within this period, the Minister has either to authorise the transaction, authorise it subject to stipulations if they are necessary to avoid any serious and imminent threat to the interests of public order and public security, or refuse the authorisation if even stipulations are not sufficient to avoid such a threat. Should the Minister fail to take a formal decision within the relevant one- or two-month period, the transaction may be implemented in any event.

Further, in the case of a suspicion of circumvention and of a serious and imminent threat to the interests mentioned above, the Minister has to formally impose an approval requirement with regard to certain other transactions, including also (shareholding) acquisitions of Austria-based undertakings with activities relating to public safety and order by buyers located in the EU/EEA or Switzerland. However, any such approval requirement under this section may only be imposed if it is compatible with Austria's obligations under EU and international law. Implementation prior to approval may result in criminal penalties and, further, may render the transaction in question void.

In response to the covid-19 outbreak, an amendment to the FTA has been pushed ahead and is currently under review in parliament. The key points are likely to be the lowering of the investment threshold in critical sectors and an expansion of the scope of sectors. Furthermore, a cooperation mechanism between the member states in the sense of a consultation is intended.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There are no legal deadlines for prior notification of mergers but, as mergers subject to merger control must not be completed before clearance, notifications must be submitted well before the envisaged date for the closing of the transaction. It is possible to file a pre-merger notification even prior to the signing of the relevant agreement, provided the parties have, in principle, agreed on the structure and timing of the transaction and intend in good faith to enter into this agreement in the foreseeable future. Following a legal dispute about option rights between two potential buyers, the statutory parties have recently initiated Phase II proceedings in relation to a notified takeover in the gambling sector, to obtain a court ruling on the question of notifiability of the proposed transaction. There are no specific sanctions for not filing a notifiable merger (within a certain deadline) but implementation of a notifiable merger prior to clearance can be fined.

In complex cases (especially where the need for remedies may already be anticipated by the notifying parties) it can also be helpful for the parties to engage in pre-notification discussions with the statutory parties prior to formal filing. While there is no formal pre-notification procedure, the the Federal Competition Authority (FCA)'s head has recently voiced concerns with regard to a case – which had gone to Phase II – where the notifying party had failed to engage in a pre-notification contact prior to notification. For instance, in the telecoms sector it is advisable to engage in pre-notification discussions and provide the FCA and the Federal Cartel Prosecutor (FCP) with regulatory data at an early stage in Phase I. In the proceeding regarding the acquisition of Tele2 Austria, a provider of fixed line telecommunications services, by Hutchison Drei Austria, one of the major Austrian mobile telecoms operators, the parties reached out to the authorities at an early stage of the transaction process, engaging in pre-notification contacts to discuss the scope of information and data required. The case has shown that clearance within the four-week Phase I window can be obtained even in complex cases if the parties actively engage with the FCA and FCP.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Each of the undertakings concerned is entitled to file a pre-merger notification. However, usually the acquirer files the notification. Joint notifications are permissible but rare in practice. In Phase I proceedings, there is a fixed filing fee of €3,500. In Phase II proceedings, the Cartel Court sets a lump-sum fee of up to €34,000. However, in the case of a (full) in-depth review of a merger in Phase II there will usually be additional costs for the preparation of an expert's opinion, which the notifying parties will have to pay (in the past, fees ranged between €150,000 and €300,000).

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Generally, the waiting periods are four weeks in the case of a Phase I clearance and up to six months if proceedings for a Phase II review by the Cartel Court are initiated. However, since the 2013 amendment to the Austrian Cartel Act (ACA) the notifying party has had the right to apply for an extension of the Phase I deadline by two weeks to avoid the initiation of an in-depth investigation without reasonable concerns on the substance. This request makes sense if the FCA and the FCP can be convinced with a little more time that the transaction does not raise

competition concerns or if a remedy package in Phase I is a feasible option for both the authorities and the parties. In previous years, such an extension of Phase I was sought in only few cases (usually significantly below 5 per cent of all cases).

Further, the review period for Phase II proceedings will be extended by one month upon request by the notifying party. Implementation must be suspended until clearance.

A transaction that is subject to Austrian merger control must not be implemented until:

- both statutory parties have waived their right to request a Phase II review of a merger by the Cartel Court;
- neither statutory party has requested the initiation of Phase II proceedings within the four-week period of Phase I (or six-week period in the case of an extension request); or
- if Phase II proceedings have been initiated, the issuing of a final decision of the Cartel Court whereby these proceedings are ceased, the relevant request of a statutory party is held inadmissible, or the merger is approved.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The implementation of a transaction that is subject to merger control is null and void if effected prior to clearance. The same applies to the underlying agreement. However, it is unclear what this means in the case of a foreign-to-foreign merger governed by foreign contract law.

In the case of an unauthorised implementation of a merger that requires pre-merger notification, the Cartel Court can, upon the request of a statutory party, impose on each party that intentionally or negligently violates the standstill obligation a fine in the amount of up to 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover achieved by that party in the last business year.

To date, the highest fine imposed by the Cartel Court for violation of the standstill obligation is €1.5 million. Fines in other cases have been significantly lower, typically ranging between €15,000 and €150,000. The Cartel Court imposed a fine of €20,000 in a case relating to the notifiable establishment of interlocking directorates at the managing board level. An unlawful completion of the concentration had been effected by formal registration of the amended representation competences at the companies' register. When determining the fine, the court acknowledged the factual complexity of the case, the fact that joint (not sole) control had been established as well as the fact that the infringement had been voluntarily terminated by subsequent submission of a merger notification.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Yes; sanctions for violation of the standstill obligation by early implementation of a notifiable transaction are also applied in foreign-to-foreign merger cases. In 2010, for instance, the FCA requested the Cartel Court to impose a fine against a foreign logistics company that had failed to notify its initial acquisition of a minority shareholding in a Hungarian company. After imposition of a fine of €4,500 by the Cartel Court, the FCA appealed and requested the fine to be increased to almost €5 million, largely on general turnover grounds. In its final decision issued in 2013, the Supreme Court imposed a fine of €100,000.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

In principle, any structural or behavioural undertaking is acceptable under Austrian law, including local 'hold-separate' agreements. However, given the lack of precedent decisions by the Supreme Court in this area, it is unclear which solutions would be considered sufficient by the Austrian authorities.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Public takeover bids in Austria do not receive special treatment under the merger control rules. The Takeover Act regulates Austrian public takeover bids. A takeover panel has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters coming under its scope and supervises compliance with its rules.

### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The merger notification must contain precise and comprehensive information on all factual aspects that could give rise to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, in particular:

- the corporate structure (direct and indirect shareholders and subsidiaries) of the undertakings concerned, including undertakings that are connected to them by one or more of the links that constitute a concentration within the meaning of section 7 of the ACA;
- the turnover (by volume and value) achieved by these undertakings in the last business year (to be provided separately for each relevant product or service market);
- the market shares of these undertakings in each relevant product or service market;
- information on general market conditions; and
- in the case of a media concentration, precise and comprehensive information on other factors that could impair media plurality.

In 2016, the Cartel Court fined an applicant €750,000 for providing inaccurate and misleading statements in the notification, which resulted in a wrong description of the proposed transaction (the transaction actually constituted another type of concentration). The Cartel Court also held that a very high standard of care was required when preparing merger notifications. Recent experience suggests that a thorough analysis of the filing structure itself is advisable in cases where transactions consist of various acquisition steps (in some cases a joint filing may be required, whereas in others separate filings may be possible or required). In the absence of specific legislation, the Austrian authorities will take into account the European Commission's Jurisdictional Notice when assessing such issues.

The FCA has published a form for merger notifications on its website. The use of this form is not compulsory but is strongly recommended by the statutory parties.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Upon receipt of the notification, the FCA forwards a copy of the notification to the FCP and publishes a short summary of the notification on its website ([www.bwb.gv.at](http://www.bwb.gv.at)). This summary contains the names of the

parties, a brief description of the type of the concentration (eg, merger, creation of a joint venture) and the business sectors concerned.

Within two weeks of the date of publication, third parties whose legal or economic interests are affected by the concentration (ie, competitors and customers, in particular) may submit written comments to the FCA and the FCP. Third parties do not have procedural rights and cannot challenge a clearance decision.

The Competition Commission, an independent advisory body, may recommend the FCA to request a Phase II review of the merger by the Cartel Court. Such a recommendation has to be issued within three weeks of the filing of the notification. In the event that the FCA or the FCP requests a Phase II review of the merger by the Cartel Court, the FCA will publish the request on its website.

Following the initiation of a Phase II review of the merger, the Cartel Court has five months to adopt a prohibition or clearance decision (upon request by the notifying party, the review period will be extended by one month). A decision by the Cartel Court by which a concentration is cleared subject to conditions or obligations, or both, will be published on the FCA's website once it is final and binding. Non-confidential (full text) versions of decisions of the Cartel Court are also published in an electronic database (Ediktsdatei) run by the Federal Ministry of Justice.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

If neither of the statutory parties requests the initiation of a Phase II review by the Cartel Court, clearance takes four weeks (or six weeks in the case of an extension request by the notifying party). The review period starts to run on the day of receipt of the notification by the FCA provided that the filing fee (€3,500) has been paid.

Early clearance is possible, if the transaction clearly does not raise competition concerns. However, this procedural option is only used rarely and the parties and their advisers should generally expect the full four-week review period. Early clearance will be granted in exceptional circumstances and requires that both the FCA and the FCP waive their right to apply for an in-depth review of the transaction to the Cartel Court. The earliest early clearance can be obtained is after the expiry of the two weeks for third-party comments (plus an additional three business days for comments to come in via mail).

Under the regime laid down by the ACA, the Cartel Court does not issue a confirmation of Phase I clearance. Instead, the statutory parties are obliged to inform the notifying party of the fact that they did not request the initiation of Phase II proceedings within the four-week (or six-week) period.

If a statutory party requests Phase II proceedings, the Cartel Court can issue a prohibition decision within five months of such request being made (if both statutory parties issue such requests, the date of the first request is decisive). After expiry of the five-month period (without a final decision) or, before that, after withdrawal of the respective requests by the statutory party (parties), the Cartel Court must close its review proceedings and the standstill obligation is lifted. The notifying party may apply for an extension of the five-month period by one month. According to the legislative materials, this period may be used, in particular, for remedy negotiations.

During Phase II proceedings before the Cartel Court, the statutory parties withdraw their requests only in exceptional cases, mainly if the parties offer commitments that are sufficient to remedy the competition concerns that had been identified and if the statutory parties do not insist on having such commitments fixed as conditions or obligations in a formal decision of the Cartel Court. Once Phase II proceedings before the Cartel Court have been initiated, such withdrawal is almost the only practical way to obtain a merger clearance before the end of the full review period.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A concentration will be cleared if it does not give rise to the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position. An undertaking will be considered to be dominant under the Austrian Cartel Act (ACA) if it faces no or only insignificant competition, or if it is in a superior market position as regards its competitors, customers or suppliers. The ACA provides for a number of rebuttable presumptions of dominance. The concept of collective dominance was formally introduced into the ACA with the 2013 amendment. In the assessment practice of the FCA, the 'significant impediment of effective competition' (SIEC) test (which has not yet been formally introduced into the ACA) has also played a role.

Single dominance will be presumed where:

- an undertaking's market share is greater than 30 per cent;
- its market share is greater than 5 per cent, and it is facing competition from no more than two other undertakings; or
- an undertaking's market share is greater than 5 per cent and it is one of the four largest undertakings on the relevant market that together hold at least 80 per cent of the relevant market.

Collective dominance will be presumed where:

- a group of three or fewer undertakings has a market share of at least 50 per cent; or
- a group of five or fewer undertakings has a share of at least two-thirds of the relevant market.

There is a reverse burden of proof where the above legal presumptions of dominance are met. In this context, the notifying party will have to prove that the transaction does not give rise to the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position. A concentration leading to the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position will be prohibited unless there is an improvement of competitive conditions that outweighs the disadvantages of market dominance, or the concentration is necessary to preserve or enhance the international competitiveness of the undertakings involved and is justified by national economic considerations.

A concentration that otherwise does not meet the requirements for clearance may be cleared by the Cartel Court subject to conditions and obligations. Media mergers are subject to a specific public interest regime (see article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR)). Media mergers that meet the EUMR thresholds will be assessed by the Austrian authorities as to their effect on the plurality of the media. The Cartel Act does not provide an exemption for failing firms; however, the Supreme Court has recognised the 'failing firm defence', which allows restructuring concentrations to be implemented even in cases where a dominant market position might be strengthened.

Overall, merger control practice in recent years has shown that the statutory parties also tend to scrutinise aspects of a case that are not directly related to the notified transaction (ie, in some cases a broader facts-based or economic approach might be applied, especially in cases with a substantive overlap in the parties' businesses). The FCA's head has also noted that macroeconomic issues such as employment protection may be considered in the context of the assessment.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No.

## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The test for clearance is whether the concentration will give rise to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Within the scope of that test, the authorities may rely, however, on a number of theories of harm (eg, vertical foreclosure, conglomerate effects, collective dominance) to prove that a dominant position would be created or strengthened by the concentration (the FCA has also raised the issue of existing structural links enhancing coordination between the acquirer and a competitor of the target). Similar to the situation at EU level prior to the entry into force of the new EUMR, it is not entirely clear whether unilateral effects in an oligopoly situation (resulting, in particular, from the elimination of a close competitor) can be brought within the dominance test.

This notwithstanding, horizontal overlaps play by far the most important role in the competition analysis carried out by the Austrian competition authorities.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition considerations still play a considerable role in Austrian merger control. The ACA retains a provision allowing the Cartel Court to clear an anticompetitive merger on industrial policy grounds: a concentration having adverse effects on competition may be cleared if it is necessary to preserve or enhance the international competitiveness of the undertakings involved and is justified by national economic considerations.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The ACA provides that the Cartel Court shall clear a concentration giving rise to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position provided that there is an improvement of competitive conditions that outweighs the disadvantages of market dominance; or the concentration is necessary to preserve or enhance the international competitiveness of the undertakings involved and is justified by national economic considerations.

Under both elements of this provision, the Cartel Court has to take account of economic efficiencies. So far, however, economic efficiencies have not played an important role in the competition analysis carried out by the Austrian authorities. Where efficiencies are invoked in favour of a concentration, the party alleging the efficiencies bears the burden of proof. In practice, only opinions of economic experts are likely to be accepted as proof.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

## Regulatory powers

### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Cartel Court will issue a prohibition decision if it considers that a concentration would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position but does not lead to an improvement of competitive conditions that could outweigh the disadvantages of market dominance, and is not necessary to preserve or enhance the international competitiveness of the undertakings involved and is not justified by national economic considerations, and that the remedies offered by the parties are not sufficient to alleviate competition concerns.

Even after clearance of a transaction the Cartel Court may, upon request of a statutory party, impose proportionate measures (post-merger measures) on the parties to alleviate competition concerns if clearance was obtained on the basis of incorrect or incomplete information, or if a party violates an obligation imposed in the clearance decision.

Upon request of a statutory party, the Cartel Court may impose fines of up to 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover achieved by a party in the last business year in cases of:

- unauthorised implementation of a merger (including violations by the parties of a prohibition decision as well as violations of conditions and obligations imposed in a clearance decision); or
- violations of a post-merger measure imposed by the Cartel Court.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

According to the Austrian Cartel Act (ACA), the parties may offer remedies (conditions or obligations, or both) even in Phase I to convince the statutory parties not to request a Phase II review of the merger by the Cartel Court. Parties may also offer remedies later to convince the statutory parties that they should withdraw such a request or to receive a formal clearance decision from the Cartel Court should the statutory parties decide not to do so. Such remedies are binding upon the parties in that the implementation of a concentration in violation of these remedies is equivalent to a violation of the standstill obligation, which is subject to fines in the amount of up to 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover achieved by the relevant party in the last business year.

There are no firm rules on the type of remedies acceptable under Austrian law, so both structural remedies (eg, divestments or IP-based remedies) and behavioural remedies are suitable. The number of concentrations cleared on the basis of remedies, including divestments, has recently shown a marked increase. However, behavioural remedies still play the primary role in practice. Also, different types of remedies may be combined to fully remove competition concerns.

Since 2014, behavioural remedies have included, inter alia, a hold-separate commitment in relation to an existing indirect minority shareholding of the acquirer group and a bundling limitation for magazine advertisements, the use of mandatory public tenders (including services below the regulatory thresholds) and limitations in relation to the annual turnover of a joint venture undertaking, non-discriminatory access to infrastructure (eg, outdoor advertising space) to competitors as well as continued operation of the acquired business, including separate market presence and a commitment not to acquire further (specified) businesses in a certain area and time period.

In 2019, five transactions were cleared subject to commitments. While in four of these cases, the commitments were behavioural in nature (non-discriminatory access to services, prohibition of exclusivity arrangements with customers, safeguarding continued service and support for the target's products to Austrian customers post-transaction, non-discriminatory access to patents, etc), one case also involved structural remedies. This concerns the *REWE/Lekkerland* transaction, which was notified to the European Commission (COMP/M.9142) but partially referred to the German Federal Cartel Office and the Austrian Federal Competition Authority (FCA). The FCA opposed the acquisition of the operative business of Lekkerland in Austria and only cleared the transaction subject to REWE's commitment to carve out this business and not acquire it (or parts of it) or establish personnel links between REWE and Lekkerland Austria (in particular at management level) for a term of five years from clearance. This structural remedy was accompanied by a behavioural commitment by REWE to continue to provide services to Lekkerland Austria as previously provided by Lekkerland Group (ie, the parent) at adequate conditions.

In 2018, a case that concerned the leasing of railcars (*VTG Rail Assets/CIT Rail Holdings (Europe); Nacco-Group*) was cleared subject to structural commitments, namely the divestiture of approximately 30 per cent of the Nacco business to an upfront buyer (the same conditions were also agreed on with the German Federal Cartel Office).

The FCA has repeatedly pointed out that remedies should be practicable to implement with a manageable monitoring mechanism.

Also, according to recent statements of the FCA, adequate remedy solutions will usually aim at strengthening the position of the parties' competitors in the relevant markets (eg, by granting network access). In an expert talk session hosted by the FCA, it was also pointed out that effective reporting duties play a very important role in the case of solutions based on behavioural remedies. In this context, the FCA will particularly rely on 'self-monitoring' involving competing players on the relevant markets (the FCA referred to a case where a fine of €200,000 was imposed on a party for violating its remedy obligations, which had been discovered as a result of notification by one of its competitors).

There is no formal procedure applicable to remedies offered by the parties. Such remedies will be discussed informally with the statutory parties and the Cartel Court. Remedies that are offered in Phase II before the Cartel Court will usually be subject to an evaluation by an economic expert appointed by the Cartel Court (which will also have an impact on the timing of clearance).

Decisions by the Cartel Court clearing a concentration, subject to conditions and obligations, will be published on the FCA's website once the decision is final and binding. Non-confidential (full text) versions of the Court's decisions are published in an electronic database (Ediktsdatei) run by the Federal Ministry of Justice.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The ACA does not specify which remedies are acceptable. Consequently, a broad range of remedies is possible as long as the measures sufficiently address the competition concern that has been identified by the authorities.

There is no specific time frame in which remedies may be offered and discussed. In practice, the parties may therefore approach the authorities at any time until the end of the investigation. It is advisable, however, for a party wishing to offer remedies to approach the statutory parties as soon as the nature of their competition concerns becomes clear. In several cases, parties have been able to avoid a full Cartel Court investigation by offering remedies at a relatively early stage of the proceedings (in some cases, the statutory parties were also prepared to withdraw their applications for an in-depth review on the basis of remedy offers resulting in an early termination of the ongoing Phase II proceedings).

The statutory parties have in some cases insisted on upfront buyer solutions where divestments were necessary. That is, they wanted to approve the acquirer of the assets to be divested before withdrawing their request for a Phase II review of the merger by the Cartel Court. However, in several recent cases the implementation of remedies was only required within a certain time period starting from clearance (eg, six months). In the case of a material change of circumstances after clearance of a transaction subject to conditions or obligations, or both, the parties may apply to the Cartel Court for their modification or removal.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There is only very limited experience regarding remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers. In a case involving the acquisition of parts of a Spanish bubblegum manufacturer by the world leader in chewing gum, the

Austrian authorities were satisfied with a commitment by the acquirer to continue to offer the whole spectrum of bubblegum products offered by the target on the Austrian market for a period of at least two years. It cannot be excluded, however, that in cases involving foreign parties with strong market positions in Austria, the authorities would require much stricter remedies.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The ACA does not contain any provision specifically regulating the treatment of ancillary restrictions, although their admissibility has been recognised by earlier case law. The European Commission's 2005 Notice on Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to Concentrations may provide useful guidance on this matter.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In the course of its investigations, the Federal Competition Authority (FCA) may, on its own initiative, address information requests to competitors and customers. This has become a common approach, especially in cases involving remedies.

As regards the rights of third parties to intervene in merger proceedings, third parties whose legal or economic interests are affected by the concentration (ie, in particular, competitors and customers) may submit written comments to the FCA and the Federal Cartel Prosecutor (FCP). The deadline for the submission of written comments is two weeks after the date of publication of a short summary of the notification on the FCA's website. Such interveners, however, do not have a right to any specific treatment of their submission.

In the course of Phase II proceedings before the Cartel Court, third parties may at any time submit written comments to the court. The Austrian Cartel Act (ACA), however, explicitly provides that third-party interveners do not acquire party status in the proceedings by virtue of their submission.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The FCA only publishes a short non-confidential summary of each notification on its website. If a statutory party requests the initiation of a Phase II review of the merger by the Cartel Court, the fact that such request has been made is also published on the FCA's website. In some cases, this publication consists of a single sentence, naming the statutory party having lodged the request and the date of the request. In other cases, however, the FCA has issued a press release setting out the competition problems identified in the course of its preliminary investigation.

Also, decisions by the Cartel Court clearing a concentration subject to conditions and obligations have to be published on the FCA's website. In cases involving remedies agreed between the notifying party and the FCA (so as to avoid a request for a Phase II investigation or to have such request withdrawn), the FCA also publishes the text of the commitments on its website.

Finally, with the 2013 amendment to the ACA, an enhanced duty of the Cartel Court to publish full text decisions was introduced. Decisions of the Cartel Court (including the court's reasoning) are published in



the Ediktsdatei, a publicly available online collection of court decisions (however, the parties have the right to request that confidential information be redacted prior to publication, and this is done at the discretion of the court).

Business secrets are generally protected by way of a restriction on third parties' access to the file. Persons who are not parties to the merger proceedings are only granted access to the file if the parties agree. Interveners in the proceedings are not considered to be parties.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

On a European level, the FCA is a member of the European Competition Network (ECN) and participates in the cooperation among ECN members. The FCA is also a member of the International Competition Network.

In its day-to-day practice, the FCA cooperates closely with the other ECN members, in particular with the German Federal Cartel Office. In particular, in cooperation with the German Federal Cartel Office, the FCA developed and published a joint guidance on the interpretation of the newly implemented transaction-value-based threshold. A final version of this guidance was published in July 2018. Therefore, where a transaction is notified not only in Austria, but also in other EU member states, the parties should ensure that the information provided to the authorities is consistent. It is, nevertheless, advisable to keep the statutory parties informed of any relevant procedural developments occurring in parallel proceedings before other competition authorities (or regulatory bodies).

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions by the Cartel Court are subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court. Only the parties to the transaction and the statutory parties are entitled to appeal decisions of the Cartel Court; third parties may not appeal such decisions, irrespective of their interest in the case and of any intervention in the proceedings before the Cartel Court.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Appeals may be lodged within a period of four weeks from the day on which the decision is served on the parties. The respective other party or parties to the proceedings are allowed a further four weeks to reply to the appeal. The Supreme Court must reach a decision within two months of receipt of the file, which is sent to the Supreme Court upon receipt of the reply to the appeal.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2019, 495 transactions were notified in Austria, which is – again – a slight increase compared to the previous year, which saw 481 merger filings. As in previous years, the statutory parties have been busy with merger review and significant enforcement action.

In 2019, one case went into Phase II (as in 2018; in 2017, the statutory parties had initiated Phase II proceedings in two cases). This case related to the acquisition of GOM GmbH, a company active in the development and production of 3D metrology solutions, by Carl Zeiss AG, who

– among others – also provides multidimensional metrology solutions. The FCP withdrew its request for an in-depth review in June 2019, after Carl Zeiss AG committed to behavioural remedies. The remedies included a guarantee of continued support of GOM-systems post-transaction to customers in Austria for a term of 10 years from the date of discontinuation of serial production of the respective systems, as well as a commitment to continue cooperation with the existing service partner for GOM-systems (training for the service personnel, supply of spare parts, etc.).

In addition, the statutory parties requested an in-depth review in relation to the proposed acquisition of Föhrenburg Beteiligungs-Aktiengesellschaft by Brau Union Aktiengesellschaft in March 2020. This transaction concerns the production and supply of beer as well as the wholesale supply of beverages more broadly. The parties to this transaction already proposed remedies in Phase I, which – however – were found to be insufficient to eliminate the statutory parties' competition concerns in Phase I (relating, inter alia, to foreclosure concerns regarding the wholesale market level, the entry into further gastronomy marketplaces and the acquirer's already strong market position). The case is currently pending before the Austrian Cartel Court.

Four cases were cleared subject to remedies already in Phase I in 2019, namely Z-4651 *EVENTIM LIVE GMBH; Barracuda Holding GmbH*, Z-4428 *Österreichische Post AG/Assets der DHL Paket (Austria) GmbH* and Z-4180 *Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co KGaA; D.Med Consulting GmbH*, all of which were cleared subject to behavioural remedies, and Z-4588 *REWE-ZENTRALFINANZ eG, REWE-Zentral AG, Lekkerland AG & Co KG and Lekkerland AG*, which was cleared subject to (among others) the structural commitment not to acquire the operative Austrian business of Lekkerland.

The *EVENTIM* case related to the acquisition of sole control over Barracuda Holding GmbH, an Austrian organiser of live events, by *EVENTIM Live GmbH*, a provider of ticketing services. The statutory parties identified foreclosure concerns that were remedied by *Eventim's* commitment to offer its ticketing services in a non-discriminatory manner to all organisers of rock and pop music events based on certain standard terms for five years, as well as not to use or at least limit in time any exclusivities in its contracts with ticket offices and other distribution partners.

The acquisition of certain logistic assets of *DHL Paket (Austria) GmbH*, a subsidiary of *Deutsche Post AG*, the former public German postal service provider, by *Österreichische Post AG* (*Deutsche Post's* Austrian counterpart) was cleared subject to remedies, after a long prenotification phase and extensive market testing. During the proceedings, the Federal Competition Authority (FCA) was in close contact with the Austrian regulator and other market experts, as well as with the German Federal Cartel Office (the transaction has also been notified in Germany). The transaction was cleared by the statutory parties subject to behavioural remedies that aimed at non-discriminatory access to *Österreichische Post AG's* parcel delivery services by other logistics companies and quality and price transparency for consumers.

The acquisition of joint control over *D.Med Consulting*, a company active in the field of development and marketing as well as consulting for medical products with a focus on dialysis technologies and related medical fields, by *Fresenius Medical Care* and *KR2* was cleared in early 2019 subject to conditions intended both to protect current projects conducted by the target for a competitor of the acquirer and to prevent the acquirer gaining a competitive advantage by obtaining sensitive information.

Already in 2017, one case concerning the operation of ski-resorts (*Bergbahnen Aktiengesellschaft Wagrain; Fremdenverkehrs GmbH/Bergbahnen Flachau Gesellschaft mbH*) was cleared without remedies in the formal sense, but the companies had agreed to certain commitments that were already included in the initial merger application for the Phase I review. The commitments included discounted new ski passes and new bus tariffs.

In 2019, the FCA joined a referral request by the German FCO regarding the proposed acquisition of certain rights and assets in relation to TachoSil, a surgical haemostatic product, by subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson. This is just the most recent of a number of referral cases in recent years, such as the referral in relation to Knauf's acquisition of Armstrong World Industries' modular suspended ceilings business or the *Apple Inc/Shazam Entertainment Ltd* transaction, both of which were referred based on a request by the FCA in late 2017 and early 2018 respectively.

Also in 2019 and early 2020, the FCA continued to vigorously pursue and fine violations of the stand-still obligation. To name just a few, the FCA imposed fines against Castanea Rubra Assets GmbH (€100,000), Aktieselskabet af 5.5.2010 (€75,000) and WIG Wietersdorfer Holding GmbH (€70,000). In one case (*KTM AG, Kiska GmbH*), the FCA fined the parties for not having notified the acquisition of 1.1 per cent of the shares in Kiska by KTM, which pushed KTM's shareholding in the target just above the 25 per cent threshold (the fine amounted to €60,000). In late 2018, the FCA also requested the Court to impose a fine on food retailer REWE for having provided incomplete and misleading information in the notification of its acquisition of 30 outlets of the food retailer Zielpunkt GmbH back in January 2016 (the fine was set at €212,000). This transaction had been cleared in 2016 subject to remedies that required REWE to close a number of its own grocery stores in close proximity to some of the acquired outlets. In 2018, the FCA found that the notification had failed to mention that the acquirer was about to open a new outlet in close proximity to one of the closed down stores, which reportedly misled the FCA about the suitability of the proposed remedy. The FCA also found a violation of the reporting obligations under the commitments.

Since 2017, the FCA has been conducting a sector investigation into the Austrian healthcare sector, which had previously seen two noteworthy mergers (both cleared subject to remedies). The investigation targets numerous segments of the healthcare industry, including pharmaceutical production and distribution, pharmacies, medical devices, e-health and also health institutions and health insurance. First results relating to the pharmacy area were published in May 2018. In this report, the FCA addresses possible competition restraints regarding market entry, ownership as well as operating rules applicable to pharmacies. According to the FCA, anticompetitive regulations exist in various areas such as needs assessment, prohibition of chains and third-party ownership, restriction of opening hours, restrictions on online sales of OTC medicines and of pharmacy delivery services and exclusive rights of pharmacies to sell OTC medicines. Far-reaching liberalisation measures are therefore recommended, with the aim of achieving better prices and more transparency for consumers as well as enhanced quality through more competition. In October 2019, the FCA published the second part of this sector investigation, dealing with healthcare in rural areas. Among others, the FCA recommends to deregulate the Austrian Pharma Act, in particular regarding those provisions limiting doctors' ability to operate their own medical dispensaries (in competition to community pharmacies, which currently almost exclusively distribute pharmaceuticals). Primary healthcare units, which are established in order to reduce the burden on out-patient departments in hospitals, should also be free to disperse pharmaceuticals. In light of this ongoing sector investigation, it can be expected that transactions in the healthcare sector will generally be of interest to the FCA.

Furthermore, the FCA launched a sector investigation into the taxi and private hire car market in Salzburg and Vienna in September 2019. While the investigation is still ongoing (the final report is expected to be published in the summer of 2020), the FCA has already published some preliminary findings on its website. Most notably, the FCA concluded that digitalisation and technology, in particular internet-based intermediary platforms, improve the service to the benefit of customers across the market and may reduce the need for statutory regulation, owing to

increased transparency and quality control. The FCA will also analyse the potential impact of various forms of pricing regulation in this sector on competition (eg, minimum, maximum and fixed fares).

In October 2018 the FCA published a 'Fairness catalogue for companies' which is intended as (non-binding) guidance to market participants and to prevent breaches of good conduct, with a particular view to the retail sector.

A large number of transactions with only very limited effects on the Austrian market come within the ambit of Austrian merger control, because of the low turnover thresholds. In light of the FCA's criticism of the Supreme Court's case law on the domestic effects requirement, it will presumably continue to closely monitor compliance with the notification obligation. In this context, the head of the FCA has repeatedly emphasised his ambition not only to take up cases of early implementation but also to focus on the completeness of notifications submitted to the FCA.

Moreover, in recent years, the FCA has been active in the gas and electricity markets. Mergers in this sector could therefore attract particularly close competition scrutiny. The same applies to media mergers, which tend to be closely scrutinised by both the FCA and the FCP (including in particular aspects of media plurality). Other sectors of a broader public interest, for example, telecoms and financial services, have also been subject to an in-depth review recently. The telecoms sector was also subject to a sector investigation by the FCA, which was concluded in March 2016. With regard to the food retail sector, which has been under close scrutiny for anticompetitive conduct, takeovers of the majority of stores from an insolvent retailer by several of the major retail chains in Austria were cleared in Phase I in early 2016 (out of 98 stores, 28 could only be taken over subject to conditions, while takeovers of eight stores were abandoned because of competitive concerns; considerations relating to the securing of jobs played a certain role in the authorities' assessment).

Apart from that, there have been developments regarding the nature of evidence that the FCA reviews in assessing mergers. For complex cases, it is advisable to provide economic evidence, at least in Phase II and potentially earlier to avoid a Phase II referral. Also, the FCA and FCP appear to be increasingly interested in parties' internal documents in complex cases. For instance, we have seen in the telecoms sector that it is advisable to engage in pre-notification discussions and provide the statutory parties with regulatory data early Phase I. The acquisition of Tele2 Austria, a provider of fixed-line telecoms services, by Hutchison Drei Austria, one of the major Austrian mobile telecoms operators, is a prime example of good procedural cooperation with the authorities. This case has shown that a detailed economic analysis of a transaction within the four-week Phase I window is possible if the parties reach out to the authorities at an early stage of the transaction process, engage with pre-notification contacts to discuss the scope of information and data required, and keep up the dialogue with the authorities throughout Phase I to swiftly provide any additional evidence required for the analysis.

The same applied for the *Comcast/Sky* case, which, because of the close cooperation regarding the authorities' media merger review, could be cleared unconditionally in Phase I, using the two-week procedural extension tool. This matter required a solid understanding of the media market not only in Austria but more widely, combined with an ongoing dialogue with the authorities. In Phase II proceedings, the Cartel Court usually appoints an independent economic expert to review this evidence or conduct their own market investigations on which they will then report to the Cartel Court. It is also quite common that the FCA sends out questionnaires to market participants (eg, in the case *BGO Holding/hali/svoboda büromöbel*, the FCA conducted a market test with 300 customer surveys and 172 requests for information from competitors in Austria and abroad). Besides that, however, third parties still have

a rather limited role in Austrian merger control, especially compared to the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) process (they have no procedural rights and cannot challenge a clearance decision).

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

As mentioned above, the latest amendment to the ACA was adopted in May 2017. This amendment introduced several unclear legal terms that can be difficult to handle in practice. In the light of practical uncertainties regarding the new threshold, the FCA published a joint guidance paper with the German Federal Cartel Office on the new transaction-value-based threshold in 2018 (which was similarly introduced in Germany).

In terms of the interpretation of the new threshold, according to the wording of the law, the 'value of consideration' has to exceed €200 million. The FCA has already made it clear that this should not only include the purchase price itself, but other non-cash benefits granted to the seller such as payments that are conditional on future turnover or profits. Moreover, it can be difficult to assess whether the target is 'active in Austria to a significant extent'.

The FCA has clarified in a number of public talks that current activities of the target are relevant for the purpose of the analysis. There is some uncertainty in particular around the question of what constitutes an activity.

The FCA has worked with a number of indicators such as production facilities, branches, local sales forces, R&D activities – or with regard to the digital economy – a high amount of 'monthly active users'. Furthermore, for the new threshold to be met, the activity in Austria has to be significant. This should be judged on a sector-specific scale, but there is currently no case law or decision practice available on this issue. While the joint guidance paper states that basic domestic turnover is generally not used as an indicator to assess whether the target has substantial domestic operations or not, it is also made clear in the paper that, 'in mature markets that are characterised by turnover generation', domestic turnover can still be used as a criterion. The guidance paper further states that the FCA will routinely not assume that the target has substantial domestic operations if the target's Austrian turnover is below €500,000 provided that this turnover adequately reflects the market position and competitive potential of the target. In a recent case, the FCA expressly stated though that even domestic turnover that significantly exceeds €500,000 in a 'traditional' industry characterised by turnover generation, would per se not automatically lead to the assumption of substantial domestic activities (instead, such activities would have to be corroborated by additional factors). Generally, the FCA has encouraged companies and their advisers to reach out to the authorities and discuss the application of the new threshold in cases of doubt.

Concerning procedure, the present institutional structure of competition enforcers in Austria (with two authorities – the FCA and FCP – being entitled to request the initiation of proceedings before the Cartel Court, and the Cartel Court acting as the sole adjudicator in competition law matters) has been up for debate for some time. However, whereas the FCA has repeatedly pointed out that it should be the competent body for both negotiating and decision-making with regard to remedies, current reform discussions do not question this aspect any more. Similarly, the legislator has not yet decided to increase the (domestic) turnover thresholds to limit the number of transactions that are notifiable to the FCA but have no impact on the Austrian market.

The latest reform discussions have also included a potential change of the substantive test (with a view to introducing a SIEC test as in the EUMR); however, it is still unclear whether and when such change might be introduced.

During the period of late March until the beginning of May 2020, in response to the covid-19 outbreak and public lockdown measures, there

was a suspension mechanism in place for procedural deadlines (effectively extending the Phase I review period and deadlines in proceedings before the Cartel Court and the Supreme Court). However, the legislation effecting this temporary change ceased to apply as of 1 May 2020.

Another change brought about by covid-19 is the introduction of an electronic filing system (Web-ERV) which is mandatory and replaces physical submission. Until further notice, filings can only be submitted electronically via this system, to which only law firms have access.

Moreover, an amendment to the Foreign Trade Act is also under preparation. The main points will presumably be the lowering of the investment threshold in critical sectors, an expansion of the range of sectors and the establishment of a cooperation mechanism in the sense of a consultation between the member states. The amendment is expected to come into force in autumn 2020.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The number of transaction that have been notified to the statutory parties has once again increased (to almost 500 in 2019). In 2019, five transactions were cleared subject to remedies, most of them behavioural in nature. However, in the *REWE/Lekkerland* case, the Federal Competition Authority (FCA) only cleared the transaction subject to REWE's commitment to not acquire the operative Austrian business of Lekkerland.

The FCA continued to vigorously pursue and fine early implementation cases. Fines have been imposed in numerous cases, typically ranging between €50,000 and €100,000. In one case in late 2018 and early 2019, the FCA imposed a fine of €212,000 against REWE for having provided incomplete information in its notification of its 2016 acquisition of 30 food retail outlets of Zielpunkt GmbH, which reportedly misled the FCA about the suitability of the proposed remedy subject to which the statutory parties had cleared the transaction.

Furthermore, the FCA continued its investigation into the healthcare sector. After having released the first interim report on pharmacies already in 2018, the FCA has now published the second interim report on healthcare in rural areas. Furthermore, in September 2019, the FCA has launched a new sector inquiry into the taxi and private hire car market.

In response to the covid-19 outbreak, the Austrian parliament passed legislation that suspended merger control timelines in Austria. With respect to all notifications submitted after 22 March 2020, the four-week review period only started on 1 May 2020. However, the legislation effecting this temporary change ceased to apply as of 1 May 2020.

Lastly, the 2017 amendment of the Austrian Cartel Act that introduced a new value-based notification threshold still leaves some room for interpretation and leads to a certain degree of uncertainty. Under the new threshold, mergers have to be notified if the combined worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds €300 million, the combined Austrian turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds €15 million, the value of consideration exceeds €200 million and the target is active in Austria to a significant extent. This threshold has been introduced in Germany in an almost identical manner (with different values) and, accordingly, raises the same questions of law in both jurisdictions. Being still relatively new to both legal systems, it gives rise to interpretation and application issues that can be difficult to handle in practice. In light of those practical uncertainties, the FCA has developed a draft joint guidance paper together with the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO).

The following summarises key considerations concerning the criterion of a 'significant domestic activity', as addressed in the guidance provided by the authorities. It is not always straightforward to



assess whether the target is 'active in Austria to a significant extent'. Importantly, the FCA and FCO have clarified in a number of public talks and in their draft joint guidance paper that current (as opposed to potential future) activities of the target are relevant for the purpose of the analysis.

There is some uncertainty around the question of what constitutes a 'significant domestic activity'. As clarified in the draft joint guidance paper, any activity of the target with a market nexus (for example, this is generally assumed where the target's services are offered for cash on an existing market) can generally be relevant. The assessment of domestic activity requires sector-specific indicators, such as local production facilities, branches, sales forces, R&D activities, or, with regard to the digital economy, a high amount of 'monthly active users' or access frequency of a website. A sufficient local nexus can also be based on the location of the customer base (eg, if users of an app are located in Austria). In Austria, a mere location of the target company can also constitute a sufficient domestic activity (which does not necessarily require a registered company in the formal sense). In 'mature markets that are characterised by turnover generation' a sufficient local nexus may also be established by domestic turnover of more than €500,000. However, the FCA made clear in its case practice that even if this criterion is met, additional factors typically need to be established to corroborate the existence of substantial domestic activities. The situation is different if domestic turnover is not an adequate indicator; for instance, because the company is active in a market that is not characterised by turnover or because its product has only recently come onto the market so that the low turnover generated so far does not reflect the competitive potential. In this case, significance must be determined on the basis of other criteria.

Considering the above uncertainties, the FCA has encouraged companies and their advisers to reach out to the authorities and discuss the application of the new threshold in cases of doubt. Important examples are, in particular, pharma cases, where it may not be clear whether the R&D activities (eg, pipeline products) amount to a significant activity; in this context, further indicators could be a local specific budget assigned to this activity or proximity to market launching.

Regarding the second crucial element relating to the 'value of consideration', the joint guidance paper defines the value of consideration as encompassing 'all assets and other monetary benefits that the seller receives from the buyer in connection with the merger in question'. The term 'asset' is to be interpreted in a broad sense and covers all cash payments and the transfer of voting rights, securities, tangible assets and intangible assets. But it also includes 'considerations that are contingent on certain conditions, such as those specified in earn-out clauses, or agreed additional payments to the seller that are conditional on the achievement of certain turnover or profit targets at a specific point in future (eg, licence fees). Last but not least, also included are payments for non-competition by the seller.



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# Belgium

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation is included in Book IV of the Code of Economic Law and the Royal Decree of 30 August 2013 on the notification of concentrations. On 25 April 2019, parliament adopted a new law by which it replaced Book IV of the Code of Economic Law in full, resulting in a new numbering of its articles. The decisions mentioned in this chapter shall be read as referring to the corresponding provisions of the new text.

The Belgian Competition Authority is responsible for the enforcement of the Competition Act. The Authority is a single and independent administrative body and is composed of a president, the Competition College (presided by the president), the Investigation and Prosecution Service (headed by the Competition Prosecutor General) and a management committee. The Investigation and Prosecution Service conducts the investigations (both in merger and conduct-related cases) and presents its cases to the Competition College, which has the decision-making power. The members of the Investigation and Prosecution Service can also issue decisions regarding simplified merger filings.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The definition of a concentration in Book IV of the Code of Economic Law is similar to that under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). A concentration occurs where:

- two previously independent undertakings merge;
- an undertaking or a person already controlling an undertaking acquires control over the whole or part of another undertaking; or
- two or more undertakings form a 'full-function' joint venture.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The merger control provisions of Book IV of the Code of Economic Law apply only to 'full-function' joint ventures, that is, those that perform 'on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity'. However, to the extent that a full-function joint venture between undertakings that remain independent could lead to coordination of the behaviour of the parent companies, such coordination will be assessed under the criteria set out in article IV.1 of the Code of Economic Law (ie, the Belgian equivalent to article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)).

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Book IV of the Code of Economic Law defines 'control' fairly broadly, so that the acquisition of a minority shareholding can be caught in certain circumstances. As is the case under EU law, control means the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, whether by contract or otherwise. For example, in cases where outright legal control is not acquired, rights attaching to use or ownership of assets, shareholders' agreements and board representation will be considered. In its *Belgacom SA/Vodafone Belgium SA/Belgacom Mobile SA* decision of 30 October 2006, the Authority confirmed that joint control may exist where minority shareholders have additional rights that allow them to veto decisions that are essential for the strategic commercial behaviour of the joint venture. More recently, the Authority found in its *Picanol NV/Tessenderlo Chemie NV* decision of 21 October 2013 that Picanol NV, by purchasing 27.6 per cent of the shares in Tessenderlo Chemie NV, acquired de facto control over Tessenderlo Chemie NV because the remaining shares were dispersed among a large number of shareholders.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Concentrations must be notified if the parties have an aggregate Belgian turnover exceeding €100 million and at least two of the parties have an individual Belgian turnover of at least €40 million. Under the Code of Economic Law, for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction, Belgian turnover is the total turnover during the previous financial year attributable to the Belgian national market. The Authority seeks to align its approach regarding the geographic allocation of turnover with the practice of the European Commission. The Belgian rules for the calculation of turnover credit institutions and other financial institutions are the same as the EUMR rules (see article IV.8 of the Code of Economic Law).

The Authority confirmed in a decision on interim measures (*Alken-Maes NV/AB Inbev NV*) that it is competent to assess whether non-notifiable mergers constitute an abuse of a dominant position insofar as the potential anticompetitive effects go beyond those directly linked to the bringing about of the merger.

Book IV of the Code of Economic Law does not apply to concentrations falling under the EUMR (with exceptions, provided for in the EUMR).

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory for concentrations that meet the turnover thresholds. Concentrations must be notified to the Competition Prosecutor General prior to completion of the transaction. There are no exceptions to this rule.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified in Belgium where the turnover thresholds are met, regardless of the location or nationality of the parties. Many foreign-to-foreign mergers may therefore trigger an obligation to file where the parties have sales in Belgium, even if they have no Belgian-based assets.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are special rules applicable to investment in certain sectors, including banking, insurance and media, but these generally apply irrespective of whether the investor is foreign. Also, the works council or employees' organisation of a Belgian company must be informed in advance of certain structural or other changes that will affect the company, including mergers and takeovers. In specific circumstances, consultation with the works council or union representatives concerning employment prospects and the organisation of work is mandatory.

Public undertakings and undertakings to which the public authorities have granted exclusive or specific rights are subject to the same rules as private undertakings insofar as this does not undermine their assigned role.

Since 2018, there has been a limited foreign investment control regime at Flemish level, providing for a type of 'emergency brake' procedure for strategic investments into government-owned entities. The rules allow the Flemish government to annul or declare void any foreign acquisition that would threaten the strategic interests or the independence of the Flemish Region or Flemish Community or both.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A concentration must be notified prior to its implementation. Draft agreements may be notified provided the parties explicitly declare that they aim to conclude a final agreement that does not differ from the draft agreement on any of the points relevant for a competition law assessment. The basic outline of the concentration, as well as related restrictions (such as a non-compete covenant) should be contained in the draft agreement. If this is not the case, or if the Competition College finds that the final agreement differs substantially from the notified draft on competition law issues, it may reject the first notification, in which case a second notification may be required, once the final agreement has been signed. This would result in delay for the review, and duplication of time, effort and costs.

Where the Competition College finds that the merging parties have failed to notify a concentration prior to its implementation, it may impose fines up to 1 per cent of the total turnover in the preceding financial year.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The notification must be made jointly by the parties if the merger creates a new undertaking, and by the parties or acquirers jointly in the case of acquisition of joint control. In the case of acquisition of sole control, the acquirer alone must notify.

No filing fees are required.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

As is the case under the EU Merger Regulation, concentrations may not be implemented before clearance.

This suspension obligation does not prevent the implementation of a public bid or of a series of transactions in securities, provided that the concentration is notified without delay and the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of its investments, and on the basis of a derogation granted by the president.

At the request of the parties, the president can grant an exemption of the suspension obligation. This has happened a number of times in recent years.

An exemption of the suspension obligation was granted for the first time in 2008 when the Belgian state, through the Federal Participation and Investment Company, acquired a stake in Fortis and requested a derogation from the suspension obligation to implement a transaction aimed at rescuing a failing bank where further delay would have compromised the survival of the bank. In 2011, the Federal Participation and Investment Company again applied for and obtained a derogation from the suspension obligation in relation to its acquisition of Dexia Bank Belgium, after the Dexia Group got into financial difficulties.

The president, furthermore, granted exemptions to the suspension obligation in 2013, in the context of the initial public offering (IPO) of Bpost, on the basis of the urgency in light of the IPO and the fact that the transaction only required a simplified notification and did not entail any prima facie competition concerns; and, in 2015, in the context of the acquisition by Cordeel Group NV of Imtech Belgium Holding NV and Imtech België NV, based on the need to safeguard the business continuity of Imtech – a company in bankruptcy proceedings.

In 2019, the president granted an exemption to the suspension obligation in three different cases. First, in the context of the acquisition by Plukon Food Group of Pluimvee Slachterij Lammens, where a partial exemption to the suspension obligation was granted based on the necessity to take some safeguard measures in the context of Pluimvee Slachterij Lammens' bankruptcy proceedings. Second, in the context of the acquisition by Mirage Holdings of Maxi-Toys to enable an urgent capital increase, based on the need to ensure business continuity. Lastly, in the context of the acquisition of Euronics by Connect+ to avoid members of Euronics+ to leave the group, which would have impacted the value of the overall transaction.

#### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If a transaction is properly notified but implemented before clearance has been obtained (gun jumping), the Competition College may impose fines not exceeding 10 per cent of total turnover, and, in addition, periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 per cent of the average daily turnover in the preceding financial year per day. These sanctions can be imposed even if the concentration is ultimately cleared.

In 2003, the Competition Council (now the Competition College) imposed a €1 million fine for breach of the suspension obligation under the Competition Act of 1991, but this decision was overturned by the Brussels Court of Appeal. In 2015, the Competition Authority imposed a symbolic fine of €5,000 on Cordeel Group NV for closing its acquisition of Imtech Belgium Holding NV and Imtech België NV before obtaining merger clearance.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for gun jumping equally apply in the case of a foreign-to-foreign transaction.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers cannot be closed outside Belgium without breaching the suspension obligation, unless the president grants a derogation.

#### Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No, except that in this case the duty to notify rests with the bidder only and the suspension obligation is somewhat different.

#### Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

A considerable amount of detailed information (comparable to the information that is required for an EU Form CO filing) must be provided, including information concerning the parties, the relevant market or markets, details of the transaction and the personal and financial links of the parties with other companies. The information must be provided in accordance with Form CONC C/C. Derogations as to the amount of information to be provided may be obtained, although these are not binding on the Competition College. The form must be completed in a Belgian official language (French or Dutch), depending on where the parties have their principal seat of business. Where the merger agreement is signed between non-Belgian entities, the parties are free to choose the language of the filing (in practice, French or Dutch). Supporting documents must be submitted in their original language. Where this is not a Belgian official language or English, a translation in the language of the proceedings may be requested. Notifying parties should indicate in their notification which information constitutes business secrets for such information to be treated as strictly confidential.

Certain mergers that are unproblematic from a competition law perspective can be notified under the simplified procedure. Under this procedure, the information provision burden is slightly reduced, although significant amounts of information must still be provided.

Notifying parties may be fined for providing incorrect or incomplete information. The Authority has in the past fined notifying parties for the provision of incomplete information. For example, in 2012, the Authority fined Belgacom €75,000 for providing incomplete information in response to a request for information in the framework of its acquisition of Wireless Technologies BVBA. In 2015, it imposed a €50,000 fine on Sanoma for obstructing the review of the acquisition by De Persgroep Publishing NV of magazines Humo NV, Story, Teveblad and Vitaya by failing to provide certain information in response to a request.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

A distinction can be made between simplified and non-simplified cases. Simplified cases are reviewed and cleared on an expedited timetable.

Non-simplified cases can be dealt with in first phase or, if they raise serious doubts, may go into an in-depth second phase investigation.

For both simplified and non-simplified cases, notifying parties are required to engage in pre-notification discussions with the Authority, on the basis of a draft notification. Upon notification, the Competition Prosecutor General starts the investigation and appoints one of the prosecutors who will be in charge of coordinating the investigation. The prosecutor appointed by the Prosecutor General can request additional information from the parties, both during the pre-notification discussions and after formal notification. The prosecutors usually conduct their investigation by consulting online databases and contacting suppliers, customers and competitors.

In non-simplified cases, the prosecutor is required to submit a draft decision to the president, with copy to the notifying party or parties who have the right to respond in writing. Depending on the complexity of the transaction, if the prosecutor considers that the transaction is likely to lead to a significant impediment to effective competition, it will communicate its objections to the parties at least five working days before the submission of the draft decision to the president. The parties can submit commitments during this period and the prosecutor will consider the commitments in the draft decision. Under the normal procedure, a formal hearing before the Competition College is held, at least 10 working days after the prosecutor submits the draft decision.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Where the conditions for the simplified procedure are met and the concentration does not raise any competition concerns, a member of the Investigation and Prosecution Service will confirm this in a written decision to the notifying parties within 15 working days. This decision has the legal value of a Competition College clearance decision. In 2019, the majority of simplified decisions were issued before the end of the statutory 15 working day review period.

In non-simplified cases, the Competition College must take a decision no later than 40 working days after notification (first-phase decision), failing which the transaction is deemed to be cleared. The Competition College may decide to initiate second-phase proceedings if the concentration raises serious doubts as to its effect on competition. A further 60 working days' investigation is then carried out, at the end of which the Competition College must reach its final decision (second-phase decision). There is no possibility of speeding up this process, but the time limits may be prolonged at the request of the parties. If the parties offer commitments, the first phase will be increased by 15 working days and the second phase by 20 working days. A proposal to modify Book IV of the Code of Economic Law was adopted by Parliament on 25 April 2019. The modifications will leave the time periods unchanged. However, the prosecutor will have an extended deadline to submit its comments to the Competition College when the parties offer remedies. The new rules also introduce the possibility for the prosecutor to stop the clock at all stages of the proceedings.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

#### Substantive test

### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test in Belgian merger control is aligned with the EU Merger Regulation as it provides that concentrations that do not 'significantly impede effective competition' in the Belgian market or in a substantial part of it must be cleared, while concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the

creation or strengthening of a dominant position, must be blocked (the SIEC test).

In its assessment, the Competition College must take into account factors such as the effectiveness of actual or potential competition (whether at a national or international level) as well as barriers to entry, the bargaining power of customers and suppliers, the maturity of the market, the economic and technical level of the market and alternative sources of supply.

The Competition College must clear concentrations where the parties' share on the relevant market in Belgium does not exceed 25 per cent.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Book IV of the Code of Economic Law does not provide for a special substantive test for the joint ventures it governs (ie, full-function joint ventures). However, to the extent that full-function joint ventures between undertakings that remain independent could lead to coordination of the behaviour of the parent companies, such coordination will be assessed under the criteria set out in article IV.1 of the Code of Economic Law, which is the Belgian equivalent to article 101 TFEU.

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Under the SIEC test, the Competition Authority can examine the various types of harm that result from a merger (single dominance, unilateral effects, coordinated effects, conglomerate effects and vertical foreclosure). So far, its focus has been mainly on single dominance based primarily on a market share analysis. However, the Authority increasingly takes an economic approach based on the effects of the merger on competition, looking beyond market shares. For example, it recognises that market shares do not correctly reflect the dynamic process of bidding markets and heterogeneous, two-sided markets and that the actual effect of the merger on the competitive dynamics should be examined.

### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Authority assesses concentrations purely based on competition criteria. These competition criteria may be interpreted broadly. For example, in the past the Authority considered the plurality of the media as a factor in its assessment of mergers in the media sector. The powers of the Council of Ministers to clear a transaction blocked by the Competition Council on the basis of 'general interest' considerations have been abolished as of 2013.

### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

In its assessment, the Competition College must take into account factors such as the effectiveness of actual or potential competition (whether at a national or international level) as well as barriers to entry, the bargaining power of customers and suppliers, the maturity of the market, the economic and technical level of the market and alternative sources of supply.

The Competition College must clear concentrations where the parties' share on the relevant market in Belgium does not exceed 25 per cent.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition College may clear a transaction subject to conditions, as explained below. If the notifying party fails to provide an acceptable remedy to address the Competition Authority's competition concerns, the Authority may prohibit the transaction.

### Remedies and conditions

## 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. The Competition College may make a clearance decision subject to structural or behavioural conditions, such as divestiture of assets or an undertaking not to open new outlets in Belgium for a given period of time. The parties can address competition concerns by modifying the terms of the transaction, including by giving divestment undertakings, in the course of both first-phase and second-phase proceedings.

The Authority has recently approved several concentrations subject to structural remedies. In 2018, the Authority approved the acquisition by Volvo Group Belgium NV of authorised retailer Kant NV subject to the closure of one of Volvo's points of sale and the authorisation of another retailer. In 2017, the Authority conditionally approved the acquisition by McKesson of Belmedis et al, subject to the divestment of one of their depots in the Ghent area. In 2016, the Authority made the merger between supermarket chains Delhaize NV and Koninklijke Ahold NV conditional upon the divestment of up to 23 stores and cleared the acquisition of Utopolis NV by Kinopolis NV subject to the divestment of two out of the four Utopolis cinemas.

In multiple cases, the Authority has proven to be receptive to behavioural commitments rather than relying solely on structural remedies to address concerns. In 2019, the Authority approved the acquisition of sole control over media group, De Vijver Media, by telecommunications provider Telenet, who would be fully vertically integrated post-transaction, subject to a set of behavioural commitments aimed at guaranteeing access to its television channels to competing distribution platforms on the one hand, and access to both its distribution and advanced advertising platforms and its user data to competing broadcasters on the other hand. In 2017, the Authority approved the acquisition by telecommunications provider Telenet of cable operator Coditel subject to Telenet granting a third party (Orange) access to the Coditel network based on defined technical terms and price-setting mechanism, and not to offer any new quad-play services in the Coditel area during a certain period. In 2016, the Authority made the acquisition of AMP and LS Distribution Benelux by postal incumbent Bpost, active in press and small parcel distribution, press subscription management services and operation of retail press outlets, subject to behavioural remedies aimed at preserving competition between different distribution systems and guaranteeing the equal treatment and non-discrimination of all the points of sale. In 2015, the Authority conditionally approved the acquisition by media company De Persgroep Publishing NV of several Belgian magazines (Humo, Teve-blad, Story and Vitaya). De Persgroep Publishing NV, inter alia, committed to maintaining Humo, Story and Teve-blad on the market for a period of three years to safeguard the plurality of media. Behavioural remedies aimed at maintaining editorial diversity were imposed by the Competition College on 25 October 2013 on Belgian media groups Corelio NV and Concentra NV when clearing the creation of Mediahuis. Both parties agreed to maintain the distribution of their respective newspapers.



## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

In the first-phase investigation, the notifying parties have five working days from the day they are informed of the prosecutor's objections (which needs to occur at the latest on working day 20) to formally offer remedies. In the second phase, they have 20 working days from the opening of the second phase investigation to do so.

In recent cases, the remedies documents attached to the Authority's conditional clearance decisions have taken a similar form as the model text of commitments under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), including a detailed description of the conditions and obligations attached to the clearance, the assets to be divested (in the case of a divestiture remedy), reporting obligations to the Authority, the conditions that need to be met by the purchaser of the remedy assets, etc. It is now standard practice to include the possibility for the notifying parties to request a waiver or modification of (part of) the commitments.

In 2018, the Authority lifted one of the conditions (the mandatory notification to the Authority of any organic growth) imposed on leading movie theatre company Kinepolis in 1997 when the authority conditionally approved the merger of cinema groups Bert and Claeys, resulting in the creation of Kinepolis. In late 2018, the Market Court annulled that decision on procedural grounds. The Authority subsequently adopted a new decision in 2019, lifting the same condition subject to some limitations. However, in October 2019, the Market Court again annulled the Authority's decision and completely lifted the commitment regarding organic growth. It further referred the case back to the Belgian Competition Authority to determine an appropriate transition period for the termination of that condition. In February 2020, the Authority determined a period of 18 months, ending on 11 August 2021 would be an appropriate, effective and proportionate transitional period, after which Kinepolis will be free to grow organically without any prior authorisation of the Belgian Competition Authority.

In 2015, the incumbent telecom operator Proximus (formerly Belgacom) requested the Authority to lift the commitments imposed in 2011 in the context of its acquisition of Wireless Technologies BVBA and its subsidiary The Phone House (TPH), a retailer of telecom equipment and services. To alleviate the transaction's anticompetitive effects created through vertical overlaps between the parties' activities, Belgacom had offered to divest 25 to 35 TPH shops, transform two of its Belgacom Centres into TPH shops, and safeguard the multi-operator model of TPH shops for at least five years (including the adoption of a Chinese wall policy). The commitments contained a review clause that was triggered if the sales of competitors' products constituted less than 30 per cent of the TPH's total turnover. The Authority granted Proximus' request to lift the commitments, as it concluded that the importance of TPH shops as distribution channels for Proximus' competitors had decreased considerably since 2011, which made customer foreclosure by Proximus very unlikely. The Authority's approval was conditional upon Proximus adopting a lenient approach in terminating the existing agency agreements; communicating transparently to customers when a certain shop had been transformed from the multi-operator to the exclusive model; and the adoption of a Chinese wall policy to protect any sensitive information available to TPH shops.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Competition College has not imposed any remedies in a foreign-to-foreign merger case.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Even though the Competition Act does not provide any explicit reference to ancillary restrictions, its approach to ancillary restraints should be the same as under the EUMR. Therefore, competition restrictions (such as non-compete clauses) agreed in connection with a concentration will be covered by the clearance decision provided they are directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. However, they are not expressly covered in the decision, so the risk of incorrectly categorising them as ancillary lies with the parties. Where they are not covered by the decision, they remain subject to the usual competition rules on restrictive agreements. The Authority recently confirmed this approach in its 2017 decision approving the acquisition by Brussels Airlines of Thomas Cook. The Authority subsequently opened an investigation regarding potentially anticompetitive practices resulting from certain clauses within the commercial service agreement that was concluded between Brussels Airlines and Thomas Cook Belgium, of which the Authority became aware when it examined the acquisition. On 12 February 2020, the Investigation and Prosecution Service (IPS), the Authority's investigative arm, submitted a proposed decision advising the Competition College to find that an infringement by object and by effect had taken place. However, the ISP recommended against fining Brussels Airlines for the alleged infringement given that the potentially anticompetitive clauses were never implemented in practice.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Any individual or legal entity showing 'sufficient interest' can intervene during the investigation. The Competition Act allows the Belgian Competition Authority to consult any person it deems appropriate for the purpose of its investigation, and contacts with third parties, including competitors and customers, are routinely made. It has become standard practice in cases that give rise to competition concerns for the Authority to hear interested third parties (see most recently *AVS Group GmbH/De Fero, Conway/Alvadis, Telenet/De Vijver Media, Ineos Oxide/RWE Generation Belgium, Telenet/Coditel, Shanks NV/Van Gansewinkel Groep BV, Cebeo NV/Cheyns NV*). Recently, the Authority has been using online investigation tools to collect feedback from customers and competitors (eg, in *Volvo Belgium/Kant Group*). Finally, the Supreme Court, when deciding on a reference for preliminary ruling in 2008, confirmed that interested third parties can be authorised by the Competition Council (and, by analogy, now by the Competition College) to inspect and make copies of certain non-confidential documents in the investigation file, provided that these documents are strictly necessary to enable the interested third parties to effectively intervene and raise any competition concerns. The Competition College has since granted interested third parties access to non-confidential extracts from the draft decision.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Extracts of notifications (including the names of the parties) and decisions of the Competition College are published in the Official Gazette and on the website of the Authority.

Members of the Investigation and Prosecution Service and the Competition College may not use or divulge documents or information supplied in the notification for purposes other than those of the investigation. However, members of the Authority are freed from this duty of confidentiality when they give testimony in court. Responsibility for clearly identifying and marking confidential information as such lies with the party seeking protection.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Authority is a member of the European Competition Network, the European Competition Authorities Network and the International Competition Network.

The Competition Act allows the president, the Competition Prosecutor General and the members of the personnel of the Authority to exchange confidential information with the European Commission and the competition authorities of the other member states and use in evidence information received from them.

The president represents Belgium in European and international competition organisations and participates in meetings of European and international institutions.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

All decisions taken by the Competition College in the field of merger control, including decisions of the members of the Investigation and Prosecution Service under the simplified procedure, can be appealed to a specialised chamber of the Brussels Court of Appeal (the Market Court, which was created in January 2017). Interested third parties can appeal decisions if they previously requested to intervene during the proceedings before the Competition College regarding these decisions.

The Competition Act provides that the Market Court does not have full jurisdiction when reviewing merger decisions and can only annul or uphold the decisions.

A judgment by the Market Court can itself be reviewed on points of law and procedure only by the Supreme Court. The president represents the Competition Authority in appeal procedures before the Market Court and the Supreme Court.

Decisions of the prosecutors on the confidentiality of submitted information can be appealed to the president within three working days of notification of the decision.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Final decisions of the Competition College in the field of merger control may be appealed to the Market Court within 30 days of notification of the decision to the parties. Third parties who intervened in the merger proceedings may also appeal the decision within 30 days of notification of the decision.

In general, the Market Court processes appeals brought against decisions of the Authority in merger control cases quickly (one year or even less).

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

There is no specific severity or leniency in the Competition College's enforcement policy as regards foreign-to-foreign mergers.

Mergers and acquisitions in the energy, telecommunications and financial sectors may attract particular attention from the Competition Authority.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

On 25 April 2019, parliament adopted a legislative proposal to amend Book IV of the Code of Economic Law. The new rules aim at streamlining merger control and other proceedings before the Authority. While the duration of the simplified Phase I and Phase II review periods will remain unchanged, the prosecutors leading a merger control investigation will now have more leeway to stop the clock at all stages of proceedings, as opposed to only in Phase I as is currently the case. The prosecutor will also have five more working days to pass its recommendations to the Competition College if the notifying parties submit a remedy proposal.

On 8 January 2020, the Authority approved complementary rules concerning the simplified merger procedure after seeking comments from interested parties between 18 October and 18 November 2019. The complementary rules stipulate that the Authority can now additionally apply the simplified procedure in the following cases.

- 1 In mergers with horizontal overlaps where the combined market share of the merging parties is less than 50 per cent and:
  - the increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index resulting from the transaction remains below 150; or
  - the increase in market share remains below 2 per cent; and
- 2 In mergers where the Authority, taking into account all relevant circumstances, considers that there is no doubt on the admissibility of the concentration and that the concentration does not raise competition concerns given that:
  - the merging parties are active on the same product and geographical market and their combined market shares would be higher than 25 per cent but lower than 40 per cent; or
  - one or several of the parties involved in a vertical merger has a market share over 25 per cent but below 40 per cent either upstream or downstream.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In 2019, the Competition Authority adopted 28 decisions, compared to 36 decisions in 2018. All notified concentrations were cleared, with the vast majority of the clearance decisions (21) being adopted after a simplified review procedure.

In 2019, the Authority imposed remedies in one case, *Telenet/De Vijver Media*. It also reviewed for a second time the commitments it had imposed on Kinopolis in 1997 when it conditionally cleared the merger of the Bert and Claeys groups into the Kinopolis cinema groups.



### Telenet/De Vijver Media

In March 2019, the Authority conditionally cleared Telenet's proposed acquisition of sole control over De Vijver Media, following the European Commission's referral of the deal in November 2018. De Vijver Media is a holding company active in the media who owns the television production company Woestijnvis, the broadcasting company SBS Belgium (which operates different television channels) and the advertising sales company SBS Belgium Sales NV. In 2015, Telenet had already acquired a 50 per cent controlling stake in De Vijver Media following conditional clearance by the European Commission. Even though Telenet already exercised joint control over De Vijver Media, the Competition College noted that the subsequent acquisition of sole control could impact competition. In particular, it found that, post-transaction, Telenet will be vertically integrated as it would be producing television content, operating television channels in addition to running a dominant distribution platform. To alleviate the Authority's foreclosure concerns, Telenet committed to a set of behavioural remedies, including to:

- give access to its television channels to competing distribution platforms on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions;
- refrain from decreasing the quality of its television channels;
- not discriminate against competing television channels through the user interface of its distribution platform;
- not use newly negotiated distribution fees in the negotiations of agreements for the distribution of competing television channels on its distribution platform;
- issue a binding offer for a duration of six months to provide advanced advertising services to any Flemish television channel that so requests within three months of the decision under certain terms and conditions; and
- not to share user data in relation to ratings of competing television channels distributed through its platform with its own television channels and television production company.

### Kinopolis

On 25 March 2019, the Authority – following the annulment by the Market Court of an earlier decision taken in 2018 to partially lift commitments entered into by Kinopolis in the context of the merger of the Bert and Claeys groups in 1997 – again partially lifted Kinopolis's obligation to request prior authorisation for organic growth, subject to certain conditions in relation to the size (no authorisation required if a new cinema has a maximum of seven theatres and a maximum of 1,125 seats) and the location (10-km radius around existing Kinopolis cinema complex) of any new cinema complex. Kinopolis appealed this decision, and on 23 October 2019 the Market Court again annulled the Authority's decision and completely lifted the limitation on organic growth. In addition, it ordered the Authority to establish a transitional period to enable Kinopolis's competitors to prepare to compete with Kinopolis once the condition is lifted. On 11 February 2020, the Authority decided that, as of 12 August 2021, following an 18-month transitional period, Kinopolis will be free to grow organically and operate new cinemas without any prior authorisation from the Authority.

In the first four months of 2020, the Authority has already cleared seven concentrations, six of which under the simplified procedure. In addition, in January 2020, the Authority opened an in-depth investigation into the proposed acquisition of Ceres by Dossche Mills.



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# Bosnia and Herzegovina

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, merger control, as well as other aspects of competition law, is substantially governed by the Competition Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Act). The Act became effective as of 27 July 2005. It was enacted at the state level and applies throughout the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, in both entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska) and in the Brčko District. The Act was amended twice so far, in 2007 and 2009.

In addition to the Act, numerous regulations were adopted by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council (the Council), the authority responsible for enforcement of the Act and for monitoring competition in the market. These regulations set out the procedural framework and define the standards for application of the Act. The most relevant regulations for merger control are the Regulation on the Notification of Concentrations and the Criteria for the Assessment of Concentrations, and the Regulation on the Definition of Relevant Markets.

The competition legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is generally in line with the rules and principles of the EU competition law regime. Moreover, in practice, the Council often uses the EU competition law standards as a guide to deciding the cases brought before it.

The Council is an independent authority established by the Act. It has exclusive competence to decide on the existence of activities prohibited by competition law in the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council has six members. Three members are appointed by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with one representative from each of the constituent nations. Two members are appointed by the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one member is appointed by the government of the Republic of Srpska. The mandate of all members of the Council lasts for six years with an option to be extended for an additional six years. A new president of the Council is appointed every year. The Council submits its annual reports to the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

More information about the Council and its activities can be found at [www.bihkonk.gov.ba](http://www.bihkonk.gov.ba).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act defines a concentration as:

- a merger by absorption or a merger by the formation of a new entity;
- the acquisition of control or a controlling interest by one or more undertakings over another undertaking or a part thereof, or a group of undertakings or a part thereof through the acquisition of a majority shareholding, or the acquisition of a majority of voting

rights, or in any other way under the company laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina; or

- the creation of a full-function joint venture.

Intra-group acquisitions and restructurings are not caught by the merger control rules.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint ventures) are caught by the Act.

Joint ventures that aim to coordinate the market behaviour of two or more undertakings, whereby each of them maintains its legal and economic autonomy, are not subject to the merger control regime, but may be covered by the provisions on restrictive agreements.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Act provides a rather general and broad definition of 'control' without specifying any details that may lead to the existence of control within the meaning of the Act.

Following the wording of the Act, 'control' exists when one or more undertakings jointly have a dominant influence over another undertaking or group of undertakings, based on the law, an agreement or any other means, and considering all legal circumstances and facts. 'Control' is deemed to exist when one or more undertakings jointly:

- have a majority shareholding in an undertaking;
- have a majority of the voting rights; or
- have the right to appoint more than half of the management board members, the supervisory board members, or the appropriate body that manages or controls operations, or otherwise has the right to manage the operations of the undertaking.

Given this broad definition of 'control', the acquisition of a minority interest that enables the holder to exercise a dominant influence over an undertaking or group of undertakings is subject to the merger control regime.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

According to the Act, the Council has to be notified of an intended concentration if, in the preceding business year:

- 1 the combined worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds 100 million Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks; and

- 2 (a) the individual turnover of each of at least two undertakings concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina amounts to at least 8 million Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks; or (b) the undertakings concerned together have a market share of more than 40 per cent on the relevant market in Bosnia and Herzegovina (according to the interpretation applied by the Council, this threshold can be met by one undertaking alone).

The Regulation on the Notification of Concentrations and the Criteria for the Assessment of Concentrations (Regulation) adopted by the Council, effective as of 5 May 2010, stipulates that if the undertakings concerned have registered corporate seats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the concentration shall be notified to the Council if the local threshold (2)(a) or (b) is satisfied, regardless of whether the worldwide threshold (1) is also met. The Council intended to clarify the wording of the Act with this provision. However, its interpretation has led to confusion. In particular, it was unclear whether the Council is at all competent to interpret the Act in such way in a legally binding manner and whether this provision may also have an impact on foreign-to-foreign mergers. Therefore, we filed a request for clarification to the Council. In its rather broad reply, the Council stated that if some of the undertakings concerned have their registered corporate seat outside Bosnia and Herzegovina or some undertakings concerned have their registered corporate seat abroad, but have subsidiaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both the local threshold (2)(a) or (b) and the worldwide threshold (1) have to be met to trigger a filing obligation. Therefore, one may conclude that the 'clarification' provided by the Council in the Regulation (ie, notification required if only the local threshold (2)(a) or (b) is satisfied) applies only to cases where all undertakings concerned are purely domestic undertakings (ie, undertakings that have local shareholders and are not subsidiaries of foreign legal entities).

The aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned is to be calculated on a worldwide consolidated basis. Turnover generated by sales between the undertakings concerned is not taken into account.

In the case of an acquisition of one or more parts of an undertaking or of a group of undertakings, irrespective of whether such parts constitute independent legal entities, only the turnover pertaining to the parts subject to the concentration is taken into account. Should there be more than one concentration of the undertakings concerned within a two-year period, they will be considered as one single transaction and it shall be deemed that the transaction occurred on the date of the occurrence of the last transaction.

If the undertaking concerned is a bank or financial institution, the turnover shall consist of the following: income from interest and similar income sources; income from securities; commissions; net profit from financial operations; and other operating income.

For insurance and reinsurance companies, the turnover shall consist of gross premiums, which include all received and expected premiums, as well as reinsurance premiums, but after the deduction of taxes and fees charged by reference to the amounts of the individual premiums or the aggregate amount of premiums.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

As a general rule, the Council shall be notified of all concentrations that exceed the thresholds set forth in the Act.

An exemption from the filing obligation exists in cases in which banks, financial institutions or insurance companies acquire shares in the ordinary course of business with the intention of reselling them within the following 12 months, provided that in the meantime the shares are not used to influence the market behaviour of the undertaking concerned. Furthermore, the acquisition of control by a

bankruptcy administrator or liquidation administrator in the course of bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings does not require that the Council be notified.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign concentrations are covered by the Act if the turnover thresholds are exceeded.

We are not aware of any cases or discussions in which the Council would have indicated that an effects-based exemption from the filing obligation (where the turnover thresholds were met) would be accepted. To date, the Council appeared to be unwilling to consider arguments in that respect.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no special rules related to foreign investments, special sectors or other relevant approvals in the competition law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in certain business sectors, such as banking, telecommunications, energy and pharmaceuticals, additional regulatory provisions exist that need to be observed. For example, certain changes in the shareholding structure of a telecommunication provider require a notification to or approval by the competent telecommunications agency. This notification or approval from the telecommunications agency is required in addition to the merger approval by the competition authority, if any.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

According to the Competition Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Act), the Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council (the Council) has to be notified of an intended concentration within 15 days of the signing of the respective agreement, the announcement of a public offer of shares, or an acquisition of control, whichever (of the three) occurs first. However, the undertakings concerned have the option to notify the concentration already once they can demonstrate their intention to undertake the concentration based on, for example, the conclusion of an agreement in principle, a memorandum of understanding, a letter of intent signed by all parties to the concentration or a public announcement of the intention to submit a purchase offer.

Failure to notify the Council of the concentration within due time may result in a fine of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover of the undertakings concerned, realised in the business year preceding the concentration. In addition, a fine of between 5,000 and 15,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks may be imposed on the responsible persons within the undertakings concerned. Such fines may be imposed regardless of whether the concentration was implemented or not at the moment when the Council learned of the concentration. Therefore, fines for a failure to notify the Council of a concentration in due time may be substantial (depending on the undertaking's turnover). In this respect, the Council imposed fines for late filing in several cases (2013) ranging between 19,000 and 310,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks. The Council may also impose fines for the implementation of a concentration prior to or without clearance.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Responsibility for notifying the Council of the acquisition of a majority shareholding or a majority of voting rights or other controlling interests rests with the acquirer. In the case of an acquisition of control based on a public offering of shares, the offeror has the filing responsibility. In the case of joint ventures and in all other cases, the responsibility to notify the Council of the transaction lies with all undertakings concerned.

An initial filing fee of 2,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks is payable prior to the submission of the notification, and proof of payment must be submitted to the Council with the notification. In addition, a fee of 5,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks is payable after the Council issues a Phase I clearance decision without performing an in-depth investigation. A fee of 0.03 per cent of the total annual turnover of each of at least two undertakings concerned, generated through the sale of goods or services in the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina (up to 50,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks) is payable if the Council adopts its decision after an in-depth (Phase II) investigation. If the Council dismisses the notification because of the requirements for filing not being met, a fee of 1,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks is payable. In practice, the Council will not issue its decision unless the fees are paid.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The Act provides that the intended concentration must not be implemented until the Council passes a decision authorising the transaction or until the waiting period expires (suspension obligation).

Following the submission of the notification, the authority first assesses the completeness of the filing. The law does not provide a specific time frame for this stage. In practice, it is thus recommended to be in contact with the authority during this stage to ensure that this period is short. Once the filing is accepted as complete, the Council issues a certificate of completeness. If the Council, upon review of the submitted notification, takes the view that the notified concentration does not raise any competition law concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a clearance decision for the concentration is issued within 30 days of the date of issuance of the certificate. If the Council does not take any decision within such 30-day period, the concentration shall be deemed to be approved.

If the Council takes the view that the intended concentration is likely to have a negative effect on competition in the market, it can initiate an in-depth (Phase II) investigation. Such investigation may take up to three months, meaning that the Competition Council is obligated to issue a final decision within three months of the day of adoption of a decision on initiation of proceedings.

An extension of an additional three months is possible if the intended concentration involves a sensitive business sector and in cases in which it is necessary to carry out additional analysis defining the state of facts or an examination of evidence. If the Council initiates a Phase II investigation but fails to issue a decision within the above-mentioned deadline, the concentration shall be deemed to be approved.

The suspension obligation does not prevent the implementation of a takeover bid of which the competent authority has been notified in accordance with the respective public takeover bids regulations as provided in article 18, paragraph 10 of the Act.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing a concentration without obtaining prior clearance by the Council may result in a fine of up to 10 per cent of the parties' total turnover in the year preceding the closing of the concentration. Individuals responsible within the undertakings may in that case be subject to fines ranging from 15,000 to 50,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks. These fines were introduced with the amendments to the Act adopted in October 2009. Previously, there were no sanctions prescribed by the law in the event that the parties implemented the transaction before obtaining clearance, although the suspension obligation did exist.

The statute of limitations for infringing the suspension obligation is five years from the date of the infringement (ie, the day of closing the transaction without clearance).

In addition, if the Council was not notified of a concentration and it later finds that such concentration had negative effects on competition in the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council may order that the acquired shares and assets be sold. The Council may also restrict the voting rights of the acquiring undertaking or order the cessation of the joint venture or any other form of acquired control that the Council believes restricts competition in the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In March 2010, for the first time after the 2009 amendments to the Act, the Council imposed a fine on an undertaking for closing the concentration before obtaining prior clearance from the Council. The fine amounted to 200,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks and was imposed on a local company engaged in the trade of petroleum and petroleum products for failure to notify the Council of the acquisition of 10 petrol stations from another local company, as well as for closing the concentration before obtaining prior clearance from the Council. For procedural reasons, this fine was reimposed by the Council in 2011. Apart from that, the Council imposed in three more cases fines for failure to notify a concentration and breach of the suspension obligation in 2011, although at lower amounts (40,000, 50,000 and 70,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks). In 2012, the Council did not impose any sanctions for closing before clearance. In 2013, in one case, a fine of 656,667 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks was imposed on the undertakings concerned for late filing and closing before clearance. In this case, however, the decision of the Council was in the following challenged by one of the undertakings concerned and, consequently, the fine was substantially lowered. In 2014, the Council imposed in one case a fine of 26,500 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks for failure to notify the concentration and closing before clearance.

In 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2019, the Council did not impose any sanctions for closing before clearance or for failure to notify a concentration, while in 2016 fines were imposed in two cases for failure to notify the concentrations and for implementation of the concentrations without decision of the Council. In one case, two undertakings with fines of 30,000 and 7,500 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks, respectively, for failure to notify the concentration, and with fines of 60,000 and 15,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks, respectively, for implementation of the concentration without decision of the Council. In the second case, a fine in an amount of 10,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks was imposed to the undertaking concerned for a failure to notify the concentration within the statutory deadline.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for closing before clearance are also applicable in cases involving foreign-to-foreign mergers.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are assessed in the same way as local concentrations. The Act and the applicable regulations do not provide for hold-separate (carve-out) solutions. Although discussed in practice, such solutions have not yet been tested with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The suspension obligation does not prevent the implementation of a takeover bid of which the competent authority has been notified in accordance with the respective public takeover bid regulations as provided in article 18, paragraph 10 of the Act.

#### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The information and documentation required for the notification of an intended concentration is set out in the Regulation on the Notification of Concentrations and the Criteria for the Assessment of Concentrations. The following information, inter alia, is to be provided to the Council when filing a notification:

- names, seats and business activities of the undertakings concerned;
- names and contact details of persons authorised to represent the undertakings concerned before the Council;
- description of the intended concentration;
- legal basis of the concentration;
- information regarding the financial status and total turnover of the undertakings concerned (on both a worldwide and national level) for the business year preceding the concentration;
- information about the relevant market and the market shares of the undertakings concerned;
- list of the main competitors and estimates of their market shares;
- information on the ownership structure of the undertakings concerned;
- information about related parties;
- description of distribution and retail networks used by the undertakings concerned;
- description of planned research projects and investments regarding the undertakings concerned; and
- reasons for the intended concentration and detailed description of the expected benefits for customers.

Documents that have to be enclosed in a notification are, inter alia:

- excerpts from the commercial registry or other equivalent documents showing the relevant details regarding the undertakings concerned;
- powers of attorney for the persons authorised to represent the undertakings concerned before the Council;
- an original or a certified copy of the legal basis of the intended concentration;
- financial statements of the undertakings concerned for the business year preceding the concentration; and
- organisational charts of the undertakings concerned.

The Council may request additional information and documentation that it deems necessary or useful when considering a concentration. If the

notifying party cannot submit certain information or a requested document despite all reasonable efforts, it may provide the Council with the brief reasonable explanation as to why that information or a particular document is not available.

The notification and all enclosures thereto have to be provided in one of the official languages of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, all documents submitted to the Council have to be in the form of an original or a certified copy and apostilled (depending on the jurisdiction of origin of a particular document).

Provision of incorrect or incomplete information to the Council or refusal of a party to comply with an information request may result in a fine of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover of the undertakings concerned, realised in the business year preceding the concentration. In addition, a fine of between 5,000 and 15,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks may be imposed on the responsible persons within the undertakings concerned.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The Act provides that the intended concentration must not be implemented until the Council passes a decision authorising the transaction or until the waiting period expires (suspension obligation).

Following the submission of the notification, the authority first assesses the completeness of the filing. The law does not provide a specific time frame for this stage. In practice, it is thus recommended to be in contact with the authority during this stage to ensure that this period is short. Once the filing is accepted as complete, the Council issues a certificate of completeness. If the Council, upon review of the submitted notification, takes the view that the notified concentration does not raise any competition law concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a clearance decision for the concentration is issued within 30 days of the date of issuance of the certificate. If the Council does not take any decision within such 30-day period, the concentration shall be deemed to be approved.

If the Council takes the view that the intended concentration is likely to have a negative effect on competition in the market, it can initiate an in-depth (Phase II) investigation. Such investigation may take up to three months, meaning that the Competition Council is obligated to issue a final decision within three months of the day of adoption of a decision on initiation of proceedings.

An extension of an additional three months is possible if the intended concentration involves a sensitive business sector and in cases in which it is necessary to carry out additional analysis defining the state of facts or an examination of evidence. If the Council initiates a Phase II investigation but fails to issue a decision within the above-mentioned deadline, the concentration shall be deemed to be approved.

The suspension obligation does not prevent the implementation of a takeover bid of which the competent authority has been notified in accordance with the respective public takeover bids regulations as provided in article 18, paragraph 10 of the Act.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Once the Council issues a certificate of completeness, it has to decide within 30 days whether the proposed concentration raises competition law concerns in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If the Council believes that the proposed concentration will not have any negative effect on competition, it will issue a (Phase I) clearance decision. If the Council does not issue a decision within the 30-day period, the concentration shall be deemed to be approved.

If the Council takes the view that the intended concentration could have a negative effect on competition, it may initiate a Phase II investigation. A Phase II investigation may take up to three months, meaning that the Competition Council is obligated to issue a final decision within three months following the date on which the resolution authorising the institution to conduct Phase II proceedings is adopted. The Phase II investigation may be extended for an additional three months if the intended concentration involves a sensitive business sector and in cases in which it is necessary to carry out additional analysis defining the state of facts and examination of evidence. If the Council initiates a Phase II investigation but does not issue a decision within the defined deadline, the concentration shall be deemed to be approved.

In practice, after submission of the filing, it usually takes a rather long time until the Council considers the filing complete and issues the certificate of completeness. Therefore, the start of the review period is usually delayed. Against that background and according to our experience, it takes about three to five months from initial submission of the filing until clearance in cases in which the Council does not initiate a Phase II investigation. If a Phase II investigation is launched, the overall proceedings until clearance may take up to eight months (and even longer).

The law does not provide for a formal way of speeding up the procedure.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council (the Council) will assess the effects that the intended concentration is likely to have (ie, whether the intended concentration results in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position of one or more undertakings that may restrict competition in the market).

The Competition Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Act) provides the following general criteria for assessment as to whether the concentration prevents, restricts or distorts the competition:

- the structure of the relevant market;
- concentration effects to other actual and potential competitors;
- the market position of the undertakings concerned and their market shares, economic and financial power and strength;
- economic, legal and other entry obstacles to the market;
- supply and demand trends for the relevant goods or services;
- technical and economic developments trends; and
- consumers' interests.

Despite the difference in the wording of article 2, paragraph 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, the criteria applied by the Council in making its assessment are usually similar to those applied by the European Commission.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No. The same substantive test is applied to joint ventures.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Council investigates whether the intended concentration leads to the creation or strengthening of single or collective market dominance and will typically also look into vertical foreclosure aspects, while other criteria are typically of a lesser concern.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues are generally not supposed to be relevant in the review process.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Council takes economic efficiencies into consideration to the extent that it can be established by the parties that such economic efficiencies benefit customers.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council (the Council) may, in addition to monetary penalties, order the parties to sell the acquired shares or restrict the voting rights of the undertakings concerned, or order the cessation of the joint venture or any other form of acquired control that restricts competition in the market.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The Competition Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Act) does recognise structural or behavioural remedies as a way to remedy competition concerns.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The Act does not regulate the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedies.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To date, the Council has not required any remedies to be offered.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The competition law of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not regulate that aspect. Also, the Council has not yet developed a practice in this respect. However, as the Council often refers to the European Commission's practice for guidance, it is not unlikely that the principles with regard to ancillary restraints adopted by the European Commission would be taken into account by the Council when dealing with such matters.



## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council (the Council) is competent to gather information ex officio and require from the parties, as well as from third parties, additional information and documentation that the Council considers necessary or useful for an assessment of the concentration. Moreover, third parties that have a legal or economic interest in the concentration (eg, competitors) are invited to submit their observations and concerns regarding the intended concentration. This invitation is published on the Council's website and in daily newspapers.

Access to the Council's file is only granted to the parties to the proceedings. The Competition Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not clear as to whether and under what circumstances third parties can be admitted as parties to merger control proceedings. According to the general administrative rules of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a party can, inter alia, be a person that has a right to be such party to protect its legal interests. In general, only undertakings concerned are admitted and regarded as parties in the proceedings before the Council.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Final decisions of the Council are published in the Official Gazettes (state, entity and Brčko District level) and on the Council's website.

Also, the Council publishes information regarding submitted notifications (ie, general information such as the names of the parties, the form of concentration and the business sector in which the concentration is taking place) with an invitation to all interested parties to submit their comments on its website and in daily newspapers.

All other communication between the Council and parties in the course of the concentration assessment procedure is not publicly available. All information that is deemed to contain business secrets is to be kept confidential by the Council. Such information is not disclosed and is removed from any decision published by the Council.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

As of 2005, the Council is a member of the International Competition Network, which enables cooperation with other antitrust authorities from countries that are members of the network. Also, the Council actively promotes cooperation with antitrust authorities from the region. To this end, the Council has concluded memorandums of understanding with the Croatian Agency for the Protection of Competition, the Serbian Commission for the Protection of Competition, as well as with the competition authorities of Turkey, Bulgaria and Macedonia. In the following period, cooperation is expected to be established with the competition authorities in Montenegro, Slovenia, Estonia and Austria.

# WOLF THEISS

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## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council's decision can be challenged in an administrative court procedure before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The claim must be brought within 30 days after publication of the decision.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Administrative court proceedings before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina usually last up to one year, but can take longer depending on the complexity of the case.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

According to the draft activities report of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council (the Council) published on its website, in 2019, the Council received 21 cases relating to merger control and nine final decisions in total were adopted by the end of 2019 (four concentrations were approved, four cases were dismissed because the notified behaviours were deemed not to qualify as notifiable concentrations under the relevant regulations and, in one case, the concentration was conditionally approved).

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There were no amendments to the Competition Act of Bosnia and Herzegovina or pertaining by-laws in 2019.



**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year****36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?**

According to the draft activities report of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Competition Council (the Council) published on its website, in 2019, the Council received 21 cases relating to merger control, out of which in 2019 four concentrations were approved in Phase I, one concentration was conditionally approved in Phase I and four cases were dismissed because the notified cases were deemed not to qualify as notifiable concentrations under the relevant regulations. The remaining cases have been transferred to 2020.

The concentrations that have been approved concerned the following markets: electricity production (acquisition of sole control over the company Hidroelektrane Bistrica doo Foča, which operates a hydro-power plant, by Mješoviti Holding ERS – MP ad Trebinje Hidroelektrane na Drini ad Višegrad), production and sale of medicinal devices and medical supplies (acquisition of control over the company SANITEKS dd Velika Kladuša by Athabasca Investment doo Tomislavgrad), production and sale of non-alcoholic beverages (acquisition of control over the company Vitaminka ad Banja Luka by the companies Vitinka ad Zvornik and Sinovi i oci doo Banja Luka), wholesale of confectionery products (acquisition of control over the company Bambi ad Požarevac by Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company – Srbija, Industrija bezalkoholnih pića doo Beograd). The concentration, which was conditionally approved, concerned the markets of fixed telephony, mobile telephony, internet services and the distribution of radio and TV programmes, and involved the acquisition of control over the company Elta-Kabel doo Doboj by Mtel ad Banja Luka. In all proceedings, the Council mostly relied upon the market data submitted by the notifying parties in their merger notifications.

# Brazil

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The main legislation is Law No. 12,529 of 2011 and a series of resolutions issued by the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE), the antitrust agency. In terms of merger control, the main resolutions are as follows:

- CADE's Internal Rules of Proceeding (Resolution No. 01 of 2012, as amended by Resolution No. 22 of 2019);
- Resolution No. 02 of 2012, as amended, provides for the definition of 'group of companies', the cases eligible for the fast-track proceeding, required information under both the fast-track and ordinary proceedings, and stake acquisition rules;
- Resolution No. 12 of 2015 establishes the rules for consultation on CADE's position on the application of merger control rules in specific cases;
- Resolution No. 16 of 2016 establishes the 30-day deadline for fast-track merger reviews;
- Resolution No. 17 of 2016 establishes the criteria for filing of associative (collaborative) agreements; and
- Resolution No. 24 of 2019 establishes the procedures for gun-jumping investigations and the report of transactions that do not meet the threshold for mandatory reporting.

CADE includes three distinct bodies: an Administrative Tribunal, the General Superintendence in charge of merger analysis and antitrust investigations, and a Department of Economic Studies. With respect to merger review enforcement, the General Superintendence is responsible for reviewing and clearing transactions that do not raise antitrust concerns, and challenging cases before the Tribunal, while CADE's Tribunal is responsible for deciding on the cases challenged by the General Superintendence, by the Tribunal or by interested third parties and regulatory agencies.

In terms of latest developments, CADE has issued a series of Guidelines establishing directives on issues related to competition policy or institutional procedures and to provide explanations of the existing legislation, in terms of merger control, including the Guidelines on Gun Jumping and the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers. In July 2017, CADE published an Internal Manual for the Analysis of Ordinary Merger Cases, describing the best practices for the review of such cases by CADE's officials based on the experience of the agency since the entry into force of the Law No. 12,529 of 2011, including pre-filing, granting of waivers and infraction notices in the course of the proceeding. In October 2018, CADE issued the Guidelines on Remedies, which gathers the best practices and procedures adopted by CADE in

the design, implementation and monitoring of remedies established by the agency. In April 2019, CADE issued the Guidelines for the Submission of Information to the Department of Economic Studies, aiming at improving, standardising and expediting the economic analysis of the cases. Finally, in July 2019, CADE issued the Resolution No. 24/2019 that replaces Resolution No. 13/2015 and establishes procedural aspects for gun-jumping investigations and the report of transactions that do not meet the threshold for mandatory reporting.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Mergers, equity and assets acquisitions, joint ventures, consortia, associations and any foreign-to-foreign transactions are caught, provided they produce effects in Brazil and meet the double turnover jurisdictional threshold.

Effects, for the purposes of Brazilian merger notification, are defined very broadly to include deals in which the target company (including joint ventures) has either assets or legal entities in Brazil or revenues originating in Brazil, even if through exports only and regardless of their amounts. There is no precise definition by CADE as to what level of sales in Brazil the business involved in the transaction could establish sufficient nexus or effects to trigger CADE's jurisdiction – generally, even minimal sales or revenues can require a notification if the other thresholds are met.

Associative or collaborative agreements between competitors must be filed with CADE if the following criteria are met:

- the parties or groups meet the double Brazilian turnover criterion; and
- the agreement is for a period of at least two years and its object is the creation of a 'joint enterprise' to develop a certain economic activity, provided that:
  - it establishes the sharing of risk and results between the parties regarding the object of the agreement; and
  - the parties or groups are competitors in the relevant market that is the object of the agreement.

Agreements between vertically related parties are not subject to notification as 'associative or collaborative agreements' since 2016, when Resolution No. 17/2016 came into force.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

All types of joint ventures are subject to merger review in Brazil provided they produce effects in Brazil and meet the double turnover jurisdictional threshold. The only exception envisaged in the Brazilian Competition Law concerns joint ventures, consortia, or associative or collaborative agreements for the specific purpose of participating in public bids.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Brazilian competition legislation does not provide a firm definition of 'control'. CADE states broadly that control involves the ability to interfere in the activities of a company or undertaking. It can either be due to the possession of a majority of the equity interest or when a minority shareholder has control powers as a result of contractual arrangements, for example. The control can be sole or shared.

Control can also be external when exercised by a party that does not actually hold a shareholding interest in another party, but it has the ability to direct the development of a business, such as in the franchiser-franchisee relationships (Merger Review No. 08700.000395/2019-83 – *Sonic/Chilli Beans/GIF IV*).

The acquisition of minority and other interests is also caught by merger control rules under certain circumstances described in Resolution No. 02/2012, article 10:

- when said acquisition results in acquisition of control, unit or shared;
- provided that the activities of the purchaser group and the target do not overlap or are vertically related:
  - when it grants to the purchaser direct or indirect participation of 20 per cent or higher in the target; or
  - acquisition made by the holder of 20 per cent or more of the social capital or voting capital, provided that the acquired participation, direct or indirectly, of at least one individual seller, represents 20 per cent or more of the social or voting capital; or
- provided that the activities of the purchaser group and the target overlap or are vertically related:
  - when it grants to the purchaser direct or indirect participation of 5 per cent or higher in the target; or
  - when the purchaser already had 5 per cent of participation in the social or voting capital of the target and the last acquisition, individually or added to others, results in an increase of participation of 5 per cent or more in the social or voting capital.

#### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Law No. 12,529 of 2011 introduced a double turnover system. The legal thresholds for mandatory notification are turnover or volume of sales in Brazil in the year preceding the transaction, by one of the parties equal to or greater than 750 million reais, and by another party equal to or greater than 75 million reais. These values have been established in Interministerial Ordinance No. 994/2012 MJ/M. Parties are considered as the consolidated economic groups to which they belong.

For the purposes of calculation of the turnover, CADE considers as part of the same economic group the companies that are subject to a common control and companies in which any of the companies under common control has, directly or indirectly, at least 20 per cent of the voting or share capital.

Companies that are ultimately state-owned are considered to be part of separate or autonomous economic groups, meaning that other state-held interests are not considered part of the economic group, provided there is no coordination with these other companies. This also means that transactions between two separate state-owned companies are subject to normal merger control regulations as if they were fully independent.

For investment funds, the following will be considered as part of the same economic group: the quota holders with more than 50 per

cent participation in the fund directly involved in the transaction, and the companies of its economic group; and the companies in which the fund directly involved in the transaction has more than 20 per cent of the voting or share capital.

CADE has the prerogative of requiring the submission of any transaction within a period of one year as of its closing date, even if it does not satisfy the notification thresholds mentioned herein.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory whenever the transaction can produce any effects in Brazil and meets the double Brazilian turnover jurisdictional threshold. The only exception contained in the Brazilian Competition Law concerns joint ventures, consortia or associative or collaborative agreements with the specific purpose of participating in public bids and the agreements derived from these public bids. Resolution No. 02/2012 of 2012, as amended, provides for other exceptions in the case of an equity acquisition. CADE can request the filing of transactions that do not fulfil the jurisdictional thresholds up to one year after the closing.

Lastly, the mandatory notification of associative or collaborative agreements must fulfil the requirements established in Resolution No. 17/2016.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Yes, foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified whenever they produce or can potentially produce effects in Brazil and the double Brazilian turnover jurisdictional threshold is met. As previously mentioned, effects, for the purposes of Brazilian merger notification regime, are defined very broadly to include the presence of assets or legal entities in Brazil or revenues originating in Brazil related to the business involved in the transaction, even if through exports only. There is no 'minimum or sufficient effects' test in place, and even minimal sales or revenues generated in Brazil can trigger a notification. This situation has been assessed on a few occasions throughout CADE's decisional practice.

On certain occasions, CADE has decided that it has jurisdiction over foreign-to-foreign or international transactions where a worldwide relevant market definition is possible and the economic groups are active in the directly affected or related markets in Brazil. CADE also has, on other occasions, decided not to assess foreign-to-foreign transactions when effects in Brazil are sufficiently demonstrated to not be concrete or plausible. An assessment of potential effects of the envisaged transaction in the Brazilian territory is recommended whenever the parties reach turnover thresholds.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There is no specific legislation for merger control involving foreign investment in Brazil. Merger review provisions apply similarly across the board.

Law No. 12,529 of 2011 applies to all economic sectors, which means that no special clearance should be fulfilled by sector regulators or agencies, except for the banking sector. In February 2018, CADE and the Central Bank entered into a memorandum of understanding regarding each agency's jurisdiction in merger control cases involving the banking sector, ending a long dispute over their jurisdiction for such cases. Mergers in the banking sector now must be submitted to both agencies, but transactions that may pose 'high and imminent' risks to the stability of the Brazilian financial system – at the Central Bank's discretion – may be unilaterally approved by the Central Bank, and

CADE will have to approve the deal without restrictions as well, based on the aspects of a prudential nature applied by the Central Bank.

Other regulated sectors may require not only the standard merger review clearance by CADE, but also special clearance by their respective sector regulators or agencies. Depending on the nature of the transaction, this may be the case, for example, for the telecommunications industry, insurance, oil and gas, electricity, aviation, health insurance, securities and hydro transportation.

CADE has cooperation agreements in place with several other government agencies – including most regulatory agencies and other bodies, such as the Internal Revenue Service – and will regularly interact with them in more complex cases for further information on the markets and these agencies' views on the transaction. This has been the case, for instance, in the recent reviews of *AT&T/Time Warner* (Merger Review No. 08700.001390/2017-14), *Disney/Fox* (Merger Review No. 08700.0044944/2018-53) and *Banco Itaú/XP Investimentos* (Merger Review No. 08700.004852/2018-28).

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no deadline for filing in Brazil, but transactions of mandatory notification cannot be closed or implemented before clearance. Any failure to notify or gun jumping is subject to penalties that can include rendering the deal null and void. In addition, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) may impose penalties ranging from 60,000 to 60 million reais, require the parties to file the transaction for merger control review, and launch an administrative proceeding to investigate whether the parties could have engaged in anticompetitive practices. In international transactions, carve-out agreements (to hold Brazil-related assets separate and consummate the transaction elsewhere) are not acceptable under CADE's current case law.

Notification should be submitted to CADE preferably after the execution of a formal binding document between the parties and, obviously, before the consummation of any act associated with the transaction. Also, it should be submitted, whenever possible, jointly by the parties participating in the transaction.

Regarding gun jumping, article 147, second paragraph, of CADE's Internal Rules states that the parties involved in transactions being reviewed by the agency should keep their facilities and all competitive conditions unaltered until CADE's final decision approving the transaction. In the meantime, it is prohibited any transfer of shares or influence of the parties in each other's business, as well as the exchange of competitively sensitive information outside of what is strictly necessary for the agreement between the parties to be arranged.

CADE has been increasingly strict in enforcing its gun-jumping regulations and has been employing all tools at its disposal to enforce its pre-merger control regime. For instance, CADE negotiated a fine of 30 million reais in Merger Review No. 08700.009018/2015-86 (*Cisco/Technicolor*) after the parties recognised that they closed the transaction during CADE's analysis and made a carve-out of the Brazilian portion of the target. In Merger Review No. 08700.002655/2016-11 (*Blue Cycle/Shimano Inc*), CADE imposed a fine of 1.5 million reais and determined the nullity of the distribution agreement between Blue Cycle and Shimano – this was the first time that the nullity sanction was imposed. In 2017, in the Merger Review No. 08700.007553/2016-83 (*Mataboi Alimentos/JBJ Agropecuária*), after negotiating a pecuniary fine of 664,983.32 reais, CADE blocked a transaction that had already been implemented, based on its effects, and determined that the transaction be undone entirely. Most recently, CADE negotiated a record fine of

57 million reais in the Merger Review No. 08700.001908/2019-73 (*IBM/Red Hat*), when the parties implemented the estimated 132 billion reais transaction worldwide while CADE's review was still ongoing.

Per CADE's decisional practice, in international transactions, carveouts or hold-separate mechanisms for Brazilian assets or businesses (while the transaction is implemented elsewhere) can be seen as a circumvention of the pre-merger control regime and do not exempt gun-jumping violations in Brazil.

Pecuniary sanctions can be collected from any of the parties of the transaction, whichever is easier for CADE. Failure to pay the fine will lead CADE to start proceedings for collection in a federal court.

On 20 May 2015, CADE published gun-jumping guidelines. These guidelines bring examples of the kinds of conduct that may be interpreted by CADE as gun jumping and also suggest measures to mitigate the risk of gun jumping, such as the creation of an antitrust protocol and the creation of clean teams.

Efforts are still undergoing to improve CADE's gun-jumping detection efforts. Internal agency guidelines were issued in 2018 to streamline the assessment of third-party gun-jumping complaints. In July 2019, CADE's Tribunal approved Resolution No. 24/2019 that replaces Resolution No. 13/2015 and establishes procedural aspects for gun-jumping investigations and the report of transactions that do not meet the threshold for mandatory reporting. It also sets forth the criteria for the calculation of gun-jumping fines, which includes the time elapsed since consummation of the transaction and transaction value and other aggravating factors (eg, timing, severity of conduct and intent).

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The law makes no distinction between different parties to a deal, so that all parties (including the seller) are responsible for filing (one filing per deal only), and any party can be punished for non-compliance. The flat filing fee is in the amount of 85,000 reais. The payment receipt of CADE's fee must be submitted along with the filing form on the filing date.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Under article 88 of Law No. 12,529 of 2011, merger control cases must be reviewed within 240 days. This deadline can be extended by 60 days, at the request of the parties, and no more than 90 days, based on a reasonable decision of CADE's Administrative Tribunal. As per CADE's Resolution No. 16/2016, the General Superintendence's decision on fast-track cases should be issued within 30 days of filing or amendment. In 2019, the authority actually cleared simple transactions incapable of raising competition issues in an average period of 16.8 days (plus 15 waiting days after the decision is published by the General Superintendence of CADE in the Official Gazette, during which the clearance can be challenged at CADE, in both fast-track and non-fast-track cases). For ordinary cases, parties should also take into account the pre-notification procedure (ie, time necessary for submitting drafts of the filing form with CADE before it greenlights the filing). The time frame for ordinary cases may substantially vary depending on the complexity of the case, but the 2019 average review period was of 89.4 days. Transactions can neither be closed nor implemented before clearance by CADE.

Transactions carried out in the over-the-counter or in the stock exchange markets do not require CADE's prior clearance to be implemented. However, political rights related to the acquired shares shall not be exercised by the buyer before CADE's approval.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The gun-jumping penalties are:

- to make the deal null and void;
- the payment of a penalty ranging from 60,000 to 60 million reais; and
- the launching of an administrative proceeding if the deal is considered harmful to competition.

There have been several cases in which CADE imposed pecuniary gun-jumping penalties on the parties, and a couple of cases in which CADE made the deal null and void.

### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There are no examples of sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in pure foreign-to-foreign mergers under the new Brazilian Competition Law.

Nevertheless, CADE has stated in its decision-making practice, first in the *Cisco/Technicolor* case (Merger Review No. 08700.009018/2015-86) and most recently in *IBM/Red Hat* (Merger Review No. 08700.003660/2019-85), both international transactions, that carveouts or hold-separate mechanisms for Brazilian assets or businesses (while the transaction is implemented elsewhere) can be seen as a circumvention of the pre-merger control regime and do not exempt gun-jumping violations in Brazil (implying that there will be no distinction for the application of the gun-jumping sanctions on foreign-to-foreign mergers).

### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

CADE may, upon request of the parties, agree with the parties to authorise them to partially implement the transaction so that some measures can be implemented by the parties before a final clearance is issued. This involves a lengthy and uncertain negotiation with the authorities and remains an exceptional measure.

CADE's Internal Rules provide that an injunction and preliminary authorisation may be granted exceptionally when there is no danger of irreparable damage to the conditions of competition in the market, the measures for which authorisation is sought are fully reversible, and the demonstration of imminent substantial and irreversible financial losses to the acquired company.

According to Law No. 12,529 of 2011 and CADE's Internal Rules, upon request, CADE may authorise parties to close a notified transaction before clearance if there would be no irreparable harm to competition, the measures for which the authorisation was requested are fully reversible and the target company would face serious financial losses if it could not proceed more quickly. For the first time since the enactment of Law No. 12,529 of 2011, in December 2017, CADE's Tribunal granted an injunction and preliminary authorisation for the anticipated closing of Merger Review No. 08700.007756/2017-51, involving Excelente BV and Rio de Janeiro Airports. In this exceptional case, the General Superintendence already had unconditionally approved the deal, but the parties would have to wait the statutory 15 days (after the publication of the approval decision in the Official Gazette), during which the clearance could be challenged by CADE's Tribunal. This was a national case related to a public agreement and with a certain background of public and political interest (which is the due activity of the international airport of Rio de Janeiro). According to CADE, should the transaction not be closed immediately, one of the parties would not receive the

necessary capitalisation and payments, which could interrupt the activities of Rio de Janeiro's international airport.

## Public takeovers

### 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The main difference on the merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids is that CADE does not demand their clearance before the offer is consummated. However, CADE still prohibits that any voting rights be exercised by the new owner before clearance.

## Documentation

### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Filing requires the preparation of a notification form (either a simple form for transactions that are eligible for the fast-track proceeding, or a complete form for ordinary transactions). Both forms require corporate information on the parties and the economic groups to which they belong, and on the transaction itself. In contrast to some other jurisdictions, Brazil requires the parties to present a relevant market definition up front. Estimates of market shares for the parties and their main competitors, clients and suppliers are also required, as well as some elaboration on barriers to entry and other market conditions. The information is requested in a substantially more detailed way in the complete filing form, which usually demands a considerable time for the parties to prepare.

The main documents that the parties must present accompanied by the filing form, to the extent that they are available, are:

- a copy of the final version of the contractual instrument concerning the transaction, listing the respective exhibits relevant to the anti-trust review;
- copies of non-compete and shareholders agreements, if any;
- a list containing all other documents that have been prepared in connection with the transaction; and
- the latest annual report or audited financial statements of the parties directly involved in the transaction, and of their respective economic groups.

Other documents are specifically required for non-summary cases, to the extent that they are available, such as copies of reviews, reports, studies, inquiries, presentations and other similar documents prepared with the purpose of evaluating or analysing the proposed transaction, and market studies, researches, reports, forecasts and any other document, either prepared by third parties or not, which are relative to the affected market dynamics.

The payment receipt of CADE's fee must be submitted along with the filing form on the filing date. CADE's filing fee is the same and applied for both fast-track and ordinary proceedings.

There are legal sanctions on supplying wrong or missing (labelled 'false or misleading') information in merger reviews to CADE. Based on article 43 of Law No. 12,529 of 2011, as a general rule, false or misleading information, documents or statements provided by any agent to CADE shall be punishable by a pecuniary fine that may vary from 5,000 to 5 million reais. Moreover, if CADE delivers its clearance decision based on false or misleading information, according to article 91 of Law No. 12,529 of 2011, the applicable fine shall vary from 60,000 to 6 million reais without prejudice to the revision of CADE's previous decision and the adoption of other applicable measures.

In 2016, in Merger Review No. 08700.010688/2013-83 (*JBS/Rodopa*), CADE closed a deal with complex remedies and later learned

that the parties had withheld the information that environmental licences did not allow production levels agreed in the remedies to take effect. CADE fined the parties 3.5 million reais and stated it would not declare the transaction null and void solely because of the delicate financial situation of the target. Still in 2016, in Merger Review No. 08700.002084/2016-14 (*Marcopolo/San Marino*), CADE fined the parties 250,000 reais for misidentifying a company that pertained to the parties' economic group as a competitor. Most recently, in 2020, in Merger Review No. 08700.002566/2019-17 (*Ultra Som/Hapvida/GSFRP*), CADE imposed a fine of 2 million reais on the parties for presenting conflicting market share information at different stages of the merger review proceeding.

Providing accurate information to CADE should be a priority even during pre-notification contacts, since the same regulations also apply. The inaccurate information presented in *Marcopolo/San Marino* was part of pre-notification contacts.

CADE often contacts third parties during market investigations in merger reviews (especially in those not eligible for the fast-track proceeding). Not responding to CADE's requests for information is an administrative violation and can subject offenders to fines between 5,000 and 100,000 reais for each day past the original response deadline.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The review starts at CADE's General Superintendence, which oversees the merger investigation. Within the General Superintendence, all cases are first analysed by a specific unit (Triage Unit) in charge of a preliminary analysis to distinguish fast-track from non-fast-track or complex mergers. The latter ones are to be sent to one of CADE's specialised units (according to the market area involved) for further analysis. The final decision on either path comes from the General Superintendent, who can approve the merger outright as it normally does for fast-track proceeding cases or ordinary cases that are not considered harmful to competition. If the General Superintendence believes the merger cannot be cleared or needs remedies, it challenges the merger to the Tribunal. Therefore, complex cases will certainly take longer and are usually analysed by CADE's Administrative Tribunal. If the merger review is to be analysed by the Administrative Tribunal, a commissioner will be assigned to the case by draw. The commissioner will prepare a report and the decision vote, which is then submitted to the full commission during a public session. The final decision at the tribunal is taken by a majority vote.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Simple transactions incapable of causing any anticompetitive impact may be subject to a fast-track proceeding. This fast-track treatment is granted at the authority's discretion whenever the transaction involves a horizontal overlap inferior to 20 per cent; or a vertical relationship in which none of the parties has more than 30 per cent in any of the vertically related markets; or if the transaction concerns the creation of classic or cooperative joint-ventures; or if it is the entry of a new player; or finally if the horizontal concentration is below 50 per cent and does not surpass a variation of 200 points in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. As per CADE's Resolution No. 16/2016, the General Superintendence's decision on fast-track cases should be issued within 30 days of filing or amendment. In addition, these cases are likely to be reviewed in an average period of 15 days (plus 15 waiting days after the publication of the approval of the General Superintendence of CADE in which the clearance can be challenged at CADE's Tribunal). Ordinary cases will

take longer, up to the 330-day legal limit (yet the average review period is 89.4 days). With regard to cases where remedies have to be negotiated, our experience shows they take an average time of approximately 180 days, especially because usually the commitments do not provide a clear-cut solution, and also because they heavily rely on the timing of the proposal, in addition to the complexity of the transaction, and eventually CADE's need for market tests related to the proposed remedies.

Besides trying to provide the relevant information as completely and clearly as possible and arranging pre-notification meetings with the authorities to try to anticipate discussions with the case handlers, there is not much the parties can do to speed up clearance.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Brazilian Competition Law contains both a dominant position test and a lessening or restriction of competition test. Although not much elaboration has been done regarding either one, in practice most decisions tend (usually implicitly) to focus more on the dominant position test, meaning that a deal will normally be cleared if not deemed to create or strengthen a dominant position, even without a deeper analysis of the possible lessening of competition effects.

In July 2016, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) published the Guideline for the Analysis of Horizontal Concentration Merger Reviews, setting forth the main arguments that would be taken into consideration for the analysis of merger reviews with horizontal concentration.

CADE's recent case law and the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers show a special concern with the loss of a firm through a transaction that may facilitate coordination among the remaining firms in the industry, leading to reduced output, increased prices or diminished innovation. Further, the authority recognises the principle that a reduction in the number of firms in a market increases the potential for coordinated conduct, including both overt and tacit collusion.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No, it is the same test applicable to mergers, with the already mentioned exemption of joint ventures aiming at taking part in public bids, which are not subject to merger review by CADE.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

In accordance with the Brazilian Competition Law, the authority will investigate transactions that lead either to market dominance or to a lessening of competition. For these purposes, the authority will analyse both unilateral effects and coordinated effects, though the former are much more frequently used in practice. Vertical issues are becoming more important in the review and several remedies have already been imposed based on foreclosure or essential facility-like theories, and CADE may even seek structural remedies in vertical cases. One recent feature in the review, especially for full-form cases, is that the Brazilian authority tends to pay attention to conglomerate effects of the transaction.



## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Traditionally, non-competition issues such as industrial policy or public interest are not factored into the review process by the competition authorities. Other government bodies cannot intervene in merger control analysis but merely participate on whatever grounds they deem appropriate. In February 2018, CADE and the Central Bank entered into an agreement regarding each agency's jurisdiction in merger control cases involving the banking sector, ending a long dispute over their jurisdiction for such cases. Mergers in the banking sector must now be submitted to both agencies, but transactions in which delay in closing may pose 'high and imminent' risks to the stability of the Brazilian financial system – at the Central Bank's discretion – may be unilaterally approved by the Central Bank and CADE will have to approve the deal without restrictions as well, based on the aspects of a prudential nature applied by the Central Bank.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The economic efficiency defence is expressly accepted by the Brazilian Competition Law within certain conditions, which include evidence that the gains will also benefit consumers. Although they are regularly analysed and taken into account in substantially complex transactions, it is fairly uncommon for CADE to authorise a deal based on efficiencies alone. In the authority's opinion, efficiencies presented by the parties in merger transactions are rarely accepted because they are normally either unproven, not related to the transaction, insufficient to justify the approval, or there is no evidence that they will be passed on to the consumers.

CADE has been adopting high standards of proof in the analysis of efficiency claims and, as a rule, efficiencies normally are not decisive for the clearance of a given transaction, especially if it involves significant concentration in the markets involved. Even so, there are some cases in which the efficiency claims were accepted by CADE and therefore played a more relevant role to approve a transaction without restrictions, such as:

- Merger Review No. 08700.009559/2015-12 (*TNT/Fedex*), after the appeal opposed by a third party, CADE's Tribunal maintained the unconditional clearance decision posed by the General Superintendence and, among other arguments, understood that there were duly quantified efficiencies that demonstrated that the net effect of the transaction is at least non-negative;
- Merger Review No. 08700.003252/2016-81 (*Casino/Dia*), efficiency claims of countervailing power;
- Merger Review No. 08700.012062/2015-73 (*Universal Studios/Sony Pictures*), efficiency claims of costs reduction owing to the sharing of the distribution agreement; and
- Merger Review No. 08700.010033/2015-77 (*TIM/Vivo/Claro/Oi*), efficiency claims of costs reduction owing to the sharing of infrastructure.

Moreover, CADE's practice is to assess efficiencies only at the latest stage of the merger review (ie, after being unable to ascertain that the exercise of market power is unlikely through the traditional analyses of merger control, especially in vertical mergers), as an opportunity to the parties to demonstrate that the effects of the transaction are non-negative. This careful assessment of the efficiencies was reinforced in merger review No. 08700.004446/2017-84 (*Essilor/Luxottica*), in which CADE clarified that its assessment of efficiencies would take place only

in case it could not discard the possibility of exercising market power in earlier steps of the merger review, following third-party complaints that efficiencies were unproven. If it is the case, CADE will likely decide for additional investigation that gives the parties the opportunity to present efficiencies in complex deals, and these may be used as a base to negotiate remedies further.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) has very broad enforcement powers, with the law expressly allowing it to take whatever measures are deemed necessary to remedy damages caused by a transaction, including up to dissolution or break-up of a company. As an administrative authority, CADE can request judicial backing to forcibly carry out decisions such as the collection of fines or the performance of a specific obligation. Since the pre-merger control regime in Brazil entered into force by means of Law No. 12,529/2011 in 2012, CADE has reported to have increased the use of remedies in complex deals or transactions reviewed under a non-fast-track proceeding. Since the enactment of Law No. 12,529/2011 in 2012, remedies have been rather negotiated between CADE and the parties, and unilateral imposition of restrictions by CADE on the deals are rare.

In addition, CADE has the power to require, within one year of the date of consummation, the submission of any merger to analysis, even when the specific merger is not included under the thresholds provided by Law No. 12,529/2011.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. CADE has a tradition of attempting, whenever possible, to remedy specific competition problems rather than blocking a whole deal. Divestment and behavioural commitments have been adopted, tailored to the characteristics of the markets affected, targeting, for instance, brands, production facilities and distribution networks. If, in the post-merger notification regime, such undertakings were mostly unilaterally imposed by CADE, in the pre-merger notification regime it is expected that discussing and negotiating the commitments with CADE will be routine for more complex cases and within the new (and shorter) time frames envisaged in the Brazilian Competition Law. Although, in theory, CADE tends to favour structural remedies owing to its liquidity (as indicated in 2018 CADE's Remedies Guidelines), the practice shows that, in particular since 2016, most of the remedies negotiated by CADE have been behavioural ones – although remedy discussions always occur on a case-by-case basis. Such behavioural remedies may include objective pricing criteria, transparent commercial policies, as well as prohibitions to impose exclusivity, discriminatory conditions, tying and bundling strategies.

A noteworthy highlight of CADE's recent decision-making practice was the recent reassessment of *Disney/Fox* (Merger Review No. 08700.004494/2018-53). CADE had originally approved the deal in February 2019 subject to the sale of Fox's *Fox Sports* pay-TV channels, as part of a divestment package that was also adopted in other jurisdictions. However, the assets failed to attract viable buyers in Brazil. In May 2020, CADE reviewed its decision and approved the deal subject to new behavioural conditions. However, CADE noted that this was only possible because the parties clearly demonstrated that they had undertaken all efforts to comply with the initial conditions. Previously, CADE had ordered a deal to be undone (*JBS/Rodopa* – Merger Review No.



08700.010866/2013-83), when divestments failed to attract bidders and the parties offered no other conditions that could remedy anticompetitive concerns.

**26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?**

The remedies have to be specific, they should address the competition problems raised by the deal, and they have to be adequate to the market. CADE is usually concerned with the effects of the remedies on consumers rather than on competitors – although remedy discussions always occur on a case-by-case basis. Timing will depend on the specific remedy being adopted by the authorities; however, offering remedies earlier on in the process in complex cases may increase the chances of successfully negotiating remedies with CADE. Based on article 165 of CADE's Internal Rules, CADE may receive proposals of remedies from the parties from the filing up to 30 days after the challenge by the General Superintendence to CADE's Tribunal.

**27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?**

There has never been a foreign-to-foreign case involving foreign companies without any assets in Brazil (parties exclusively active in Brazil through export sales) in which remedies were required by the authorities. Foreign-to-foreign mergers involving assets in Brazil have been subject to the same remedies mentioned above.

### Ancillary restrictions

**28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?**

Clearance decisions routinely include non-compete provisions. In 2009, CADE released two internal rulings (Súmulas 4 and 5) based on its case law and consolidating the understanding about such ancillary agreements. In Súmula 4, CADE consolidated the understanding that it will accept non-compete agreements in joint ventures, provided that they have a close relationship with their corporate purposes and their relevant markets. In Súmula 5, CADE consolidated its prevailing understanding that a reasonable period for such non-compete agreements is five years as of the acquisition of the company or business, provided that it is related only to the affected business sold. CADE has frequently ordered the parties, even in foreign-to-foreign mergers, to change the original agreement if a non-compete clause provides for a longer period or comprises a broader market or territory. Ancillary exclusivity agreements can also be covered by the decision, and CADE has in the past ordered the elimination of exclusivity clauses it did not deem reasonably justified.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

**29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?**

Clients, suppliers and competitors are often involved in non-fast track cases, voluntarily or upon a calling by the authorities. Third parties can present submissions, request meetings with officials or even challenge the clearance made by the General Superintendence. Often, the authorities also bring clients and competitors into the process by sending them official requests for opinions and additional information. Their input is traditionally taken into consideration by the authorities. Third parties that act in bad faith may receive penalties that vary from 5,000 to 5 million reais.

### Publicity and confidentiality

**30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?**

The process is given full publicity. After notification, CADE publishes in the Official Gazette a summary of the notification, including the names of the parties and inviting comments from anyone. The parties and third parties can require confidential treatment of certain information, but the remaining files are public and can be accessed at CADE's website. If relevant business information such as business secrets is requested during the review, the parties may request restricted access to that information or confidential treatment. The decision is also published in the Official Gazette and, for the merger reviews that reach CADE's Administrative Tribunal, the decision will be taken in an open public session, which is streamed in real time through CADE's website.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

**31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?**

CADE has cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding with several jurisdictions, including Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the European Union, Italy, Mercosur countries (Argentina and Paraguay), BRICS countries (China, Russia and South Africa), Portugal, the United States, Peru, Colombia, Japan and South Korea. CADE has also signed similar agreements with the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group. Contacts and discussion between Brazilian authorities and those of other jurisdictions are steadily increasing, especially with respect to the investigation of international cartels, and stimulated by repeated contacts in international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Competition Network.

It is said that the new framework also incentivises greater interaction and coordination between CADE and international antitrust authorities during ordinary merger reviews, including the coordination of remedies. At the same time, such interaction and experience has substantially improved the design and implementation of remedies by CADE in comparison to past precedents. In 2019, the OECD accepted Brazil's application for membership as associate member of the entity's Competition Committee.

CADE can, in international cases, cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions and may share information with them if the parties grant a waiver. In 2019, for instance, CADE cooperated with the agencies in the European Union and the United States in *IBM/Red Hat* (Merger Review No. 08700.001908/2019-73); South Africa in *GSK/Pfizer* (Merger Review No. 08700.001206/2019-90); Chile, Mexico, the United States and Argentina in *Disney/Fox* (Merger Review No. 08700.004494/2018-53); and Mexico, Chile and the European Union in *Avon/Natura* (Merger Review No. 08700.004028/2019-59).

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

**32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?**

Administrative appeals against the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE)'s decisions are submitted to the same panel of commissioners, as it is a one-tier agency within the Brazilian public administration. This means that decisions are rarely changed in the administrative sphere, unless there is evidence of a new fact or document that could result in a more favourable decision. However, the parties always have the right to go to court to challenge a CADE decision.

The Brazilian Constitution provides for the judicial review of administrative acts. If the capacity of the courts to go over procedural aspects is unlimited, the extent to which they can review the merits of CADE decisions remains unclear and will only be decided by the judiciary itself as more appeals reach the higher courts in the next few years.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

As judicial review in Brazil begins with a court of first instance and may ascend on successive appeals up to the Supreme Court, a final judicial decision on an administrative act may take several years. However, an injunction suspending the effects of CADE's decision may be obtained in a few weeks. This will tend to be the crucial judicial battle, in that if the appealing parties do not get an injunction suspending a CADE order immediately, they will have to comply with it first and then wait for years until a final judicial decision is issued. The number of court challenges to CADE decisions on merger cases is still quite small, but at least in some high-profile cases, parties were able to secure an injunction suspending a divestment order until the end of the judicial review.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Enforcement of the notification rules was quite rigorous under the former law, and led to a large number of penalties imposed for non-compliance including foreign-to-foreign mergers. Unfiled deals, which were subsequently discovered, were almost always fined. The Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) has already imposed several penalties for gun-jumping events. Moreover, CADE has been imposing several remedies (be it structural or behavioural) in several transactions that are considered harmful to competition.

In the merger control area, apart from the already published gun-jumping guidelines, CADE published a Guideline for the Analysis of Horizontal Concentration Merger Reviews, setting forth the main arguments that are taken into consideration for the analysis of merger reviews with horizontal concentration.

In October 2018, CADE issued the Guidelines on Remedies, which gathers the best practices and procedures adopted by CADE in the design, implementation and monitoring of remedies established by the agency. In April 2019, CADE issued the Guidelines for the submission of standardised information, as requested by the agency, to the Department of Economic Studies, to improve and expedite the analysis of the cases.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

No.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

Merger control activity in Brazil fluctuated somewhat in the period of the economic crisis in Brazil, but the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) reviewed a record of 433 cases in 2019 (a record since 2015), with high-profile cases including *IBM/Red Hat*

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(Merger Review No. 08700.001908/2019-73), *GSK/Pfizer* (Merger Review No. 08700.001206/2019-90), *Disney/Fox* (Merger Review No. 08700.004494/2018-53) and *Avon/Natura* (Merger Review No. 08700.004028/2019-59). No cases were blocked by CADE in 2019.

A noteworthy highlight of CADE's recent decision-making practice was the recent reassessment of *Disney/Fox*. CADE had originally approved the deal in February 2019 subject to the sale of Fox's *Fox Sports* pay-TV channels, as part of a divestment package that was also adopted in other jurisdictions. However, the assets failed to attract viable buyers in Brazil. In May 2020, CADE reviewed its decision and approved the deal subject to new behavioural conditions. However, CADE noted that this was only possible because the parties clearly demonstrated that they had undertaken all efforts to comply with the initial conditions. Previously, CADE had ordered a deal to be undone (*JBS/Rodopa* – Merger Review No. 08700.010866/2013-83) when divestments failed to attract bidders and the parties offered no other conditions that could remedy anticompetitive concerns. A recent trend observed in CADE's remedies practice is that it has evolved to accept the inclusion of third-party trustees for monitoring the compliance with the negotiated remedies and to employ arbitration clauses to solve disputes in an effort to reduce monitoring costs to the authority.

CADE has also been paying keen attention to information obtained during market tests in merger review proceedings, including from customers and competitors, to support new investigations into potential anticompetitive practices. For instance, in *IBM/Red Hat*, CADE launched a new proceeding to investigate whether Red Hat had been refusing to certify rival software and, in *Disney/Fox*, CADE launched a new proceeding to investigate whether smaller pay-TV operators had been discriminated against when purchasing programming.

From the beginning of 2019, CADE had a special focus on gun-jumping investigations. It launched 14 such investigations in 2019, and issued a decision in seven cases, with fines being applied in four of them.

In July 2019, CADE's Tribunal approved Resolution No. 24/2019, which replaces Resolution No. 13/2015 and establishes procedural aspects for gun-jumping investigations and the report of transactions that do not meet the threshold for mandatory reporting. It also sets forth the criteria for the calculation of gun-jumping fines based on CADE's practices, including aggravating factors (eg, timing, severity of conduct and intent). On the same date, CADE approved Resolution No. 25/2019, which provides for the formal aspects and standards for the Commissioners of CADE's Tribunal to write and present their votes on cases before they are read during CADE's hearing sessions.

During the covid-19 crisis, CADE released a statement reinforcing the agency's commitment to continue its activities, adapting to the health restrictions in place. Most of the agency's staff are able to work remotely, which has made video and audio conferences a routine. Deadlines for merger control proceedings were not suspended; on the contrary, merger control analysis will be prioritised by CADE (but may see delays due to the difficulty in obtaining data from companies).

Lastly, in terms of internal organisation, CADE's Tribunal has seven seats: one for the agency's president and the other six for appointed commissioners. Currently, all seats are filled. New commissioners are appointed by the federal president and go through a confirmation process in the Brazilian Senate.

# Bulgaria

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The principal piece of legislation regulating merger control in Bulgaria is the Protection of Competition Act (PCA). The Bulgarian national competition authority, the Commission on Protection of Competition (the Commission), has been entrusted with enforcing merger control rules under national law. It has issued a standard notification form (updated as of 2 January 2020 by a Decision No. 1384, dated 19 December 2019), and guidance on its completion, which are available on the Commission's website.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The PCA defines a merger (concentration) among undertakings as a lasting change of control, which results from the legal merger or amalgamation of two or more previously independent undertakings, or the case where one or more persons, already controlling at least one undertaking, acquire control, directly or indirectly, in respect of other undertakings or parts of them, by way of acquisition of shares or property, by contract or by any other means.

Changes of control on a temporary basis are generally not caught by local merger control. Examples of situations where control is acquired on a temporary basis include the acquisition by an intermediate buyer in preparation for the transfer of the business to a final controlling shareholder during a short period of time, as well as situations such as a short-term lease of a business. Conditional transactions (such as those related to put and call options) are also generally not considered to occasion concentrations upon their entry, but rather upon the fulfilment of the relevant conditions.

While a concentration can arise both where control of an entire undertaking is being transferred and where control is transferred in respect of only part of that undertaking, transactions where control is transferred in respect of certain assets, solely for the purpose of a particular service being provided back to the transferor or its group by an outside supplier (outsourcing), are generally not considered to result in a concentration, unless the transferred part of the business will have access to the market outside the outsourcing relationship.

Changes between sole and joint control and vice versa, as well as changes in the jointly controlling parents, are usually considered to represent a concentration. The conversion between positive and negative sole control is normally not considered to constitute a merger for the purposes of merger control.

Acquisitions of control by individuals or entities, which do not themselves constitute an undertaking and do not control previously one or more undertakings, have also been considered not to represent a

concentration. However, the Commission has used a very broad interpretation in respect of the concept of undertaking in this context.

Similarly to other jurisdictions, transactions where credit and other financial institutions or insurance undertakings, which deal in securities on own account or on account of others, hold temporarily securities of an undertaking for the purpose of resale, are not considered to represent a concentration, provided they do not exercise the voting rights attached to these securities for the purpose of influencing the competitive conduct of the undertaking, or exercise such voting rights only to the extent necessary to prepare the transfer of the securities that should be fulfilled within one year of their acquisition.

The acquisition of control by a person entrusted with functions in the context of liquidation or insolvency of the undertaking is also not considered a concentration for the purposes of Bulgarian merger control. The acquisition by financial holding companies of control, where such control is exercised solely to maintain the value of the investment, but not to determine the competitive behaviour of the undertakings in which the holding participates, either directly or indirectly, is also not caught by local merger control rules.

Finally, intra-group reorganisations, where ultimately control remains the same, are also not considered to represent a concentration.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an economically autonomous entity is considered a concentration. As above, short-term alliances (eg, consortia established solely for the purpose of bidding for and performing a particular public contract) generally do not constitute a concentration. However, the continuation of their activity on a lasting basis upon change of the original intent may be caught by merger control rules.

The acquisition of joint control of a pre-existing undertaking can also trigger the application of these rules.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The PCA defines control as the acquisition of rights, the entry into agreements or other means that as a matter of law or fact, together or individually, would allow the exercise of decisive influence on an undertaking by acquiring ownership or use of all or part of its assets or acquiring rights, including on the basis of an agreement, which afford the ability to exercise decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of the undertaking.

Acquisitions of minority shareholdings do not trigger Bulgarian merger control rules, unless they result in the acquisition of control within the sense explained above.

In this context, the Commission has taken into account the ability of a minority shareholding to exercise de facto control, considering

factors such as the fact that the remaining shareholdings are widely dispersed, and therefore a sufficiently large minority interest is capable of achieving a decision-making majority in the bodies of the undertaking, in particular considering the history of majorities in such bodies. A minority shareholding can also afford negative sole control where a single shareholder alone is capable of blocking strategic decisions, despite the fact that neither it, nor any other shareholder is capable of adopting them by itself, and provided joint control is not present otherwise.

Joint control results from the ability of several independent parents, jointly to exercise decisive influence on the undertaking, as a result of factors such as their agreement to vote together on particular strategic issues, or their ability to adopt or veto strategic decisions, considering the applicable majorities, the existing shareholdings and other arrangements.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A transaction that represents a concentration would need to be notified to and cleared by the Commission, where the jurisdictional threshold detailed below is met, provided, however, such concentration is not subject to notification and clearance by the European Commission under the EU Merger Regulation. The threshold is as follows:

- the combined aggregate annual turnover of all the undertakings participating in the concentration in the territory of Bulgaria during the preceding financial year exceeding 25 million levs; and
- either the annual turnover of each of at least two of the participating undertakings in the concentration in the territory of Bulgaria during the preceding financial year exceeding 3 million levs; or
- the annual turnover in the territory of Bulgaria during the preceding financial year of the undertakings, subject to acquisition, exceeding 3 million levs.

As a consequence of the second alternative component in the jurisdictional threshold (turnover of the target), situations may arise where the threshold is passed and the notification obligation is triggered, by reason of the target's turnover alone, even though the acquirer may have had no or very little turnover in Bulgaria during the preceding financial year.

Transactions that are below the thresholds cannot be investigated on their merits under Bulgarian merger control. The parties are, however, free, if in doubt, to notify such transactions on a voluntary basis. In such cases the Commission, without reviewing the case on the merits, has to issue a decision that the transaction does not fall within the scope of the prior notification obligation.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Where the local notification thresholds are exceeded, the filing is mandatory, unless the transaction also triggers the thresholds for notification to and clearance by the European Commission under the EU Merger Regulation, in which case the European Commission would have jurisdiction. Nevertheless, where the European Commission, despite having jurisdiction, has referred the case to the Bulgarian competition authority under the conditions laid down in the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission would have jurisdiction to review the case, provided the Bulgarian notification threshold (see above) has been exceeded.

No exceptions to the mandatory filing obligation are currently available.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified where the thresholds for notification are met. In this respect, there is no distinction between foreign-to-foreign and purely local mergers. The fact that the Bulgarian jurisdictional thresholds are met has been considered sufficient by the Commission to assert jurisdiction irrespective of any local effects or nexus considerations. Such considerations, the Commission has held, are relevant to the assessment of the concentration as part of the merger control proceedings, but not to the obligation to notify.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are generally no rules specific to foreign investments (ie, general prudential supervision of shareholding rules as regards certain regulated entities apply equally to local and foreign investors). Exceptions to this are certain restrictions on foreign investments in the real estate sector and investments and activities by offshore companies and their affiliates. However, these do not factor in the Bulgarian merger control process.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no specific filing deadline; however, given that notification and clearance should precede the acquisition of control and should be submitted prior to undertaking of factual and legal actions to implement the transaction, the parties would be well advised to submit their filing sufficient time in advance to allow the decision of the Commission to be issued in time.

As there is no filing deadline, there are no sanctions related to late filing. As regards closing the transaction without having submitted a notification or prior to clearance, see below.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The persons acquiring control (directly or indirectly) are the parties responsible for filing. These, depending on the circumstances of the case, may be the direct parties to the transactions, their parents or the specific entities established to take control or otherwise participate in the concentration.

In the case of a legal merger, the merging parties would be under an obligation to file.

A filing fee of 2,000 levs applies. In addition, a clearance fee of 0.1 per cent of the combined aggregate Bulgarian turnover of the participating undertakings for the latest preceding financial year would apply where a clearance decision is issued. This fee is capped at 60,000 levs.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Where notification is mandatory, implementation of the transaction must be suspended prior to clearance. The suspension does not apply in the case of a tender offer or a series of transactions in securities admitted to trade in regulated markets of financial instruments, by which control is acquired from different sellers, provided the Commission is notified without delay, and also provided the acquirer does not exercise

the rights attached to the securities, except to the extent necessary to protect the value of the investment made.

After submission of the notification, the Commission has three working days to review the filing as to whether it is complete. If the Commission considers the filing complete, the chairperson will initiate proceedings. If the filing is incomplete, the Commission will inform the parties and initiate proceedings only after the deficiencies in the information or documents have been rectified.

As of the day following the day of initiation of proceedings, the Commission, in an accelerated (Phase I) proceedings, has to review the notification within a period of 25 working days. The review period is instructive and its expiry without a decision does not lead to a presumptive clearance. Requests for additional information during the proceedings stop the clock, and the review timeline is correspondingly extended.

The Phase I review period can be extended by up to 10 working days at the parties' request, to allow them to prepare proposals for changes to the concentration. If proposals for changes to the concentration are submitted, the review period is automatically extended by a further 10 working days to allow the Commission to review and analyse the proposed proposals for changes to the concentration.

Where, during the Phase I proceedings, the Commission has come to the conclusion that the concentration raises serious doubts that it may lead to the creation or strengthening of dominance as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded, it may initiate an in-depth (Phase II) investigation into the case.

The Phase II investigation must be completed within four months of the publication in the Commission's online electronic register of the decision to open the Phase II investigation. In complex cases, this period can be extended by up to an additional 25 working days. In case of a remedies offer, the timeline for review is automatically extended by 15 working days. The review periods in Phase II are also instructive and no implied clearance is available should they not be met.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses in violation of the suspension obligation or without having submitted a notification and obtained clearance where this is mandatory can result in the imposition of sanctions in an amount of up to 10 per cent of the infringing parties' annual turnover.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Sanctions are applied in such cases.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Commission has not objected to carve-out closing, where the transaction may be implemented in other jurisdictions, but is not implemented in Bulgaria pending clearance from the Commission. The way in which this is achieved would depend in each particular case, considering the parties' activities in Bulgaria, but in general would involve the undertaking of legal obligations that the concentration will not be accomplished as regards Bulgaria until the Commission has issued its decision.

The Commission does not have the authority to waive the standstill obligation neither of its own initiative, nor at the request of the parties.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

In the case of public takeover bids in respect of publicly listed companies whose shares are traded in regulated markets of financial instruments, the suspension obligation does not apply, subject to notification without delay and provided the acquirer of control does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities, except where necessary to protect the value of the investment. In this context, notification without delay would normally mean that the notification should be submitted as soon as possible and in any case before the actual acquisition of control has taken place.

Planned concentrations should normally be notified after the publication of the bid, but may occasionally be notified before that, if the parties can demonstrate a good faith intention to make such a bid. It must be underlined, however, that no exception to the notice publication requirement has been provided for such cases.

### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The notification must contain information on the undertakings concerned, as well as their groups, the nature of the concentration as well as the mechanism and time frame in which control will be acquired, the economic rationale of the transaction, description of the relevant markets in which the parties operate, including their market shares, annual turnovers and any barriers to market entry that affect competition in these markets, their main competitors, suppliers and customers, as well as the parties' view as to why the transaction will not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in any relevant market as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded. Usually, documents evidencing the corporate existence of the parties are attached to the notification, the transaction documents giving rise to the change of control on a lasting basis, the annual reports of the undertakings concerned, a power of attorney, organisational charts of the parties' groups, a draft public notice on the transaction and various other documents that reflect the parties' positions in the relevant markets before the concentration.

In practice, the level of detail of the data required has been considerably increased in the new model notification, effective as of 2 January 2020, particularly in respect of 'significantly affected markets; which arise if there is: a horizontal overlap leading to a combined market share of 15 per cent or more; or a vertical overlap or conglomerate effects raising individual or combined share of 25 per cent or more in any affected product markets. Less detailed information is required for markets that are not considered 'significantly affected'.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

After submission of the filing, the Commission's administration will review the notification and attachments and where they are complete, the chairperson of the Commission will initiate proceedings on the case (a case number is assigned).

Once proceedings are initiated, a brief notice concerning the case is published on the website of the Commission (draft of which is provided by the parties to the merger control proceedings).

During the proceedings, the Commission often sends questionnaires to the parties and to their major competitors, suppliers and



customers, who in addition to providing information, are invited to express their views concerning the merger.

At this stage or with the notification, the parties can offer remedies to address specific competition concerns that arise out of the transaction.

After the Phase I review, the Commission will issue a decision by which it:

- 1 declares that the transaction does not constitute a concentration or does not fall within the scope of article 24;
- 2 clears the transaction unconditionally;
- 3 clears the transaction subject to conditions and obligations; or
- 4 initiates in-depth (Phase II) proceedings on the case.

The decision under (4) above cannot be appealed. The decision at the end of Phase I is issued without a hearing of the parties. Access to the file can be provided only after the Phase I decision is issued.

The actions following the initiation of Phase II investigation follow a similar pattern to those under a Phase I proceeding. Interested third parties can submit observations within 30 days of publication of the decision opening the Phase II investigation on the Commission's website.

At the end of the review, the Commission will either issue an unconditional clearance, or adopt a statement of objections, addressed to the notifying party or parties.

The parties will have 14 days or more to respond to the statement of objections and access the file. After they submit their response, they also have the right to be heard in an open sitting of the authority, which can take place no sooner than two weeks after the expiry of the deadline for the submission of the response.

At the end of the Phase II investigation, the Commission will issue a decision by which it:

- approves the transaction unconditionally;
- approves the transaction subject to conditions and obligations; or
- prohibits the transaction.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

In practice, most mergers are reviewed within the 25-working-day review period prescribed by the law for a Phase I (accelerated) proceeding. The Commission rarely shortens its review below this period and also rarely extends it beyond it by any significant amount of time. However, it takes additional time, after the adoption of the Commission's decision, for the parties to be notified.

The preliminary review for completeness of the notification sometimes exceeds the legally allowed three working days following the submission of the notification. In almost all cases the Commission makes use of its ability to request additional information during the preliminary review process (after submission of notification), which extends the period for initiation of the case itself and the deadlines for the decision, respectively.

In Phase II proceedings, in most cases the Commission has issued its decision sooner than the expiry of the four-month period prescribed by the Protection of Competition Act.

The review periods vary depending on the nature and complexity of the case. In principle, the Commission follows the statutory periods for examination and its internal guidelines within the assessment of the specific transaction.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A transaction will be cleared where it does not lead to the creation or strengthening of a single or collective dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded.

The Commission may clear a concentration that would lead to the creation or strengthening of dominance where it aims to modernise the relevant economic activity, improvement of the structures of the market, better meeting interests of consumers and overall the positive effects would outweigh any negative effects on competition in the relevant markets.

The authority's analysis in merger cases is focused on the dominance test and the potential for impediment to competition, particularly having regard to existing entry barriers, including barriers to expansion of existing competitors. Positive effects have rarely, if at all, been the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the review process. Traditionally, the Commission's analysis has often focused on horizontal and vertical non-coordinated effects.

The Commission's case law has occasionally ventured outside the boundaries of the dominance test, by accepting remedies that in essence resolve issues falling outside the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No, the dominance test applies also to joint ventures.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Commission's analysis is essentially focused on dominance, and by extension any horizontal or vertical non-coordinated effects that will arise as a result of the transaction, to the extent that these are a direct result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Conglomerate issues and coordinated effects have rarely, if at all, featured in the reasoning of the Commission's decisions. The Commission also has expressed on several occasions the view that potential abusive conduct by the resulting group falls outside the merger control analysis, which should focus on the change in the process of competition that will result directly from the merger.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues would not normally be considered in the Commission's analysis as regards mergers, except where such noncompetition issues constitute positive effects of the transaction, which have to be considered in the balance with any factors impeding competition as a result of the transaction.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

As discussed above, economic efficiencies are considered to only a limited extent. Normally the analysis is focused on the possible harm to competition as a result of the transaction and ways to address this. Only once they have been addressed or mitigated to a significant extent



can any efficiencies come into play to finalise the Commission's overall assessment. Where serious competition issues arise, efficiencies alone have never been sufficient to tip the balance between prohibiting and clearing the transaction.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Commission has the power to prohibit a concentration. It also has the power to clear the transaction subject to conditions and obligations. In a Phase I proceeding, the conditions and obligations should correspond to the proposals for changes to the concentration offered by the parties. At the end of a Phase II proceeding, the Commission itself may choose the remedies it can attach to its clearance decision as conditions and obligations.

Where a notifiable concentration was completed in contravention of a prohibition decision or without clearance, where it finds that the transaction should have been prohibited or cleared subject to conditions and obligations, in addition to imposing any sanctions, the Commission can impose any measures it deems necessary to restore effective competition in the relevant markets, including separation of capital, shares or assets, and termination of joint control.

As noted, the Commission may withdraw its clearance decision where it is based on incomplete, incorrect, untrue or misleading information, or where the parties have failed to comply with the conditions and obligations attached to the clearance decision aimed at preserving effective competition and limiting its negative impact on the market concerned. The decision of the Commission may also be revoked by the court.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The parties are free to offer any remedies, behavioural or structural, that they consider capable of addressing any competition issues that may arise as a result of the merger. During the Phase I proceedings, the Commission can accept or reject them. During the Phase II proceedings, the Commission may also impose remedies of its own initiative, or modify the remedies offered by the parties in its final decision.

In general, the preference so far in the Commission's case law has been towards behavioural remedies.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The parties can offer remedies at any time during the proceedings before the Commission, including with the notification itself. Guidance on the preparation and submission of such an offer is provided in rules for imposing measures to safeguard competition in case of concentrations between undertakings, which were adopted by Commission Decision No. 1776 of 20 December 2011.

Where accepted, the remedies become binding on the notifying party as conditions and obligations attached to the clearance decision. The obligations usually have a specific deadline by which they need to be fulfilled, but there are also cases where open-ended obligations have been adopted.

The Commission has the power to control the fulfilment of the conditions and obligations, with a corresponding obligation of the parties to inform the Commission about the performance of its decision.

Where the parties have failed to comply, the Commission may impose sanctions upon them and in addition may reopen the case and withdraw the clearance decision.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Commission has adopted remedies as conditions and obligations attached to its clearance decision on several occasions in foreign-to-foreign mergers. In some cases, these have been remedies offered on a global basis across a number of jurisdictions, which were then also transposed in the Bulgarian merger control proceedings, and in others these have been remedies specific to Bulgaria.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The Commission generally follows closely the European Commission's practice as regards ancillary restraints. On a number of occasions, the Commission has held that such restrictions should be considered cleared with the decision clearing the concentration, provided they are deemed directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. Where the Commission is seized with the matter of such ancillary agreements, it would normally discuss them in the reasoning of its decision.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Main customers and main competitors are routinely involved in the review process by being invited to provide their position on the transaction, along with any specific information and documents the case handlers deem necessary.

Unless they are constituted as parties or interested third parties in the proceedings, they would not normally have access to the file.

However, where they have a legal interest, they can appeal the Commission's final decision in the framework of judicial review.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Shortly following the opening of the proceedings on the case, a brief notice of the notified transaction is published on the Commission's website. This notice is drafted by the parties and attached to the notification, but may be amended by the Commission before it is published. Therefore, the parties must expect that the transaction will become public shortly after they have submitted the merger notification to the Commission.

Documents containing commercial and other secrets must be accordingly noted (by placing a stamp or written note that the document is confidential on each page) at the time of their submission to the authority. At that time or shortly thereafter, the parties must also provide a non-confidential version of the confidential documents, along with a list of all confidential and non-confidential documents and reasoning for the requests for confidentiality. The confidential document is then excluded from the access to the file and its content will not be replicated in the public version of the Commission's decision.

The Commission may, on a request of a party or of its own initiative, waive the confidentiality of particular information or documents, where it considers they are not confidential, or where this is necessary to prove an infringement or for effective exercise of the rights of defence of the parties. The party (including a non-participating third party) whose information is disclosed has the right to appeal against the disclosure in the framework of judicial review.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Bulgarian competition authority is a member of the European Competition Network – the information sharing network of all competition authorities in the European Union. In this network it actively cooperates with other authorities, particularly in the case of multi-jurisdictional merger filings. Cooperation may be limited to exchanging information, or may extend to sharing views on the scope of relevant markets, the effect that the particular concentration may have upon them and how any competition issues may be remedied. A waiver of confidentiality is often requested from the notifying party for the purposes of such information exchange within the European Competition Network.

The Commission has also entered into bilateral memorandums on cooperation with competition authorities of Azerbaijan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Kosovo, Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and others.

In addition, the Commission actively participates in cooperation on competition issues within the International Competition Network, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the competition forum of UNCTAD, and certain other international initiatives.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

All decisions of the Commission ending the proceedings (with the exception of a decision opening a Phase II investigation) are subject to judicial review. The parties to the proceedings, as well as all interested third parties, can bring an appeal against the decision in the framework of judicial review.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The deadline for submitting an appeal is 14 days, which for the parties to the proceedings starts as of the moment they are notified of the decision, and for third parties, from the moment the decision is published on the website of the Commission.

The judicial review process can go through two instances – a first instance consisting of review by one judge at the Administrative Court of Sofia District, and a cassation instance, consisting of review by a panel of three judges at the Supreme Administrative Court. While the review periods vary depending on the complexity of the case and the workload of the court at the relevant time, normally the proceedings on the case should be complete within a period of one to two years.

An appeal does not suspend the effect of a clearance decision, in respect of which immediate execution derives from the law or the Commission's ruling, unless the court explicitly orders the suspension of its implementation.

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## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Commission routinely reviews and decides on foreign-to-foreign, foreign-to-local and local-to-local mergers, without distinction. It also imposes sanctions for failing to notify a merger, where notification was necessary, including in the cases of foreign-to-foreign mergers.

Recently, the Commission's focus has been on strengthening the pre-notification process. Thus, ideally, the Commission would like to have a full set of documents and information it considers it needs from the notifying party before starting the clock. This, occasionally, may extend the process and the parties should adjust their expectations to this approach. In addition, based on the model notification form effective as of 2 January 2020, the focus would be to distinguish the cases that bring about 'significantly affected markets', in which case more detailed information would be required from the parties and those that do not.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are no current proposals to amend the applicable legislation that has been published.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

No updates at this time.

# Canada

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

In Canada, the federal Competition Act (the Act) establishes jurisdiction for the review of mergers affecting any market in Canada. The Act is enforced by the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner), who is appointed by the Federal Cabinet for a five-year renewable term. The Commissioner is supported by the Competition Bureau (the Bureau), an independent law enforcement agency within the federal Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development. The Commissioner and, by extension, the Bureau have broad powers to investigate and evaluate a merger. Should the parties to a merger not be prepared to cure competitive concerns identified by the Bureau, the Commissioner can apply to the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) for a remedial order.

The Tribunal, created by the Competition Tribunal Act (the Tribunal Act), is a specialised adjudicative body composed of judicial members and business and economic experts. The Tribunal is the forum of first instance for any merger challenged by the Commissioner. While the Tribunal Act requires that the Tribunal conduct its hearings 'as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of fairness permit', the Tribunal operates with many of the procedural trappings of an ordinary court and, consequently, hearings routinely take many months to complete.

The Investment Canada Act applies whenever a non-Canadian, directly or indirectly, acquires control of a Canadian business regardless of whether it was owned by Canadians or other non-Canadians. A non-Canadian acquirer must either file an application for review or a post-closing notification of the investment unless a specific exemption applies.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

All mergers that have a sufficient Canadian nexus (ie, a real and substantial connection to Canada), regardless of size, are subject to the substantive jurisdiction of the Act, and therefore to potential investigation and evaluation by the Commissioner and possible referral to the Tribunal. The definition of 'merger' is broad and includes the acquisition of control or a significant interest in the business of another person. However, the Act's pre-merger notification regime is of more limited scope. Part IX of the Act creates five broad categories of transactions that are subject to pre-merger notification if they meet certain party and acquiree size thresholds. These are: asset acquisitions; share acquisitions; acquisitions of an interest in an unincorporated combination; amalgamations; and the formation of unincorporated combinations.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Generally, joint ventures with a sufficient Canadian nexus are caught by the Act's broad definition of 'merger' and are subject to the Act's substantive jurisdiction. Depending on how it is structured, a joint venture could be caught under the mandatory pre-merger notification regime as an unincorporated combination (usually a partnership), a share or asset acquisition, or a corporate amalgamation. However, there are exemptions for joint ventures that meet certain conditions. There are also similar provisions in the Act dealing with competitor agreements that may apply to joint ventures.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Act contains a bright-line definition of 'control': the holding or acquisition of more than 50 per cent of the voting securities of the corporation or, in the case of a partnership, sole proprietorship, trust or other unincorporated entity, the holding or acquisition of an interest in the non-incorporated entity that entitles the holder or acquirer to more than 50 per cent of the profits of the entity or of its assets on dissolution. However, the Act's pre-merger notification regime does not require that control be acquired to trigger a filing obligation. The acquisition of 'any of the assets in Canada of an operating business' (other than in the ordinary course) or of shares yielding cumulative ownership of more than 20 per cent of the voting shares of a public company (more than 50 per cent if the acquirer already owned 20 per cent or more before the proposed transaction) or more than 35 per cent of the voting shares of a private company (more than 50 per cent if 35 per cent or more was owned before the proposed transaction) will be sufficient to trigger a notification obligation (provided that certain other financial criteria are met). There are similar thresholds for acquisitions of interests in combinations.

Additionally, minority interests less than outright control may be caught by the substantive (as opposed to notification) provisions of the Act, because the Act defines a merger to include any transaction by which a party acquires a 'significant interest' in the business of another person. What constitutes a 'significant interest' is not defined by the Act. However, the Commissioner's Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs) contemplate that the acquisition of a 'significant interest' could occur at as low as a 10 per cent ownership interest – or in some cases without an equity interest if contractual or other circumstances allow material influence to be exercised over the economic behaviour of another person (including decisions relating to pricing, purchasing, distribution, marketing, investment, financing and the licensing of intellectual property rights). The MEGs note that, among other factors, board composition, voting and veto rights, the terms of any shareholder or voting agreements and put, call or other liquidity rights are relevant to determining if there has been or will be an acquisition of a 'significant interest'.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Act's substantive jurisdiction extends to all mergers that have a real and substantial Canadian nexus, regardless of size. However, the Act's pre-merger notification requirements are triggered by bright-line thresholds designed to give certainty to merging parties regarding filing obligations. The transaction must involve an 'operating business' in Canada (in the sense that employees regularly report for work within Canada as opposed to merely a passive investment – but, in the Commissioner's view, such employees may be those of an agent or contractor). The obligation to notify is also contingent upon satisfaction of both a party-size threshold and an acquiree-size threshold.

#### Party-size threshold

The parties to the transaction, together with their worldwide 'affiliates' (defined generally as those entities in a relationship of control to one another or under common control), collectively have assets (book value) in Canada or gross revenues from sales in, from or into Canada (that is, domestic sales plus exports and imports) in excess of C\$400 million in the most recently completed fiscal year. For share acquisitions, the acquiring corporation and the acquired corporation (rather than the vendors of the shares) are deemed to be the parties to the transaction. In the case of the acquisition of an interest in a combination, the parties are the person or persons who propose to acquire the interest and the combination whose interest is to be acquired. A vendor that owns more than 50 per cent of the shares in a corporation, or the interests in a combination, to be acquired would be included in the party-size threshold calculation as an affiliate of the entity being acquired.

#### Acquiree-size threshold

The acquiree-size threshold (sometimes referred to as the transaction-size threshold) is based on the book value of assets in Canada that are held by the entity that is the subject (target) of the transaction or that are themselves the subject of the transaction, or the gross revenues generated from those assets (domestic plus export sales). For 2020, the threshold (for assets or revenues) is C\$96 million. The threshold is potentially subject to an annual inflation adjustment, which typically gets announced and goes into effect in late January or early February. Consequently, the threshold may be slightly different from C\$96 million in 2021.

If the underlying party-size and acquiree-size thresholds are met, the acquisition of more than 20 per cent of the voting shares of a public company (more than 50 per cent if the acquirer already owned 20 per cent or more before the proposed transaction) or more than 35 per cent of the voting shares of a private company (more than 50 per cent if 35 per cent or more was owned before the proposed transaction) will trigger a notification obligation. Similarly, a proposed acquisition of an interest in a combination of two or more persons to carry on business other than through a corporation (eg, a partnership) is also notifiable if the party-size and acquiree-size thresholds are met and if it will result in the acquiring party and its affiliates being entitled to more than 35 per cent (or more than 50 per cent if the entitlement was already 35 per cent) of the profits of the combination or of its assets on dissolution. Similar, but more complex, thresholds apply to amalgamations.

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Notification is mandatory for transactions that exceed the party-size and acquiree-size thresholds. A narrow exemption exists for asset securitisations meeting certain criteria. There are also other exceptions of very limited scope (such as transactions involving affiliated entities).

Parties occasionally notify voluntarily (eg, by applying for an advance ruling certificate), where a transaction falls below the notification thresholds, if there is significant concern about the competitive impact of a transaction. Doing so allows the parties to seek confirmation from the Commissioner that he or she will not challenge the merger.

If a non-notifiable merger comes to the Bureau's attention from other sources (eg, marketplace complaints or the Bureau's Merger Intelligence and Notification Unit), a notification is not required but the Bureau may request or compel production of relevant information to carry out an assessment under the substantive merger provisions of the Act. The Bureau has recently increased its focus on gathering intelligence to identify and review below-threshold potentially anticompetitive transactions, with at least three below-threshold transactions reviewed in depth since June 2019.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Canada asserts an 'effects' test for jurisdiction. Thus, mergers may be subject to substantive review under the Act even though they occur outside Canada, if competitive effects from the transaction would occur within Canada and the target has an operating business in Canada. The competitive effects of primary interest are the impacts on customers located in Canada. Such effects could arise in relation to current or future sales into Canada when one or both merging parties are located outside Canada.

Foreign-to-foreign transactions are subject to pre-merger notification if the financial thresholds for notification are exceeded and the target has an operating business in Canada. (The asset value branches of the thresholds focus only on assets in Canada. However, the revenue branches of the thresholds include exports in addition to domestic sales, and in the case of the party-size threshold imports as well.) For example, the acquisition of more than 20 per cent of the shares of a foreign public corporation that has a subsidiary that carries on an operating business in Canada would trigger a notification obligation if the subsidiary's assets or revenues exceed the acquiree-size threshold and the parties and their affiliates collectively have assets or revenues exceeding the party-size test.

### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The Investment Canada Act applies whenever a non-Canadian, directly or indirectly, acquires control of a Canadian business regardless of whether it was owned by Canadians or other non-Canadians. A non-Canadian acquirer must either file an application for review or a post-closing notification of the investment unless a specific exemption applies.

To determine whether an investment is reviewable under the Investment Canada Act, it is necessary to consider whether the investor or the vendor is a 'Trade Agreement Investor' (ie, an entity controlled by citizens of states that are party to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union, an entity controlled by citizens of states that are party to (and have ratified) the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an entity controlled by citizens of states that are party to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its successor

agreement, the Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA), as well as citizens of Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Peru and South Korea), whether the investor or the vendor is a 'WTO Investor' (ie, an entity controlled by citizens of member states of the World Trade Organization) and whether the investor is a state-owned enterprise (SOE). Depending on the nationality of the ultimate controller of the investor or the vendor, there are different size thresholds that apply with respect to the need to obtain approval of a transaction. There are also separate and very low thresholds that apply where the Canadian business being acquired engages in cultural activities (such as those involving books, magazines, film, television, audio or video recordings, or radio or television broadcasting).

The threshold test changed for non-SOE WTO Investors from an asset value test to an enterprise value test in 2015. As of February 2020, if the Canadian business is being acquired directly, by or from a WTO Investor and is not engaged in cultural activities, an investment is reviewable only if the Canadian operating business being acquired has an enterprise value of C\$1.075 billion. Also, as of February 2020, if the Canadian business is being acquired directly by or from a Trade Agreement Investor and is not engaged in cultural activities, the investment is reviewable only if the Canadian operating business being acquired has an enterprise value of C\$1.613 billion. Both the WTO Investors threshold and the Trade Agreement Investors threshold typically undergo annual inflation adjustments each January or February. Where the investment involves the acquisition of publicly traded shares, enterprise value is calculated as the sum of the market capitalisation of the target and its liabilities minus its cash and cash equivalents. Where the investment involves the acquisition of privately held shares, enterprise value is calculated as the sum of the acquisition value and the target's liabilities (based on its most recent quarterly financial statements) minus its cash and cash equivalents (based on its most recent quarterly financial statements). Where the investment involves the acquisition of assets, enterprise value is calculated as the sum of the acquisition value and assumed liabilities minus cash and cash equivalents.

Where an SOE WTO Investor is involved, and if the Canadian business is being acquired directly and is not engaged in cultural activities, an investment will be reviewable only if the Canadian operating business being acquired has assets with a book value in excess of C\$428 million. This threshold typically undergoes an annual inflation adjustment each January or February.

If the acquisition by or from a WTO investor is indirect (ie, the acquisition of shares of a foreign corporation that controls a Canadian business) and does not involve a cultural business, the transaction is not reviewable.

Where the Canadian business engages in any of the activities of a cultural business, or if both the investor and the vendor are not WTO Investors, the applicable thresholds for direct and indirect investments are assets with a book value in Canada of C\$5 million or C\$50 million, respectively.

An application for review is made to the Investment Review Division of the federal Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development (or the Department of Canadian Heritage, where the merger involves any cultural businesses). There is an initial review period of 45 calendar days, which may be extended by 30 calendar days at the discretion of the agency, and further upon consent of the investor.

On an application for review, the substantive test applied is whether the proposed transaction is likely to be of net benefit to Canada. Any economic impact on Canada may be considered, including employment, investment, productivity, R&D, exports, Canadian management participation in the business and other factors. If the acquirer is an SOE, the review will also examine whether it is likely to operate the acquired Canadian business in an ordinary commercial manner. The Investment

Canada Act approval is parallel to but separate from Competition Act reviews, and the Bureau provides input into this process with respect to a transaction's effects on competition in addition to completing its own review. Very few transactions are rejected under the Investment Canada Act net benefit to Canada test, but it is common for investors to provide undertakings to the government to confirm that the net benefit test will be fulfilled.

An acquisition of control of a Canadian business by a non-Canadian that falls below the thresholds for review under the Investment Canada Act does not require an application for review. However, even where the transaction falls below the thresholds, it must still be notified by way of a filing form to the Investment Review Division of the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development (or the Department of Canadian Heritage for cultural cases). Notifications may be submitted by the acquirer any time before or up to 30 days after consummation of the transaction. If the transaction is in the cultural sector, a review may then be ordered (regardless of the asset value) by the Federal Cabinet within 21 days of receipt of the notification.

The Investment Canada Act also establishes a national security review regime, under which transactions can be reviewed regardless of the size of the business or transaction, the nationality of the acquirer, whether the transaction involves an acquisition of control or of a minority interest and whether or not the transaction has closed. A recent annual report on the administration of the Investment Canada Act noted that national security factors that have given rise to reviews include: the potential for injury to Canada's defence capabilities; the potential for transfer of sensitive dual-use technology or know-how outside Canada; the potential impact of the investment on the supply of critical goods and services to Canadians; the potential to enable foreign surveillance or espionage; the potential for injury to Canada's international interests; and the potential of the investment to involve or facilitate organised crime.

An April 2020 covid-19 related policy statement by the government of Canada noted that the Investment Canada Act's national security provisions would be used to review carefully any foreign direct investments in Canadian businesses related to public health and involved in the supply of critical goods or services to Canadians or to the government. As well, the policy statement highlighted that 'sudden declines in valuations [of Canadian businesses] could lead to opportunistic investment behaviour', and that, until the economy recovers from the covid-19 pandemic, the government will engage in enhanced scrutiny of foreign investments in Canadian businesses 'to protect national security and to ensure the integrity of all investments into Canada'. Based on these statements, it appears possible that the government may use the Investment Canada Act's national security provisions to take action against certain types of investments by non-Canadians in respect of Canadian businesses that are at depressed valuations due to the economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic. Moreover, the policy statement notes that investments by state-owned enterprises and by 'private investors' that are 'closely tied to or subject to direction from foreign governments' will be scrutinised particularly carefully.

There have been a few recent cases involving national security reviews under the Investment Canada Act that have become public. A number of transactions have been rejected or have been abandoned based on concerns about the investor in question acquiring telecommunications assets that were regarded as critical infrastructure. There has also been a 'proximity' case in which the establishment of a new Canadian business was required to find a new location that was not near a facility of the Canadian Space Agency. One transaction has been blocked because the geo-mapping assets in issue were sensitive on a national security basis. In addition, a Chinese firm was ordered to divest a recently acquired interest in a Canadian fibre components and modules company, but this decision was challenged and on a re-review the



government cleared the transaction. In early 2018, the proposed takeover of a Canadian construction services firm by a Chinese state-owned enterprise was blocked. While the precise reasons for this decision were not made public, the Canadian firm's work with nuclear power facilities, telecommunications infrastructure, and military housing and training facilities may have raised concerns related to critical infrastructure.

In addition to the general reviews under the Competition Act and, if applicable, the Investment Canada Act, there are sector-specific ownership limits and review regimes in areas such as financial services, transportation, broadcasting and telecommunications.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The federal Competition Act (the Act) does not set out deadlines for filing. When to submit a notification is a decision of the parties. However, a transaction that is notifiable may not be consummated until the applicable statutory waiting period has expired.

Failure to comply with the pre-merger notification requirements in the Act constitutes a criminal offence with possible fines of up to C\$50,000 as well as the possibility of civil penalties of up to C\$10,000 per day. The Competition Bureau (the Bureau) monitors financial press accounts of transactions and may also be made aware of transactions through competitor, customer or supplier complaints. While to date there have been no convictions or penalties imposed for failure to notify (other than agreements to implement compliance programmes), parties should expect this provision of the Act to be enforced vigorously unless the failure to notify was inadvertent, in which case a decision not to prosecute or other resolution might be negotiable with the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner) and the Director of Public Prosecutions.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Generally, both parties to the transaction have the obligation to file. For share acquisitions and acquisitions of an interest in a combination, the Act deems the target entity, not the vendor, to be a party to the transactions. In hostile or unsolicited takeover bids, the bidder makes an initial filing (which commences the waiting period) and the Commissioner then requisitions the counterpart filing from the target (which must be filed within 10 days).

As of 1 April 2020, the filing fee for a notification was raised to C\$75,055.68. This fee amount will be in effect until April 2021, when it once again will be subject to an adjustment for inflation. The same filing fee applies to a voluntary notification by way of an application for an advance ruling certificate. The filing fee is often paid by the acquirer, but this is a matter of negotiation between the parties. Where filings have been submitted by both parties, the Bureau considers both notifying parties to be jointly and severally liable for the filing fee. If only a request for an advance ruling certificate is submitted for a proposed transaction, the requesting party is solely responsible for the fee.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

There is a 30-day no-close waiting period from the day the filing is certified complete (usually the same day as the filing by the last of the parties occurs). In hostile or unsolicited takeover bids, the 30-day no-close waiting period begins on the date that bidder's filing is certified as complete.

The Commissioner may, within the initial 30-day waiting period, issue a supplementary information request (SIR) (similar to a US 'second request') requiring the parties to submit additional information that is relevant to the Commissioner's assessment of the proposed transaction. If the Commissioner issues a SIR, a second no-close waiting period continues until 30 days after the day that the required information has been received by the Commissioner and certified complete by the parties (except in the context of hostile or unsolicited takeover bids, where the second no-close waiting period commences once the Commissioner receives the certified complete SIR response from the bidder). While the issuance of a SIR is a formal process established by the Act, requests by the Commissioner during the initial waiting period for the voluntary disclosure of additional information are common and do not affect the statutory waiting period.

Consummation of the transaction is not permitted during the waiting periods. The Act provides for early termination of either waiting period by the Commissioner. This can be expected to occur if the review has been completed but not when the review is ongoing.

If the parties proceed by way of an application for an advance ruling certificate instead of filings, there is not a fixed timeline. The no-close period effectively runs until the Commissioner has either issued such a certificate or provided a 'no action' letter confirming the Commissioner's lack of intention, at that time, to make an application under section 92 of the Act in respect of the proposed transaction together with a waiver of the filing requirements.

In complex cases, reviews may extend beyond the waiting periods. In such cases, the Commissioner sometimes simply requests that the parties refrain from closing their transaction until the review is complete. There is no obligation to accommodate such a request, but merging parties often do so. Formal timing agreements between the parties and the Bureau may also be used to confirm that a transaction will not be closed for a period of time after the expiry of the statutory waiting period. In particular, if the parties plan to raise an efficiencies defence, the Commissioner has provided recent guidance indicating an expectation that the parties and the Bureau will enter into a model timing agreement to allow the Bureau sufficient time to evaluate the parties' claimed efficiencies. Alternatively, the Commissioner can seek a temporary injunction to prevent the transaction from closing for a further 30 (extendable to 60) days to allow the Bureau to complete its review.

If the Commissioner decides to challenge a transaction, another provision of the Act allows the Commissioner to seek an interlocutory injunction to prevent the transaction from closing in whole or in part, pending the resolution of the Commissioner's challenge on the merits. To obtain an interlocutory injunction, the Commissioner must prove that there will be 'irreparable harm' if the injunction is refused and that the 'balance of convenience' favours delaying the closing of the transaction. The 2016 *Parkland* case clarified that 'irreparable harm' includes harm to consumers and harm to the broader economy resulting from the transaction, where such harms cannot be undone by an order of the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) under the merger provisions of the Act. The Commissioner must provide 'sufficiently clear and non-speculative' evidence of market definition and concentration and likely harm to competition to meet this test.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing prior to expiry of the applicable waiting period is a criminal offence that can be subject to a fine of C\$50,000 and also a civil penalty of up to C\$10,000 for each day of non-compliance. While there have been no reported cases of prosecutions, and while some leniency has been

shown in cases of inadvertence, the Commissioner is likely to enforce this provision vigorously if it appears that the non-compliance was intentional.

Regardless of whether the waiting period has expired, closing before clearance carries the risk that the Commissioner will challenge the merger after completion of the review if he or she concludes that it is likely to lessen or prevent competition substantially. He or she may seek a divestiture or dissolution order up to one year after the date of closing. There is also the possibility that coordination undertaken prior to closing that amounts to 'gun jumping' could be subject to a prosecution for conspiracy or bid rigging (given that the parties would not (yet) benefit from the affiliates exception from these criminal offences).

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Subject to crafting a local hold-separate resolution (which is extremely rare), if the transaction is notifiable in Canada, the penalties for early closing would apply to foreign-to-foreign transactions.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The parties may proceed with closing if the no-close waiting periods have expired but the review process is ongoing, and the Commissioner has not obtained an injunction or entered into a timing agreement with the parties.

The Commissioner will focus primarily on Canadian issues in all cases. In a foreign-to-foreign merger, the Bureau (and the Tribunal) will typically be receptive to local divestiture or possibly behavioural remedies as long as they are sufficient to address the domestic anticompetitive effects. Local hold-separate arrangements pending resolution of a Bureau review or Tribunal proceeding have occasionally been employed in the past. However, the Bureau's Remedies Bulletin indicates that the circumstances in which the Bureau will consider agreeing to the use of such hold-separate agreements are narrow.

#### Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Rules exist to ensure that targets of hostile or unsolicited takeover bids supply their initial notification in a timely manner. In such a case, the 30 day no-close waiting period commences upon the submission of the acquirer's filing.

For hostile or unsolicited takeover bids that result in SIRs being issued by the Commissioner, the second 30 day no-close waiting period commences upon the Commissioner's receipt of a certified response to the SIR from the acquirer.

#### Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The information required for a pre-merger notification filing is set out in the Act and in regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act. The main requirements of the pre-merger notification filing are:

- an overview of the transaction structure;
- an executed copy of the legal documents to be used to implement the proposed transaction (or the latest draft thereof, if not yet finalised);
- a description of the business objectives of the transaction;

- a list of the foreign antitrust authorities that have been notified of the proposed transaction;
- a summary description of the principal businesses carried on by each party (on an affiliate-by-affiliate basis) and of the principal categories of products (or services) within such businesses, including contact information for the top 20 customers and suppliers for each such product category;
- basic financial information for each party;
- business, product, customer, supplier, financial and geographic scope of sales information of each of the party's principal businesses;
- all studies, surveys, analyses and reports prepared or received by an officer or director for the purpose of evaluating or analysing the proposed transaction that contain market-related or competition-related information (similar to the '4(c)' documents under the US Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 (the HSR Act)); and
- similar information related to each affiliate of the notifying party with significant Canadian assets or sales.

If the Bureau concludes during the initial 30-day review period that a more detailed review is warranted, it may issue a SIR requiring the production of additional documents and data. The Bureau's (non-binding) guidelines on the merger review process state that, in all but exceptional cases, the Bureau will limit the number of custodians to be searched in preparing a response to a SIR to a maximum of 30 individuals. The default search period for hard copy and electronic records in the possession, custody or control of a party will generally be the year-to-date period immediately preceding the date of issuance of the SIR and the previous two full calendar years. The Bureau will also generally limit the relevant time period for data requests to the year-to-date period immediately preceding the date of issuance of the SIR and the previous three full calendar years. Where parties operate on a North American basis, and where the transaction does not raise Canada-specific concerns, the Bureau may, in appropriate cases, work with the parties to try to limit the list of custodians (to the extent possible) to a list of custodians that the US authorities have agreed to in connection with a second request under the HSR Act.

An officer or other person who has been duly authorised by the board of directors of the notifying party is required to certify on oath or solemn affirmation that, to the best of that person's knowledge and belief, all information provided in the pre-merger notification filing and in a response to a SIR (if applicable) is correct and complete in all material respects. Knowingly providing incorrect information could result in criminal prosecution for perjury in connection with swearing a false certificate.

The Competition Act also contains an obstruction offence that applies where any person impedes or prevents or attempts to impede or prevent any inquiry or examination under the Act. Knowingly withholding or providing misleading information could be seen as impeding or attempting to impede an examination by the Commissioner.

There has also been one reported case where the Bureau advised merging parties (identities not disclosed) that it would rescind the previously issued clearance because the information received in connection with the merger notification was materially misleading.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

After notifications have been filed, the Bureau will typically have follow-up questions as it conducts its investigation. Bureau staff will usually contact some or all of the customers set out in the parties' filings to solicit information from them regarding the proposed transaction. Suppliers,



competitors and additional customers may also be contacted. In addition, the Bureau may request that the parties to the merger provide additional information, documents or data such as estimates of market shares.

If the Commissioner plans to issue a SIR, the scope of this request will be discussed with the merging parties very shortly before the expiry of the initial 30-day waiting period and these discussions may continue after the request is issued. The SIR will typically involve compulsory production of large volumes of documents and data. Subpoenas may also be issued to third parties to produce relevant documents or data. The provision of compulsory testimony through depositions before a hearing officer is possible but rarely used in practice.

Most complex mergers will involve face-to-face meetings with Bureau staff and federal Department of Justice lawyers. Regardless of complexity, regular communication between the Bureau staff and the parties' counsel is the norm.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

There is a 30-day no-close statutory waiting period from the day the filing is certified complete.

The Commissioner may, within the initial 30-day waiting period, issue a SIR requiring the parties to submit additional information that is relevant to the Commissioner's assessment of the proposed transaction. If the Commissioner issues a SIR, a second no-close statutory waiting period continues until 30 days after the day that the required information has been received by the Commissioner and certified complete by each of the parties.

In most straightforward cases, the Commissioner's review is typically concluded in less than two weeks. However, in more complex cases the Bureau's review process may be substantially longer.

Although it is non-binding, the Bureau's Fee and Service Standards Handbook sets out the following 'service-standard' periods to which the Bureau will attempt to adhere in its review process:

- 14 days for non-complex mergers;
- 45 days for complex mergers, except where a SIR is issued; and
- 30 days after compliance with a SIR, for complex mergers where a SIR is issued (this last service-standard period is co-extensive with the statutory no-close waiting period following compliance with a SIR).

The Bureau informs notifying parties of the commencement of its service standards within five business days of receiving sufficient information to assign a complexity rating, as outlined in its Competition Bureau Fees and Service Standards Handbook for Mergers and Merger-Related Matters. However, service standards are intended to be maximums and the Bureau may complete cases in less than the full service-standard period.

It is possible to speed up the timetable for clearance if the Bureau's substantive inquiries can be satisfied before the statutory waiting or the 'service-standard' periods (or both) expire. The Commissioner can terminate the waiting periods early – within the initial 30-day period or within the no-close period following the issuance of a SIR – if he or she is satisfied that there is not a competitive concern. Parties and their counsel will usually provide additional information as requested by the Bureau on a voluntary basis and often submit detailed 'competitive impact' analyses to the Bureau to expedite completion of the review process.

If the parties proceed by way of an application for an advance ruling certificate, the no-close period effectively runs until the Commissioner has either issued such a certificate or provided a 'no action' letter confirming the Commissioner's lack of intention, at that time, to make an application under section 92 of the Act in respect of the proposed transaction together with a waiver of the filing requirements.

In cases in which a formal filing has been made and the 30-day period has expired but the Commissioner needs more time for his or her review, the Commissioner sometimes simply requests that the parties refrain from closing their transaction until the review is complete. There is no obligation to accommodate that request, but merging parties often do so. However, there have been a number of recent cases where merging parties have chosen to close their transactions once the waiting periods have expired but prior to the Bureau finishing its review. This includes the *Parrish & Heimbecker/Louis Dreyfus* grain elevator sale that closed in December 2019 and that the Commissioner has challenged before the Competition Tribunal (case ongoing at the time of this writing), the *Thoma Bravo/Aucerna* deal that closed in May 2019 that the commissioner challenged, ultimately resulting in a divestiture pursuant to a consent agreement, the *Tervita/Newalta* deal that closed in July 2018 with the Commissioner opting to let the one-year deadline to challenge the transaction expire, and the *Pembina/Veresen* deal that closed in October 2017 with the Commissioner's decision not to challenge the transaction not being made until September 2018.

Formal timing agreements between the parties and the Bureau may also be used to confirm that a transaction will not be closed for a period of time after the expiry of the statutory waiting period. In particular, if the parties plan to raise an efficiencies defence, the Commissioner has provided recent guidance indicating an expectation that the parties and the Bureau will enter into a model timing agreement to allow the Bureau sufficient time to evaluate the parties' claimed efficiencies. Alternatively, the Commissioner can seek a temporary injunction to prevent the transaction from closing for a further 30 (extendable to 60) days to allow the Bureau to complete its review.

Given the foregoing, for simple transactions the review period is typically about two weeks. However, for very complex transactions, the review period can extend to 150 days, or even longer.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner) to challenge and the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) to issue a remedial order is whether the merger or proposed merger is 'likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially' in any relevant market. The federal Competition Act (the Act) sets out a number of evaluative factors that the Tribunal (and, by implication, the Commissioner during his or her investigation) is to consider in applying this substantive test:

- the availability of acceptable substitute products;
- the effectiveness of remaining competition;
- foreign competition;
- whether the merger will remove a vigorous competitor from the market;
- whether the target entity has failed or is about to fail;
- barriers to entry;
- the nature and extent of change and innovation in the market; and
- any other relevant factors (which will often include the possible existence of countervailing buyer power).

The Act also requires that the Tribunal not make a determination on the basis of market shares or concentration ratios alone.

Uniquely among mature competition regimes, the Act provides a statutory efficiencies defence that allows an otherwise anticompetitive merger to be 'saved' if there are offsetting efficiencies. A 2015 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that quantitative efficiencies and quantitative anticompetitive effects will typically be balanced

against one another, after which non-quantitative evidence will also be balanced.

The Commissioner's Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs) elaborate on the Competition Bureau (the Bureau)'s views of each of the evaluative factors set out in the Act. They also establish 'safe harbours' within which the Commissioner generally will not challenge a merger with respect to 'unilateral effects' and 'coordinated effects' theories of competitive harm. In respect of unilateral effects, the Commissioner generally will not challenge a merger if the combined post-merger market share of the merged entity is less than 35 per cent. For coordinated effects theories of harm, the Commissioner generally will not challenge a merger where the post-merger four-firm concentration ratio (combined market shares of the largest four firms) is below 65 per cent or the merged entity's market share would be less than 10 per cent. Transactions that involve higher market shares or industry concentration are not automatically challenged, but will generally receive careful scrutiny.

While a 'failing firm' technically is not a defence, 'whether the business, or part of the business, of a party to the merger or proposed merger has failed or is likely to fail' is listed as a factor to be considered by the Tribunal in analysing a merger. The MEGs elaborate that, if 'imminent failure' of a firm is probable and that, in the absence of the merger, the assets of the failing firm would be likely to exit the relevant market, then the loss of the actual or future competitive influence of the failing firm will not be attributed to the merger in the Bureau's review. In addition, the Bureau will want to be satisfied that there are no competitively preferable alternatives to the proposed transaction such as a competitively preferable purchaser, retrenchment by or even liquidation of the failing firm. In April 2020, the Bureau released a position statement describing its approach to failing firm arguments after its review and decision not to challenge the *American Iron & Metal Company/Total Metal Recovery* transaction. It confirmed and elaborated on the approach in the MEGs that financial documents and related information will be examined in detail to determine whether the firm is failing and that no competitively preferable alternatives exist. The position statement also detailed the types of information that the Bureau typically gathers from customers, competitors and other interested parties to perform this analysis.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Joint ventures often fall within the definition of mergers and in such situations are subject to the same substantive test. However, the Act specifically exempts from merger review certain unincorporated 'combinations' in connection with one-off projects or programmes, provided a number of specified criteria are met. These relate to control of the joint venture parties, the business rationale for the formation of the joint venture, the scope and duration of the joint venture's activities, and the extent of the adverse effect of the joint venture on competition. Part IX of the Act contains an imperfectly analogous notification exemption for 'combinations' that meet specified criteria.

In March 2010, two new provisions of the Act came into force dealing with agreements between competitors. Such agreements may be subject either to criminal prosecution under the conspiracy offence or to challenge as a reviewable practice by way of an application to the Tribunal for a prohibition order. The substantive framework for the competitor agreements reviewable practice is almost identical to the merger provisions. Once the Bureau has decided which track to pursue (merger, civil agreement among competitors or criminal conspiracy), there are double jeopardy protections that preclude it from using the other tracks.

The Bureau has indicated in its Competitor Collaboration Guidelines that the conspiracy offence will be used for 'naked restraints' (cartel-like conduct) and that those bona fide joint ventures that do not constitute mergers will normally be reviewed under the competitor agreements' reviewable practice provision.

## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

In general, the Bureau will consider whether a proposed horizontal transaction (ie, a merger involving current or potential competitors) is likely to lead to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition on either a unilateral effects basis or a coordinated effects basis. Under the unilateral theory of harm, the Bureau will consider whether the merged entity will likely be able to raise prices profitably (or lessen competition in other, non-price dimensions) as a result of the merger without relying on an accommodating response from its competitors. Under the coordinated theory of harm, the Bureau considers whether the proposed merger is likely to reduce the level of competition in a market by, for example, removing a particularly aggressive competitor, or enabling the merged entity to coordinate its behaviour with that of its competitors, so that higher post-merger prices are profitable and sustainable because other competitors in the market have accommodating responses.

Vertical mergers may raise concerns when they increase barriers to entry, raise rivals' costs or facilitate coordinated behaviour.

Mergers may also give rise to concerns about the prevention (as opposed to lessening) of competition in a market when, in the absence of the proposed merger, one of the merging parties is likely to have entered the market *de novo* and eroded the existing market power of the other party.

In addition to price, the Bureau may also assess the effects of a merger on other dimensions of competition, including quality, product choice, service, innovation and advertising.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The MEGs, Tribunal jurisprudence and media statements by senior Bureau staff indicate that merger review is informed by the Act's purpose clause, including its concern with ensuring that 'small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy'. However, as a practical matter, non-competition issues such as industrial policy considerations are generally not relevant to the Commissioner's review. These factors can be relevant to an assessment under the Investment Canada Act.

Bureau reviews of proposed mergers in the federal financial services and transportation sectors on competition grounds may operate in parallel with ministerial approval processes that are based on broader public interest considerations. In both systems, the Commissioner's views on the competitive ramifications of proposed mergers inform but would not bind the relevant minister in making a decision on public interest grounds. Thus, the Act specifically provides that the Tribunal shall not make an order in respect of a merger involving financial institutions or transportation undertakings in respect of which the Federal Minister of Finance or Minister of Transport, as the case may be, has certified to the Commissioner that the merger would be in the public interest. For example, in February 2019, the Bureau provided a report to the Minister of Transport regarding a proposed merger of the two main airlines operating in northern Canada, Canadian North and First Air. The Bureau's report concluded that the proposed merger would give rise to significant competition concerns. However, in June 2019, the government of Canada approved this merger following a public interest assessment led by the Minister of Transport, notwithstanding the Bureau's competition concerns.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Act provides an efficiencies defence that allows an otherwise anti-competitive merger to be 'saved' by efficiencies that are likely to be greater than and offset any prevention or lessening of competition. The scope of the efficiencies defence was examined in the *Superior Propane* and the *CCS/Tervita* cases. *Superior Propane* was the first decision in which a party succeeded in having an otherwise anticompetitive merger saved by efficiencies. The main issue in that case was whether a 'total surplus' or a 'consumer welfare' standard should be used to evaluate the trade-off between efficiencies and anticompetitive effects. The Tribunal adopted the 'total surplus' standard, but the Federal Court of Appeal rejected this approach and remanded the case back to the Tribunal for reconsideration of the proper standard to apply. At the rehearing, the Tribunal again rejected the consumer welfare standard but adopted a 'balancing weights' approach, which gives some consideration to the redistributive effects of a merger (eg, negative impacts on low-income consumers) in addition to the overall magnitude of efficiency gains. This decision was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal.

In *CCS/Tervita*, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned decisions of the Tribunal and Federal Court of Appeal and accepted the parties' efficiencies defence. While the majority decision of the Supreme Court recognised that the transaction's cognisable efficiencies were minimal, the Commissioner had not met the required burden to quantify the quantifiable anticompetitive effects of the merger. As a result, the transaction's minimal efficiencies were sufficient to outweigh the uncalculated anticompetitive effects, which were given a weight of zero. Qualitative anticompetitive effects and qualitative efficiencies generated by a merger will only be considered and weighed against each other in the analysis in respect of effects and efficiencies that cannot be quantified. As a result, the Bureau now seeks to determine whether the parties plan to raise an efficiencies defence early in the review process. Supplementary information requests typically have efficiency-related questions that parties must address if they intend to make an efficiency claim. The Bureau may require production of considerable data so that it can properly quantify the transaction's anticompetitive effects and efficiencies.

In July 2019, the Bureau published a draft model timing agreement for merger reviews involving efficiencies claims. The timing agreement establishes stages, including when certain data and information are to be supplied to the Bureau and its responses on the efficiencies arguments raised by the merging parties. The first transaction to use the model timing agreement was the *Canadian National Railway Company (CN)/H&R Transport Limited* transaction in 2019.

In *CN/H&R*, the Bureau concluded that the acquisition by CN of H&R would likely result in a substantial lessening of competition in eight local markets, but the Bureau determined that the efficiency gains would be greater than the likely anticompetitive effects and therefore did not challenge the transaction. This is the latest in a series of cases where efficiency claims have 'saved' an otherwise anticompetitive transaction. In the 2017 *Superior Plus/Canwest Propane* transaction, the Bureau concluded that while the merger would give rise to a substantial lessening of competition in 10 local markets, it would not seek to require divestitures in these markets because the efficiency gains resulting from the transaction were likely to outweigh the anticompetitive effects in these local markets significantly. Divestitures were required in 12 other local markets where efficiency gains were not seen to outweigh the anticompetitive effects. The Bureau also concluded that the efficiencies defence was applicable in its 2016 review of Superior Plus's proposed acquisition of Canexus, although this deal was abandoned because of a challenge by the Federal Trade Commission in the United States. In

addition, in the 2017 *First Air/Calm Air* merger, the Bureau noted that its financial expert found that the merger's efficiencies gains were likely to outweigh its anticompetitive effects significantly, leading to the Bureau's conclusion that it did not have a sufficient basis to challenge the merger. The Bureau's review of *Chemtrade/Canexus* in 2017 was also approved on the basis that the efficiencies that would likely be lost from blocking the merger or imposing remedies would significantly outweigh the likely anticompetitive effects of the merger.

In March 2018, the Bureau published for public comment a draft of a new guide for assessing efficiencies in merger reviews. The final version of the guide had not been published at the time of writing. However, in May 2019, the then recently appointed Commissioner gave a speech in which he noted that he is highly unlikely to exercise his enforcement discretion to decline to challenge a potentially anticompetitive merger without 'reliable, credible and probative evidence that supports and validates the efficiencies defence being advanced'. The Commissioner indicated that the Bureau will expect to receive detailed evidence supporting the efficiencies claimed, to have the opportunity to test the evidence underlying the efficiency claims and to be provided with adequate time, pursuant to timing agreements, to meaningfully assess the efficiencies. The draft model timing agreement provides detail on the type of information that the Bureau expects to receive from merging parties to substantiate efficiency claims.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal), on application by the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner), may order the parties to a proposed merger to refrain from implementing their merger or doing anything the prohibition of which the Tribunal determines is necessary to ensure the merger (or a part of it) does not prevent or lessen competition substantially. If a merger has already been completed, the Tribunal may order the dissolution of the merger or the divestiture of assets or shares. In addition, with the consent of the Commissioner and the merging parties, the Tribunal may order any other action to be taken to remedy the anticompetitive effects of a proposed or completed merger.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Divestitures are the primary remedy used in merger cases. In the *CCS/Tervita* case, the Competition Bureau (the Bureau) sought dissolution as the preferred remedy, but the Tribunal concluded that a divestiture order would be appropriate. While it is possible (and frequently of interest to merging parties) to resolve issues through the use of behavioural remedies such as firewalls or agreements to supply, these tend to be viewed by the Bureau as less desirable than structural remedies such as divestiture and are more often seen in vertical rather than horizontal cases. Parties should expect that, in most cases, the Commissioner will seek to have any negotiated remedies recorded in a consent agreement that is filed with the Tribunal, whereupon it has the force of a Tribunal order.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Any divestiture or other remedy ordered by the Tribunal must restore competition to the point at which it can no longer be said to be substantially less than it was before the merger. The Tribunal has broad

jurisdiction to attach detailed terms and conditions to divestiture orders, including deadlines for completion and provisions appointing and empowering trustees to effect divestitures if the merging parties fail to do so in a timely manner. The Bureau also has broad discretion to negotiate the terms of divestiture or dissolution orders or behavioural remedies to be embodied in a consent agreement.

The Bureau's 2006 Remedies Bulletin indicates that it prefers 'fix-it-first' remedies whereby an approved up-front buyer is identified and, ideally, consummates its acquisition of the standalone business to be divested at the same time as the merger parties consummate their own transaction. When it is not possible to fix it first – which, in practice, is frequently – the Bureau will normally require that divestitures be effected by the merging parties within three to six months. If they fail to do so, a trustee will be appointed to complete the sale in a similar time frame without any guaranteed minimum price to the seller.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers with competitive effects within Canada are subject to the federal Competition Act, including its remedial provisions. Consequently, divestitures of Canadian assets have been required in many foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, in some cases, the Bureau may rely on remedies required by foreign competition authorities and not take separate remedial steps in Canada if the foreign remedies are sufficient to address anticompetitive concerns in Canada. Examples include *United Technologies/Raytheon*, *Harris Corporation/L3 Technologies*, *United Technologies/Rockwell Collins*, *BASF/Ciba*, *Dow/Rohm & Haas*, *GE/Instrumentarium*, *Procter & Gamble/Gillette*, *UTC/Goodrich*, *Thomson/Reuters* and *Novartis/GSK*, where the remedies required by the United States or European authorities were seen as sufficient to address Canadian concerns.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The Bureau will consider ancillary restrictions as part of its consideration of the transaction as a whole. Thus, the Bureau's clearance of a transaction will normally also cover any ancillary restrictions that are known at the time of the review.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Competition Bureau (the Bureau) routinely contacts customers, and often also suppliers and competitors, for factual information and their views about a merger. However, the federal Competition Act (the Act) authorises the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner) alone to bring an application to the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal). Consequently, a complainant has no direct ability to challenge a merger.

The Bureau is attentive to complaints from all types of private parties. The Act also provides that any six residents of Canada can compel the Commissioner to conduct an inquiry into a merger, but the Commissioner remains the sole 'gatekeeper' who can commence a challenge before the Tribunal.

The Competition Tribunal Rules provide that, if the Commissioner brings an application to the Tribunal, any party affected by the merger may seek leave to intervene. Thus, complainants may obtain a formal voice in the proceedings at this stage.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

All documents (including pre-merger notifications) and information provided to the Bureau are treated confidentially. However, the Act does permit the Commissioner to share information and documents received with a Canadian law enforcement agency (which would be rare in merger cases). In addition, the Commissioner may disclose information for the purposes of the administration or enforcement of the Act. This may occur in the Bureau's 'field contacts' with customers, suppliers and competitors, although such interviews are conducted in a manner that attempts to minimise disclosure of any confidential information.

The Commissioner's interpretation of the confidentiality safeguards in the Act is articulated in the Bureau's 2013 information bulletin on the Communication of Confidential Information Under the Competition Act. The Bureau asserts that it has the power to share confidential information with foreign antitrust agencies without receiving a waiver from the parties providing the information, pursuant to the 'administration and enforcement' exemption. This interpretation is perceived by some as controversial and has not been tested before the courts.

The Bureau does not announce the receipt of filings or commencement of investigations in the merger context. Once a merger review has been completed, the Bureau publishes the names of merger parties, the industry in which they operate and the outcome of the Bureau's review in a monthly online registry. The Bureau also publishes press releases or position statements regarding decisions in high-profile cases.

While the Bureau's position that it had a 'public interest privilege' over all documents collected from third parties as a class as part of a Bureau investigation or inquiry was rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal in the *Vancouver Airport Authority* case, such a privilege may still be claimed for certain materials on a document by document basis. Competitively sensitive information of third parties can be protected in Tribunal proceedings through the use of confidentiality orders.

Where a challenge occurs or a remedy is embodied in a consent agreement, most of the relevant materials will be filed on the public record at the Tribunal. However, commercial or competitively sensitive material may be filed on a confidential basis if a protective order is obtained.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Bureau routinely cooperates with other antitrust authorities on mergers that have multi-jurisdictional aspects. Specific antitrust cooperation instruments (cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding) exist between Canada and three jurisdictions that give rise to a significant number of cross-border reviews: the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as between Canada and each of Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, South Korea and Taiwan. Unlike many of its sister agencies, the Bureau asserts that it does not require a waiver to share confidential information with foreign agencies, as long as such sharing of information is likely to result in assistance to the Bureau in its review of a transaction. However, it frequently requests that merging parties grant confidentiality waivers to foreign agencies to enable them to engage in two-way communications with Bureau staff.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Competition Tribunal Act provides for an appeal from the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal), on questions of law and of mixed fact and law to the Federal Court of Appeal as of right, and on questions of fact alone by leave of the court. An appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal is only available if leave is obtained from the Supreme Court of Canada. In its recent decision in *CCS/Tervita*, the Supreme Court of Canada held that Tribunal decisions on questions of law are to be reviewed for correctness and questions of fact and mixed law and fact are to be reviewed for reasonableness.

Although it is theoretically possible to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner)'s decisions or actions, in practice he or she is accorded a very high amount of deference because the Commissioner's activities are investigative rather than adjudicative.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

A decision of the Tribunal is appealable to the Federal Court of Appeal, but factual findings may only be appealed with leave of the court. The typical time period for such an appeal would be six to 12 months.

An appeal from the Federal Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is only available with leave from the Supreme Court, which is granted only infrequently. In the *CCS/Tervita* case, almost two years elapsed from the date of the Federal Court of Appeal decision until the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision (five months for leave to be granted, eight months for the case to be heard, and 10 months under reserve).

Enforcement decisions by the Commissioner (eg, a decision not to challenge a merger) are theoretically subject to judicial review by the Federal Court. However, such decisions are granted very substantial deference, so it is rare for complainants or other parties to bring an application for judicial review of such a decision. The time frame for such a proceeding would likely be similar to appeals of Tribunal decisions.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Merging parties (both domestic and foreign) will typically work with the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner) to address any concerns he or she might have with their transaction, rather than face a lengthy and uncertain process of defending their merger through litigation before the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal). As a result, the Commissioner has litigated very few contested proceedings before the Tribunal. The Commissioner obtained mixed results in the *Southam* newspaper case. However, the Commissioner failed to obtain a remedy in the *CCS/Tervita*, *Hillsdown* and *Superior Propane* cases. The Commissioner was also unsuccessful in attempting to obtain a temporary injunction against the *Labatt/Lakeport* merger and subsequently decided not to challenge this merger. More recently, the Commissioner obtained a partial injunction, and ultimately a consent resolution, in the *Parkland* case. In some cases, the Commissioner has obtained remedies in merger cases on consent following the start of litigation. For example, in August 2019, the Commissioner succeeded in obtaining a divestiture on consent in *Thoma Bravo/Aucerna* following the Commissioner



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filing an application to the Tribunal challenging the transaction. As well, the Commissioner's December 2019 challenge to the *Parrish & Heimbecker/Louis Dreyfus* grain elevator transaction remains ongoing as of the time of writing.

In the vast majority of cases in which the Commissioner has had concerns, the Competition Bureau (the Bureau) has been successful in negotiating consent divestitures or behavioural remedies. This has occurred in numerous foreign-to-foreign mergers, including *Evonik/PeroxyChem*, *Linde/Praxair*, *BASF/Bayer*, *Bayer/Monsanto*, *Abbott/St Jude*, *Abbott/Alere*, *DuPont/Dow*, *Valspar/Sherwin-Williams*, *Teva/Allergan*, *Iron Mountain/Recall*, *Medtronic/Covidien*, *Novartis/Alcon*, *The Coca-Cola Company/Coca-Cola Enterprises*, *Teva/Ratiopharm* and *Live Nation/Ticketmaster*. Transactions have also occasionally been abandoned in the face of opposition by the Commissioner (eg, Bell's proposed reacquisition of 50 per cent interests in two television channels from Corus in 2018, and the *LP/Ainsworth* and *Bragg/Kincardine* mergers in 2014).

The current merger review process was adopted in March 2009. From March 2009 to September 2019, supplementary information requests (SIRs) were issued in connection with 115 transactions. In recent years, SIRs have been issued in approximately 5 per cent of all transactions. This trend continued in the statistics for the Bureau's half-year ended 30 September 2019. Responding to these requests requires a significant investment of time and resources (similar to, although usually not as extensive as, the US 'second request' process). The time frame for the completion of the Bureau's review of a transaction subject to a SIR has ranged from three months to seven-and-a-half months.

The substantive merger enforcement framework is set out in the 2011 Merger Enforcement Guidelines. The Bureau remains focused primarily on horizontal cases that could substantially lessen or prevent competition through unilateral or coordinated effects.



## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

As of 1 May 2018, technical changes were implemented in the federal Competition Act (the Act)'s provisions to expand the definitions related to affiliated entities. The earlier version of the Act did not fully capture affiliates held through trusts and partnerships.

There are no further proposed changes pending.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In 2019, the Competition Bureau (the Bureau) expanded the remit of the Merger Notification Unit and renamed it the Merger Intelligence and Notification Unit (MINU). Its mandate includes a broader focus on intelligence gathering, particularly in respect of transactions that do not trigger mandatory notification obligations but that may potentially be anticompetitive. In a September 2019 press release, the Bureau highlighted the enhanced information-gathering efforts of the MINU and encouraged parties with non-notifiable transactions that may raise competition concerns to engage voluntarily with the Bureau prior to closing. From June 2019 to May 2020, the Bureau conducted extensive reviews of at least three transactions that were below the merger notification thresholds: *Evonik/PeroxyChem*, *CN/H&R* and *PSAV/Encore Event Technologies*.

As part of the Bureau's response to covid-19, the Bureau has noted that it has become increasingly difficult to make market contacts in a timely manner, which might lead to merger reviews taking longer than the Bureau's service standards. The Bureau, therefore, recommends that merging parties with complex matters notify the Bureau as early as possible to provide the Bureau with sufficient time to conduct its review. More generally, the Bureau has indicated that it will be prioritising 'urgent marketplace issues that require immediate action to protect Canadians'. The Bureau has also stopped providing hard copy letters and is now providing all letters electronically, which include letters indicating merger clearance.

During the pandemic and economic recovery period, we expect that there may be significantly more transactions involving failing firms and restructurings that will give rise to efficiencies defences.

# China

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML) (which entered into force on 1 August 2008) contains a chapter entitled 'Concentration of undertakings'. This chapter deals with the merger control regime in China. The AML is supplemented by implementing regulations, including the Rules on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings published by the State Council (the Notification Thresholds Rules) in August 2008.

In March 2018, as part of wider institutional reform in China, the Antimonopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which was formerly responsible for the enforcement of the merger control rules under the AML, and the two other competition authorities in China, the Price Supervision and Antimonopoly Bureau of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Antimonopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Bureau of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce were merged into one new super authority called the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR). Following the merger, SAMR is now responsible for the enforcement of merger control in China.

In addition to the AML itself, MOFCOM published a range of secondary legislation, some of which has been slightly amended by SAMR to reflect the institutional change. The legislation includes, among others, implementation rules, interim rules and guidance notices that complement the AML and the Notification Thresholds Rules and address procedural and substantive issues as well as information requirements related to the merger control procedure in China.

In 2009, MOFCOM published several implementing measures (such as the 2009 Notification Measures and 2009 Review Measures) covering a range of issues, such as the information the notifying party is required to include in merger filings submitted to MOFCOM, a number of key substantive and procedural issues regarding merger control reviews, rules on the calculation of turnover for financial institutions and voluntary filing of non-reportable mergers. In addition to the implementing rules published by MOFCOM, the Antimonopoly Commission of the State Council (which is the authority under the AML that is generally responsible for coordinating and guiding antitrust policy within China) published guidelines on the definition of the relevant market in 2009.

In 2011, MOFCOM published implementation rules for national security review of mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors. In the same year, it published interim provisions to assess the effects of concentrations on competition (the 2011 Interim Provisions for the Assessment of the Effect of a Concentration of Undertakings on Competition).

In 2012, MOFCOM published interim rules to empower it to investigate concentrations that meet the jurisdictional thresholds but where

the relevant party or parties have failed to notify. In 2012, MOFCOM also published a new notification form (the Notification Form), which contains more burdensome information and document requirements.

In February 2014, MOFCOM published interim provisions on standards for transactions reviewed under a simplified procedure (the Interim Provisions on Standards for Simple Cases). These provisions provide criteria for defining 'simple cases', namely transactions that do not give rise to significant competition concerns and therefore merit streamlined review by the authority. In April 2014, MOFCOM published the Tentative Guidelines on the Notification of Simple Cases. These guidelines provide procedural guidance on the notification of simple cases but do not set any deadlines for the authority to complete its review in these cases. That said, in practice, the authority seeks to complete its review of 'simple cases' in Phase I. MOFCOM also adopted a new notification form for notifying simple cases as well as a public notice form for notifying transactions under the simple case procedure.

In June 2014, MOFCOM published Guidance for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings (the Notification Guidance). The Notification Guidance specifies the factors to consider when determining whether there is an acquisition of control and provides procedures for pre-notification consultation meetings with the authority.

In December 2014, MOFCOM adopted the Interim Provisions on the Imposition of Restrictive Conditions on Concentrations of Undertakings (the 2014 Interim Remedy Provisions), which provide guidance in relation to the types of remedies that can be imposed, the conduct of remedy negotiations, the implementation and monitoring of remedies, the varying and lifting of remedies, and the legal liabilities to which undertakings and trustees are subject. They took effect from 5 January 2015.

In February 2015, MOFCOM published the Guidance on the Notification Name of Concentrations of Undertakings (the Naming Guidance), amended in February 2017, which provides rules on how to name a transaction for notification purposes.

In September 2018, the State Council and SAMR amended parts of the regulations and measures set out above to reflect the change from MOFCOM to SAMR. The substantive rules remain unchanged for now. The amended regulations and measures include the Notification Thresholds Rules, the Notification Guidance, the Notification Form, the Naming Guidance and the Tentative Guidelines on the Notification of Simple Cases (the name of the latter was amended and is now known as the Guidelines on the Notification of Simple Cases). References to these regulations and measures in this document refer to the amended secondary legislation.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Mergers and acquisitions that are characterised as a 'concentration of undertakings' are caught by the AML and require notification to SAMR if they meet the relevant turnover thresholds.



A concentration of undertakings is defined in the AML as:

- a merger of undertakings;
- an undertaking acquiring control over one or more undertakings by acquiring shares or assets; or
- an undertaking acquiring control or being able to exercise decisive influence over one or more undertakings by contract or any other means.

### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The AML is silent on whether joint ventures are subject to notification. However, this issue was clarified in the Notification Guidance. This provides that a newly established joint venture (ie, a greenfield joint venture) constitutes a concentration of undertakings if at least two undertakings jointly control the joint venture. If, however, only one undertaking solely controls a joint venture and other shareholders have no control, then that joint venture does not constitute a concentration of undertakings. The Notification Form also provides that both greenfield joint ventures and joint ventures formed by way of acquisition or change of control are reportable transactions and that the 'undertakings concerned' in joint venture transactions will vary depending on the nature and type of the transaction structure. MOFCOM/SAMR have imposed remedies in several cases involving the establishment of a joint venture, such as *Corun/Toyota China/PEVE/Sinogy/Toyota Tsusho* in 2014 and *Zhejiang Garden/DSM* in October 2019. Several companies have also been fined for failure to file reportable joint ventures.

### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The AML does not provide a definition of 'control'.

However, the Notification Guidance explains that control in the context of China merger control includes both sole control and joint control and that control or decisive influence is determined by reference to legal and factual circumstances. Factors that are taken into consideration include the corporate governance procedures of the undertakings concerned as reflected in transaction documents and articles of association (eg, the voting mechanism at the general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors or other supervisory board, the appointment and removal of senior management), the objective and the future plan of the transaction, the shareholding structure of the undertakings concerned before and after the transaction (eg, if an acquisition of control cannot be determined on the basis of concentration agreements and articles of association, but factors such as the shareholding being dispersed give an undertaking de facto control, such a transaction also constitutes an acquisition of control), the relationship between the shareholders and directors of other undertakings; whether there exist significant commercial relationships, cooperation agreements, etc, between the undertakings concerned. Accordingly, the issue of whether a transaction leads to an acquisition of control or decisive influence must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

For any merger or acquisition of control that is considered a 'concentration of undertakings', a pre-merger notification must be filed with SAMR if the relevant parties' turnover exceeds any of the following thresholds, as set out in the Notification Thresholds Rules and the Notification Guidance:

- the total worldwide turnover of all parties to the transaction in the previous financial year exceeded 10 billion yuan and the PRC turnover of each of at least two parties to the transaction in the previous financial year exceeded 400 million yuan; or
- the combined PRC turnover of all parties to the transaction in the previous financial year exceeded 2 billion yuan and the PRC turnover of each of at least two of the parties to the transaction in the previous financial year exceeded 400 million yuan.

The Notification Guidance and the 2009 Notification Measures also provide that, in cases where a concentration does not meet the notification thresholds, the undertakings participating in the concentration may nevertheless notify the transaction voluntarily to SAMR. Parties may choose to file on a voluntary basis in circumstances where the transaction may give rise to competition concerns.

Further, SAMR has the discretion under the Notification Thresholds Rules to review non-reportable transactions that are not voluntarily notified by the parties, if SAMR considers that the transaction is likely to result in the 'elimination or restriction of competition'. Such a discretionary review may, for example, be initiated in the event of complaints from third parties including customers, suppliers or competitors.

A national security review regime took effect in March 2011, which may apply to transactions that do not trigger a merger control filing requirement or transactions that do trigger such a requirement but involve the acquisition of control of a Chinese enterprise in certain sensitive sectors.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory for any 'concentration of undertakings' that meets any of the notification triggers specified in the Notification Thresholds Rules.

The AML provides for an exemption from pre-merger filing for intragroup transactions in specific circumstances, namely where:

- among all undertakings involved in the concentration, one undertaking possesses 50 per cent or more of the voting shares or assets of every other undertaking; or
- one undertaking not involved in the concentration possesses 50 per cent or more of the voting shares or assets of every undertaking involved in the concentration.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Yes. Foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified if the turnover thresholds are met. The Notification Thresholds Rules require two parties to generate turnover in China (albeit low amounts). Otherwise, there is no additional 'effects test'. However, under the Interim Provisions on Standards for Simple Cases, certain foreign-to-foreign transactions may qualify as 'simple cases' on the basis that the transaction does not give rise to significant competition concerns. Transactions that qualify for simple treatment are subject to less burdensome information requirements under the Guidelines on the Notification of Simple Cases and a streamlined review process.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Yes. All foreign investment in China must be filed with or approved by MOFCOM or one of its local branches. Foreign investment is regulated under the Foreign Investment Law (effective from 1 January 2020), the Implementing Regulations of the Foreign Investment Law (effective from

1 January 2020), the Catalogue of Sectors Where Foreign Investment is Encouraged (Encouraged Sector Catalogue) (2019) and the Negative List (amended in 2019). Certain sectors are closed to foreign investment or subject to foreign ownership restrictions, while foreign investment is encouraged in other sectors through preferential policies. Foreign investment falls under four categories in China: encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited. The first category is provided in the Encouraged Sector Catalogue and the last two categories are prescribed in the Negative List. The 2019 Encouraged Sector Catalogue contains 415 nationwide sectors and 693 regional sectors, representing an increase over the encouraged sectors in the former 2017 Foreign Investment Catalogue. The 2019 Negative List has reduced the number of restricted and prohibited sectors from 48 to 40 compared to the 2018 version, including for sectors such as financial services, transportation, energy, agriculture and infrastructure. This highlights an increasing trend towards fewer restrictions for inbound investment. While foreign investment in restricted sectors must be approved by MOFCOM or its local branches, only a filing is required for foreign investment in sectors outside the Negative List.

Another relevant approval regime is the national security review regime. This applies to an acquisition of Chinese domestic businesses by foreign investors if (1) the transaction involves the military sector (including enterprises located near key and sensitive military facilities and other enterprises active in connection with national defence); or (2) it involves key agricultural products, as well as sectors involving key energy infrastructure, transport, technology and equipment manufacturing, and the transaction will result in the acquisition of 'actual control' by the foreign investor over the Chinese domestic business. If a transaction needs to be reviewed on national security grounds, it will be conducted by an inter-Ministerial Committee, led by NDRC as well as MOFCOM (the Committee).

MOFCOM used to have a key role in the national security review regime, as it was responsible for determining whether a transaction fell within the regime. However, according to an announcement published on NDRC's website on 30 April 2019, resulting from a reassignment of responsibilities among government ministries, NDRC is responsible for receiving national security review filings. While no further details are currently available on the precise scope of NDRC's responsibilities, the announcement suggests that NDRC will play a more important role under the national security review regime.

In August 2011, MOFCOM published a set of implementing rules, which include an 'anti-circumvention' clause, prohibiting foreign investors from circumventing national security review by relying on mechanisms such as trusts, multilevel reinvestments, leasing and loan arrangements, contractual control structures or offshore transactions. This makes clear that national security review is concerned with the substance and actual effect of a transaction rather than its form.

National security review is conducted in two phases: a 'general review' (Phase I), which lasts up to 30 working days, and a 'special review' (Phase II), which lasts up to 60 working days. Where the Committee cannot reach consensus, the transaction may be referred to the State Council for final determination, for which there is no time limit for a decision. According to the Foreign Investment Law (2019), the national security review decision is the final decision once made. This means it is non-appealable.

Where the Committee determines that a transaction gives rise to national security concerns, parties may be required to abandon or (in cases where completion has already occurred) unwind the transaction, or to put in place remedial measures to address the concern.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML) does not provide any deadlines for filing, but it provides that notifiable transactions cannot be closed without being notified to and cleared by the authority.

Undertakings that fail to notify a qualifying transaction to SAMR may be subject to various penalties. SAMR has the power to order the undertakings to cease the implementation of the concentration, dispose of shares or assets, or transfer businesses within a given time limit and adopt other necessary measures to restore the pre-merger market situation. SAMR may also impose a fine of a maximum of 500,000 yuan. The more serious implication for most businesses is the adverse impact on relations with SAMR, potentially on a long-term basis.

Both the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and SAMR's published decisions for failure to file to date involve not only domestic transactions and Sino-foreign transactions, but also foreign-to-foreign transactions.

In 2014, MOFCOM adopted its first public failure to notify decision. It imposed a fine of 300,000 yuan on Tsinghua Unigroup for failure to notify its acquisition of RDA Microelectronics (both are Chinese companies). Fines were imposed notwithstanding the fact that MOFCOM found that the transaction had no adverse impact on competition in China, making it clear that 'lack of impact' on competition is not a basis for not filing in China if the transaction constitutes a concentration of undertakings and the turnover thresholds are met. As of April 2020, MOFCOM and SAMR have published 51 decisions for failure to notify. The maximum fine of 500,000 yuan has not been imposed so far. In practice, fines have generally ranged from 150,000 yuan to 400,000 yuan.

In January 2017, MOFCOM adopted its first penalty decision involving a foreign-to-foreign transaction for failure to notify. Canon was fined 300,000 yuan for failure to file its acquisition of Toshiba Medical. The case involved a multistep transaction. There have been two further cases involving foreign-to-foreign transactions since then: on 3 May 2017, MOFCOM announced that it had imposed a fine of 150,000 yuan on OCI Corporation for failure to file its acquisition of Tokuyama Malaysia; and on 10 August 2018, SAMR fined Paper Excellence BV, a company registered in the Netherlands, for failure to file its acquisition of Eldorado Brasil Celulose SA, a Brazilian company, prior to closing.

In December 2019, SAMR adopted its first penalty decision involving a transaction that closed prior to clearance. As a result, the party with a duty to file, New Hope Investment, was fined 400,000 yuan for implementing the transaction before SAMR approved it.

In 2019, SAMR imposed penalties in 18 cases for failure to notify, a record number in a year since the AML entered into force in 2008. It highlights the authority's strict stance on failure to notify reportable transactions.

In some cases, the merging parties voluntarily submitted a notification after completing their underlying transactions, and actively cooperated during the investigation with the authority, as the case may be. However, the merging parties were still fined despite these mitigating factors.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

According to the 2009 Notification Measures, the Notification Form and the Notification Guidance, the notification of a concentration effected by way of a merger is made by all undertakings involved in the merger. For a concentration effected by other means, the notification is made by the undertaking that will acquire control or will exercise decisive

influence, with the assistance of other undertakings to the concentration. Undertakings involved in the concentration that serve merely as an acquisition or investment vehicle are not considered as an appropriate notifying party. The Notification Guidance further provides that if two or more of the undertakings have the obligation to notify, the undertakings may jointly notify or appoint one of the undertakings to make the notification. Where parties agree that one of them should notify the transaction on behalf of all of them, the others are not exempt from their obligation to notify. Other undertakings participating in the transaction may submit a notification where the parties obliged to file the notification fail to do so.

It is not unusual in practice for the target to be involved as a joint filing party. At present, there are no filing fees.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

SAMR has a statutory review period of 180 calendar days.

The initial review period is 30 days (Phase I), commencing from acceptance of the filing as complete. In practice, the period between notification and acceptance of the case is unpredictable. The pre-acceptance period normally takes up to six to eight weeks or longer depending on, among other things, the complexity of the transaction, the completeness of the notification, supplemental questions raised during the market inquiry and the merging parties' response to those questions. The pre-acceptance period can be shorter (approximately up to four weeks) if the transaction is a simple case. The authority has intensified its pre-acceptance review for data completeness in recent years, which may potentially impact the duration of the pre-acceptance period for both standard and simple cases.

At the end of the initial Phase I review period, SAMR must either issue a written decision to clear the transaction or issue a written notice of 'further review'. If the notifying party does not receive any written notice of further review at the end of the review period, the transaction is deemed to have been cleared and the parties are free to implement the concentration. If the notifying party receives such a notice, which, unlike in the European Union for example, does not necessarily indicate that SAMR has concerns about the concentration, the review period can be extended for another 90 days (Phase II), commencing from the date of the decision for 'further review' of the transaction. In certain circumstances, the 90-day Phase II review period may be extended by another 60 days.

However, some conditional clearance decisions show that in practice the total review period can take longer than the maximum statutory review period of 180 days. This is the case, for example, where the authority is running out of the time to complete its review owing to complex remedy negotiations. In such a case, the notifying party may need to agree to withdraw and refile the notification, which restarts a further 180-day review period. Recent examples of cases where the parties have withdrawn their notification and re-filed include *Nvidia/Mellanox* (2020), *Danaher/GE BioPharma* (2020), *Novelis/Aleris* (2019), *Zhejiang Garden/DSM* (2019), *II-VI/Finisar* (2019), *Cargotec/TTS* (2019) and *KLA-Tencor/Orbotech* (2019).

There is no provision under the AML or its implementing rules for expedited review. However, transactions that qualify as simple cases under the Guidelines on the Notification of Simple Cases benefit from a quicker review. The simple case procedure is proving effective so far in shortening the review period. In 2019, simple cases accounted for approximately 80 per cent of the authority's caseload, and nearly all of them were cleared within Phase I.

#### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The completion of a concentration prior to clearance and subject to a notification duty can lead to sanctions. SAMR has the power to order the undertakings to cease the implementation of the concentration, dispose of shares or assets, or transfer businesses within a given time limit and adopt other necessary measures to restore the pre-merger market situation. SAMR may also impose a fine of a maximum of 500,000 yuan. The more serious implication for most businesses is the adverse impact on relations with SAMR, potentially on a long-term basis.

In December 2019, SAMR imposed fines for the first time for closing before clearance. It fined New Hope Investment 400,000 yuan for implementing its transaction prior to SAMR approval. Fines to date have usually been imposed for failure to file, not closing before clearance, and published penalty decisions to date involve domestic transactions, Sino-foreign transactions and foreign-to-foreign transactions.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Yes. Sanctions also apply to foreign-to-foreign mergers. In January 2017, MOFCOM published the first penalty decision involving a foreign-to-foreign transaction for failure to file (ie, Canon's acquisition of Toshiba Medical). SAMR has yet to adopt a penalty decision involving closing before clearance of a foreign-to-foreign merger.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

There is little track record to date on this question and there is no formal 'hold-separate' or 'carve-out' arrangement that might be acceptable to remedy local issues in a foreign-to-foreign merger.

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No. Although there is no official position on this, in practice, the review process can be expedited when a transaction is subject to public takeover bid rules.

#### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Under the AML, the 2009 Notification Measures and the Notification Guidance, the notification and documents to be submitted include the following:

- a notification form, containing the names of the parties, registered business addresses, scope of business, the identity certificates or registration certificates of the notifying parties, as well as the date on which the concentration will take place – in the case of offshore notifying parties, certificates notarised and authenticated by the relevant local authorities must be submitted;
- explanation of the transaction's impact on competition in the relevant market;
- the transaction agreement and other relevant documents;
- the financial and accounting reports for the previous accounting year of the participating undertakings, audited by public accountants; and

- other documents and materials as may be required by the authority.

The Notification Form requires a significant amount of information and documents to be provided such as details of the parties' Chinese activities and foreign entities active in the relevant sectors, details of the joint venture (if applicable), general information on other undertakings involved in the transaction (eg, the seller), internal documents and materials prepared by third parties in relation to the transaction, and detailed information about customers and suppliers. This may result in more time and resources being required to prepare a filing. While some of the information required is optional, SAMR may ask for explanations if the optional information is not provided.

As mentioned above, 'simple cases' are subject to less burdensome information requirements. According to the Guidelines on Notification of Simple Cases, SAMR will not review a notification as a simple case on its own initiative. Notifying parties that would like their transaction to be treated as a simple case must submit an application to SAMR using a 'simple case notification form'. Some of the information and documents required to be submitted in the standard notification form are not required in the simple case notification form. This, to some extent, eases the administrative burden for notifying parties. Information and documents that do not need to be provided in a simple case notification form include:

- information on the parties' affiliates if not active in the business relevant to the notified transaction;
- the business licences and certificates of approval of the parties' affiliates within China;
- the demand and supply structure of the relevant market and information on the parties' major suppliers and customers;
- information on market entry;
- information on horizontal or vertical cooperation agreements; and
- potential efficiencies of the transaction.

However, a simple case notification still requires substantial corporate and competition-related information; in particular, market definition analyses and a full set of data including total market sizes and the market shares of the parties and their major competitors. In addition, a 'public notice form' must be submitted alongside the simple case notification form. The notice identifies the notifying parties and includes a summary of their activities, the transaction and the reasons for notifying the transaction as a simple case (with reference to one or more of the criteria for qualifying as a simple case). After the transaction is accepted by SAMR as a simple case, SAMR will publish the public notice form on its website for a period of 10 days for public comments.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The AML contemplates a two-phase review process. The 2009 Review Measures provide guidance on the procedures to follow when the authority conducts its review. They also recognise a notifying party's right to be heard and to make known its views on concerns raised by the authority.

Prior to a formal notification of a concentration, a notifying party may consult SAMR on matters related to the notification. The application for pre-notification consultation is made in writing. This is not a mandatory procedure. In complex cases, for example, where the notifying parties are uncertain as to whether a transaction is reportable, or the precise scope of the relevant markets involved is difficult to delineate, it may be helpful to consult SAMR prior to filing. This may facilitate preparation of the filing and streamline the review process. The decision to consult SAMR is made on a case-by-case basis.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

In practice, a large majority of reviews (including 'no-issue' cases) extend well beyond the initial 30-day Phase I review period – unless the transaction is a simple case. For a case without significant competition concerns and that does not qualify for simple treatment, the usual time taken from notification to clearance is approximately four to six months depending on the facts of the case. It is commonly understood that the delay is largely caused by a combination of factors such as capacity constraints at SAMR, the complexity of the cases and the broad scope of involvement of other government agencies and third parties that the authority consults during its review process.

Although the Guidelines on Notification of Simple Cases do not provide any formal guidance regarding the timetable for review of simple cases, this is proving effective in shortening the review period. The usual time taken from notification to clearance is approximately two to three months and the vast majority of simple cases are cleared within Phase I. Some cases are cleared shortly after the start of Phase II if SAMR is unable to complete its review within Phase I. SAMR does not usually conduct extensive consultation with stakeholders, such as other government agencies for simple cases as it does for standard cases. This is one of the key factors that facilitate the shortened review.

Administrative time limits have been set for case teams to request information and for notifying parties to respond to information requests. This serves to streamline and speed up the review process.

### SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

#### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Under the Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML), a concentration must be prohibited if it has or is likely to have 'the effect of eliminating or restricting competition', unless the parties can show that the concentration may generate efficiencies and that its positive effects on competition significantly outweigh its negative effects on competition, or that the concentration is in the public interest.

The AML provides that the following factors shall be taken into consideration in reviewing a concentration:

- the market shares of the participating undertakings in the relevant market and their ability to control the market;
- the degree of concentration in the relevant market;
- the effect of the proposed concentration on market access and technological development;
- the effect of the proposed concentration on consumers and other relevant undertakings;
- the effect of the proposed concentration on the development of the national economy; and
- other factors that affect market competition considered relevant by the authority.

Industrial policy and other non-competition factors also play a prominent role, and can often cause delays in the review process.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Joint ventures are not subject to any special standard of review distinct from other types of transactions. However, unlike in the European Union, both full-function and non-full function joint ventures require notification.

## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Under the AML, a concentration may be challenged on the ground that it has or is likely to have 'the effect of eliminating or restricting competition'. The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) is familiar with concepts such as unilateral and coordinated effects, with the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) having published draft guidelines on them in June 2011 and its conditional clearance decision in *Uralkali/Silvinit* (2011) showing the application of these concepts in practice. The conditional clearance decisions in *Baxter/Gambro* (2013), *Thermo Fischer/Life Technologies* (2014), *NXP Semiconductors/Freescale* (2015), *ABI/SABMiller* (2016), *Abbott/St Jude Medical* (2016), *Agrium/Potash Corporation* (2017), *Linde/Praxair* (2018), *Cargotec/TTS* (2019), *II-VI/Finisar* (2019), *Zhejiang Garden/DSM* (2019), *Novelis/Aleris* (2019) and *Danaher/GE BioPharma* (2020) similarly show a willingness to apply these concepts. In *Henkel/Tiande* (2012), *Corun/Toyota China/PEVE/Sinogy/Toyota Tsusho* (2014), *KLA Tencor/Orbotech* (2019) and *Zhejiang Garden/DSM* (2019), the authority analysed foreclosure effects resulting from vertical integration. There is renewed and growing interest in leveraging and tying or bundling effects, as evidenced by the conditional clearance decisions in *Merck/AZ* (2014) and, more recently, *Brocade/Broadcom* (2017), *HP/Samsung* (2017), *Essilor/Luxottica* (2018), *UTC/Rockwell Collins* (2018), *KLA Tencor/Orbotech* (2019), *Infineon/Cypress* (2020) and *Nvidia/Mellanox* (2020). In *Brocade/Broadcom* (2017) and *Nvidia/Mellanox* (2020), the authority also raised concerns over the potential misuse of third-party competitors' confidential information and the risk of undermining interoperability of complementary products in the relevant markets.

In *Google/Motorola Mobility* (2012), *Microsoft/Nokia* (2014) and *Nokia/Alcatel Lucent* (2015), MOFCOM dealt with the complex question of the licensing of standard essential patents in the IT sector.

In June 2014, MOFCOM published a decision to block the proposed *Maersk/MSK/CMA CGMP3 Network* shipping alliance (the P3 Prohibition). This was the second prohibition decision in the history of merger review in China and the first time MOFCOM prohibited a global foreign-to-foreign transaction. The decision analyses the alliance as an integration of the three major container liner shipping companies' businesses (as opposed to a typical loose alliance in the shipping industry). MOFCOM analysed the horizontal overlaps between the parties on particular trades and relied on the resulting post-transaction high market shares and market concentration levels as primary grounds to oppose the transaction. In *Maersk Line/Hamburg Süd*, MOFCOM considered the potential anticompetitive effects of vessel-sharing agreements to which the merging parties are members.

In *Dow Chemical/DuPont* (2017), *Becton Dickinson/CR Bard* (2017), *Bayer/Monsanto* (2018), *UTC/Rockwell Collins* (2018) and *Danaher/GE BioPharma* (2020), the authority examined, among other things, the transaction's potential adverse impact on innovation.

In addition, the authority will investigate factors that may affect the development of the national economy, as well as the public interest.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues are relevant to both domestic consolidation, where industrial policy factors may be supportive, and to inbound investment, where industrial policy factors may create additional challenges in securing merger clearance.

The AML provides that 'undertakings may implement a concentration through fair competition and voluntary coalition in accordance with law to expand their business scale and increase their market

competitiveness'. That provision is understood to reflect the state's policy of encouraging consolidation and concentrations between Chinese domestic companies and supporting successful domestic companies to compete with foreign multinational companies. In addition, SAMR may decide not to prohibit a concentration that creates serious competition issues where there is proof that the concentration is in the public interest. The AML also provides that the state must protect the legitimate operation of industries that are vital to the national economy and national security where mainly state-owned enterprises are active. Relevant guidance also provides that specific explanations should be given in the notification if the concentration is related to national security, industrial policy, state-owned assets, etc. National security review is also potentially applicable under the national security review regime.

Investments by foreign companies in China and foreign-to-foreign transactions may also be reviewed in light of industrial policy considerations where it is considered that broader interests in China may be adversely affected by the concentration. Examples might include the acquisition of well-known Chinese brands or R&D facilities located in China. This can create delays in the process and, at worst, can derail the transaction.

As evidenced by two notable conditional clearances (*Glencore/Xstrata* and *Marubeni/Gavilon*) in 2013, global transactions involving commodities that are strategically important to China will be subject to close scrutiny during the transaction's review. In both cases, although the parties did not enjoy a significant combined market share, each transaction was subject to a long review process and remedies. This is possibly owing to sensitivity regarding transactions involving strategically important industrial and agricultural raw materials, the import of which China relies on heavily. In both decisions, MOFCOM referred to China's dependence on the import of the relevant products. Although MOFCOM did not explicitly present China's reliance on imports as a concern, its decisions are nonetheless indicative that transactions involving supply of strategically important products may be subject to stricter scrutiny.

In addition, non-competition issues can become a complicating factor in high-profile, transformational deals in sensitive or strategic sectors deemed important to China's economy. In July 2018, Qualcomm aborted its US\$44 billion acquisition of NXP Semiconductors after failing to secure Chinese merger control approval before the long-stop date. There has been widespread speculation that the *Qualcomm/NXP* deal was impacted by the Sino-US trade dispute. During the Sino-US trade dispute in 2018 and 2019, some other high-profile US deals experienced delays in obtaining merger control approval in China.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The AML allows SAMR to clear a concentration that gives rise to competition concerns if there is proof that the concentration may generate efficiencies and that its positive effects on competition significantly outweigh its negative effects on competition. In practice, notifying parties must provide relevant information and evidence on the possible efficiencies that may arise from the concentration, including how the efficiencies are to be achieved, the time required, quantification, the level of the resulting benefit to consumers and whether such efficiencies can be achieved without the concentration. The 2011 Interim Provisions for the Assessment of the Effect of a Concentration of Undertakings on Competition also make reference to the possibility of transactions giving rise to economic efficiency through economies of scale, economies of scope and reduced production costs, without specifying to what degree such considerations are relevant in assessing transactions. Economic efficiencies have not been discussed in any detail in remedy decisions to date.



## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Under the Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML), a concentration cannot be implemented until clearance has been obtained from the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR). SAMR can block a concentration or impose remedies as a condition to clearing the concentration. As of April 2020, two transactions have been prohibited and remedies have been imposed in 47 cases.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. SAMR may clear a concentration subject to remedies. According to the 2014 Interim Remedy Provisions, the authority may impose divestiture remedies, behavioural remedies (eg, security of supply-type remedies, access to essential facilities such as networks or platforms, licensing key technologies and terminating exclusive agreements) or a combination of both. There are many examples of both types of remedies in China's decisional practice.

The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and SAMR have imposed a range of behavioural remedies, including security of supply remedies, remedies preventing bundling or tying or imposing unreasonable transaction conditions, remedies that impose restrictions on future acquisitions, access remedies and remedies that seek to address unique or sector-specific concerns. In *Uralkali/Silvinit* (2011), for example, MOFCOM imposed behavioural remedies that aimed to maintain the status quo for the sale of the parties' products in China, including requirements as to volume, quality, product type and contract negotiation practices. In *Agrium/Potash Corporation* (2017) and *HP/Samsung* (2017), MOFCOM similarly imposed remedies related to the terms and conditions of supply of certain overlap products and in addition required the merging parties to commit not to acquire a competing business for a prescribed number of years. Another notable case is *Google/Motorola Mobility* (2012). MOFCOM imposed behavioural remedies to ensure, in particular, that Google would continue to offer its 'Android' platform on a free and open-source basis, and that it would continue to comply with the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing terms in connection with Motorola Mobility's significant portfolio of standard essential patents in the telecommunications sector. In *Microsoft/Nokia* (2014) and *Nokia/Alcatel Lucent* (2015), MOFCOM also imposed behavioural remedies to address the licensing of standard essential patents. In *Maersk Line/Hamburg Süd* (2017), MOFCOM imposed a set of behavioural remedies requiring the merging parties to withdraw from two vessel-sharing agreements on trades between the Far East and South America and not to enter into any vessel-sharing agreement with major competitors on these trades for five years, and ordered Maersk Line to reduce and maintain its reefer capacity shares below a certain level for three years post-closing. In *Essilor/Luxottica* (2018), *KLA Tencor/Orbotech* (2019), *Infineon/Cypress* (2020) and *Nvidia/Mellanox* (2020), behavioural remedies were imposed, including requiring the merging parties not to engage in bundling or tying nor impose unreasonable terms and requiring the merging parties to continue to supply Chinese customers on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. In *Brocade/Broadcom* (2017) and *Nvidia/Mellanox* (2020), the merging parties also committed to take measures to protect confidential information of third parties and to maintain the interoperability level of relevant products.

In terms of divestment remedies, SAMR may require merging parties to commit to divest a business, assets or minority interests

within a specified time frame post-closing. In recent cases, buyer upfront divestiture remedies have been imposed (eg, *NXP/Freescale* (2015)) as well as 'fix-it-first' divestiture remedies (eg, *ABI/SABMiller* (2016) in the brewery sector, the first such case, *Abbott/St Jude Medical* (2016) in the medical devices sector and *Dow Chemical/DuPont* (2017) in the agricultural sector).

Often a combination of behavioural and divestment remedies is imposed. In *Glencore/Xstrata* (2013), for example, MOFCOM imposed both divestiture remedies and behavioural remedies (ie, commitment to supply the Chinese market). This approach has been adopted in a number of recent remedy cases (eg, *Dow Chemical/DuPont* (2017), *UTC/Rockwell Collins* (2018), *Linde/Praxair* (2018), *Bayer/Monsanto* (2018) and *Novelis/Aleris* (2019)).

The authority has also imposed 'hold-separate' remedies in the past, although there is no mention of hold-separate remedies in the 2014 Interim Remedy Provisions among the examples of the types of remedies that can be imposed. Hold-separate remedies are potentially far-reaching in that they oblige merging parties to operate separately and independently after closing (eg, with respect to management, sales, products and R&D) and prevent full integration until and unless the remedy is lifted. Hold-separate remedies can remain in force for a relatively long period of time and the remedies will be lifted automatically or upon application. For example, in *Seagate/Samsung* (2011), which concerned the global hard disk drive (HDD) market, MOFCOM required complex hold-separate remedies, which essentially required Seagate to hold the Samsung HDD business separate from its own HDD business for a period of at least a year from the decision. The hold-separate remedies were lifted in 2015 upon application, approximately four years after they were imposed.

Shortly after the *Seagate/Samsung* decision, MOFCOM imposed extensive hold-separate remedies in *Western Digital Corporation/HGST* (2012), which prohibited Western Digital Corporation from combining its operations with HGST's HDD business for a period of at least two years from the decision. The hold-separate remedies were eventually partially lifted in 2015 upon application; the remaining elements of the hold-separate remedies expired in 2017 automatically.

Similarly, in *Marubeni/Gavilon* (2013), *MediaTek/MStar* (2013), *Advanced Semiconductor Engineering/Siliconware Precision Industries* (2017), *Cargotec/TTS* (2019) and *II-VI/Finisar* (2019), the authority imposed hold-separate remedies. In *Cargotec/TTS* (2019) and *II-VI/Finisar* (2019), SAMR required the parties to make specific measures to ensure independence and competition, including setting up firewalls, formulating firewall-related internal guidance and providing competition compliance training to employees. The hold-separate remedies in *II-VI/Finisar* (2019) can only be lifted upon application in at least three years while in *Cargotec/TTS* (2019), the hold-separate remedies will automatically expire in two years.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

According to the 2009 Review Measures, remedies proposed by undertakings should be able to remove or reduce the negative effects that the concentration has or may have on competition and must be capable of being implemented. Written versions of the remedies should be clear and precise to allow their effectiveness and practicability to be properly evaluated.

The 2014 Interim Remedy Provisions set out the procedure to be followed to implement remedies, including the conduct of remedy negotiations, the implementation and monitoring of remedies, the varying and lifting of remedies, and the legal liabilities to which the undertakings and trustees are subject. For example, the notifying parties must provide a final remedy proposal 20 days before the end of the 'further review',



which assumes that the authority has made known its concerns. It is unclear whether, from the authority's perspective, this further review period includes the additional 60 days, which can be added to the Phase II 90-days review period. The 2014 Interim Remedy Provisions also enable the notifying parties to submit remedies proposals before competition concerns are raised about the transaction. Notifying parties can be required to offer 'crown jewel' remedies. SAMR may solicit opinions on the remedy proposal from a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including government agencies or departments, industry associations, competitors, suppliers and customers. Specifically, with respect to structural remedies, the 2014 Interim Remedy Provisions require companies to find a buyer for the divested business within the time frame specified in the conditional clearance decision or, where no time frame is specified, within six months of conditional clearance (SAMR has the discretion to extend this period by a further three months). If the merging parties are unable to find a buyer in time, SAMR can appoint a divestiture trustee to do so. The divestment must be implemented within three months after the sales agreement is executed. SAMR can also require the parties to complete a divestment prior to implementation of the main transaction.

The 2014 Interim Remedy Provisions also provide detailed guidance on the selection of supervisory trustees and trustees' obligations.

Undertakings may apply to vary or lift remedies when there are material changes to the parties, the transaction, or market conditions. In January 2015, MOFCOM announced that it had agreed to lift one of the remedies imposed in *Google/Motorola Mobility* in 2012 following Google's sale of its shares in Motorola Mobility to Lenovo on the grounds that Google was no longer active in the smartphone business to which the remedy applied. In October 2015, considering the changes in the competitive dynamics of the relevant markets, MOFCOM agreed to partially lift the hold-separate remedies in relation to Western Digital's acquisition of Hitachi's HDD business in 2012. It set a two-year period for the remaining elements of the hold-separate remedies to expire. In the same month, MOFCOM agreed to lift entirely the hold-separate conditions imposed on Seagate in relation to its acquisition of Samsung's HDD business in 2011. In June 2016, MOFCOM announced that it had agreed to lift all remedies imposed on Walmart following Walmart's acquisition of a 33.6 per cent stake in NewHeight in 2012. In February 2018, MOFCOM lifted the respective remedies imposed in *Henkel/Tiande Chemical*, following Tiande's acquisition of sole control over the joint venture, and *MediaTek/Mstar*, owing to changes in the market. In April 2020, SAMR lifted the remedies imposed in *Corun/Toyota China/PEVE/Sinogy/Toyota Tsusho* given substantive changes of the competition landscape in the market.

Finally, the provisions also set out the legal liabilities for undertakings that do not comply with the remedies imposed, which include a fine of no more than 500,000 yuan, in addition to an order to correct the non-compliance. In December 2014, MOFCOM adopted two decisions against Western Digital Corporation for two separate instances of non-compliance with the hold-separate remedies imposed by MOFCOM in 2012 in *Western Digital Corporation/HGST*. In February 2018, MOFCOM fined Thermo Fisher Scientific 150,000 yuan for its failure to comply with one of the conditions imposed for its acquisition of Life Technologies.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To date, the vast majority of concentrations cleared subject to remedies involve foreign-to-foreign mergers. From 2008 when the AML entered into force to April 2020, 47 transactions have been cleared conditionally, of which 44 were foreign-to-foreign transactions.

Recent examples include *Dow Chemical/DuPont* (2017), *Brocade/Broadcom* (2017), *HP/Samsung* (2017), *Agrium/Potash Corporation* (2017), *Maersk Line/Hamburg Süd* (2017), *Advanced Semiconductor Engineering/Siliconware Precision Industries* (2017), *Becton Dickinson/*

*CR Bard* (2017), *Bayer/Monsanto* (2018), *Essilor/Luxottica* (2018), *UTC/Rockwell Collins* (2018), *Linde/Praxair* (2018), *KLA Tencor/Orbotech* (2019), *Cargotec/TTS* (2019), *Il-VI/Finisar* (2019), *Novelis/Aleris* (2019), *Danaher/GE BioPharma* (2020), *Infineon/Cypress* (2020) and *Nvidia/Mellanox* (2020).

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

There is no track record to date on this question. Neither the AML nor the regulations or guidelines address ancillary restrictions.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Customers and competitors are routinely contacted for their views during the merger review process and are often invited to attend meetings with the authority.

The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has the authority to review a concentration that does not meet the relevant notification thresholds. That discretionary review may be initiated in the event of complaints from customers or competitors. Further, implementing regulations are expected to clarify third parties' rights to make representations, access documents or to be heard.

The *Microsoft/Nokia* decision in 2014 was the first time that the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) seemingly highlighted specific concerns raised by third parties in its decision. In this case, several leading Chinese technology companies reportedly submitted opinions and complaints to MOFCOM flagging concerns over the potential impact of the transaction on patent licensing. Similarly, in the P3 Prohibition case in 2014, MOFCOM reportedly asked Chinese trade associations, shippers and container liner shipping companies to comment on the proposed P3 Network shipping alliance during its review, and two of China's largest container liner shipping companies and the China Shippers Association reportedly opposed the deal. In more recent remedy decisions, the authority explicitly notes that it consulted with relevant government departments or authorities, industry associations, and relevant enterprises regarding the definition of the relevant markets, market participants, market structure, and characteristics and future development of the relevant market.

These decisions illustrate the importance of third-party opinions in China's merger review process. The decisions are also a reminder of the importance of taking into account the potential reaction of different stakeholders and preparing, in advance, a strategy to deal with potential complaints from customers, suppliers or competitors.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML) does not require SAMR to make public pre-merger notifications received, nor does it require it to publish unconditional clearance decisions. Only prohibition decisions and conditional clearance decisions are required to be published. In 2012, MOFCOM started to publish a list of unconditionally cleared concentrations on a quarterly basis, although the information it discloses is fairly limited (mainly relating to the undertakings' names and nature of the transaction). SAMR continued the same practice until April 2019,

when SAMR started to publish a list of unconditionally cleared cases on a monthly basis and, two months later in June 2019, SAMR started to publish the case list on a weekly basis.

Further to the Guidelines on Notification of Simple Cases, SAMR will publish a notice of simple cases on its website for public comments for a period of 10 days. This is intended to enable third parties to challenge the simple treatment determination and raise any potential competition concerns about the contemplated transaction. The notice identifies the parties and includes a summary of their activities, the transaction and the basis on which the notifying parties sought simple treatment.

Notifying parties are required to mark content in their notification or in annexes to the notification as confidential if they do not wish the information provided to be published or disclosed to a third party. A non-confidential version of the notification and annexes must be provided at the same time. Guidance published by MOFCOM indicates, for example, ranges to use when redacting market shares in the non-confidential version of the notification and annexes.

The AML provides that the competition authority and its staff shall keep confidential commercial secrets obtained during an investigation. The 2009 Review Measures and Notification Guidance also impose confidentiality obligations on other organisations and individuals if they become aware of business secrets and other confidential information during the review process.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

While China is currently not a member of the International Competition Network, it has regular bilateral or multilateral meetings with other competition authorities, covering both general issues and also, on occasion, specific cases. MOFCOM entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in 2011 to enhance bilateral cooperation between China and the United States in the merger area. MOFCOM entered into similar arrangements in 2012 with the UK Office of Fair Trading (now the Competition and Markets Authority) and with the South Korean Federal Trade Commission. In May 2014, MOFCOM and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission signed an MOU, which allows for information sharing between the two authorities, subject to confidentiality restrictions. MOFCOM and the Competition Authority of Kenya entered into an MOU in June 2014. In May 2015, MOFCOM and Canada's Competition Bureau entered into an MOU on antitrust cooperation. In April 2016, MOFCOM and the Japan Fair Trade Commission entered into an MOU. In May 2016, MOFCOM and the antitrust authorities of Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa entered into an MOU. Since the establishment of SAMR, SAMR has entered into MOUs or cooperative agreements with various jurisdictions including the European Union, the Philippines, Belarus, Serbia, Russia, Japan, Korea and the Republic of Seychelles.

In specific cases, SAMR may ask the notifying parties to grant a waiver so that it can discuss non-confidential aspects of a transaction with other competition authorities. In 2017, MOFCOM noted that it had cooperated with other competition authorities in more than 20 matters including *Dow Chemical/DuPont*.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Under the Chinese Antimonopoly Law, a notifying party who wishes to contest the authority's decision must appeal to SAMR for 'administrative reconsideration' in the first instance. If the notifying party is still

not satisfied after this, it can then bring an administrative action to challenge SAMR's decision before a People's Court.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

A notifying party may appeal to SAMR for 'administrative reconsideration' within 60 days of becoming aware of the decision. The time frame for administrative reconsideration is 60 days.

If a notifying party is not satisfied after this, it may bring an administrative action within 15 days of receipt of SAMR's 'administrative reconsideration' decision. The time frame for the administrative action is three months.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The single most important development is the merger of the Antimonopoly Bureau at the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the two other competition authorities in China, the Price Supervision and Antimonopoly Bureau of the National Development and Reform Commission and the Antimonopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Bureau of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce into the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR). The former Director General of the Antimonopoly Bureau at MOFCOM, Zhenguo Wu, was appointed Director General of the Antimonopoly Bureau at SAMR. Given that the three former merger divisions within the Antimonopoly Bureau at MOFCOM have been kept and many of the officials involved in mergers have remained in office including the former leadership of the Antimonopoly Bureau at MOFCOM, the changes that will be brought to China's merger control enforcement policy, if any, are expected to be gradual and incremental.

Since the entry into force of the Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML) in 2008, the number of notifications reviewed by MOFCOM and now SAMR annually has increased. By the end of April 2020, MOFCOM and SAMR had between them concluded more than 3,000 cases, among which 47 cases were approved subject to remedies (44 of them concerned foreign-to-foreign transactions) and two were prohibited.

Based on public record, in 2019, SAMR unconditionally cleared more than 440 cases and approved 45 cases subject to remedies. In 2019, SAMR imposed penalties in 18 cases for failure to notify, hitting a record high since the AML entered into force in 2008.

In December 2014, MOFCOM published its decision to fine Western Digital Corporation for two instances of non-compliance with the hold-separate remedies imposed in connection with its acquisition of Hitachi's HDD business. In February 2018, MOFCOM fined Thermo Fisher Scientific 150,000 yuan for its failure to comply with one of the conditions imposed for its acquisition of Life Technologies. These cases highlight the authority's willingness to impose fines to ensure compliance with remedies imposed, particularly in the case of hold-separate commitments.

The simple case procedure represents a significant improvement in the time taken to review transactions, given that previously the vast majority of such transactions resulted in clearance in Phase II. Recent experience shows that for 'simple cases', it may take SAMR approximately four weeks to declare the notification complete. Declaration of completeness and case acceptance starts the 10-calendar-day public consultation period during which any third party may challenge the transaction's status as a 'simple case' and raise objections about the transaction. The transaction is cleared currently within about two to

three weeks of the expiry of the 10-day public consultation period. This has enabled most simple cases to be cleared within Phase I. From the adoption of the simple case review procedure in April 2014 to the end of 2019, more than 1,500 simple cases have been concluded.

MOFCOM and now SAMR has vigorously enforced the merger control law. 2017 saw the largest number of remedies imposed in a given year. Following the *Glencore/Xstrata* and *Marubeni/Gavilon* decisions, it is expected that global transactions involving commodities that are strategically important to China are likely to be subject to close scrutiny. The *Google/Motorola*, *Microsoft/Nokia and Nokia/Alcatel Lucent* transactions also suggest that the authority will pay close attention to transactions in the IT sector, particularly where standard essential patents (SEPs) (and in some cases non-SEPs) are in issue. The *MediaTek/MStar*, *Advanced Semiconductor Engineering/Siliconware Precision Industries*, *KLA-Tencor/Orbotech* and *Infineon/Cypress* decisions indicate that the semiconductor sector has continued to draw close scrutiny from the authority. In addition, the authority continues to pay close attention to leveraging and tying or bundling effects theories of harm in conglomerate mergers, such as *Essilor/Luxottica* (2018), *UTC/Rockwell Collins* (2018), *KLA-Tencor/Orbotech* (2018) *Infineon/Cypress* (2020) and *Nvidia/Mellanox* (2020), as well as a transaction's potential adverse impact on innovation; for example, in *Dow Chemical/DuPont* (2017), *Becton Dickinson/CR Bard* (2017), *Bayer/Monsanto* (2018) and *Danaher/GE BioPharma* (2020).

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Early in January 2020, SAMR published proposed draft amendments to the AML for public comments. The proposed draft reflects a more aggressive enforcement policy, with the most significant amendments in the area of merger control. The key proposed changes for merger control include:

- significant increase in fines for merger control violations: the fining cap will significantly increase from 500,000 yuan to 10 per cent of the relevant undertaking's turnover in the previous year;
- 'stop the clock' during merger review: the proposed 'stop the clock' mechanism will allow SAMR to 'stop the clock' when SAMR awaits an RFI response; SAMR and the parties engage in remedy negotiations; or the notifying party so applies;
- potential flexibility to revise filing thresholds: the authority to design and amend the filing thresholds is delegated from the State Council to SAMR;
- transactions falling under the thresholds: the proposed draft clarifies SAMR's ability to investigate transactions falling under the turnover thresholds, but that have or are likely to have the effect of restricting competition; and
- introduction of a definition of control: the proposed draft includes a definition for the concept of control, which will be the first time that control is defined in the AML.

In March 2020, SAMR published its 2020 legislative plan, according to which it plans to finalise the proposed amendments to the AML for review by the legislature this year. While details of the timing of adoption are unknown, the proposed amendments signal the dawn of a new AML. In addition, SAMR's 2020 legislative plan also provides that SAMR aims to adopt the Interim Provisions on Review of Concentrations of Undertakings within 2020, the draft of which was published for public comments in January 2020. The draft is largely a consolidation – with minor changes – of rules and regulations on merger control adopted by SAMR and MOFCOM.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

On 13 February 2019, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) conditionally cleared *KLA-Tencor/Orbotech* after an over one-year review. The transaction concerns a vertical and conglomerate merger in the semiconductor equipment sector. Given that KLA-Tencor has a significant market share in the upstream market, SAMR was concerned that the merging parties would impede competition in the downstream market by vertical foreclosure, tying and bundling or misuse of confidential information received from competitors in the downstream market. As a result, the parties were required to continue to supply the upstream product to the Chinese market on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and not to engage in tying or bundling, or impose unreasonable commercial terms. In addition, the parties shall take measures to protect information received from competitors in the downstream market.

On 5 July 2019, SAMR conditionally cleared the *Cargotec/TTS* deal, which concerned a horizontal merger in the cargo-handling equipment sector. SAMR was mainly concerned by the high combined market shares of the parties in the relevant markets post-transaction, which might lead to a price increase and reduction of customers' choices, thus harming customers' interests. SAMR required the parties to hold separate their respective businesses in the relevant markets for two years and to take other measures, such as setting up firewalls, formulating firewall-related internal guidance and providing competition compliance training to employees. In addition, SAMR also imposed behavioural remedies to ensure Cargotec's supply of the relevant products to the Chinese market, including restrictions on price increases and refusal or malicious delay of supply.

Similarly, in *II-VI/Finisar*, which was a horizontal merger in the market for wavelength selective switches cleared by SAMR in September 2019, SAMR also imposed hold-separate remedies alongside behavioural remedies to address the potential unilateral and coordinated effects. Unlike *Cargotec/TTS*, *II-VI* and *Finisar* were required to hold separate their respective businesses in the relevant market for at least three years and the remedy will not expire automatically. The parties will need to submit an application for the remedy to be lifted. The parties were also required to supply the relevant product on fair and reasonable terms and were prohibited from discriminating between customers in terms of price, delivery date, after-sales service and other commercial terms.

On 18 October 2019, SAMR conditionally approved *Zhejiang Garden/DSM*, which concerned a greenfield joint venture in the nutrition sector. SAMR raised concerns around potential coordination owing to the high combined market share between the joint venture partners in a horizontally overlapping market, which is downstream of the joint venture's activities. SAMR was also concerned about the transaction's foreclosure effects. SAMR required the joint venture partners to hold their respective downstream businesses separate, and the joint venture to be run independently of the joint venture partners. In addition, SAMR prohibited the joint venture partners and the joint venture from disclosing price information on relevant products to third parties unless required by customers, government authorities, or applicable laws.

On 20 December 2019, *Novelis/Aleris*, which combined the largest producer of aluminium automotive body sheets worldwide, Novelis, with one of its competitors, Aleris, was cleared by SAMR subject to divestiture and behavioural remedies. Like the European Commission in the European Union, SAMR required Aleris to divest its aluminium automotive inner and outer body sheets business in the EEA. In

addition, SAMR required the merged party to refrain from supplying the upstream product, cold-rolled sheets, to its competitors in China for 10 years to prevent potential coordination between the merged party and its competitors in the markets for aluminium automotive inner and outer body sheets. SAMR adopted a narrow market definition in this case, further sub-segmenting the automotive body sheets market into inner body sheets and outer body sheets. This is a reminder that SAMR can take a very narrow approach to market definition in certain circumstances.

These decisions highlight that, in addition to divestures, SAMR will also consider hold-separate commitments to address competition concerns arising from high levels of market concentration. In addition to structural remedies, SAMR may also impose behavioural remedies.

All these transactions were unconditionally cleared in other jurisdictions, except *Novelis/Aleris*, which was also cleared subject to remedies in the United States and the European Union. This is because, from the Chinese antitrust authority's perspective, these transactions gave rise to China-specific concerns. This indicates that the Chinese antitrust authority is confident to chart its own course in relation to merger control enforcement.




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# Colombia

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation is Law 1340 of 2009, with additional regulation set forth in Resolution No. 10930 of 2015 and Resolution No. 76544 of 2019, issued by the national competition authority, the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (SIC).

In Colombia, SIC acts as the main enforcer of merger control rules; however, there are two exceptions: the Superintendency of Finance regarding mergers between financial institutions or other entities subject to its surveillance and the Civil Aviation Authority for mergers between aircraft operators. Whenever a merger is under review by the Superintendency of Finance, it must request a non-binding opinion from SIC; this request is not mandatory in the case of the Civil Aviation Authority, but it is still a common practice.

Besides antitrust merger control, SIC has powers in the following matters:

- investigation of anticompetitive conducts;
- unfair competition;
- consumer protection (judicial and administrative powers);
- intellectual property (judicial and administrative powers regarding trademarks and patents);
- legal metrology (administrative powers); and
- data privacy (administrative powers).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Mergers are subject to merger control by SIC if the following criteria are met (these criteria differ for the finance and aviation sectors):

- market overlap: the companies involved in the transaction develop the same business activity (horizontal merger) or carry out activities within the same value chain (vertical merger). In Colombia, conglomerate mergers are not caught by merger control;
- economic threshold: during the fiscal year preceding the merger, the parties to the transaction and all the companies that are controlled or have control over the parties and perform the same business activity or carry out activities within the same value chain, had, individually or in the aggregate, operating income or total assets amounting to an equivalent of 60,000 Colombian minimum legal wages (approximately US\$17 million as at 2020). As a general rule, SIC only takes into account income and assets from undertakings in Colombia; however, if either one of the parties participate in the Colombian market only through exports and does not have any corporate vehicles in Colombia, global assets and operating income should be considered; and

- acquisition of competitive control: one of the parties in the transaction acquires competitive control over the economic activity of the target (including acquisition of competitive control over essential assets).

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

According to SIC's case law and guidelines, joint ventures are deemed as business mergers if they meet the full-functionality test, as per the following conditions:

- merger of a business line: the joint venture must have the effect of merging a business line or market, instead of specific operations;
- full-functionality: the joint venture must be autonomous or at least have the potential to develop its activity as a business separate from its parents; and
- lasting basis: elimination of competition between the parties to the transaction should take place on a lasting basis.

If the aforementioned conditions are not met, joint ventures would not be caught under merger control, and the transaction would be deemed as cooperation between competitors.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

For antitrust purposes, 'control' is understood as the de facto possibility of influencing strategic decisions, regarding: corporate policy (including prices, investments, indebtedness or similar); initiation, variation or termination of business activity; and management of goods or rights that are essential for the performance of the company's economic activity. Therefore, contractual arrangements, management representation or even holding veto rights over certain strategic decisions could constitute competitive control, which should be assessed case by case.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The two relevant thresholds for merger control purposes are the following:

- economic threshold: during the fiscal year preceding the merger, the parties to the transaction and all the companies that are controlled or have control over the parties to the transaction and develop the same business activity or carry out activities within the same value chain, had, individually or in the aggregate, operating incomes or total assets amounting to an equivalent of 60,000 Colombian minimum legal wages (approximately US\$17 million as at 2020). As a general rule, SIC only takes into account operating incomes and



assets in Colombia, unless the parties participate in the Colombian market only through exports and do not have a corporate vehicle in Colombia, in which case, assets and income are calculated on a global basis; and

- market shares threshold: if the parties' joint market share is 20 per cent or higher in any of the relevant markets, the transaction requires prior approval from SIC (prior approval). Otherwise, the transaction is deemed as authorised by law, and only a notification to SIC is required, providing the evidence that the transaction does not meet the market threshold.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing system for merger control is mandatory.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Pursuant to the effects doctrine (article 2 of Law 1340 of 2009), if the undertakings concerned are engaged in economic activities with effects in Colombia, they are considered as market participants, regardless of whether they are domiciled outside Colombia.

Consequently, foreign-to-foreign mergers may be subject to merger control whenever the parties:

- have corporate vehicles in Colombia;
- conduct business in Colombia through subsidiaries;
- sell products in Colombia;
- own goods or assets in Colombia; or
- perform business operations that have effects in Colombia.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Regarding foreign investments, no specific rules apply for merger control. However, Colombian regulations prohibit some forms of foreign investment in certain industries, such as national security or environmental.

In the context of prior approval proceedings that take place in regulated or sensitive sectors, SIC is required to request non-binding opinions from relevant public agencies.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Filings must be delivered before closing. The breach of this duty is regarded as a violation of Colombian Competition Law, which may result in investigations against the parties and the responsible individuals.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

All the undertakings taking part in the transaction are responsible for filing. Notwithstanding the latter, the filing could be made by any of the parties, as long as such party manages to submit all the required information before SIC.

At the time of submission of this report, filing fees were not being required; however, they are to be expected in the near future.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Colombia applies a suspensory system, so that clearance is required prior to closing. For notifications (ie, the parties have joint market shares below 20 per cent in all the relevant markets), the parties can close immediately after filing, but SIC has the power to order a prior approval proceeding within 10 business days from the date of filing, if it considers that the parties are not to properly support the fact that the transaction did not meet the market shares threshold.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing and performing integrated activities before clearance are violations of Colombian Competition Law to which the following sanctions apply:

- fines against the parties: up to 100,000 monthly minimum legal wages (approximately US\$25 million as at 2020), or 150 per cent of the revenue or profit obtained from the infraction, whichever is higher;
- fines against individuals: up to 2,000 monthly minimum legal wages (approximately US\$600,000 for 2020); or
- reversion of the transaction: if it is determined that the transaction it produced an undue restriction on competition (there are no legal precedents).

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

In theory, penalties would be applicable to foreign-to-foreign mergers, but they are difficult to enforce in practice.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

In the context of a prior approval proceedings, parties can either file a formal carve-out proposal to SIC to obtain its approval of the hold-separate mechanisms within five business days; informally notify SIC about the carve-out remedies to be implemented, or apply private remedies without informing SIC, facing the risk of gun-jumping sanctions. For successful carveouts, the parties must guarantee that no transfer of control or exchange of sensitive information will occur on a lasting basis with respect to the business in Colombia.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

For public takeover bids, SIC can, on behalf of the interested party, request the target to submit the statutory information to carry out the merger control proceeding.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The level of detail depends on many factors and should be evaluated case by case. In general terms, Resolution No. 10930 of 2015 establishes the minimum required information. For prior approvals, the filing



must include detailed information regarding the proposed transaction, the parties, relevant markets, competitors, customers and distribution channels. For notifications, it is necessary to provide the financial statements of the parties to the transaction, a description of the transaction, market definition and market shares of the parties to the transaction and their competitors.

Providing incomplete information may delay SIC's decision, as decision timings do not start until all information has been filed before SIC. Providing false or misleading information is subject to sanctions and could even face criminal prosecutions.

**Investigation phases and timetable**

**17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?**

For notifications, SIC has 10 business days to issue an acknowledgment of receipt, or to order a prior approval if it does not agree with the methodology used by the parties to define relevant markets or to calculate their market shares.

Prior approval proceedings are organised through phases, during which the information and assessment burdens increase. During the initial stage or Phase I, SIC may bring forward a preliminary assessment of the transaction within 30 business days (Phase I). SIC can thereafter decide to perform an in-depth analysis of the transaction by requiring additional statutory information (Phase II), as a result of which it has three additional months to take a decision from the time Phase II information has been provided in full form. In exceptional circumstances, SIC can make a single request for supplementary information to the Parties, extending the time it has to make a decision for an additional three-month period (for the ease of understanding we refer to this circumstance as a Phase III, even though it is still part of Phase II). If SIC does not issue a decision within three months from the date the parties submit all the required information for Phase II or Phase III, it is understood that the transaction has been authorised by Law.

**18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?**

While a decision can be issued at any time during a prior approval proceeding, the following is a timetable summarising each phase:

Phase I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Phase I information provided by the parties.</li> <li>Public announcement: the filing goes public for third parties to comment or request a private interest to be recognised in the proceeding.</li> <li>Preliminary assessment: 30 business days – duration defined by law and cannot be modified.</li> </ul>
Phase II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Phase II information provided by the parties.</li> <li>Comments by other regulatory authorities (when applicable).</li> <li>In-depth study (remedies proposal).</li> </ul> <p>Three months from the time all Phase II information request has been provided.</p>
Phase III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Additional information request, which resets the three-month period once only.</li> <li>Final decision.</li> </ul> <p>(Three months)</p>

**SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT**

**Substantive test**

**19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?**

The substantive test requires the transaction not to produce an 'undue restriction on free competition'.

This test should be applied in accordance with the objectives of Colombian Competition Law (ie, to protect the participation of businesses in the market, consumer welfare and economic efficiency), so the parties can request for an efficiencies or failing firm exemption, to obtain clearance in spite of potential anticompetitive effects.

**20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?**

No.

**Theories of harm**

**21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?**

The substantive test and goals of Colombian Competition Law have led to considering unilateral, coordinated, vertical and, occasionally, portfolio effects, as plausible theories of harm to free competition.

**Non-competition issues**

**22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?**

There are no cases that have been decided on explicit non-competition arguments.

**Economic efficiencies**

**23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?**

Economic efficiency is a possible, but very uncommon, defence for a transaction. The parties have the burden of demonstrating that the transaction is indispensable to produce positive or pro-competitive effects to the benefit of consumers, which outweigh any anticompetitive concern.

If successful, the transaction is cleared on the condition that the benefits are effectively passed on to consumers (as a behavioural remedy).

**REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS**

**Regulatory powers**

**24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?**

The Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (SIC) has the power to impose remedies or prohibit the transaction, by means of a reasoned resolution. The parties may file internal administrative appeals (reconsideration petitions) against those decisions.

SIC's decisions could be subject to judicial review, but in practice it is uncommonly, since judicial review is usually non-suspensory and take a long time.

## Remedies and conditions

**25** | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. Structural, behavioural and hybrid remedies may be offered by the parties or directly imposed by SIC.

If market conditions change over time, the parties can request SIC to remove the remedies imposed, given that they no longer fulfil the purpose for which they were initially imposed.

**26** | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

There are no statutory regulations regarding remedies conditions or timing. It wholly depends on the criteria adopted by SIC on a case-by-case basis.

In most cases, remedies could be satisfied upon closing, but SIC has required compliance with certain remedies as a prior condition for the parties to close the transaction.

In addition, SIC usually monitors compliance through different instruments, including external audits and periodic reports. Surveillance efforts are to be paid by the parties through a yearly contribution, which rates are fixed depending on the complexity of the remedies to be verified; however, they cannot exceed one per thousand of the current assets of each company. SIC may also request the parties to obtain an insurance policy for compliance with the remedies.

**27** | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There are no records of remedies imposed on strictly foreign-to-foreign mergers with no corporate vehicles or assets in Colombia; however, it is common to see remedies imposed on foreign companies with locally incorporated companies, usually in line with other antitrust authorities.

## Ancillary restrictions

**28** | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Antitrust clearance is only issued in relation to the market effect of the merger (in Colombia, contracts are not required by the proceeding). It is still a matter of debate whether ancillary restraints could be cleared as part of the process or are instead always subject to ex post control by SIC.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

**29** | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Yes. First, they can provide their views within 10 business days after the transaction is made public. Likewise, the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce (SIC) may request information from third parties.

### Publicity and confidentiality

**30** | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Prior approval proceedings require general details from the proposed transaction to be published in a newspaper or SIC's website. Nevertheless, the parties can request SIC to refrain from making the transaction public only on public policy grounds.

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Additionally, the information submitted by the parties may be kept confidential, but it is necessary to file an explicit request justifying the legal grounds on which confidentiality must be granted. In that event, the parties also have to submit an executive summary of the confidential information for it to be incorporated into the public record.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

**31** | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Colombia is part of several international antitrust cooperation agreements. Most of these agreements were established through free trade agreements (FTAs) subscribed by the country. Some of these FTAs have a competition chapter that includes cooperation provisions. Additionally, there are several agreements with antitrust authorities, including the authorities of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Spain, South Africa and the United States, and, in general, authorities of countries that are members of the International Competition Network and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Nonetheless, information exchanges between authorities are limited. For instance, SIC is not entitled to exchange the parties' information, unless they expressly provide a waiver.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

**32** | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Against SIC's decision, a reconsideration petition can be presented. If the parties do not agree with the final outcome, they can request judicial courts to review the decision, but in the meantime, the decision generally comes into effect.

### Time frame

**33** | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The parties have 10 business days to file reconsideration petitions before the Superintendent of Industry and Commerce, once the decision has been notified. The term during which the Superintendent is expected to reach to a final decision is two months.

Judicial review may take years; therefore, parties are not always keen to request for court's review of the decision.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Superintendency of Industry and Commerce has recently started to use remedies as a tool to correct markets rather than to counteract any anticompetitive effects.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Yes. It is pending the expedition of a filing fees regulation.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In the Puerto Bahía Port Project, the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce decided to impose public access standards as a remedy to approve the construction of a very important port project in the Urabá region.

# Costa Rica

Claudio Antonio Donato Lopez, Claudio Donato Monge and Marco López Volio

Zurcher Odio & Raven

## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Act for the Promotion of Competition and Consumer Defence is the main body of law. However, the Act for the Strengthening of Competition Authorities, which entered into force in 2019, also contains relevant dispositions and introduced significant changes to the legal framework.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The legislation uses a very broad definition of a 'concentration', defining it in general terms as any transaction that results in an acquisition of control of one entity over another, or the formation of a new economic agent under joint control. As such, almost all mergers may be caught under that definition, as long as they meet the thresholds set forth by the law.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Any joint venture that results in a change of control or joint control and reaches the thresholds, may be caught by the law.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

There is a broad definition of control that considers both positive and negative control. As such, the possibility of blocking strategic decisions is also considered as 'control'.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

There are two thresholds that need to be met by the parties.

- joint threshold: the combined assets of the parties in Costa Rica, or the combined revenue generated during the last fiscal period, has to be more than 30,000 base salaries; and
- individual threshold: the individual sales or assets in Costa Rica of each party have to be more than 1,500 base salaries.

Transactions that fall below these thresholds are not subject to notification.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing is mandatory. If the obligation to notify is triggered, there are no exceptions.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified if the involved parties have executed any activities with an incidence in Costa Rica at any time during the previous two years (and if the economic thresholds are met).

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no special rules on foreign investment. Prior to the new act, the financial, securities, insurance and pension sectors had some special dispositions regarding the concentration of entities participating in those markets. However, after the reform, only the telecommunications sector is subject to certain differentiations (mainly, that the procedure is directed by the Superintendency of Telecommunications and not by Coprocom).

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The transaction needs to be filed prior to closing. There are sanctions for not filing and they are applied in practice. These sanctions are mainly fines and measures to execute a demerger, should the Commission consider it necessary.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

All parties are responsible for filing. There are no filing fees.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The transaction is suspended prior to clearance. The parties may request a waiver in qualified and exceptional circumstances.

The waiting period depends on the transaction's complexity. Once it has been submitted, Coprocom will have 15 business days to execute its initial review and request additional information. Once the information is complete, there are two possible stages of the process. The first stage consists of a 30-day maximum term, where Coprocom determines if the

transaction poses any risk to competition. If there are no risks, then the transaction is approved. Should there be a risk identified, Coprocom will open a second phase, where it shall grant the applicant 10 business days to file its allegations or evidence to dispute the concerns identified by Coprocom. This second stage may be extended by up to 90 calendar days.

The waiting period is 30 days after all the required information has been submitted. However, this period may be extended up to 60 days in cases of special complexity. Once the second phase is finished, Coprocom may authorise the concentration or may grant 30 business days to the applicant to provide measures that may offset the anticompetitive effects that it has identified. After this, Coprocom shall determine whether the transaction is authorised with conditions or rejected.

### Pre-clearance closing

**12** What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

There may be fines imposed and the Commission may order the demerger or reversal of the transaction that was not notified.

The fines imposed are determined based on the severity of the breach of the law and range from 0.1 per cent to 10 per cent of the economic agent's sales.

**13** Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Yes, sanctions may be applied in such cases.

**14** What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Under very qualified cases, and given that the parties provide the evidence to support their case, Coprocom may waive the suspensive effects of the notification and may authorise closing prior to clearance.

### Public takeovers

**15** Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There are no applicable special rules for public takeover bids.

### Documentation

**16** What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

If the filing is incomplete, Coprocom will issue a request for information. However, if the filing contains wrong or false information, there is a risk of a fine.

### Investigation phases and timetable

**17** What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The different phases are as follows:

- Once it has been submitted, Coprocom will have 15 business days to execute its initial review, and request additional information.
- Initial review phase: once the information is complete, there are two possible stages of the process. The first stage consists of a 30-day maximum term where Coprocom determines if the transaction poses any risk to competition. If there are no risks, then the transaction is approved.

- Second phase. Should there be a risk identified, Coprocom will open a second phase, where it shall grant the applicant 10 business days to file its allegations or evidence to dispute the concerns identified by Coprocom. This second stage may extend up to another 90 calendar days. After this, Coprocom shall determine whether it authorises the transaction, or it will indicate its concerns to the parties and grant them the opportunity to provide conditions that may mitigate these effects.

**18** What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The timetable depends on the transaction's complexity and its potential effects on the market. If there are no relevant anticompetitive effects, the transaction would be approved in 30 days after the required information has been submitted. If there are concerns of anticompetitive effects, the process may be extended by 120 days or more.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

**19** What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance consists of an analysis of the anti-competitive effects and the procompetitive effects of the transaction. If the transaction does not generate significant anticompetitive effects, or if the procompetitive effects offset those anticompetitive effects, the transaction is approved. Coprocom may also impose additional conditions to mitigate the anticompetitive effects.

**20** Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures.

### Theories of harm

**21** What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

There is no definitive list set forth by the law that states the theories of harm that Coprocom will investigate. However, its precedents have shown that Coprocom analyses market dominance, unilateral effects (over prices, negotiation mechanisms, capacity, innovation and expansion possibilities of competitors), coordinated effects, vertical foreclosure and conglomerate effects.

### Non-competition issues

**22** To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

In theory, non-competition issues should not be relevant in the review process. The main reason for legal reforms that entered into force in 2019 was to grant Coprocom more independence from the Ministry of Economy, which previously had some influence over the Commission.

### Economic efficiencies

**23** To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies are considered where the transaction may result in anticompetitive effects. If the transaction does not generate anticompetitive effects, there is no need for Coprocom to analyse economic efficiencies.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Coprocom has the powers to reject, divest or order the reversal of a transaction that was not notified. Coprocom may also impose hefty fines over the parties.

### Remedies and conditions

25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

It is possible to remedy competition issues. The law establishes the following potential remedies; however, the parties or Coprocom may suggest a remedy that is not expressly stated:

- divestment of undertakings or sale of assets;
- restrictions or limitations related to the sale of services or goods;
- obligation to supply certain goods or services to specific customers or competitors; and
- introduction of specific clauses in agreements signed with clients or suppliers.

26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The conditions and timing are determined on a case-by-case basis.

27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The authority has required remedies in some transactions. However, it there are no precedents of remedies being imposed on foreign-to-foreign mergers.

### Ancillary restrictions

28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

There is no legal framework that establishes this beforehand. It would be determined by Coprocom on a case-by-case basis.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The concentration authorisation process requires that a notice is published in a national newspaper, with the purpose of allowing any third party to appear before the authority and express its arguments in relation to the concentration. Their right is to manifest their position. They may provide proof against the transaction, as well as their arguments as to the reasons why the concentration should be admitted or rejected.



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### Publicity and confidentiality

30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Coprocom creates two case files: one confidential case file that may be accessed only by the authority and the notifying parties; and another non-confidential, which is accessible to the public.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

There are internal agreements between authorities to exchange information and also to seek advice related to similar cases that other authorities may have reviewed. However, whenever such cooperation occurs, it is rarely something that is disclosed.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The ruling by Coprocom is subject to an administrative appeal before Coprocom, and then it is subject to judicial review. There have not been judicial reviews on rulings related to concentration authorisation processes.

### Time frame

33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An appeal is generally resolved within five business days. The judicial review does not have a clear time frame, and it may take between six months and two years.



## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

There does not seem to be a specific focus on a certain industry or sector.

In the last five years, there have been very few transactions rejected (but there are cases of rejections) and there have been other transactions that were accepted under certain conditions.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The Regulations to the Act for the Strengthening of Competition Authorities are expected to be published in 2020. However, those Regulations would only clarify certain points of this Act and would not represent any drastic changes.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The most relevant development was the Act to Strengthen the Competition Authorities, which introduced some relevant changes to the competition law legal framework in Costa Rica.

The most relevant changes were:

- Coprocom has more independence and is better equipped with more economic and human resources;
- the merger notification process now has suspensive effects, so that transactions may not be closed without previous clearance from Coprocom; and
- there is an additional individual threshold that must be met by at least two of the parties of the transaction. Before, there were some acquisitions of minor companies with irrelevant participations in the market, which had to be notified if the purchaser was a large entity. Now, most of those smaller or irrelevant transactions do not need to be notified.

# Croatia

Borna Dejanović and Luka Čolić

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Merger control, as well as other aspects of competition law, has been substantially governed by the Competition Act, which entered into force on 1 October 2010. In addition, there are numerous regulations that set out the procedural framework and define the standards for its application. One of the most relevant regulations is the Regulation on the Notification and Assessment of Concentrations (Official Gazette 38/11), which provides information on the content and form of the notification and the assessment criteria for concentrations. In preparation for Croatia's accession to the EU on 1 July 2013, the Competition Act was amended to comply with EU competition law.

Since Croatia's accession to the European Union, the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) has been directly applicable. Hence, mergers falling within the scope of the EUMR are reviewed by the European Commission (one-stop-shop principle) and not by the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA), except for those cases in which the European Commission decides that it will not assess a particular concentration and that the assessment thereof should be assigned to the CCA. The CCA, at the same time, remains competent to review national merger control cases under the Competition Act, as further described below. The CCA is an independent authority. The decision-making body within the CCA is the Competition Council (the Council), which consists of five members, one of whom is the president of the Council.

More information about the CCA and its activities can be found at [www.aztn.hr](http://www.aztn.hr).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

A concentration is constituted by:

- a merger of two or more independent undertakings or parts thereof;
- the acquisition of control or decisive influence of one or more undertakings over one or more other undertakings or a part of an undertaking, in particular by:
  - acquisition of the majority of shares or share capital;
  - obtaining the majority of voting rights; or
  - in any other way according to the provisions of the Croatian Companies Act and other regulations; or
- the creation of a joint venture by two or more independent undertakings, performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

A concentration does not arise if:

- banks or other financial institutions, investment funds or insurance companies, in their ordinary course of business, which includes

transactions and dealing with securities, for their own account or for the account of third parties, hold shares on a temporary basis with a view toward reselling them, provided that they do not exercise their voting rights in respect of those shares for the purpose of determining the competitive behaviour of that undertaking (ie, they exercise such voting rights solely with a view toward preparing the disposal of the entire or a part of the undertaking or its shares, do not undertake any operation that may distort, restrict or prevent competition, and carry out the disposal within one year following the acquisition). If the disposal is not reasonably possible within this period, it may – upon request – be extended by the CCA;

- the acquisition of shares or share capital is the result of internal restructuring of an undertaking (intra-group merger); or
- control is acquired by an office holder or administrative officer in the event of a bankruptcy, liquidation or winding up of an undertaking in accordance with the bankruptcy laws and the Croatian Companies Act.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture by two or more independent undertakings, performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint venture), constitutes a concentration.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

In general, 'control' may be obtained through the transfer of rights, contracts or other means, by which one or more undertakings, either separately or jointly, taking into account all legal and factual circumstances, gain the ability to exercise decisive influence over one or more undertakings on a lasting basis.

An undertaking is deemed to be controlled by another undertaking if the controlling undertaking, directly or indirectly:

- holds more than half of the share capital or half of the shares;
- may exercise more than half of the voting rights;
- has the right to appoint more than half of the members of the management board, supervisory committee or a similar administrative or managing body; or
- in any other way exercises a decisive influence on the right to manage the business operations of the undertaking.

Minority interests (including board or management representation and contractual arrangements) are caught, provided that they confer control by any means described above.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The CCA must be notified of a concentration where in the business year preceding the concentration:

- the combined total worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned amounted to at least 1 billion kunas and at least one of the undertakings concerned has its seat or a subsidiary in Croatia; and
- the individual total turnover realised in Croatia by each of at least two undertakings concerned amounted to at least 100 million kunas.

For the purpose of turnover calculation, the revenues from the sale of goods or the provision of services have to be taken into account. The turnover of an undertaking concerned includes:

- 1 the turnover of the undertaking concerned;
- 2 those undertakings in which the undertaking concerned, directly or indirectly owns more than half the shares or capital or business assets, or has the power to exercise more than half the voting rights, or has the power to appoint more than half the members of the supervisory board, the administrative board or bodies legally representing the undertakings, or has the right to manage the undertakings' affairs;
- 3 those undertakings that have in the undertaking concerned (acquiring or controlling undertaking) rights or powers listed in (2); and
- 4 those undertakings that have in the undertakings referred to in (3) the rights or powers listed in (2).

Turnover generated by sales or services between companies belonging to the same group is not taken into account. In the case of an acquisition of one or more parts of an undertaking or of a group of undertakings, irrespective of whether such parts constitute independent legal entities, only the turnover pertaining to the parts subject to the concentration are taken into account for the purpose of the turnover calculation.

For the purpose of the turnover calculation of banks and other institutions that provide financial services, after the deduction of indirect taxes related to them, the sum of the following income items has to be taken into account:

- income from interest rates and similar income;
- income from securities (ie, income from shares and other variable yield securities, income from participating interests in economic entities, and income from shares in affiliated economic entities);
- commissions receivable;
- net profit on financial operations; and
- other operating income.

For insurance companies and companies that perform reinsurance activities, the value of the gross premiums, which includes amounts paid and received in relation to the insurance contracts issued by or on behalf of an insurance company, including reinsurance premiums, after the deduction of taxes and parafiscal contributions charged by reference to the amounts of individual premiums or in relation to the total premium volume, have to be taken into account.

Concentrations falling within the jurisdiction of the European Commission are not subject to Croatian merger control (one-stop-shop principle). According to article 19, paragraph 7 of the Competition Act, the European Commission may, however, decide to refer the assessment of a concentration to the CCA, irrespective of the concentration having a Community dimension, provided that Croatian national thresholds are met. Should this be the case, the parties to the concentration must submit a respective Croatian merger notification to the CCA

within 30 days of the date of the receipt of the relevant decision of the Commission.

Irrespective of whether the above-mentioned turnover thresholds are met, in specific situations in the media, postal or electronic communications sectors a filing with the CCA or the Croatian Regulatory Authority for Network Industries (HAKOM) may be required.

Except the situations described above, the general rule is that there is no obligation to notify the merger to the CCA if the thresholds from article 17 of the Competition Act are not met.

### 6 Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If a transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Act, and if the statutory turnover threshold requirements are cumulatively met, the filing is mandatory.

### 7 Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The Competition Act requires local effects insofar that – in addition to a certain domestic minimum turnover generated by at least two of the undertakings concerned – at least one of the undertakings concerned is required to have its seat or a subsidiary in Croatia. As a result, purely foreign-to-foreign mergers usually fall outside of the scope of the CCA's jurisdiction.

### 8 Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no provisions that would relate specifically to foreign investments. Inter alia, in the following sectors, provisions related to merger control exist.

#### Media sector

The CCA has sole competence to decide on concentrations involving media companies. However, the Electronic Media Act (Official Gazette, No. 136/13) defines in articles 54 and 55 specific threshold requirements for certain types of media undertakings that deviate from the general turnover thresholds. Moreover, according to article 57 of the Electronic Media Act, the Electronic Media Agency is authorised to order the shareholding structure of a media company to be changed (otherwise its media licence could be withdrawn). Furthermore, the Media Act (Official Gazette, No. 81/13) prohibits concentrations that would result in a combined market share of more than 40 per cent in the markets comprising all daily or all weekly newspapers in Croatia, respectively.

#### Postal and electronic communications sectors

According to article 68 of the Electronic Communications Act (Official Gazette, No. 72/17), operators with significant market power and operators who have been granted licences to use radio frequencies are obligated to notify HAKOM of any intention to merge or consolidate or of any other type of joint or coordinated action (irrespective of whether the turnover thresholds are met). Prior to the implementation of any such operation, HAKOM must issue an approval. If the intended operation also qualifies as a concentration exceeding the jurisdictional thresholds, a notification also has to be filed with the CCA. In the course of the assessment, the CCA may invite HAKOM to comment on the case.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no explicit filing deadline. However, the notification has to be submitted to the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) prior to the intended implementation of the concentration and following the conclusion of the merger agreement on the basis of which control or decisive influence will be acquired by the controlling undertaking or following the publication of the invitation to tender. The parties may submit the notification even before the conclusion of the merger agreement or the publication of the invitation to tender, if they are able to provide, in good faith, evidence of the proposed conclusion of the merger agreement or the announcement of the invitation to tender. In the case of a breach of the filing obligation, the CCA may impose a fine of up to 1 per cent of the undertaking's total annual turnover realised in the preceding business year.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

There are two scenarios to consider.

In case of an acquisition of an entire undertaking or parts of one or more undertakings by another undertaking, the notification has to be submitted by the undertaking acquiring control.

In all other cases, the parties to the concentration have to submit a joint notification in relation to the concentration.

An initial filing fee of 7,000 kunas is payable prior to the submission of the notification, and proof of payment must be submitted to the CCA together with the notification. For notifications in the media sector where the general turnover thresholds are not met, the initial filing fee amounts to 3,500 kunas.

A fee of 105,000 kunas is payable if the CCA adopts its decision after an in-depth investigation.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The intended concentration must not be implemented prior to clearance (suspension obligation).

As to the waiting periods, there are two periods to consider.

First, following the submission of the notification, the CCA first assesses the completeness of the merger notification. The law does not provide for a specific time frame; in practice, it is thus recommended to be in contact with the authority during this stage to ensure that this period is short.

Second, once the CCA has issued the confirmation of completeness, it then assesses the intended concentration in one or two phases, depending on whether the intended concentration raises competition concerns or not.

In Phase I, the CCA has 30 days to clear the intended concentration. If no decision has been adopted prior to the expiry of this waiting period, the intended concentration is presumed by law to be approved in Phase I.

If, however, the authority takes the view that the intended concentration gives rise to competition law concerns, it shall adopt a procedural order on the initiation of Phase II proceedings. Once the CCA has initiated Phase II proceedings, it must issue a decision within three months (which may be extended by an additional three months, if this is necessary to carry out additional market analysis). If no decision has been adopted prior to the expiry of the waiting period, the intended concentration is presumed by law to have obtained clearance in Phase II.

According to article 19(6) of the Competition Act, the CCA may, in particularly justified cases, upon the request of the parties, permit the implementation of particular actions relating to the implementation of the notified concentration before the expiry of the applicable waiting period. When deciding on such a request, the CCA takes into account all circumstances of the case, in particular the nature and gravity of the damages that might be posed to the parties to the concentration or third parties, and the effects of the concentration on competition. From publicly available information one can derive that such pre-clearance implementation is rarely granted.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

There are two principal categories of sanctions for closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses prior to clearance. The distinction between the two is made based on whether the notifiable concentration would have to be prohibited or not.

In case the concentration has been closed prior to clearance, and the requirements for obtaining a clearance have not been met (irrespective of whether a notification has been submitted to the CCA), the CCA may impose a fine of up to 10 per cent of the undertaking's total annual turnover generated in the preceding business year. Where the concentration could in principle obtain clearance, but has been closed prior to clearance (irrespective of whether a notification has been submitted or not), the CCA may impose a fine of up to 1 per cent of the undertaking's total annual turnover generated in the preceding business year. A similar fine will be adopted if the merger filing provides incorrect or false information about the parties and their businesses. Individuals are not subject to fines.

In addition, the CCA may order (by separate decision) any indispensable measures aimed at restoring effective competition in the relevant market, and set deadlines for their adoption. In particular, the CCA may:

- order acquired shares or share capital to be transferred or divested; or
- prohibit or restrict the exercise of voting rights attached to the shares or share capital, and order the joint venture or any other form of control by which the concentration has been put into effect to be removed.

There are no publicly available cases in which the CCA has recently imposed such sanctions to restore competition.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for closing before clearance (gun jumping) are also applicable in foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, we are not aware of these sanctions having been applied in practice to such mergers since the introduction of the Competition Act, as they usually fall outside the scope of the Croatian merger control regime (inter alia, a merger filing is only required if at least one of the undertakings concerned has its seat or a subsidiary in Croatia).

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Competition Act does not explicitly provide for hold-separate (carve-out) solutions. Foreign-to-foreign concentrations are therefore assessed and treated in the same way as local concentrations. The Competition Act includes an additional local jurisdictional threshold requirement,

according to which at least one of the undertakings concerned is required to have its seat or a subsidiary in Croatia. If this (additional) requirement is not met, a concentration does not require a notification in Croatia. As a result, since the introduction of the Competition Act, most foreign-to-foreign mergers that could require hold-separate (carve-out) solutions fall outside the scope of the application of the Croatian merger control regime. The CCA may in particularly justified cases, upon the request of the parties, permit the implementation of particular actions relating to the implementation of the notified concentration before the expiry of the applicable waiting period.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The Croatian Takeover Act (Official Gazette, No. 148/13) stipulates that the deadline for requesting an approval from the Croatian Financial Services Agency to publish the public offer for shares in stock companies is suspended until merger clearance is granted by the CCA. Therefore, potential acquirers are not required to submit their public offers before the CCA has issued the merger clearance.

### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The information and documentation to be submitted in a merger notification is set out in article 20 of the Competition Act and in the Regulation on the Notification and Assessment of Concentrations (the Regulation).

Inter alia, the following needs to be provided:

- information on the parties to the concentration (eg, names, registered seats, excerpts from the commercial register, nature of the business, ownership and control; description of the distribution and retail networks; and annual financial reports for the last preceding business year);
- power of attorney;
- description of the intended concentration;
- certified copies or originals of all documents on the basis of which the concentration takes place;
- definition of the relevant markets;
- market shares held by the undertakings concerned on the relevant markets;
- information on main competitors and their market shares in the relevant markets;
- description of the distribution and retail networks in the relevant markets, relevance of research and development;
- economic rationale of the concentration;
- description of the benefits expected to result from the concentration for consumers; and
- (if available) copies of analyses, reports or studies related to the relevant markets.

The CCA may request additional information from the undertakings concerned, such as information on the number of their employees, their top five suppliers and customers, or sales figures (value and volume). If some of the information requested in the Regulation is not available to the parties, this must be stated in the filing, together with information as to where the undertakings tried to collect the data concerned, the reasons why this collection was not successful, and where the CCA could obtain the missing information.

The notification and all documents attached thereto need to be submitted in the Croatian language. In addition, all documents submitted

to the CCA must be in the form of an original or a certified copy bearing an apostille (depending on the jurisdiction of origin of a particular document). If a document requires translation, both the original or a certified copy and its certified Croatian translation have to be provided.

The Competition Act also envisages the possibility to submit a short-form notification in cases that – from experience – usually do not give rise to competition law concerns. The Regulation, that defines the precise content of short-form notifications, has been published in the Official Gazette (No. 38/11) and came into force on 9 April 2011.

According to article 20 of the Competition Act, a short-form notification may be submitted if:

- none of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same relevant product and geographic market (ie, no horizontal overlaps), or in a market that is upstream or downstream of a market in which another party to the concentration is engaged (ie, no vertical relationship);
- two or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same relevant product and geographic market (horizontal relationship), provided that their combined market share is less than 15 per cent, or when one or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in a relevant product market that is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other party to the concentration is engaged (vertical relationship), provided that none of their individual or combined market shares at either level is 25 per cent or more;
- a party to the concentration is to acquire sole control of an undertaking over which it already has joint control; or
- in cases in which two or more undertakings acquire control over a joint venture, where the joint venture has no, or negligible, actual or foreseen activities within Croatia.

However, even in these cases, the CCA may require a full notification to be made if it finds that the concentration may lead to a significant impediment of effective competition.

If the merger filing provides incorrect or false information about the parties and their businesses, the CCA may impose a fine of up to 1 per cent of the undertaking's total annual turnover generated in the preceding business year.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Following the submission of the merger notification, the CCA first assesses its completeness. The law does not provide for a specific time frame for the review of the completeness of the notification. Once the CCA has issued the confirmation of completeness, the CCA assesses the intended concentration in one or two phases, depending on whether the intended concentration raises competition concerns or not.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

In Phase I, the CCA has 30 days to clear the intended concentration. If no decision has been adopted prior to the expiry of this time period, the intended concentration is presumed to be approved in Phase I.

If the CCA initiates Phase II proceedings, it must issue a decision within three months. This waiting period may be further extended by an additional three months, if this would be necessary to carry out additional market analysis. If no decision has been adopted by the CCA prior to the expiry of the waiting period, the intended concentration is presumed by law to have obtained the clearance in Phase II.

From publicly available information it can be seen that the CCA usually tends to clear concentrations in Phase I (ie, within 30 days as of the day when the complete filing was submitted).

The Competition Act does not provide the possibility for the parties to obtain a waiver or to apply for expedited proceedings.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Competition Act introduced to the Croatian merger control regime the substantive test for the assessment of concentrations that is applied by the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) (Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004). According to article 16 of the Competition Act, the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) assesses whether the intended concentration would significantly impede effective competition in the market, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

In assessing concentrations, the CCA regularly takes into account special circumstances revolving around the specific case. For instance, in a vertical merger between a meat products manufacturer and a grocery retail chain, as well as in another horizontal merger between two telecommunications operators, the CCA took into consideration the 'failing firm' defence raised by the parties to these concentrations.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Similar to the rules under the EUMR, if the effect or object of a full-function joint venture is the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent, such coordination will be appraised in the review process under rules on prohibited agreements.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

In essence, the CCA investigates the intended concentration on the basis of the following:

- the structure of the relevant market;
- actual and potential competitors in the relevant market;
- supply and potential market supply;
- costs, risks, technical, economic and legal conditions necessary to enter into or withdraw from the relevant market;
- possible effects of the intended concentration on competition in the relevant market;
- market shares and market position, economic and financial power, business activities of the undertakings concerned in the relevant market;
- internal and external advantages for the parties to the concentration in relation to their competitors;
- possible changes in the business operations of the parties to the concentration following the implementation of the concentration; and
- effects of the concentration on other undertakings, especially relating to consumers' benefit, as well as other objectives and effects of the intended concentration, in particular:
  - decrease in prices of goods or services;
  - decrease in transportation, distribution or other costs;
  - specialisation in production; and
  - other benefits directly deriving from the implementation of the intended concentration.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Competition Act does not expressly mention non-competition issues such as industrial policy or public interest issues as being relevant for the assessment process. In practice, however, it is not unlikely that the CCA would take into account non-competition issues in a way similar to the European Commission.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies are part of the appraisal of the concentration and are taken into account under the condition that they are advantageous to consumers.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Based on the assessment of the concentration under the substantive test the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) may, following the initiation of Phase II proceedings, issue:

- a clearance decision, by which the concentration is assessed as compatible with competition rules;
- a decision declaring the concentration conditionally compatible with the Croatian competition rules, provided that within given time limits certain measures are taken and conditions are met (provisional measures); or
- a decision prohibiting the implementation of concentration.

The CCA may also on its own initiative or upon request of a party to the concentration withdraw or amend a decision when the decision is based on incorrect or false information that has been essential for the decision-making, any of the parties to the concentration have not fulfilled the conditions and obligations determined in the decision of the CCA, or the parties to the concentration cannot duly fulfil the proposed conditions or observe the set deadlines because of unpredictable circumstances beyond their control.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

In practice, the CCA accepts both structural and behavioural remedies.

An example is the acquisition of a Slovenian food retail business by a Croatian major food production and retail conglomerate. In its decision, the CCA rendered a complex economic and behavioural analysis of the merger, and ordered a number of measures to counter balance the anti-competitive effects of this concentration. In particular, these measures included the divestment of 96 retail outlets in the combined network of both undertakings (by either terminating lease agreements, or renting or selling the shops to third parties), and the obligation imposed on the acquirer to ensure that the three bestselling products of five of the target's largest suppliers are offered in its retail network for at least three years. The CCA appointed a monitoring trustee, to ensure that the measures are duly implemented.

In 2009, in the course of the acquisition of a local Croatian oil company by a Hungarian oil company, the CCA demanded that the



Croatian target company sell one of its local subsidiaries. The CCA listed in the clearance decision certain requirements to be observed to ensure the future business integrity of the disposed subsidiary after being sold to third parties. In the same year, in a case regarding the acquisition of a local retail chain, the CCA ordered the disposal of certain retail stores. In both cases, the acquirer was ordered to nominate a monitoring trustee, to monitor compliance with the remedies.

In 2014, the CCA imposed a set of remedies on the parties to a concentration in the telecommunications sector. In this case, the CCA accepted the measures proposed by the parties to the concentration, aimed at eliminating negative effects of the concentration on competition. Among other remedies, the concentration was limited to a period of four years following the acquisition. This concentration was initially cleared by the CCA accepting a 'failing firm' defence, since the control over the target was acquired in a pre-bankruptcy settlement process. In this case, in 2017, the CCA partially repealed the initial clearance from 2014, imposing a revised set of remedies on the parties to the concentration. The new remedies were requested and accepted, due to the impact of extraordinary circumstances.

Also, in 2017, the CCA conditionally cleared another concentration in the telecommunications sector, imposing a combined set of structural and behavioural remedies on the parties to the concentration.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

There are two scenarios relating to remedies (including divestments) that may apply.

First, the parties to a concentration may at any time during the proceedings (eg, already in the notification) offer commitments, upon their own initiative, to remove serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration with Croatian competition rules.

Second, the CCA may, if it reaches the preliminary conclusion that a concentration may be cleared only subject to conditions or obligations, invite the undertakings concerned to suggest certain remedies to obtain merger clearance. Upon such notice, the parties have one month to propose suitable remedies to the CCA.

When assessing remedies, the CCA takes into account whether they are adequate to restore efficient competition. In the event the CCA does not or only partly accepts the proposed remedies, the CCA is authorised to impose other behavioural or structural measures, conditions, obligations and deadlines, to ensure effective competition (article 22 of the Competition Act).

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

We are not aware of any foreign-to-foreign mergers in which the CCA has requested remedies. According to the publicly available information of the CCA, in 2019 only two 'foreign-to-foreign' mergers were assessed and cleared in Phase I without remedies, while no such mergers were assessed by the CCA in 2018.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The Competition Act does not contain explicit provisions on ancillary restrictions. However, the CCA generally takes the European Commission's decisional practice into account. Therefore, in practice, ancillary restraints directly related to and necessary for the concentration are usually covered by the CCA's clearance decision.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) may gather information ex officio and also require from the undertakings concerned, as well as from third parties (eg, customers and competitors), additional information that it considers necessary for the assessment of the concentration.

Also, both the fact that a notification has been submitted and the fact that Phase II proceedings have been initiated are made public on the website of the CCA, inviting third parties to submit their observations and comments on the intended concentration.

Access to the CCA's case file may only be granted to the parties to the proceedings. According to the Croatian general administrative procedure rules, a 'party' may be an entity that has a right to be such to protect its legal interests. In practice, however, only the undertakings concerned are admitted as parties to the merger control proceedings and, accordingly, third parties may not be admitted as parties to the proceedings. The undertakings concerned have the right to access the case files only once they have received a statement of objections in Phase II. Besides the provisions of the Croatian General Administrative Procedure Act (Official Gazette, No. 47/09), the general rules stipulated in the Competition Act on third parties' rights in the proceedings apply. While they cannot be admitted as parties to the merger control proceedings, interested third parties may submit their comments and observations on the intended concentration, following the CCA's publication thereof.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

As to the publicity given to the process, the fact that a notification has been submitted and the fact that Phase II proceedings have been initiated are made public on the CCA's website, inviting third parties to submit observations and comments on the intended concentration. Decisions made by the CCA are published on its website as well. Access to the case file may only be granted to the parties to the process.

The CCA may not disclose business secrets, namely, information that is defined to be a business secret by law or by the undertakings concerned. Business secrets, inter alia, encompass any business information that has actual or potential economic and market value, and the disclosure of which could result in an economic advantage for other undertakings.

In particular, the CCA does not consider the following to be covered by the secrecy obligation:

- information that is publicly available, including information available through specialised information services or information that is common knowledge among specialists in the field;
- historical information, in particular information that is at least five years old;
- statistical information; and
- data and documentation on which the decision of the CCA is based.

Against this background, it is generally advisable to explicitly mark any confidential information as such in the merger notification and any other comments, statements and documents sent to the CCA. Case-related information that is made public by the CCA is generally published in a non-confidential version.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The CCA has concluded cooperation agreements with several national competition authorities, for example, Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. In addition, the CCA is a member of the International Competition Network (ICN). Since 1 July 2013, the CCA has been a member of the European Competition Network (ECN), inter alia, participating in the ECN's Merger Working Group. The CCA also has participant's status in the OECD Competition Committee and it actively participates in its work and attends the meetings of the OECD Competition Committee. Members of the CCA also regularly participate in conferences, summits and other high-level meetings organised by other competition authorities, thereby ensuring that Croatia is involved in the international competition law dialogue. As for recent developments, the CCA carried out an EU twinning light project in Montenegro, aimed at strengthening the administrative capacities of the Montenegrin competition authority through training of its staff, particularly in relation to complex economic analyses, evidence collection procedures and surprise inspections (dawn raids).

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

A legal action for judicial review against the decision of the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) must be filed directly with the Croatian High Administrative Court within 30 days from the date on which the decision of the CCA was served. Decisions of the High Administrative Court may be further appealed, on limited grounds, before the Croatian Constitutional Court, which has recently shown a tendency to intervene in competition matters.

In past years, most of the judicial reviews brought before the then-competent Croatian Administrative Court (which was the competent court to decide in competition law cases until mid-2013) were dismissed, and the recent practice of the Croatian High Administrative Court has shown that the tendency of the judges to mostly reject these remedies has not changed. According to publicly available information, only a handful of judicial reviews have been undertaken in relation to merger control proceedings, while the vast majority of follow-on administrative disputes related to other infringements of competition law.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Previously, the judicial review performed by the Croatian Administrative Court could take up to two years. Depending on the complexity of the case, it could take even longer. Although the Croatian High Administrative Court (which took over the respective competency in 2013) has recently performed several judicial reviews in a much shorter period of time (ie, within a few months of the submission of the request for judicial review), showing an improvement in the overall duration of proceedings, other recent cases have shown that the judicial review process still tends to be rather lengthy.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Because of the relatively high domestic notification thresholds, the number of merger control cases is rather small in Croatia. According to publicly available data, 14 mergers were cleared by the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA) in 2019, out of which 13 mergers were cleared in Phase I (two of which were 'foreign-to-foreign' mergers), and one merger was cleared in Phase II (in two separate decisions, divided according to the relevant business segments assessed). In 2019, three notifications were dismissed, as the statutory requirements for the assessment of concentrations by the CCA were not met. Also, according to public information, the CCA cleared 11 concentrations in 2018 and 12 concentrations in 2017, all in Phase I. In 2017, the CCA imposed a comprehensive set of measures, conditions and deadlines in one Phase II merger clearance decision and, in addition, partially repealed Phase II clearance in relation to a previous decision from 2014, imposing a revised set of remedies on the parties to the concentration. Both of these aimed at eliminating negative effects on competition in the telecommunications sector. In 2016 and 2015, all cases were cleared in Phase I (there were around 12 cases in 2016 and 14 cases in 2015).

While there were, according to publicly available information, no recent cases in which the CCA imposed fines for implementing concentrations prior to or without the CCA's approval, in the past years the CCA imposed a number of rather symbolic administrative fines, ranging from approximately €130 to €4,000, on undertakings operating in the media sector for violations of the merger filing obligation.

'Foreign-to-foreign' mergers usually fall outside of the scope of the Croatian merger control regime (inter alia, a merger filing is only required if at least one of the undertakings concerned has its seat or a subsidiary in Croatia). According to the information published by the CCA, only two 'foreign-to-foreign' mergers have been assessed in 2019 (one in the insurance sector, and the other in the electronic and static media business segment). Both mergers have been cleared in Phase I. According to public information, no 'foreign-to-foreign' mergers have been assessed by the CCA in 2018.

A significant part of the CCA's work includes analysis of (referred) notifications of concentrations with an EU dimension, regularly referred from the European Commission. As stated in the CCA's annual report for 2018, the CCA received 425 notifications of concentrations involving an EU dimension throughout 2018, in which the CCA assessed whether these concentrations had any impact on the Croatian markets. In 2019, the CCA received 473 notifications of concentration from the European Commission.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The latest amendment of the Competition Act entered into force on 1 July 2013. The Competition Act is expected to be slightly amended by 2021, for purposes of its alignment with EU *acquis communautaire*. The EU Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (ECN+ Directive) has to be transposed into national law by February 2021.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year****36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?**

In 2018, the European Commission referred the assessment of a concentration that had an EU dimension to the Croatian Competition Agency (CCA). The referral was made upon request of the undertakings concerned, under the provision of article 4, paragraph 4 of the EU Merger Regulation. The reason for the referral was that this concentration was deemed to have an impact primarily on the upstream retail market for the supply of gas to large industrial customers in the relevant geographic area of Croatia, as well as on the downstream fertiliser production market, the relevant geographic scope of which was found to comprise the territory of the whole European Economic Area (EEA). The CCA cleared the concentration in Phase I. This merger control case involved intensive cooperation between the CCA and the European Commission.

In 2019, the CCA cleared the creation of a joint venture related to the markets for production and wholesale of sugar, after conducting an in-depth market investigation and an analysis of customer demand patterns. In this case, the CCA concluded that the relevant geographic markets comprised at least the territory of the EEA. In 2019, the CCA cleared a complex concentration, involving a mixed share and asset deal, part of the transaction of a portfolio of distressed assets and non-performing loans (NPLs). This was the first NPL transaction filed under the merger control regime in Croatia.

In 2020, the CCA cleared a merger on the market for the provisioning of nautical tourism port services on Croatian territory in Phase I, by which an international private equity fund acquired ownership over three marinas on the Croatian section of the Adriatic coastline. In January 2020, the CCA cleared a vertical concentration of a media services provider and a provider of telecommunications services in Croatia. In this case, one interested undertaking approached the CCA, asserting that the merger may result in anticompetitive effects on the market competition, supported by an opinion of a legal expert. Although there were no direct vertical overlaps, the CCA assessed the prospective spill over effects and the creation of prospective barriers on connected markets. This merger was cleared in Phase II.

As for current trends, the outbreak of the coronavirus has slowed down economic activities throughout the EU in 2020. It remains to be seen how the covid-19 pandemic will affect M&A, as well as what its impact on merger control proceedings in Croatia will be. In any event, it is expected that many companies will face economic issues, resulting in restructurings or bankruptcies. In this respect, companies with better market standing and access to funds may have the opportunity to purchase operations of their competitors, and we may see an increasing number of 'failing firm' defences.

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# Cyprus

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Law 83(I) of 2014 (the Law), is the statute regulating the control of concentrations between undertakings in Cyprus.

Enforcement of the legislation rests with the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC). The CPC has overall responsibility for implementing the Law and is the competent independent authority for the control of concentrations.

The CPC declares that a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the functioning of competition in the market. The investigation and procedural aspects of the notification of concentrations are implemented by the CPC's civil service (the Service).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Law is applicable to transactions resulting in a permanent change of control. Such transactions are:

- mergers of two previously independent undertakings or parts thereof; and
- acquisitions by one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, directly or indirectly, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by agreement or otherwise, of control of one or more other undertakings.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures performing all functions of an autonomous economic entity in a permanent manner are caught under the Law.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

'Control' is defined under the Law as control stemming from any rights, agreements or other means which, either severally or jointly, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence over an undertaking through:

- ownership or enjoyment rights over the whole or part of the assets of the undertaking; or
- rights or contracts that confer the possibility of decisive influence on the composition, meetings or decisions of the bodies of an undertaking.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Transactions caught by merger control constitute concentrations for the purposes of the Law. Nevertheless, only concentrations of major importance must be notified to the CPC.

For the purposes of the Law, a concentration of undertakings is deemed to be of major importance and, therefore, meets the jurisdictional thresholds if:

- the worldwide aggregate turnover achieved by at least two of the undertakings concerned exceeds, in relation to each one of them, €3.5 million;
- at least two of the undertakings concerned achieve a turnover in Cyprus; and
- at least €3.5 million of the aggregate turnover of all undertakings concerned is achieved in Cyprus.

The Law vests the Minister of Energy, Commerce and Industry with the power to declare a concentration as being of major importance even where the thresholds are not met.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing of concentrations of major importance is mandatory.

However, notification is not required in the following cases, where a concentration between undertakings is not deemed to arise:

- a credit or financial institution or an insurance company, the normal activities of which include transactions and dealing in securities on its own account or for the account of third parties, holds on a temporary basis, securities that it has acquired in an undertaking with a view to reselling them, provided that:
  - the institution does not exercise voting rights in respect of those securities with a view to determining the competitive behaviour of that undertaking, or it exercises those voting rights only with a view to facilitating the disposal of all or part of that undertaking or of its assets or the disposal of those securities; and
  - any such disposal takes place within one year of the date of acquisition – a period that can be extended by the CPC on request, where it can be shown that the disposal was not reasonably possible within the period set;
- control is exercised by a person authorised under the legislation relating to liquidation, bankruptcy or any other similar procedure;
- the concentration of undertakings between one or more persons already controlling at least one or more undertakings is carried out by investment companies;

- property is transferred under a will or by intestate devolution; or
- it is a concentration between two or more undertakings, each of which is a subsidiary undertaking of the same entity.

The exemption relating to investment companies, refers to those companies the sole objective of which is to acquire holdings in other undertakings, to manage such holdings and turn them into profit, without involving themselves directly or indirectly in the management of those undertakings.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are caught under the Law. The test as to whether a foreign-to-foreign merger is caught as a concentration of major importance is satisfied where the jurisdictional thresholds are met, with the local effects dimension being the achievement of a turnover of at least two undertakings concerned in Cyprus and the combined Cyprus-achieved turnover of all undertakings concerned is at least €3.5 million.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Notwithstanding exceptions in relation to credit and financial institutions or insurance companies, there are no specific rules on foreign investments, special sectors or other approvals.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Concentrations of major importance must be notified to the Service prior to their implementation, following the conclusion of the relevant agreement or the publication of the relevant takeover or the acquisition of a controlling interest. Notification can also take place where the undertakings concerned prove to the Service their bona fide intention to conclude an agreement or, in the case of a takeover offer or of an offer for the acquisition of a controlling interest, following a public announcement of an intention or final decision to make such offer.

Upon becoming aware of a concentration of major importance that ought to be notified but the undertakings concerned have failed to do so, the Service immediately notifies the undertakings concerned of their obligation to proceed with notifying such concentration in accordance with the provisions of the Law. The time limit for the assessment of the concentration would then commence at the time of the Service receiving such notification.

Where the concentration has been partially or entirely implemented in the absence of clearance by the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC), administrative fines may be imposed.

The CPC has the power to order the partial or total dissolution of a concentration of major importance to secure the restoration of the functioning of competition in the market, provided that the requirements of the Law are met.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Concentrations of major importance must be notified to the Service in writing, either jointly or separately by the undertakings participating in a merger or in the joint acquisition of control of another undertaking. In

all other cases, the party responsible for notification is the undertaking acquiring control.

Filing fees are fixed by the Law at €1,000. Where a concentration becomes subject to a full investigation (Phase II), the undertakings concerned are bound to pay a fee of €6,000 to the CPC.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Within one calendar month from the date of submission of the notification or such additional information necessary for the notification to be considered complete and payment of the filing fee, the Service is required to inform the notifying undertaking of whether the concentration is cleared or whether it will proceed to a full investigation of the concentration.

If, owing to the volume of work or the complexity of the information contained in the notification, the Service is unable to comply with the one month time frame, it shall, within seven calendar days prior to the lapse of the one-month period, inform the notifying undertaking of an extension of 14 calendar days.

In a Phase II investigation, the Service is required to prepare a report of findings to the CPC within three months as of the date of submission of the notification or such additional information necessary for the notification to be considered complete, provided that the relevant filing fee is settled.

In the case of a full investigation, the notifying party or parties must be informed of the CPC's decision no later than four months from the date of submission of the notification or such additional information necessary for the notification to be considered complete.

The Law expressly prohibits the partial or entire implementation of the concentration prior to clearance, infringement of which prohibition entails administrative fines.

#### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Where a concentration is either partially or entirely implemented prior to the clearance of the CPC; prior to the lapse of the time frame within which the Service ought to inform the notifying undertaking of whether the concentration is cleared; or shall be fully investigated but the Service has not so informed, administrative sanctions may be imposed by the CPC.

An administrative fine of up to 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover achieved by the notifying undertaking during the immediately preceding financial year may be imposed on the notifying undertaking for the discussed infringement, which may be followed by additional administrative fines of €8,000 for each day the infringement persists.

There have been no cases where the undertakings concerned implemented a concentration prior to clearance by the CPC under the new regime. Nevertheless, taking into account the approach followed under the previous framework, it can be certain that the CPC will exercise its powers in relation to the implementation of concentrations in violation of the statutory provisions in a rigorous manner.

Moreover, the CPC has the power to order the partial or total dissolution of a concentration that has been implemented prior to obtaining clearance by the CPC.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Closing before clearance could lead to administrative fines being imposed, irrespective of whether such concentration is a foreign-to-foreign merger or not.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Closing prior to clearance is not possible unless the Service fails to inform the notifying undertaking of whether the concentration is cleared or a Phase II investigation will be carried out within the statutory one-month period, in which case the concentration is deemed as cleared. Nevertheless, a temporary approval of a concentration is possible pursuant to the provisions of section 31 of the Law, in the case where a full (Phase II) investigation is decided by the CPC, where the undertakings concerned can establish, upon a relevant application to the CPC, that they shall suffer substantial damage as a result of any additional delay to the concentration. Temporary approval may be accompanied by conditions decided at the CPC's discretion and it does not affect the final decision of the CPC.

#### Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

In the case of public takeover bids, concentrations of major importance arising from the publication of a public takeover or the acquisition of a controlling interest must be notified to the CPC prior to their implementation and following such publication. Notification can also take place where the undertakings concerned prove to the Service of the CPC their bona fide intention of a takeover offer or of an offer for the acquisition of a controlling interest, following a public announcement of an intention or final decision to make such offer.

#### Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The notification of a concentration of major importance should include the information prescribed in Appendix III to the Law. The notification must be made in Greek and must be accompanied by various supporting documents and other information which may be in Greek or English, including but not limited to the following:

- a copy of all final or most recent documents that brought about the concentration either by agreement or following a public bid;
- in the case of a public bid, a copy of the public bid document;
- copies of the most recent annual reports and audited financial statements of all the undertakings participating in the concentration;
- copies of reports or analyses prepared for the purposes of the concentration;
- a list and short description of the contents of all analyses, reports, studies and surveys that were prepared by or for any of persons responsible for notification for the purpose of evaluating or analysing the proposed concentration in relation to the market and competition conditions;
- details of the concentration (including the nature and scope of the concentration, the financial and structural details of the concentration, and details regarding the turnover in Cyprus and worldwide of each undertaking);

- details of relationships of ownership and control as between each participant in the concentration and the undertakings connected with it;
- personal and economic ties as between each group of undertakings and any other undertaking operating within the affected market in which such group holds, inter alia, at least 10 per cent of the voting rights or shares;
- a description and analysis of the relevant markets; and
- a description and analysis of the affected relevant markets.

A fine of up to €50,000 may be imposed for a failure to provide requested information or clarifications, or for providing misleading or inaccurate information.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Phase I entails the preparation of a written report by the Service to the CPC and an assessment of the concentration by the CPC upon receiving the said report by the Service. The CPC's assessment shall lead to a decision that the concentration is not one of major importance and therefore does not fall within the scope of the Law, that the concentration is of major importance but does not raise any doubts as to its compatibility with competition in the market and is therefore declared compatible and cleared, or that doubts as to such compatibility are raised and a full investigation must be initiated.

Phase II entails the preparation of a report of findings by the Service, which is submitted to the CPC within three months of the date of receipt of the notification, provided that the fees applicable in the case of a full investigation are paid. The CPC is then bound to assess the concentration under the light of the findings of the Service and accordingly declare the concentration as compatible, subject to conditions that it may decide to impose upon the undertakings concerned, or incompatible with competition in the market and thus not cleared.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Within one calendar month from the date of submission of the notification or such additional information necessary for the notification to be considered complete and payment of the filing fee, the Service is required to inform the notifying undertaking of whether the concentration is cleared or whether it will proceed to a full investigation of the concentration.

If, owing to the volume of work or the complexity of the information contained in the notification, the Service is unable to comply with the one month time frame, it shall, within seven calendar days prior to the lapse of the one-month period, inform the notifying undertaking of an extension of fourteen calendar days.

In a Phase II investigation, the Service is required to prepare a report of findings to the CPC within three months as of the date of submission of the notification or such additional information necessary for the notification to be considered complete, provided that the relevant filing fee is settled.

In the case of a full investigation, the notifying party or parties must be informed of the CPC's decision no later than four months from the date of submission of the notification or such additional information necessary for the notification to be considered complete.



## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A concentration that would significantly impede effective competition in Cyprus, or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the functioning of competition in the market.

In assessing the compatibility of a concentration, there are no special circumstances that would be taken into account. The Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) takes into consideration the following criteria:

- the need to maintain and develop conditions of effective competition in the relevant markets, taking into account, inter alia, the structure of the affected markets, other markets upon which the concentration may have significant effects and the potential competition on behalf of undertakings within or outside Cyprus;
- the position in the market of the undertakings concerned and undertakings connected to it in a manner prescribed under Annex II to the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Law 83(I) of 2014 (the Law);
- the financial power of such undertakings;
- the alternative sources of supply of products or services in the affected markets or other markets upon which the concentration may have significant effects;
- any barriers of entry to the affected markets or other markets upon which the concentration may have significant effects;
- the interests of the intermediate and end-consumers of the relevant products and services;
- the contribution to technical and economic progress and the possibility of such contribution being in the interest of consumers and not obstructing competition;
- the supply and demand trends for the relevant markets; and
- the contribution on the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The decisional practice of the CPC demonstrates that the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-248/16, *Austria Asphalt GmbH & Co OG v Bundeskartellamt*, Judgment of 7 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:643 is adhered to by the CPC. As such, when there is a change from sole to joint control in the over an existing undertaking, the criterion of a concentration is only fulfilled when the arising joint venture performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

A joint venture that is genuinely fully functional must be able to operate independently of its parents on an identifiable market. To do so, the joint venture must have a management dedicated to its day-to-day operations and access to sufficient resources including finance, staff, and assets (tangible and intangible) in order to conduct its business activities on a lasting basis.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

While the Law is silent in this regard, the CPC's approach and analysis of harm is substantially aligned with the respective approach of the European Commission. Besides high market shares, the assessment usually takes into account the anticompetitive effects that could

potentially arise out of a concentration, such as coordinated effects as well as unilateral effects.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The CPC only takes competition issues into account when considering the Service's report and issuing its decision. However, the Minister of Energy, Commerce and Industry can, by issuing a justified order, declare a concentration as being of major public interest with regard to the effects it might have on public security, pluralism of the mass media and the principles of sound administration.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

In reviewing the compatibility of a concentration with the competitive market, the CPC takes into account the following:

- the structure of the affected markets, the structure of other markets where the notified concentration might have significant implications and the actual or potential competition from undertakings located either within or outside Cyprus;
- the market position of the participants;
- the economic power of all the undertakings in the market;
- any barriers of entry to the affected market;
- the interests of the intermediate and end-consumers of the products and services;
- the alternative sources of supply of the products and services that are traded in the affected markets and of their substitutes;
- the supply and demand trends for the relevant markets; and
- the contribution on the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to the consumer's advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Before reaching its final decision and subject to the time limits provided by the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Law 83(I) of 2014 (the Law), the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) may, if it considers it expedient to do so, carry out negotiations, hearings or discussions with any of the interested parties or other persons. Furthermore, the CPC has wide investigative powers when assessing a concentration, including access to any premises, property, means of transport, books or records in the possession of the undertakings concerned or third parties.

In declaring a concentration compatible with the operation of competition in the market, the CPC may impose conditions or remedies in relation to the implementation of the transaction, thus having the ability to interfere with the essence of the transaction. The CPC has at any given time the power to revoke decisions related to the compatibility of any concentration and to amend any of the terms of its decision if it determines that:

- its initial decision was based on false or misleading information or that necessary information relating to the concentration at hand was withheld by the notifying party or by any other undertaking concerned or by any interested person; or
- any condition attached to the decision and imposed on the participants to the concentration has not been satisfied or has ceased to be satisfied.

Where the CPC exercises its power of revocation, it may, following a study of the Service's report, order either a partial or complete dissolution of the concentration to secure the restoration of the competitive market. It may do this, either in the course of exercising its powers of revocation of a previous decision of clearing a concentration or upon establishing that a concentration has been implemented in violation of an obligation to notify such concentration to the CPC or is duly notified but implemented prior to clearance by the CPC. The CPC also has the power to prohibit a concentration by declaring it incompatible with the operation of competition in the market.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Competition issues can be remedied through the CPC exercising its discretionary power. In the course of remedying competition issues, the CPC may order the dissolution or partial dissolution of the concentration concerned in order to secure the restoration of the functioning of competition in the market, through the deprivation of any participation, shares, assets or rights acquired by any person participating in the concentration, or by the cancellation of any contracts that created the concentration or that arose from it, or by a combination of the two, or any other way the CPC deems necessary.

If the CPC ascertains that the notified concentration falls within the scope of the Law and raises doubts as to its compatibility with the competitive market, it will inform the Service of the need to conduct a full investigation. In such an event, the Service will request further information from the participants as well as other entities involved in the specific sector for the purpose of completing its investigation. Also, the Service notifies the participants that they may make suggestions to undertake remedies that will remove the CPC doubts as to the compatibility of the transaction within the time limit defined by the Service. Appendix IV of the Law is a form that the participants will be asked to submit when they are willing to undertake any remedies. The CPC accepts both divestiture and behaviour remedies. If, following its review of the additional information provided to it, the CPC's doubts as to compatibility have not been removed, the Service, if it finds any differentiations or modifications in the circumstances under which the concentration has been established that may result in the removal of the doubts, will commence negotiations with the participating undertakings.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The CPC is required to provide written notification to the undertakings concerned of any remedies as part of its decision, which it is bound to issue within four months as of the date of receiving the notification of the concentration and payment of the filing fees. Should the merger be cross-border, the CPC may liaise with the relevant foreign authority in relation to applicable remedies. Furthermore, any remedies have to be limited to those that are reasonably necessary for the protection of the competitive market.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Although there is an increasing number of local transactions in which remedies have been required, there is no case at present where the CPC has requested remedies of a material nature in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The clearance decision issued by the CPC covers related agreements if such agreements are related to, and are necessary for, the implementation of the merger.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Yes, parties having a legitimate interest may be invited to comment, but only in the event of a full investigation. Parties having a legitimate interest may on a voluntary basis submit views at any phase of the evaluation of a concentration or they may be asked to supply information by the Service of the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC). In the case of a full investigation, the Service is required to provide any person having a legitimate interest, but who is not a participant in the concentration, with an appropriate opportunity to submit their views at the second phase of the investigation.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The CPC publishes a description of the notification in the Official Gazette of the Republic and on its website, indicating the names of the participants, the nature of the concentration and the economic sectors involved. In so doing, the CPC takes into account, as far as possible, the legitimate interest of the affected undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. The CPC also publishes in the Official Gazette of the Republic and on its website a non-confidential version of its decision. The undertakings concerned may request that any part of the decision remains confidential and the CPC will decide whether such information should be treated as confidential. The party to which the CPC addresses a written request for information should identify documents, statements and any material it considers to contain confidential information or business secrets, justifying its opinion, and provide a separate, non-confidential version within the time limit set by the CPC for the notification of its opinion.

The CPC and the Service are under a statutory duty of confidentiality, infringement of which is a criminal offence punishable with imprisonment of up to six months or a fine of up to €1,500 or both.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Pursuant to section 54 of the Law and the relevant provisions of the EU Merger Control Regulation No. 139/2004, the CPC cooperates with other national competition authorities in the European Union and the European Commission on the basis of the system of parallel competences and the exchange of views and information between them via the European Competition Network.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The decisions of the CPC are administrative executive acts issued by a public authority. As such, an aggrieved party having legitimate interest and seeking to annul a CPC decision has the right to file for administrative recourse to the Supreme Court under article 146 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Appendix 5 of the Law is relevant to this purpose.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The time limit for commencing an administrative appeal is 75 days from receipt of notification of the CPC's final decision or its publication in the Official Gazette.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Concentrations notified to the CPC are assessed under the legislative and policy rules in place and described above. The CPC is particularly keen to ensure, in the course of exercising its powers under the Law, that effective competition in the Republic or in a substantial part of it, is not significantly impeded, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. As had been the case under the previous merger control framework, a considerable number of the notified concentrations concern foreign-to-foreign transactions.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The Law came into effect in June 2014 and replaced the previous merger control regime in place since 1999. There are no current proposals to change the legislation.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

A number of important issues have been considered by the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) recently, which have shed more light on its decision-making practice.

Specifically, the CPC dealt with the first non-performing loans servicing transaction in Cyprus, which essentially created the relevant market. In the *APS/Hellenic Bank* case, the CPC defined the relevant product market as being the management of immovable property acquired by credit institutions through enforcement proceedings or payment of credit rights derived from mortgages, and the management of non-performing loans granted by credit institutions or other persons.

In the *VLPG* case, in which the CPC carried out a full investigation, clearance was granted subject to commitments by the participating undertakings. The case concerned the creation of a joint venture by Hellenic Petroleum Cyprus Ltd, Petrolina (Holdings) Public Ltd, Intergaz Ltd and Synergkaz Ltd, in which the said undertakings shifted part of their activities relating to the storage and handling of liquefied petroleum



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gas to the joint venture. The joint venture was held to potentially have the ability and motivation to exploit its dominant position and to hinder the expansion of other companies and potential competitors. The CPC also highlighted the potential for significant obstruction of competition as a result of the creation of the joint venture's dominant position.

The transaction was cleared subject to a number of remedies, including the exclusion of members of the boards of the parent undertakings from sitting on the board of the joint venture, confidentiality undertakings by the joint venture in relation to the parent undertakings, the appointment of a trustee and the introduction of criteria for the assessment of storage capacity requests from third parties, together with providing any new entrant that constructs LPG storage facilities in the area, access to the anchor and unloading pipes, to the extent that it will be under the control of the joint venture.

# Czech Republic

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

In the Czech Republic, merger control is primarily regulated in sections 12 to 19 of the Czech Competition Act No. 143/2001 (the Act).

The merger regulation in the Act is implemented in Decree No. 294/2016, which primarily provides for the form of a merger notification and specification of the documents required for a merger filing.

Soft law of the Czech competition authority is also relevant to merger control but is not binding. The Czech competition authority has so far published the following soft law concerning merger control:

- notice on requirements of the proposal to approve the concentration;
- notice on pre-notification contacts;
- notice on the calculation of turnover;
- notice on the concept of a concentration;
- notice on the concept of parties to the concentration;
- notice on the implementation of a concentration prior to the approval;
- notice on the competition defence for undertakings in economic difficulties; and
- notice on simplified procedure.

The authority responsible for enforcing merger control legislation is the Czech competition authority – the Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Pursuant to section 12 of the Act, the following types of transactions are subject to the notification obligation:

- the merger of two or more independent undertakings;
- the acquisition by one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, of direct or indirect control over another undertaking or its part either by acquisition of shares or ownership interest or by an agreement or in a public auction or by any other means; and
- the establishment of a full-function joint venture.

The following transactions are not covered by the merger control rules:

- 1 the temporal acquisition of shares by a bank in an undertaking by setting off its claims against the undertaking, if the acquisition is made in the context of a restructuring process for a period not exceeding one year;

- 2 the temporal acquisition not exceeding a period of one year by an investment undertaking of shares in another undertaking only for the purpose of their sale, provided that the investment undertaking does not exercise its voting right to influence the competitive conduct of the controlled undertaking; and
- 3 the transfer of certain powers of statutory bodies of an undertaking to third parties pursuant to special legislation, particularly to a liquidator or an insolvency administrator.

The Office can extend the deadline of one year in (1) and (2) under certain conditions.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The merger control rules apply to the formation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all functions of an autonomous economic entity. Pursuant to section 12(6) of the Act, pertinent coordinative aspects of a full-function joint venture are assessed pursuant to the provisions of the Act regulating prohibited agreements.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

In section 12(4), the Act defines 'control' as the possibility to exercise decisive influence over another undertaking, in particular by:

- ownership or the right to use an enterprise of the controlled undertaking or a part thereof; or
- rights or other legal facts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decision of the bodies of the controlled undertaking.

The Act does not stipulate a fixed shareholding threshold or any specific board and management representation, the meeting of which would constitute control. The Office always assesses the actual situation.

Not only the acquisition of control but also the change in quality of control is deemed a concentration within the meaning of the Act.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A concentration is subject to approval by the Office if:

- the aggregate net turnover of all parties to the concentration in the last completed accounting period within the market of the Czech Republic exceeds 1.5 billion Czech koruna, and the aggregate net turnover of each of at least two of the parties to the concentration for the last completed accounting period within the market of the Czech Republic exceeds 250 million Czech koruna; or

- the aggregate net turnover of:
  - at least one undertaking being party to the merger (consolidation);
  - an enterprise or its part being acquired;
  - an undertaking whose control is being acquired; or
  - at least one of the undertakings creating a concentrative joint venture, for the last completed accounting period within the market of the Czech Republic, exceeds 1.5 billion Czech koruna, and the aggregate worldwide net turnover of the other party to the concentration for the last completed accounting period exceeds 1.5 billion Czech koruna.

Aggregate net turnover is composed of the net turnover of:

- all parties to the concentration;
- all persons that will control the parties to the concentration and persons that will be controlled by the parties to the concentration after completion of the concentration;
- all persons controlled by the same person that will control the parties to the concentration after completion of the concentration; and
- all persons jointly controlled by two or more persons referred to in the previous items.

For the purpose of calculating the turnover, the turnover resulting from the sale of products between the parties to the concentration and those persons listed above in respect of the calculation of the net turnover shall not be taken into account.

If only part of an undertaking is subject to the concentration, only that portion of the turnover achieved by this part shall be taken into account when calculating the turnover.

The rules for the calculation of turnover of banks also apply to the calculation of turnover of credit and other financial institutions, with the exception of insurance companies. For banks, the net turnover is understood as the sum of the incomes, particularly interest incomes, incomes from securities, incomes from participating interest, incomes from charges and commissions and incomes from financial operations. For insurance undertakings, the net turnover should be understood as the total sum of premiums written resulting from all concluded insurance contracts.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If a transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Act and exceeds the notification thresholds, filing is mandatory. No exemptions from the notification obligation apply.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

No special rules apply to foreign-to-foreign mergers. No local effects tests nor any kind of nexus test exist. Therefore, if a foreign-to-foreign transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Act and exceeds the notification thresholds stipulated by the Act, filing the transaction is mandatory.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

No. There are no special rules in respect of foreign investment or special sectors. There are only special rules for certain temporal transactions involving banks or investment undertakings as well as liquidation and insolvency situations. According to other special legislation, transactions

in sectors such as banking may further require special approval from regulatory bodies other than the Office.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A concentration cannot be implemented neither before it is approved by the Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) nor before a clearance decision of the Office enters into force. The notifying party may file the notification as soon as the legally binding transaction documents have been signed. The notification may even be submitted prior to the signing of the relevant transaction documents, provided the parties have, in principle, agreed on the structure and timing of the concentration.

There are no specific sanctions for not filing a notifiable merger. Failure to file is seen by the Czech Competition Act No. 143/2001 (the Act) as breach of the suspension clause.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

A notification must be submitted in the case of:

- a merger by the merging parties;
- acquisition of sole control by the parties acquiring sole control;
- acquisition of joint control by the parties acquiring joint control;
- acquisition of an enterprise of another undertaking or a part thereof by the acquiring party or parties; and
- creation of a full-function joint venture jointly by all undertakings participating in the creation of a full-function joint venture.

The notification is subject to payment of an administrative fee of 100,000 Czech koruna.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

There is a deadline of 30 days from the date of opening the notification proceedings for the Office to assess a concentration within Phase I and decide:

- 1 that the concentration does not constitute a concentration that must be notified pursuant to the Act;
- 2 to clear the concentration; or
- 3 to open Phase II of the investigation because there are serious concerns that the concentration would significantly impede competition.

If the Office does not issue the decision according to (1) or (2) or does not open Phase II within the 30-day deadline, the concentration is deemed to be cleared.

The Phase II decision must be issued no later than five months from the date when the notification proceedings are opened. If the Office does not issue the decision within the given deadline, the concentration is deemed to be cleared.

If the notifying party proposes remedies, the respective deadline for Phase I or Phase II will be extended by another 15 days.

In the case of a simplified procedure, the Office must issue a decision within 20 days.

If the Office requires amendment of the notification by the notifying party, the Office's time frame for issuing the decision is suspended.

In our experience, the Office typically issues the respective decision shortly before the deadline.

The concentration may not be implemented until it has been approved by an effective decision of the Office.

Pursuant to section 18(3) and (4) of the Act, the Office might grant an exemption from the standstill obligation on the request of the notifying party if the parties to the concentration or any third party runs the risk of suffering substantial damage or another serious detriment. The Office has 30 days from the receipt of the request to decide. The Office might also grant only partial exemption or grant the exemption subject to certain conditions.

A request for exemption from the standstill obligation is subject to payment of an administrative fee of 10,000 Czech koruna.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

For closing the concentration before clearance, the Office may impose a fine of up to 10 million Czech koruna or 10 per cent of the net turnover of the undertakings that are in breach of the standstill obligation. The Office may further take measures that it considers necessary to restore effective competition on the relevant market, particularly a demerger obligation. There is also a risk that the respective transaction agreement will be deemed invalid. This question, however, is still not clear under Czech law.

In practice, the Office uses the right to impose a fine for breach of a standstill clause. When setting the fine, it takes into account the circumstances of the breach, if the parties knew about the breach and the length of the breach.

There has not been any recent case law on this issue. The last cases where the Office imposed a fine for gun jumping were S104/2015 *Bohemia Energy entity sro* (imposed fine: 5,383,000 Czech koruna) and S164/2015 (R21/2016) *Armex Oil sro* (imposed fine: 4,906,000 Czech koruna), both from 2016.

#### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The same rules and sanctions for implementation of the notified concentration prior to clearance apply to foreign-to-foreign concentrations. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no such case so far.

#### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Act provides for a worldwide bar on closing. However, the Office may grant an exception from the standstill clause.

Because the Office is obliged to assess the negative effects of mergers only on markets within the Czech Republic, merging parties could be convicted by the Office for breach of the standstill obligation only if a merger closing before the adoption of the Office's clearance decision has an effect on markets within the Czech Republic. Therefore a 'hold-separate agreement' for the Czech part of a foreign transaction would probably not be seen as gun jumping.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The same rules and requirements apply to public takeover bids; however, pursuant to section 18(2) of the Act, the ban on closing does not apply

to implementing a public offer to purchase or exchange stocks provided that the transaction was notified immediately and that the buyer does not exercise the voting rights arising from the acquired stocks.

### Documentation

#### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The notification must be made on a notification form prescribed by Decree No. 294/2016. It can be downloaded at the Office's website. The notification form must be filed in Czech.

The Decree also specifies the documents that must accompany the filed notification. It is necessary to submit to the Office either the original documents or their authenticated copies. If any document is in a foreign language, it must be translated into Czech by an authorised translator. Long documents, such as annual reports and consolidated financial statements, do not have to be translated into Czech if the originals provided to the Office are in English or German. The Office may also decide on a case-by-case basis that parts of the agreements establishing the notified concentration or relevant studies and analysis, which are not necessary for the assessment of the notified concentration, do not need to be translated into Czech if the originals provided to the Office are in English or German. Detailed information is set out in the Office's notice on requirements of the proposal to approve the concentration.

The level of detail required in the preparation of a filing depends on the circumstances of the concentration. If there is no overlap in the activities of the parties to the concentration or their aggregate market share is below 15 per cent in the case of a horizontal concentration or the market share of any party to the concentration is below 25 per cent in the case of a vertical concentration, it is not necessary to fill in parts 6 and 7 of the notification form.

The Act also foresees a simplified procedure for certain types of concentrations, which allows the parties to the concentration to provide less information and fewer supporting documents. The simplified notification of the concentration may be filed when:

- none of the undertakings involved is operating in the same relevant market, or their combined share in the market does not exceed 15 per cent, and at the same time, none of the undertakings concerned is operating in a market vertically connected to the relevant market in which another undertaking operates, or their share in every such market does not exceed 25 per cent; or
- the undertaking acquires exclusive control over the joint venture in which it has participated in joint control so far.

Detailed information and requirements concerning the simplified procedure are set out in the Office's notice on the simplified procedure.

The sanction for not supplying full, correct and true business information is a fine of up to 300,000 Czech koruna or 1 per cent of net turnover achieved in the last accounting period.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The Office recommends the notifying party to have pre-notification contacts with it prior to filing the notification, the details of which are described in the Office's notice on pre-notification contacts.

Clearance procedure could be divided into two phases. The Office initiates Phase I after its receipt of the notification by parties to the concentration. Specifically, upon receipt of the notification, the Office publishes a short summary of the notification on its website as well as in the Commercial Gazette. In the case of a simplified procedure, the



summary is published only on the website. The summary contains the names of the parties, a brief description of the type of concentration and the business sector concerned. Third parties are invited to provide their pertinent objections by a set deadline, usually five days.

The Office informs the notifying party in writing about the opening of the investigation, which constitutes Phase I. Within Phase I, the Office assesses whether the concentration falls within the scope of the Act and whether the concentration would significantly impede competition. In the event that the concentration might raise serious doubts of significant impediment of competition, the Office opens Phase II; otherwise, the concentration is cleared. If the Office needs clarification, further information or documents, it approaches the notifying party in writing. In such a case, the Office's time frame for issuing the decision is suspended.

The parties to the concentration can offer remedies to the Office either prior to the notification or at any time in the course of the investigation; however, at the latest within 15 days from obtaining the statement of objections.

If the Office intends to open Phase II, it informs the notifying party about this in writing in the course of Phase I.

Prior to issuing the decision, the Office will invite the notifying party to make itself acquainted with information and documents contained in the administrative file, which will be the basis for its decision.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The Office has 30 days from the date of opening the notification proceedings to assess a concentration within Phase I and decide:

- 1 that the concentration does not constitute a concentration that must be notified pursuant to the Act;
- 2 to clear the concentration; or
- 3 to open Phase II of the investigation, because there are serious concerns that the concentration would significantly impede competition.

If the Office does not issue the decision according to (1) or (2) or does not open Phase II within the 30-day deadline, the concentration is deemed to be cleared.

The Phase II decision must be issued no later than five months from the date when the notification proceedings are opened. If the Office does not issue the decision within the given deadline, the concentration is deemed to be cleared.

If the notifying party proposes remedies, the respective deadline for Phase I or Phase II will be extended by another 15 days.

In the case of a simplified procedure, the Office must issue a decision within 20 days.

If the Office requires amendment of the notification by the notifying party, the Office's time frame for issuing the decision is suspended.

In our experience, the Office typically issues the respective decision shortly before the deadline. There is no other possibility for speeding up the proceedings besides using the simplified procedure.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) assesses the notified concentrations against a test that basically corresponds to the 'substantial impediment to effective competition' test under the EU Merger Regulation. The Office prohibits implementation of concentrations that would significantly impede competition in the relevant

market. A significant impediment to competition can be caused particularly by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The Czech Competition Act No. 143/2001 presumes that a concentration will not have as its result the significant impediment of competition where the aggregate market share of the parties to the concentration on the relevant market does not exceed 25 per cent.

Nevertheless, the substantive test is not only restricted to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. There are a number of legal and economic aspects that must be taken into account when pursuing the test, such as the necessity of maintaining and further developing competition, the structure of all affected markets, the market shares of the parties to the concentration, the economic and financial power of the parties, the legal and other barriers to entry to the market, the ability of suppliers and customers of the parties to switch, the development of supply and demand in the affected markets, the needs and interests of consumers, and research and development. A concentration's impact on competition must be assessed with regard to all these combined criteria.

A concentration that otherwise does not meet the requirements for clearance may be cleared by the Office subject to conditions and obligations.

Regarding the 'failing firm defence' the Office published a soft law document, which is available at its website. Thus, the Office recognises this specific situation and after consideration of all relevant circumstances is willing to clear the concentration, although the conditions to satisfy the 'failing firm defence' are strict and the Office thoroughly assesses the characteristics of the market and the potential impacts that the concentration might have.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No, there is no special substantive test for joint ventures. It is not only theories of harm arising from the creation or strengthening of a unilateral or collective dominant position that are the subject of the Office's investigation; the possibility of the elimination of important competitive constraints on oligopolistic markets caused by a merger is also examined by the Office within the assessment of merger effects on relevant markets.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The test for clearance is whether the concentration significantly impedes effective competition. Within the scope of the test, the Office may rely on a number of theories of harm (eg, vertical foreclosure, conglomerate effects and collective dominance) to prove that the concentration would significantly impede effective competition. Thus, the Office investigates all potential risks and impacts on the relevant markets the concentrations might have.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

In merger cases, the Office does not consider any non-competition issue as a criterion for assessing whether a merger can or cannot be declared to be compatible with the Czech market. The only thing that is checked is whether a merger significantly impedes economic competition. When deciding on a concentration notification, the Office primarily assesses the necessity of preservation and further development of effective competition, the structure of all markets affected by the concentration, the shares of the parties to the concentration in those markets, their economic and financial power, legal and other barriers to enter relevant markets by other undertakings, the alternatives available to suppliers and customers

of the parties to the concentration, the development of supply and demand in the affected markets, the needs and interests of consumers, and research and development, provided that it is to the consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to effective competition.

### Economic efficiencies

**23** | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Office might take economic efficiencies into account in the review process. Where efficiencies are invoked in favour of a concentration, the party alleging the efficiencies bears the burden of proof. In practice, it is advisable to document the efficiencies through the opinions of economic experts.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

**24** | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) will issue a prohibition decision if it considers that a concentration would significantly impede competition in the relevant market, particularly through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position of the parties to the concentration or some of them.

If the decision is not complied with, the Office may impose restorative measures to restore effective competition; for example, an order to sell the shares of the acquired undertaking or to abolish the agreement on which the concentration is based.

In addition, the Office may impose a fine of up to 10 million Czech koruna or 10 per cent of the net turnover if the transaction is closed despite its veto.

### Remedies and conditions

**25** | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

To address the Office's competition concerns about the notified concentration, the parties to the concentration may offer remedies. The decision to accept the proposed remedies is fully at the discretion of the Office. The parties to the concentration may offer remedies prior to the notification of the concentration or at any time in the course of the investigation; however, it must be at the latest 15 days from the receipt of the statement of objections.

The Czech Competition Act No. 143/2001 (the Act) does not specify the nature of the remedies that might be proposed. Both structural and behavioural remedies are possible.

**26** | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The Act does not specify which remedies are acceptable. Both structural and behavioural remedies can be proposed, but the Office prefers structural remedies.

Remedies may be proposed prior to the notification of the concentration or any time in the course of the Office's investigation; however, they must be proposed at the latest 15 days after obtaining the statement of objections.

If remedies are proposed, the deadline for the decision of the Office within Phase I or Phase II shall be extended by 15 days.

The Office shall respect remedies proposed by the parties to the concentration and only those shall be binding. In practice, it is

advisable to discuss intended remedies with the Office during pre-notification contacts.

**27** | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

In the past 10 years, there has been no such record. In 2003, the Office requested commitments or remedies in a few foreign-to-foreign mergers (S008/2003 *General Electric Company/AGFA Geavert* and S029/2003 *DSM/division Vitamins and Fine Chemicals Roche Group*).

### Ancillary restrictions

**28** | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Pursuant to section 17(2) of the Act, the clearance decision also covers those restrictions to competition that the notifying party identified in the notification and that are directly related and necessary to the concentration. The Office accepts the European Commission's Notice on Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to Concentrations as useful guidance on this matter.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

**29** | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) publishes an announcement regarding the initiation of the notification proceedings on its website and in the Commercial Gazette without delay after the receipt of the concentration notification. In the case of a simplified procedure, the summary is published only on the website. The announcement contains the names of the parties to the concentration, a brief description of the type of concentration and the business sector concerned. The announcement also contains an invitation for third parties to submit any potential objections within the set deadline. Third parties may provide objections to or comments on the notified concentration at any time during the investigation, although the Office is not obliged to deal with them.

The Office may, on its own initiative, address information requests to competitors and customers or any third parties in the course of its investigation.

According to the case law of the Regional Court in Brno (62 Af 55/2011-174 and 62 Af 42/2012-116), which is in charge of reviewing the Office's decisions, third parties who provide their objections against the concentration within the set deadline and who are of the opinion that the Office did not properly deal with them in its first instance decision on the concentration can appeal the clearance decision of the Office. However, this case law was heavily criticised and was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court (6 As 47/2014-82). At the same time, however, the Supreme Administrative Court suggested that third parties must have other possibilities to challenge the clearance decision. The specification of those possibilities was, however, left open.

### Publicity and confidentiality

**30** | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

During the investigation, parties to the concentration must disclose all information and documents available, including those that might contain

business secrets. To protect business secrets, the notifying party must provide the notification both in a version with business secrets and in a version with the business secrets redacted.

The Office publishes an announcement regarding the initiation of the notification proceedings on its website and in the Commercial Gazette.

The final decision of the Office is published on its website but without the business secrets indicated by the parties to the concentration.

With regard to access by third parties, it was generally accepted for a long time that only the notifying party could see the file. However, according to case law of the Supreme Administrative Court (9 Afs 29/2012-53), if a third party demonstrates a strong interest in obtaining access to the file, the Office must allow the third party to have such access, but only to documents in which the business secrets have been redacted. This conclusion has been confirmed by other case law of the Supreme Administrative Court (eg, 6 As 42/2015-75 and 6 As 47/2014-82).

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

At the level of know-how exchange, the Office cooperates with the European Commission and with the competition authorities of other countries within the European Competition Network, the International Competition Network and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The notifying party is entitled to appeal the decision of the Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) within 15 days from the date of delivery of the decision on the concentration. The appeal body is the chair of the Office.

The decision of the chair of the Office can then be challenged by bringing an administrative action to the Regional Court in Brno. However, the administrative action has no suspensive effect on the decision of the Office unless the court grants it at the special request of the plaintiff.

According to the current case law of the Supreme Administrative Court, third parties must have other possibilities to challenge the clearance decision. The specification of those possibilities was, however, left open. Therefore, such specification must be clarified in the next decision-making practice.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An appeal of the first instance decision of the Office must be lodged within 15 days from the date of delivery of the decision. Administrative action against the second instance decision of the Office (ie, the decision of the chair of the Office) must be lodged within two months. There is no deadline for the chair of the Office to decide about the appeal against the first instance decision. There is also no deadline for a decision of the court about the administrative action against the second instance decision. The court usually decides within a year or so.

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## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2019, the Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) issued 40 decisions concerning concentrations, 26 of them within the simplified procedure and three of them within the Phase II procedure. Two clearances were subject to commitments. There have been no prohibition decisions by the Office in the past nine years.

There is no particular focus on any industries, sectors or issues in the Office's decision-making practice.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There is currently one proposal to amend the Czech Competition Act No. 143/2001 by implementing Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the member states to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

Compared to the previous year, in 2019, the Office for the Protection of Competition (the Office) has dealt with more complex concentrations that have required further assessment within the Phase II proceedings. In addition, two concentrations were subject to commitments. This trend is also illustrated by the decreased number of decisions delivered in the simplified procedure.

Competition law on digital markets and related issues remain as the hot topics. The Office also continues to cooperate with other competition authorities from neighbouring countries and with other public authorities. Regarding the complexity of competition law issues, it will be necessary for competition enforcers as well as other practitioners to cooperate crosswise and find new experts in diverse areas.

Czech legal practitioners also kept watch on the first outcomes of the adopted thresholds based on value of transaction in Germany and later in Austria. In addition, a potential change of the actual merger control regime was discussed in light of the opposing decision of the European Commission in the *Alstom/Siemens* case. However, no particular proposals to amend the Czech Competition Act No. 143/2001 in this regard have been made.

Although 2019 was a year of a lower number of concentrations than 2018, the Czech economy was still in a phase of economic growth, which has also been illustrated by the high number of announced concentrations between undertakings active in all industries. Healthcare, IT, media, water services and real estate are key industries where undertakings have decided to merge. Overall, the Czech Republic constitutes a stable and positive opportunity for foreign investments.

# Denmark

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The main legislation on Danish merger control is contained in the Danish Competition Act (Consolidated Competition Act No. 155 of 1 March 2018), which is modelled on EU competition law. The Competition Act can be accessed online at [www.kfst.dk](http://www.kfst.dk), which is the website of the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA).

In the field of merger control, the provisions of the Competition Act are accompanied by the Executive Order on the Calculation of Turnover in the Competition Act (No. 1286 of 26 November 2019) and the Executive Order on the Notification of Concentrations (No. 690 of 25 May 2020). The European Commission's jurisdictional notice and ancillary restraints notice provide guidance.

The DCCA is the principal enforcer of competition law in Denmark. The Competition Council, which is part of the DCCA, consists of seven members appointed by the Minister for Business and Growth: a chairman, a vice chairman and two additional members with knowledge of competition law or other relevant academic background, two members with managerial background from the business world, and one member with special knowledge of consumer affairs. The Competition Council has the overall responsibility for the administration of the Competition Act and regulations issued thereunder. In addition, the Council shall make decisions on matters of principle or of particular importance.

The DCCA, which is also the secretariat of the Competition Council, is in charge of day-to-day administration of the Competition Act. The DCCA prepares the decisions of the Council and issues decisions in matters not dealt with by the Competition Council. The DCCA is divided into units in charge of different areas of business and industry. The DCCA also has transversal units and a management and administration secretariat.

The decisions of the competition authorities are subject to appeal before the Competition Appeals Tribunal, which is made up of a Supreme Court judge, and four other members with expertise in either economics or law. The Appeals Tribunal forms part of the administration and its decisions are in turn subject to appeals by the undertakings before the ordinary courts.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The provisions of merger control apply to 'concentrations'. In accordance with the EU Merger Regulation, a concentration will be deemed to arise where either:

- two or more previously independent undertakings merge; or
- one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings, acquire, whether by purchase of

securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.

The preparatory documents accompanying the Competition Act explicitly refer to the European Commission's notices on merger regulation.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a full-function joint venture (ie, a joint venture performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis) also constitutes a concentration. In this respect, the preparatory documents make explicit reference to the European Commission's notices.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Act contains a precise definition of control that is consistent with the law and practice under the EU Merger Regulation: control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means that, either separately or jointly, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence over an undertaking.

In cases where outright legal control is not acquired, rights attached to shares or contained in shareholder agreements, board representation, ownership and use of assets and related commercial issues may be considered. In the case of the acquisition of minority shareholdings, the Competition Council will assess the situation by looking at the strength of voting rights and other factors. Such considerations may lead to the conclusion that the possibility of exercising control as defined exists. It does not matter whether control has actually been exercised. The European Commission's practice will be followed.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The merger control provisions apply to concentrations where either:

- the combined aggregate turnover in Denmark of all the undertakings concerned is at least 900 million kroner and the aggregate turnover in Denmark of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is at least 100 million kroner; or
- the aggregate turnover in Denmark of at least one of the undertakings concerned is at least 3.8 billion Danish kroner and the aggregate worldwide turnover of at least one of the other undertakings concerned is at least 3.8 billion kroner.

The preparatory work to the Danish Competition Act states that 'undertakings concerned' is to be interpreted in accordance with the

Commission's practice. Moreover, it is stated explicitly in the Competition Act that where the concentration consists of the acquisition of parts (regardless of whether they are constituted as legal entities such as assets constituting a separate business) of one or more undertakings, only the turnover relating to the parts that are the subject of the transaction will be taken into account with regard to the seller or sellers. Two or more transactions that take place within a two-year period between the same persons or undertakings will be treated as one and the same concentration arising on the date of the last transaction.

Concentrations below the thresholds may in exceptional circumstances be referred to the European Commission under article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation.

On 3 April 2020, the DCCA referred the proposed merger between Mastercard and Nets to the European Commission, since the DCCA came to the conclusion that the merger may affect markets in a number of other EU member states. This is the first time that the DCCA has requested a referral to the European Commission.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing of merger notifications in Denmark is mandatory if the turnover thresholds are met.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers satisfying the turnover thresholds are subject to Danish merger control even where no actual effects in the Danish market can be shown. The thresholds have been defined so as to require actual turnover in Denmark (generally interpreted as sales to customers located in Denmark) of a substantial magnitude.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

On 1 July 2015, a sector-specific threshold was introduced. Within the sector of public electronic communications networks, the second limb of the primary thresholds (ie, that each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than 100 million kroner) has been abolished. If a merger is within this sector, and the combined aggregate turnover in Denmark of all the undertakings concerned is more than 900 million kroner, the jurisdictional threshold is met and the merger must be notified (regardless of the aggregate turnover of the individual undertakings).

Furthermore, exemptions apply with regard to the calculation of the turnover of (1) associations of companies and (2) financial institutions. These exemptions are set out in the Executive Order on the Calculation of Turnover in the Competition Act (No. 1286 of 26 November 2019), sections 5 to 7.

Special rules apply to financial undertakings (eg, banks, mortgage-credit institutions, investment management institutions). Hence, such financial undertakings are not allowed to merge without permission from the Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs. That is stipulated in section 204 of the Financial Business Act (Act No. 937 of 6 September 2019).

The acquisition of a controlling shareholding in a public limited liability company registered on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange creates an obligation to make a general bid to purchase the remaining shares.

At this point in time, there is no cross-sectoral screening regime in Denmark regarding foreign direct investment. The Danish Munitions Act (consolidated Act No. 1004 of 22 October 2012) is currently the only legislative act that regulates foreign acquisitions and investments on the basis of national security interests in Denmark. It follows from

the Danish Munitions Act, that Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanisms apply to undertakings producing materials constructed for military purposes (eg, firearms, ammunition, gunpowder and explosives). The Act on the Continental Shelf and Certain Pipeline Installations on Territorial Waters is, besides the Danish Munitions Act, the only other act that partially takes foreign and national security interests into consideration. The Act stipulates that an authorisation must be granted before placing certain pipelines in Danish waters, irrespective of whether the company is Danish or foreign.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Concentrations falling within the thresholds must be notified to the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest; and in any event before implementation.

Fines may be imposed for failure to notify and unlawful implementation. To date, three fines in the range of 4 million to 6 million kroner have been imposed on companies that had failed to notify a merger to the DCCA.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In principle, all the parties involved in a concentration are responsible for filing. In practice, however, the filing of acquisitions is often made by the acquiring party. The fee amounts to 50,000 kroner for simplified notifications and 0.015 per cent of the parties' turnover for non-simplified notifications. However, the filing fee is capped at a maximum of 1.5 million kroner.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

A concentration that is notifiable to the DCCA must not be put into effect before it has been approved by the DCCA or the Competition Council's time limits have expired.

This creates waiting periods of 25 working days (Phase I) or additionally 90 working days (Phase II) after the expiry of the first waiting period. A Phase I review can be extended by 10 working days if the undertakings propose new or revised commitments. A Phase II review can be extended by 20 working days in three scenarios:

- if the undertakings propose new or revised commitments late in the process (ie, if 70 working days or more have passed from the decision to initiate Phase II);
- at the request by the parties; or
- with the parties' consent.

Hence, the maximum extension in Phase II is 2 × 20 working days (ie, if 70 working days or more have passed from the decision to initiate Phase II). The DCCA must declare whether a notification is complete within 10 working days. In practice, the DCCA may have several additional questions and sometimes even begin negotiations with the parties on possible commitments with the effect that the deadlines are not triggered.

There are two exceptions to this rule: first, a (conditional) derogation may be granted by the DCCA; second, an exception applies in respect of public bids that have been notified, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments and on the basis of a derogation granted by the DCCA.



## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Fines may be imposed for unlawful implementation of a concentration prior to clearance. However, since the introduction of merger control in Denmark in 2000, the Competition Authority has only once used its powers to ask the Public Prosecutor's Office to pursue matters of failure to notify. (We are aware of at least one instance where the parties to a 'foreign-to-foreign' transaction notified considerably later than the one-week deadline, which applied at the time.)

Generally, the size of any fine will depend on factors such as the size and turnover of the undertakings concerned, the duration of the violation and whether the merger has impeded effective competition in the relevant market. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances may also be taken into account. However, the fine imposed can amount to up to 10 per cent of the undertaking's revenue. Substantive violations of the competition rules may trigger fines according to the following base amounts: up to 4 million kroner for minor violations, 4 million to 20 million kroner for serious violations, and more than 20 million kroner for very serious violations. However, fines for procedural infringements are likely to be significantly lower than these base amounts, probably in the magnitude of some 10,000 to 500,000 kroner.

Where clearance is subsequently denied or made conditional, the transaction will have to be annulled or otherwise reopened and modified.

### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

In principle, the same sanctions are applicable to notifiable foreign-to-foreign mergers as to other notifiable mergers. However, the administrative practice and case law hold no examples of sanctions for filing late in foreign-to-foreign merger cases.

### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Solutions such as 'ring fencing' or 'hold separate' would normally not be acceptable to merit a derogation from the 'stand still' obligation. Most often, the best way to proceed is to demonstrate the absence of any effect on Danish markets, which may likely accelerate the process of obtaining an early clearance decision.

## Public takeovers

### 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The Competition Act does not prevent the implementation of a public bid that has been notified to the DCCA, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments and on the basis of a derogation granted by the DCCA.

## Documentation

### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Filing under the Competition Act requires the use of a specific form known as Annex 1. The form requires the provision of information about the parties, the markets, customers, suppliers and competitors, and is only a little less detailed than the Form CO used under the EU Merger

Regulation. For straightforward cases that are unlikely to raise competition concerns, a simplified 'short-form' filing using a form known as Annex 2 is also possible. This form is similar in structure to Annex 1 but requires less information to be submitted. Both forms require the lodging of a non-confidential version, which is intended to be used for market testing.

Fines may be imposed for supplying wrong or missing information. Fines of 50,000 kroner have been imposed in two unrelated merger cases involving the submission of incomplete information in one instance and omitting to correct previously submitted incorrect information in another.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

It is clear that pre-notification consultations with the DCCA may and should take place. Very often these consultations can have a significant impact on the outcome and provide the undertakings concerned with the opportunity to address possible competition concerns early in the process so as to ensure that the review process is accelerated. The informal pre-notification consultation is often initiated on the basis of a briefing paper or an early draft of the notification, which is shared with the DCCA.

The time frames (Phases I and II) are inspired by article 10(1) and (3) of the EU Merger Regulation. The Competition Authority may approve a concentration before the expiry of the initial investigation (Phase I). The Competition Authority cannot prohibit a concentration within Phase I but may initiate an in-depth investigation (Phase II) if there are serious doubts regarding the concentration's compatibility with the Competition Act. The Competition Authority may 'stop the clock' at any time during the formal review periods in Phase I and II if the parties do not provide requested additional information within the time frame given.

### 18 What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The timetable for clearance is the same whether the merger is filed under the simplified procedure or the full-form notification procedure. Within 10 working days of the filing, the DCCA shall either declare the notification complete – thereby confirming that the time began running upon notification – or specify any missing information to be submitted. In cases of simplified notifications, the Competition Authority has 10 working days to decide whether to accept the simplified procedure or demand a full-form notification.

Unless the notification has been accepted as complete during the pre-merger notification consultation, the parties are often sent such requests, which will in effect extend the waiting period.

The DCCA must make its decision on the substance within 25 working days (Phase I) of the receipt of a complete notification. The Phase I deadline of 25 working days can be extended to 35 working days (extended Phase I) if one or more of the participating undertakings are proposing commitments. The Competition Council will decide to either approve the concentration or initiate further proceedings. In the latter case, the Competition Council must make a final decision within 90 working days (Phase II) after the expiry of the original 25 working days.

The time limit of 90 working days may be extended by 20 days if the undertakings propose new or revised commitments at a late stage (ie, if 70 working days or more have passed from the decision to initiate Phase II). The review period is thereby extended to 110 days irrespective of the number of days remaining of the original deadline. The deadline can also be extended by up to 20 days on request by the parties or with the parties' consent.

Similarly to the EU Merger Regulation, the Danish merger control scheme builds on close contacts as early in the process as possible. Cases that do not pose any substantive issues can often be cleared according to a simplified procedure. After a complete notification has been received, the DCCA decides within 25 working days whether a concentration may be approved on the basis of a simplified procedure. In practice, an approval on the basis of a simplified procedure will be given quickly, depending on the nature of the pre-notification.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test to be applied by the Competition Council is whether the concentration significantly impedes effective competition (SIEC), in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Unless this is the case, the concentration must be approved.

The substantive test for clearance of concentrations that have as their object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings is similar to that set out in the EU Merger Regulation. Such aspects of coordination shall therefore be appraised in accordance with the criteria laid down in the provisions of the Competition Act, which are the domestic equivalents of article 101(1) and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This test applies in addition to the SIEC test.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

In the case of full-function joint ventures, which may also have the object or effect of coordinating the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent, such coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of the provisions of the Competition Act applying to anticompetitive agreements (similar to article 101(1) TFEU).

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority and the Competition Council tend to follow the European Commission's practice with regard to the applicable 'theories of harm'.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Competition Authority is expected to apply the above substantive test without taking account of non-competition issues.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

There is no express efficiency defence. However, section 1 of the Competition Act states that the purpose of the Competition Act is to promote 'efficient resource allocation' and, consequently, it can be argued that efficiency should be considered. In practical terms, an efficiency argument can be raised if available, and will be considered in the assessment of the case. However, in raising the efficiency defence the undertakings concerned might risk the competition authorities interpreting the argument as an indication of increased dominance,

as the efficiency gained will make competition even more difficult for competitors that do not benefit from similar efficiencies. Therefore, the efficiency defence should be applied with due caution.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The transaction may be approved, approved with conditions, or prohibited. Commitments may be offered to eliminate competition concerns. The Competition Council has the power and duty to impose conditions; therefore, it may not, according to the principle of proportionality, prohibit the transaction if the parties can design suitable remedies that eliminate competition concerns. The parties to the merger might therefore be in the position of deciding whether to proceed with the transaction on the basis of remedies accepted by the Competition Council.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

If the competition authorities assess that the concentration cannot be approved without conditions, the undertakings concerned will enter into a dialogue or negotiation with the competition authorities to agree on suitable commitments. The commitments agreed with the competition authorities will be formulated as conditions in the approval of the concentration. Such conditions can be appealed separately after approval of the concentration, even though they are agreed during the negotiations with the competition authorities. The Competition Authority may attach conditions including divestment orders or behavioural remedies for clearance of a concentration and may also issue orders to ensure that the parties fulfil these.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Based on the administrative practice to date, it appears that where relevant, divestments are conducted by way of an irrevocable power of attorney granted to an independent trustee. The trustee will generally be entitled to sell the relevant activity within a certain period, although the length of this period will not be publicly disclosed. In one case, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority has accepted that if it is not possible to fulfil the divestment order within a certain period, the remedy is considered to have lapsed.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Only on rare occasions have remedies been necessary in foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, in one foreign-to-foreign merger with the acquirer having a subsidiary and the target having sales in Denmark, the parties were required to give an undertaking not to discriminate between customers to avoid a possible vertical foreclosure problem.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

It is for the undertakings concerned to assess whether any individual terms of the merger agreement are to be categorised as ancillary restrictions. The practice in previous Danish merger decisions, as

well as decisions made by the Commission, may serve as guidance to the undertakings in their assessment of ancillary restrictions associated with a merger. If a merger involves restrictions of a nature that is not covered by prior practice or that has not been dealt with by the Commission in its Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations, the Competition Council may, upon request from the parties, assess the ancillary restrictions at the same time as it assesses the merger itself. Merger notifications in which the undertakings concerned request an assessment of ancillary restrictions cannot be processed by the simplified procedure.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Depending on the particular circumstances, the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) may conduct market tests. Customers and competitors also frequently submit their observations to the DCCA. In practice, these processes may well affect the design of any remedies attached to a conditional clearance decision.

Third parties do not have a right to appeal the DCCA's decisions to the Competition Appeals Tribunal, but can lodge a complaint with the courts.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The DCCA will make a public statement about the fact that a merger notification has been made and invite comments from third parties. The statement includes information on the identity of the parties, the nature of the concentration and the affected industry. As part of the review process, the DCCA will often seek comments from the market and perhaps perform 'market testing'.

All merger decisions are published on the DCCA's website. Generally, the DCCA issues press releases after it adopts decisions in important cases. Pre-merger notification consultations take place secretly. Confidential information is always omitted in public versions of decisions.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Subject to reciprocity, the DCCA may exchange information with competition authorities in other countries. This right applies explicitly to information covered by the DCCA's secrecy obligations. An agreement dated 8 September 2017 exists between Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland for exchange of data. The DCCA also generally cooperates with the Commission and competition authorities in other member states.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Competition Authorities' decisions may generally be appealed to the Competition Appeals Tribunal and its decisions may in turn be appealed to the ordinary courts by the undertakings.

Commitments in merger cases agreed to by the undertakings during negotiations with the competition authorities can be appealed independently to the Competition Appeals Tribunal. A recent example is the *Nykredit* case in which the Nykredit Group claimed that commitments made in connection with a 2003 merger had been fulfilled after some eight years in force. This was challenged before both the Competition Appeals Tribunal and the Maritime and Commercial Court, and appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the commitments were given without any time limit, as such a time limit was not explicitly stated as part of the commitments. In its ruling, the Supreme Court made it clear that the commitments form part of the basis for the authority's decision and that it is the undertakings that bear the risk of any ambiguities.

The Western High Court adopted a judgment on the issue of whether the DCCA could demand a full-form notification of a merger instead of simplified notification. When Salling Group acquired Wupti.com in 2015, the parties notified the DCCA of the merger using the simplified procedure. However, the DCCA found that the information in the simplified procedure was insufficient to determine the nature of the merger. The DCCA therefore ordered Salling Group to file a full-form notification, increasing the filing fee significantly. The merger between Salling Group and Wupti.com was cleared on the basis of the full-form notification report, but Salling Group subsequently complained to the Competition Appeals Tribunal, claiming that a short-form notification under the simplified procedure would have been sufficient. The Competition Appeals Tribunal upheld the DCCA's finding. The case was appealed before the Court of Aarhus, which also ruled in favour of the authority. Salling Group then appealed the decision before the High Court, which agreed that there was no basis for setting aside the DCCA's finding, thus emphasising that the DCCA has a wide margin of discretion when they determine the merger notification procedure.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

To date, no merger decisions have been subject to judicial review. In most antitrust cases, an appeal to the Competition Appeals Tribunal should be expected to take between three and 12 months, while a subsequent appeal to the ordinary courts can take between one and three years.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

From 2000, when merger control was introduced in Denmark, until 1 October 2010 when thresholds were lowered, the Danish competition authorities approved approximately 95 mergers; approximately four out of five were cleared without commitments or other conditions, and the rest were approved after the undertakings concerned agreed to commitments. Since 1 October 2010 (and the introduction of new merger rules), the Danish competition authorities have approved approximately 260 mergers. So far, only one merger has been prohibited formally (in 2008), but we are aware of some five to 10 cases that were abandoned late in the filing process in recognition of the fact that substantive assessment posed serious challenges.

For mergers, the authorities' enforcement concerns will always depend on the concentrations notified. Over the past year or so, financial services and foodstuffs have continued to dominate the area, but industries such as energy, transport and telecommunications remain as important as always.

Another area of focus is notification – specifically, striking the right balance between allowing the use of the simplified procedure as opposed to requiring a full notification. As mentioned in the *Salling Group* case, the Western High Court acknowledged that the DCCA has a wide margin of discretion when determining the notification procedure.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Most recently, amendments to the Competition Act were made on 19 December 2017. In the field of merger control, these changes have had an impact on the time limits in relation to Phase I and II. The amendments entered into force on 1 January 2018. Currently, there are no proposals or plans for further amendment of the legislation.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

Breach of procedural rules in merger control cases has lately been an area of increasing focus for the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA). This has been emphasised in two recent cases:

- In 2019, Circle K was fined for failing to properly notify a merger to the DCCA. Circle K had previously notified the DCCA of its acquisition of tools, equipment, inventory, employees, goodwill, etc, related to 72 gas stations from 12 different lessees, who had previously been leasing the stations under the Shell brand. The DCCA approved the acquisition without remedies. However, in May 2016, Circle K had already entered into transfer agreements with said lessees and terminated their leases following an approval from the European Commission in March 2016 of Circle K's acquisition of Dansk Fuel, which constituted Shell's Danish activities. The acquisition of the 72 gas stations was not covered by the European Commission's clearance but should have been notified separately to the DCCA. Hence, the Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime fined Circle K 6 million Danish kroner.
- In 2018, Danish energy companies SEAS-NVE and SE (SE has merged with Eniig and is now called Norlys) were fined for failing to file a merger approval notification with the DCCA, when they acquired joint control over a Danish company in 2012. The acquisition constituted a merger that should have been approved by the DCCA, but the companies failed to file for the DCCA's approval. The companies contacted the DCCA in 2017 and admitted the non-compliance and subsequently filed a simplified application, which was approved with no complication. However, both companies were fined 4 million Danish kroner for failing to notify the acquisition and for having completed the transaction prior to the required regulatory approval.

Furthermore, the DCCA has referred a merger between Mastercard and Nets to the European Commission. It is the first time that the DCCA has requested a referral to the European Commission.

Finally, minor amendments have been made in the Executive Orders on the Calculation of Turnover to ensure conformity with the equivalent provisions of EU law. Also, as in other jurisdictions, the DCCA have begun to consider the introduction of a 'size-of-the-transaction-test' as part of the merger thresholds. According to the authority's 'pre-hearing proposal', a concentration (below the current thresholds) may become notifiable if the following cumulative conditions are met: the transaction value exceeds a new threshold of presumably 300 million kroner; the target company has significant activities in Denmark;

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and the merging entities have an aggregate annual revenue in Denmark in excess of presumably 900 million kroner. To adopt the proposal, a bill for the amendment of the Competition Act would have to be introduced, which is not yet scheduled.

The merger control regime does not seem to be affected by the economic crisis yet and, at this point in time, the DCCA has not made a statement regarding the role of merger control in times of economic crises.

A new Executive Order on the Notification of Concentrations has been issued, in which the information requirements have been amended. The amendment formally includes more stringent rules on information, but the amendment only scarcely introduces new requirements, since most of the information previously was granted to the DCCA voluntarily or would emerge when answering the DCCA's questions.

# Ecuador

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The primary law regulating the control of economic concentrations in Ecuador is the Organic Law for Market Power Control (the Antitrust Law), which was enacted on 13 October 2011. The main secondary laws are the Regulation of the Antitrust Law, published on 7 May 2012, and Resolution No. 002 by the Antitrust Regulation Entity, in respect of Turnover Thresholds for Concentration Operations, published on 22 October 2013.

The oversight entity in antitrust matters is the Superintendency for Market Power Control (SCPM), which is the antitrust entity, while the regulatory entity is the Antitrust Regulation Entity. The investigation entity of the SCPM is the Economic Concentrations Investigation and Control Intendancy, and the resolution entities are the First-Instance Resolution Committee and the SCPM (second instance at the administrative stage).

The Economic Concentrations Investigation and Control Intendancy is the entity in charge of investigating and processing economic concentrations' control procedures, and the First-Instance Resolution Committee is in charge of approving, rejecting or subordinating approval to compliance with behavioural or structural conditions.

On 20 April 2020, the SCPM issued Resolution No. SCPM-DS-2020-018, which introduces a new fast-track procedure for the competition authorisation of mergers and acquisitions in this jurisdiction.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The kinds of mergers caught include:

- transfers of an entire business;
- acquisitions of rights representing capital, shares or equity interests;
- relationships stemming from common administration; and
- any other agreement for transferring assets from one economic operator to another or granting the decisive control or influence in making decisions.

Premised on Ecuadorian antitrust legislation, economic concentration is defined basically by a change of control of one or more economic operators.

To be considered an economic concentration under Ecuadorian antitrust legislation, the concentration must be between local economic operators or, if between foreign companies, must produce effects in Ecuador. The Antitrust Law establishes two thresholds that economic concentration operations must meet to determine whether the operation requires the prior approval of the SCPM. Both these thresholds

need not be met; rather one needs to be fulfilled for the operation to be subjected to analysis and approval by the oversight authority.

One threshold concerns the market share of the economic operators participating in the operation, while the other involves business turnover.

In respect of which party is obliged to notify the economic concentration operation, notification to the SCPM must be provided by the party acquiring control of the company and that wishes to carry out the economic concentration, or the acquirer, depending on each case.

Resolution No. SCPM-DS-2020-018 establishes that the economic concentrations operations that may be subject to the abbreviated procedure are 'those that do not have the potential to generate detrimental effects on competition and free competition'. They must meet at least one of the following criteria:

- the economic operator that takes control does not carry out economic activities in Ecuador directly or indirectly (through related companies that belong to the same economic group);
- in horizontal economic concentration operations, the joint participation of the economic operators involved and the companies or economic operators that belong to their economic group must be less than 30 per cent in the relevant market, and in the event that the economic concentration operation generates horizontal integration in several relevant markets, this criterion must be met in each of them;
- in horizontal economic concentration operations, prior to the operation, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the market resulting from the economic operation must be less than 2,000 points, and, as a consequence of the operation, it must generate a variation of less than 250 points;
- in vertical economic concentration operations, the economic operators involved and the companies or economic operators that belong to their economic group must have a participation quota of less than 30 per cent in the relevant vertically integrated markets, and in the event that the economic concentration operation generates vertical integration in several relevant markets, this criterion must be met in each of them;
- in vertical economic concentration operations, the HHI of vertically integrated markets as a result of the economic concentration operation must be less than 2,000 points, and in the event that the economic concentration operation generates vertical integration in several relevant markets, this criterion must be met in each of them; or
- the economic concentration operation involves economic operators that are at risk of bankruptcy.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures that produce effects in Ecuador, surpass the thresholds established in the Antitrust Law and cause a change in the control in one of the economic operations by decisively influencing the



decisions of the other must notify the SCPM. The scope of application of the Antitrust Law includes state-owned enterprises; therefore, joint ventures involving this kind of economic operation are also subject to prior control by the SCPM.

**4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?**

Article 12 of the Regulation of the Antitrust Law defines control as 'the result of contracts, acts or any other means which, taking factual and legal circumstances into account, confer the possibility of asserting substantial or decisive influence over a company or economic operator. Control may be joint or exclusive'. The position of the SCPM is that control implies the power resulting from the economic concentration that the acquirer has to decisively influence the decisions of the economic operator emerging from the transaction. There are no minority and other interests less than control caught under the merger control regulation.

**Thresholds, triggers and approvals**

**5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?**

The Antitrust Law stipulates that if an economic concentration operation complies with one of the following conditions, the operation must be subjected to analysis and the prior approval of the SCPM:

- the turnover in Ecuador of all participants in the economic concentration in the preceding fiscal year exceeds the amount expressed in the unified basic salary (RBU) (US\$400 for 2020) established by the Antitrust Regulation Entity; and
- if the economic concentration involves economic operators engaged in the same economic activity and, as a consequence thereof, the acquired or increased share in the relevant market is equal to or surpasses 30 per cent.

By way of Resolution No. 009, the Antitrust Regulation Entity sets the thresholds in terms of the amount of the turnover in Ecuador of all participants in the economic concentration operation, over which prior notification to the SCPM is mandatory when the turnover of all participants in the economic concentration in the fiscal year preceding the transaction is more than 3.2 million RBUs for economic concentrations involving the domestic financial system and securities market, 214,000 RBUs for concentrations involving insurance and reinsurance companies, and 200,000 RBUs for economic operations not falling under either of the two preceding cases.

To calculate the turnover of economic operators participating in the economic concentration, the turnover of the following economic operators must be added together:

- 1 the economic operator in question;
- 2 economic operators in which the economic operator in question directly or indirectly has:
  - more than half of the subscribed and paid-in capital;
  - the power of exercising more than half of the voting rights;
  - the power of designating more than half of the members on administrative bodies; or
  - the right to direct the economic operator's business;
- 3 companies or economic operators with the rights and powers listed in (2) with regard to a company or economic operator involved;
- 4 economic operators in which an economic operator listed in (3) has the rights listed in (2); and
- 5 economic operators in question in which various economic operators listed in (1) to (4) jointly have the rights listed in (2).

The Antitrust Law requires presenting the economic concentration notification within eight calendar days of the date of execution of the agreement, irrespective of the method of the economic concentration. The notification must be made in writing.

**6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?**

The economic concentration notification is mandatory when the concentration produces effects in Ecuador so long as it exceeds the thresholds set by the antitrust regulation entity. Although the law stipulates that if the concentration does not surpass the thresholds, no prior authorisation from the SCPM will be required, the SCPM may, directly or upon the petition of a party, request that the economic operators involved in the concentration notify the concentration for informative purposes. If the SCPM requests notification for informative purposes, notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date that the SCPM serves notice of the request.

The Antitrust Law also establishes that when an economic concentration exceeds the thresholds but involves the acquisition of shares, bonds, obligations or other convertible bonds without voting rights, as well as acquisitions of economic operators liquidated or that have not reported any activities in the country in the last three years, it is exempt from the mandatory notification to the SCPM.

**7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?**

Provided that the foreign-to-foreign mergers produce effects in Ecuador, the operation must be notified to the SCPM, and the prior authorisation of the SCPM must be requested. The thresholds established in the law for determining whether an economic operation is subject to notification are calculated based on economic figures in Ecuador.

**8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?**

In Ecuador, there is no special rule or law that exclusively governs economic concentrations for foreign investment. The regulation for all kinds of economic concentrations (including economic concentrations outside Ecuador that produce effects in the country) is found in the Antitrust Law, and the entity that analyses and resolves in that regard is the SCPM.

**NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE**

**Filing formalities**

**9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?**

Concentration operations requiring prior approval must be notified to the Superintendency for Market Power Control (SCPM) within a period of eight days from the execution of the agreement. The Organic Law for Market Power Control (the Antitrust Law) states that executing an economic operation before notifying the Antitrust Law will be regarded as a serious offence punishable by law with a fine of up to 10 per cent of the breaching economic operator's total turnover in the fiscal year preceding that of the fine. All offences listed in the Antitrust Law are, in practice, sanctioned by the SCPM.



## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In the case of a merger, the party responsible for notifying the SCPM is the acquiring economic operator. For transfers of the assets of a business, it is the economic operator that is the recipient of the transfer. For the acquisition of rights representing capital, shares, or equity interests, it is the acquiring economic operator. For relationships because of common administration, it is the economic operator whose members on the administrative board become part of the administrative boards of the other economic operator. For the transfer of assets from one economic operator to another, it is the economic operator acquiring those assets.

When there are various economic operators involved in the acquisition of control of another or other economic operators, the notification must be made collectively, for which a common attorney must be appointed.

For the notification of economic concentrations, the economic operator providing notification must pay filing fees to the SCPM in a sum equal to the higher of the following: 0.25 per cent of income tax, 0.005 per cent of the sales volume, 0.01 per cent of the assets or 0.05 per cent of the equity. These sums are calculated taking the economic operators with presence in Ecuador into account. The fee payment voucher must be attached to the notification.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

In accordance with the Antitrust Law, the SCPM must issue its decision in respect of the economic operation within 60 working days from the date it acknowledges receipt of the submitted notification. The SCPM may suspend the term for up to 60 calendar days. In addition, the initial term of 60 working days may, on an exceptional basis, be extended for up to 60 working days. The SCPM usually takes about three months between the date of the notification of the economic operation and the date of the resolution. The economic concentration operation can neither be closed nor perfected until authorisation from the SCPM is secured.

The economic concentrations subject to the fast-track procedure will be resolved within a maximum period of 25 days working days from the date on which the SCPM office becomes aware of the operation.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The Antitrust Law stipulates that executing an economic concentration operation that must be notified but has not been authorised by the SCPM is a serious offence. This kind of offence is sanctioned with a fine of up to 10 per cent of the breaching economic operator's total turnover in the fiscal year preceding that of the fine. To date, no economic operators that have closed the transaction before securing SCPM approval have been sanctioned; nonetheless, the SCPM has the power to start administrative procedures to sanction.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The relevant sanctions also apply to foreign-to-foreign economic concentrations that produce effects in Ecuador. The SCPM has signed cooperation agreements with other antitrust authorities for collaborating in this type of case.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Premised on its legal power to subject the approval of an economic concentration to compliance with structural conditions, and as part of the conditions for approving an economic concentration in which the disinvestment of an asset package to be transferred to a third party had been ordered, in 2016, the SCPM resolved that the economic operators involved in an economic concentration had to sign a hold-separate arrangement until the ordered disinvestment was made. The reason was that the parties forming part of the economic concentration in Ecuador had to maintain their independence and competition in the market to avoid a monopoly. This took place in a stock purchase in the parent company between two subsidiaries that held the entire market share in Ecuador.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There is only one economic concentration system in Ecuador, and there are no special rules or systems for public takeover bids. In other words, if, as a consequence of a public takeover bid, the thresholds and conditions set by the Antitrust Law are met, then it must be notified to the SCPM. Nonetheless, there are no secondary competition rules in Ecuador governing the execution of or compliance with a structural condition ordered by the SCPM that must be observed for a public takeover bid.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

There is a form pre-established by the authority for notifying an economic concentration that was approved by way of an SCPM resolution. The form requests information related to the economic sector in which the economic operators involved in the concentration do business, a summary of the terms and conditions under which the operation will be carried out, the total value of the economic concentration, information regarding the goods or services offered, the chain of distribution, a list of the providers of the economic agents involved in the concentration, general data of all operators forming part of the concentration operation, the relevant market, the total turnover of the participants, their market shares, the level at which the operation applies (national, regional or international), competitors at each of the markets and the existence of barriers to entry.

Together with the form, copies of the financial statements, a draft of the legal document or agreement concerning the economic concentration, a sworn statement that the information furnished is true, market analysis supporting the information supplied and a confidentiality request must be submitted in the Spanish language.

### Investigation phases and timetable

## 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Once the economic concentration notification is filed, it will be investigated by the Concentrations Control Intendancy, which will follow the process and request information from the notifying economic operator as well as from its competitors, providers and clients. Once the analysis stage is completed, it will submit a report to the First-Instance Resolution Committee. That committee will either approve, reject or subject the request to compliance with a behavioural or structural condition.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

In accordance with the Antitrust Law, an economic concentration must be resolved within a term of 60 working days upon notification by the SCPM that it has received the filing. The SCPM, however, may suspend that term up to 60 calendar days and may also request an extension of up to 60 working days. No other time periods apply. The time it takes the authority to complete the administrative procedure for analysing the concentration will depend on the magnitude thereof.

### SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

#### Substantive test

## 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Normally, the Superintendency for Market Power Control (SCPM) performs an analysis of the defined relevant market structure, concentration indexes, barriers to entry, efficiencies, supply and demand structure of the relevant market, benefits for or detriment to consumers as a result of the concentration, and competitive pressures.

In its analyses of economic concentration operations, the SCPM has used economic concentration indexes of the relevant market as its tool for calculating. For this purpose, it uses the Stenbacka threshold calculation and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no specific test in Ecuador for joint ventures. All concentration tests are conducted pursuant to the same substantive test by the SCPM.

#### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The SCPM analyses and investigates all economic concentration indexes of the defined relevant market, the degree of market power of the operators doing business in that market, the tendency to abuse such market power, unilateral effects, coordinated effects, etc.

#### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

When analysing and deciding on economic concentration interests, the SCPM always looks at the public interest or general interest of consumers and users. This is because the purpose of the Organic Law for Market Power Control is precisely to procure the general well-being of consumers and users.

#### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

When analysing economic concentration operations, the SCPM examines the effects that the operation will bear on the relevant market and, among those effects, its analysis considers efficiency in supply that could entail minor costs, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency, among other things. After reviewing SCPM resolutions within this ambit, the authority has considered that a large part of concentrations generate efficiencies and, therefore, most cases have been approved.

### REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

#### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Superintendency for Market Power Control (SCPM) has the power to approve, reject or subject the approval of an economic concentration to compliance with the conditions that it orders. In that context, based on an analysis of a case in question, the authority has the power to reject a concentration operation should it find it detrimental to the market. Obviously, if the SCPM denies an economic concentration, the concentration may not be perfected in Ecuador.

If the SCPM subjects approval of the economic concentration to compliance with conditions, the conditions will be either behavioural or structural.

With these conditions, the SCPM looks to maintain the competitive pressures existing in the relevant market prior to the concentration.

#### Remedies and conditions

## 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes, it is possible. The Organic Law for Market Power Control (the Antitrust Law) confers upon the resolution entity the power to implement structural and behavioural remedies to stop an economic concentration from causing distortions at the market in question as a consequence. This power is broad, and the Antitrust Law does not specifically describe the type of conditions that the SCPM could order.

In respect of structural remedies, the SCPM has ordered the sale of industrial plants, assets for product distribution, transfer of intellectual property rights and intellectual property licences, among other things. In turn, with regard to behavioural remedies, the SCPM has banned the implementation of exclusivity clauses and agreements with clauses conditioning the obligation of clients to acquire a minimum percentage of monthly purchases or clauses aimed at giving benefits to the concentrated economic operator to the detriment of its competitors, suppliers or clients.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The conditions are clearly described in detail in the SCPM resolution subjecting approval of an economic concentration to compliance with those conditions. The resolution grants the notifying economic operator a term of 90 days to sign and submit a commitment to the SCPM that must specifically describe how each condition will be met and executed. During that term, the notifying party must write up the commitment and send it to the SCPM for its review. Nonetheless, approval by the SCPM must be given within a maximum term of 90 days from the date of issuance of the resolution. There must be a time period for implementing and complying with each condition.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To date, the SCPM has not had a case in which all the parties in an economic concentration operation were foreign companies without any assets in Ecuador. The economic concentration of foreign companies with subsidiaries or assets in Ecuador have, in certain cases, been subject to conditions.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

To date, the SCPM has not had an economic concentration case where it had to analyse ancillary restrictions.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In its analysis, the Superintendency for Market Power Control (SCPM) reviews the information provided by the notifying party with regard to its competitors and providers, as well as the supply and demand structure in the market in question. Furthermore, when analysing an economic concentration, the SCPM will repeatedly require information from the competitors of the economic operators involved. The clients or competitors with a legitimate interest are entitled to file a special review appeal against the economic concentration resolution issued by the SCPM.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

With the economic concentration notified to the SCPM, the notifying economic operator will then have to submit a confidentiality request concerning all the information furnished or that part thereof that it deems pertinent. The SCPM keeps confidential the sensitive information with which it is furnished, and only the parties involved in the process have access to the information not declared by the SCPM as confidential. The SCPM publishes on a webpage an extract of the resolutions available to the public in general. The resolutions do not contain information that the SCPM has declared confidential, which is the sensitive information of economic operators.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Presently, the SCPM has cooperation agreements signed with the anti-trust authorities of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Honduras, Italy, Mexico, Paraguay, Russia, Spain, Tunisia and Uruguay. The SCPM frequently holds meetings with sister authorities to exchange opinions and benefit from the experience of other countries in antitrust matters. The SCPM may sign agreements with sister authorities to share information that could be of benefit to both parties.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Organic Law for Market Power Control offers three appeal remedies at the administrative level:

- reconsideration motion filed with the First-Instance Resolution Committee;
- appeal review filed with the Superintendency for Market Power Control (SCPM); and
- special appeal review filed with the SCPM.

Resolutions may also be appealed at the judicial level before the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction.

All remedies, whether at the administrative or judicial level, bear devolutive but not suspensive effects.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Reconsideration motions and review appeals must be filed within 20 working days of the date the resolution is served. Special review appeals may be filed within three years of the date the resolution becomes final. This means when a resolution had not been the subject of an appeal, the parties were served notice thereof within 20 days thereafter.

The term for filing a subjective appeal at the judicial level before the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction is 90 days from the date the resolution is notified, while the period for filing an objective or nullity appeal at the judicial level before the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction is three years from the time the resolution comes into effect.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In view of the time the Organic Law for Market Power Control (the Antitrust Law) has been in effect and the Superintendency for Market Power Control (SCPM) has been in operation, we may conclude that the majority of economic concentration notifications in Ecuador have been approved by the authority; however, some have been denied, while others were the subject of significant structural or behavioural conditions.

Considering that the SCPM has been operating a little under 10 years, the economic concentration system in Ecuador faces many challenges, particularly with regard to educating economic operators about the rules governing this area of the law and the prior concentration notification processes. In this regard, the SCPM has focused on training and has also published a technical guide for analysing economic concentration operations. The guide is a public document containing a clear explanation about how concentrations are examined, the thresholds for notification, a definition of relevant market, turnover calculations, offences and sanctions, among other things.

The treatment given to foreign-to-foreign mergers is the same as that of a local merger.

Especially in terms of concentration indexes, the SCPM has ongoing analyses being performed in the following economic sectors: food, biotechnology, clothing, footwear, energy, pharmaceutical, metal mechanic, transportation, construction, forest timber products, environmental services, technology, automobile and petrochemical.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

In 2016, the Antitrust Law was amended by eliminating the possibility of the SCPM ordering the sale of a stock percentage in companies involved in a concentration operation to their workers as part of a structural condition. One concern about the Antitrust Law is the eight-day term that starts to run from the agreement execution date, as required by the Law, to notify the concentration as it is usually too short. There is also some ambiguity regarding the Spanish term *conclusión del acuerdo*, translated herein as 'agreement execution'.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year****36** | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

There have been no material changes in the law. The same principles still apply. However a fast-track procedure for mergers may be applicable on certain cases.

The main case regarding mergers and acquisitions was *AmBev/Sab Miller*. Although the transaction closed several years ago, effects remain from the conditional approval.

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# Egypt

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The overarching competition regulation is promulgated by virtue of Law No. 3 of 2005 (the Competition Law). The Competition Law has since been amended on three occasions: in 2008, 2010 and 2014.

The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) is entrusted with the task of overseeing the implementation of the Competition Law and is, therefore, considered as the primary designated regulator of competition in Egypt. Although the ECA administratively follows the Ministry of Trade and Industry, it is actually managed by a board of directors constituted by the Minister, which includes representatives of various ministries, independent experts and representatives of trade unions and industry associations.

An amendment to the Competition Law was issued, in July 2014, that grants the ECA more autonomy by allowing its board of directors to initiate criminal procedures without the previous prerequisite approval of the Minister of Trade and Industry.

The Competition Law is not the only competition-related regulation in Egypt, nor is the ECA the only regulator. Sectors such as telecommunications and banking are also regulated by other regulators that work in close coordination with the ECA to ensure application of the principles of the Competition Law, albeit in wide and general terms, and the banking and telecommunications regulations. Yet, despite the overlapping jurisdiction of the various regulators in respect of competition matters, the merger notification regime instated by article 19 of the Competition Law remains applicable to all sectors under the sole jurisdiction of the ECA.

For telecommunications, the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) applies articles 4 and 24 of Telecommunications Law No. 10 of 2003 to regulate competition and to ensure economic freedom in the sector. The NTRA controls mergers indirectly through reviewing the licence requirements of any given operator. Although there are no particular provisions in the Telecommunications Law regarding merger control, the NTRA usually assesses and evaluates any merger on the basis of its possible impact on competition. In the absence of specific penalties, the NTRA may simply block any merger by revoking or threatening to revoke the merging entities' licences.

In the banking sector, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) exerts more power in managing competition in the sector and explicitly approving or disapproving transactions over shares in banks and financial institutions operating under the Banking Law umbrella. Basing itself on article 12 of the Banking Law No. 101 of 2004, the CBE has the right to review all applications to own more than a 10 per cent stake in a bank or any other percentage that would enable the acquirer to exert control over the management and the decision-making within said bank. The CBE retains all discretion to evaluate the application technically, financially and from a competition impact point of view.

According to article 12, applications to own more than 10 per cent (or any controlling stake) must be presented to the CBE along with a long list of required documents (strategic plans, financial statements of the acquirer, credentials in the banking business, etc) 60 days prior to the date on which the acquisition is planned to take place. Historically, the CBE has demonstrated a high level of selectivity by imposing strict qualitative requirements before approving any merger or acquisition in the banking sector.

Finally, public utilities are excluded from the scope of application of the Competition Law either automatically by law, if they are managed by a public sector entity, or by explicit request if they are managed by private sector companies. If a private sector company runs a public utility, it should file an application with the ECA requesting its exclusion from the application of the Competition Law, and the ECA may grant this exclusion on the grounds of public interest alone.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

According to article 19 of the Competition Law, introduced by Law No. 190 of 2008 as an amendment to Law No. 3 of 2005, each party – with an annual turnover of more than 100 million Egyptian pounds generated in Egypt – that acquires assets, proprietary rights, usufruct or shares, or sets up a union, a merger, an amalgamation or a joint management transaction, must notify the ECA within 30 days after its date of completion. The scope and extent of applicability of the merger notification requirement is quite vast and may include a very wide range of transactions undertaken or contemplated by medium-sized and large businesses.

Although the notification is simple and not disruptive to business, it remains a mandatory endeavour that requires a certain level of disclosure on a probably recurrent basis for active companies on the Egyptian market. No approval from the ECA is currently required, but this may change in the future.

Although the text of the Competition Law itself suggests extraterritoriality, the ECA initially published its notification guidelines, explicitly excluding foreign-to-foreign transactions from the scope of notification even if those transactions have an impact on the Egyptian market; however, the notification guidelines were modified in June 2018 to impose notification on foreign transactions if either party generates a turnover in Egypt in excess of 100 million Egyptian pounds. These guidelines took effect on 1 September 2018.

Despite the currently applicable post-merger notification framework instated by the Competition Law, the ECA issued, on 23 October 2018, a first-of-its-kind decision in which the ECA explicitly requested Uber and its regional competitor Careem to obtain a pre-approval from it before they complete their contemplated merger, which the ECA learnt about through media reports. In an unexpected turn of events, the ECA threatened to use the provisions of article 6 related to collusions and cartels to go after the two ride-hailing giants if they go through with the

notification without the approval of the ECA. The ECA approach is yet to be tested in court and may be ultimately deemed an overstepping of authority based on wrongful interpretation of the law.

### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

According to article 19 of the Competition Law, introduced by Law No. 190 of 2008 as an amendment to Law No. 3 of 2005, each party – with an annual turnover of more than 100 million Egyptian pounds generated in Egypt – that acquires assets, proprietary rights, usufruct or shares, or sets up a union, a merger, an amalgamation or a joint management transaction, must notify the ECA within 30 days after its date of completion. The scope and extent of applicability of the merger notification requirement is quite vast and may include a very wide range of transactions undertaken or contemplated by medium-sized and large businesses.

### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

From a competition protection perspective, only the Banking Law specifies a threshold of an acquired stake above which the approval of the regulator is required. There are, however, in Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992, provisions that oblige the acquirer of a stake exceeding 33 per cent of any listed company to launch a mandatory tender offer to acquire up to 100 per cent of the shares of the company. The requirement is intended for transparency purposes and to provide minority shareholders with an equal opportunity to cash in on their investments at the same level of economic benefit available to majority shareholders.

The Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) regulates the tender offer process and must grant its approval before the process is launched. The tender offer approval requirements are listed in article 334 et seq of the Capital Market Law (as regularly amended), and the full application must be presented to the FRA, which must examine and approve, reject or modify the application within set time limits.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The threshold for the required notification of the merger is the size of the annual cumulative turnover of parties involved generated in Egypt. According to article 19 of the Competition Law, when the annual turnover of the acquirer or merging entity exceeds 100 million Egyptian pounds, the notification becomes mandatory, and failure to make the notification is a criminal offence that is punishable by a fine ranging between 20,000 and 500,000 Egyptian pounds, which can be doubled for a repeated offence. The threshold for notification is 100 million Egyptian pounds in combined turnover generated in Egypt.

Theoretically, there are no circumstances where a notification would be due if the quantitative threshold is not met; however, the recent *Uber/Careem* decision may suggest that notification may be conceptually required if the two parties to the merger are the sole actors in a given market, regardless of the currently generated turnover.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Notification is mandatory by law. It should be served within 30 days of completion. In principle, no approval from the ECA is to be sought; however, the recent ECA approach, following the *Uber/Careem* decision, suggests that the ECA will force itself into having a say about certain high-profile transactions.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Based on the principle of extraterritoriality of the Competition Law, foreign-to-foreign transactions are theoretically supposed to fall within the scope of application of article 19 of the Competition Law if they are considered to have an impact on the Egyptian market.

The wording of the Competition Law itself is quite far-reaching and general in respect of the notification requirement. It does not state that the annual turnover that triggers the notification requirement must be generated in Egypt; it also does not state otherwise. However, the ECA's latest guidelines explicitly include foreign-to-foreign transactions in the scope of notification. According to the guidelines, the threshold for notification is the turnover generated in Egypt alone.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The acquisition of public-owned assets or shares in public sector companies by foreign investors (privatisation) is subject to the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers and is usually granted after a thorough set of procedures. The acquisition of state-owned assets is generally subject to the Public Tendering Law and may not be authorised through a direct order without a duly publicised bidding process, unless in cases where public interest so requires.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Transactions must be notified within 30 days of closing. The notification is merely informative in principle, and no clearance or approval would be a priori sought or granted. The sanction for failing to notify is a criminal penalty that ranges between 20,000 and 500,000 Egyptian pounds.

In practice, the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) actively seeks to enforce the provisions of article 19 and has brought many entities to admit breach and settle out of court against a fine that the ECA deems appropriate.

The amount of the settlement fine usually being considered negligible (ie, almost one per thousand of the minimum turnover threshold on average, based on ECA statistics published on its website) means that all those accused in recent years have opted to settle out of court with the ECA. The alternative route would be litigious and involves being investigated by the Public Prosecutor and eventually being referred to the Criminal Economic Court, with all the associated reputational damage, costs and expenses.

Having said that, we note that the ECA has, in the *Uber/Careem* decision, requested that the merger must be approved before closing. The application will be reviewed by the ECA, and a response would be given within 60 days from the date on which all the supporting documents requested from the ECA are provided. The ECA emphasised in the above-mentioned decision that its request to review and pre-approve the *Uber/Careem* merger is based on the fact that those two are the only actors in the relevant market and that their agreement to merge is a form of disguised collusion (penalised by a fine that does not exceed 500 million Egyptian pounds). The ECA based its decision on article 20(2) of Law No. 3 of 2005 (the Competition Law), which allows the ECA to proactively anticipate and prevent all acts or transactions that it reasonably suspects would have harmful effects on consumers and on competition itself.



## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The acquirer of assets or shares and the merging entity of a merger process are required to make the notification. In case of joint management or joint venture, any of the parties to the transaction, especially those with an annual turnover exceeding 100 million Egyptian pounds, are obliged to make the filing.

In the latter case, they may opt to undertake the process jointly or each on their own.

No filing fees are required, but lawyers' services may be needed to follow up with the ECA and to make sure that the notification process has been duly completed to the satisfaction of the ECA after fulfilling all mandatory requirements and providing all requested information and documents. Partial or incomplete notification may not avert the risk of prosecution.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The notification obligation is post-closing; therefore, there is no suspending effect on the transaction itself. However, if the ECA gets its way, certain transactions would have to wait for 60 days before being cleared by it. Practically speaking, the ECA has gone after one case so far: *Uber/Careem*. The ECA decision provided the sole grounds based on which Uber and Careem knew they had to obtain a clearance from the ECA or face prosecution for illicit collusion.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Not applicable. When approvals of special regulators are required, such as the approval of the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority or the Central Bank of Egypt, the parties attempting to execute the transaction before obtaining those approvals would be blocked at the share transfer level, which must be undertaken through the stock exchange even if the concerned target is not publicly listed.

If in the unlikely scenario where a transaction takes place without due approval, the regulators always retain the right to cancel operational licences in the case of an unauthorised change of control (for banks, the threshold is 10 per cent).

In the *Uber/Careem* case, failing to notify and file for the ECA clearance prior to closing would expose the two undertakings to a criminal fine that can reach up to 500 million Egyptian pounds, to be doubled for ignoring the ECA decision requesting them explicitly to obtain the clearance.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The obligation to notify is a post-closing obligation. In the case where the notification is explicitly requested to be made before closing, penalties would apply irrespective of whether the transaction has a local component or is merely foreign-to-foreign.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Not applicable a priori. However, if the ECA requests a pre-notification, there would be technically no solution but to either challenge the ECA decision in court or file for its approval. According to media sources, Uber and Careem may have decided to follow the latter route.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Other than the requirements stipulated under the Capital Market Law, which are intended to guarantee transparency and equal opportunity for both bidders and sellers, the standard notification requirements apply as far as the ECA is concerned. The approval of the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) before the launching of the tender offer is mandatory, and no public takeover bid may be launched without the terms of takeovers and all necessary disclosure being approved by the FRA and published as part of the invitation to sell shares to the offering buyer.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

According to article 44 of the Executive Regulations of Law No. 3 for 2005, the notification must include the following information:

- the name of the notifying party and the related parties, their respective nationalities, the addresses of their headquarters and their main places of business;
- the details of the transaction along with its date and the legal position it creates;
- the licences and approvals obtained from other regulators;
- the annual turnover of the concerned entities; and
- all supporting documents.

Failure to supply the required documents would be deemed as failure to meet the obligation to notify and is punishable by a fine not exceeding 500,000 Egyptian pounds. If false information is intentionally provided to the ECA, the fine can reach 1 million Egyptian pounds.

### Investigation phases and timetable

## 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

If it comes to the knowledge of the ECA, either independently or through a third party's complaint, or through its constant monitoring of the M&A market, that a transaction has occurred but not notified in accordance with the Competition Law or is contemplated in a manner to cause harm to consumers or competition, it would notify the concerned parties that they are being investigated for breach of article 19 of the Competition Law, or in the latter case, it would issue a preventive decision forcing the parties to the contemplated transaction to file for ECA approval prior to closing. The ECA would then initiate a criminal procedure against the infringing party, and the file would be sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office, which would confirm the infringement and would refer the matter to the competent court. In practice, all those accused so far have opted to settle the matter out of court with the ECA against payment of a fine to be determined by the latter.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

There is no time limit in the law itself, but the notification process typically takes up to one week between the date the notification is filed and the date on which the ECA confirms receipt of the notification if no further documents or information are required.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Not applicable in general, but when explicitly required via a decision of the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA), the merger must not cause harm to consumers nor to competition.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Not applicable.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Not applicable in general, but it may be applicable under the new ECA approach on selective transactions.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The industrial policy, public interest, national security, economic efficiencies, user or consumer interest and the protection of minority shareholders are all factors considered when clearance and pre-approval are needed in specific sectors, such as telecommunications and banking. Other than in those cases, those factors are not of consequence from a strict competition law perspective as the approval and the clearance of the ECA is neither required nor granted.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The industrial policy, public interest, national security, economic efficiencies, user or consumer interest and the protection of minority shareholders are all factors considered when clearance and pre-approval are needed in specific sectors, such as telecommunications and banking. Other than in those cases, those factors are not of consequence from a strict competition law perspective as the approval and the clearance of the ECA is neither required nor granted.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Not applicable, except in certain fields of industry. The National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) and the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) may block the execution of the transaction in the cases where their written authorisation is required to proceed with the execution.

To our knowledge, all banking and most telecommunication licences contain provisions that would require the approval of the CBE and the NTRA respectively. Having said that, the new approach of the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) suggests that the ECA will try to give itself the power to block certain transactions if it deems that those transactions are harmful to the consumer and to the competition and the labour market in general, as alluded to in one of the ECA's press statements. The law does not explicitly grant the ECA such power, but this would have to be confirmed through court once the ECA approach is challenged in court.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Not applicable in general, but the ECA may conceptually request certain remedies to allow certain transactions to go through. There is no precedent to confirm or deny this.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Not applicable in general and no precedent exists.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Not applicable. In specialist fields of industry, foreign-to-foreign transactions rarely come to the attention of the regulators as the laws regulating those fields are strictly territorial by essence. However, if the regulators (including, recently, the ECA) conclude that a foreign-to-foreign transaction would fundamentally hurt competition or affect the strategic ownership and management of the locally based entities subject to its jurisdiction, the ECA would go after the foreign entities for colluding on the Egyptian market, but no action would be directly taken against the foreign entity by the other regulators, although the operating licences of the local entities would be revoked or suspended for reasons related to transparency, public interest or national security, for example.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Not applicable in general, and there is no precedent to support the ECA's new perception and approach.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Not applicable in general, but the new approach of the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) in the *Uber/Careem* case invited all stakeholders to express their feelings and concerns about the contemplated merger and gave them until April 2019 to present their feedback.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Commercially sensitive information is not usually required for the purpose of the notification. Generally, the ECA seems to be reasonable in addressing the notifying parties' concerns regarding sensitive commercial information. Furthermore, according to article 16 of Law No. 3 of 2005, the ECA and all its employees are bound with a strict confidentiality obligation. Any ECA employee that has access to commercial information of a given entity is also prohibited from working for a competitor of the concerned party for a period of two years from the date the employee gained access to the confidential information. The breach of the confidentiality of information about the filing party is a criminal offence.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Generally, yes. To the author's knowledge there are a few protocols of cooperation that have been signed with various regulators in other jurisdictions, the details of which have not been publicised or made publicly available. Egypt is also party to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) treaty, and the COMESA notification theoretically supersedes and replaces the local Egyptian notification. In practice, the ECA would still require local notification, but because, unlike the COMESA notification, the ECA notification is a priori post-closing, the ECA would require sight of the COMESA clearance as part of the required local filing documentation.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Because the sanctions are not administrative in nature and may only be imposed through a criminal court order, the means of appeal are those generally available for defendants in criminal law cases. The deadline for filing an appeal of a first-degree court ruling is 10 days from the date of issuance of the ruling.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

There is no specific time frame, but in criminal law matters, procedures are fairly expeditious. Between the first-instance court and final appeal, the usual time frame is around 12 to 16 months.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) is actively seeking to enforce article 19 on all sectors of industry (telecommunications, healthcare, building materials, transport, etc). A published list of investigated cases and their outcomes are listed in the ECA activity report published on its website. The ECA has also issued a first-of-its-kind decision to force Uber and Careem to obtain ECA clearance prior to merging. Uber and Careem seem to be complying with the ECA decision, although they had the alternative of challenging the ECA decision in court because the ECA are trying to create a new notification framework without appropriate legislative cover.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The ECA has been lobbying for years to instate a legislatively supported pre-closing merger control regime, and this may come to fruition shortly.



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## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The most important update is the decision by the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) that ordered Uber and Careem to get their contemplated merger approved by the ECA prior to closing despite the fact that the law only provides for a post-merger notification.

The ECA approach basically relies on two elements: (1) the power granted to the ECA to proactively prevent any act or transaction that it reasonably suspects will have an adverse impact on consumers or on competition (article 20 of Law No. 3 of 2005); and (2) its interpretation that the agreement to merger is a disguised agreement to collude on a given market to dominate it and thwart competition.

Practically speaking, parties contemplating a merger are supposed to follow the normal post-notification process as required by law, but they will have to consider whether to obtain the approval of the ECA before closing if and once the ECA issues a decision explicitly requiring them to do so.

In the only case on record so far, the ECA issued a decision to force Uber and Careem to file for pre-approval on the basis of the high-profile nature of the transaction and the fact that Uber and Careem are the only competitors in the ride-hailing market. Uber and Careem have so far been reported to comply with the ECA decision and to file for their pre-approval, therefore creating a precedent in this respect. We are not sure whether Uber and Careem will challenge the ECA refusal to grant their merger the requested clearance and whether similar high-profile cases would follow on the ECA agenda.

# European Union

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The EU merger control rules, which apply to large-scale M&A transactions, are set out in Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EUMR). The regime applies to the European Economic Area (EEA; that is, the 27 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden) together with the three members of EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). Moreover, although the United Kingdom left the European Union on 31 January 2020, the EUMR will continue to apply in full in the UK during the Brexit transition period, which is currently due to end on 31 December 2020.

The EUMR is enforced by the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission (DG Comp or the Commission) in Brussels.

EUMR notifications are reviewed by sector-specific units within DG Comp, which have integrated merger control competence. In addition to the sector-specific merger units, the Commission's internal decision-making process involves a number of other stakeholders: the chief economist team and the case support and policy unit (within DG Comp), and the Legal Service and the sectoral directorates general (eg, Transport and Energy) (outside DG Comp). The Commission also uses 'peer review panels' in Phase II cases to test the validity of the case team's arguments. The panels consist of a team of lawyers and economists from DG Comp, who are independent from the original case team. In addition, two hearing officers, who are independent of DG Comp and report directly to the competition commissioner, organise and conduct oral hearings in Phase II cases and act as an independent arbitrator where a dispute on the effective exercise of procedural rights between parties and DG Comp arises.

The Commission has published a series of notices and guidelines to assist in the interpretation of a number of key issues under the EUMR. These include notices on jurisdictional and procedural issues (including the Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice (2008), the Notice on the Simplified Procedure (2013) and the Notice on Case Referrals (2005)); guidelines on issues of substance (including the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers (2004) and the Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-horizontal Mergers (2008)); as well as the Remedies Notice (2008) and the Notice on Ancillary Restraints (2005). In addition, the Commission has published a number of 'Best Practices', including the Best Practices on the Conduct of Merger Proceedings (2004) and the Best Practices for the Submission of Economic Evidence (2011). These and other notices are important reading in all potential transactions. They are available on the Commission's website.

The EUMR is based on the 'one-stop-shop' principle, whereby once a transaction has triggered notification to the Commission, the

national authorities of the member states are precluded from applying their own competition laws to the transaction (except in the circumstances in which transactions may be investigated). In addition, the ability of national authorities to apply other non-competition laws is circumscribed. However, member states have tested the ambit of these principles (eg, Spain in *E.ON/Endesa*, Italy in *Abertis/Autostrade* and Poland in *Unicredito/HVB*).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

A concentration is defined in the EUMR as a merger of two or more previously independent undertakings (or parts of undertakings) or the acquisition of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of another undertaking, which brings about a durable change in the structure of the undertakings concerned. The EUMR applies to concentrations that have a 'Union dimension' (ie, meet certain turnover thresholds).

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Provided that the applicable turnover thresholds are met, the creation and change of control over 'full-function' joint ventures are caught by the EUMR. A 'full-function' joint venture is an autonomous economic entity resulting in a permanent structural market change, regardless of any resulting coordination of the competitive behaviour of the parents.

Non-full-function joint ventures, such as strategic alliances and cooperative joint ventures (eg, production joint ventures), are not governed by the EUMR but by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) rules on restrictive practices, notably article 101 TFEU, which prohibits agreements between undertakings that may affect trade between member states and that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. According to Regulation 1/2003, article 101 TFEU can be enforced by the Commission or by national competition authorities. However, non-full-function joint ventures can trigger merger control in a number of member states (eg, Germany, the United Kingdom and, in some circumstances, Austria) by the acquisition of a minority interest (see individual country chapters).

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Control means the possibility of exercising 'decisive influence' over an undertaking on the basis of rights, contracts or other means. When outright legal control is not acquired (eg, through the acquisition of shares with the majority of the voting rights), the Commission will consider whether the acquirer can still exercise legal or de facto control over the undertaking through special rights attaching to shares or contained in shareholder agreements, board representation, ownership and use of assets and related commercial issues.

There is no precise shareholding or other test for decisive influence and each case is decided on its facts. For example, in *News Corp/Premiere* (2008), the Commission found that, based on the historic pattern of attendance at annual general meetings, the acquisition by News Corp of a 24.2 per cent shareholding was sufficient to confer on it a de facto majority of the voting rights, resulting in a notifiable concentration; by contrast, in *Ryanair/Aer Lingus* (2007), a holding of over 25 per cent was deemed not to amount to either de jure or de facto control. The definition of control was considered by the General Court, upheld by the Court of Justice of the European Union, C-84/13 P, when it confirmed the Commission's decision to fine Electrabel for closing a transaction prior to notification and clearance (*Electrabel/Compagnie Nationale du Rhône*). The court agreed with the Commission that Electrabel had obtained de facto control of the target in 2003, three years prior to notification, and said that the relevant question was the ability of Electrabel, at that time, to impose its decisions on the target. The shareholding structure was the key factor in support of this conclusion: Electrabel held 49.95 per cent of the target's shares, had a voting agreement in place with the next largest shareholder (with 22 per cent) and the remaining shares and voting rights were widely dispersed among almost 200 entities with a poor track record of participation at general meetings.

The General Court has also considered the extent to which minority shareholdings come within the scope of the EUMR. Following *Aer Lingus'* appeal against the Commission's decision not to order Ryanair to divest its minority shareholding in the wake of its 2007 prohibition decision, the court confirmed that the EUMR does not empower the Commission to deal with minority shareholdings, where these do not lead to an acquisition of control under article 3(2) EUMR.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The purpose of the EUMR is to review those concentrations that have a 'Union dimension', the criteria being designed to ensure that only large-scale acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures are caught. Thus, a concentration will be caught by the EUMR where:

- the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the parties exceeds €5 billion; and
- the aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of at least two parties exceeds €250 million; unless
- each of the parties achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Union-wide turnover in one and the same member state.

In an attempt to reduce the need for businesses to make multiple applications for clearance at the national level within the European Union, the EUMR also applies to smaller concentrations that have an impact in at least three member states. These concentrations are caught by the EUMR where:

- the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the parties exceeds €2.5 billion;
- the aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of at least two parties exceeds €100 million;
- in each of at least three member states, the aggregate turnover of all the parties exceeds €100 million; and
- in each of at least three member states mentioned immediately above, the turnover of each of at least two parties exceeds €25 million; unless
- each of the parties achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Union-wide turnover in one and the same member state.

Turnover is deemed to be the amount derived from the sale of products or the provision of services (excluding turnover taxes) in the preceding financial year. The turnover of the whole group to which the relevant undertaking belongs is taken into account according to detailed tests set out in the EUMR. The calculation can be complex and may involve certain adjustments being made to the turnover figure in the latest audited accounts, for example, to account for certain recent disposals or acquisitions.

In an acquisition, the turnover of the vendor is irrelevant except for that of the business being acquired. In the case of joint ventures, the whole turnover of the parents (and their groups) intending to share joint control of the venture is taken into account. In addition, there are rules for the calculation of turnover in specific sectors, in particular for banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, as well as principles based on case experience for the geographic allocation of turnover in particular sectors such as airlines, telecommunications and financial services.

The EUMR establishes a system of referrals to ensure that a concentration is examined by the authority best placed to conduct the assessment (in line with the principle of subsidiarity). Under articles 4(4) and 9 of the EUMR, in certain cases, the national competition authority or the merging parties can request that a transaction that meets the EUMR thresholds is reviewed – in whole or in part – by the national competition authority. By the same token, under articles 4(5) and 22 of the EUMR, provided that certain conditions are met, the merging parties or one or more member states may request the Commission to review a merger that does not meet the EUMR thresholds (eg, *Dolby/Doremy/Highlands* (2014), *Facebook/WhatsApp* (2014), *SCJ/Sara Lee* (2010)). Despite the existence of these referral mechanisms, the Commission has reported that a significant number of cases are still subject to review in three or more member states.

In April 2019, the Commission published a report 'Competition policy for the digital area' written by three special advisers to the Commission. It discusses how competition policy should evolve to tackle the challenges posed by the digital economy and specifically mentions the possibility of introducing an additional transaction value-based threshold to catch certain transactions in the digital economy. The Report rejects the immediate introduction of such a threshold in the EUMR, and advises the Commission instead to wait and assess the experience gathered in Austria and Germany with their respective transaction value tests and to evaluate the workability of the current referral system between member states and the Commission.

### 6 Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory for concentrations with a Union dimension. There are no exceptions and the EUMR empowers the Commission to fine undertakings that fail to notify. In certain circumstances, however, parties may request that a transaction that meets the EUMR thresholds be referred wholly or partly to a member state.

### 7 Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The EUMR applies to all concentrations that have a Union dimension. Because the turnover thresholds are based on geographic turnover and not on the location or registered office of the parties, even foreign-to-foreign transactions essentially involving non-EU groups are caught if the financial thresholds are met.



## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The EUMR applies to all transactions that meet the relevant turnover thresholds. There are no sector-specific rules. Foreign direct investment is governed at the member state level. However, pursuant to a new EU framework regulation for the screening of foreign direct investments, the European Commission will have, as from October 2020, the power to issue an opinion when an investment poses a threat to the security or public policy of more than one member state.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no specific deadline for making a filing under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EUMR). According to article 4 of the EUMR, proposed concentrations (with a Union dimension) 'shall be notified to the European Commission (the Commission) prior to their implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest'. A notification may also be made where the undertakings concerned demonstrate to the Commission a good faith intention to conclude an agreement, or in the case of a public bid, where they have publicly announced an intention to make such a bid.

However, the proposed concentration must be notified and cleared prior to implementation (this is known as the 'suspensory effect' of the EUMR). The EUMR provides the Commission with powers to impose fines of up to 10 per cent of aggregate worldwide turnover on the parties if they intentionally or negligently fail to notify a merger with a Union dimension. In 2014, the Commission imposed a fine of €20 million on Marine Harvest for acquiring de facto sole control of Morpol prior to formal notification. This decision was upheld by the General Court (T-704/14) in 2017; an appeal before the court is currently pending. Similarly, in 2018, the Commission imposed a fine of €125 million on Altice for implementing the acquisition of PT Portugal before obtaining the Commission's clearance, and in some instances prior to the notification of the transaction (*Altice/PT Portugal*).

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In the case of either the acquisition of joint control or of a merger that creates a new undertaking, the notification must be jointly submitted by the parties to the merger or by the undertakings acquiring joint control. In the case of acquisition of sole control, the acquirer alone must notify. No filing fees are required.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Notification under the EUMR has a suspensory effect, meaning that a transaction that is subject to notification may not be implemented until clearance is obtained. Public takeover bids, however, are not subject to the full suspension obligation. The Commission can and will investigate any mergers that have closed without prior notification, and could order the unwinding of any notifiable merger that has been implemented prior to clearance. The Commission has shown its willingness to prevent 'gun jumping' in the form of early implementation between the merging parties. The EUMR empowers the Commission to conduct inspections (ie, 'dawn raids') if it suspects that the parties have implemented the

transaction prior to clearance. The Commission carried out dawn raids at the premises of merging parties suspected of gun jumping in the *Ineos/Kerling* case in 2008 and in the *Caterpillar/MWM* case in 2011 (these acquisitions were ultimately cleared without conditions, and no finding of gun jumping was reached).

In exceptional circumstances, the Commission may grant a derogation from this suspension obligation if it is satisfied that the detriment to the notifying parties or to a third party resulting from the suspension exceeds the threats to competition posed by the transaction. According to the Commission, an applicant must demonstrate that the standstill obligation poses a real threat to the business, not merely a hypothetical one (eg, *SCJ/Sara Lee* (2011)). The Commission has recognised that undue delay could potentially be fatal to a proposed emergency rescue package and has granted derogations on a limited number of occasions – mostly during the global economic downturn in 2008 and 2009.

#### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The Commission may impose fines on companies (of up to 10 per cent of aggregate worldwide turnover) for closing a transaction before clearance has been obtained, irrespective of whether clearance is ultimately obtained. The Commission may also order interim measures to restore or maintain conditions of effective competition.

The General Court has confirmed that the fact that a concentration has no adverse effect on competition and is ultimately cleared by the Commission is pertinent only insofar as it may be a relevant factor in determining the amount of the fine to be imposed (see *Electrabel/Compagnie Nationale du Rhône*). Similarly, the court also took the view that a finding that an infringement was committed negligently, rather than intentionally, does not prevent a characterisation of that infringement as grave or serious.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Commission has the same powers to impose sanctions in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers as in mergers of domestic (EEA/EFTA) companies. To date there are no examples of such sanctions having been applied in foreign-to-foreign mergers, but most companies take care not to breach the notification obligations in such cases.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers cannot be implemented outside the EU without breaching the EUMR suspension obligation, unless the Commission grants a derogation. At a late stage in the investigation, the Commission may be prepared to grant a derogation to allow closure of a transaction if the competition issues have been resolved. However, these situations are rare, and parties must usually await clearance before closing. It is not permissible under EU merger control rules to close a transaction globally while suspending implementation of closing in the European Union (ie, by way of a carve-out).



## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The EUMR does not prevent the implementation of a public bid that has been notified to the Commission, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments and on the basis of a derogation granted by the Commission. These derogations are difficult to obtain and do not apply where a controlling stake is acquired by the purchaser through the acquisition of a single package of shares from one seller only (*Yara/Kemira Growhow* (2007)). In 2008, the Commission exceptionally granted such a derogation in the context of a Phase II investigation (*STX/Aker Yards* (2008)).

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Notification is made to the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission using a Form CO. The parties are required to provide the Commission with detailed information regarding the transaction, the undertakings involved (corporate details and structure), the definition of the relevant markets, the effect of the merger on the affected markets (including information on competitors and customers and economic evidence in more complex cases) and possible efficiencies arising from the transaction. The parties must submit one original of the Form CO, three hard copies and two copies on CD or DVD-ROM together with supporting documentation. This includes the transaction documents, audited accounts and relevant internal documents such as board presentations and the parties' ordinary course analyses, reports and strategic plans relating to any potentially affected market. The filing must be complete for the review clock to start running. Notification can be made in any of the EU official languages.

Although the Commission can grant waivers from the obligation to provide information (a process that has been formalised and clarified) the significant amount of detail and senior management time required to complete a Form CO should not be underestimated. In complex cases, it is not uncommon for the review process to last seven to eight months; this is in addition to the time it takes to complete 'pre-notification' discussions, which are not subject to any statutory time limits. The Commission has implemented changes as part of a 'merger simplification project' with the aim of streamlining the notification process and reducing the administrative burden on notifying parties.

Mergers that qualify for assessment under the simplified procedure (broadly, when the merger is unlikely to raise competition concerns, according to prescribed criteria set out in the notice on the simplified procedure) are notified through the submission of a Short Form CO, which requires less detailed information from the parties. Recent amendments to the notice on simplified procedure and the Short Form CO have extended the categories of merger cases suitable for the simplified procedure. The Commission may, however, require the submission of a full Form CO where it appears either that the conditions for using the Short Form CO are not met, or, exceptionally, where they are met but the Commission nonetheless determines that a full Form CO notification is required for an adequate investigation of possible competition concerns.

The Commission can impose a fine of up to 1 per cent of aggregate worldwide turnover if incorrect or misleading information is supplied during its review. Periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 per cent of average daily turnover can also be imposed for each day that the infringement persists. For these purposes, the EUMR empowers the

Commission to conduct inspections (ie, dawn raids) if it suspects that the parties have provided incorrect or misleading information. The Commission has recently been active in penalising procedural infringements, imposing sizable fines in *Facebook/Whatsapp* (2017) and in *General Electric/LM Wind* (2019).

The Commission's Best Practice Guidelines 2004 and the Notice on the Simplified Procedure summarise key aspects of the notification procedure, in particular the desirability (and usually the necessity) of pre-notification contacts with the Commission.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Most (if not all) proceedings begin with pre-notification contacts with the Commission. These contacts are not strictly mandatory, but are nonetheless highly advisable and, in practice, essential, even for simplified procedure cases. Depending on the complexity of the transaction, this pre-notification stage may involve the submission of a finalised draft Form CO or a briefing memorandum for the Commission's consideration and possibly attending a meeting with Commission officials. The Best Practice Guidelines also provide that the Commission may undertake informal fact-finding exercises in the pre-notification period, so long as the transaction is in the public domain and the merging parties have had the opportunity to express their views on such measures.

Following the formal notification, the Commission will initiate a Phase I review. In this context, the Commission will contact relevant third parties such as customers, suppliers and competitors to collect their views on the transaction and may require them to complete detailed questionnaires on the relevant markets. During the course of the investigation, the Commission will often demand further information at short notice. Calls and meetings are also frequently held with the case team. As explained in the Best Practice Guidelines, 'state-of-play meetings' may be held with the parties at various key stages of the investigation and the Commission may also instigate tripartite or 'triangular meetings' with the merging parties and interested third parties to allow points of concern to be discussed. In complex merger cases, the Commission commonly issues extensive and tailored document requests. Following the Phase I investigation, the Commission may decide to clear the merger unconditionally, to clear the merger subject to conditions and obligations offered by the parties, or to initiate an in-depth investigation if it considers that the transaction raises 'serious doubts' as to whether it may give rise to a significant impediment to effective competition (Phase II).

For the notifying parties, a Phase II inquiry will involve responding to many requests for information and may lead to a statement of objections. If a statement of objections is issued, the parties will be granted access to the Commission's file and with the agreement of the parties an oral hearing will take place (often involving complainants). The oral hearing is organised and conducted by one of the two hearing officers. Following the Phase II investigation, the Commission may decide to clear the merger unconditionally, to clear the merger subject to conditions and obligations or to prohibit the merger.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The Commission must reach a Phase I decision within 25 working days of the effective date of notification. This period may be increased to 35 working days if the Commission receives a referral request from a member state or the parties submit commitments (remedies) to resolve competition issues. The review period under the simplified procedure is also 25 working days.

Should the Commission initiate a Phase II investigation, the decision must be taken within 90 working days of the date on which the proceedings were initiated (ie, from the beginning of Phase II). This period may be extended to 105 working days if the parties offer commitments after the 55th day of Phase II proceedings. Further, the investigation period may be extended if the parties request a one-off extension of the investigation period (they must do so within 15 working days of initiation of Phase II proceedings) or if the Commission decides to extend the Phase II investigation period with the consent of the parties. In both cases, the cumulative extension cannot exceed 20 working days.

These time periods may be suspended (thereby 'stopping the clock') if, for circumstances imputable to one of the undertakings involved, the Commission has to issue a decision to request information or to order an inspection.

Pre-notification discussions with the Commission are a standard part of all merger review processes (including simplified cases) and can be expected to take a minimum of two weeks. This period can be considerably extended even for relatively straightforward cases.

There is no formal means of accelerating the review under the EUMR. However, the Commission has showed some flexibility in certain cases, notably by issuing 'accelerated' clearance decisions during the financial crisis even in cases that raised significant competition concerns and required remedies (eg, *BNP Paribas/Fortis* (2008)).

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EUMR) prohibits concentrations that significantly impede effective competition in the EEA, or a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Full-function joint ventures are appraised under the same test. In its appraisal, the European Commission (the Commission) must (formally) take into account substantiated claims of efficiencies brought about by the merger and evidence that one of the merging parties (or the acquired undertaking) is a 'failing firm' (also referred to as a 'rescue merger'). In practice, such 'defences' play a limited role in merger review and, up until now, the Commission has never cleared an otherwise problematic merger only on the basis of efficiencies claimed by the parties for all markets where competition concerns were found and has accepted the failing firm defence only in very few cases.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

In addition to examining whether the joint venture will significantly impede effective competition, the Commission will also assess under article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) whether it is the object or effect of the transaction to coordinate the competitive behaviour of two or more parents to the joint venture. Such coordination can occur where two or more parents retain activities in candidate markets; namely, activities either in the same market, or on an upstream, downstream or closely related neighbouring market to that of the joint venture. The significance of this 'spill over' effect is assessed and can be cleared with the merger – if justified – under the criteria set out in article 101(3) TFEU. Full details of overlapping activities of the parents in candidate markets must be given in the notification.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

In accordance with the guidance set out in the Commission's guidelines on horizontal mergers and non-horizontal mergers, the Commission will consider, in its assessment, whether the merger will have unilateral or coordinated anticompetitive effects.

Anticompetitive unilateral effects may occur when the merger removes relevant competitive constraints over the merging firms to the extent that it contributes to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position (eg, *London Stock Exchange/Deutsche Börse* (2017), *Pfizer/Hospira* (2015), *Ryanair/Aer Lingus III* (2013) and *Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext* (2012)) or to the weakening of competitive pressure in an oligopolistic market (eg, *Orange/Jazztel* (2015), *UPS/TNT Express* (2013) (Commission decision overturned by General Court on appeal, T-194/13), *Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria* (2012), *EDF/Segebel* (2009) and *T-Mobile Austria/Tele Ring* (2006)). The Commission assesses the parties' ability and incentives to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and services, but also to diminish innovation. Potential loss of innovation as a result of the merger is increasingly investigated by the Commission (eg, *Dow/Dupont, J&J/Actelion* (both 2017) and *Bayer/Monsanto* (2018)). In 2020, the General Court (*CK Telecoms UK Investments Ltd v European Commission*) ruled on the standard of proof applicable to the Commission when establishing a significant impediment to effective competition under article 2(3) EUMR when a merger does not lead to a dominant position or coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets (ie, so-called 'gap cases'). The General Court's judgment requires that the Commission must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate with 'a strong probability' the existence of a significant impediment to effective competition in these circumstances.

In non-horizontal mergers, the main concern of the Commission with regard to unilateral effects lies in the ability and incentive of the merging firms to engage in input or customer foreclosure, owing to vertical links (*BASF/Cognis* (2010), *TLP/Ermewa* (2010), *RWE/Essent* (2009), *TomTom/Tele Atlas, Google/DoubleClick* (both in 2008)) or to portfolio effects (*Qualcomm/NXP* (2018), *Essilor/Luxottica* (2018), *Microsoft/LinkedIn* (2016), *Intel/McAfee* (2011)).

Coordinated effects may arise when the merger alters the competitive conditions prevailing on the market, allowing competitors to coordinate their behaviour (eg, *Celanese/Blackstone/JV* (2017), *AB InBev/SAB Miller* (2016), *ABF/GBI Business* (2008), *Sony/BMG* (2007 and 2004), *Johnson & Johnson/Guidant* (2005)).

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Under the EUMR, the Commission can only prohibit a concentration that significantly impedes effective competition in the European Union, or a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. When applying the test, the Commission looks only at competition-related criteria, and economic efficiencies are also relevant. In certain cases, however, member states may have limited jurisdiction to intervene to protect their non-competition legitimate interests. In Phase II cases, the full College of Commissioners, rather than just the commissioner for competition, is involved in the final decision, and they may consider issues other than pure antitrust in forming their views. The competition portfolio (under Commissioner Vestager) is part of project teams concerning digital, energy, jobs, growth, investment and competitiveness. The Commissioner must, therefore, cooperate with colleagues with responsibilities for these other portfolios.

In the context of the global economic downturn after 2008, the Commission was required to consider how the grant of state aid (ie, support from government) might affect the substantive analysis in merger control proceedings (eg, in relation to the financial strength and future market positions of the parties). However, in most cases (eg, *BNP Paribas/Fortis*, *Santander/Bradford & Bingley Assets* (both in 2008)) the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission concluded that the state measures in question did not affect its competition analysis, as such aid was the subject of a separate assessment under the state aid rules.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Commission, in its Horizontal Guidelines, has stated that it will consider substantiated efficiency claims in its overall assessment of the merger. According to the Horizontal Guidelines, the Commission will only take into account efficiencies that are of direct benefit to consumers, merger-specific, substantial, timely and verifiable, thereby counteracting the adverse effects of the merger. Efficiency considerations are highly unlikely to be taken into account where the merger results in the creation of a monopoly or a quasi-monopoly. In practice, this means that significant evidence will need to be adduced by the parties to satisfy the requisite criteria. The Form CO includes a section specifically dealing with efficiencies, although it is not obligatory for parties to complete this section.

The Commission has accepted the parties' efficiencies claims in a very few cases (eg, *FedEx/TNT* (2016), *UPS/TNT Express* (2013), *Microsoft/Yahoo!*, *Search Business* (2010) and *TomTom/Tele Atlas* (2008)) but it has never cleared an otherwise problematic merger purely on the basis of efficiencies claimed by the parties.

Indeed, the Commission has routinely rejected parties' claims for merger efficiencies in the past on the basis that the burden of proof is on the parties in respect of efficiency claims. However, in 2020, the General Court (*CK Telecoms UK Investments Ltd v European Commission*) held that the Commission should take into account 'standard efficiencies' when conducting an economic analysis of the likely price effects of a merger.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The European Commission (the Commission) is empowered to prohibit a concentration that will significantly impede effective competition in the European Union, or a substantial part of it. Since the entry into force of the first EU merger control regime in 1990, the Commission has blocked 30 mergers (as of 1 May 2020). Even though the Commission recently blocked several mergers (*London Stock Exchange/Deutsche Börse* (2017), *HeidelbergCement/Schwenk/Cemex Hungary/Cemex Croatia* (2017), *Siemens/Alstom* (2019), *Wieland/Aurubis Rolled Products/Schwermetall* (2019) and *Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp* (2019)), prohibition decisions are expected to remain relatively rare. This statistic does not, however, take into account transactions that were abandoned by notifying parties as a result of initial objections raised by the Commission either during 'pre-notification' discussions or during the course of a formal notification.

If the parties implement a notifiable merger before clearance has been obtained or after a prohibition decision has been issued, the companies concerned may not only incur fines but may also be ordered to dissolve the merger in its entirety. The Commission may also impose interim measures or take any other action that it considers appropriate to restore conditions of effective competition.

The Commission may revoke its clearance decision (whether granted in Phase I or II) if it subsequently transpires that the decision was based on incorrect information, or where there has been a breach of an obligation attached to the decision. In such a case, the Commission may also order the dissolution of the merger.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

During the course of a Commission investigation, the parties can offer undertakings to the Commission to remedy competition issues identified by the latter. Proposed remedies will need to be submitted in a Form RM, introduced by the Remedies Notice (2008). Remedies have regularly been accepted to avoid prohibiting a transaction, or indeed a Phase II referral. The Commission has a strong preference for structural rather than behavioural undertakings, but in its Remedies Notice (2008) and Best Practice Guidelines for Divestiture Commitments (2013), states that it will also accept behavioural undertakings in limited circumstances.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The most basic condition applicable to a divestment or other remedy is that it must be capable of restoring effective competition in a timely fashion, while being simple enough to allow the Commission to determine this with sufficient certainty.

The Commission has a clear preference for structural remedies, in particular divestments, as it believes that the most effective way of restoring competition will be either to create new competitive entry or strengthen existing competitors through divestments. According to the Commission's Best Practice Guidelines for Divestiture Commitments, divested activities must constitute a viable business able to compete over the long term on a stand-alone basis. In this regard, the Commission will consider a broad range of divestiture remedies and where appropriate alternative structural remedies to facilitate market access, such as the granting of licences. In *T-Mobile/Orange* (2010), in addition to a divestment remedy, the parties concluded a revised network sharing agreement with a competitor to secure its position as a competitive force on the market. In *Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria* (2012), in addition to a divestment remedy, Hutchison committed to provide wholesale access to up to 30 per cent of its network to 16 mobile virtual network operators for a period of 10 years. Divestments can only be made to a suitable purchaser, approved by the Commission, and the sale must be completed within a specified time limit (usually six months). If the parties do not find an acceptable purchaser within the disposal deadline, a 'divestiture trustee' will handle the disposal of the business at no minimum price. Any divestment remedy must be accompanied by a proposal to safeguard the business in the interim and the parties will need to propose a monitoring trustee to oversee compliance with the preservation measures.

A principal concern of the Commission is the practical efficacy of the remedies proposed by the parties and, in particular, the need to ensure the long-term viability of the 'remedy-taker' or divestment purchaser. When there are doubts about the viability of the business to be divested, an 'upfront purchaser' may be required. The Commission may also require a 'fix-it-first' remedy, meaning that the parties must identify a purchaser for the divestment business and enter into a binding agreement with that purchaser during the Commission's merger control review. The viability of the business to be divested was an important part of the Commission's assessment in the cases of *GE/Alstom* (2015), *Chemchina/Syngenta* (2016), *London Stock Exchange/Deutsche Börse* and *HeidelbergCement/Schwenk/Cemex Hungary/Cemex Croatia* (both 2017).

The Commission may also accept other non-divestment structural remedies such as the severing of links with competitors or important players in a supply chain. For example, the Commission intervened in *Glencore/Xstrata* (2012) because of concerns that the merged entity would have the ability and incentive to raise prices of zinc metal. To remedy concerns, Glencore committed to severing links with Nyrstar (the largest European zinc metal producer). This included, inter alia, the termination of an exclusive long-term offtake agreement and committing not to buy zinc metal quantities from Nyrstar for 10 years.

In certain (but more limited) circumstances, behavioural remedies can be accepted, such as in *Microsoft/LinkedIn* (2016), which was granted conditional clearance in Phase I on the basis of the parties' commitments to allow PC OEMs using Windows not to install the LinkedIn application and to ensure interoperability and provide access to all necessary information to LinkedIn's competitors. Similarly, in *ASL/Arianespace* (2016) the Commission was satisfied with behavioural commitments that included the implementation of information firewalls and restrictions to employee mobility between the merging parties. In other cases (eg, *Universal Music Group/EMI Music* (2012)) the Commission has accepted behavioural remedies as part of a package including other divestment and structural commitments.

Alternatively, primary and secondary remedies can be offered in circumstances where the preferred primary remedy may be difficult to implement owing to external factors. The second alternative remedy must be equal to or better than the first remedy, and will typically involve divestiture of the parties' 'crown jewels'. This twofold structure has been used in a number of cases including *Pfizer/Wyeth* (2009), *Teva/Ratiopharm* (2010) and *Swissport/Servisair* (2013).

Under the Remedies Notice, the Commission has discretion to review the need for commitments when the parties are able to establish that a 'significant change in market circumstances' has occurred. This review is of particular relevance for non-divestment type remedies (see, for instance, *Newscorp/Telepiu* (2010) and *Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim* (2011)). Typically, such commitments will include a review clause and the Commission has been willing to accept detailed review clauses specifying certain criteria of particular relevance for the future assessment of the need for the commitments (see, for instance, *T-Mobile/Orange* (2010) and *SNCF/LCR/Eurostar* (2010)).

The Commission will accept undertakings both in Phase I and Phase II. In Phase I, the commitments must be submitted to the Commission within 20 working days from the date of receipt of the notification (and in practice in draft form earlier). The notifying parties can also in some circumstances withdraw their notification and resubmit it following appropriate changes to the original concentration in an attempt to avoid the need for second-stage proceedings. In Phase II, undertakings must be submitted to the Commission at the latest within 65 working days of initiation of the Phase II investigation.

The court has shown a willingness to accept deviations from the strict procedural rules, particularly in relation to timing in cases of 'late remedies' (Case T-87/05 *EDP v Commission* (2005), and Case T-212/03 *MyTravel* (2008)).

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Commission can require the same type of remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers as in domestic EU mergers. When analysing remedies, the Commission may liaise with other competition authorities that are examining the same merger on the basis of confidentiality waivers by the parties. For example, in *UTC/Goodrich* (2012), the Commission cooperated with the US and Canadian authorities on remedies and in *Panasonic/Sanyo* (2009) the Commission cooperated with the Japanese and US authorities including as to the identity of a suitable purchaser

for divested assets. Other examples of EU-US cooperation include *Johnson & Johnson/Guidant* (2005), *Inco/Falconbridge* (2006), *Agilent/Varian* (2010), *Intel/McAfee* (2011) and *Thermo Fisher Scientific/Life Technologies* (2013).

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The treatment of ancillary restraints (such as non-compete obligations or transitional supply agreements) is set out in Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EUMR) and the Commission's notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations, published in March 2005 (the Ancillary Restraints Notice). The EUMR provides that any Commission decision approving a merger will automatically cover restrictions that are directly related and necessary to the implementation of the merger. The Commission is obliged to assess the restrictions only if the parties so request and the issues raised are novel and give rise to genuine uncertainty. Consequently, merging parties will usually need to assess for themselves, by reference to the Ancillary Restraints Notice, whether or not their restrictions are permissible.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Third parties can play a significant role in EUMR proceedings. The European Commission (the Commission) publishes a summary of all notifications in the Official Journal of the European Union. This provides a preliminary opportunity for third parties to express their opinions on the likely impact of the transaction. In publishing the notice, the Commission is obliged to consider the parties' legitimate interests in relation to the protection of business secrets.

More importantly, the Commission also sends out detailed questionnaires to third parties (usually to customers, suppliers, competitors and trade associations) seeking their views on the transaction. This is done by means of a web-based eQuestionnaire, which provides respondents with a secure web-based workspace to submit their replies to the Commission. Third parties who show a sufficient interest (including worker representatives) may also apply to be heard by the Commission, by giving oral or written evidence. They may further be given a non-confidential copy of the statement of objections in Phase II proceedings, enabling them to submit comments to the Commission on its preliminary assessment. Active complainants will often attend the oral hearing with the notifying parties.

Third parties can also appeal a Commission clearance decision to the General Court if they can show sufficient interest. Examples include Impala's appeal against the Commission clearance decision of *Sony/BMG*, Editions Odile Jacob's appeal in relation to the *Lagardère/Vivendi Universal Publishing* (2004) merger against the Commission's clearance decision (rejected by the General Court T-279/04, which was confirmed by the CJEU C-551/10) and the Commission's approval of Wendel as the purchaser of certain divestment assets (upheld by the General Court T-452/04 and confirmed by the CJEU C-553/10) and Cisco Systems' appeal against the Commission clearance decision of *Microsoft/Skype* (rejected by the General Court T-79/12). Another example is KPN's successful appeal of the Phase II clearance decision *Liberty Global/Ziggo* (2015) (T-394/15). Third parties will usually need to have played an active role in the Commission's proceedings to have standing to appeal. The General Court rejected an application by Canonical, an open-source software developer, to intervene in support of the Commission in the proceedings brought by Monty Program against the *Oracle/Sun*



*Microsystems* clearance decision. In 2011, the General Court clarified that consumer associations enjoy a right to be heard during the administrative proceedings provided that they lodge a written application to be heard by the Commission during the administrative proceedings (*Association belge des consommateurs test-achats/European Commission*, T-224/10).

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Upon receipt of a notification, the Commission publishes a non-confidential notice of the fact of notification in the Official Journal inviting third-party comments. The parties to the transaction provide a draft of this notice as part of the Form CO (section 1.2 of the Form CO). The Commission also issues a press release following the adoption of its decision at the end of every Phase I and Phase II examination (and upon referring a case to a Phase II investigation). A non-confidential copy of the final decision is made available on the Commission's website, after the Commission and the parties have agreed on which information qualifies as business secrets and, therefore, should be redacted. In addition, final decisions issued following a Phase II examination are published in the Official Journal (with business secrets redacted). In the case of a short-form decision for simplified procedure cases, the Commission will publish a notice of the fact of the decision in the Official Journal.

Dedicated antitrust press follow cases very closely and report on developments and speculation on a daily basis.

The confidentiality of business secrets is protected under article 339 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and under article 17 of the EUMR (see also articles 18 and 19, and recital 42). These provisions require the Commission (and the member states, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA states, their officials and other servants) not to disclose information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy that they have acquired through the application of the EUMR.

If a party believes that its interests would be harmed if any of the information supplied were to be published or otherwise divulged to other parties, this information should be submitted separately with each page clearly marked 'business secrets'.

Parties should also give reasons why this information should not be divulged or published. In the case of mergers or joint acquisitions, or in other cases where the notification is completed by more than one of the parties, business secrets may be submitted under separate cover, and referred to in the notification as an annex. All such annexes must be included in the submission in order for a notification to be considered complete.

The Commission has published 'Guidance on the preparation of public versions of Commission decisions under the Merger Regulation' as well as 'Best practices on the disclosure of information in data rooms' (both 2015).

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

#### Cooperation with national competition authorities in the European Union

The member states' national competition authorities (NCAs) have the opportunity throughout the Commission's investigation to express their views on the concentration. Within three days of receipt of a notification, copies are sent to the NCAs for their comments. The NCAs have a particularly active role to play in Phase II decisions as part of an advisory committee that opines on the Commission's draft decision and any commitments before its final adoption. This opinion is published.

In addition, despite the one-stop-shop principle, a member state may have limited jurisdiction to intervene to protect its noncompetition legitimate interests, such as public security, plurality of the media and the prudential supervision of financial institutions (see article 21 EUMR), and in certain defence-related matters (see article 346 TFEU). The list of legitimate interests in article 21 EUMR is not exhaustive and a member state can claim additional legitimate interests in consultation with the Commission, though the Commission has attempted to limit a wider application. This provision has received scrutiny recently.

The national competition authorities also cooperate with the Commission in the context of the referral system foreseen in the EUMR.

For other instances where a transaction does not qualify for review by the Commission but does require merger clearance at the national level in several member states, the Commission published Best Practices on Cooperation between EU National Competition Authorities in Merger Review (2011) with a view to improving cooperation between the European NCAs, streamlining the approval process across the different jurisdictions and avoiding conflicting outcomes, in particular by facilitating information sharing between the national authorities.

#### Cooperation with the United States

The Commission routinely seeks to cooperate with the US antitrust authorities that are also reviewing a proposed transaction. Cooperation is based on the 1991 US-European Community Agreement on the Application of Competition Laws (as amended), under which the Commission is required to keep the US antitrust authorities informed of mergers involving US interests, and vice versa, and also on the US-EU Best Practice Guidelines on Bilateral Cooperation published in October 2011, which aim to enhance coordination on the timing of reviews, collection and evaluation of evidence and communication between the reviewing agencies. In view of this cooperation, and in particular the exchange of information between the EU and US authorities, parties to transatlantic mergers should carefully coordinate their merger clearance procedures and, to the extent possible, ensure that any remedies offered will not produce inconsistent results in the United States and European Union. Examples of high-profile cases in which the EU and US agencies have closely cooperated include *Intel/McAfee* (2011), *Medtronic/Covidien* (2014), *NXP/Freescale* (2015), *Wabtec/Faiveley* (2016), *Smiths/Morphy* (2017), *Dow/Dupont* (2017) and *Bayer/Monsanto* (2018).

#### Cooperation with Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland

Several other cooperation agreements with third countries exist. The EC-Canada cooperation agreement was signed in June 1999 and contains similar provisions to the US agreement. An agreement with Japan on cooperation and anticompetitive activities entered into force in August 2003 (currently under review by the EU and Japan), with the aim of facilitating bilateral cooperation in major merger and acquisition cases. Close cooperation with the Japanese Fair Trade Commission proved successful in the *Sanyo/Panasonic* case (2009), which was granted a Phase I clearance subject to conditions. For several years, the EU and China have been increasing their cooperation on competition policy (agreement on the terms of reference of a bilateral competition policy dialogue from May 2004; memorandum of understanding on cooperation from September 2012; best practices cooperation framework from October 2015). In April 2019, the EU and China agreed, on a memorandum of understanding on dialogue in the area of the state aid control regime and the fair competition review system, and on the terms of reference of the EU-China competition policy dialogue. The European Union has also entered into a bilateral competition cooperation agreement with South Korea, and into a memorandum of understanding with the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and the heads of the Brazilian Competition Authorities to ensure closer cooperation. In

March 2011, the European Union and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the area of competition policy, legislation and enforcement. The European Union has been working in close technical cooperation with the Competition Commission of India. On 1 December 2014, a cooperation agreement entered into force between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation.

In addition, the Commission actively participates in the International Competition Network's working group on multi-jurisdictional merger control, which was established in 2001 with the aim of promoting best practices and international cooperation.

The Commission played a key role in the adoption in 2015 of the ICN Merger Working Group Practical Guide to International Enforcement Cooperation.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EUMR) provides for appeal to the General Court against Commission decisions on both procedural and substantive grounds. A further appeal can be made to the CJEU. An appeal can be made either by way of an expedited procedure (only suitable for cases where the appeal is based on limited grounds), or following the normal appeal procedure.

Both merging parties and third parties who show standing can lodge an appeal before the General Court to challenge Commission decisions. Member states can also appeal merger decisions.

The appeal process for substantive appeals is rigorous, with the General Court engaging in a detailed forensic analysis of the European Commission (the Commission)'s decision. The judgments have led to a clarification of the standard of review and the type of evidence that the Commission can rely upon. For example, in February 2005, in *Commission v Tetra Laval BV*, the CJEU confirmed that, even though the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, the General Court must establish whether the evidence relied upon by the Commission is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, whether that evidence contains all the information necessary to assess a complex situation and whether it is sufficiently capable of substantiating the Commission's conclusions.

In more recent cases, the General Court has put emphasis on procedural grounds and reinforced due process and transparency standards in merger control procedures. In *UPS v Commission* (2017), the General Court held that the Commission had infringed UPS's rights of defence when handling economic evidence and it annulled the Commission's decision. The General Court has also recently asserted the Commission's obligation to lay out a complete reasoning justifying its decisions in *KPN v Commission* (2017).

If the EU courts annul a merger decision, the parties need to re-notify their deal, as was the case in *Sony/BMG*, approved by the Commission in October 2007 after reassessment subsequent to the court's decision.

In addition to judicial review remedies, actions have been brought against the Commission for non-contractual liability arising from its decisions in the merger control area (article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The average time for the adjudication of a merger decision case before the General Court is about 30 months, although in some cases the process can take a number of years. When used, the expedited procedure

has shortened the waiting period to between seven and 18 months from the date of the Commission's decision. Consequently, for cases that are not expedited (and even some that are), the delay involved will usually represent a major factor against bringing an appeal.

Appeals to the CJEU of the General Court's findings generally take in excess of two years to be concluded.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The majority of mergers notified to the European Commission (the Commission) are cleared in Phase I without commitments. For example, in 2019, 343 cases were approved in Phase I (without commitments), 10 were cleared in Phase I (with commitments) and nine were decided upon in Phase II (six of them were cleared with commitments; three cases were prohibited). Further, the majority of Phase I clearances (283 out of 343) were subject to the simplified procedure. Although prohibition decisions are rare – there were none in 2018 and none in 2020 (as of 1 May 2020) – in 2019, there were three prohibition decisions. This is the highest annual figure since 2001, when the Commission prohibited five transactions.

The Commission analyses foreign-to-foreign mergers in the same way as EU-to-EU mergers. EU merger control applies equally to all industries and sectors.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are no pending changes to Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EUMR).

On 31 January 2020, the UK left the European Union. However, the EUMR (as well as other areas of EU law) continues to apply in full in the UK during the Brexit Transition Period, which is currently due to end on 31 December 2020. After this date, the EUMR 'one-stop-shop' principle will no longer apply to the UK and transactions can be reviewed by both the Commission and in the UK.

In March 2020, the Commission applied a number of measures in response to the covid-19 outbreak in the context of merger control. Relevant parties were encouraged to use electronic means to notify potential transactions. Further, the Commission announced that it would temporarily accept, and indeed encourage, submissions in digital format. This could be done by email to the functional mailbox of the merger registry, or electronically through eTrustEx. The delivery of paper originals could then be arranged at a later time.

On 3 April 2020, the Commission opened a public consultation on the review of the Commission's notice on the definition of the relevant market. The market definition notice dates from 1997 and provides guidance as to the Commission's application of the concept of relevant product and geographic market definition in its antitrust and merger control enforcement. With the public consultation, the Commission aims to gather evidence to assess whether the market definition notice is still up to date, taking into account the developments in the Commission's decisional practice and the courts' case law since the adoption of the notice.



## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

#### High-profile prohibitions

On 6 February 2019, the European Commission announced the prohibition of the proposed acquisition of Alstom by Siemens. On the same day, the European Commission (the Commission) announced the prohibition of Wieland's proposed acquisition of Aurubis Rolled Products and Aurubis' stake in Schwermetall. On 11 June 2019, the Commission announced the prohibition of the creation of a joint venture by Tata Steel and ThyssenKrupp.

The *Siemens/Alston* and the *Wieland/Aurubis* transactions would have led to the merging parties becoming global leaders in their individual industries. The prohibition of the *Siemens/Alston* deal proved particularly controversial and led to the German and French Economic and Finance Ministers voicing their dissatisfaction with the Commission's approach. France and Germany also unveiled a 'Common manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st century' to facilitate the creation of 'European champions'.

The *Tata Steel/ThyssenKrupp* prohibition came at a difficult time for the steel industry, in an era of cheap imports, high tariffs and geopolitical uncertainty.

The three high-profile prohibitions amounted to the highest number of annual prohibitions since 2001 and led to heightened debate about the competitiveness of European Industry, as well as further calls to amend Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 to allow for the development of 'European champions'.

#### Continued crackdown on 'big tech'

In 2019, the European Commission's focus on 'big tech' was underlined further with Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager being appointed for a second term, in an expanded role as Executive Vice President for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age. The combination of Vestager's competition brief with a specific digital role leads tech companies to expect greater antitrust scrutiny over the next five years.

The Commission has stated that it will continue to monitor whether new jurisdictional merger control thresholds should be introduced. This is particularly relevant for mergers in the tech sector, where acquisitions of smaller start-ups with low revenues may not reach the jurisdictional thresholds. Further, the EU's expert report on competition law for the digital era recommends that the Commission should revisit its theories of harm, with a view to addressing mergers concerning large incumbents acquiring fast-growing start-ups.

#### EU merger control in times of covid-19

Although the Commission, as well as other competition authorities, is making considerable efforts to ensure 'business as usual' during the covid-19 crisis, the pandemic is inevitably having a material impact on merger control reviews. From a procedural viewpoint, timelines have been affected with suspensions of ongoing reviews in certain cases. In some cases, the Commission asked parties to delay notifications that are not urgent.

In terms of the substantive analysis, although the covid-19 crisis has significantly impacted the economy and the Commission's way of working, there are no indications pointing to a shift in the substantive analysis of notified mergers. However, the dynamics at play in a certain market and the identity and strength of the remaining participants may be impacted by the effects of the covid-19 pandemic on the economy.

Whereas the long-term commercial repercussions of the covid-19 pandemic remain uncertain, an increase in distressed M&A activity



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as a result of the crisis can be expected in certain sectors. In cases where distressed companies seek to merge with a competitor to safeguard their long-term financial stability, they may invoke the failing firm defence if the deal would otherwise raise material competition concerns. However, learning from previous economic crises, and judging by the limited number of cases so far, it appears the covid-19 crisis is unlikely to make it materially easier for distressed firms to invoke the failing firm defence.

# Faroe Islands

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The main legislation on Faroese merger control is contained in the Faroese Competition Act (No. 35 of 3 May 2007, as amended on 27 April 2012). The Faroese Competition Act has been modelled on the Danish Competition Act, with the intention to also ensure conformity with competition law in the European Union and EEA. An English version of the Faroese Competition Act can be accessed on the Faroese Competition Authority's website.

The Faroese Competition Council is the principal enforcer of competition law in the Faroe Islands. It consists of a chairman and four members appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry. The Council must have comprehensive insight into public as well as private enterprise activity, including expertise in legal, economic, financial and consumer-related matters. The chairman and two members of the Council must be independent of commercial and consumer interests. In practice, however, the Competition Authority, which is the secretariat of the Competition Council, is in charge of the day-to-day administration of the Competition Act and prepares the decisions of the Council.

The decisions of the competition authorities are subject to appeal before the Competition Appeals Council, which is made up of four members appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry. The chairman and the vice chairman of the Appeals Council must be qualified lawyers.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The provisions on merger control apply to 'concentrations' where either:

- two or more previously independent undertakings merge (amalgamate); or
- one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings, acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, or by contract or any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a full-function joint venture (ie, a joint venture performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis) also constitutes a merger. Non-full-function joint ventures are not encompassed by the Faroese Competition Act. The distinction between full-function joint ventures and non-full-function joint ventures is made in accordance with EU competition law.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Control is constituted by rights, contracts or any other means that, either separately or jointly, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence over the operations of an undertaking. Minority shareholdings are caught if the possibility of exercising decisive influence over the operations of an undertaking is conferred upon a minority shareholder.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The merger control provisions apply to concentrations where the participating undertakings have a total turnover of 75 million kroner in the Faroe Islands and at least two participating undertakings have a turnover of at least 15 million kroner in the Faroe Islands, or at least one of the participating undertakings has a turnover of 75 million kroner in the Faroe Islands and at least one other of the participating undertakings has a turnover of 75 million kroner worldwide. The Competition Authority does not have the power to investigate transactions falling below the thresholds.

The Minister of Trade and Industry has issued Executive Order No. 9 of 11 March 2008 laying down detailed rules on the notion of a concentration and the calculation of turnover.

Official guidelines have been published in the Faroese language only.

The Competition Authority has not referred any cases below these thresholds to the European Commission.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing a merger notification is mandatory if the turnover thresholds are met. Clearly unproblematic mergers may be notified by short notice, the rules of which are laid down in accordance with EU competition law.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are caught, if at least one of the parties to the transaction is active in the Faroe Islands. Where no actual effects on the market can be shown, the merger can generally be notified – and approved – by short notice.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no special merger control rules relating to foreign investment. The fishing industry is subject to specific antitrust rules, which are stricter than the merger control regime under the Faroese Competition Act. Mergers that are permissible under the specific fishing industry rules are therefore generally also permissible under the Faroese Competition Act. Such mergers may be notified by short notice.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Concentrations falling within the threshold must be notified to the Competition Authority no later than one week after:

- the conclusion of the merger agreement;
- the merger is publicly notified; or
- the acquisition of control over the target company.

Fines may be imposed for implementation before clearance.

The Faroese and Danish languages are of equal status in the Faroe Islands. Filing can therefore be made in either language. It may also be possible on a case-by-case basis to make arrangements with the Faroese Competition Authority to file in other languages (such as English).

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In principle, all the parties involved in a concentration are responsible for filing. No filing fees apply.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The implementation of the transaction is suspended prior to clearance. The parties can ask for dispensation from this rule. The Competition Authority has the power to make dispensations conditional upon specific terms.

#### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Fines may be imposed for implementation before clearance. Where the Competition Council finds that the merger will significantly impede effective competition, the Competition Council has the power to annul the merger, and issue an order demanding the undertakings already merged to separate their businesses. Furthermore, the Competition Council is entitled to make approval of the merger subject to conditions.

There are no recent cases that illustrate the sanctions.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To date, no sanctions have been applied in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

So far, there has not been an opportunity to test under which circumstances a dispensation may be obtained.

#### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The Competition Act does not prevent the implementation of a public bid that has been notified to the Competition Authority.

#### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The level of detail depends on the filing form. For a merger that can be filed by short notice, the level of detail is less than when the merger must be filed by ordinary notice. The provisions on whether a merger can be filed by short or by ordinary notice are in Executive Order No. 2 of 17 May 2012, section 3.

With the permission of the Faroese Competition Authority, the participating undertakings can omit information from a notice. The competition authorities will then assess the short-form notification, and may require a full notification if the merger has an impact on the Faroese market.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

## 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Pre-notification consultations with the Competition Authority may and should take place. Very often these consultations can have a significant impact on the outcome and provide the undertakings concerned with the opportunity to address possible competition concerns in the notification – with the effect that the procedure is accelerated. To initiate this informal procedure, a briefing paper is often delivered to the Competition Authority.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Within 30 working days of the Faroese authorities' receipt of a complete filing submission, the Competition Council will notify the participating undertakings if further investigations are required, or alternatively whether the merger can be approved. If the authorities have not given this notification within the 30-day time limit, the authorities can no longer annul the merger. Merger notifications submitted by short notice are generally approved before the expiry of the 30-day period.

The Competition Council must make its final decision within 90 working days of the above-mentioned notification being sent to the participating undertakings. This deadline can be extended by up to 20 working days when commitments are proposed, and again by up to 20 working days with the parties' consent.

### SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

#### Substantive test

## 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Section 15 of the Faroese Competition Act applies the substantial impediment of effective competition (SIEC) test.

**20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?**

There is no special substantive test for full-function joint ventures.

**Theories of harm****21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?**

A concentration that will not significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, will be declared compatible with the Faroese Competition Act. The creation or strengthening of a dominant position alone is therefore not a sufficient reason to prohibit a concentration, nor is it a requirement to prohibit a concentration. In its substantive assessment, the Competition Authority also considers the likely impact of the concentration on third parties and the affected markets in general. In that respect, documented efficiency gains that will be passed on to the consumers can speak in favour of approving the concentration.

In connection with the Competition Authority's assessment of the market, it should be considered whether the market is open for potential international competition.

Due to the application of the SIEC test and the intention to ensure conformity with competition law in the European Union and EEA, the Faroese Competition Council relies heavily on the case law of the European Courts and the administrative practice of the European Commission.

**Non-competition issues****22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?**

The Competition Council is expected to apply the above substantive test without taking into account non-competition issues.

**Economic efficiencies****23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?**

There is no express efficiency defence. However, section 15 of the Competition Act provides that the SIEC test is applicable. Furthermore, the Faroese Competition Authority has stated that documented efficiency gains that are passed on to consumers can have an exempting effect on a concentration that otherwise would have been prohibited.

**REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS****Regulatory powers****24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?**

The transaction may be approved unconditionally, conditionally or prohibited.

**Remedies and conditions****25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?**

If the competition authorities assess that the concentration cannot be approved without conditions, the Competition Council may attach conditions to their approval of the concentration.

**26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?**

The Faroese Competition Authority has stated that an approval of a concentration can be made subject to certain conditions, including:

- divestments of companies or parts of companies;
- dissolving of cooperation with other companies on the market; and
- admission of third-party access to, for example, distribution systems, production systems or other systems of strategic importance for the participating undertakings.

**27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?**

No practice is available on this issue.

**Ancillary restrictions****28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?**

The merger control provisions in the Faroese Competition Act do not contain any regulation on ancillary restraints. However, the Faroese Competition Authority has confirmed that reasonable necessary ancillary restraints that do not have a harmful effect on competition can be accepted. The Faroese Competition Authority uses the rules laid down in Council Regulation No. 139/2004 and the Commission Notice No. 2008/C 95/01 as guidelines.

The Faroese Competition Authority has considered several cases where competition clauses have been modified. In one particular case, the Competition Council has confirmed that competition clauses should be limited to no more than two years where goodwill is the subject of the transfer, and no more than three years if both know-how and goodwill are included.

**INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES****Third-party involvement and rights****29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?**

The Faroese authorities have not promulgated any procedures on this issue. However, it is likely that customers and competitors will be heard in connection with the Competition Authority's review.

So far, the Competition Authority has only involved customers in the review process.

**Publicity and confidentiality****30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?**

The Faroese Competition Authority and the Council publish all decisions with the exception of sensitive information, business secrets and the like, which are redacted. The authorities can also allow the merging parties to exclude other information.

**Cross-border regulatory cooperation****31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?**

The Faroese Competition Authority maintains close cooperation with the competition authorities in the other Nordic countries, and according to the Faroese Competition Act, the Authority can also cooperate with

other jurisdictions, such as in relation to the exchange of information. Knowledge-sharing is common practice.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Generally, the Competition Council's decisions may be appealed to the Competition Appeals Council and its decisions may in turn be appealed to the ordinary courts.

There are currently no cases where this has occurred.

### Time frame

33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

To date, no merger decisions have been subject to judicial review.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2019, one merger was cleared. Four mergers were cleared in 2018. At this point in time, there does not seem to be a special focus on particular industries or sectors.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The Faroese Competition Act was amended as of 27 April 2012. There are no current proposals for any further changes.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

No updates at this time.

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# Finland

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation is the Competition Act (No. 948/2011) (the Competition Act), which entered into force on 1 November 2011 repealing the Act on Restrictions on Competition (No. 480/92). Provisions on merger control were first included in the now repealed Act on Restrictions on Competition on 1 October 1998. The Competition Act introduced a few substantive amendments to the merger control provisions, which further harmonise the Competition Act with EU rules.

The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) investigates a concentration in the first stage and either clears it, with or without conditions, or requests the Market Court to prohibit it. Only the Market Court is empowered to block concentrations.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Competition Act applies to concentrations defined as:

- the acquisition of control of an undertaking;
- the acquisition of the whole or part of the business of an undertaking;
- a merger; and
- the creation of a joint venture performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The establishment of a joint venture that performs all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis, that is, a full-function joint venture, will be caught by the Competition Act. A full-function joint venture must have sufficient resources, be independent of its parent companies, have its own staff, including operative management and operate on a permanent basis. The competition authorities interpret the concept of full-function joint venture in accordance with the guidelines set out by the European Commission.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

There is no definition of control in the Competition Act. In practice, the competition authorities interpret the concept of control in accordance with the European Commission's practice. Consequently, acquisitions of minority shareholdings and other interests less than control may establish joint or sole control, and therefore be caught by the merger control rules.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A concentration must be notified to the FCCA if the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the parties exceeds €350 million and the aggregate turnover in Finland (including, for example, imports into Finland) of each of at least two of the parties exceeds €20 million.

In the calculation of the relevant turnovers, the turnover of the whole buyer group will be taken into account, whereas of the seller's turnover only the amount relating to the target of the acquisition is relevant. The rules concerning the parties whose turnover will be taken into account as well as the manner of calculating the turnover correspond for the most part with the provisions of the EU Merger Regulation.

If the target company is acquired in stages, all the acquisitions from the same seller over a period of two years are taken into account in the turnover calculation.

In cases of uncertainty as to whether the turnover thresholds are exceeded or not, the matter can be discussed with the FCCA.

The FCCA cannot under any circumstances investigate transactions that fall below the turnover thresholds.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing is mandatory if the turnover thresholds are met, with no exceptions. However, concentrations meeting the thresholds set down in the EU Merger Regulation fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Commission.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign transactions will be caught if the turnover thresholds are met. The Competition Act does not contain any provisions on a particular local effects test. In practice, the FCCA applies a similar substantive test to foreign-to-foreign transactions as it applies to other transactions.

Joint ventures may have to be notified in Finland even if the joint venture does not have any operations in or sales into Finland. It is sufficient that the turnovers of the parent companies of the joint venture (which are the undertakings concerned) exceed the turnover thresholds.



## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

In certain insurance transactions, a notification to the FCCA is exempted if the Financial Supervisory Authority has requested a statement from the FCCA, and the FCCA has found no objections to the concentration. If such statement has not been requested, the concentration shall be notified to the FCCA after the parties have received an approval or a non-opposition decision from the Financial Supervisory Authority.

Foreign acquisitions of defence industry companies as well as companies in the civil sector considered critical to securing functions fundamental to society are subject to the Act on the Monitoring of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions in Finland (No. 172/2012). A foreign acquirer of a Finnish defence industry company must apply for an approval from the Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment prior to the acquisition. Foreign acquisitions of non-defence industry companies are only subject to notification. In the defence industry, monitoring covers all foreign acquirers and domestic corporate acquirers in which a foreign owner holds at least 10 per cent of votes or has a corresponding de facto influence. In the civil sector, monitoring applies only to foreign acquirers domiciled outside EU and EFTA states and corporate acquirers domiciled in such states, in which a non-EEA or non-EFTA owner has the shareholding or de facto influence referred to above. The Act applies to acquisitions of at least 10 per cent, at least 33 per cent or at least 50 per cent of votes in a limited liability company or a corresponding de facto influence. In addition, the authority handling the matter may require an application for approval or a notification to be submitted if the buyer subsequently increases its influence in the target company even if the increase does not exceed the above thresholds. There is an ongoing legislative process to amend the Act on the Monitoring of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions in Finland to meet the requirements of the EU Regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. In addition, needs for amendments due to national considerations that have arisen will also be assessed. The amendments are intended to enter into force on 11 October 2020 when the EU regulation starts to apply.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no specific deadline for filing a notification. Notification must be submitted to the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) following the conclusion of the acquisition agreement, the acquisition of control, or the announcement of the public bid but prior to the implementation of the concentration. A concentration may also be notified to the FCCA as soon as the parties demonstrate with sufficient certainty their intention to conclude a concentration, for example, by a letter of intent or a memorandum of understanding signed by all parties to the concentration or by a public announcement of the intention to make a public bid. As there is no specific deadline for filing, sanctions are only relevant when the concentration is implemented before the FCCA has cleared it.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The acquirer of control, or those acquiring joint control, the acquirer of business, the parties to the merger or the founders of a full-function joint venture are responsible for filing. There are no filing fees.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Under the main rule, no steps may be taken to implement the transaction prior to its clearance. However, when the Market Court is investigating a transaction on the basis of the FCCA's request to block it, the prohibition on the implementation ceases in one month from such request, unless the Market Court orders the suspension to continue.

The FCCA and the Market Court may, upon request, permit certain implementing measures to be taken during the investigation period. Further, a party that has launched a public bid can purchase the shares offered prior to clearance, even though it may not use its voting rights to determine the competitive behaviour of the target company. The same rule applies in certain cases where shares are redeemed.

#### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If the transaction is closed before clearance, a fine of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of the relevant undertakings may be imposed. The fine is imposed by the Market Court on the basis of the FCCA's request. When the amount of the fine is set, attention is paid to the nature, extent, degree of gravity and duration of the infringement. The fine will be imposed, unless the infringement is considered minor or the imposition of the fine is otherwise unnecessary in view of safeguarding competition.

Further, the Market Court may – at the request of the FCCA – prohibit the concentration or order the concentration to be dissolved or annulled, for example, by requiring the undertakings concerned or assets brought together to be separated or by requiring the cessation of the joint control to restore the conditions of effective competition. The Market Court may, instead of prohibiting the concentration, attach conditions on its clearance. The request of the FCCA must be notified to the parties within one year from the closing of the transaction.

There are no decisions so far where sanctions would have been imposed for closing before clearance.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The same rules apply to foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, there are no decisions so far where sanctions have been imposed for closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Implementation of a merger before clearance is, under the main rule, prohibited also in foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, under the Competition Act, the FCCA has the possibility to decide to grant permission to implement a merger before clearance.

#### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No. However, a party that has launched a public bid can purchase the shares offered prior to clearance, even though it may not use its voting rights to determine the competitive behaviour of the target company.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The notification form is broadly similar to Form CO of the EU Merger Regulation. Various types of information must be given – depending on the details of each case – inter alia, on the parties, the transaction structure, relevant markets, competitors, customers, suppliers, market conditions, entry barriers, trade associations and ancillary restraints. The notification form must be completed in Finnish or Swedish; appendices to the notification are generally also accepted in English. Standard appendices include corporate documents of the parties, the agreements bringing about the transaction being notified, certain internal analysis of the transaction itself, as well as the markets relevant to the assessment of the transaction. Generally, the FCCA has been less stringent on requiring internal documents to be produced (in comparison, for example, to the European Commission).

In certain circumstances, the notification may be filed with the FCCA using the 'short-form' notification. The short-form notification is mainly used in notifying joint ventures that do not have connections to the Finnish markets. Such a situation may be deemed to exist where the joint venture – or the jointly controlled undertaking, as the case may be – has no business activities in Finland and generates no turnover from Finland.

The FCCA may, in individual cases, grant waivers in respect of the information to be given if certain information is deemed unnecessary for the investigation or if the transaction affects competition only to an insignificant extent.

Supplying wrong or misleading information to the FCCA is sanctioned in the Criminal Act (39/1889).

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Under the main rule, the FCCA will, after it has received a notification, send a market inquiry to the competitors, customers and suppliers of the parties to the concentration. The aim of the procedure is to establish the structure of the market and the competition conditions therein, and to afford the relevant market players the possibility to be heard on the planned concentration.

Should the FCCA decide to initiate a second-phase investigation, more detailed questions may be sent to competitors, customers and suppliers. The statements as well as other issues pertinent to the case will be discussed with the parties.

Parties are generally advised to engage in pre-notification consultations with the FCCA in all cases and in cases where the horizontal overlap or vertical links between the parties' activities are considerable, it is recommended to approach the FCCA as early as possible, even prior to definitive signing of the transactional agreements, so as to ensure that the process starts as early as possible.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

In the first phase, the concentration will be examined by the FCCA. The FCCA's investigation deadlines were amended by an amendment of the Competition Act that entered into force on 17 June 2019. Under the new provisions, the FCCA has a period of 23 working days during which it has to clear the concentration as such or with conditions, conclude that the transaction will not be caught by the Competition Act or decide to initiate a second-phase investigation.

If the FCCA decides to initiate a second-phase investigation it must, within 69 working days of such decision, either clear the concentration as such or with conditions, or request the Market Court to block it. The Market Court can extend the deadline by 46 working days, giving the FCCA a maximum of 115 working days for a Phase II investigation. Having received the FCCA's request to block a concentration, the Market Court has three months to clear the concentration as is, clear it with conditions or prohibit it.

There is a pending proposal to temporarily extend the FCCA's Phase II investigation period by 23 working days to 92 working days owing to the covid-19 pandemic. The proposal is considered a matter of urgency and is intended to enter into force as soon as possible. If adopted, the extended deadline will apply to mergers notified to the FCCA between 2 July 2020 and 31 October 2020.

With the Market Court procedure included, the maximum aggregate investigation period of a concentration may amount to over nine months (which includes the possible 46-working-day extension of the FCCA's second-phase investigation period). However, this is expected only in cases where there is significant overlap between the parties' activities and the resulting market shares are high; under the main rule, most concentrations are cleared in the first phase. Depending on the complexity of the case, the FCCA's first phase investigations typically take approximately two to four weeks.

The time limits set for the FCCA's decision-making will not start running until a complete notification has been filed. In addition, the FCCA has the power to 'stop the clock' if the parties fail to respond to the FCCA's request for additional information within the set time limit or provide essentially insufficient or incorrect information. In such cases, the FCCA may extend the time limits for decision-making by the corresponding number of days during which the requested information was outstanding.

The merger review procedure in the FCCA may be speeded up by pre-notification discussions, to which the parties are generally encouraged by the FCCA. Also, it might be worth noticing that pre-notification discussions will in most cases de facto speed up the merger review, but they do not affect or change the time limits prescribed for the review.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A concentration may be prohibited if it significantly impedes effective competition in the Finnish market or a substantial part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position (SIEC test). The SIEC test, also applied by the European Commission, was introduced in the 2011 reform of the Competition Act and replaced the dominance test applied previously. However, finding of a dominant position remains as a typical example of a situation amounting to a significant impediment of effective competition. Under the Competition Act, an undertaking is considered dominant if it can significantly influence the price level, terms of delivery or other conditions of competition at a given level of production or distribution. In addition to dominance cases, the SIEC test is primarily intended to enable intervention in certain arrangements between competitors on markets that can be considered as oligopolistic, where, however, the market leader is not involved and no dominant position is created.

The substantive test may be countered with the failing, or 'flailing', firm defence. In the recent *Kesko/Lähikauppa* case, the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) allowed the acquisition of Lähikauppa by one of the major retail grocery chains Kesko even though the market shares of the combined entity in some of the relevant regional markets was nearly 100 per cent.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No. The competition authorities will apply the SIEC test as with respect to other concentrations.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The 'theories of harm' based on which the FCCA assesses the notified transactions and the increase in market power include the horizontal effects as well as the vertical and conglomerate effects of the transaction. When assessing whether the concentration may significantly impede effective competition based on these effects, the FCCA takes into account, for example, the market shares of the parties, the economic and financial strength of the concentration, the amount and nature of residual competition, the bargaining power of customers and suppliers, potential competition, barriers to entry and saturation of the markets.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues are not relevant in the FCCA's review process.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

In the review process, the authorities will take into consideration the increase in production efficiency and dynamic efficiency resulting from the concentration that appear in the Finnish market, provided that the efficiency gains are passed on to customers and may only be achieved through the concentration. The weight given to economic efficiency considerations depends, inter alia, on the significance of the efficiencies and the likelihood of their achievement. In general, the principles established in the European Commission's Horizontal Merger Guidelines are also applicable in Finland.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) investigates a concentration and either clears it, with or without conditions, or requests the Market Court to prohibit it. If the impediment to competition may be avoided by attaching conditions to the implementation of the concentration, the FCCA shall primarily order such conditions to be followed. However, the FCCA can only impose conditions that the parties have approved. Thus, if the FCCA and the parties cannot agree on suitable conditions, the FCCA has to make a proposal to the Market Court to prohibit the concentration.

If the Market Court finds that the concentration would significantly impede effective competition in the Finnish market or a substantial part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, the Market Court may prohibit the concentration. If the transaction has already been implemented, the Market Court may order it to be dissolved, for example, by requiring the undertakings concerned or assets brought together to be separated or by requiring the cessation of joint control, to restore the conditions of effective competition. Further, the Market Court may, instead of prohibiting or

ordering the dissolution of the concentration, attach conditions for its clearance.

If the parties implement a transaction before clearance or without regard to a prohibition of the concentration or conditions imposed by the competition authorities, an administrative fine of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of the relevant undertakings may be imposed.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Both the FCCA and the Market Court may clear a concentration on the condition that certain undertakings are given by the parties to the concentration. In fact, under the Competition Act, the FCCA should always endeavour to impose conditions rather than request that the Market Court prohibits a concentration. Typically, competition concerns identified by the FCCA may be resolved by imposing conditions on the clearance. Thus far, the FCCA has proposed that a concentration be prohibited only four times, although several cases have entered the second-phase investigation and have been resolved by commitments given by the parties. The Market Court has prohibited only one of these four concentrations. The remaining three were approved subject to conditions. However, one of these concentrations was abandoned owing to the strict conditions imposed and one restructured and re-notified to the FCCA. Where conditions are imposed, the authorities usually prefer structural remedies, such as divestments, but behavioural undertakings have also been accepted.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The FCCA may impose conditions on the implementation of a concentration if the harmful effects on competition (the significant impediment of effective competition in the Finnish market or a substantial part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position) can thus be avoided. The FCCA may not require a remedy that does not strictly address and have an effect on the harmful effects that the Competition Act aims to avoid. The remedies may be structural or behavioural. The possibility of imposing conditions should be explored prior to prohibiting the concentration. The conditions imposed should not be more severe than necessary for the removal of the anticompetitive effects of the concentration. The FCCA can only impose conditions that the parties have approved.

The FCCA may decide that a condition (eg, divestment requirement) imposed on an involved party is to be fulfilled within a certain time period, for example, six months for a divestment. The FCCA supervises the implementation of the conditions in accordance with its decision to approve the concentration and may, for instance, nominate a trustee to monitor the implementation of the conditions and to report to the FCCA thereof.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Up to this point, there have been no foreign-to-foreign merger cases in which the FCCA would have required remedies.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

It is possible to request in the notification form that the FCCA also clears any restrictions ancillary to the notified concentration. Typically accepted ancillary restrictions are limited to non-compete obligations on the seller, supply or purchase agreements and licence agreements.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Under the main rule, competitors, customers and suppliers of the parties to the concentration will be heard in the investigation. However, the Supreme Administrative Court has held that competitors are normally not allowed to appeal against a decision to clear a concentration, as the right to complain requires that the decision may have had a direct effect on the complainant's rights, obligations or interests.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) lists the received notifications on its website (the names of the parties and the notification date). Otherwise, the FCCA is reluctant to comment publicly on pending merger control procedures. Confidential information is protected by clearly indicating the business secrets in all documents submitted to the FCCA.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Yes, the FCCA cooperates on a regular basis with other antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions. The FCCA is part of the European Competition Network (ECN), which is a cooperation forum of the European Commission and the national competition authorities of the member states. The operation of the ECN is based on Council Regulation No. 1/2003 and facilitates the exchange of information and case allocation between the participating authorities. While the work of the ECN does not directly relate to merger control, the members of the ECN engage in cooperation and exchange of best practices in the area of merger control in the context of the EU Merger Working Group. The FCCA is also a member of the European Competition Authorities (ECA). One of the main focuses of the ECA is the cooperation of national authorities in relation to multinational merger control processes. As regards the allocation of and information exchange between the national authorities and the European Commission in merger cases, please refer to the EU Merger Regulation. In addition to the European cooperation networks, the FCCA cooperates closely with competition authorities in other Nordic countries and, in 2017, joined the Cooperation in Competition Cases Agreement between Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The Nordic competition authorities meet annually and form special working groups to facilitate the cooperation. All in all, the FCCA participates in approximately 30 different international working groups relating to competition policy.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA)'s decision on whether it will initiate a second-phase investigation may not be appealed. Further, in the 2011 reform of the Competition Act, the right of the notifying party to appeal a decision whereby the FCCA has conditionally approved a transaction was removed.

As a general rule, other decisions of the FCCA made under the merger control rules may be appealed to the Market Court by such parties whose rights, obligations or interests the FCCA's decision has directly affected. Decisions of the Market Court may be further appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court.

Both the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court have confirmed that the FCCA's clearance decision does not normally have a direct effect on the rights, obligations or interests of the competitors of the undertakings concerned, and thereby the competitors do not generally have the right to appeal such decisions to the Market Court.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

When decisions of the FCCA are appealed to the Market Court, the Market Court does not have a time limit on its decision-making. However, when the FCCA proposes to the Market Court that a concentration be prohibited, the Competition Act sets a three-month time limit on the Market Court to rule on the case.

The Market Court ruled on one merger control case in 2019 approving the FCCA's request to prohibit the acquisition of Heinon Tukku Oy by Kesko Oyj. This was the first time a concentration has been prohibited by the Market Court. The decision was delivered in three months owing to the time limit set in the Competition Act for such decisions.

In other types of cases, the handling times in the Market Court vary greatly depending on the nature of the case. To give some examples, in 2009, the Market Court delivered a decision concerning an appeal against the conditions imposed by the FCCA on the clearance of an acquisition (acquisition of C More Group AB by TV4 AB, MAO:525/09), which was delivered in approximately 10 months. A similar decision on appeal against conditions imposed on the clearance of an acquisition delivered in 2008 (acquisition of E.ON Finland Oyj by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, MAO:123/08) took approximately 20 months. Interim decisions, such as interim injunctions concerning remedies, are typically made within one to three months. For example, in 2009, a decision concerning an application for an interim injunction to avoid implementing conditions imposed on the clearance of an acquisition while the appeal against the conditions was pending (acquisition of C More Group AB by TV4 AB, MAO:580/08/KR) was delivered in approximately two months.

The Market Court's decisions (eg, decisions to prohibit a transaction) are appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. The handling times of the Supreme Administrative Court vary significantly depending on the nature of the case. The Supreme Administrative Court did not rule on any merger control cases between 2011 and the first half of 2020. In 2010, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled on only one merger control case, where it dismissed the FCCA's appeal against the Market Court's decision that removed the conditions imposed on the acquisition of E.ON Finland Oyj by Fortum Power and Heat Oy. The decision was issued by the Supreme Administrative Court in approximately 28 months. In 2009, the Supreme Administrative Court delivered one merger control decision concerning an interim injunction, where the decision was issued in approximately three months owing to its urgent nature. In all competition law cases decided by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2019, the average decision-making time was 25.7 months.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

During the first half of 2020, the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) issued six unconditional clearance decisions in Phase I and one conditional clearance decision after a Phase II investigation (*Donges Teräs Oy/Ruukki Building Systems Oy*). In addition, two Phase II investigations are currently pending (*Mehiläinen Yhtiöt Oy/Pihlajalinna Oyj*, and *Loomis AB/Automatia Pankkiautomaatit Oy*).

In 2019, the FCCA issued a total of 34 merger clearance decisions. Out of these cases, four were cleared subject to conditions after a Phase II investigation (*Caverion Industria Oy / Maintpartner Group Oy, MB Equity Fund V Ky/A-Katsastus Group, Parma Oy/AS TMB, Posti Group Oyj/Suomen Transval Group Oy*). In addition, at the FCCA's request, the Market Court prohibited one concentration (*Kesko Oyj/Heinon Tukku Oy*). The FCCA also issued one decision amending the conditions imposed in merger clearance decisions in 2000 and 2004 on Valio, the largest dairy company in Finland, by reducing the raw milk quota Valio is required to sell to its competitors.

The FCCA has not officially identified any particular sectors or issues as its current enforcement concerns. However, on the basis of the recent decisions by the FCCA and the statements given by officials of the authority in the national media, it appears that the FCCA has a particular interest in the social and health services, grocery market, transportation, telecommunications, intellectual property rights, digital goods and services, energy, construction, primary production and competition neutrality of public sector services.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The reform of the Competition Act, which was initiated in 2015, reached an important juncture on 14 March 2017 when a working group appointed by the Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEE) published its final report (the Final Report). In the Final Report, the working group proposed a full spectrum of changes to the Competition Act concerning inspections, sanctions and information exchange between competition authorities, among others. The reform of the Competition Act takes place in two phases.

The first phase was initiated in December 2017 when the MEE submitted a draft government bill based on the Final Report for public consultation. The government bill was presented on 24 May 2018 and passed by the Finnish parliament on 7 March 2019. The legislative package passed by the parliament also includes amendments to the merger control investigation deadlines. The amendments entered into force on 17 June 2019.

The second phase concerns the implementation of the Directive to empower the competition authorities of member states to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (2019/1) (the ECN+ Directive). In June 2019, the MEE appointed a working group to prepare the national implementation of the ECN+ Directive. The working group submitted a draft government bill for public consultation on 14 May 2020. In addition to amendments implementing the ECN+ Directive, the working group proposes amendments to increase predictability of fine levels. The proposed amendments are intended to enter into force by February 2021.

In addition, there is a pending proposal to temporarily extend the FCCA's Phase II investigation period by 23 working days to 92 working days owing to the covid-19 pandemic. The proposal is considered a matter of urgency and is intended to enter into force in June 2020. The

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extended Phase II investigation period would be in force until the end of October 2020.

Another notable legislative development includes a government bill concerning the inclusion of sector-specific merger control rules for the social and healthcare sector in the Competition Act for a fixed term, which was submitted by the MEE on 15 June 2017. However, this bill has been declared lapsed.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The year 2020 will remain in the history books as the year when the Market Court delivered its first-ever decision to prohibit a concentration. In February 2020, the Market Court handed down a decision prohibiting the proposed acquisition of Heinon Tukku Oy by Kesko Oyj, both active in wholesale of groceries. The Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (FCCA) requested the Market Court to prohibit the acquisition, as it would have significantly impeded effective competition in the market for broadline distribution of groceries to Finnish food service customers, such as hotels and restaurants. According to the FCCA, the parties' combined market share in this market ranged between 60 and 70 per cent and a substantial number of customers considered the parties as their first or second choice in the supply of groceries. Therefore, the FCCA considered that, without the competitive constraint from Heinon Tukku, one of the few other full-range distributors, Kesko would have been able to increase its prices to the detriment of food service customers, and in the end raise the average bill paid by consumers. The parties argued, inter alia, that the acquisition does not raise competition concerns, as they face competition also from specialist distributors and food manufacturers offering a more limited range of products. However, the Market Court agreed with the FCCA's market definition and found that the proposed acquisition would have created or strengthened Kesko's dominant position in the market and, thus, would have led to significant impediment of competition. The Market Court found that the prohibition of the acquisition was the only way to safeguard effective competition in that case, as the behavioural remedies offered by Kesko did not adequately address the identified harm to competition. Kesko did not appeal the Market Court's decision, which became final.

The consistent trend towards stricter merger review can also be seen in the number of conditional clearance decisions. In 2019, the FCCA made a record also in this respect, as all four cases were cleared subject to conditions after a Phase II investigation (*Caverion Industria Oy/Maintpartner Group Oy*, *MB Funds/A-Katsastus Group*, *Parma Oy/AS TMB*, and *Posti Group Oyj/Transval Group Oy*). Interestingly, even though the FCCA clearly prefers structural remedies, in two of the conditional clearance decisions (*Posti Group Oyj/Transval Group Oy* and *MB Funds/A-Katsastus Group*) competition concerns were resolved with behavioural commitments. Both clearances were subject to a commitment by the buyer to continue offering the target's services to competitors for a transitional period and to limit transfer of confidential customer data.

Another trend worth noting is that the FCCA applied for additional time from the Market Court to complete its investigation in three cases in 2018 and two cases in 2019. This goes hand-in-hand with the increased number of Phase II investigations combined with the FCCA's scarce resources. The FCCA normally has 92 working days in total from the submission of a merger control notification until the end of Phase II to complete its investigation, but the Market Court may extend the deadline by a maximum of 46 working days upon request by the FCCA. In addition, the FCCA has adopted a more stringent approach to the assessment of completeness of notifications. Prior to 2018, the FCCA had not used its power to declare notifications incomplete, but since then it has used this power at least eight times.



# France

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

French merger control rules are set out in the French Commercial Code (the Code).

An independent administrative authority, the Competition Authority (the Authority), has jurisdiction over merger control cases in France. However, the Minister for the Economy holds residual powers in two circumstances: even if the concentration is cleared by the Authority at the end of the first phase, the Minister can ask that the Authority open a second phase in-depth review of the concentration (although the Authority has discretion to act upon this request or not) and, in addition, whatever the final decision of the Authority at the end of the second phase, the Minister can substitute his or her own decision based on public interest grounds.

In 2013, the Authority published merger control guidelines (the Guidelines). Although non-binding, these should generally be followed by the Authority. At the end of 2019, the Authority launched a public consultation with a view to adopting new guidelines.

In addition, following a public consultation in 2018 to modernise and simplify French merger control, a decree simplifying the merger control procedure entered into force on 20 April 2019.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The French definition of 'mergers' is aligned with the definition set out in the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). The French legislation thus applies to 'concentrations', which may occur when:

- two or more formerly independent undertakings merge; or
- one or several persons who already control at least one undertaking, acquire, directly or indirectly, control of all or part of one or several other undertakings.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures are treated under French law as under the EUMR. It follows that the creation of a joint venture performing, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, constitutes a concentration. A concentration also occurs when a joint venture that was not initially full-function becomes fully fledged (*DCNS/Priou* case, 2016).

The French *Adrexo* case (2008) involved an interesting scenario. There, it was considered that a shift from joint control to sole control over a joint venture could, even in the absence of any change in its shareholding, result solely from the change of control over another joint venture, independent from the first one, but owned by the same parent companies.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The notion of 'control' under French law is similar to that of the EUMR – control arises from rights, contracts or any other means that enable the party to exercise a decisive influence on the activity of an undertaking, be it on an individual or joint basis, and having regard to the factual and legal circumstances, in particular:

- ownership rights and possession of all or part of the assets of an undertaking; and
- rights or contracts that confer a decisive influence on the composition or the resolutions of the decision-making bodies of an undertaking.

De jure or de facto control is relevant to qualify a concentration (see, for instance, the 2018 *AG2R La Mondiale/Matmut* case concerning a de facto merger). As under the EUMR, joint control based on strategic veto rights is also caught by the French merger control regime.

Minority and other interests that do not reach the standard of negative sole control or joint control are not subject to merger control.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Three alternative sets of turnover-based thresholds currently exist in France. Following a public consultation, the Authority concluded in June 2018 that the existing thresholds remain relevant and that the introduction of a transaction value-based threshold would not be relevant at this stage.

Turnover calculations under French law are very similar to those set out in the EUMR and the Code expressly refers to article 5 of the EUMR on this subject. The turnover of an undertaking is thus calculated by taking into account the whole group to which the undertaking belongs, and the seller is not taken into account.

First, French merger control applies where the following cumulative thresholds are met:

- all the undertakings that are party to the concentration achieved, during the previous financial year, a worldwide combined pre-tax turnover of over €150 million;
- at least two of the undertakings concerned each achieved, during the previous financial year, a pre-tax turnover in France exceeding €50 million; and
- the transaction is not caught by the EUMR.

Second, lower thresholds apply to concentrations involving undertakings in the retail trade (ie, where two or more parties to a concentration operate retail premises). French merger control is thus applicable where the following cumulative thresholds are met:

- all the undertakings that are party to the concentration achieved, during the previous financial year, a worldwide combined pre-tax turnover of over €75 million;
- at least two of the undertakings concerned each achieved, during the previous financial year, a pre-tax turnover in the retail trade sector in France exceeding €15 million; and
- the transaction is not caught by the EUMR.

Third, lower thresholds apply to concentrations involving undertakings operating in French overseas departments and French overseas communities (ie, where at least one party to a concentration is active in one or more French overseas departments, in the Mayotte department, in the Wallis-et-Futuna islands or in the French overseas communities of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Saint-Martin and Saint-Barthélemy). French merger control is thus applicable where the following cumulative thresholds are met:

- all the undertakings that are party to the concentration achieved, during the previous financial year, a worldwide combined pre-tax turnover of over €75 million;
- at least two of the undertakings concerned each achieved, during the previous financial year, a pre-tax turnover exceeding €15 million (this threshold is reduced to €5 million in the retail trade sector) in at least one French overseas department or French overseas community concerned. These €15 million or €5 million thresholds do not have to be achieved by all the undertakings concerned within the same overseas department or community, and
- the transaction is not caught by the EUMR.

The scope and interpretation of these tests are clarified by the Guidelines, which contain very specific additional rules and illustrations of how the thresholds should be applied and interpreted.

Retail trade is primarily defined in the Guidelines as the sale of goods to consumers for domestic use, including a number of non-exhaustively listed activities such as the sale of second-hand goods and a number of handicraft activities, but excluding, inter alia, banking, insurance or travel agency services and restaurants, as well as undertakings achieving all their turnover through online sales. Premises qualify as retail premises where more than half of the turnover achieved in these premises (of which at least one must be located in France) is generated through such activities (note that the Guidelines take the view that if this 50 per cent threshold is met, 100 per cent of the turnover achieved in the premises, retail and non-retail alike, must be taken into account for checking whether the €15 million threshold is achieved – presumably, the same approach should prevail with respect to the €5 million threshold).

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory, and no exceptions are provided for by the law.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Where the relevant turnover thresholds are met, mergers, including foreign-to-foreign mergers, fall under French merger control rules, and must be notified and obtain clearance prior to completion. There is therefore no need to conduct a 'local effects test' as such. It is not relevant whether the parties are incorporated under French law or have subsidiaries in France.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Under French Treasury rules, foreign investments in France are unrestricted. However, certain foreign investments must be declared, for administrative and statistical purposes, to the Minister for the Economy and the Banque de France.

Where the foreign investment concerns a 'strategic' French sector (such as a sector that might affect public policy), prior authorisation may be necessary. In a number of 'strategic' sectors (eg, defence, security, weapons and ammunition, cryptology, security of information systems, gambling, private security, research against bioterrorism, materials used for intercepting correspondences and conversations, and dual-use technologies) prior authorisation is required. This list was extended in 2014 to include procurement of energy (including gas, electricity and hydrocarbons), procurement of water, transport, electronic communications, vital construction works and protection of public health, where the concerned activity is crucial for the integrity, security and continuity of one of these sectors. The scope of 'strategic' sectors was further extended in 2018 to include the following sectors: technical devices for the interception of communications, remote sensing or capture of computer database, security of information systems, research and development for activities relating to weapons, ammunition, powder and explosive substances intended for military purposes or for war materials and related materials, spatial operations, specific electronic and computer systems necessary for the exercise of public security missions, activities of data hosting and research and development activities in the areas of cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, robotics, additive manufacturing, semiconductors, dual-use goods and technologies. The Decree and Ministerial Order of 31 December 2019 again expanded the scope of the strategic sectors to activities related to the press, food security and research and development in the field of energy storage and quantum technologies. Biotechnology was added to the list in April 2020.

All foreign investments in these sectors must be formally approved by the Minister for the Economy prior to implementation. For this purpose, 'foreign investment' means the acquisition of control in a French entity pursuant to Article L 233-3 of the French Commercial Code or the acquisition of all or part of a branch of activity of a French entity. Also, non-European investments fall under stricter requirements than European investments, since prior approval of the Minister is also required for them when 25 per cent (this threshold was lowered from 33.3 to 25 per cent in 2019) of the voting rights in a French-registered company is exceeded (directly or indirectly). To identify the ultimate controlling entity of an investor, the Decree of 31 December 2019 provides that where no control can be established on the basis of French corporate law concepts, control will be assessed under French merger control rules.

Following notification, the Minister of Economy has 30 business days to indicate whether the notified foreign investment falls outside the scope of control, is cleared unconditionally or requires further analysis. In the latter case, the Minister has an additional period of 45 business days to clear the foreign investment (with or without conditions) or to refuse it. Such review entails a standstill obligation. Where an investment is deemed to threaten national interests, approval may be conditional upon the parties' implementation of specific remedies, including divestments, set in proportion to the importance of the national interest at stake. Failure to comply with the notification requirement entails very significant risks (in particular, a significant fine, nullity of the relevant agreements and an injunction to restore the status quo ante).

The Action Plan for Business Growth and Transformation (law Pacte), dated 22 May 2019, strengthened and expanded the powers of the Minister for the Economy. In particular, the law strengthens the power of injunction of the Minister and also empowers the Minister

to impose interim measures if the protection of national interests is compromised or likely to be compromised (eg, suspension of the voting rights attached to the shares acquired by the investor without approval). This law also expands the Minister's powers to fine the investor in the event of an acquisition without prior approval, approval obtained by fraud, non-compliance with the remedies or breach of an injunction (the Minister may, in these circumstances, impose a fine capped at the highest of the following amounts: twice the amount of the investment, 10 per cent of the target's annual turnover, €1 million for natural persons and €5 million for legal persons).

In addition, there are certain sectors in which specific merger rules apply, such as:

- the audiovisual sector, in which, unless otherwise agreed in international conventions to which France is a party, a foreign legal entity may not hold more than 20 per cent of the capital or voting rights of an audiovisual company that exploits an audiovisual communication system in French. There are also specific rules on cross-media ownership. If a concentration in the audiovisual sector is reportable to the Authority, the Authority must seek the opinion of the French Audiovisual Authority;
- the press sector, in which a single individual or legal entity may not control daily publications that represent more than 30 per cent of the total circulation on the national market of similar publications; for publications in French, the 20 per cent rule as described above applies;
- investment services and insurance (where specific authorisation from the relevant French authorities is required); and
- the banking sector, in which a non-binding opinion would be requested from the Credit Institutions Committee during the Authority's second phase investigation.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The obligation to notify is not framed within any particular time limits. Filing may be made at any time once the project is sufficiently well advanced, and in particular is normally possible when the parties have entered into a gentlemen's agreement or signed a letter of intent, or after the publication of the purchase or exchange offer.

Sanctions for not filing fall on the notifying parties (acquirers) and are as follows:

- the parties may be directed, subject to a periodic penalty, either to file the concentration or to demerge; and
- in addition, the Competition Authority (the Authority) may fine the concerned party as follows (maximum fines):
  - corporate entities: 5 per cent of pre-tax turnover in France from the previous financial year (plus, where applicable, the turnover in France of the acquired party over the same period); and
  - individuals: €1.5 million.

Failures to notify reportable mergers have been fined repeatedly (eg, a €392,000 fine imposed in 2012 on Colruyt France for failure to notify the acquisition of UGCA Unifrais, or a €400,000 fine imposed in 2013 on the Reunica group for failure to notify the merger with the Arpège group). A €4 million fine was imposed in 2013 on Groupe Castel for deliberate failure to notify the acquisition of six companies of the group Patriarche so as to accelerate completion of the operation. The highest administrative court ultimately reduced the fine to €3 million in 2016, considering that the Groupe Castel did not intentionally omit to notify and that it was cooperative with the Authority when notifying the relevant operations.

In the *Colruyt France* case, which was confirmed by the highest administrative court in 2013, the Authority clarified that such infringements are subject to a five-year limitation period from the date when the change of control materialises.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Those subject to an obligation to notify are entities that acquire control of all or part of an undertaking. In the case of the creation of a joint venture, the parent companies are under an obligation of joint notification.

There is no filing fee.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Filing has a suspensive effect: a concentration that requires notification must not be completed before approval has been obtained from the Authority. In addition, the powers of the Minister for the Economy to intervene within a certain period may extend the suspension period. If the Authority clears the transaction expressly in the first phase, it should a priori be possible to complete the transaction without waiting for the end of the five-day period granted to the Minister to request the opening of a second phase in-depth review. If the time period for the Authority to authorise the transaction in the first phase has expired (tacit authorisation), the transaction remains suspended until the end of the Minister's five-day period. Should the Authority authorise the transaction in the second phase, whether the Minister intervenes or not, the transaction should not be completed before the end of the Minister's 25-day period. Should the Minister for the Economy ultimately intervene, transactions must not be completed before the Minister has issued its decision.

Derogations may be granted to make it possible to proceed with the completion of all or part of the concentration without awaiting the decision of the Authority, or of the Minister as the case may be, provided that these derogations are necessary and duly justified. Derogations, which remain exceptional, are generally granted in cases where the target is subject to insolvency proceedings. The law dated 6 August 2015 provides that exemption from the standstill obligation may be granted subject to conditions and that the exemption will cease to be valid if the Authority does not receive complete notification of the transaction within three months of its implementation. Between May 2019 and May 2020, the Authority granted derogations in two cases (*Bristish Steel/Ascovial* and the restructuring of the *AltéAd* group). It is noteworthy that, in 2018, in the *GPG/Tati Group* case, the Authority granted the derogation and subsequently required structural and behavioural remedies to approve the concentration and that, in the *Financière Cofigeo/groupe Agripole* case, the Authority granted the derogation and then imposed divestment injunctions after a Phase II investigation.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing before clearance (gun jumping) is considered as equivalent to an absence of filing and triggers the same sanctions as for not filing.

On 8 November 2016, the Authority jointly fined Altice Luxembourg and SFR Group €80 million for having prematurely implemented two mergers that had each been notified and cleared in 2014 (ie, the acquisition of SFR by Numericable (an Altice subsidiary) and that of OTL Group by Numericable).

This decision, which followed complaints from competitors and dawn raids, is the first decision of the Authority dealing with gun jumping (ie, completion of merger before clearance) practices and was then unprecedented internationally in terms of the scale of the practices concerned and of the amount of the fine imposed (which is, however, the result of a settlement).

This heavy fine in particular reflected: the accumulation of various gun-jumping practices, the fact that the practices involved all the targets' activities and that they started before the notification and occurred throughout the merger control proceedings, the fact that certain practices related to competition law risks identified by the Authority in one clearance decision, the scale of the transactions concerned by the infringements (two large mergers were affected), and the fact the Authority found that the behaviour was deliberate.

The gun-jumping practices sanctioned by the Authority in the *Altice* case notably consisted of:

- the intervention by Altice in SFR and OTL's operational management before clearance:
  - in the SFR transaction, the contract provided for an 'ordinary course of business' limitation, but the latter was applied in the sense that 'over the threshold' decisions were nevertheless permitted with the acquirer's prior authorisation; therefore, the actual implementation of the contract amounted to gun jumping; and
  - in the OTL transaction, the 'ordinary course of business' limitation had very low financial thresholds and the contracts provided that 'over the threshold' decisions were only possible with the acquirer's prior authorisation;
- exchange of confidential information: Altice and SFR exchanged large quantities of strategic information in readiness for their integration. Such information was confidential and concerned individualised data, SFR's recent commercial performance and forecasts for the coming months. In the OTL merger, Altice set up an economic performance reporting mechanism allowing it to access weekly OTL's commercially sensitive information (monitoring comparable to that exercised by a controlling shareholder);
- far-reaching closing preparation and premature anticipation of commercial opportunities: Altice asked and SFR agreed to suspend a promotion during the standstill period and also replaced Vivendi (SFR's owner before the transaction) in the acquisition of a third-party operator (OTL). The Authority accordingly held that SFR ceased to behave as an economic entity independent from Altice. Moreover, the two undertakings have jointly and systematically studied new commercial opportunities or the extension of existing contracts. The decision reports examples of two new projects that started with the announcement of the transaction (for instance, Altice and SFR took advantage of the suspensive period to negotiate and operationally prepare the launch of new offers under the SFR brand and using Numericable's network); and
- anticipated assignment of managers: OTL's managing director began to carry out his duties within the SFR-Numericable group before clearance and was involved in SFR's new commercial projects and also received commercially sensitive information.

The Authority, however, indicated after the decision was released that each of the above practices would not necessarily constitute a standalone gun-jumping infringement and that there had been an accumulation effect. In particular, pre-closing covenants should not be regarded as automatic gun jumping, and an assessment of the threshold is always necessary.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The fact that the transaction is foreign-to-foreign is irrelevant and sanctions would apply in cases of closing before clearance.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

No specific solutions permitting closing before clearance are provided for under French law in foreign-to-foreign transactions, other than the general possibility available in any transaction to seek from the Authority a derogation from the suspension requirement.

#### Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Public bids may fall within the scope of French merger control if they involve stocks or shares that confer sole or joint control over an undertaking listed on the French Stock Exchange and otherwise meet the applicable jurisdictional thresholds. As a derogation to the suspensive effect of the merger control process, the stocks or shares in question may be purchased and transferred, so long as the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to them before the Authority clears the transaction. Where a transaction is realised in stages, namely, an acquisition of a first block of shares triggers an obligation to launch a public bid to purchase the rest of the share capital, the derogation applies to both stages; therefore, both the shares acquired privately and those acquired through the public bid can be transferred but are subject to the obligation not to exercise the voting rights.

Therefore, under merger control rules, a public bid may be approved by the French Stock Exchange regulatory authority and the stocks or shares transferred before the Authority's authorisation is granted. Theoretically, therefore, a public bid could be cancelled, or substantially modified, on competition law grounds after having been implemented, possibly obliging the acquirer to divest the stocks or shares purchased.

However, a provision making the offer conditional upon clearance of the transaction by the competition authorities (the European Commission, the competition authorities of EEA member states, US competition authorities and any other foreign competition authority provided that its merger control procedure is compatible with a maximum time frame of 10 weeks) at the end of the first phase of the review process can be inserted into the offer documents. In such case, the offer lapses and becomes void if any of the relevant competition authorities opens a Phase II review. For these purposes, the offer period is extended until the end of the first phase.

#### Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Filings have notably to include:

- a copy of the merger agreement or draft agreement and a memorandum giving details of the legal and financial aspects of the transaction and its likely impact, in particular on competition;
- the identity of the parties concerned (including the entities economically linked to them);
- a definition of the relevant product and geographic markets, as well as the criteria used to identify any substitutable products or services; and
- a description of the position in the relevant market of the parties involved in the transaction.

Filing most often involves the provision of detailed information about the parties and their business. The time necessary to prepare a non-complex filing will, in general, range from 15 days to a month, depending on the size of the transaction, the markets concerned and the cooperation of the parties to the transaction. Filings also have to include a declaration certifying that the data provided is complete and accurate.

A distinction must be drawn between the markets 'concerned' by the concentration and those that are 'affected' by the transaction.

Markets 'concerned' are relevant markets on which the concentration will have an influence, either directly or indirectly. An 'affected' market is: a market on which at least two undertakings party to the merger are active and hold a combined market share of 25 per cent or more; or a market on which at least one undertaking party to the merger is active, another one being active on an upstream, downstream or related market, where, on either of those markets, the combined market share of all the undertakings is 30 per cent or more (this threshold was recently raised from 25 to 30 per cent in 2019 to simplify the merger control review). The information required for the notification is more detailed if the concentration involves 'affected' markets.

The Guidelines provide that transactions that should not, *prima facie*, raise anticompetitive issues, may be eligible for a simplified procedure with less onerous information requirements.

In the Guidelines, the Authority emphasises the benefits of the simplified procedure and lists its conditions, allowing the concerned parties to obtain the transaction's clearance within a shorter time period (of 15 to 20 working days on average) where no competition issues are anticipated (eg, where there is no horizontal or vertical overlap and where the parties are not active in neighbouring markets). Each year, approximately half of the filings reviewed by the Authority are dealt with under the simplified procedure.

In October 2019, the Authority launched an online notification form for mergers that benefit from the simplified procedure. The online procedure (including both a pre-notification form and a formal notification form) concerns the following notifiable transactions:

- transactions where the purchaser operates neither on the same market as the target, nor on upstream, downstream or related markets (which covers most transactions carried out by investment funds);
- transactions relating to food distribution and that do not involve a change of trading name of the retail store concerned; and
- transactions relating to motor vehicle distribution.

This online procedure is expected to cover about half of the notifications submitted to the Authority and is expected to allow the Authority to issue a decision more quickly (within around three weeks instead of five weeks).

Since the entry into force of the Decree of 18 April 2019, the parties only have to submit one copy of the filing (annexes enclosed) to the Authority. This decree also simplifies the financial data of the parties to be provided to the Authority.

Providing inaccurate information or omitting information may result in fines up to 5 per cent of the undertaking's turnover (taking into account the circumstances leading to the omission or misrepresentation, as well as the conduct of the undertakings *vis-à-vis* the Authority). In addition, the clearance decision may be withdrawn, meaning that the parties must notify the transaction again within one month of the withdrawal (otherwise a fine may be imposed for gun jumping).

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The Mergers Unit of the Authority examines concentrations notified to the Authority.

Informal pre-notification contacts are often necessary and highly recommended in the Guidelines to identify (and possibly resolve) potential issues. The Authority invites the parties to get in touch with its services at the earliest opportunity to anticipate any possible competition concerns. Although not compulsory under the French Commercial Code (the Code), pre-notification has now become systematic in practice.

Formal notification triggers the first phase review. The Authority may request information not only from the parties, but also from other market players, including the parties' suppliers, customers and competitors. This is done notably through 'market tests' performed by the Authority. There is also a notice posted on the Authority's website to allow for spontaneous comments by third parties. In addition, the Authority has the power to conduct onsite investigations, although the use of such powers remains exceptional. In cases raising competition concerns, the parties may propose remedies to avoid a second phase.

Should the Authority consider that a case raises major competition difficulties or should the Minister decide to request a Phase II review of a case despite the clearance granted by the Authority at the end of the first phase (and should the Authority accept such request), an in-depth investigation is conducted by the Authority's case handlers, who generally request additional information from the parties, in writing and, possibly, during hearings. The case handlers may also submit questions to the parties' suppliers, customers or competitors and, where necessary, conduct onsite investigations. The case team issues a report to which the parties may reply in writing, and a formal hearing is then organised at the end of the second phase, during which third parties (customers, experts, etc) may be heard in the absence of the notifying parties. In its final decision, the Authority can authorise the concentration with or without commitments proposed by the parties. It can otherwise prohibit the transaction. It may also, if need be, take injunctions that impose conditions that were not proposed by the notifying parties (in the 2018 *Financière Cofigeo/groupe Agripole* case, the Authority used, for the second time ever, its injunction power: in the absence of suitable commitments from the parties, it granted clearance subject to appropriate remedies it imposed to protect competition).

The Minister for the Economy has the power, after a second phase decision of the Authority, to review the case and to take the final decision on public interest grounds, which it did for the first time in 2018 in the *Financière Cofigeo/groupe Agripole* case.

Finally, to comply with French labour law, the labour or employees' organisation (works council) of a French company involved in a merger has to be informed and consulted before signing of the transaction and a meeting of the works council is compulsory following the publication of the notification release on the Authority's website.

### 18 What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The Authority's formal examination of a concentration takes place in up to two phases and the clearance timetable is as follows.

Phase I (a maximum of 60 working days, unless clock is stopped by the Authority):

- This phase is common to all concentrations. The Authority may authorise the concentration within 25 working days of the date at which the notification is considered complete.
- This review period may be extended for an additional 15 working days if the notifying parties submit commitments.



- Two 'stop-the-clock' procedures exist:
  - the parties may ask for suspension of the review for a period of up to 15 working days if necessary for, inter alia, the finalisation of commitments. In this case, the first phase can last up to 60 working days (including the five working days granted to the Minister for the Economy under its intervention powers); and
  - the Authority may suspend the review period where the notifying parties fail to promptly inform the Authority of a new relevant fact or fail to provide requested information within the allocated deadline, or where third parties fail to do so for reasons pertaining to the notifying parties. Such suspension lasts as long as its cause exists.

Where no competition issues are anticipated, the simplified procedure allows the parties to obtain clearance within a shorter time period (ie, on average after 15 working days following the filing of a complete notification).

The Authority may also shorten its first phase review when one of the undertakings is facing financial difficulties or is subject to legal proceedings.

At the end of the first phase, the parties must still comply with the waiting period granted to the Minister (five working days, see below) if the Authority does not adopt a decision in writing but instead does not issue any decision by the end of first phase (ie, grants tacit approval).

Phase II (a maximum of 130 working days from the opening of the second phase, unless the clock is stopped by the Authority):

- Where, after a first-phase review, the concentration raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with competition on the relevant markets in France, the Authority will initiate an in-depth examination of the concentration. This will be the case where the concentration may lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position or the creation or strengthening of purchasing power that may lead to a situation of economic dependence for suppliers. The factoring of efficiencies into the competitive assessment may also be considered.
- The Authority will issue its decision within 65 working days of the opening of the second phase. The parties may submit commitments. The period of 65 working days is maintained if the commitments are submitted within 45 working days following the beginning of the review period. If the commitments are submitted less than 20 working days from the expiry of the 65-working-day deadline, the review period is extended by 20 working days from the receipt of such commitments. This extension is also applicable in case of a modification of already submitted commitments proposed less than 20 working days from the expiry of the 65-working-day deadline. In any case, the review cannot extend further than 85 working days.
- Two 'stop-the-clock' procedures exist:
  - the parties may ask for suspension of the review for a period of up to 20 working days if necessary for, inter alia, the finalisation of commitments; and
  - without any time limit, the Authority may also suspend the review if the parties fail to inform it of a new fact as soon as it occurs or fail in their duty to provide information or if third parties, as a result of the parties' negligence, fail to provide the requested information. The review period starts to run again as soon as the issue giving rise to the suspension is resolved.

At the end of the second phase, the parties must still comply with the waiting period granted to the Minister (25 working days, see below).

### Powers of the Minister for the Economy

The Minister for the Economy no longer has jurisdiction over merger control. However:

- after the first phase, within five working days after the notification of the Authority's clearance decision to the Minister, the latter can ask the Authority for an in-depth examination of the case. However, the Authority has a discretion as to whether to allow this request or not and has indicated that it would decide on the fate of such request within five working days from receiving it; and
- after the second phase, within 25 working days from the notification of the decision of the Authority to the Minister, the latter has, at his or her initiative, the power to review the case and take the final decision on the concentration on public interest grounds. These may include industrial and technological progress, companies' competitiveness in an international context and social welfare, but not competition grounds. The law dated 6 August 2015 provides that, where the parties have failed to timely comply with the commitments provided for in the Minister's decision, the latter may withdraw his or her decision (thus obliging the parties to re-notify the transaction within one month), or enjoin the parties to comply with the relevant commitments subject to periodic penalty, or enjoin the parties to comply with new injunctions (replacing the initial commitments that were not complied with) subject to periodic penalties.

Since these powers were introduced in 2008, the Minister has used its power to review a merger on public interest grounds only once.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance is whether the transaction significantly lessens competition, especially by creating or strengthening an individual or collective dominant position. Unilateral effects, even in the absence of dominance, are taken into account in practice. In addition, at the end of the second phase, the Minister is entitled to call the case and take into account the economic and social effects (ie, effects other than the impact on competition) of the concentration to prohibit or authorise it.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No, there is no special test for joint ventures. A joint venture performing, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, is treated like any other type of merger. However, possible coordination issues between parent companies will be examined.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Competition Authority (the Authority) broadly uses the same analytical framework as the European Commission. In addition to the level of market shares, it may take into consideration a wide variety of elements in its assessment of unilateral and coordinated effects in horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers.

In the *Castel/Groupe Patriarche* second-phase case (2012) the Authority used the upward pricing pressure test to analyse the incentives of the new entity to increase the prices of wines. The 2013 Guidelines insist on the increasing importance of such tests in the competitive assessment of transactions.

The Authority used the gross upward pricing pressure index (GUPPI) test in the *Casino Guichard-Perrachon/Monoprix* (2013) case as part of its analysis to impose divestments. Conversely, in *Orlait/*



*Terra Lacta* (2014), the Authority also used the GUPPI test to conclude that a price increase was unlikely to result from the merger, in view of the highly competitive market structure and the strong countervailing buyer power.

To quantify online competition in local markets, the Authority used for the first time a 'scoring method' in the *Fnac/Darty* case (2017), in addition to the market shares and GUPPI methods. Based on diverse evidence, each competitor was thus applied a weight (or 'score') reflecting the different levels of competitive constraint they imposed on the parties to the merger.

In *Elsan/MediPôle-Partenaires* (2017), in the healthcare sector, the Authority for the first time took account of the impact of the concentration on the quality of the medical treatment offer and required corresponding divestiture commitments. The assessment of non-price effects of mergers is however not unprecedented. For instance, the Authority previously took into account media pluralism issues in its merger assessment and again recently did so in the *Mondadori France/Reworld Media* case (2019), where Reworld Media had to divest one car magazine in order to maintain sufficient competition and to guarantee pluralism in the car magazines market.

In the in-depth investigation (Phase II) of the *Axel Springer Group (SeLoger.com)/Concept Multimédia (Logic-Immo.com)* merger which, for the first time, involved two online platforms, the Authority took into account network cross-effects and focused particularly on the importance of data.

Market definition is sometimes key in assessing the possible theories of harm and the Authority may accept innovative market definitions. In *Fnac/Darty* (2016), following an in-depth investigation, the acquisition of Darty by Fnac was cleared by the Authority subject to the divestment of six stores, in order to maintain sufficient competition in the market for retail distribution of electronic products in Paris and its suburbs. This was the first case in which the Authority has ever defined a relevant market as including both in-store and online retail channels. It held that competitive pressure exerted by online sales had become significant enough to be integrated in the relevant market, whether it comes from pure players or from the bricks and mortar stores' own websites. In 2019, the Authority also implemented this approach to the distribution of toys in the context of the *Luderix International (Picwic)/Jellej Jouets (Toys 'R' Us)/undivided ownership Mulliez*. It considered that the characteristics of the toy distribution market justified analysing online sales and physical outlets as belonging to one and same relevant market, which was the first time such a conclusion was reached in the European Union in the toy sector. In *Fnac Darty/Nature & Découvertes* (2019), the Authority applied this approach again, considering that the retail market for books and the retail market for toys each included both the physical and the online channels.

However, such conclusion as to online and physical sales channels is not systematic. For instance, in *Sarenza/Monoprix* (2018) and *André/Spartoo* (2018), while the Authority took into account the competition exerted by e-commerce players on the brick and mortar distributors, it did not conclude that there was a single relevant market for both channels. In *Dimeco/Cafom group* (2018), concerning a merger of two domestic electrical goods distributors active in Guadeloupe, the Authority considered that the specificities of the French overseas markets (notably the low development of online sales and the insular location of Guadeloupe) required it to define the relevant markets as brick-and-mortar retail points only.

Other recent decisions of the Authority offer examples of innovative market definitions and the corresponding competitive assessment. In the *Webedia/Elephant* case (2019), the Authority scrutinised, for the first time, the monetisation industry of 'influence' and of 'influencers' (whose activities occur on content-sharing platforms and social networks). The Authority focused on the risk of vertical effects in relation to the

positions of Webedia (as regards management services proposed to 'talents and influencers'), and of Elephant (as a distributor of audiovisual program rights). Such a risk could have consisted in excluding competitors from those two markets, by establishing contractual ties between the influencers managed by Webedia and the productions of Elephant, to create unavoidable offers on those markets. However, given the limited positions of the parties, no sufficient leverage effect was found and the merger was cleared unconditionally. Also, in the *Ineos/OGC Nice* merger (2019), the Authority focused, for the first time, on identifying the relevant markets in which football clubs operate in France and, in particular, defined a relevant market for the transfer of professional players, which it had never identified before.

Finally, In *Fnac Darty/Nature & Découvertes* (2019), the Authority assessed for the first time the risk of exclusion of competitors from shopping centres as a result of Fnac Darty's increased bargaining power vis-à-vis shopping centre managers.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Authority only considers competition issues in its assessment, possibly with efficiency defence arguments.

However, since 2008, at the end of a second phase, the Minister for the Economy may decide to examine the case. Although the Minister cannot challenge the findings of the Authority on competition analysis, he or she can make a decision based on grounds of public interest justifications other than the maintenance of competition. Notably, the Minister's decision may be based on factors such as industrial development, maintaining employment or the competitiveness of the undertakings in international competition. The decision of the Minister will then supersede that of the Authority.

For the first time, in June 2018, the Minister used this power in the *Financière Cofigeo/groupe Agripole* transaction. In this case, the Authority had cleared, following an in-depth investigation, the acquisition by Financière Cofigeo of certain securities and assets of Agripole group (carrying a ready-made meals business), subject to divestment injunctions. On the very day of the clearance, the Minister announced that the transaction needed to be assessed on public interest grounds, in particular the maintaining of employment and industrial development. The Minister stressed that his review was taking place in the exceptional context of the serious fraud that led to the financial difficulties of the target which required state intervention. On 19 July 2018, the Minister cleared the transaction, without divestment but subject to the maintenance of employment within the group for two years. The Minister considered that the divestment would have led to a material risk for employment. Besides, the Minister considered that his decision would allow Cofigeo to stimulate the markets on which it is active, which would have a positive impact on the whole sector.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The French Commercial Code (the Code) requires the Authority, during the second phase, to assess whether the transaction makes a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the damage to competition. To be taken into account, efficiencies must be both quantifiable and verifiable, they must be specific to the concentration, and at least some of their benefit must be passed on to consumers. The Authority can compel the parties to respect requirements aimed at ensuring that a sufficient contribution is made to economic progress to offset the damage to competition.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

In addition to the standard a priori merger control review further to a notification, the Competition Authority (the Authority) also has ex post merger control powers for all concentrations in the following strictly defined scenario: the Authority may, in the event of an abuse of a dominant position or of a state of economic dependence, enjoin by a reasoned decision the undertaking or group of undertakings concerned to amend, supplement or terminate, within a specified timetable, all agreements and all acts by which the concentration of economic power allowing the abuse was brought about. This provision is applicable to concentrations below the notification thresholds that were not notified, as well as to those that have been subject to a merger control procedure. Under the former merger control regime, the Minister for the Economy, who used to be in charge of merger control in France, enjoyed similar powers, but used these only once, in 2002, to terminate joint venture arrangements on the market for drinking water supply.

The Authority is currently considering the enlargement of its ex post merger control review powers.

The Authority recently rejected a complaint lodged by Towercast challenging TDF's takeover of Itas, claiming that this merger, which fell below the notification thresholds, was aggravating TDF's dominant position. The Authority rejected the complaint, considering that such a merger could not constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The Authority also noted that article 22 of the European Merger Control Regulation 139/2004 had not been used in this case and that the conditions to apply the above-mentioned ex post powers were not met.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Between filing and the final decision of the Authority, the notifying parties may submit amendments to the transaction to remedy competition issues. The parties may put forward various remedies (behavioural as well as structural), such as commitments to sell assets to third parties (those third parties should then be approved by the Authority), to execute a contract (eg, a trademark or patent licence), to amend conditions of sale, to keep the Authority informed of any change in the structure of the relevant market (such as an increase in the parties' market share) or even sometimes to freeze their market share. Remedies can be submitted either in Phase I or in Phase II. However, not all second-phase investigations end in remedies, as shown by the *Axel Springer/Concept Multimedia* (2018) merger that was ultimately cleared without commitments.

The Authority can delay the concentration until the commitments are fulfilled. In the case of a divestment commitment, the parties may be required to prepare an equally or more effective alternative solution ('crown jewels'), where the initial divestment turns out to be either unlikely or impossible.

The Guidelines introduced a standard form of divestiture commitments and a standard form of trustee mandate to habilitate a trustee to monitor and audit fulfilment of the commitments.

A few recent cases illustrating the large possible scope of remedies in France are set out below.

In *Elsan/MediPôle Partenaires* (2017), the Authority accepted alternative divestments (ie, the notifying party had to divest one healthcare facility it could choose among several identified in a given area, the divestment of any of them being able to solve the competitive concerns identified).

In the retail sector of gardening, DIY, pet and landscaping products, the Authority cleared the *Groupe InVivo/Jardiland* transaction (2018) subject to commitments to divest six outlets and to terminate five franchise contracts, which must be taken on by one or more competing chains. Alternative crown jewels commitments were also agreed upon. In 2019, several decisions also made binding commitments to divest retail points of sale (eg, *Audilab/Demant* in the sale of hearing aids sector, *Frans Bonhomme/Point P Travaux Publics* in the markets for the distribution of building materials for public works and *D'Aucy/Triskalia* in the gardening, DIY, landscaping and pet product retail distribution market).

In 2018, the Authority cleared under conditions the creation of the joint venture Cash Paris Tax Refund by Global Blue and Planet Payment. The joint undertaking would operate at the end of the refund process, acting as a 'desk' carrying out the VAT refund procedure for tourists. Its clients will be its parent companies and their competitors. The establishment of the joint venture, which would, besides access information on the parent companies and their competitors, have enabled its parent companies to coordinate their behaviour in the upstream markets of VAT refund services in France. To remedy this issue, a commitment was taken to erect a firewall between the common undertaking and the parent companies to bar the latter from access to strategic information on their competitors.

In 2019, and for the third time ever, the Authority required a 'fix-it-first' commitment to clear the acquisition of Alsa by Dr. Oetker (Ancel). The new entity would have become the leader in the market for production and marketing of dessert mixes to supermarkets and hypermarkets, with a market share greatly superior to 50 per cent, by combining the two main brands of this market (Ancel and Alsa). Dr. Oetker thus committed to entering into an exclusive trademark licensing agreement for Ancel dessert mixes for five years, renewable once. The Authority agreed the proposed licensee before giving its clearance. To further ensure the existence of a credible alternative supplier in this market, Dr. Oetker also notably committed to entering into an outsourcing contract with the licensee (for the supply of Ancel dessert mixes products) for a transitory period of three years, to avoid supply disruption and to enable the licensee to immediately stimulate competition, independently of the development of its own production capacities.

In the *SAFO/NDIS* case (2019), the Authority required, for the first time, an 'upfront buyer' commitment to remedy competition concerns deriving from the strengthening of SAFO's market share in the relevant wholesale distribution markets. SAFO undertook not to implement the transaction until it had divested the target's wholesaler-importer business and obtained the Authority's approval of its purchaser. SAFO also granted a behavioural commitment not to operate the acquired hypermarket under one of Carrefour's brands and to run such hypermarket autonomously from its master-franchisor, to avoid the removal of an independent retail operator from the market.

In *CDG Express/RATP Dev/Keolis* (2019), since the Authority identified a risk of tie-in sales between the future CDG (Paris airport) Express ticket and baggage registration and transport services (ie, the new entity may rely on its position on the market for the provision of public passenger transport services to sell, at the same time as a ticket for the CDG Express and on preferential terms, a check-in and baggage service to and from the airport), the parties committed to entrust the operation of the baggage service to an independent partner with autonomy in the determination of its commercial policy. This commitment was subscribed for the duration of the public service contract (ie, 15 years from the effective date of bringing the CDG Express connection into service).

In *Salto/TF1/France Télévisions/M6* (2019), TF1, M6 and France Télévisions made several commitments to address the competition concerns raised by the creation of their joint venture Salto in the audiovisual sector. These commitments aim at preventing coordination risks

between TF1, France Télévisions and M6, as well as risks identified concerning the upstream market for the acquisition of broadcasting rights, the market for editing and marketing television channels, the market for the distribution of pay-TV services and advertising markets. Despite the numerous competition concerns and corresponding commitments, the Authority cleared the merger in Phase I, following a continuous dialogue with all stakeholders (several market tests) and an opinion of the French Superior Council of the Audiovisual.

In 2020, in the health facilities sector, the Authority cleared Elsan's acquisition of HSM, subject to structural and behavioural commitments. Although the Authority considered that the transaction would generate efficiency gains for obstetric patients, it held that these would not be sufficient to offset the risks of reduction in the healthcare offering; rate increases and decline in the quality of ancillary services; and reduction, via exclusivity provisions, in the pool of practitioners for healthcare facilities. Therefore, Elsan committed to transfer the entire activity from one facility to another one and to maintain those activities until March 2028; to maintain the standard of quality and content of its ancillary services (eg, access to a private room, television) without increasing their price above the level of inflation; and to refrain from inserting certain exclusivity clauses binding the practitioners.

From May 2019 to April 2020, the Authority was fairly active in the field of commitments, with eight clearances subject to remedies, including one conditional clearance in Phase II (*Elsan/HSM* merger in February 2020).

Finally, as to merger behavioural remedies, the Authority issued in January 2020 a comprehensive report on its decision-making practice in this field, notably revealing that a third of the commitments taken in French merger cases are behavioural ones (among the highest rates in Europe).

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Undertakings can be submitted to the Authority at any time from the notification of the case, during the first 25 working days in the first phase and 65 working days in the second phase. Where the parties submit undertakings in the first phase, the review period of 25 working days is extended by 15 additional working days. Parties may also ask for a 'stop the clock' of up to 15 working days to finalise undertakings. During the second phase, where undertakings are submitted or modified more than 45 working days after the opening of the second phase, such in-depth review period is extended by 20 working days from the date when such remedies are proposed. On a few occasions, the Authority required 'fix it first' commitments requiring the notifying party to identify, prior to the adoption of the decision, a suitable acquirer to take on the asset that it has committed to divest. The Authority also authorised in 2019, for the first time, a merger with an 'upfront buyer' commitment, where the transaction could not be implemented until the buyer of the business divested had been approved by the Authority (*Super NKT/SAFO* case).

Undertakings imposed on the parties by the Authority (ie, injunctions) aim at remedying anticompetitive effects of the operation. Moreover, remedies can be imposed by the Minister for the Economy to deal with other negative consequences of the operation.

- Failure to implement a remedy can result in the imposition of fines:
- for corporate entities – up to 5 per cent of their turnover in France in the previous financial year (plus, where applicable, the turnover in France over the same period of the acquired party); and
  - for individuals – up to €1.5 million.

Moreover, the Authority may also:

- withdraw the decision authorising the operation. In such case, and except where the situation that existed prior to the concentration

- is restored, the parties will be bound to notify the transaction a second time within one month of the withdrawal of the decision;
- enjoin the parties to comply, within a certain deadline, with the orders, injunctions or undertakings provided for under its decision, under periodic penalty; and
- enjoin the parties, subject to periodic penalty, to comply with new injunctions or orders that will replace the initial commitments that were not complied with.

In 2011, further to remedies agreed by Canal Plus in the 2006 *Vivendi Universal/CanalSat/TPS* case, the Authority considered in the course of a monitoring process that Canal Plus had breached several remedies and therefore decided to withdraw its authorisation and to fine the company €30 million. Vivendi and Canal Plus then re-notified the operation and the Authority opened a second-phase investigation in March 2012. In July 2012, the Authority finally cleared the operation subject to several injunctions. The case was confirmed on appeal. The Authority's decision provided that the injunctions, taken for five years (until July 2017), could be renewed for five additional years (2017–2022), should the circumstances warrant it. Against this background, the Authority launched in July 2016 a public consultation to determine whether these obligations in force since 2012 should be lifted, adapted or renewed. The Authority's analysis revealed that Canal Plus's position is increasingly challenged, leading the Authority to modify on 22 June 2017 the injunctions initially imposed: certain injunctions have been lifted, or adapted to take into account the evolution of the markets, while others have been maintained until 31 December 2019.

In April 2016, the Authority imposed a fine of €15 million on *Altice/Numericable* group for breach of remedies agreed in the 2014 *Numericable/SFR* case, relating to the divestment of Outremer Telecom. The *Altice/Numericable* group had undertaken to maintain the viability, market value and competitiveness of this business to favour its acquisition by a competitor. It subsequently appeared that Outremer Telecom's tariffs rose by 17 to 60 per cent, giving customers the opportunity to terminate their subscriptions without incurring cancellation fees. As a result, cancellation rates were three times higher in January 2015 than in January 2014. This constituted a reversal in Outremer's business strategy aiming at capturing new customers through aggressive competitive pricing. The Authority considered that this new strategy put the competitiveness of Outremer Telecom's offer at considerable risk, thus breaching the commitments.

In addition, in March 2017, the Authority jointly fined Altice and SFR Group €40 million for breach of other remedies made binding under the same 2014 *Numericable/SFR* decision. In this case, SFR had basically committed to continue to perform the contract (the Faber contract) it had entered into with Bouygues Telecom for their co-investment in the development of optical fibre infrastructure in high-density areas. However, the Authority held that *Altice/SFR Group* had only very partially fulfilled this commitment. This case was also the first in which the Authority imposed injunctions subject to periodic penalty payment, in order to further secure their implementation.

In July 2018, the Authority fined for the first time a company for non-compliance with structural commitments consisting of divesting assets within a given deadline. The Authority thus fined Fnac Darty Group €20 million for failing to divest three stores, as per the commitments, and ordered to divest two specific stores in lieu of those that were not disposed. The Authority notably considered that, confronted with difficulties in finding a buyer for these three other stores, it was Fnac Darty's responsibility to take the appropriate measures to fulfil its commitments, such as by asking the Authority to substitute other stores for those it wasn't able to sell.

It is also possible for the Authority to review remedies adopted for clearance of an operation in view of changes in circumstances. The

Authority used this possibility for the first time in the *Bigard/Socopa* case (2011) where it authorised the enforcement of a review clause included in the clearance decision, changing a trademark licence remedy into a trademark sale remedy. However, in this case, the Authority also fined Bigard €1 million for various practices aimed at reducing the value of the trademark and at discouraging candidates.

As part of the re-examination of the commitments submitted in relation to the acquisition by Vivendi and Groupe Canal Plus (GCP) of Direct 8 and Direct Star, the Authority had to decide upon a proposal of modified commitments formulated by GCP. The Authority's investigation revealed that Canal Plus's position is increasingly challenged, leading the Authority to modify in June 2017 the initial commitments: certain of them have been lifted, or adapted to take into account the evolution of the markets, while others have been maintained. The new framework applied until the end of 2019. This review was made in parallel to the re-examination of the injunctions imposed by the Authority on GCP in the context of the *Vivendi Universal/CanalSat/TPS* case.

Likewise, in 2019 the Authority had to review the remedies made binding in 2014 for the acquisition of Mediaserv (now Canal+ Telecom) by Canal Plus Overseas (now Canal+ International) for an initial duration of five years after which a new competitive analysis would be performed to examine whether or not they should be maintained. The Authority reviewed the new commitments proposed by Canal+ and market-tested them, concluding that certain existing obligations should be maintained, while others could be eased. All the commitments maintained or modified were renewed for a period of five years (ie, until 2024).

In 2019, the Authority had to decide whether Altice's commitments in relation to its acquisition of SFR (*Numericable/SFR* case in 2014) should be renewed. In 2014, these commitments were taken for a five-year duration that could be renewed once if the market conditions so required. The Authority considered it unnecessary to renew the 2014 commitments owing to the evolution of the markets since then and the emergence of credible alternatives to Altice's offers. However, as regards the injunctions imposed on Altice by the Authority in 2017 in relation to the Faber contract that Altice was also seeking to remove, the Authority ruled that the injunctions without periodic penalty payments should be lifted, while those with periodic penalty payments should be upheld.

The Authority is clearly minded to exercise a more systematic *ex post* control of the implementation of undertakings.

However, such enforcement policy does not systematically lead to findings of infringements. Further to *ex officio* proceedings initiated by the Authority in 2018 to verify compliance with the commitments taken by Altice France in the 2014 *Numericable/SFR* case and consisting in the disposal of Completel's DSL network, the Authority considered that there was no evidence establishing that Altice had not complied with its commitment. On this occasion, the Authority highlighted that, when reviewing compliance with a commitment, its control is limited to the framework set by its previous decision making the commitment binding (rather than the broad competitive analysis power it exercises in the context of the notification of mergers).

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers do not prevent the Authority reviewing the merger and if necessary requiring remedies (eg, the behavioural injunctions imposed in the *Boeing/Jeppesen* case (2001) and the divestment undertaking in the *GE/Invision Technologies* merger (2004)).

For obvious ease of enforcement purposes, remedies concerning the French national market are normally preferred. However, specific provisions exist for international coordination on remedies in cases where the affected markets are wider than national, or where competition on a single product market is affected in various countries.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

French decisional practice is not as developed as the European Commission's on the issue of ancillary restraints. However, it was considered on a number of occasions that restrictions that are both necessary and directly related to a merger are covered by the clearance decision. As to the types of arrangements that may be covered, national practice closely follows (and often expressly refers to) the approach of the European Commission.

The Guidelines for the first time dedicated specific provisions to ancillary restraints. The Authority is therefore ready to treat as ancillary restrictions provisions such as non-compete clauses in favour of the purchaser (provided their scope and duration are not excessive), licence agreements as well as purchase and supply contracts (provided they are of a limited duration and are not exclusive).

The Authority has used these provisions and examined ancillary restraints in several cases (eg, *Visa Europe/SAS Carte bleue* (2009), *Terrena/Groupe Bigard* (2010), *GFI-Bus/Thalès 'Business Solutions'* (2012), *Roullier/Fertilore* (2013), *Carrefour/Unibail* (2014)).

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Competition Authority (the Authority) may interview any third parties during the review of the concentration and it may also seek comments from any person who may be considered relevant for the review process. The Authority may hear third parties in the absence of the notifying parties. Moreover, the works council (employees' representative body) of the notifying parties shall be heard by the Authority at their request.

Third parties, such as complainants, are not directly involved in the merger control process as they have no automatic rights to be consulted or informed beyond the general information published on the Authority's website concerning pending procedures. Third parties do not have access to the notification file, but they can intervene through their response to the 'market test' that may be carried out by the Authority in the first and second phases (and, if the notifying party agrees, even in the pre-notification phase).

Third parties may also challenge the Authority's decision before the administrative courts. There is, however, no legal obligation for the Authority to consult third parties when the commitments are amended. In the 2014 *Wienerberger* case, following the 2013 *Bouyer-Leroux/Imerys* clearance decision, a third party, the Wienerberger company, challenged the legality of the Authority's decision as it had not been consulted on the modified commitments submitted by the notifying parties. The complaint was dismissed on appeal by the French Supreme Administrative Court.

In 2018, the Authority opened an in-depth examination into the *Axel Springer Group (SeLoger.com)/Concept Multimédia (Logic-Immo.com)* merger in the online property portal sector. To evaluate the capacity of current potential competitors to stimulate competition following the merger of two of the main operators in the French online property advertising market, the Authority launched a broad consultation, analysed numerous internal documents of the parties and, for the first time, issued an online questionnaire to more than 30,000 estate agencies.



## Publicity and confidentiality

### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Information on previous and pending decisions of the Authority is publicly available on the Authority's website. When a transaction is notified, a brief release is published on the Authority's website. It includes the identity of the parties concerned, the nature of the operation and the markets concerned.

The Authority's decisions are made public and parties may ask the Authority not to refer to confidential information in the public version of the decision. The Authority's Rapporteur Général is in charge of the management of confidentiality of business secrets.

Decisions issued by the Minister for the Economy are published in the ministerial official publication, the electronic 'Bulletin Officiel de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes' on the Minister's website.

Press releases from both the Authority and the Minister, if any, may also be found online. For important decisions, the press release is also published in English.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Within the framework of the European Competition Network, competition authorities of EU Member States inform each other of merger cases pending before them, in particular to be able to jointly request the application of article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. The Authority also cooperates with non-EU antitrust agencies.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the Competition Authority (the Authority) and of the Minister may be challenged before the French Supreme Administrative Court (the Council of State) on the grounds of abuse of power or for breach of a procedural rule.

In 2007, the Council of State quashed the Minister's decision clearing the acquisition of Delaroche by EBRA, mainly on the grounds that the Minister failed to correctly apply the concept of control and thus failed to properly review the merger.

In December 2013, the Council of State annulled the clearance decision of the acquisition of Direct 8 and Direct Star by Group Vivendi and Canal Plus, on procedural grounds and because it considered the agreed commitments insufficient. A new clearance decision based on strengthened commitments was then issued in April 2014.

In 2016, the Council of State partially annulled the decision of the Authority clearing the acquisition of Totalgaz by UGI (2015), in the liquefied petroleum gas sector. While the decision was confirmed for three of the four relevant markets, the Council of State considered that the scope of the competitive assessment was too narrow in relation to the fourth one and annulled the clearance decision and the relevant commitments in respect of this market.

In 2016, the Council of State rejected one request for a suspensive interim measure on the grounds that the claim did not show an urgent need to suspend the implementation of the decision, nor raise serious doubts as to the existence of an assessment error by the Authority. The applicants had sought to suspend the Authority's conditional clearance of the acquisition of Agri-Négoce by Axérial Participations, claiming that

the commitments were insufficient to meet the competition concerns on the market for seed collection in a given area.

In 2017 and 2018, the Council of State reviewed a number of appeals relating to the *Fnac/Darty* merger. As regards the scope of the commitments, a third party, who had entered into a lease agreement with Fnac, unsuccessfully lodged an appeal against the Authority's decision, in that it provided for the divestiture of the store concerned by the lease. Besides, as regards the implementation of the commitments, the *Fnac/Darty* group (as vendor) and the Dray group (as a contemplated acquirer of divested stores) respectively challenged the Authority's refusals to approve the contemplated purchaser as a suitable purchaser of the divested stores, and to extend the commitments' implementation deadline. All these appeals were rejected by the Council of State.

In 2019, the Council of State rejected the request for suspensive interim measure lodged by Mondadori's works council, which sought to suspend the Authority's conditional clearance in the *Mondadori France/Reworld Media* case.

## Time frame

### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Appeals against decisions of the Authority and of the Minister can be brought by the parties within two months of the date when the decision is notified, and by third parties within two months of publication of the decision on the Authority's website. In principle, appeals do not result in the suspension of the decisions. However, an action aimed at suspending a decision issued by the Authority can be lodged before the Council of State through a specific procedure, the request for suspensive interim measures. Such a suspension can be granted if the parties demonstrate that there is an emergency and that there is a serious doubt concerning the legality of the decision. This emergency procedure was first used in the *Cegid/CCMX* case in 2004, in which the Council of State ruled that, in view of the high combined market share of the parties, the approval decision would have had irreversible effects on the structure of competition on the market. In this particular case, however, the merger was eventually cleared by the Council of State in its final decision of 13 February 2006.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Recently, the Authority has been fairly active: approximately 270 clearance decisions were rendered from May 2019 to April 2020, of which eight were conditional clearances, mainly in the sectors of health, media and distribution or retail.

Again this year, several concentrations in French overseas territories were examined, these kinds of mergers being generally good candidates for commitments given the specificity of the overseas markets and local vertical integration issues. For instance, the Authority cleared the *SAFO/NDIS* merger (2019) in the supermarket sector in Cayenne subject to both the Authority's first 'upfront buyer' divestment commitment and a behavioural commitment. The Authority also cleared in 2020 the acquisition of the Pain Frotté group, which operates bakeries in La Réunion, by the groups Kin Siong, Lam Tow and Yong Wai Man, subject to the divestment of one bakery. Also, upon the announcement of the acquisition of Vindémia, active in La Réunion and Mayotte, by Groupe Bernard Hayot, the Authority announced that case handlers would travel to La Réunion in November 2019 to interview the economic operators and stakeholders affected by this takeover, since this concentration would be the largest acquisition ever to be examined by the Authority in overseas territories.

One merger case was referred by the European Commission to the Authority in 2019 to 2020, upon request of the parties. Since 2009, the European Commission appears to have referred two concentrations to the Authority.

To address the question of retailers' buying power, the law dated 6 August 2015 and the subsequent Decree of 14 December 2015 (which were inspired in this respect by an opinion of the Authority) introduced the obligation for the parties to joint purchasing agreements in upstream retail to inform the Authority of their contemplated buying alliance, even though such arrangements do not fall within the scope of merger control (eg, because it is considered as a non-full-function joint venture). This obligation applies where the following cumulative thresholds are met:

- all the undertakings that are party to the contemplated arrangement achieved, during the previous financial year, a worldwide combined pre-tax turnover exceeding €10 billion; and
- all the undertakings that are party to the contemplated arrangement achieved in France, during the previous financial year, a combined pre-tax purchase turnover of over €3 billion.

In July 2018, the Authority opened two market investigations in relation to purchasing alliances it was informed of on the basis of the above-mentioned provisions. The Authority announced that these investigations should be completed by the end of the year 2020.

The law dated 30 October 2018 made some amendments to the existing framework (without, however, modifying the thresholds). The Authority must now be informed at least four months prior to completion (instead of two) and the Authority is entitled to carry out a competitive assessment of the implementation of the agreement and the parties shall also agree to undertake appropriate remedies where anticompetitive effects are identified. The Authority now also has the power to order interim measures (including an injunction to return to the status quo ante or to request a modification of that agreement).

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

As a result of public consultations, a number of measures were implemented in 2019 to alleviate the burden on companies triggering merger control.

Also, following consultations in 2017 and 2018, the Authority, in September 2019, opened a new public consultation in order to revise its 2013 Guidelines. The revised guidelines were published on 23 July 2020 and take into account the experience of the Authority and case law since 2013.

As regards the possible introduction of *ex post* merger control review, the Authority announced, among its priorities for 2020, that it will endeavour to review more closely operations that currently fall below the thresholds but nevertheless impact the competitive dynamics of markets. During the public consultation on this subject that ended in September 2018, numerous stakeholders pointed out that an *ex post* regime would generate significant legal uncertainty for undertakings.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

As a result of public consultations, a number of measures were implemented in 2019 to alleviate the burden on companies triggering merger control.



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# Germany

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

German merger control provisions are enforced by the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office – BKartA) in Bonn. The current legislation can be found in Part 1, Chapter 7 of the Act against Restraints of Competition of 1958 (GWB). An English translation of the GWB is available at [www.bundeskartellamt.de](http://www.bundeskartellamt.de).

The BKartA is a federal authority that is responsible to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, but is independent in its decision-making and does not receive political orders. The BKartA is subdivided into 13 decision divisions. The first to ninth decision divisions have jurisdiction for the full range of competition law enforcement areas in a specific economic sector, including merger control. The 10th to 12th decision divisions specialise in prosecuting hardcore cartels. The last decision division is in charge of consumer protection but is also responsible for the full range of competition law enforcement areas (including merger control) in specific economic sectors (not covered by the first to ninth decision divisions). The BKartA is supported by its Chief Economist Team. Andreas Mundt has been President of the BKartA since 2009.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The GWB sets out a comprehensive list of events constituting a concentration, which includes not only the acquisition of control and the creation of joint ventures, but also the acquisition of minority shareholdings or of a material competitive influence below the level of control. The most important events constituting a concentration are:

- the acquisition of (direct or indirect) control over another enterprise or parts thereof by one or several enterprises;
- the acquisition of all or a substantial part of the assets of another enterprise;
- the acquisition of a share in a company's capital or voting rights resulting in an overall shareholding of 25 per cent (or more) or 50 per cent (or more); and
- any other combination of companies enabling one or several companies to directly or indirectly exercise a material competitive influence on another company (this covers some acquisitions of minority shareholdings of below 25 per cent).

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture or the acquisition of a share in an existing joint venture qualifies as a concentration if it involves the acquisition of a share in a company's capital or voting rights of 25 per cent (or more).

The acquisition of a share of 25 per cent or more is not only a concentration between the acquirer and the joint venture, but is also regarded as a concentration between the parent companies (ie, the acquirer and those parent companies that hold a share of at least 25 per cent in the joint venture). This means that the other parent companies' consolidated turnover must also be taken into account - separately from the joint venture's turnover - for the calculation of the turnover thresholds. However, the latter concentration is limited to the markets in which the joint venture is active.

The GWB does not differentiate between full-function and non-full-function joint ventures so that the creation of a joint venture that does not perform all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis may be notifiable in Germany.

In addition, joint ventures are not only subject to merger control, but may also fall under the provisions on restrictive practices (GWB, section 1 and article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). This means that they require merger control clearance by the BKartA and may also be challenged under the restrictive practices provisions.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The concept of 'acquisition of control' has largely been adopted from the European merger control regime. Although there is no definition of 'acquisition of control' under the GWB, the provisions describe how control can be acquired, namely by rights, contracts or any other means that, either separately or in combination, and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence over another enterprise, in particular through ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of the enterprise; or rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of the enterprise. A change of control must occur on a lasting basis to be considered a 'concentration'.

German merger control also catches acquisitions of interests below the level of control. An acquisition resulting in an interest (shares or voting rights) of 25 per cent (or more) constitutes a concentration. In addition, the acquisition by one or several enterprises of a material competitive influence over another enterprise constitutes a concentration. This covers situations where (1) a shareholding of below 25 per cent is acquired, provided additional factors that make the situation comparable to an acquisition of 25 per cent are present and, at the same time (2) the acquired influence is 'relevant for competition' (the acquirer obtains an influence which can have an effect on the way the target company competes on the market or its potential to compete). Such factors can include any that may give the acquirer the possibility of influencing the target (such as the right to appoint members of the supervisory board, information rights as a shareholder, specific rights agreed in the shareholders' agreement, etc, known as 'plus factors').

For example, in a 2008 decision (*A-TEC Industries AG/Norddeutsche Affinerie AG*), confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, the BKartA determined that both (together or taken independently) the acquisition of 13.75 per cent of the target's share capital (which amounted to a de facto blocking minority of 25 per cent because of consistently low shareholder attendance at the target's annual shareholder meetings) and the right to appoint three of 12 members of the target's supervisory board enabled the acquirer to exercise a material competitive influence over the target. Also decisive was the fact that the acquirer was the only shareholder in the target with market knowledge of the target's business and had a proven strategic interest in the target's competitive behaviour. The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf explicitly mentioned that for a material competitive influence to exist, the acquisition of the shares must confer an influence over the decision-making process and the market behaviour of the target, and that this is the case if the acquirer possesses an overwhelming market and industry knowledge that the other shareholders do not have. When assessing the existence of the 'plus factors', more weight will be given to qualitative considerations (representation and possibility of influence in the decision-making bodies, sector-specific knowledge of the minority acquirer) than to purely quantitative indicators (percentage of the shares acquired, distribution of the remaining shares). Another interesting case in that respect concerned the creation of a joint venture between EDEKA, the largest food retailer in Germany, and Budnikowsky, a drugstore company with 181 outlets in the Hamburg metropolitan area, which the BKartA cleared in May 2017. The two companies planned to hive off Budnikowsky's procurement, IT, e-commerce, administrative and logistic activities into the joint venture in which EDEKA would hold 25.1 per cent. However, while EDEKA did not acquire any shares in Budnikowsky or vice versa, the BKartA still considered that EDEKA's shareholding in the joint venture allowed it to exert material competitive influence over Budnikowsky. The decision of the BKartA to even consider EDEKA's supposed influence over Budnikowsky under merger control rules can be described as game-changing, as up to that point there had to be some kind of corporate influence for a transaction to result in the ability to exert 'material competitive influence', whereas here there was no such link between the parties. Thus, for legal certainty, it may be advisable to notify cooperation agreements like this to the BKartA in the future. Some commentators have also described this case as a way of using merger control to obtain an individual exemption for cooperation agreements.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

There are two alternative sets of thresholds.

According to the first set of thresholds, a concentration must be notified prior to its completion if in the last financial year:

- the combined worldwide turnover of all participating enterprises exceeded €500 million;
- one participating undertaking had a turnover exceeding €25 million within Germany; and
- at least one further undertaking had a turnover in Germany exceeding €5 million.

The ninth reform of the GWB in 2017 added another set of thresholds, which catch concentrations that do not meet the thresholds in the first set, in an attempt to give the BKartA the power to review certain transactions, inter alia, in the fast-moving digital sector. According to this second set of thresholds, a concentration must be notified prior to its completion if, in the last financial year:

- the combined worldwide turnover of all participating enterprises exceeded €500 million;
- one participating undertaking had a turnover exceeding €25 million within Germany, but neither the target nor any other participating undertaking had a turnover in Germany exceeding €5 million;
- the value of consideration for the transaction exceeds €400 million; and
- the target is active in Germany to a significant extent (local nexus).

However, if the parties to a concentration fulfil the first set of thresholds, they will be exempted from the notification obligation if one party to the merger achieved less than €10 million worldwide turnover (in the case of the target including the seller and all its affiliates, provided that the seller controls the target and, in the case of the acquirer, including all its affiliates), or the concentration relates to the combination of public undertakings as a consequence of a 'reform of communal territory'. These exemptions do not apply if the parties to a concentration fulfil the second set of thresholds.

Turnover figures must be calculated by reference to an undertaking's last completed financial year, on a worldwide consolidated group basis excluding intra-group sales and VAT. In specific sectors, the calculation of turnover is a two-step process: for example, in the case of goods traded (ie, goods that are simply purchased and resold), only 75 per cent of the turnover achieved is to be taken into account. There are special rules for credit institutions and building societies, as well as insurance companies for the broadcasting sector and for producers and distributors of newspapers or magazines.

Merger control under the GWB is not applicable to any transaction that falls below the German turnover or transaction value thresholds and the BKartA cannot investigate such cases. No such cases have been referred to the European Commission thus far. German merger control is also not applicable to any transaction that falls within the scope of the EUMR (with exceptions provided for in the EUMR).

Transactions that meet the above thresholds, but have no 'appreciable [domestic] effects' within the territory of Germany are exempt from the notification requirement.

The question of whether the target is active in Germany to a significant extent (which is relevant for the application of the second set of thresholds) is different from the question of whether the transaction can have an 'appreciable effect' in Germany and should, therefore, be dealt with separately. In July 2018, the BKartA, together with the Austrian competition authority, published a joint guidance paper. However, in case of doubts – given that the threshold is still relatively new, with little practical experience – it is advisable for the parties to seek informal guidance from the BKartA. Recent experience shows that the BKartA is open to such informal discussions and provides guidance quickly.

The ninth reform in 2017 of the law has excluded the application of merger control to transactions in which all undertakings concerned: are members of a banking industry association according to the German Corporation Tax Law; are principally active in the provision of back-office services for companies of the banking industry association of which they are a member; and do not have any own end-customer relationships in the services mentioned above.

#### 6 Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory if the jurisdictional thresholds described above are met and if the requirements of the appreciable (domestic) effects clause are met.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are subject to German merger control only if they have an 'appreciable effect' within the territory of Germany. The BKartA has always applied the concept of 'appreciable effect' broadly. In practice, it is likely that almost all foreign-to-foreign concentrations caught by the first set of thresholds will have an 'appreciable effect' within the territory of Germany, even if the parties have no subsidiaries or other assets within Germany.

The only exception where the local effects test still plays a role relates to foreign joint ventures, as the turnover thresholds may, in these cases, be met by the parent companies alone and through activities that are not (directly) related to the joint venture. To ensure greater clarity, the BKartA updated its guidance in 2014 'to relieve concentrations that do not affect Germany of unnecessary bureaucracy'. The guidance provides concrete examples as well as a flowchart to illustrate how to apply the concept of 'appreciable effects'.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Yes, there are two different tests under which the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Ministry) assesses foreign investments: the cross-sectoral examination and the sector-specific examination. Both regimes have been amended in recent years, leading to a tighter control over acquisitions of domestic companies. Further changes will enter into force still this year.

### Cross-sectoral examination

The cross-sectoral examination is applicable in cases where investors from outside the European Union or EFTA – directly or indirectly – acquire 25 per cent or more (and in certain cases 10 per cent) of the voting rights in a German enterprise if the acquisition could pose a threat to Germany's public policy or security. The Ministry may also examine acquisitions by investors from within the European Union or EFTA if one of their (indirect) shareholders comes from a non-EU or non-EFTA member state and holds 25 (or 10) per cent or more of the shares. This right of scrutiny applies to all sectors and enterprises and allows the Ministry to initiate a review of the investment. The regulation lists a number of strategic industry sectors where transactions will be scrutinised more carefully. In particular, this applies to critical infrastructure: energy, information technology and telecommunications, transport and traffic, health, water supply, food, finance and insurance. Other strategic sectors include software for critical infrastructure, cloud-computing services and the media. In 2020, the list of sectors that trigger a mandatory filing was extended to include companies that develop, manufacture or distribute (components for) personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals or medical products companies that provide services to ensure the undisturbed functioning of government communication infrastructure or that extract or process specific raw materials. Another update expected for autumn 2020 will further extend the list to 'critical technologies' such as artificial intelligence, robotics or semiconductors. This update will also bring a few other changes. In particular, the Ministry may then consider whether a transaction is likely to pose a threat to the public order and security of another EU member state.

The Ministry may either restrict the acquisition or prohibit it altogether, rendering the purchase contract invalid. Filings are mandatory for acquisitions in the sectors listed above (if certain materiality thresholds are met). Such acquisitions are also subject to a stand-still obligation. For all other acquisitions, filings are voluntary, but may be advisable as they lead to shorter review periods for the Ministry. If no

filing is made, the Ministry has up to five years from signing to open an investigation (and ultimately unwind the transaction). This period is reduced to two months starting from the day of the submission of the complete filing. If an investigation is opened and the parties have sufficiently addressed all questions raised in the opening decision, the Ministry has four months to clear the case (unconditionally or with orders), enter into negotiations with the purchaser (which stops the clock) or to prohibit the transaction. Furthermore, Germany will implement a cooperation mechanism to allow the European Commission as well as other member states to provide comments in relation to foreign investments undergoing screening in Germany.

### Sector-specific examination

The sector-specific test also applies to purchasers from within the European Union or EFTA. The test focuses on acquisitions falling within certain strategic sectors: acquisitions of 10 per cent or more of the voting rights in companies that produce or develop goods listed in the War Weapons Control Act, specific items mentioned in export control lists, certain cryptographic systems or specially designed motors, gears or transmissions to drive battle tanks or other armoured military tracked vehicles must be notified to the Ministry, which may prohibit or restrict the acquisition to safeguard Germany's essential security interests. The transaction may not be closed without the approval of the Ministry, which is obliged to issue a written statement of clearance if there are no objections to the notified investment. The statement of clearance is deemed to be issued if the Ministry does not initiate a formal review of the acquisition within two months of its notification.

### Sanctions

In July 2020, Germany introduced criminal sanctions (prison terms up to five years or financial penalties, or both) for closing without obtaining prior clearance and certain activities that are considered to be gun jumping (eg, the exchange of sensitive information). The same applies to violations of enforceable orders by the Ministry prohibiting or restricting an acquisition.

For transactions that do not trigger a mandatory filing, the Ministry may still open a review procedure *ex officio* and, in a worst-case scenario, the transaction may have to be unwound. Where the suspensory regime applies, failure to notify may lead to the transaction being invalid until clearance. In addition, violations of enforceable orders by the Ministry prohibiting or restricting an acquisition may give rise to administrative fines.

### Special sectors

Besides the general foreign investment regime, there are some other sector-specific rules, such as in relation to radio and television broadcasting.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There are no legal deadlines for a notification of a concentration, but notifiable concentrations must not be completed before clearance. It is possible to file a pre-merger notification even prior to the signing of the transactional documents. Parties should also not forget to submit a mandatory post-completion notice to the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office – BKartA), which needs to be filed without 'undue delay' following completion of the transaction. This is, however, a mere formality.

Fines can be imposed for closing before clearance as well as for submission of incorrect or incomplete filing. Those sanctions are regularly applied in practice.

## 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In principle, all parties involved in a merger (ie, typically the purchaser and the target company) are responsible for filing. In the case of an acquisition of shares or assets, the vendor must also notify. In practice, the filing is often done by the acquiring firm on behalf of all parties involved.

Filing fees payable to the BKartA can amount to up to €50,000 (in cases of minor importance or with insignificant effect on the German market, the filing fees normally range between €3,000 and €15,000). In exceptional cases, a fee of up to €100,000 is possible. The BKartA determines the fees by taking into consideration both its administrative (ie, personnel and material) expenses and the economic significance of the transaction notified. In addition to the fees, the BKartA can recover costs for external consultants (eg, economists) from the merging parties.

## 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Mergers that are subject to merger control may not be completed before either the BKartA has cleared the transaction or the relevant waiting periods of one month (first phase) or four months (first and second phases together) after submission of a complete notification have expired without the BKartA having prohibited the transaction.

2008 case law clarified that the suspension obligation also applies to transactions that are notified to the BKartA even where there is no formal notification obligation. Therefore, the decision to submit a 'precautionary notification' of a transaction where the question of the notification requirement is not entirely clear (eg, in possible cases involving the acquisition of material competitive influence) must be carefully made, as the notification, once submitted, triggers the waiting periods until a final decision of the BKartA is rendered. The BKartA can, upon the submission of an application, grant an exemption from the suspension obligation if there are compelling reasons to do so. This is the case, in particular, if the parties involved can establish that an exemption would prevent severe damage to one of the undertakings involved or to a third party. However, both the BKartA and the courts interpret this exemption restrictively. Stock market, staff loss or competitiveness risks usually would not suffice – exemption tends to be limited to situations of imminent insolvency.

The parties have the right to withdraw their notification at any time, unless the BKartA itself has delivered a decision ending the procedure (such as an explicit or implicit clearance decision or a prohibition decision). Such withdrawal automatically ends the merger control procedure.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The completion of a notifiable merger prior to clearance can lead to severe penalties: fines of up to €1 million or, in the case of undertakings, of up to 10 per cent of their total worldwide group turnover in the preceding business year, can be imposed. The BKartA regularly imposes fines for closing notifiable transactions prior to clearance. Since the end of 2007, the BKartA has imposed five fines (up to €4.5 million) for closing before clearance.

In a recent judgment in the case *Edeka/Kaiser's Tengelmann*, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf decided that a partial implementation of a concentration before clearance also violated the suspension requirement. In that case, the merging parties had already started implementing some aspects of the merger agreement (one party agreeing to close outlets in an interim period before clearance and joint purchasing cooperation). This decision has been confirmed by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in November 2017 that decided that measures or behaviour, which themselves cannot constitute a concentration per se, but which are made in the context of the intended concentration and can (at least) partly create the effects of that intended concentration, constitute gun jumping. In another judgment relating to the same case, rendered on 17 July 2018 (*Edeka/Kaiser's Tengelmann II*), the German Federal Court of Justice also confirmed the possibility for the BKartA to formally issue interim measures against existing or merely imminent gun-jumping acts of the parties (and according to the BKartA this approach also holds in the context of the Court of Justice of the European Union's *Ernst & Young* judgment).

In cases of negligent disregard of the notification obligation, the BKartA normally informs the parties to the transaction of their obligations and insists on the submission of a post-completion notice containing all the details that are normally required in a pre-merger notification. If the parties comply with this request, they may in many cases escape a fine, if it was their first violation of the obligation to notify. However, if the concentration involves parties with significant business activities in Germany who have already submitted a number of notifications in prior transactions, fines are more likely. In cases of deliberate disregard of the notification obligation, the BKartA normally will impose a fine. Fines are much more likely if there is already a negative track record.

The BKartA does not treat notifications of transactions that occur after their (complete or partial) completion as 'proper' notifications but will rather consider them as post-completion notices. The BKartA assesses the competition issues triggered by the proposed transaction directly as part of a 'merger dissolution procedure'. As a consequence, the one-month period for first-phase cases does not apply. Should the BKartA reach the conclusion that the transaction raises substantial issues, it may directly order the dissolution of the transaction. As a consequence, it is easier for the BKartA to undo a consummated merger that fulfils the prohibition conditions in the Act against Restraints of Competition of 1958 (GWB) quickly, as there is no longer a need to issue a formal decision prohibiting the merger before opening a merger dissolution procedure.

Further, any transaction implementing a merger in violation of the clearance requirement is regarded as invalid under civil law (at least in German law) until final clearance is given.

## 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Sanctions for closing before clearance are applied to any notifiable concentration. Whether the concentration involves national undertakings or foreign undertakings is irrelevant. The largest fine ever imposed by the BKartA for closing before clearance related to a foreign-to-foreign merger (fine imposed on Mars in 2008 for having closed the non-German parts of the acquisition of Nutro Products).

## 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Hold-separate arrangements that are entered into between the parties for the purpose of closing a foreign-to-foreign transaction prior to clearance without breaching the suspension obligation may be possible if

they ensure that the closing will not have an impact on the market in Germany. However, because they are unusual under German merger control rules, they require analysis in each individual case, and in practice, it is difficult to design hold-separate arrangements in a way that clearly excludes effects on the German market. This was made particularly clear after the BKartA's fining of Mars for having closed its acquisition of Nutro before clearance. Mars had notified its intention to acquire all shares in Nutro. Nutro had no assets in Germany and all sales of Nutro products into Germany were made through an independent third-party distributor located outside Germany. Following clearance by the FTC in the United States, Mars acquired the majority of the shares in Nutro prior to the BKartA's clearance. Prior to the transfer of the Nutro shares, the seller and Mars agreed to transfer and carve out the German activities that remained with the seller. The BKartA found that this was not sufficient as, in the BKartA's view, the German business could not be separated from the remaining Nutro business. It therefore concluded that the acquisition of the foreign Nutro assets had an impact on the German market and that the transfer of the shares therefore constituted an infringement of the German standstill obligation.

It is generally advisable to discuss all kinds of carveout or hold-separate solutions with the BKartA beforehand to avoid fines. In cases that do not raise competitive issues, asking the BKartA for a quick clearance may be the preferable option.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

German merger control rules are aligned with article 7(2) EUMR, allowing the notifying parties under certain conditions to consummate the public takeovers prior to clearance. The GWB does not prevent the implementation of a public bid that has been notified to the BKartA, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments and on the basis of a derogation granted by the BKartA.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Germany is one of the few jurisdictions worldwide that requires only a limited amount of information in a notification. The GWB requires, as a minimum, a description of the transaction and, in respect of all participating enterprises: name, place of incorporation, type of business, turnover of the parties involved (worldwide, in the European Union and in Germany), market shares of the parties in Germany and the basis of its own calculation if the combined market shares amount to 20 per cent or more, and in the case of an acquisition of shares in another company, information about the shares already held in the target company and the shares to be acquired. In the case a transaction is notified because the second set of thresholds is met, the value of consideration for the transaction as well as the principles dictating its computation are also required pieces of information. It is advisable, and may accelerate the proceedings, to provide at least some basic information on the markets concerned by the transaction. The level of information and analysis will depend on the extent to which the merger raises substantive competition law issues. The usual form of notification is a simple letter setting out the necessary information.

The notification must be submitted in German. The relevant waiting period begins after a complete notification has been received by the BKartA.

Foreign parties must appoint an authorised representative in Germany, on whom documents in the merger proceedings can be formally served. In contrast to EU merger control law, there is no obligation to submit the acquisition or merger agreement or any additional documents such as internal reports or annual reports and accounts to the BKartA. However, the BKartA sometimes requests such documents. Similarly, the BKartA does not usually require the submission of powers of attorney.

Fines for the following administrative offences can be imposed. If a filing is made with incorrect or incomplete information, a fine of up to €100,000 can be imposed. A fine of €90,000 was imposed in a case in which one notifying party did not disclose a majority participation in a company, although this participation was relevant for the substantive assessment of the notified concentration with another company (*Clemens Tönnies/Tummel*, January 2013). The same penalties can apply for a failure to submit a post-merger completion notice or in cases of incomplete, incorrect or late notice. A fine of up to €1 million or, in the case of an undertaking, up to 10 per cent of its total worldwide group turnover in the preceding business year, can be imposed if the notifying parties intentionally include or make use of incorrect or incomplete information in the notification with a view to causing the BKartA to refrain from issuing a prohibition decision or from opening a second-phase investigation. External lawyers advising the notifying parties can also be fined if they intentionally submit incorrect information. Several external lawyers have already been or are subject to such an infringement procedure. Fines for incomplete filings have, so far, been rare in practice. Early in 2016, the BKartA imposed a fine of €90,000 on Bongrain Europe SAS for submitting incorrect (under-evaluated) market shares in a merger control filing. Where the parties intentionally submit incorrect information, the BKartA is likely to impose significant fines (eg, a fine of €250,000 has previously been imposed on a US company that provided incorrect information on its market share).

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

If the BKartA has sufficient data on the relevant markets, a decision is likely to be issued after internal discussions within the BKartA's division responsible for the case. If it requires more information (which is often the case) or needs to verify the information provided by the parties, it often contacts other market participants (such as competitors, customers, suppliers or business associations) to seek their views and information on their activities and the relevant markets, as well as often requiring the notifying parties to provide further information.

In the vast majority of cases, the BKartA is able to ascertain during the first-phase investigation that the case does not raise substantive competition problems in Germany. In these cases, the BKartA will issue an informal clearance letter within the first phase. The clearance letter is not reasoned and not subject to appeal by third parties.

If competition concerns are identified during the first-phase investigation, the BKartA must inform the parties (usually, but not necessarily, in writing) within one month that a second-phase investigation will be initiated. If the initial concerns are not confirmed during the second phase, the BKartA will either clear the concentration directly or, especially if there are intervening third parties, issue a draft clearance decision. If the second-phase investigation confirms the competition concerns, the BKartA will set out the identified issues in a written statement of objections. Both the statement of objections and the draft clearance decision provide an opportunity to submit comments. In addition, upon request of the notifying or the intervening third parties, the BKartA will also allow them to present their comments in a meeting with the case team.



Merging parties can submit proposals for commitments at any time of the procedure, provided that the BKartA still has sufficient time to review and market test the proposal. At the end of a second phase, the BKartA will either issue a clearance decision, a clearance decision with commitments or a prohibition decision. All three types of decisions are formal administrative decisions, which means that they must be reasoned and are subject to full judicial review.

The BKartA is open to pre-filing consultations in cases that are high-profile, are likely to raise competition concerns or present an unusual degree of complexity. Such discussions will usually help with the efficient preparation of the notification, as they will identify the areas in which the BKartA would like to receive more information etc. In fact, the President of the BKartA, Andreas Mundt, welcomed this explicitly by stating the following in its annual 2018 end-of-year press release: 'Companies often approach us first, in particular in cases which might be critical. Some of these projects will then not even be notified. After taking preliminary soundings in the extensive *Karstadt/Kaufhof* case we were able to send out formal requests for information to around 100 companies on the actual day of notification. This ultimately meant that the merger could be examined very quickly and at the same time very thoroughly.' In various press releases issued by the BKartA in 2019–2020 for merger cases, the BKartA mentions that a Phase I clearance could be granted due to intensive analysis having been conducted, in agreement with the parties, even before the parties had formally submitted their notification. By contrast, in simple cases, pre-filing consultations with the authority appear unnecessary.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The BKartA must decide within one month of complete notification whether to clear the merger or, if the transaction raises competition concerns, whether to commence an in-depth second phase investigation. Decisions in second-phase proceedings must be issued within four months of the notification date. The four-month period may be further extended, provided that the notifying parties consent. This is applied in many cases after commitments have been proposed by the parties to allow the BKartA to properly market test the commitments, and there is an automatic one-month extension of the second phase if the parties submit commitments. In addition, there is a stop-the-clock mechanism in second-phase proceedings should the notifying parties not fully respond to an information request of the BKartA.

In practice, decisions are usually issued within the initial investigation (first phase) period of one month (more than 95 per cent of all notifications).

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A merger must be prohibited by the BKartA if it 'would significantly impede effective competition', in particular if it leads to the creation or strengthening of a dominant market position.

In 2013, the dominance test was replaced by the European significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) test. However, the dominance test remains the key standard example of SIEC. In the context of dominance (as an example of an SIEC), the principles set out in the 2012 Guidance document on the dominance test continue to be relevant. The BKartA applies the analytical framework of the SIEC test in a similar way to the European Commission.

According to the definition of dominance under the Act against Restraints of Competition of 1958 (GWB), a dominant position exists if

one or more enterprises have no competitors at all, are not subject to material competition, or are in a superior market position that enables them to act independently of competitors, customers and other market participants. The GWB contains a number of rebuttable presumptions as to the existence of dominant market positions. There is a presumption of single dominance where a single company has a share of at least 40 per cent of the market. Collective dominance is presumed if three or fewer enterprises have a combined market share of at least 50 per cent, or if five or fewer enterprises have a combined market share of at least two-thirds. Collective dominance is an issue that was at the heart of a number of recent high-profile mergers reviewed by the BKartA and the German courts. In contrast to the presumption of single firm dominance, the parties themselves must rebut the presumption of collective dominance (by showing, inter alia, that there would be no implicit collusion between the presumed jointly dominant companies). Because the BKartA is under a statutory obligation to fully investigate all relevant factors, these presumptions function more like soft safe harbours. Before the courts, they continue to play a slightly more important role.

The BKartA often considers complex economic arguments. Besides market share levels, the factors it takes into account include the competitive structure of the market, barriers to entry and potential competition (see the recent prohibition of proposed acquisition of MBO group by Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG), the closeness of competition (a factor whose weight appears to have gained importance in recent years), switching costs (see the recent press release regarding withdrawal by IBM of its notification of its acquisition of staff, hardware and software from T-Systems' mainframe business), access to customers (eg, the importance of distribution networks and brands), access to suppliers, vertical integration, structural links to competitors, suppliers and customers, and also, if relevant, the parties' financial resources. The Guidance on Substantive Merger Control sets out the analytical framework for review. In 2019–2020, the negotiation power of the customers or suppliers of merging parties often played an important role in justifying clearance (eg, *Vue Group (Cinemaxx)/Cinestar* movie theatre mergers: no competition concerns on the procurement market owing to a high concentration on the supply side represented by the large Hollywood film studios as film distributors; *Kemper/Reinert* meat and sausage producers merger (strong countervailing buying power of food retail companies); *Harry-Brot/one production asset of Kronenbrot*: high buyer power of food retailers like Edeka, Rewe and Kaufland as customers; and *Rewe/Lekkerland* merger: strong buyer power of the large oil companies as customers).

There are three exceptions to this rule. A concentration cannot be prohibited by the BKartA even if it would significantly impede effective competition in three situations.

The first is where the parties can show that the merger will result in an improvement of market conditions on another market, which outweighs the detrimental effects on competition. The most recent application of this clause can be found in the clearance by the BKartA of the takeover of Mediengruppe Frankfurt by the Ippen Group, with both companies publishing newspapers in the Hesse region in Germany (possible negative effects existed on some regional reader markets; however, improvements on the reader market in another region were viewed, on balance, as being significantly more important).

The second applies if the relevant market has been in existence for at least five years and had a total annual value of less than €15 million in the last calendar year (de minimis market clause). This rule does not apply where a concentration is notifiable pursuant to the second set of thresholds. This de minimis rule also does not apply in relation to markets in which the service is provided free of charge to users. For the purposes of assessing the €15 million threshold, only the value of the German part of the market has to be taken into account, even if the geographical market is wider than the national market. If the relevant



geographical market is narrower than the national market, the relevant geographical market must be taken as the reference point for the calculation.

However, the clause should be assessed carefully, as, in a limited number of cases and under clearly defined conditions, the BKartA is allowed to bundle closely related geographic and product markets and to aggregate their volumes of sales when calculating the total size of the German market for the purposes of the de minimis market clause. This can be the case in particular where:

- a product market has been artificially separated into different de minimis markets within Germany;
- the transaction affects several homogeneous geographically neighbouring de minimis markets;
- the transaction affects several neighbouring product markets that have comparable competitive market structures; or
- the parties operate on a local de minimis market but also on non-de minimis upstream or downstream markets where the conditions of competition on the de minimis market directly determine which competitors are able to operate on the upstream or downstream markets.

Although the above principles were developed at a time where the legal framework was different (the question of de minimis markets played a role in determining whether there was a notification obligation in the first place), it is likely that the jurisprudence of the courts continues to be applied.

The third exception is a specific rule for the failing firm defence in the press sector. Dominant publishers will be allowed to acquire a small or medium-sized competitor even if this leads to the strengthening of a dominant market position, provided that the acquired publisher meets specific financial underperformance criteria (which are clearly defined by the law and differ from the failing firm defence criteria) and that no other acquirer could be found.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Under the GWB, all joint ventures have to pass the SIEC test under the merger control rules.

In addition to the SIEC test under merger control, all cooperative aspects of the joint venture are reviewed under the restrictive practices provisions of the GWB (this is in contrast to the EUMR, where potential coordination effects between the parent companies are assessed as part of the merger control process). This review is not automatically integrated into the merger procedure but may be performed either in parallel or after the merger procedure (eg, after a merger control clearance). A joint venture will raise competition issues if it leads to coordination between the parent companies. Coordination will be more likely in cases where the parent companies continue to be active on the same market as the joint venture. Spillover effects on neighbouring or other markets are less likely, but can also occur (eg, if the joint venture carries substantial weight compared to the parent companies' other activities). However, a joint venture is unlikely to violate the restrictive practices provision if the following conditions are met:

- it is a full-function joint venture that acts as an independent market participant;
- the parent companies are not active in the joint venture's relevant product markets; and
- the joint venture is not exclusively or predominantly active in markets upstream or downstream of its parent companies' activities.

## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The BKartA examines all aspects of competition in the relevant markets. This covers unilateral and coordinated effects in horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. A detailed summary of how the BKartA will typically approach the analysis can be found in its revised Guidance on Substantive Assessment. In July 2019, the BKartA prohibited a concentration in the used packaging waste disposal and recycling sector (*Remondis/DSD*), for reasons of both vertical foreclosure risks (customer and input foreclosure – raising rivals' costs) on the one hand, and horizontal overlaps leading to dominance on the other. This prohibition decision was confirmed on appeal (the Court only analysed horizontal overlaps).

With regard to unilateral effects, key aspects of the BKartA's analysis relate to market shares, concentration ratio, capacity restrictions, customer preferences and switching costs, IP and know-how factors, market phase, access to procurement or sales markets, links with other companies, financial resources, potential competition and market entry, neighbouring substitution and countervailing buying power. In vertical mergers, the BKartA focuses its assessment on input and customer foreclosure effects.

With regard to coordinated effects, the BKartA's assessment focuses on the question of whether coordination becomes more stable, for example, because a significant outside competitor is acquired (eg, *Magna/Karmann* of 21 May 2010), or the companies participating in coordination become more symmetric (eg, *Axel Springer/ProSiebenSat.1* decision of 19 January 2006, confirmed by the Federal Court of Justice on 8 June 2010). For a recent example on a decision having reviewed in-depth to which extent coordinated effects could be expected in a situation of (very) high combined market shares, please see the case summary relating to the clearance of the *Syburger Verlag GmbH/motorbike business unit of Reiner H Nitschke Verlags-GmbH* in April 2020.

The identification of competition issues in conglomerate mergers is rather rare. The only example of this goes back over 10 years. It is the *Axel Springer/ProSiebenSat.1* case (2006), where one of the issues was cross-media effects and foreclosure. In the *Tokyo Electron/Applied Materials* case (2014) a significant conglomerate merger was cleared because the investigation did not confirm allegations by complainants that the merging parties would have the ability and incentive to foreclose rivals.

The protection of companies' incentives and ability to compete play an increased role in the BKartA's substantive assessment, and the degree of innovation capabilities is a factor that is taken into account by the BKartA in its substantive assessment. While the BKartA has had no prominent recent case, there is no reason to believe that the approach of the BKartA would be any different to the recent approach of the European Commission in innovation.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues are not relevant and may not be taken into account by the BKartA. The BKartA regularly reiterates that its prerogative is the control of concentrations from a pure competition perspective. For example, when it cleared the acquisition of the newspaper *General-Anzeiger* by *Rheinische Post* in 2018, it noted that, while it is part of merger control to examine whether readers still have alternative sources to choose from, the BKartA cannot use diversity of opinion per se as an assessment criterion in its examination. It has also constantly

taken the view that public interest and foreign investment grounds should be dealt with in a separate process by another authority.

However, the BKartA's decision to prohibit a merger can be overruled by the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy if the negative effects of the merger on competition are outweighed by benefits to the economy as a whole or if the merger is justified by an overriding public interest. The decision may also include conditions imposed on the parties. The Minister enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the criteria for granting an authorisation, but the decision is subject to judicial review on questions of substance as well as on procedural questions. In addition, before an authorisation can be granted by the Minister, an elaborate procedure has to be followed. In particular, the Monopolies Commission, an independent but government-sponsored competition policy think tank has to issue a public opinion on the public interest issue. Afterwards, a public hearing has to be held.

Cases of ministerial authorisation being granted are rare. Since the introduction of merger control in 1973, a ministerial authorisation has only been granted without conditions in three cases and with conditions in seven cases (recently in the *Edeka/Kaiser's Tengelmann* and *Miba/Zollern* cases). In total, there have been only 23 applications.

The ninth reform of the GWB in 2017 introduced new provisions on certain procedural aspects of a ministerial authorisation, in particular speeding up the procedure and allowing the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy to issue guidelines about details of the procedure. The minister is supposed to authorise a merger within four months from receiving the application; if a decision is not reached after six months, the application will be deemed to be denied.

In addition, the reforms limit the scope of third parties' ability to appeal against a ministerial decision: in contrast to the legal situation before the amendment, where an economic impact would suffice, now only persons or companies that can show an infringement of their own rights will have sufficient legal standing. Because the requirements for such an own right are quite high, it remains to be seen if the option of an appeal against the ministerial decision will retain any practical relevance in the future.

These changes to the law follow the recent case of *Edeka/Tengelmann* where a merger was initially authorised by the minister, but then later blocked by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf following appeals of competitors.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Efficiency arguments have so far not played a major role in the BKartA's practice. It is unlikely to accept efficiency arguments where the transaction would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant market position. However, in such cases, a clearance can still be granted if the parties can demonstrate that the merger will also result in an improvement of market conditions that outweighs the disadvantages of market dominance. Efficiencies could only be considered as such an improvement of market conditions if the efficiency gains would be passed on to the consumer (balancing clause). In this respect the BKartA will require a high level of proof that the parties will pass on the efficiencies. As the BKartA works on the understanding that a dominant company will often have little or no incentive to pass efficiency gains on, it is difficult to succeed with efficiency arguments in cases involving the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Whether efficiencies will be accepted as a defence in SIEC cases that do not create or strengthen a dominant position is an open question. Efficiency arguments can play a certain role in proceedings regarding a ministerial authorisation.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If the statutory conditions for prohibition are fulfilled, the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office – BKartA) will prohibit the merger. The BKartA also has the power to order the divestment or the disposal of certain assets where a merger has already been completed.

The BKartA has used the power to order the dissolution of a concentration and ordered two Swiss-based companies to undo their merger (*Sulzer/Kelmix*). This was the first ever divestment order from the BKartA in relation to a foreign-to-foreign merger (however, the decision was successfully appealed by the parties on other grounds). According to the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, public international law is not in conflict with a prohibition of a foreign-to-foreign merger if the merger produces effects on the German territory. However, in the case of an already completed foreign-to-foreign merger, it remains unclear how the BKartA would in practice be able to enforce such a prohibition order if the parties refused to undo their merger.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The relevant provisions expressly provide for imposing conditions and obligations and accepting structural undertakings in second phase clearance decisions. In addition, remedies (such as a restructuring of the transaction or divestment undertakings) are also possible prior to the clearance decision. Behavioural undertakings that do not affect the structure of the market are rarely accepted as sufficient to address competition concerns unless they have similar effects (divestment of slots, access to infrastructure, etc).

Undertakings subjecting the parties to the transaction to permanent behavioural control by the BKartA are explicitly prohibited by the Act against Restraints of Competition of 1958 (GWB). This has been confirmed once more by the BKartA in *Remondis/DSD*. However, albeit rare in practice, behavioural remedies are possible under German law, if they are effective and do not lead to a permanent control of the undertaking's behaviour by the BKartA.

The BKartA has published guidance (available in English) on acceptable remedies explaining which conditions they must meet to enable the BKartA to clear the transaction with conditions and obligations.

The BKartA has also published model texts for the different types of remedies and a trustee mandate on its website. These templates are similar to the models used by the European Commission, but considerably shorter.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The BKartA can accept remedies if they effectively solve the competition problem and provided they do not involve a permanent monitoring of the parties' behaviour by the BKartA. Consequently, a broad range of undertakings is possible as long as the undertaking effectively remedies the competition concerns raised.

In general, all kinds of structural undertakings are accepted by the BKartA, although in practice most are divestment undertakings.

Non-structural remedies have also been accepted in some cases (see, for example, the acquisition of the cable network operator Kabel Baden-Württemberg by Liberty Global Europe Holding, where remedies

included the granting of early termination rights to large customers and the waiving of certain exclusivity clauses).

Divestitures can only be made to a suitable purchaser approved by the BKartA. The BKartA will nowadays normally ask for an 'upfront buyer', meaning that the parties agree not to implement the transaction until the buyer has been approved (suspensive condition). An upfront buyer will be required in circumstances where there is risk as to the viability of the business to be divested, finding a suitable purchaser, or where the remedy concerns a substantial part of the concentration. The sale must be completed within a specified time limit. 'Fix-it-first' solutions (ie, sale of the divestiture business before the clearance decision is issued) remain relatively rare. In exceptional circumstances, the BKartA can also agree to a resolutive condition (ie, implementation of merger before suitable buyer is accepted and divestment business is sold, but clearance lapses if no suitable buyer is found).

Any divestment remedy must be accompanied by a proposal to safeguard the business in the interim. Normally, the parties need to appoint a monitoring trustee to oversee compliance with the preservation measures. A 'divestiture trustee' will be required to handle the disposal of the business in the event that the parent companies do not find an acceptable purchaser within the disposal deadline.

Unlike the EUMR, the GWB does not provide for the possibility of commitments in the first phase and nor is there a deadline in the second phase for the submission of commitments. However, it is advisable to discuss commitments with the BKartA as soon as the BKartA's competition concerns become clear.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

As for all mergers that it reviews, the BKartA may require remedies in relation to foreign-to-foreign mergers before issuing a clearance decision. As in domestic transactions, parties to a foreign-to-foreign merger have been required to divest parts of their business around the world. Other remedies have also been imposed on parties to a foreign-to-foreign merger.

The BKartA liaises closely with other competition authorities investigating a merger, in particular with regard to remedies, provided the parties supply a waiver allowing the BKartA to exchange the necessary confidential information with the other competition authorities.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

A clearance decision of the BKartA does not automatically cover arrangements that are related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration insofar as these arrangements may restrict competition between the parties. They may, however, be reviewed outside the merger control process under the restrictive practices provisions of the GWB or article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This does not mean that such arrangements are automatically unlawful and void. As a basic rule, ancillary arrangements are exempted from the restrictive practices provisions if they are necessary and indispensable to the successful implementation of the concentration and EU law and practice are taken into account. In particular, ancillary restrictions in the context of newly formed joint ventures and moderate non-compete obligations on the seller may be accepted.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

During the initial investigation period of one month, but even more so during the second phase in-depth investigation, the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office – BKartA) often contacts customers, competitors or other market participants for market information, and their reactions have a substantial influence. However, the BKartA will dismiss information or arguments brought by third parties if it is not competition-related or if it does not bring any new elements.

A third party may also, upon application, formally participate in merger control proceedings before the BKartA as an intervening party if its interests are materially affected by the notified transaction. Therefore, competitors, customers and suppliers usually qualify as intervening parties and have been admitted in many second-phase proceedings as interveners. No private action may be brought parallel to the merger control proceedings of the BKartA, as merger control in Germany is a purely administrative matter.

Third parties admitted as intervening parties have the right to access the file, the right to be heard and the right to challenge second-phase decisions to the extent they are affected by the decision. First-phase clearance decisions are not subject to appeal.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The BKartA publishes a list of notified transactions with very limited case information on its website. If the parties would like to keep the transaction confidential during an initial period, they normally have to limit themselves to informal pre-notification discussions with the BKartA and the submission of a draft notification. The fact that a formal merger notification has been made in a particular case can only be kept confidential by the BKartA in very exceptional cases upon request. If such a request is made and the BKartA needs to undertake further investigations, it usually does not accept the notification as triggering the waiting periods. However, the BKartA will only postpone publication in extremely rare cases.

In addition, the BKartA also publishes a list of all ongoing second-phase investigations.

Information on important merger decisions is published in the form of press releases on the internet and in the biennial competition report of the BKartA. A non-confidential version of all second-phase decisions is also available on the BKartA's website, along with summary reports of selected cases (some of which are also available in English).

The BKartA is under a statutory obligation to guarantee confidentiality and the disclosure of any business secrets by staff of the BKartA would constitute a criminal offence. Consequently, business secrets contained in a merger notification or in a response to an information request issued by the BKartA will be kept confidential by the BKartA if they are identified as such by the notifying party, and indeed amount to business secrets.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The BKartA cooperates closely with other competition authorities within and outside the European Union, both on a formal and informal basis, where appropriate. However, the transmission of business secrets provided by the merging parties or by third parties is only permitted if the parties that have submitted the information give their consent, if the information is used for the same subject matter for which it was collected and if the receiving authority protects the confidentiality of the information. Regular cooperation exists in particular with the European Commission on jurisdictional issues. The BKartA has also a track record of cooperating with the US Federal Trade Commission (see the press release regarding the proposed concentration between Harry's Inc and Edgewell Personal Care Company, in which the BKartA mentions close cooperation with the US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice), and on policy matters, within the International Competition Network and the OECD. There is also a merger working group within the European Union with members from the European Commission and all EU national competition authorities and observers from the EFTA countries. Further details on cooperation between national competition authorities in the European Union can be found in the Merger Working Group's Best Practices (2011).

The European Commission and the national competition authorities of the member states exchange basic case information about notified transactions. Notification of a transaction in one EU member state can, therefore, trigger questions from other national competition authorities.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

All second-phase decisions of the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office – BKartA) are subject to full judicial review by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, and its judgments are subject to review by the Federal Court of Justice only on a point of law.

In its decision of 25 September 2007 regarding the *Springer/ProSiebenSat.1* case, the Federal Court of Justice acknowledged the right to a declaratory judgment on the BKartA's merger prohibition decisions, even in cases where the parties have abandoned the merger. Judicial review must be granted when the parties have 'a particular interest' in such review, either to clarify the factual basis of the BKartA's decision or to obtain legal certainty on a point of law (eg, if a similar acquisition may be attempted in the future).

Judicial review of second-phase clearance decisions is also available to third parties admitted, at the BKartA's discretion, as intervening parties (as well as, in some circumstances, third parties who applied for this status but were refused on the grounds of procedural efficiency) to the extent that they can show that their competitive interests are directly and individually affected by the decision.

However, third parties admitted as intervening parties in the initial merger control procedure do not automatically have the right to appeal the BKartA's decisions. As stated above, they still have to demonstrate how the decision directly and individually affects their competitive interests.

In proceedings brought by third parties against a clearance decision, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf may order interim measures preventing the parties from consummating the transaction. The court will do so if, based on a preliminary assessment, it has 'serious doubts as to the legality of the appealed clearance decision'. In contrast to the normal court proceedings, the appellant further has to

show that its rights are infringed by the clearance decision. Thus, the requirements for getting an interim order are more demanding than for lodging an appeal.

Ministerial authorisation decisions overruling a prohibition order of the BKartA are also subject to full judicial review by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf.

For the first time in the BKartA's existence, one regional court (LG Köln) had to decide on the German state's liability in connection with a merger that was declared by higher courts to have been unlawfully blocked by the BKartA. The court recognised the responsibility of the state but decided that no damages should be paid by the state, as the conditions for fault were not fulfilled. The judgment was upheld by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf in 2014.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An appeal against a decision of the BKartA has to be filed with the BKartA within one month of service of the decision. In cases of an application for ministerial authorisation, the period for a subsequent appeal begins upon issue of the order by the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy.

Proceedings before the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf will typically last 12 to 36 months until judgment. The judgment of the Higher Regional Court can then be appealed within one month. Following this, a review process before the Federal Court of Justice will normally take another one to three years.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The BKartA has continued to be very active in merger control over the past year. Out of around 1,400 notifications made to the BKartA in 2019 (stable compared to 2018), eight led to in-depth second-phase investigations. In 2019, four transactions were prohibited by the BKartA. There was no case cleared subject to conditions in 2019 (although such results are usually common) and five notifications (which were reviewed in second-phase) were withdrawn after the BKartA either expressed competition concerns or indicated that it intended to prohibit the proposed merger.

Between 2005 and 2009, merger control enforcement by the BKartA featured a number of cases concerning hospital mergers and electricity and gas mergers. Between 2009 and 2012, petrol stations, food retail and media proved to be sectors that kept the BKartA very busy. In 2013 to 2016, we observed that those sectors remained a focus, with hospitals, media and food retail deals the object of intense scrutiny. Over the period from 2018 to mid 2020, no such sectoral trend is to be observed, with Phase II cases, notification withdrawals or prohibitions happening in relation to a diverse array of sectors. It is to be expected, however, that cases in relation to petrol stations, hospitals, used packaging waste disposal and recycling, retail, sanitary equipment wholesale, airlines, telecommunications and mobile communications, which are sectors well known to the BKartA and often characterised by a high level of concentration, will often be subject to increased scrutiny (and hence candidates for in-depth merger control scrutiny). The BKartA also has a very sophisticated approach with regard to platform businesses, particularly in the digital industries.

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The ninth reform of the Act against Restraints of Competition of 1958 (GWB) entered into force in 2017. However, the next reform of the GWB is already in the works.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

Although the last reform of the Act against Restraints of Competition of 1958 is very recent (it entered into force mid 2017), the legislator is already preparing the next reform of the law. The Ministry of Economics and Energy published on 24 January 2019 its proposal to reform the competition rules. Originally, it was expected that the updated law, pending parliamentary approval process, would enter into force at the end of 2020. This might, however, be further delayed.

The reform of the law concerns multiple areas of competition law (with a focus on dominance or on adopting a set of new rules applicable to companies being in a situation of paramount market power).

As regards merger control, however, the following main changes are currently proposed by the Ministry:

- the second local turnover threshold (in the first set of thresholds, but also in the second set of thresholds when reference is made to the target's turnover in Germany) will be increased to €10 million. This will reduce the number of notifiable concentrations by around 20 per cent. This proposal responds to the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office – BKartA)'s plea to free up resources to concentrate on cases that are more likely to have problematic competition effects in Germany;
- the rule according to which notification would not be required if one of the undertakings concerned is an independent company (ie, does not belong to a group of companies) with a worldwide turnover of less than €10 million (even when the three cumulative thresholds of the first set of thresholds are met) would be deleted;
- the de minimis market threshold may also be increased from €15 million to €20 million. However, this threshold will be calculated by adding up the value of all markets that are concerned by the competition concerns rather by reference to each de minimis market separately;
- as regards the calculation of turnover, it could now also be calculated on internationally recognised accounting standards (eg, International Financial Reporting Standards) for those undertakings that exclusively use those standards in their regular accounting (for the others, German accounting rules would still apply);
- the specific turnover rules applicable to the press sector will be updated;
- the obligation to submit a post-completion notice will be abolished;
- the review deadline for the second phase will be extended from four to five months; and
- the procedure relating to ministerial approval will be modified.

Another significant addition proposed by the reform is that the BKartA would be given the right to impose on a specific company the obligation to notify any concentration in one or several specific economic sectors, if certain turnover thresholds are reached and if there are reasons to believe that future concentrations involving that company may reduce the level of competition in Germany.

Together, these changes embody the overall objective of enabling the BKartA to review the transactions that have the most potential to



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significantly impact competition. This would also be made possible because resources, which were historically used to review a large volume of smaller or less relevant transactions, would be freed up owing to the raising of thresholds.



# Greece

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation is Law No. 3959/2011 on the Protection of Free Competition (the Competition Law).

The Competition Law is enforced by an eight-member Competition Commission (the Commission), an independent authority with administrative and economic autonomy supervised by the Minister of Development and Investments, with a five-year term of office.

The Directorate General of Competition (DG) is headed by a general director appointed by the Commission for a four-year term of office and consists of approximately 100 members.

The National Telecommunications and Post Committee enforces the law regarding concentrations and antitrust cases in the electronic communications sector, according to Law No. 4070/2012, as in force.

Concentrations and antitrust cases in the media sector (TV, radio, newspapers and periodicals) are governed in principle by Law No. 3592/2007 (the Media Law), as in force, and by the Competition Law. These laws are enforced by the Commission.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Competition Law applies to concentrations in general. The term 'concentration' includes any kind of merger or acquisition between two or more previously independent undertakings (article 5.2 of the Law). A concentration is also deemed to arise where one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings, acquire direct or indirect control over the whole or parts of one or more undertakings.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

All full-function joint ventures shall constitute a concentration and shall be examined under merger control rules. However, the cooperative aspects of the joint venture shall be examined under article 1(1) and (3) of the Competition Law. In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account: whether the parent undertakings retain a significant portion of activities in the same market as the joint venture or in an upstream, downstream or closely related market; and whether it is likely that the joint venture eliminates competition in a substantial part of the relevant market.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

According to the Competition Law, control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or other means that, either separately or in combination, and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on the activities of an undertaking, in particular by ownership or usufruct over all or part of the assets of an undertaking, and rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking. Control is acquired by the person or persons who (or undertakings that) are holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned, or while not being holders of such rights or entitled to such rights under such contracts, have the power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom.

In a 2019 decision, the Commission stated that control may be acquired by natural persons if those natural persons carry out further economic activities on their own account or if they control at least one other undertaking. In that case, the natural person who acquired the shares of the target company (the son) did not fulfil these requirements, so the Commission examined whether the requirements were met by the other notifying natural person (the father) on the grounds that the formal holder of a controlling interest may differ from the person or undertaking, having, in fact, the real power to exercise the rights resulting from this interest. The Commission concluded that control over the target would be, in essence, exercised by the father and that the undertakings concerned were the target undertaking and the father, with the turnover of the undertakings controlled by him being included in the calculation of his turnover.

The acquisition of control may be in the form of sole or joint control. Sole control can be acquired on a de jure or a de facto basis. In the former case, sole control is normally acquired where an undertaking acquires a majority of the voting rights of a company. In the case of a minority shareholding, sole control may occur in situations where specific rights are attached to this shareholding. Sole control on a de facto basis may exist, among others, when a minority shareholder is likely to achieve a majority in the shareholders' meeting, given that the remaining shares are widely dispersed to a large number of shareholders and this shareholder has a stable majority of votes in the meetings, as the other shareholders are not present or represented. The Commission will assess whether, following the concentration, the party acquiring control will be able to determine the strategic commercial decisions of the target undertaking.

Joint control exists when the shareholders must reach agreement on major strategic decisions concerning the controlled undertaking. The Commission has consistently held that joint control exists in the case of equality in voting rights or in the appointment of decision-making bodies. Furthermore, it has held that the acquisition of minority interests may be caught by the Competition Law if, in combination with other factors, it may confer joint control to the holding party, that is, when this minority



shareholder can block actions that determine the strategic commercial behaviour of the undertaking. As such, the Commission considers decisions on investments, business plans, determination of budget, or the appointment of management. Such veto rights may be included in a shareholders' agreement or in the company's statutes. Finally, joint control exists, according to the Commission, when the minority shareholdings together provide the means for controlling the target undertaking. This can be the result of either an agreement by which they undertake to act in the same way or can occur on a de facto basis, when, for example, strong interests exist between the minority shareholders to the effect that they would not act against each other in exercising their rights in relation to the joint venture.

In a 2016 decision, the Commission dealt with the acquisition of exclusive control over 14 regional airports in Greece. This was achieved through the conclusion of concession agreements between Fraport AG and the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund whereby Fraport was assigned with the financing, upgrade, maintenance, management and operation of the airports for a period of 40 years. This period was considered sufficiently long to lead to a lasting change in control of the undertaking concerned.

Regarding the acquisition of control of a part of an undertaking, the Commission looks separately at each category of assets acquired and examines whether, despite the fact that they may have been acquired by different legal acts, they constitute a single unitary transaction. Furthermore, it considers the acquisition of control over assets as a concentration if those assets constitute a business to which a turnover can be attributed. It has found that this occurs in cases where the assets include, for example, installations, stock, goodwill, operation licence, intangible assets and are combined with a transfer of personnel. In the same context, in a 2013 decision, it has considered as part of an acquired business, apart from the tangible (eg, inventory) and intangible (eg, goodwill) assets transferred, the right of the acquiring undertaking to use the premises where the target business was carried out by virtue of a lease agreement of a 12-year duration concluded with the owner of the premises.

In a 2018 case in the media sector, the Commission has found that the acquisition by an undertaking in a public auction of five trademarks under which a corresponding number of newspapers had been previously published and that had been given as security to the lending banks by the owning company constituted a concentration, as these newspapers, when in circulation, generated a turnover. The acquiring undertaking, which re-launched the circulation of the newspapers under the acquired brands, received (small) fines for late notification and early implementation of the transaction on the grounds that it should have been aware that such acquisition was a concentration and should have suspended implementation until the Commission had issued its decision.

Minorities and other interests less than control are not caught by Competition Law.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

- 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A concentration is subject to a pre-merger notification if the parties have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of at least €150 million and each of at least two participating undertakings has an aggregate turnover exceeding €15 million in Greece. In concentrations in the media sector, the thresholds are €50 million and €5 million, respectively.

In the case of an acquisition of parts of one or more undertakings, irrespective of whether these parts have a legal personality or not, only the turnover related to the target assets shall be taken into account with regard to the seller.

Regarding credit institutions and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, article 10(3) of the Competition Law includes specific provisions regarding calculations of turnover.

- 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing is mandatory without exception.

- 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Yes, if the thresholds are met, according to article 6. Several foreign-to-foreign mergers have been notified where the parties had sales in the Greek market, even in the absence of a local company or assets. The basis for the application of the Competition Law to such mergers is article 46 thereof, under which the Law is also applicable to concentrations taking place outside Greece, even if participating undertakings are not established in Greece, where they have actual or potential effects on competition in the Greek market.

- 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Regarding competition matters relating to special sectors of the economy under the umbrella of a regulatory authority, such as the telecommunications sector, which is supervised by the National Telecommunications and Post Committee (NTPC), the Commission will deal with markets falling within its competence, while referring others to the NTPC. This was demonstrated in a 2018 decision of the Commission, which approved the acquisition of sole control by Vodafone Hellas over Cyta Hellas regarding the markets of acquisition of TV content, including the right to retransmit other TV channels and to offer pay TV services. In contrast, the examination of the offering of combined or bundled landline telephony, broadband access to internet, pay TV and mobile telephony were referred to the NTPC.

Legislation relating to special sectors, such as banking, insurance, investment services, telecommunications, media, energy, etc, provide for special notifications or approvals, not related to antitrust issues, in cases of acquisitions of major holdings. In addition, there exist special reporting requirements when a major holding in a company listed in the Athens Stock Exchange is acquired or disposed of. These should be examined on a case-by-case basis.

Legislation aiming to attract investments includes the Greek Development Law 4399/2016 and the Law on Strategic and Private Investments 4146/2013. Tax incentives on transformation of companies are provided by a number of laws, such as Law 4172/2013, Law 2166/1993 and Law 1297/1972.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

- 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A pre-merger filing should be submitted within 30 calendar days of the conclusion of a binding agreement, the announcement of a public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest. Filing before any of the above events, in principle, shall not trigger the timetable for clearance.

In the case of wilful failure to notify a concentration as above, the Competition Commission (the Commission) imposes a fine of at least €30,000 up to 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking under obligation to notify. In the majority of cases, the fines for late

notification do not exceed double the minimum fine amount, although there have been some exceptions.

Failure to notify constitutes a criminal offence for the undertaking's lawful representative, punishable with a penalty from €15,000 to €150,000.

## 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In the case of a merger agreement, the concentration must be notified by all parties involved, whereas in cases of acquisition of sole control by the party acquiring control and in cases of acquisition of joint control, notification must be made by all the undertakings participating in the agreement.

The filing fee for a pre-merger filing amounts to €1,100.

## 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

In cases of concentrations subject to pre-merger control, the implementation of the transaction is prohibited until the Commission issues a decision:

- approving the transaction under article 8(3) within 30 days from the notification of the transaction (Phase I decision);
- approving the transaction after an in-depth investigation (with or without conditions) within 90 days from the initiation of Phase II proceedings, according to article 8(4), (5), (6) and (8) (Phase II decision);
- approving the transaction before a 90-day term following initiation of Phase II proceedings has expired without the issuance of a prohibitive decision (deemed clearance) according to article 8(6); and
- prohibiting the transaction within 90 days from the initiation of Phase II proceedings according to article 8(6).

In a 2014 case, the Commission dealt with an acquisition of joint control, approved back in 2012, in the form of veto rights awarded to the 49 per cent shareholder by virtue of a shareholders' agreement and examined whether the concentration had been implemented before the issuance of its approving decision while it should have been suspended. According to the facts, on the same day that the shareholders' agreement was signed and even before the submission of the notification to the Commission, the shareholders' meeting of the target company had in fact elected a new board of directors consisting of directors appointed by both parties in conformity with the shareholders' agreement. From the evidence submitted to it, the Commission found that although the board had been elected by the shareholders' meeting and had convened at a meeting to constitute itself into a corporate body before the issuance of the Commission's approving decision, it had not thereafter exercised any of its powers. In fact, a month after its election, the shareholders' meeting of the target company revoked its decision electing such board with retroactive effect since its election. The Commission thus concluded that the joint control had not been actually implemented and refrained from the imposition of fines for early implementation of the concentration to the shareholders of the target company.

The issue of suspension of the implementation of a transaction came up in a 2018 decision dealing with the acquisition of sole control. In that case, the parties had notified to the Commission their non-binding memorandum of understanding providing for the sale of 100 per cent of the shares of the target company by the seller to the acquiring undertaking. A few days later, they signed and submitted to the Commission the sale and purchase agreement according to which the seller sold and delivered the shares to the acquiring undertaking, the latter paid to the seller a big portion of the purchase price and the board members of the target company had handed their written resignations to the acquiring company. That agreement did not contain a provision that the sale would

be conditional on the approval of the transaction by the Commission; however, a similar clause was contained in the notified memorandum of understanding. The Commission cleared the transaction with commitments. Until the issuance of that decision, the acquiring undertaking had not exercised its rights as the new shareholder of the target company and the resignation of the board members had not become effective. So, until that day, the target was still being managed by the previous shareholder (ie, the seller). On the basis of these facts, the Commission found that there has not been an early implementation of the transaction, especially because there was no evidence that the parties had intended to conceal the change of control and avoid the substantive examination of the transaction. However, there was a dissenting minority, including the president of the Commission.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing before clearance attracts a fine of at least €30,000 and up to 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking under obligation to notify, according to article 9. In the majority of cases, the fines for early closing do not exceed double the minimum fine amount, although there have been exceptions.

Closing before the Commission's decision constitutes a criminal offence for the undertaking's lawful representative, punishable with a fine from €15,000 to €150,000.

The Commission may adopt appropriate provisional measures to restore or maintain conditions of effective competition if the concentration has closed before a clearance decision or in breach of the remedies imposed by the Commission's clearance decision.

Early implementation may only be allowed following a special derogation by the Commission. Derogations may be granted to prevent serious damage to one or more of the undertakings concerned or to a third party. A derogation may be requested or granted at any time (before notification or after the transaction) and revoked by the Commission in the circumstances provided in the law, for example, if it was based on inaccurate or misleading information. The Commission may, in granting a derogation, impose conditions and obligations on the parties to ensure effective competition and prevent situations that could obstruct the enforcement of an eventual blocking decision. The Commission regards derogations as an exceptional measure and grants them with great caution, in particular where the participating undertakings face serious financial problems. The Commission has granted a derogation to a major Greek bank that intended to take over from a bank under liquidation all its current account contracts with its customers. The Commission held that the immediate implementation of the succession was crucial not only for the customers of the failed bank, so that they could have immediate access to their bank accounts, but also to safeguard the reputation of the Greek banking system.

### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Commission would impose sanctions in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

'Hold-separate' arrangements have, to date, not been accepted by the Commission as it considers that a concentration at the level of the parent undertakings outside Greece gives the possibility to the

acquiring undertaking to implement its business and pricing policy to the seller's customers in Greece, thus acquiring control of the target's local market share.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

In the case of public bids or acquisitions of controlling interest on the stock exchange, implementation is allowed provided the transaction has been duly notified to the Commission and the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights of the acquired securities, or does so only to secure the full value of the investment and on the basis of a derogation decision issued by the Commission. In a derogation issued in this context, the Commission allowed the exercise of the voting rights of the acquired shares to elect a new board of directors, provided this board would not proceed to management acts that would substantially modify the assets or liabilities of the company until the issuance of the clearance decision by the Commission.

### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Pre-merger filing is onerous. A specific form exists similar to the Form CO, as well as a short form filed when the notifying party considers that the concentration does not raise serious doubts. As a general rule, the short form may be used for the purpose of notifying concentrations, where one of the following conditions is met:

- none of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same relevant product and geographical market (no horizontal overlap), or in a market that is upstream or downstream of a market in which another party to the concentration is engaged (no vertical relationship);
- two or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same relevant product and geographical market (horizontal relationships), provided that their combined market share is less than 15 per cent; or one or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in a product market that is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other party to the concentration is engaged (vertical relationships), and provided that none of their individual or combined market shares at either level is 25 per cent or more; or
- a party is to acquire sole control of an undertaking over which it already has joint control.

The Commission may require a full-form notification where it appears either that the conditions for using the short form are not met, or, exceptionally, where they are met, the Commission determines, nonetheless, that a full-form notification is necessary for an adequate investigation of possible competition concerns.

Notifications should be submitted in four copies in the Greek language, with supporting documents as well as by email. In practice, if these are in English, no Greek translation will be required, except for the concentration agreement itself. This document, or at least its principal provisions, should be translated into Greek. The submitting attorney should produce a power of attorney granting him or her all necessary powers to act before the Commission and also to act as attorney for service.

In a case where wrong or missing information is provided, the law provides for a fine of €15,000 with a maximum level of 1 per cent of the turnover.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Upon receipt of notification, a rapporteur is appointed from the members of the Commission who shall be assisted by a team of employees of the Directorate General of Competition. An investigation shall commence involving contacting third parties, such as competitors or customers, with the purpose of defining the relevant and the affected markets and the competitive conditions therein. Letters may also be addressed to notifying parties with additional requests for information, which should be replied to within at least five days of receipt. The rapporteur should issue its recommendation to the Commission, also made available to the notifying parties, whether to clear the transaction or not. The parties, following the issuance of the recommendation, have access to the non-confidential information of the Commission's file on the case. Third parties do not have access to the file.

A summons is addressed by the Secretariat to the parties for a hearing before the Commission. At the hearing, the parties may present their arguments and examine witnesses. Thereafter, they may also submit written pleadings.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

There is a two-stage procedure for pre-merger filings.

If the concentration does not raise serious doubts concerning potential restrictive effects on competition, the Commission should issue a clearance decision within one month of notification (Phase I decision).

If the concentration raises serious doubts, the president of the Commission must issue a decision within one month of notification initiating a full investigation of the notified transaction. The participating undertakings should be immediately informed about this decision. The case is introduced before the Commission within 45 days. From that date, the undertakings may within 20 days at the latest propose commitments. In exceptional cases, the Commission may accept commitments even after the expiry of the 20-day term, in which case the term for the issuance of a decision under article 8(6) is extended from 90 to 105 days. Where the Commission finds that the concentration substantially restricts competition in the relevant market, or that, in the case of a joint venture, the criteria laid down by article 1(3) are not fulfilled, it shall issue a decision prohibiting the concentration. Such decision must be issued within 90 days of the initiation of Phase II. If the Commission finds that the concentration does not substantially restrict competition or if it approves the same with conditions, it shall issue an approving decision. If the 90-day term expires without the issuance of a prohibitive decision, the concentration is deemed as approved, with the Commission thereafter issuing a merely confirmatory decision (Phase II decision).

This timetable cannot be speeded up. They can be extended, *inter alia*, when the notifying undertakings consent, according to article 8(11).

If the participating undertakings do not furnish any required information within the set deadline, the term for the issuance of the decision is suspended and recommences as soon as such information is furnished. In its decisions, the Commission mentions the date of the notification, the date of its request for information and the date of submission thereof by the notifying party.

The Commission issues its decisions within the above terms.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The test for clearance is that a concentration must not significantly restrict competition in the Greek market, in particular by way of creating or reinforcing a dominant position. Criteria taken into account include actual and potential competition, barriers to entry, the economic strength of participating undertakings, the supply and demand trends relating to the products or services involved, the structure of the market and the bargaining power of suppliers or customers.

In a 2017 decision, the Competition Commission (the Commission) dealt with a conglomerate merger where an undertaking active in cold meat and cheese products was acquired by an undertaking producing sweet and salted snacks and chocolate products. The Commission cleared the merger on the grounds that it was unlikely that the acquiring company, although it had a significant share in its market, would proceed to combined sales because:

- these were not complementary products;
- supermarkets had alternative sources of supply of cold meat and cheese products given the existence of strong competitors of the acquired company in that market;
- competitors in the crude meat market could deploy effective counter-strategies to react to any attempt of foreclosure; and
- private label products played an important role in that market.

Regarding horizontal mergers, the Commission has consistently assessed to what extent these mergers might significantly impede effective competition, in particular by creating or strengthening a dominant position, in one of two ways:

- by eliminating important competitive constraints on one or more firms, which consequently would have increased market power, without resorting to coordinated behaviour (non-coordinated effects); or
- by changing the nature of competition in such a way that firms that previously were not coordinating their behaviour, would significantly coordinate and raise prices or otherwise harm effective competition (coordinated effects).

In the Media Law, dominance is defined by way of reference to a scale of market shares that will be acquired as a result of the concentration. These market shares vary depending on whether the party acquiring control is active in one or more media of the same type or of different types. The wider the spread in the various media, the lower is the market share conferring dominance. These shares vary from 25 per cent to 35 per cent.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

In addition to examining whether the joint venture will significantly restrict competition, the Commission will assess possible 'cooperative' effects.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Single or joint market dominance is the basic concern of the authorities during their investigation of a concentration. They have also examined unilateral, coordinated, vertical and conglomerate effects.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

In recent years, the Commission has shown that it also takes into account the effects on the national economy when examining a merger. For example, in relation to the banking sector, the Commission has repeatedly stressed the need to support concentrations therein, as these sectors account for a considerable percentage of gross national income and concentrations would lead to the formation of more competitive and modernised groups with increased economic and productive strength, which would offer employment to a wide range of professions.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies are taken into account by the Commission to the extent that they enhance the degree of competition in the market in favour of consumers.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If the authorities find that a concentration significantly restricts competition, then a prohibitive decision shall be issued.

If a concentration has been implemented in breach of the Competition Law or in breach of a prohibitive decision, the Competition Commission (the Commission) may require the undertakings concerned to dissolve the concentration, in particular through the dissolution of the merger or disposal of all the shares or assets acquired, so as to restore the situation prevailing before the implementation of the concentration. Divestment has to date been ordered only once, in a transaction between Greek companies. The Commission may also order any other appropriate measure for the dissolution of the merger.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The Commission may clear the transaction subject to conditions so as to render the concentration compatible with the substantive test for clearance or to ensure compliance by the parties with the amendments to the terms to the concentration agreed by them. A fine for non-compliance may be threatened by the Commission, which may not exceed 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover of the undertakings. By virtue of a subsequent decision verifying that the conditions have been breached, the Commission may declare that the fine has been forfeited.

In a 2011 decision involving the ice cream sector, the Commission analysed in great depth the non-coordinated and coordinated effects of the transaction and cleared it following an undertaking by the acquiring undertaking that the exclusivity clause, obliging the point of sales to use freezers only for the ice cream of the suppliers providing them, would be deleted from the respective agreements. In another 2011 case in the milk sector, the Commission cleared the transaction after a commitment by the acquiring company to divest a business of the target and to appoint a trustee to implement such divestiture.

In a 2017 decision, the Commission, following Phase II proceedings, cleared the acquisition by the second-largest supermarket chain in Greece of another supermarket chain, in a stage of pre-bankruptcy

proceedings, with an equal share, which would make the acquiring undertaking the largest chain in Greece, leaving the previous number one chain in second place with a difference of approximately 5 to 10 per cent in terms of market share. The acquiring undertaking had proposed the following commitments, which were accepted by the Commission:

- It would continue its cooperation with the suppliers used both by itself and the acquired chain whose sales to the new entity emerging from the merger would represent at least 22 per cent of their total sales, for a period of three years; the same commitment was taken regarding local suppliers of the acquired entity. This commitment would cease to apply in certain defined cases, including when the product supplied became obsolete, when there were issues of safety and consumer protection imposing the interruption of the cooperation, when the quality of the product deteriorated or when there was an unreasonable increase in its price.
- The acquiring company and the new entity undertook to sell 22 shops in defined locations so as to address the concerns that high shares would emerge for the new entity post-merger in these geographic areas. Such sale should be effected within a term of nine months.

On that same transaction, the Commission issued a new decision in 2018 accepting a request by the acquiring party to modify the commitments on the grounds that the circumstances had changed. More specifically, out of the 22 stores, only eight had been sold and despite continuous efforts, there was no interest from potential buyers for the remaining 14. The Commission re-evaluated the market shares in the local markets concerned and found that although before its initial decision in 2017 the share of the acquiring undertaking would exceed 50 per cent, this was no longer the case as in the meantime new undertakings had entered the market and competition had increased. The Commission thus decided to lift the commitment of sale regarding the 12 stores and imposed a commitment on the undertaking to not operate the other two stores as supermarkets for a term of three years.

In a 2019 decision, the Commission cleared a transaction subject to three years of behavioural remedies. In that case, the vertical dimension of the notified concentration posed competition concerns owing to the dominant, if not monopolistic position, of the acquired company in the market of recycling of aluminium waste. The acquiring undertaking was a big producer and processor of primary cast aluminium. According to the Commission, there was a risk that access to the recycling service would be offered by the new entity as a tied service with the purchase of primary cast aluminium from the acquiring company. The agreed remedies provided that the offer of recycling services to the customers of the acquired company would not be dependent on the purchase of primary cast aluminium from the acquiring company and vice versa, that the acquired company would continue to offer its recycling services to its existing and creditworthy customers and that the customers of both the acquiring and acquired companies would not be bound by an obligation to exclusively obtain primary cast aluminium and recycling services from them.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

To date, only one decision imposing divestment as a condition for clearance has been issued. In that case, to entirely remove the horizontal overlap between the parties to the concentration and enable access of competitors in the chocolate milk market and given that it was not possible to separate the business activity of the chocolate milk from that of white milk, the Commission concluded that the acquiring party should sell a leading trademark of chocolate milk of the acquired party to an appropriate buyer. To ensure the viability and competitiveness of the divested asset, the acquiring party further committed, subject to

the buyer's approval, to provide to the buyer access to its distribution network for chocolate milk and to have the new entity enter into a toll manufacturing agreement to produce chocolate milk for the buyer at market prices, for a transitional period of two years following completion of the divestiture.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Commission has, to date, never imposed remedies in a foreign-to-foreign merger.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

A clearance decision covers restrictions directly related and necessary for the implementation of the concentration. The Commission usually examines these restrictions separately and clears them on the basis of principles similar to those of the European Commission's Notice on ancillary restrictions.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Third parties are given the opportunity under the Competition Law to play an important role in the application of Greek merger control rules. The Directorate General of Competition may address questions to third parties, such as competitors or customers. These should be replied to within five days and the Competition Law provides for fines for those who do not comply. The Competition Commission (the Commission) may invite any third party to the hearing before it, if it decides that its participation will contribute to the examination of the case. In addition, any third party, natural or legal person may intervene in the proceedings by submitting written pleadings at least five days before the hearing.

Although the Competition Law does not explicitly give third parties the right to complain in cases of infringement of merger control rules, there is no obstacle to the investigation of a non-notified transaction given the Commission's wide powers to commence on its own initiative investigations with the purpose of establishing whether merger control rules have been infringed.

Third parties demonstrating a legitimate interest may file an appeal against the decisions of the Commission before the Administrative Appeal Court of Athens.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The Commission has fixed the form and content of the public announcement of the concentrations subject to pre-merger control by the notifying party in the daily press. This announcement should take place immediately after notification. This announcement is also uploaded to the Commission's website so that any interested party may submit observations or information on the notified concentration.

The decisions of the Commission are published in the Government Gazette. Commercial information, including business secrets, are protected from disclosure under article 28 of the Regulation of Operation and Administration of the Competition Commission.



## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Under the Competition Law, the Commission assists the European Commission in investigations carried out on the basis of EU provisions. Decisions of antitrust authorities of other member states play a crucial role in the Commission's assessment of the concentration. The Commission keeps records of concentrations subject to multiple filings in the context of the Network of European Competition Authorities (ECAs) and cooperates with ECAs regarding merger control.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the Competition Commission (the Commission) are subject to appeal before the Administrative Appeal Court of Athens. This appeal does not automatically suspend the enforcement of the contested decision, but a petition to this effect may be submitted to the Appeal Court, which may grant a suspension of the whole or part of the appealed decision, provided serious reasons exist. If the appealed decision imposes a fine, the Appeal Court may suspend only up to 80 per cent of the fine.

A recourse for judicial review of the Appeal Court's decision may be filed before the supreme administrative court, the Council of State, on points of law and procedure.

The Commission seems to recognise the possibility for third parties to request by way of a petition to the Commission the revocation of a decision it has issued approving a concentration, if this decision has been based on inaccurate or misleading information. In such case, the Commission may issue a new decision. However, this possibility is only available if the applicant can invoke a specific damage that it will suffer as a result of the approved concentration and a causal link between such damage and the issued decision.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The time frame for an appeal before the Appeal Court is 60 days from the decision being served to the parties concerned. The term for recourse before the Council of State is 60 days from the Appeal Court's decision being served. It may take more than a year for the Appeal Court to deliver its decision and even longer for the Council of State.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Competition Commission (the Commission) has, to date, never prohibited a foreign-to-foreign merger, but has imposed fines for failure to notify and for early closing.

Given the increased concentration occurring in the supermarket sector, the Commission had the opportunity in 2014–2015 to deal with a number of transactions in this sector that were approved at Phase I.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

In January 2020, a legislative drafting committee was constituted and assigned the task of reforming the Competition Law.

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## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

Following changes in the composition of the Competition Commission in the last quarter of 2019, its current members are I Lianos (the president); K Benetatou (the vice president); P Fotis, I Stefatos, M Ioannidou and M Rantou (the rapporteurs); S Karkalakos and I Petroglou (ordinary members); and M Polemis and A Adamakou (substitute members).



# Greenland

Bart Creve, Erik Bertelsen, Jens Munk Plum and Morten Kofmann

Kromann Reumert

## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Although Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland has its own competition regulation. The main legislation on Greenlandic merger control is contained in the Greenlandic Competition Act (Act of the Home Rule Parliament No. 1 of 15 May 2014), which is modelled on Danish competition law (and thereby EU competition law) and entered into force on 1 July 2014. The Act brought about a reform of merger control in Greenland, and replaced the previous regime, which provided for a mere post-notification obligation. The main difference from the Danish Competition Act is the notification thresholds, which are significantly lower. This chapter reflects the provisions of the Competition Act and the law preparatory documents accompanying the bill, but at the time of writing, the situation remains that no decisions have been adopted and there is accordingly no administrative practice.

For merger control, the provisions of the Greenland Competition Act are accompanied by executive order No. 3 of 10 March 2016 on the Notification of Mergers, and executive order No. 13 of 23 July 2015 on the Calculation of Turnover.

The legislation can be accessed in Danish or Greenlandic on [www.lovgivning.gl](http://www.lovgivning.gl).

The Competition Tribunal is the principal enforcer of competition law in Greenland. It consists of a chairman and six members appointed by the Home Rule Parliament. The chairman and three of the members must be independent of commercial and consumer interests while, of the remaining three members, one is nominated by a commercial interest organisation, one by a consumer organisation, and one is nominated by the organisation Kanukoka, which represents the interests of municipalities in Greenland.

The day-to-day administration of the Competition Act is handled by the Consumer and Competition Authority, which serves as the secretariat of the Competition Tribunal.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The provisions of merger control apply to 'concentrations'. In accordance with the EU Merger Regulation, a concentration will be deemed to arise where either:

- two or more previously independent undertakings merge; or
- one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings, acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a full-function joint venture (ie, a joint venture performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis) also constitutes a concentration.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Greenlandic regulation follows Danish legislation (which is consistent with EU law), entailing the following definition of control: control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means that, either separately or jointly, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence over an undertaking.

In cases where outright legal control is not acquired, rights attached to shares or contained in shareholder agreements, board representation, ownership and use of assets and related commercial issues may be considered. In the case of the acquisition of minority shareholdings, it is most likely that the Consumer and Competition Authority will assess the situation by looking at the strength of voting rights and other factors. Such considerations may lead to the conclusion that the possibility of exercising control as defined exists. It will most likely not matter whether control has actually been exercised. The European Commission's practice may be expected to serve as guidance.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The merger control provisions apply to concentrations where the combined aggregate turnover in Greenland of all the undertakings concerned is more than 100 million kroner and the aggregate turnover in Greenland of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than 50 million kroner.

At this point, the Competition Tribunal has not referred any cases below these thresholds to the European Commission.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing of merger notifications in Greenland is mandatory if the turnover thresholds are met.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers satisfying the turnover thresholds are subject to Greenlandic merger control even where no actual effects

in the Greenland market can be shown. However, the thresholds have been defined so as to require actual turnover in Greenland.

**8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?**

No.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

**9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?**

Concentrations falling within the thresholds must be notified to the Consumer and Competition Authority after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest; and in any event before implementation. A specific deadline can be expected in the future executive orders.

Fines may be imposed for failure to notify (and unlawful implementation).

**10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?**

In principle, all the parties involved in a concentration are responsible for filing. In practice, however, the filing of acquisitions can be expected to be made by the acquiring party. The fee amounts to 50,000 kroner for simplified notifications and 0.015 per cent of the parties' turnover for non-simplified notifications. However, the filing fee is capped at a maximum of 1.5 million kroner. Fees have to be paid at the same time as the filing of the notification.

**11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?**

A concentration that is notifiable to the Consumer and Competition Authority must not be put into effect before it has been approved by the Competition Tribunal or the Council's time limits have expired.

This creates waiting periods of 40 working days (Phase I) or additionally 90 working days (Phase II) after the expiry of the first waiting period.

### Pre-clearance closing

**12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?**

Fines may be imposed for (failure to notify and) unlawful implementation. Moreover, where clearance is subsequently denied or made conditional, the transaction will have to be annulled or otherwise reopened and modified. The Competition Tribunal has not yet issued decisions in this relation.

**13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?**

In principle, the same sanctions are applicable to foreign-to-foreign mergers as to other mergers.

**14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?**

There are still no decisions or administrative practice from the Competition Tribunal in these cases.

### Public takeovers

**15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?**

No.

### Documentation

**16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?**

Filing under the Competition Act requires the use of a specific form known as Annex 1. The form requires the provision of information about the parties, the markets, customers, suppliers and competitors, and is only a little less detailed than the Form CO used under the EU Merger Regulation. For straightforward cases that are unlikely to raise competition concerns, a simplified 'short-form' filing using a form known as Annex 2 is also possible. This form is similar in structure to Annex 1 but requires less information to be submitted. Both forms require the lodging of a non-confidential version, which is intended to be used for market testing. The forms are similar to the applicable Danish forms.

### Investigation phases and timetable

**17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?**

Pre-notification consultations with the Consumer and Competition Authority may and should take place.

After receiving a non-simplified notification, the Competition Tribunal must declare whether the notification is complete. When the notification is complete, the Competition Tribunal may approve a concentration before the expiry of the initial investigation (Phase I). The Competition Tribunal cannot prohibit a concentration within Phase I but may initiate an in-depth investigation (Phase II) if there are serious doubts regarding the concentration's compatibility with the Competition Act.

**18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?**

The timetable for clearance is the same whether the merger is filed under the simplified procedure or the full notification procedure.

The Competition Tribunal must make its decision on the substance within 40 working days (Phase I) from the receipt of a complete notification. It will decide to either approve the concentration or initiate further proceedings. In the latter case, the Competition Tribunal must make a final decision within 90 working days (Phase II) after the expiry of the original 40 working days. These time limits may be extended with up to 20 days if the undertakings propose new or revised commitments at a late stage (ie, fewer than 20 days remaining of the original deadline). The deadline is only extended with as many days required to provide 20 days for the assessment of the new or revised commitments. The deadline can also be extended with up to 20 days on request by the parties or with the parties' consent.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test to be applied by the Competition Tribunal is whether the concentration significantly impedes effective competition (SIEC), in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Unless this is the case, the concentration must be approved.

The substantive test for clearance of concentrations that have as their object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings is similar to that set out in the EU Merger Regulation. Such aspects of coordination shall therefore be appraised in accordance with the criteria laid down in the provisions of the Competition Act, which are the domestic equivalents of article 101(1) and (3) TFEU. This test applies in addition to the SIEC test

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The substantive test for clearance of concentrations that have as their object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings is similar to that set out in the EU Merger Regulation. Such aspects of coordination shall therefore be appraised in accordance with the criteria laid down in the provisions of the Competition Act, which are the domestic equivalents of article 101(1) and (3) TFEU. This test applies in addition to the SIEC test.

In the case of full-function joint ventures, which may also have the object or effect of coordinating the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent, such coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of the provisions of the Competition Act applying to anticompetitive agreements (similar to article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)).

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

There are still no decisions or administrative practice from the Competition Tribunal. However, as in Denmark, the Competition Tribunal is expected to follow the European Commission's practice with regard to the applicable 'theories of harm'.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Competition Act entered into force on 1 July 2014. There have been no decisions or administrative practice from the Competition Tribunal that can constitute the foundation for such an assessment. However, the Competition Tribunal is expected to apply the above substantive test without taking account of non-competition issues.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

No decisions or administrative practice from the Competition Tribunal can constitute the foundation for such an assessment. However, section 1 of the Competition Act states that the purpose of the Competition Act is to promote 'efficient resource allocation' and, consequently, it can be argued that efficiency should be considered. In practical terms, an efficiency argument can be raised if available, and will be considered in the assessment of the case. However, in raising the efficiency defence

the undertakings concerned might risk the competition authorities interpreting the argument as an indication of increased dominance, as the efficiency gained will make competition even more difficult for competitors that do not benefit from similar efficiencies. Therefore, the efficiency defence should be applied with due caution.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The transaction may be approved, approved with conditions, or prohibited. Commitments may be offered to eliminate competition concerns. The Competition Tribunal has the power and duty to impose conditions; therefore, it may not, according to the principle of proportionality, prohibit the transaction if it can design suitable remedies. The parties to the merger might therefore be in the position of deciding whether to proceed with the transaction on the basis of remedies accepted by the Competition Tribunal.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

If the competition authorities assess that the concentration cannot be approved without conditions, the undertakings concerned will enter into a dialogue or negotiation with the competition authorities to agree on suitable commitments. The commitments agreed with the competition authorities will be formulated as conditions in the approval of the concentration. Such conditions can be appealed separately after approval of the concentration, even though they are agreed during the negotiations with the competition authorities. The Competition Tribunal may attach conditions including divestment orders or behavioural remedies for clearance of a concentration and may also issue orders to ensure that the parties fulfil these.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

No decisions or administrative practice from the Competition Tribunal can constitute the foundation for such an assessment.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

No decisions or administrative practice from the Competition Tribunal can constitute the foundation for such an assessment.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The notifying parties are not required to identify ancillary restrictions. It is therefore up to the parties to assess whether there are ancillary restrictions that need to be evaluated by the Consumer and Competition Authority.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Consumer and Competition Authority can be expected to conduct market tests.

### Publicity and confidentiality

30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The Act on public access to documents in public files does not apply to merger cases, and information will generally be treated as confidential information. Section 24 of the Competition Act provides which information is considered to be confidential.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Consumer and Competition Authority cooperates with the other Nordic countries, (ie, Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Sweden and Norway).

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The decisions of the Competition Tribunal are not subject to administrative appeal. The decisions of the Competition Tribunal can be brought before the court in Greenland.

### Time frame

33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The time frame for an appeal before the court in Greenland can be expected to be around six to nine months.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

There have been no decisions or administrative practice from the Competition Tribunal to shed light on this question.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

An amendment of Greenland's Competition Act has been proposed and is currently subject to public hearing. If the amendment is adopted, the thresholds and the calculation of turnover will be changed.

The Bill proposes that the thresholds should be based on an aggregate turnover globally instead of locally in Greenland. This is due to the fact that some undertakings are buying commodities in Greenland for the purpose of export without being stationed in Greenland. If these undertakings merge, they will not be subject to merger control in Greenland, but the merger could potentially have a significant impact on

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the market for fish and seafood in Greenland. Therefore, a system has been proposed where the calculated turnover is not limited to turnover in Greenland. If the Bill is adopted, the thresholds will be lowered to 25 million and 10 million, thus, a merger will meet the thresholds, if the combined aggregate turnover globally of all the undertakings concerned is more than 25 million kroner and the aggregate turnover globally of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than 10 million kroner. Lastly, it is proposed, that at least one of the undertakings must be located in Greenland, for Greenlandic merger control to apply. This is to avoid mergers where none of the merging parties being located in Greenland are subject to merger control in Greenland.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

No updates at this time.

# Hong Kong

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong) is administratively and legally separate from the People's Republic of China. As such, Hong Kong has its own system of law.

The Hong Kong Competition Ordinance (Cap 619) (the Competition Ordinance), which came into full force on 14 December 2015, is the first ever economy-wide, cross-sector competition law in Hong Kong. While the Competition Ordinance focuses on two key behavioural prohibitions on anticompetitive business conduct concerning anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a substantial degree of market power, it also incorporates a limited merger control regime that applies to mergers involving a telecommunications licence carrier (the Merger Rule). The Merger Rule provides that an undertaking must not, directly or indirectly, carry out a 'merger' that has, or is likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in Hong Kong.

The Competition Commission (the Commission) and the Communications Authority (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction in enforcing the Merger Rule. The Commission and the CA have jointly issued a guideline setting out how they intend to interpret and give effect to the Merger Rule. A dedicated Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) has jurisdiction to hear and determine applications made by the Commission or the CA to unwind a completed merger or to prohibit a proposed merger.

Unless specified otherwise, where a matter relates to conduct falling within the Commission's and the CA's concurrent jurisdiction, references are made to the 'competition authority', which shall be read as including both the Commission and the CA. In practice, and as stipulated under the terms of a memorandum of understanding between the Commission and the CA, the CA will typically take the lead in relation to matters relating to the Merger Rule, given that the merger control regime in Hong Kong only applies to the telecommunications sector.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The merger control regime only applies to 'mergers' involving a carrier licence within the meaning of the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap 106). Such a carrier licence essentially relates to network operators that establish and maintain wired or wireless transmission facilities that carry 'communications' between locations that are separated by public streets or unleased land. This includes the local and external fixed network operators and mobile network operators.

There are no financial thresholds to trigger the Merger Rule. Instead, the issue is whether a merger has taken or is to take place. A 'merger' takes place if:

- two or more previously independent undertakings cease to be independent of each other;
- one or more persons or undertakings acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings. In this regard, the creation of a joint venture to perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity also constitutes a merger; or
- an acquisition by one undertaking of the whole or a part of the assets of another undertaking such that the acquirer is in a position to replace or substantially replace the acquired undertaking in the business or part of the business concerned in which the acquired undertaking was engaged immediately before the acquisition.

In each case above, the Merger Rule applies either where the acquirer or target holds a telecommunications carrier licence, or where the acquirer or target directly or indirectly controls an undertaking that holds a telecommunications carrier licence.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture to perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity constitutes a merger within the meaning of the Merger Rule. In accordance with a guideline jointly issued by the Competition Commission and the Communications Authority setting out how they intend to interpret and give effect to the Merger Rule, performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity means that a joint venture must operate on a market and perform the functions normally carried out by an undertaking operating on that market; this is not the case if it only takes over one specific function within the parent companies' business activities without access to or presence on the market.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

A merger takes place if one or more persons or other undertakings acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings. 'Control' is acquired by any person if that person becomes a holder of the rights or contracts or is capable of exercising decisive influence with regard to the composition, voting or decisions of any governing body of an undertaking or the activities of the undertaking by ownership of the assets of the undertaking. 'Decisive influence' refers to the power to determine or veto decisions relating to the strategic commercial behaviour of an undertaking. 'Control' may, therefore, be established on a legal or de facto basis such that minority and other interests that amount to less than legal control may be caught. However, no specific percentage threshold for 'control' is stated in either the Competition Ordinance or the related guidelines.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

There are no financial thresholds under the Competition Ordinance; instead, the question is whether a merger has taken or is to take place.

The competition authority has nevertheless identified two indicative 'safe harbours' according to which mergers are unlikely to substantially lessen competition:

- four-firm concentration ratio: where the post-merger combined market share of the four (or fewer) largest firms (CR4) in the relevant market is less than 75 per cent, and the merged firm has a market share of less than 40 per cent; or where the CR4 is 75 per cent or more, and the combined market share of the merged entity is less than 15 per cent of the relevant market; and
- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): where the post-merger HHI is less than 1,000 in the relevant market; or where the post-merger HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, and the merger produces an increase in the HHI of less than 100 in the relevant market; or where the post-merger HHI is more than 1,800, and the merger produces an increase in the HHI of less than 50.

However, the competition authority has expressly stated that meeting one or both of the safe harbour thresholds does not necessarily mean that the merger does not give rise to competition concerns and that it may still commence an investigation in 'appropriate circumstances'.

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is voluntary in general, but parties are encouraged to contact the competition authority at an early stage to discuss a proposed merger that involves a telecommunications carrier licence.

However, where a party is required to make a mandatory general offer (MGO) under the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases (the Takeovers Code) that would result in a 'change' in relation to a carrier licensee, the Takeovers Code requires that the MGO offeror obtains prior formal consent from the Communications Authority in relation to the 'change' to the carrier licensee before it triggers an obligation to make an MGO.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The Merger Rule applies to foreign mergers if the transaction (indirectly) involves a telecommunications carrier licence under the Telecommunications Ordinance.

### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Generally speaking, there are no economy-wide restrictions relating to foreign investment in Hong Kong. Sector-specific limits on foreign investment apply in the television and sound broadcasting sectors.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There are no deadlines for filing, as the merger control regime is generally voluntary. As a result, there are no specified sanctions for not filing except where prior formal consent from the Communications Authority is required for a 'change' to the carrier licensee. In these circumstances, failure to obtain consent may result in disciplinary action under the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases. Sanctions include issuance of a public apology, public censure, and requirements on the company involved, licensed representatives and registered institutions not to act or implement the merger or acquisition.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

'Merging parties' can submit a voluntary notification to the competition authority seeking 'informal advice' on a confidential basis (the Informal Advice Route). The informal advice is not binding on the competition authority, but it provides a preliminary view as to whether the proposed merger is likely to raise competition concerns.

Parties to a merger may also apply to the competition authority for a formal decision as to whether the merger is excluded from the application of the Merger Rule on the basis that the economic efficiencies of the merger outweigh the adverse effects caused by any lessening of competition, or the statutory exemptions apply (the Decision Route) (statutory exemptions cover statutory bodies to which the Merger Rule does not apply pursuant to section 3 of the Competition Ordinance or specified persons; and persons engaged in specified activities to which the Merger Rule does not apply as determined by the Chief Executive in Council by means of a regulation made pursuant to section 5 of the Competition Ordinance).

A fee of HK\$500,000 will be charged for an application to the competition authority for a decision; in the case of the Communications Authority (CA), the amount of the fee will be equal to the costs and expenses incurred by the CA (but capped at HK\$500,000).

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

There is no suspensory obligation.

In terms of timetable for clearance, no indicative timetable is provided by the competition authority in relation to the Informal Advice Route or the Decision Route. The competition authority has stated that it will endeavour to process applications in an efficient and timely manner, but that timing will depend on the complexities of the case and the resources available to the competition authority. In practice, from submission of all required information, 'no issues' cases have been approved within one month and complex cases have taken up to six months to be approved.

In addition, the competition authority may commence an investigation of a merger within 30 days of the day on which the competition authority first became aware, or ought to have become aware, that a merger has taken place. If the competition authority reasonably believes that a merger contravenes the Merger Rule, it must apply to the Competition Tribunal for an order within six months (this can be extended if the Competition Tribunal considers it reasonable) of the day on which the merger was completed or the competition authority became aware of the merger (whichever is the later).



## Pre-clearance closing

- 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

As noted above, there is generally no requirement to seek approval before closing such that there are no specified sanctions for closing before clearance.

However, where the implementation of a proposed transaction would result in a requirement that the offeror make an MGO pursuant to the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases, it is a requirement that the offeror obtain prior formal consent from the Communications Authority for a 'change' to the carrier licensee. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action under the Takeovers Code. Sanctions include issuance of a public apology, public censure, and requirements on the company involved, licensed representatives and registered institutions not to act or implement the merger or acquisition.

In addition, the competition authority may commence an investigation of an anticipated or completed merger and can seek various orders from the Competition Tribunal including orders to unwind the transaction or orders to divest certain assets. In certain circumstances, the competition authority can also apply to the Competition Tribunal for interim measures for the purpose of 'preventing pre-emptive action', which may prejudice the hearing of the application by the Competition Tribunal. Interim measures would include measures akin to hold-separate orders or standstill obligations.

- 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There is generally no requirement to seek approval before closing and there are no specified sanctions for not filing, except where prior formal consent from the Communications Authority is required for a 'change' to the carrier licensee or implement the merger on acquisition.

- 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Not applicable. The Hong Kong merger control regime is voluntary and non-suspensory.

## Public takeovers

- 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Yes. Where a party is required to make a mandatory general offer (MGO) under the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases (the Takeovers Code) that would result in a 'change' in relation to a carrier licensee, the Takeovers Code requires that the MGO offeror obtains prior formal consent from the Communications Authority in relation to the 'change' to the carrier licensee before it triggers an obligation to make an MGO. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action under the Takeovers Code. Sanctions include the issuance of a public apology, public censure, and requirements on the company involved, licensed representatives and registered institutions not to act or implement the merger or acquisition.

## Documentation

- 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

A prescribed form (Form M) sets out the information required for an application for a decision to exclude a merger or proposed merger from the application of the Merger Rule. Information to be provided includes the parties' general corporate information and business activities, description of the transaction, proposed market definition, market shares, detailed competition analysis and grounds for exclusion. The application should also include supporting documents such as a declaration of completeness and accuracy, copies of transaction documents and internal documents.

There is no prescribed form for a voluntary notification for informal advice, but a guideline jointly issued by the Competition Commission and the Communications Authority setting out how they intend to interpret and give effect to the Merger Rule indicates that applicants should provide some evidence that either the heads of agreement, term sheet or sale and purchase agreement are in place and that, when submitting the voluntary notification, reference may be made to the type of information listed in Form M.

## Investigation phases and timetable

- 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The competition authority may conduct an investigation into any conduct that, upon reasonable suspicion, may constitute a contravention of the Merger Rule.

In terms of timetable for clearance, no indicative timetable is provided by the competition authority in relation to the Informal Advice Route or the Decision Route. The competition authority has stated that it will endeavour to process applications in an efficient and timely manner, but that timing will depend on the complexities of the case and the resources available to the competition authority. In practice, from submission of all required information, 'no issues' cases have been approved within one month and complex cases have taken up to six months to be approved.

In addition, the competition authority may commence an investigation of a merger within 30 days of the day on which the competition authority first became aware, or ought to have become aware, that a merger has taken place. If the competition authority reasonably believes that a merger contravenes the Merger Rule, it must apply to the Competition Tribunal for an order within six months (this can be extended if the Competition Tribunal considers it reasonable) of the day on which the merger was completed or the competition authority became aware of the merger (whichever is the later).

Generally, the competition authority will have the power to obtain relevant documents and information and to require any person by written notice to attend an interview before the competition authority during an investigation. The competition authority may also conduct market inquiries that could include consulting with interested third parties. If, following its investigation, the competition authority considers that there is no reasonable cause to believe that the merger or anticipated merger contravenes the Merger Rule, the competition authority will take no further action. In the alternative, the competition authority can apply to the Competition Tribunal for an order.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

No indicative timetable is provided by the competition authority in relation to the Informal Advice Route or the Decision Route. The competition authority has stated that it will endeavour to process applications in an efficient and timely manner, but that timing will depend on the complexities of the case and the resources available to the competition authority. In practice, from submission of all required information, 'no issues' cases have been approved within one month and complex cases have taken up to six months to be approved.

### SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

#### Substantive test

## 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test to be applied for the Merger Rule is whether the merger has, or is likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in Hong Kong. A guideline jointly issued by the Competition Commission and the Communications Authority setting out how they intend to interpret and give effect to the Merger Rule explains that the competition authority will generally interpret a substantial lessening of competition by reference to whether the merger is likely to encourage one or more firms to raise prices, reduce output, limit innovation, or otherwise harm consumers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives. The lessening of competition must be 'substantial'. Limited effects on the competitive process such as day-to-day injury to individual competitors will not be considered 'substantial' if the competitive process within the relevant market remains strong.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures.

#### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The 'theories of harm' that the competition authority will likely investigate are set out in a guideline jointly issued by the Competition Commission and the Communications Authority setting out how they intend to interpret and give effect to the Merger Rule (the Guideline) and include both non-coordinated effects and coordinated effects. The factors that may be taken into consideration by the competition authority include:

- the extent of competition from competitors outside Hong Kong;
- whether the acquired undertaking has failed or is likely to fail in the near future;
- the extent to which substitutes are available or likely to be available in the market;
- the existence and height of any barriers to entry into the market;
- whether the merger would result in the removal of an effective and vigorous competitor;
- the degree of countervailing power in the market; and
- the nature and extent of change and innovation in the market.

The Guideline further sets out additional factors that the competition authority may consider when assessing a vertical merger. These include whether:

- there is market power at one or more of the functional levels involved in the merger;
- there are incentives to leverage that market power into the upstream or downstream market with the purpose of lessening or

foreclosing competition in that market (ie, where the merged firm operates in a competitive upstream or downstream market);

- the market power is likely to be leveraged (eg, where raising rivals' costs in downstream markets through discriminatory access pricing would be profitable and would lessen competition); and
- the effect is likely to substantially lessen competition in the market.

The competition authority will usually employ a 'with-and-without' test when assessing the transaction, which involves assessing the level of competition that is likely to exist in a market both with and without the merger.

#### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Chief Executive in Council may, by order published in the Gazette, exempt a specified merger or proposed merger from the application of the Merger Rule if he or she is satisfied that there are exceptional and compelling reasons of public policy to do so. There is little guidance on what constitutes exceptional and compelling reasons of public policy.

#### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Merger Rule does not apply to a merger if the economic efficiencies that arise or may arise from the merger outweigh the adverse effects caused by any lessening of competition in Hong Kong. The undertaking claiming the benefit of such exclusion will bear the burden of proof. The undertaking must show that the outweighing economic efficiency gains occur as a direct result of the merger.

A guideline jointly issued by the Competition Commission and the Communications Authority setting out how they intend to interpret and give effect to the Merger Rule sets out three general types of efficiencies:

- productive efficiencies, which are achieved where a firm produces the goods and services that it offers to consumers at the lowest cost;
- allocative efficiencies, which are achieved where resources in the economy are allocated to their highest-valued uses (ie, those that provide the greatest benefit relative to costs); and
- dynamic efficiencies, which are achieved through an ongoing process of introducing new technologies and products in response to changes in consumer preferences and production techniques.

### REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

#### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

#### Voluntary application to the competition authority for decision

Where parties have submitted an application under the Decision Route, the competition authority, after considering the representations made by those who are likely to be affected by the decision, may make a decision as to whether or not the merger or proposed merger is excluded from the application of the Merger Rule, or make a decision that includes conditions or limitations subject to which the merger or proposed merger is to have effect including, in the case of a proposed merger, specifying a date by which the proposed merger must be completed.

#### Review of anticipated mergers by the competition authority

Where the competition authority, after conducting an investigation, has concluded that the merger will not contravene the Merger Rule, then

the investigation will be closed and the competition authority will take no further action. If, however, the competition authority has reasonable cause to believe that anticipated mergers will likely contravene the Merger Rule if carried into effect, it may initiate proceedings at the Competition Tribunal. If the Competition Tribunal considers that the merger is likely to contravene the Merger Rule, it may make an order to ensure that there will be no such contravention, including ordering the person against whom the order is directed not to proceed with the merger or a part of the merger, or prohibiting the person against whom the order is directed from doing anything that will result in a merger. If the Competition Tribunal is not satisfied that a merger would likely contravene the Merger Rule, it may make a declaration to that effect. If the application is made to the Competition Tribunal but it has not yet been finally determined, the Competition Tribunal may make interim orders for the purpose of 'preventing pre-emptive action'.

### Review of completed mergers by the competition authority

Similar to anticipated mergers, the competition authority may apply to the Competition Tribunal for an order if it has reasonable cause to believe that a merger will likely contravene the Merger Rule. Insofar as the Competition Tribunal is satisfied that a merger contravenes the Merger Rule, it may make any order it considers appropriate for the purpose of bringing the contravention to an end, which may include an order providing for divestiture of any business or any undertaking or association of undertakings, or an order prohibiting or restricting the acquisition by any person of the whole or part of another person's business or the doing of anything that will or may result in a merger.

In each of the above scenarios, it is possible for the parties to propose suitable remedies to close down any competition authority investigation or Competition Tribunal proceedings.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes, it is possible for the parties to the merger to propose suitable remedies to meet the concerns of the competition authority in return for the competition authority's agreement not to commence an investigation, not bring proceedings in the Competition Tribunal, or to terminate any investigation or proceedings that have commenced. As a general rule, the competition authority prefers structural remedies, as such remedies do not generally require ongoing monitoring activity.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The procedural requirements for the acceptance, withdrawal of acceptance, variation and release of commitments are provided in Schedule 2 of the Competition Ordinance. Before accepting a commitment, the competition authority must give at least 15 days' notice of the proposed commitment to those that are considered likely to be affected by the merger and the proposed commitment and consider any representations that are made to the competition authority. Any commitment accepted by the competition authority will be made public in the register of commitments.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The competition authority does not distinguish between domestic mergers and foreign-to-foreign mergers.

Under the old regime (repealed) under the Telecommunications Ordinance, the Communications Authority approved in 2014 HKT

Limited's acquisition of CSL New World Mobility Limited subject to remedies. The remedies to address the concern in the downstream retail mobile telecommunications service market were: HKT and CSL to dispose of a specified amount of 3G spectrum, not to participate in any 3G auction in Hong Kong for a period of five years, and make known any plan of closure of any base station sites for a period of five years. The remedies to address the concern in the upstream wholesale access service market were: HKT and CSL to continue providing wholesale network access to mobile virtual network operators based on existing agreements for a period of three years, and HKT to continue giving effect to its network capacity sharing agreement with a mobile network operator that was relying on such network capacity to provide its own retail mobile telecommunications services.

Although *HKT/CSL* was a domestic transaction, the agreed remedies illustrate the types of remedies the competition authority could also seek in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

A merger transaction can involve the acceptance of restrictions that go beyond the merger agreement itself, for example, non-compete covenants, licences for intellectual property or purchase and supply agreements.

Where the restrictions are directly related and necessary to the implementation of the merger agreement, they will be treated as ancillary restrictions and will be assessed as part of the merger transaction under the Merger Rule. However, where the restrictions are not directly related and necessary, they will be assessed under the behavioural provisions under the Competition Ordinance relating to the prohibition against entering into anticompetitive agreements and the prohibition against abuse of a substantial degree of market power.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Under the Decision Route, the competition authority must publish a notice and allow for a period of 30 days for representations to be submitted and considered.

The competition authority may also, as part of an investigation into a proposed merger or completed merger, seek input from relevant third parties, conduct market inquiries that could include consulting competitors of the merging parties, suppliers, customers, industry associations and consumer groups and consider their views insofar as they are relevant, and carry out independent research, for example, to help assess the degree of competition in the relevant market.

Before accepting a commitment, the competition authority must give at least 15 days' notice of the proposed commitment to those that are considered likely to be affected by the merger and the proposed commitment and consider any representations that are made to the competition authority.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The competition authority is under a duty to establish and maintain adequate procedural safeguards to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information (which is a broadly defined term in the

Competition Ordinance and encompasses commercial information and business secrets). It is an offence when a specified person (which is a defined term in the Competition Ordinance and includes the competition authority and their members, employees or agents) is in breach of his or her duty to preserve the confidentiality of any confidential information. Disclosure is only allowed with lawful authority; for instance, when the required consent is sought or if the information has already been lawfully disclosed to the public on an earlier occasion. In the case of disclosure with lawful authority, a specified person must, before disclosing any such information, give notice to the person who provided the information and to any person who is likely to be affected by the disclosure and consider any representations that are made about the proposed disclosure. The Competition Ordinance also imposes an obligation on a third party (not being a specified person) not to disclose confidential information.

Where a person or applicant provides information to the competition authority and is seeking confidential treatment, the information must be specifically identified and the reason for confidentiality must be provided. Parties are also asked to submit both confidential and non-confidential versions of documents when appropriate.

Specifically in relation to complaints, the competition authority will generally investigate in private to protect the interests of those involved and will not make disclosures except where appropriate (eg, to carry out the investigation).

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

There is no express provision in the Competition Ordinance providing for cooperation with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions. The Competition Commission (the Commission) did, however, become a member of the International Competition Network (ICN) in December 2013. It has since been an active member of the ICN and is engaged in the work of various ICN Working Groups. In 2018, it was appointed as the co-chair of the Advocacy Working Group with a view to promoting a competition culture through non-enforcement means. In addition, the Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with the Canadian Competition Commission in December 2016 with the purpose of enhancing cooperation, coordination and information sharing between the two agencies.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

An application may be made by any person or undertaking concerned to the Competition Tribunal for a review of the competition authority's decision. An application can only be made with the leave of the Competition Tribunal. Leave can only be granted if the Competition Tribunal is satisfied that either the review has a reasonable prospect of success, or it is in the interests of justice to hear the review. Before or after the determination of an application for review, the Competition Tribunal may, either of its own motion or on application, refer any question of law arising in the review to the Court of Appeal for determination by way of case stated.

An appeal lies as of right to the Court of Appeal against any decision, determination or order of the Competition Tribunal made under the Competition Ordinance with a few exceptions. The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal and may:

- confirm, set aside or vary the decision, determination or order of the Competition Tribunal;

- where the decision, determination or order is set aside, substitute any other decision, determination or order it considers appropriate; or
- remit the matter in question to the Competition Tribunal for reconsideration in the light of the decision of the Court of Appeal.

An appeal does not lie to the Court of Appeal against any interlocutory decision, determination or order of the Competition Tribunal unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of Appeal or the Competition Tribunal.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An application for the review of a decision of the competition authority must be made within 30 days of the day on which the determination was made. The Competition Tribunal may extend the time if it is satisfied that there is a good reason for doing so and no injustice would be caused as a result of the extension.

An application for a judicial review must be made within three months of the day on which the determination was made.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Since the entry into force of the Competition Ordinance on 14 December 2015, the Communications Authority (CA) has reviewed several merger cases relating to the telecommunications sector: the indirect acquisition of New World Telecommunications by Hong Kong Broadband Network, the indirect acquisition of Wharf T&T (now WTT) by private investment firms MBK Partners and TPG, and the indirect acquisition of Hutchison Global Communications by I Squared Capital. The CA decided not to commence formal investigations into any of these acquisitions. More recently, the CA reviewed Hong Kong Broadband Network's proposed acquisition of WTT. Following a public consultation on the original commitments offered by the parties, the CA conditionally cleared the transaction subject to revised commitments. The transaction reduced the major operators in the relevant market from four to three. The CA expressed concerns about the difficulties of competing fixed network operators in accessing the telecommunications network within certain buildings already served by the merging parties. The revised commitments facilitate access to the telecommunications system and enable competing operators to provide fixed telecommunications services in those buildings. The CA was also concerned about the risk that downstream rivals who have entered into wholesale agreements with the merging parties might become captive customers of the merged entity during a transitional period and therefore be less able to compete with the merged entity. To allow sufficient time for downstream rivals to switch service providers if necessary, the revised commitments extended the period during which the merged entity must continue to provide fixed telecommunication services on existing or no less favourable terms to wholesale customers from two years to three years. The parties have agreed to submit written reports on compliance with these revised commitments to the CA every six months until the expiry of the revised commitments.

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

It is clearly unusual for a merger control regime to apply to one sector only and there have been calls from some quarters for the scope of the regime to be extended to cover the rest of the economy in Hong Kong. The government has undertaken to review the Competition Ordinance a few years after it came into effect. In this context, the Competition Commission has indicated that it would advocate for certain aspects of the Competition Ordinance to be revised, including the introduction of a cross-sector merger control regime. The acquisition of Hong Kong Express by Cathay Pacific, which was completed in July 2019 and was not reviewable under the Merger Rule, triggered a fresh wave of concerns over the lack of a cross-sector merger control regime. However, it remains to be seen whether the Merger Rule will be broadened in the future and in what time frame.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In response to the challenges presented by the covid-19 outbreak, the Competition Commission issued a statement in March 2020 regarding its approach in applying the Competition Ordinance during the outbreak. The statement does not directly address mergers and instead focuses on temporary cooperative measures between businesses, but it affirms that the Competition Ordinance continues to apply in full during the outbreak.

Depending on the development of the outbreak, it is possible that merger review timelines could be impacted in practice, in particular where extensive market inquiries are required.



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# Hungary

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The most important legislative act is Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices (the Competition Act). The other major source of law is Act CL of 2016 on the General Public Administration Procedures, which (together with the special rules in the Competition Act) sets out the basic procedural rules for administrative proceedings (including merger review). The rules of the judicial review of merger control decisions are defined by Act I of 2017 on the Code of Administrative Litigation.

Hungarian merger control rules are enforced by the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH), an autonomous public administrative authority that reports directly and only to Parliament. The Competition Council is the independent decision-making body of the GVH.

Notices and communications by the GVH are also significant sources of merger control rules. GVH updated the notices applicable to merger review in 2018, including the notice clarifying the rules related to the initiation of merger control proceedings and the notice on imposing conditions and obligations for clearance.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The following transactions are caught by the Hungarian merger rules:

- acquisition of sole or joint control over the whole or a part of previously independent undertakings;
- merger of two or more previously independent undertakings; and
- creation of a full-function joint venture.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Similar to the European Union, full-function joint ventures are subject to merger control review.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Control is defined as:

- acquisition of over 50 per cent of voting rights in the target;
- the power to appoint, elect or dismiss the majority of the executive officers of the target; and
- the ability to exert decisive influence over the decisions of the target (either by the virtue of contractual arrangements or de facto).

Minority and other interests less than control do not trigger the obligation to report the merger to the GVH.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The parties are obliged to report the merger to the GVH if:

- the combined Hungarian net turnover of all parties (ie, the acquirer or acquirers and the target) exceeds 15 billion forints; and
- the individual Hungarian net turnover of each of at least two parties exceeds 1 billion forints.

Turnover of subsidiaries jointly controlled by one of the parties and a third party must be allocated on a per capita basis according to the number of entities exercising joint control. For the purposes of the second limb of the test (ie, the 1 billion forints threshold), consecutive transactions by the same parties within two years preceding the date of the transaction must be taken into account, provided that such transactions were not subject to prior merger control notification. Intra-group revenues and the turnover of the seller's group must be excluded.

Specific rules apply to the calculation of thresholds for mergers including insurance companies, credit institutions, financial enterprises or investment companies, which are largely in line with those set out in the EU's Jurisdictional Notice.

The GVH may also decide to investigate mergers that fall below filing thresholds within six months following their implementation if it is not obvious that the concentration does not significantly reduce competition in the relevant market; and the combined net group turnover of all parties exceeded 5 billion forints in the previous financial year.

Mergers that meet the EU merger control filing thresholds will be assessed by the Commission in line with the 'one-stop-shop' principle.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory in the case of mergers that reach the jurisdictional thresholds.

A special 'public interest exemption' exists under the Hungarian competition regime, which permits the government to qualify a merger as 'strategic' and exempt it from the merger control filing requirement. The government can do so if the merger carries national strategic interests, such as it is needed to protect workplaces or to assure security of supply.

Another exception is temporary (less than one year) acquisition of control by an insurance, investment or financial institution, if such acquisition is made with a view to resell, and the exercise of control during the interim period does not exceed what is absolutely necessary.

A special covid-19 exemption was enacted in 2020: a merger does not need to be notified if it is a result of financing provided by venture capital or private equity funds directly or indirectly owned by the state in



the frame of the government's funding programme to help undertakings hit by the economic consequences of covid-19.

Filing is voluntary in the case of mergers that do not reach the jurisdictional thresholds, but may be subject to the GVH's investigation. However, in that case, sanctions cannot be applied for closing before clearance.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Yes, foreign-to-foreign mergers are subject to Hungarian merger control review if they meet the local merger control filing thresholds.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

From 1 January 2019, a foreign direct investment (FDI) screening by the Minister of Interior applies to all foreign direct investments made in certain protected sectors and industries that are important to the national security of Hungary under Act LVII of 2018. Further, as of 26 May 2020, an additional FDI screening by the Minister of Innovation and Technology was introduced in the wake of the covid-19 pandemic, which applies to strategic companies in Hungary.

There are special sectors where the approval of other authorities is necessary in addition to merger review by the GVH. For instance, approval is needed from the National Bank of Hungary for the merger of financial institutions. Also, the approval of the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority is required for the merger of electricity and natural gas utility companies operating under licences issued by the same authority. The approval of the Media Council is required for certain transactions involving media companies; if such approval is not obtained prior to the merger notification, the GVH suspends its merger review proceeding until the position statement of the Media Council is obtained. These approvals, however, with the exception of that of the Media Council, have no binding effect on the proceedings of the GVH and the GVH may conclude the merger review proceeding independently from the results of the investigations of these authorities.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no deadline for filing, but the merger cannot be implemented prior to clearance by the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH).

There are no specific sanctions for not filing per se, but sanctions apply for closing before clearance.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Typically, the acquirer, but in the case of a merger or joint venture, each of the parties are responsible for filing.

Fast-track review fees amount to 1 million forints. If further investigation is required and a Phase I review is opened an additional 3 million forints must be paid, and in the case a Phase II review is also opened, an additional 12 million forints must be paid.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Non-problematic concentrations can be cleared in a fast-track proceeding. The waiting period of the fast-track review is eight days and there have been cases where clearance was granted overnight. Fast-track review is available for non-problematic mergers and it is recommended that the parties engage in pre-notification discussions and submit a final and complete filing form in the course of such discussions for review and comments by the GVH.

If the investigation enters into Phase I, the waiting period is 30 days, while Phase II lasts an additional three months. The GVH may extend its review by a maximum of 20 days in Phase I, and two months in Phase II. The clock also stops until information requests are complied with. If the GVH fails to issue its decision within the applicable waiting period, its approval is deemed to be granted.

The implementation of the transaction has to be suspended prior to acknowledgement or clearance.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The GVH may impose daily fines for closing before clearance. Fines can range between 50,000 and 200,000 forints per day for each day starting from the date of signing (or other triggering event, as specified) until the initiation of GVH's merger review process.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Yes, sanctions also apply to foreign-to-foreign mergers.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The acquirer may apply for a GVH permission to exercise control prior to clearance. Such request must be made in a reasoned submission and can be granted in exceptional cases only, in particular if control is required to maintain the value of the target's business.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Since the introduction of fast-track proceedings into the Hungarian merger regime, the merger filing became considerably shorter. Currently, it consists of five main chapters, is 20 pages long and only requires information on the transaction, the parties and the relevant markets. If the merger cannot be cleared in a fast-track proceeding and further investigation is required, the GVH will issue targeted requests for information regarding the relevant markets and the competitive effects of the transaction.

The transaction agreement (SPA) and the annual financial reports of the parties shall be annexed to the filing form, together with proof of payment of the filing fee.

The filing form may be downloaded from the GVH website and is available in both Hungarian and English, but must be submitted in Hungarian. Supporting documents drawn up in English may be submitted in the original language, but the GVH may require the submission of a Hungarian summary or a Hungarian translation. If the documents are drawn up in languages other than English, the Hungarian translation of the parts of the documents relevant to support the data and information provided in the notification form must also be attached.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

##### Pre-notification

The first (informal) step in the notification process is the confidential pre-notification discussions with the GVH.

##### Notification stage

In straightforward, non-problematic cases the GVH closes the procedure and acknowledges the transaction within eight days of receipt of the notification by the issuance of an administrative certificate (fast-track procedure). If this is not the case, the GVH opens the investigation phase.

##### Investigation stage

In the case of transactions that require more thorough investigation, the procedure of the GVH is divided into two stages: an investigation stage by the case handlers and the decision-making stage by the Competition Council. The investigation stage is completed when the case handlers submit their investigation report to the Competition Council summarising their main findings in the case.

##### Decision-making stage

Formal decision-making is made by the Competition Council based on the investigation report and their own review and assessment.

##### Phase I and Phase II

After obtaining the agreement of the Competition Council, the case handlers will open a Phase II investigation in complex cases. In Phase II, extra time is added to the notification timetable both to the investigation (case handlers) and the decision-making (Competition Council) stage.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

It is advisable to engage in pre-notification discussions with the GVH as these discussions can help to accelerate the GVH's decision-making (by reducing the risk and scope of information requests) and can result in obtaining clearance in a fast-track procedure. Pre-notification discussions are confidential and typically last approximately two weeks. The GVH recommends that parties request the initiation of pre-notification discussions at least two weeks before they intend to report the merger.

In straightforward cases where the absence of competition concerns is clear, the GVH acknowledges the transaction by the issuance of an administrative certificate within eight days of the date the merger was reported. The administrative certificate is normally less than a page long and only contains a brief description of the transaction. The Phase I waiting period is 30 days, while Phase II lasts an additional three months. The GVH may extend its review by a maximum of 20 days in Phase I, and two months in Phase II. The clock stops until information requests are complied with. If the GVH fails to issue its decision within the applicable waiting period, its approval is deemed to be granted.

In 2019, the majority, namely 86 per cent of the GVH's merger decisions, were simplified decisions and, in nine cases, the decisions were made within one day following the receipt of the notification.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) uses the significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) test for its assessment of mergers and will clear transactions that do not result in a SIEC, particularly by creating or intensifying a dominant position on the relevant market.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The GVH assesses unilateral and coordinated effects in horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers including portfolio effects, by weighing pro- and anticompetitive aspects, in particular:

- structure and characteristics of the relevant markets;
- actual and potential competitive pressure;
- presumed competitive effects;
- sourcing and sale opportunities;
- costs, risks and conditions of market entry and exit;
- market position and business strategy of the parties; and
- effects on suppliers and other partners.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The GVH's assessment centres around competitive aspects and it is not expected that the GVH would consider non-competition issues in its review. The only exception is mergers involving media companies, where the GVH must take into account the view of the Media Council that focuses its review on maintaining media pluralism.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The GVH takes into account economic efficiencies. In practice, efficiencies are expected to be specific to the transaction and to bring along quantifiable consumer benefit (the sooner the benefits are predicted to arise, the larger weight they carry in the assessment).

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) may prohibit transactions or impose structural or behavioural remedies.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. If a transaction's projected anticompetitive effects can be prevented by imposing structural or behavioural remedies, the GVH can clear the merger subject to appropriate remedies. Usually, the GVH prefers structural remedies because of their ease of monitoring.

### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Timing and conditions are imposed on a case-by-case basis. However, all remedies have to comply with some basic requirements: they must be capable of removing competition concerns, must be proposed by the parties, and be exact, consistent and verifiable. Commitments are normally subject to market testing and the GVH also holds hearings to discuss proposed remedies.

### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

We are not aware of any truly foreign-to-foreign mergers (where the parties have no Hungarian subsidiaries, manufacturing facilities or other presence) where the GVH imposed remedies on the parties.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

By virtue of law, all ancillary restraints necessary for the implementation of a concentration are covered by the GVH's clearance decision. However, this does not mean that all restrictions labelled in an SPA as 'ancillary' would be automatically approved by the GVH when issuing its merger clearance decision. Instead, the GVH's practice is not to assess the conformity of ancillary restraints with the relevant requirements during its merger review and its clearance decisions are silent on the issue. It is, therefore, the parties' responsibility to self-assess such restraints (prior to filing) and the GVH retains the right to open an independent investigation to assess any ancillary restraint even after the merger is cleared and closed.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Yes, customers and competitors can have their voice heard in the merger review process. The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) can send information requests to any group of third parties whose views are relevant to the assessment of the merger. In complex cases, the GVH conducts an in-depth market testing exercise involving competitors, consumers and other parties affected by the transaction. In addition, third parties can also (at their own initiative) submit comments on an ongoing procedure.

Anyone can submit a complaint to the GVH when suspecting the breach of competition rules, including merger-related infringements, such as closing without clearance or gun jumping. Complainants' status slightly defers on the basis of whether they used the GVH's complaint form when submitting their complaint, as complainants using the official form have more procedural rights than those submitting an 'informal' complaint. The GVH must decide within two months from receipt of a formal complaint (which may be extended with two additional months) whether to open

an investigation on the basis of information revealed during its review of the complaint. After the complaint review process is closed, complainants can access and review the GVH file. In the case of an informal complaint, the GVH has more flexibility, as it has no obligation to formally decide on whether to open an investigation based on an informal complaint.

## Publicity and confidentiality

### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

First, after submission of the merger control filing form, the GVH publishes on its website a brief overview of the transaction containing basic information on the contemplated transaction, except if the concentration is accepted for confidential treatment, in which case no publication is made until the concentration is implemented. This summary is copied from a section of the filing form, so the parties can influence the level of detail that goes into it. Second, third parties can request access to merger files, but as a general rule access is only granted after the final and non-appealable conclusion of the merger case. Prior to that, access to merger files is only possible if the third party can demonstrate that such access is necessary to enforce a statutory right or to meet an obligation arising from law or from an administrative decision. In any event, third parties may only have access to non-confidential versions of the relevant documents. Third, the GVH may hold hearings in any competition case (including mergers). The default rule is that such hearings are public, unless the GVH decides to hold a closed hearing because of the need to discuss sensitive information. Finally, the GVH's final decision is published on the GVH's website. All sensitive and confidential information is removed from the public version of the GVH decision prior to publication on its website.

The GVH is very attentive to protecting commercially sensitive or private data throughout the process.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The GVH is a member of the European Competition Network that consists of the national competition authorities of EU member states and the European Commission. It is also a member of the European Association of Competition Authorities, which consists of national competition authorities of the member states of the EU and the EFTA (except for Switzerland), as well as the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority. The GVH is also member of the International Competition Network.

There is a lively cooperation between the GVH and the OECD, which (among others) manifests in the OECD-GVH Regional Centre for Competition in Budapest (since 2005). The Centre promotes the development of competition policy in the south-east, east and central European regions.

Finally, the GVH has bilateral cooperation agreements with a number of non-EU competition authorities, including the Chinese, Ukrainian, Moldovan, Albanian, Serbian, Russian and Taiwanese authorities.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The decision of the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) is subject to judicial review, which may be launched within 30 days of receipt of the GVH's decision. The first instance court decision may be subject to appeal to a higher court.

The GVH's decision is rarely challenged successfully. The last time a merger case was remanded and referred back for reconsideration was in 2020.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Court review takes approximately two years (including both first and second instance review) on average, but it is not uncommon for the review process to last even longer.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) closed 57 merger control proceedings in 2019, of which nine (16 per cent) were closed in one day, 40 (70 per cent) in eight-day simplified procedures, four procedures (7 per cent) were closed in Phase I and four (7 per cent) in Phase II. In 2019, the GVH continued to impose penalties for closing before clearance.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The background legislation changed in 2018 when Act CL of 2016 on the General Public Administration Procedures and Act I of 2017 on the Code of Administrative Litigation entered into force. The Competition Act has been amended with the same effect, in order to accommodate the change to the background legislation. Therefore, comprehensive legislation change in the context of merger control is not expected in the coming period.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) has kept up the trend of cracking down on any false information provided in the merger control procedure as shown in connection with the *SáGa/Master Good* merger (ÖB-0052/2019/6) where the GVH noticed that the market share data in a post-completion press release contradicts that submitted by the parties in the notification procedure and, therefore, initiated a procedure to examine whether the parties provided false data to the GVH (Vj/1/2020). The GVH finally approved the acquisition of Invitel by DIGI, concluding the reopened investigation because of misleading data provided during the notification and approval procedure. That approval, however, came with a complex remedies package involving divestment as well as behavioural remedies (Vj/42/2018).

In 2019, the Hungarian government continued to rely on the exemption from under the merger control scrutiny by the GVH especially in connection with energy sector mergers involving state-owned entities (*e-Mobi/NKM*, *Magyar Gáz Tranzit/MOL*, and *Status Power/MVM*).

In early 2020, the GVH amended its merger control jurisdictional notice (consolidated under Notice No. 1/2019). It is of particular interest among the changes that in the case of swap deals or the splitting up of joint ventures, the GVH will only examine the transaction that meets the thresholds; nevertheless, the implementation ban is closely related to the transactions not meeting the thresholds as the relevant section of the Notice states that, when assessing such transactions, the GVH operates under the presumption that if the notifiable transaction is implemented,

# Bird & Bird

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the transaction that would not have to be notified owing to not meeting the thresholds is also realised. This means that the non-notifiable transaction may be implemented regardless of the GVH's acknowledgement, but the parties must also implement the transaction that meets the thresholds and they may not choose to implement the non-notifiable transaction after the GVH acknowledged or authorised the transaction meeting the notification thresholds, or to not implement the non-notifiable one at all.

The government established a funding programme to help undertakings hit by the economic consequences of covid-19. The government exempted mergers from the mandatory notification obligation under Government Decree No. 137/2020, provided that the merger is a result of financing provided by venture capital or private equity funds directly or indirectly owned by the state in the frame of the aforementioned funding programme. The exemption was incorporated into the Competition Act at the end of the covid-19 state of emergency and has thereby become a permanent provision.

Mergers targeting Hungarian-registered strategic undertakings and involving foreign investors must be notified to the Minister of Innovation and Technology. This measure was introduced as a temporary measure under Government Decree No. 227/2020 for the duration of the state of emergency, but when the state of emergency ended, the same provisions were enacted by Act LVIII of 2020 as a permanent piece of legislation. Foreign investors are those who are not residents of Hungary, an EU or EEA member state or Switzerland. However, residents of Hungary, an EU or EEA member state or Switzerland are also considered foreign investors if a resident of a third country has majority influence (directly or indirectly) over them. Strategic undertakings are limited liability or public or private companies limited by shares with their registered seat in Hungary and active in the energy, transport and communication sectors or other areas covered by the EU Foreign Direct Investment Regulation (2019/452/EU). In the absence of the acknowledgment of the Minister of Innovation and Technology, the contract underlying the merger is null and void.

# Iceland

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Icelandic rules on merger control are set out in the Competition Act No. 44/2005 (the Act) and the Rules on the Notification of Mergers No. 684/2008.

Merger control is enforced exclusively by an independent administrative authority, the Competition Authority (CA). Decisions of the CA may be appealed to an independent administrative committee, the Competition Appeals Committee.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The definition of a merger under the Act is similar to the EU definition set out in the EU Merger Regulation 139/2004 (EUMR). It follows that a merger within the Act occurs where a change of control on a lasting basis results from:

- the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings;
- the takeover by one undertaking of another independent undertaking;
- the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings; or
- the creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures are handled in the same manner under the Act as under the EUMR. Accordingly, the creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity constitutes a merger within the meaning of the Act.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Yes, the concept of control is defined in the Act in a similar manner as in the EUMR. Accordingly, control under the Act stems from rights, contracts or any other means that, either separately or in combination and having regard to the consideration of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by:

- ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; or

- rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.

Control is acquired by persons who are holders of rights or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned or while not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights under such contracts, have the option to exercise such rights. Customary minority rights do not constitute control and other interests that do not reach the standard of control are not subject to merger review.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A merger falls within the merger control regime if first, the combined aggregated annual turnover of the relevant undertakings is 2 billion kronur or more in Iceland and second, the annual turnover of at least two of the undertakings party to the merger is at least 200 million kronur in Iceland.

The turnover of a parent, subsidiary and other undertakings within the same group as the undertakings party to the merger shall be taken into account as well as the turnover of undertakings over which they have direct or indirect control.

These thresholds are cumulative and must accordingly both be met for a merger to be caught. If the CA believes a merger falling below these thresholds will substantially impede effective competition, it can bring the merger under the regime if the combined aggregated annual turnover of the relevant undertakings is over 1 billion kronur. This is executed by ordering the parties to the merger to notify it to the CA.

The aforementioned thresholds stipulated by the Act are currently under legislative review.

Under the Media Act No. 38/2011, all mergers involving at least one media service provider with an annual turnover of at least 100 million kronur in Iceland must be notified to the CA, notwithstanding the combined aggregated annual turnover of the relevant undertakings. The Media Act also provides that if the Media Commission believes that a merger that does not meet the relevant turnover threshold can substantially impede pluralism or diversity in the media, it may request that the CA demands a notification from the merging parties.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If a merger meets the relevant turnover thresholds, it must be notified to the CA before the merger is executed. As explained above, the CA can bring a merger under the regime if the combined aggregated turnover of the relevant undertakings exceeds a certain threshold. If parties to a merger that does not meet the turnover thresholds inform the CA about



the merger, the CA has 15 working days to decide whether it brings the merger under the regime in accordance with the above.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

If the relevant thresholds for turnover in Iceland are met, mergers (including foreign-to-foreign mergers) fall within the scope of the merger regime and must be notified. Hence, a local effects test is not applied.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Under Act No. 34/1991 on Foreign Investment in Undertakings, certain types of foreign investment in Icelandic undertakings are subject to restrictions and must be notified to the Minister of Tourism, Industry and Innovation, as further described in the Act. This obligation to notify investments is limited to sectors where there are restrictions on foreign investment: the fisheries industry, the energy sector and the airline sector. However, the obligation to notify does not apply in the latter two industries where the investor is an individual or a legal entity resident or established in a member state in the European Economic Area under the EEA Agreement, member state of the European Free Trade Association or in the Faroe Islands.

According to the Electronic Communications Act No. 81/2003, mergers involving an electronic communications undertaking holding rights to use frequencies must be notified to the Post and Telecom Administration. The Post and Telecom Administration may under certain circumstances cancel rights to use frequencies, held by a party to such a merger, or change the conditions to such rights.

Furthermore, Icelandic law contains restrictions to ownership of and the right to use real property, as well as ownership of companies that own real property, pursuant to Act No. 19/1966 on the Right of Ownership and Use of Real Property. The Act limits foreign persons', resident outside the EEA area and the Faroe Islands, ownership of real property and real property companies in Iceland.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The Competition Authority (CA) shall be notified of a merger before it takes effect but after the conclusion of an agreement on the proposed merger, the public announcement of a takeover bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest in an undertaking. A merger falling within the regime shall not take effect while it is being examined by the CA. Any violation of these instructions and conditions can be subject to fines of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of the preceding business year of any undertaking or association of undertakings involved in the violation. Fines for not notifying the CA of a merger are applied in practice. The CA is authorised, however, with the consent of the parties involved, to conclude the matter by a settlement.

In addition, the CA may, on request, grant an exemption from the obligation that a merger should not take effect while it is being examined by the CA, provided that it is established that delaying the implementation of the merger could harm the undertakings concerned or its business partners and threaten competition. Such a request shall be in writing and reasoned. An exemption may be made subject to conditions to ensure effective competition.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The parties to the merger, or the parties obtaining control, as applicable, shall jointly prepare the notification of the merger. If an undertaking acquires a controlling share in another undertaking, the undertaking initiating the takeover shall prepare the notification of the merger. In the event of a takeover bid for an undertaking, the bidder shall prepare the notification. The filing fee is 250,000 kronur, but the amount is currently under legislative review.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The CA shall, within 25 working days, notify a party that has submitted a notification of a merger if it sees reason for further investigation of the competitive impact of the merger. This time limit begins on the first working day following the receipt by the CA of a notification meeting the conditions set out in the Competition Act No. 44/2005 (the Act) and the Rules on the Notification of Mergers No. 684/2008. If the merger notification is not sufficient in that respect the relevant time limits do not commence. If no such communication is received from the CA within the established period, the CA cannot annul or otherwise intervene in the merger. A decision on the annulment of a merger shall be made no later than 70 working days from the time that a notification pursuant to the first sentence has been sent to the party or parties notifying the merger. If it is necessary to obtain further information to properly review the merger, the CA may extend this time limit by up to 20 working days.

If the CA fails to make a decision on whether to annul or establish conditions for a merger within the aforementioned time limits, the CA can neither annul the merger nor make it subject to conditions.

The aforementioned time limits stipulated by the Act are currently under legislative review.

The merger may not be implemented before the CA has reached a positive decision to that extent. The CA may, however, on request, grant an exemption from the obligation that a merger should not take effect while it is being examined, provided that it is established that delaying the implementation of the merger could harm the undertakings concerned or its business partners and threaten competition. Such a request shall be in writing and reasoned. An exemption may be made subject to conditions to ensure effective competition.

#### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing before clearance is considered equivalent to an absence of filing and is accordingly subject to sanctions. The same applies to integration of activities of the merging entities before clearance.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers that meet the relevant thresholds for turnover in Iceland fall within the scope of the merger regime and must be notified. Sanctions are applicable in such cases.



#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

No specific solutions permitting closing before clearance are provided for under the Act in foreign-to-foreign transactions, other than the CA's granting of an exemption from the obligation that a merger should not take effect.

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No, there are no special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids. However, the notification of a merger in connection with a public takeover bid must be notified to the CA after the bid has been made public.

#### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

A merger notification shall include information on the merger, the undertakings concerned, the relevant markets and other details necessary for assessing the competitive effects of the merger. In brief, the standard notification shall, for example, contain:

- a short description of the merger;
- basic information of the parties to the merger, such as the names of the parties and the nature of their operations;
- detailed information on the background of the merger, its objectives and nature;
- information of ownership and control of all the parties to the merger;
- personal and financial relationship between the parties;
- all documents relating to the merger;
- detailed information on the market definition;
- a description of the effect on consumers and intermediaries; and
- a declaration certifying that the data provided by the parties is complete and accurate.

A short form may be used for the purpose of notifying a merger where one of the following conditions is met:

- the markets affected by the merger are not related;
- two or more of the parties to the merger are engaged in business activities in the same product and geographic market (horizontal merger), provided that their combined market share is less than 20 per cent;
- two or more of the parties to the merger are operating in product markets that are upstream or downstream of a product market in which either party to the merger is operating (vertical merger), provided that their individual or combined market share is less than 30 per cent;
- the merger in question is a joint venture that has a limited effect in Iceland; or
- a party acquires sole control of an undertaking over which it already had joint control.

The following information shall accompany a notification submitted in short form:

- an overview of the undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by the parties to the merger;
- a description of the product, service and geographic markets that are affected by the merger and a reasoned assessment of the market share of the undertakings in question in such markets;

- a reasoned assessment of the competitive impact of the merger;
- copies of all contracts and other instruments upon which the merger is based, together with copies of the annual financial reports of the undertakings that are parties to the merger; and
- a declaration certifying that the data provided by the parties is complete and accurate.

Submission of wrong, misleading or insufficient information to the CA is subject to fines or up to two years imprisonment. Fines can be imposed on both individual and legal persons.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

During the first phase of investigation, the CA will first review the merger notification and see if it is complete or if any information is missing. The CA may request information not only from the parties, but also from other market players, including the parties' suppliers, customers and competitors. When the CA has all the information required it will decide whether there are grounds to move on to the second phase of investigation. If the CA is of the opinion that the merger notification is not complete, it will call for additional information to be provided. The 25-working-day preliminary investigation will start when the notification is deemed complete.

The second phase of investigation is for mergers that the CA considers likely to be harmful to competition. During the second phase, the CA will perform a thorough definition of the relevant markets and evaluate the market power of the parties to the merger. To do so the CA may request further information not only from the parties, but also from other third parties. In cases raising competition concerns, the CA will issue a statement of objection and, if relevant, give the parties a chance to propose remedies. The parties then have the opportunity to respond to the CA's statement of objection and present their arguments and views on the case, before the CA issues a final decision.

If the CA is of the opinion that a merger will obstruct effective competition by giving one or more undertakings a dominant position or by strengthening such a position, or will result in a significant distortion of competition in the market in other respects, the CA may annul the merger. The CA may also establish conditions for such a merger that must be met within a given time.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The current timetable for clearance is as follows:

##### First phase (maximum 25 working days)

- This phase is common to all mergers. The CA shall within 25 working days notify a party that has submitted a notification of a merger if it sees reason for further investigation of the competitive impact of the merger.
- This time limit begins on the first working day following the receipt by the CA of a notification meeting the conditions of a sufficient merger notification.

##### Second phase (maximum 90 working days)

- A decision on the annulment of a merger shall in general be made no later than 70 working days from the time that a notification has been sent to the party notifying the merger.
- If it is necessary to obtain further information to properly review the merger, the CA may extend this time limit by up to 20 working days.

However, the time limits stipulated by the Act are currently under legislative review.

There is no special mechanism that can be used to speed up proceedings in merger cases in Iceland. However, if the merging parties feel it is necessary to execute the merger prior to the CA having reviewed it substantially, it is possible to seek a special exemption for that purpose. The time in which the CA typically reaches its decision, within the statutory timetable, varies and is dependent upon whether the merger demands further investigation by the CA, hence being moved to the second phase. The clearance process cannot exceed the time limits mentioned, and if it does, the CA cannot prevent, annul or impose conditions on a merger.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance is whether the merger impedes effective competition by creating or strengthening an individual or collective dominant position or otherwise significantly impedes effective competition. The substantive analysis is therefore largely similar to the analysis under the EU Merger Regulation 139/2004.

The merging parties can raise a failing firm defence. The Competition Authority (CA) can clear an otherwise problematic merger if one of the merging parties is a failing firm.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No, there is no special test for joint ventures. A full-function joint venture will be reviewed by the CA like any other type of merger. However, the possible coordination issues between the parents will be especially examined.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The CA largely applies the same analytical framework as the European Commission. Accordingly, it investigates all possible anticompetitive effects in respect of the type of merger in question, including non-coordinated and coordinated effects, vertical foreclosure, common ownership and conglomerate effects.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The CA is not obliged to consider non-competition issues in its analysis.

In assessing a merger according to the Media Act, the CA shall consider whether the merger may or may not adversely affect pluralism or diversity in the media on the market or markets in which the concerned media providers operate.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Under the Competition Act No. 44/2005 the CA is, in its substantive analysis of a merger, obliged to consider whether a merger will result in technical or economic progress if such progress benefits consumers and does not impede competition. For statements of such progress to be taken into account, the parties must be able to demonstrate in what

manner it will benefit consumers and to what extent and when it will materialise.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition Authority (CA) may annul a merger if it has reached a conclusion that a merger will obstruct effective competition by creating a dominant position or by strengthening such a position, or it will significantly impede competition in the market in other respects. The CA may also establish conditions for such a merger that must be met within a given time.

If the CA has found that a merger does not impede competition or has approved a merger subject to conditions, the CA may revoke such a decision where:

- the decision is based on incorrect information for which one of the merging parties is responsible or where it has been obtained by deceit; or
- the undertakings concerned violate the conditions attached to the merger.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Between filing and the final decision of the CA, the notifying parties may propose amendments to the transaction to remedy competition issues. The parties may propose various remedies (behavioural as well as structural), such as selling of assets to third parties (those third parties are subject to approval by the CA), to execute a contract (eg, a trademark or patent licence), to amend conditions of sale or to keep the CA informed of any change in the structure of the relevant market (such as an increase in the parties' market share), etc.

As explained above, the CA may establish conditions for a merger that must be met within a given time. These conditions vary in each case, such as obligations for merger parties to sell assets to third parties, to keep the CA informed of any change in the structure of the relevant market and to guarantee that the majority of the board of directors is independent from the controlling merger parties.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

When there are conditions on divestment or other remedies, the CA generally sets conditions that the assets have to be sold in a defined and transparent sales process within a specific time limit. These time limits are, however, eliminated from the published decisions for confidentiality reasons.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers that fall within the scope of the merger regime must be notified and will be reviewed.

### Ancillary restrictions

28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

As under the EU Merger Regulation 139/2004 it is recognised that certain contractual restrictions may be directly related to and necessary for the successful implementation of a merger. A decision that clears a merger is deemed also to clear such restrictions if they meet the criteria of direct relation and necessity.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Without obligation the Competition Authority (CA) habitually seeks comments of third parties such as customers and competitors during its review of a merger. Moreover, it seeks comments from other third parties if it considers it to be useful to the review process.

Furthermore, the CA has, in merger cases where the CA considered the markets involved to be highly relevant to the public, released the merger notifications, in which confidential information had been omitted, on their website and publicly requested comments as to the possible effects of these mergers on competition in the relevant markets.

Third parties are not parties to the merger case and do not have the relevant procedural rights. It follows that third parties do not have automatic access to the case file and the CA is not obliged to hear them.

It should be noted, however, that a third party can appeal the decision of the CA in a merger case to the Competition Appeals Committee if it can demonstrate sufficient individual interest in the outcome of the case. A recent example of this is a case where the CA cleared a conglomerate merger with certain conditions, but a third party, a competitor, appealed the decision to the Competition Appeals Committee. In its ruling in Case No. 6/2018 the Competition Appeals Committee found that the third party had demonstrated sufficient interest in the outcome of the case. The third party was therefore granted access to the case and the claims of the merging undertakings to dismiss the case were rejected.

### Publicity and confidentiality

30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The merger notification is not automatically publicly available, and the CA does not publish information in relation to the filing of notifications. Under the Information Act No. 140/2012, however, government authorities are obliged to grant the public access to materials concerning specific matters, if requested, with certain derogations. These derogations include, inter alia, restrictions on the right to information, owing to private interests such as important financial or commercial interests of businesses or other legal entities.

Decisions of the CA as well as rulings of the Competition Appeals Committee are published on the CA's website. Parties to a merger case may, however, request that documents or parts of documents containing commercially sensitive information remain confidential. In the published versions of such decisions and rulings, reference to confidential information is accordingly omitted.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The CA participates in international cooperation in its field. First, the relevant authorities of Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland are engaged in regular cooperation. Second, the CA participates in cooperation based on the EEA Agreement, including cooperation organised by the European Competition Network. Finally, the CA is party to the International Competition Network and takes part in cooperation in the field of competition within the OECD.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The decisions of the Competition Authority (CA) may be appealed to a separate and a superior committee, the Competition Appeals Committee. A written appeal must be received within four weeks from the time the party in question was informed of the CA's decision. The ruling of the Appeals Committee shall be rendered within six weeks from the date of the appeal. In several instances, the Appeals Committee has not been able to uphold this time frame.

If a party, including the CA, is not willing to accept the ruling of the Appeals Committee it may instigate legal action for annulment before the courts of law. Such action shall be brought within six months after the party obtained knowledge of the Appeals Committee's ruling. Such action does not suspend the entry into force of the ruling, nor shall it preclude formal enforcement proceedings.

### Time frame

33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

A written appeal to the Competition Appeals Committee must be received within four weeks of the time the party in question was informed of the decision of the CA. If a party is not willing to accept the ruling of the Appeals Committee, it may instigate legal action for annulment before the courts of law within six months after the party obtained knowledge of the Appeals Committee's ruling.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2019, the Competition Authority (CA) made decisions in 39 merger cases. The CA cleared the majority of these mergers within the first phase. Conditions were imposed on six mergers and one merger was annulled. One merger notification, where the turnover thresholds were not met, was submitted upon request from the CA. One merger notification was withdrawn in 2019, after the CA had issued a statement of objection, stating as a preliminary result that the merger in question was likely to harm competition in the relevant market and should therefore be annulled.

From 2012 to 2018, the CA received 193 merger notifications. Conditions were imposed on 38 mergers, four mergers were annulled and at least five merger notifications were withdrawn following the issue of statements of objection by the CA, concluding that the mergers should be annulled.

The current enforcement concerns of the authorities remain somewhat connected to the aftermath of the economic crisis in 2008. Most

of the merger cases following the economic crisis that started in 2008 involved banks taking over commercial undertakings, to financially reconstruct them and sell them, their commercial business or assets on the open market. Even though most of the cases in question involved conglomerate mergers, the CA established detailed conditions for the banks' ownership of these companies to ensure that ownership does not lead to harmful disruptions to competition as a result of the unusual circumstances present in the Icelandic economy. However, the most current concern with regard to the aftermath of the financial crisis is now the increased ownership of pension funds and investment funds of commercial undertakings, which has increased substantially, raising concerns within the CA, which believes that this can possibly impede competition, especially if certain pension funds, investment funds or related parties have minority shareholdings in two or more competitors or undertakings on different levels of the same market.

The focus of the CA has also been on the retail market. The Icelandic retail market has been going through considerable changes in recent years with the entry of large-scale global retailers into the Icelandic market. The CA has published several merger decisions involving mergers of large retail companies as well as retail companies and fuel companies. Notable cases include decisions of the CA in Cases No. 9/2019 and 8/2019. In its ruling in Case No. 9/2019, the CA considered that a merger between a large listed retail company that operates supermarkets, convenience stores, warehouses, distributors and clothing stores and a large fuel company would likely impede effective competition. Therefore, the CA imposed conditions to the merger, which were accepted by the merging parties, and the matter was concluded with a settlement between the CA and the merging parties. A similar result may be found in Case No. 8/2019, which involved a merger between a listed fuel company and a large retail company that operates supermarkets, convenience stores, a warehouse and electronics store.

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

A bill proposing several changes to the Competition Act No. 44/2005 (the Act) has been submitted in parliament. The main changes proposed in relation to merger control are that:

- notification thresholds are raised from 2 billion in combined aggregated annual turnover of the relevant undertakings and 200 million kronur for at least two of the undertakings party to the merger to 3 billion in combined aggregated annual turnover of the relevant undertakings and 300 million kronur for at least two of the undertakings party to the merger. The threshold for the CA to bring a merger that does not meet the thresholds but that the CA believes will substantially impede competition is raised from 1 billion kronur to 1.5 billion kronur under the regime;
- in the case of vertical mergers, a short form of notification may be used if the individual or combined market share of the merging parties is less than 40 per cent (currently, the benchmark is 30 per cent);
- the CA will be able to allow merging parties to use a short form of notification under certain circumstances, even if the conditions for such notification provided by the Act are not met;
- the CA will be able to grant exemptions from the material requirements provided by the Act for merger notifications in the short form;
- the second phase of merger investigation will be 90 working days. Furthermore, if parties to a merger express their wish to negotiate conditions to a merger on day 55 of the investigation or later, 15 working days will be added to the CA's deadline to investigate the merger. Finally, the CA will be able to extend the deadline to investigate a merger for up to 20 working days at the request of the merging parties; and



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- the filing fee is raised from 250,000 kronur to 500,000 kronur, and for a merger notification in the short form, the filing fee will be 200,000 kronur.

The proposed changes to the Act are currently under review in parliament and have not yet been passed.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The Competition Authority (CA) has, in recent years, raised concerns over the increased ownership of pension funds and investment funds of commercial undertakings, especially investment funds that are managed by management companies related to the three large commercial banks in Iceland. The CA has set conditions for such investments, which are intended to ensure commercial independence of commercial undertakings from the three large commercial banks. The CA has considered these conditions necessary to maintain effective competition in the financial market. The CA has also considered the conditions to be necessary to ensure that dealings between the commercial undertakings and other companies owned by the three large commercial banks are based on commercial grounds and to prevent tying of different types of services.

In 2018, the CA made several decisions in cases involving mergers of investment funds and commercial undertakings. Notable cases included the decisions of the CA in Cases No. 10/2018 and 21/2018. In both cases, the CA imposed conditions to a merger in form of an investment of an investment fund in a commercial undertaking. The investment funds were managed by management companies that were related to the three large commercial banks in Iceland. The objective of the conditions was to ensure the commercial independence of the commercial undertakings from the large commercial banks. To achieve this objective, the board of directors of the commercial undertakings must be independent from the relevant commercial bank and related parties. The board of directors of the commercial undertakings must also be independent of their competitors. Furthermore, the conditions include instructions in relation to disclosure of information from the board of directors of the management companies to their shareholders.

# India

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Competition law in India is governed by the Competition Act 2002 (the Competition Act) and regulations and guidance notes issued thereunder. Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act require the pre-notification of all acquisitions, mergers and amalgamations where the turnover or assets of the parties and groups cross specified thresholds (collectively described as 'combinations') to the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which is responsible for merger review applying the standard of appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Section 5 of the Competition Act covers three broad categories of combinations:

- The acquisition by one or more persons of control, shares, voting rights or assets of one or more enterprises where the parties, or the group to which the target will belong post-acquisition, meet specified assets or turnover thresholds (see below). Acquisitions not involving a change of control are caught in this category.
- The acquisition by a person of control over an enterprise where the person acquiring control already has direct or indirect control over another enterprise engaged in the production, distribution or trading of similar or identical or substitutable goods, or in the provision of a similar or identical or substitutable service, where the parties, or the group to which the target will belong after the acquisition, meet specified assets or turnover thresholds (see below).
- Mergers or amalgamations where the enterprise remaining, or enterprise created, or the group to which the enterprise will belong after the merger or amalgamation, meets specified assets or turnover thresholds (see below).

To prevent the merger control regime from becoming unduly onerous, Schedule I to the CCI (Procedure in Regard to the Transaction of Business Relating to Combinations) Regulations 2011 (the Regulations) lists categories of transactions that are 'ordinarily' not likely to cause an AAEC in the relevant market in India and, therefore, are not 'normally' required to be notified to the CCI. These transactions are:

- direct or indirect acquisitions of shares or voting rights entitling the acquirer to hold less than 25 per cent of the shares or voting rights of a target company (including through a shareholders' agreement or articles of association) solely for investment purposes or in the ordinary course of business, provided that this does not lead to the acquisition of control. The acquisition of less than 10 per cent of

total shares or voting rights will be treated solely as an investment if the acquirer:

- is able to exercise only the rights of ordinary shareholders exercisable to the extent of their respective shareholding;
- does not have, or have a right to have, or intend to have a seat on the board of the target enterprise; and
- does not intend to participate in the management or affairs of the target enterprise;
- an acquisition of additional shares or voting rights of an enterprise by the acquirer or its group, where the acquirer or its group, prior to the acquisition, already holds 25 per cent or more shares or voting rights of the enterprise, but does not hold 50 per cent or more of the shares or voting rights of the enterprise either prior to or after such acquisition. This exemption is not available if the acquisition results in the acquisition of sole or joint control of such enterprise by the acquirer or its group;
- an acquisition of shares or voting rights where the acquirer already holds 50 per cent or more of the shares or voting rights in the target enterprise, except where the transaction results in a transfer from joint control to sole control;
- an acquisition of assets not directly related to the business of the acquirer or made solely as an investment or in the ordinary course of business, not leading to control of the target enterprise, except where the assets represent substantial business operations of the target enterprise in a particular location or for a particular product or service, irrespective of whether such assets are organised as a separate legal entity or not;
- intra-group reorganisations. These include:
  - an acquisition of shares or voting rights or assets by one person or enterprise of another person or enterprise within the same group, except in cases where the acquired enterprise is jointly controlled by enterprises that are not part of the same group; and
  - a merger or amalgamation of two enterprises where one of the enterprises has more than 50 per cent shares or voting rights of the other enterprise, or a merger or amalgamation of enterprises in which more than 50 per cent shares or voting rights in each of such enterprises are held by enterprises within the same group. This exemption is not available if the transaction results in transfer from joint control to sole control;
- acquisitions of stock-in-trade, raw materials, stores and spares, trade receivables and other similar current assets in the ordinary course of business;
- an acquisition of shares or voting rights pursuant to a buy-back or a bonus issue or a stock split or consolidation of face value of shares or subscription to rights issue, not leading to an acquisition of control. Note that care will need to be taken in case of an acquisition of control through a renunciation of rights;



- an amended or renewed tender offer where a notice has been filed by the party making such an offer;
- an acquisition of shares, control, voting rights or assets by a purchaser approved by the CCI (for instance, in case of a divestiture); and
- an acquisition of shares or voting rights by a person acting as a securities underwriter or a registered stockbroker on behalf of its clients, in the ordinary course of its business and in the process of underwriting or stockbroking.

### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The formation of a joint venture is not specifically covered by section 5 of the Competition Act, as it only covers the acquisition of an 'enterprise' and mergers and amalgamations of 'enterprises'.

'Enterprise' as defined under the Competition Act effectively refers to a 'going concern' that is already conducting or has previously conducted business. A purely 'greenfield' joint venture is unlikely to be considered as an 'enterprise', and will therefore not fall within the scope of section 5. Moreover, even if it were to be considered as an 'enterprise', in the majority of cases, a truly 'greenfield' joint venture is unlikely to meet the thresholds under the target exemption. By contrast, the establishment or acquisition of a 'brownfield' joint venture (where parents are contributing existing assets or businesses, customers, customer contracts, intellectual property, etc, or conferring control over them) would be notifiable where the jurisdictional thresholds are met, as it involves the acquisition of an enterprise under section 5 of the Competition Act.

There is presently limited guidance from the CCI in relation to the treatment of joint ventures or the criteria it would apply in determining whether a transaction is greenfield or brownfield, or, for that matter, whether it would treat full-function joint ventures differently from non-full-function joint ventures.

### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The acquisition of 'control' is only one of the events that may trigger a notification. As a starting point, 'control' is defined under section 5(a) of the Competition Act to include 'controlling the affairs or management by: (i) one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or group; (ii) one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or enterprise'.

Earlier the CCI, in its substantial decisional practice, had interpreted control to mean the ability to exercise decisive influence over the management or affairs and strategic commercial decisions of a target enterprise, whether such decisive influence was capable of being exercised by way of a majority shareholding, veto rights (attached to a minority shareholding) or contractual covenants. However, the CCI has expanded the scope of 'control' in two of its orders: penalising Telenor (C-2012/10/87) for failing to notify its acquisitions of shareholdings in two companies; and penalising UltraTech Cement (C-2015/02/246) for failing to provide information on the shareholding or control of the promoter family over two companies. In *UltraTech Cement*, the CCI stated that, in defining control, regard had to be given to different levels of control – in ascending order, material influence, de facto control and controlling interest (de jure control) – and not just to special rights. In *Telenor*, the CCI held that Telenor could not have sole control of the two target companies as, in the first target, another shareholder held a 51 per cent shareholding, conferring a controlling interest; and in the second target, even though Telenor held 67.25 per cent shareholding, other shareholders held more than 26 per cent, giving them the ability to block special resolutions (which was considered negative control even under Foreign Direct Investment policy). In these cases, the CCI

has moved from the concept of 'decisive influence' based on special or veto rights towards a more expansive definition of 'control', to include 'material influence'.

Such an interpretation includes negative control by minority shareholders. In contrast to 'investor protection' rights, having the ability to veto (or cause a deadlock in respect of) strategic commercial decisions could be sufficient to confer at least joint control, the acquisition of which would require notification to the CCI. Such strategic commercial decisions have included decisions on annual business plans, budgets, recruitment and remuneration of senior management, and opening of new lines of business.

Because of the expansive interpretation given to 'control', and the absence of clear guidance from the CCI on which specific rights will be considered as pure minority protection rights, the distinction between genuine minority protection rights and negative control has become blurred. As a result, many pure financial investments and private equity transactions are susceptible to review by the CCI.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The jurisdictional thresholds under the Competition Act are as follows:

- parties test:
  - the parties have combined assets in India of 20 billion rupees or combined turnover in India of 60 billion rupees; or
  - the parties have combined worldwide assets of US\$1 billion, including combined assets in India of 10 billion rupees or a combined worldwide turnover of US\$3 billion, including a combined turnover in India of 30 billion rupees; and
- group test:
  - the group has assets in India of 80 billion rupees or a turnover in India of 240 billion rupees; or
  - the group has worldwide assets of US\$4 billion, including assets in India of 10 billion rupees, or a worldwide turnover of US\$12 billion, including a turnover in India of 30 billion rupees.

For the purposes of calculating the jurisdictional thresholds, the government of India has exempted, in the public interest, groups that exercise less than 50 per cent of the voting rights in the other enterprise.

The government of India, through a notification dated 27 March 2017, revised the de minimis target-based filing exemption to apply to all forms of transactions (ie, acquisitions, mergers and amalgamations), for a period of five years until 28 March 2022. Transactions where the assets being acquired, taken control of, merged or amalgamated are not more than 3.5 billion rupees in India or where the turnover is not more than 10 billion rupees in India are exempted from the CCI notification requirement (Target Exemption). The 2017 notification contains an explanation in relation to assessing the jurisdictional thresholds.

The CCI has also updated its frequently asked questions section on its website to give guidance on the calculation of jurisdictional thresholds.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If the jurisdictional thresholds are met and no exemptions are available, the combination must be notified to the CCI. Where a proposed combination consists of a number of interconnected steps or transactions, even where one or more of these steps or transactions would, on a stand-alone basis, have been exempt from filing, all such transactions must be filed as a composite whole and must not be completed pending the CCI's review.



In August 2019, the CCI introduced a 'green channel' filing route that covers combinations where the parties have no horizontal overlap, no vertical relationships and no complementary businesses. Such combinations are, subject to certain conditions and safeguards, deemed to be approved by the CCI upon filing.

In addition to the Schedule I exemptions and the Target Exemption, the government of India has also exempted banking companies from the merger notification requirement when a notification of moratorium has been issued in respect of such companies. A notification of moratorium is ordinarily issued to 'failing' banks that are financially and operationally weak and are on the brink of insolvency. In August 2017, the government of India exempted Regional Rural Banks and nationalised banks from the application of the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act for a period of five years and 10 years, respectively. In November 2017, the government of India exempted central public sector enterprises along with their subsidiaries operating in the oil and gas sectors from the application of the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the Act for a period of five years.

Section 6(4) of the Competition Act provides that acquisitions, share subscription or financing facilities, entered into by public financial institutions, registered foreign institutional investors, banks or registered venture capital funds, pursuant to any covenant of a loan agreement or an investment agreement, do not need to be pre-notified to the CCI. However, in such cases, the body concerned will need to notify the CCI of the acquisition within seven calendar days of completion of the transaction. So far, there have been only four decisions published by the CCI under this provision.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Until the end of March 2014, the Regulations provided an exemption for transactions between parties outside India provided there was insignificant local nexus and effects on markets in India. The CCI interpreted the exemption narrowly, rendering it virtually redundant. To remove uncertainty in this regard, the CCI withdrew the exemption, so that foreign-to-foreign transactions satisfying the standard assets and turnover thresholds under the Competition Act, and not covered by any of the other exemptions, will have to be notified even if there is no local nexus and effects on markets in India. However, the absence of a local nexus and effects should expedite the review and clearance process by the CCI.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are currently no other special rules under the Competition Act governing merger control review for foreign investment or specific sectors such as telecoms, pharmaceuticals, the media, oil and natural gas.

In addition, there are non-competition regulatory approvals, which may be required, depending on the sector in which the investment is being made. Notably, following an amendment to the recently introduced Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, it has been made clear that where a transaction covered by the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) has to be notified to the CCI, approval by the CCI is required before a resolution plan is approved by the committee of creditors (although a recent judgement by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal has indicated that this amendment was 'directory and not mandatory'). The CIRP is limited to 180 days, which may be extended up to a further 90 days in certain cases. To meet this tight deadline, a bidder would be advised to notify a transaction to the CCI as early as possible.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

In a welcome move to ease doing business in India, the government in June 2017 removed the requirement on parties to notify combinations to the Competition Commission of India (CCI) within 30 calendar days of the relevant trigger event. While notifiable transactions still require approval from the CCI prior to closing and remain subject to penalties for gun jumping, the elimination of the filing deadline has removed timing pressures on the filing parties. It should be noted that the parties may have pre-filing consultations (PFC) with CCI staff or case team members on substantive and procedural matters, and this frequently helps parties decide whether they need to notify and, if so, how they should proceed. The CCI has published a PFC Guidance Note setting out the framework for such consultations.

Previously, while the CCI actively penalised parties for belated filings, it also penalised parties for failing to notify transactions. In *SCM Soilfert* (C-2014/05/175), the CCI fined the acquirer 20 million rupees for consummating strategic open market purchases in the target enterprise without prior approval from the CCI. The CCI imposed a penalty of 50 million rupees on *Piramal Enterprises* (C-2015/02/249) for failing to notify previously closed interconnected steps of a transaction. The Competition Appellate Tribunal upheld both penalties and the Supreme Court of India upheld the penalty imposed in the *SCM Soilfert* case.

Although the penalties imposed by the CCI in recent years have only been nominal (for example, *ReNew* (C-2017/11/536); *Telenor* (C-2012/10/87) and *Intellect Design* (C-2015/12/348)), the CCI has been vigilant in pursuing defaulters. Accordingly, parties are increasingly using the pre-notification consultation process before formally submitting the filing or deciding on not submitting a filing.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In the case of an acquisition, the acquirer and, in the case of a merger, both the parties jointly, are responsible for filing. Generally, the notice is filed in the (short) Form I; however, where there is a horizontal overlap of more than 15 per cent or a vertical overlap of more than 25 per cent, it is recommended that the notice is filed in the (long) Form II. A green channel filing is required to be made in a Form I.

The filing fee for Form I is 2 million rupees and for Form II 6.5 million rupees. The acquirer, in case of an acquisition, or the parties to a merger or amalgamation in case of a merger or an amalgamation, shall pay the filing fees. In the case of a joint notification, the fees are payable jointly or severally.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The merger control regime in India is suspensory and transactions subject to merger control review by the CCI cannot be consummated until merger clearance has been obtained, or a review period of 210 calendar days has passed, whichever is earlier. The suspensory effect extends to both exempt steps of interconnected transactions as well as to the closing of global transactions (even if the Indian leg has not been consummated) pending the CCI's approval.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If the parties fail to notify a notifiable combination prior to closing, the CCI has the power to impose a penalty of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover or value of assets, whichever is higher, of the proposed combination. The CCI has used these powers regularly in cases where late filings have been made though, given the trigger exemption, such proceedings are unlikely to continue. The amount of penalty levied by the CCI has been as high as 50 million rupees. Recently, however, the CCI has imposed more nominal penalties in cases of delayed, voluntary filings. In cases where parties had consummated part of the combination prior to approval by way of pre-payment of consideration, the CCI imposed a penalty of 500,000 rupees (*Hindustan Colas* (C-2015/08/299)) and a penalty of 1 million rupees (*Chhatwal Group Trust* (C-2018/01/544)). In another case, where a loan had been advanced to the seller that could be adjusted against the consideration payable for the proposed acquisition before the CCI approval, a penalty of 1 million rupees was imposed (*Adani Transmission* (C-2015/01/547)).

A penalty of 500,000 rupees was imposed in *Cairnhill CIPF* (C-2015/05/276), where the CCI held the filing to be late because the wrong agreement or document was considered as the trigger by the parties. Interestingly, in *PSPiB and Grupo Isolux Corsan* (C-2015/10/330), which involved a dissolution of a joint venture, the CCI decided not to impose any penalty for a belated filing, given the unique structure of the combination, and the lack of finality of key terms, which were to be determined by third parties. More recently, the CCI found that even a contractual clause in the acquisition agreement amounted to the consummation of a part of the acquisition (*Bharti Airtel* (C-2017/10/531)). It is not clear what the offending clause covered since material parts of the order were redacted. However, the CCI considered that the arrangement disincentivised the target from competing with the acquirer, affected the business activities in the ordinary course of the target and could not be considered as inherent and proportionate to the objective of preserving the business valuation.

The power to impose a penalty also extends to the consummation of any part of the proposed transaction prior to obtaining CCI clearance. In *Etiihad Airways/Jet Airways* (C-2013/05/122), the CCI penalised Etiihad Airways 10 million rupees for completing one leg of the composite transaction notified for clearance. Parties, therefore, need to be conscious that they are not deliberately or inadvertently taking steps to give effect to parts of the transaction or aligning their commercial behaviour or completing any leg of a notified transaction until approval for the entire transaction has been received. In *LT Foods* (C-2016/04/387), the CCI made it clear that any coordination between parties before approval – such as handing over inventory, making introductions to suppliers and restrictions on promotional selling – was prohibited, and accordingly imposed a 'nominal' penalty of 500,000 rupees.

In May 2018, the CCI penalised telecommunications companies for failing to notify acquisitions of telecommunication spectrum (*Bharti Airtel* (C-2017/05/509); *Bharti Airtel and Bharti Hexagon* (C-2017/06/516); and *Reliance Jio Infocomm* (C-2017/06/516)). Notably, the CCI held that guidelines issued by the sectoral regulators setting caps on market shares and spectrum holdings did not replace the competition mandate of the CCI; spectrum constituted an asset, the acquisition of which amounted to a combination under the Competition Act; and the exemption for the acquisition of assets made solely as an investment or in the ordinary course of business did not apply. In line with the trend of imposing 'nominal' penalty, the acquirer in each case was required to pay 500,000 rupees for gun jumping.

Most recently, in January 2020, the CCI penalised *CPPIB* (C-2017/11/536) in relation to its failure to disclose an interconnected transaction as part of the transaction notified to the CCI. Even though the transaction documents did not capture any such interconnectedness between the two transactions, the CCI relied on press releases of the parties to establish that CPPIB was aware of the interconnected transaction and thus should have disclosed or notified it. CPPIB was required to pay 5 million rupees for gun jumping and non-disclosure.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Yes, sanctions are applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers. In *Titan International Inc/Titan Europe PLC* (C-2013/02/109), the parties sought to justify a lengthy delay in filing on the grounds that the transaction was foreign-to-foreign, they were not aware of the filing requirement, the delay was unintentional and there was no bad faith. However, the CCI pointed to a 147-day delay and the fact that the combination had been completed by the time the filing had been made. The CCI could have imposed a maximum penalty of 1.45 billion rupees. However, since the transaction was a foreign-to-foreign acquisition, the parties were based outside India and, notwithstanding the delay, they had voluntarily filed the notification, the CCI accepted these as mitigating factors and imposed a lower penalty of 10 million rupees. In *Etiihad Airways/Jet Airways*, the CCI imposed a penalty of 10 million rupees on Etiihad Airways for completing one limb of the notified transaction before receiving clearance. In *Baxter/Baxalta* (C-2015/07/297), the CCI imposed a penalty of 10 million rupees on the parties for closing the global limb of the transaction before receiving clearance in India.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

There is currently no precedent in India in relation to this issue and the CCI has not given any guidance. However, the Competition Act is worded in a manner where it may be arguable that hold-separate arrangements might be legitimate in India. If the CCI initiates proceedings against the parties for failure to notify before closing a global transaction, the parties will have to satisfy the CCI that the assets that relate to India have been kept separate until such time as the clearance from the authority is received and there is no appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India. This approach, however, is untested and the CCI might take a different approach.

What is clear, however, is that the actual combination must not be given effect to until CCI approval is received. In *Baxter/Baxalta*, the parties gave effect to a global agreement; however, the transfer of the Indian operations was subject to local implementation agreements. The CCI held that the global transaction was the notification trigger and could not be given effect to (even if, in practice, the transfer of the local entities required separate agreements).

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

At present, there are no special merger control rules under the Competition Act applicable to public takeover bids.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Both Form I and Form II require extensive information – far more than that required by the equivalent notifications under the EU Merger Regulation or the US Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. The CCI has also recently modified the existing Form I, making it generally more onerous. The filing process is complex, and the parties need to prepare filings with the utmost care and well in advance, including detailed overlaps analysis and related information for the narrowest possible market definitions. The documentation to be filed include the trigger document, financial statements of the parties, market data (market share, market size to the extent possible and based on independent third-party data sources and sales) and competitive assessment of the relevant market. A lack of complete information has resulted in the CCI invalidating the notification forms, requiring the parties to file afresh and also resetting the review clock. Further, a penalty of not less than 500,000 rupees, which may extend to 10 million rupees, may be imposed for making a false statement or omitting a material particular in the notification form.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The investigation into combinations by the CCI is in two phases.

#### Phase I

The CCI is required to form its prima facie opinion on whether the combination is likely to cause or has caused an AAEC within the relevant market in India within 30 working days of receipt of the notice. However, if the CCI reaches out to third parties or statutory authorities during Phase I, this time period may be extended by up to 15 working days. Further, where modifications are offered in Phase I itself, the time period is further extended by 15 working days. The clock will also stop if a formal request for information is made and restart only when the CCI has received a satisfactory response to all its queries. If the CCI is satisfied that the combination does not cause nor is likely to cause an AAEC or that its concerns can be addressed through remedies or modifications offered by the parties, it will clear the transaction at the end of Phase I.

#### Phase II

If the CCI forms a prima facie opinion that a combination is likely to cause, or has caused, an AAEC within the relevant market in India, it shall issue a show cause notice to the parties asking for an explanation as to why an investigation into the combination should not be conducted. The parties are given 30 calendar days to reply to this notice. After the reply has been filed by the parties, the CCI may either direct the Director General to conduct a detailed investigation or do so on its own and this heralds the formal beginning of Phase II. The parties shall also be directed to publish details of the combination in four leading daily newspapers (including at least two business newspapers), the parties' websites and the CCI's website within 10 days of the CCI's decision to investigate further. Until the date of writing, the CCI has never directed the Director General to conduct a detailed investigation into a combination and all Phase II inquiries have been conducted by the combinations division of the CCI.

The objective of this publication is to invite comments from the public in relation to the proposed combination. Once the comments are received by the CCI, it may request further information or seek clarifications from the parties. At this stage, the CCI may invite any person or member of the public, affected or likely to be affected by the combination, to file their written objections before the CCI within 15 working days from the date

on which the details of the combination are published. Thereafter, within 15 working days from the expiry of the period mentioned above, the CCI may call for additional information from the parties to the combination to be furnished by the parties within a further 15 days. Following the submission of the information and clarifications by the parties, the CCI will proceed to review the transaction and arrive at its final determination, including proposing remedies to the parties, where it is of the view that the transaction will cause or be likely to cause an AAEC.

After receipt of all the information, the CCI will pass orders either approving or prohibiting or suggesting modifications to the combination.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The CCI has up to 210 calendar days from the date of notification to approve or prohibit a notified combination. The 30-working-day periods for the parties to submit amendments to proposed modifications, and for them to accept the CCI's original modifications if the modifications are not accepted, are excluded from this 210-day time period. Further, the CCI follows a practice of excluding any time extensions sought by parties for responding to the CCI's additional requests for information from the 210-day time period (although the Competition Act and the CCI (Procedure in Regard to the Transaction of Business Relating to Combinations) Regulations 2011 are silent on this aspect).

There are no provisions to speed up the review timetable and parties who wish to gain early clearance should comply with all information requests expeditiously. In practice, CCI clearance can take anywhere between 60 and 90 days even for no-issues transactions. Transactions with substantial overlaps can take significantly longer. For example, both in the case of *Agrium/PotashCorp* (C-2016/10/443) and *Holcim/Lafarge* (C-2014/07/190), the conditional clearance decisions were adopted nearly at the end of the entire 210-day review period. The CCI in *Dow/Dupont* (C-2016/05/400) and *Bayer/Monsanto* (C-2017/08/523) took over 500 days (including all-time 'exclusions') to clear and approve the transaction subject to modifications.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for assessing a combination is whether the combination will cause or be likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) within the relevant market in India.

To determine whether a combination will have or be likely to have an AAEC, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) must have due regard to all or any of the following factors stated in section 20(4) of the Competition Act:

- the actual and potential level of competition through imports in the market;
- the extent of barriers to entry in the market;
- level of combination in the market;
- degree of countervailing power in the market;
- the likelihood that the combination would result in the parties to the combination being able to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins;
- the extent of effective competition likely to sustain in a market;
- the extent to which substitutes are available or are likely to be available in the market;
- market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or enterprise in a combination, individually and as a combination;
- the likelihood that the combination would result in the removal of a vigorous and effective competitor or competitors in the market;

- nature and extent of vertical integration in the market;
- possibility of a failing business;
- nature and extent of innovation;
- relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by any combination having or likely to have an AAEC; and
- whether the benefits of the combination outweigh the adverse impact of the combination, if any.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures and nothing has so far emerged from decided cases.

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

There is no clear guidance from the CCI on the theories of harm that they will investigate. However, on the basis of the CCI's jurisprudence, the CCI has considered both unilateral effects and coordinated effects as appropriate theories of harm in a number of cases. More recently, the CCI has also started assessing portfolio effects in detail as a theory of harm.

To date, the CCI has been focused on combined market shares, concentration in the market and the presence of strong competitors post-transaction in approving transactions.

The CCI has considered the impact of a proposed combination on innovation and has required divestments that allow a new entrant to compete in the market. In addition, in *Agrium/PotashCorp*, the CCI arrived at the view that the combination might cause coordinated effects in the market for supply of potash in India and required a divestment of minority shareholdings in competing enterprises. The CCI recently cleared the global *ZF/WABCO* transaction subject to ZF divesting its stake in an Indian joint venture, which was competing with WABCO in the Indian market.

### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues are not relevant in the review process. In *Walmart/Flipkart* (C-2018/05/571), a number of market players and pressure groups voiced criticisms of Flipkart's business practices. However, the CCI found that the majority of these concerns were unconnected to the transaction and many had nothing to do with competition law.

### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Section 20(4) of the Competition Act prescribes various factors that may be considered by the CCI while examining a transaction, including various efficiency-related factors. The efficiency-related factors include:

- nature and extent of innovation created as a result of the transaction;
- relative advantage, by way of contribution to the economic development by any transaction causing or being likely to cause an AAEC; and
- assessing whether the benefits outweigh the adverse impact of the transaction.

In its limited decisional practice to date, the CCI has not cleared any transaction that was likely to or caused an AAEC, solely on the grounds that efficiencies outweighed competition concerns. The CCI has taken the prima facie view that a transaction may cause an AAEC on approximately 10 occasions, which were cleared on account of modifications

and divestments, and not on account of efficiencies. Some guidance can be drawn from the CCI's clearance decision adopted in *Etihad Airways/ Jet Airways, Holcim/Lafarge* and *PVR/DT* (C-2015/07/288), where the CCI has indicated that the efficiencies (where claimed by the parties) should be merger specific, verifiable, quantifiable and outweigh competition concerns.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If the Competition Commission of India (CCI) believes the transaction will cause or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India, the transaction will be treated as void, and all actions taken in pursuit of the void transaction shall also be void. No transaction has yet been blocked by the CCI. The CCI also has the power to unwind a transaction, though this has not happened to date. The CCI also has the power to reduce the scope of ancillary restrictions such as non-compete provisions and can also order divestiture of assets. There is no express limitation on the types of remedies that the CCI can accept to address AAEC concerns.

### Remedies and conditions

## 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes, it is possible to remedy competition issues.

Initially, the remedies considered by the CCI were largely in the context of non-compete obligations in the pharmaceutical sector. Since then, the CCI has considered far more significant remedies, both behavioural and structural, while clearing transactions. For example, in a proposed transaction related to establishing a joint venture in relation to an aviation fuel farm facility, the CCI accepted, among other matters, commitments in relation to third-party access rights as a remedy for clearing the transaction. The CCI has also accepted firewalls and information exchange protocols as remedies (for example, *Northern TK / Fortis* (C-2018/09/601) and *Tata/GMR* (C-2019/07/676)). The CCI cleared *Schneider/L&T* (C-2018/07/586) in Phase II on the basis of a bouquet of innovative and transaction-specific behavioural remedies (including white-labelling, expansion freezes, export commitments and capacity allocation). Recently, in *Hyundai/Kia* (C-2019/09/682), the CCI accepted remedies in relation to the acquisition by these automobile manufacturers of small shareholdings in ride-sharing company Ola; the parties agreed that the strategic collaboration with Ola would be on a non-exclusive basis and that the algorithm or programme of the Ola marketplace would not give preference to *Hyundai/Kia* cars or discriminate against drivers of other cars.

Structural remedies have been imposed in *Holcim/Lafarge* and *Sun/Ranbaxy* (C-2014/05/170). In *PVR/DT*, the CCI relied on structural remedies, and required the freezing of divestitures and expansion as a precondition to clearing these transactions in the field of cinema multiplexes. The CCI did not accept behavioural remedies in the form of price caps, as it considered such remedies to be ineffective to address the identified AAEC concerns and difficult to monitor. The CCI has required significant India-specific remedies in *Dow/DuPont, FMC/ Dupont* (C-2017/06/519), *Bayer/Monsanto, ChemChina/Syngenta* (C-2016/08/424) and *Linde/Praxair* (C-2018/01/545) in order to approve these transactions. The CCI has also gone as far as requiring divestment of minority shareholdings in companies in India (*Bayer/Monsanto* and *ZF/WABCO*) and outside India (*Agrium/PotashCorp*).

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

During Phase I, the CCI will carry out a review of the proposed combination within a 30-working-day period. However, if the CCI reaches out to third parties during Phase I, this time period is extended by up to 15 working days. In practice, the process may take more than 30 to 45 working days, as the clock can be stopped for various reasons, including the time taken to respond to information requests. At the end of this, the CCI may arrive at the opinion that the proposed combination is not likely to have an AAEC, in which case it will approve the combination. During this phase, the parties themselves may offer modifications that, if accepted by the CCI, will be treated as conditions in the clearance order. Where modifications are offered by the parties, the time period for the CCI to come to a prima facie view is extended by another 15 days.

Alternatively, the CCI may reach a prima facie opinion that the combination is likely to cause an AAEC. Unless the parties can, in response to a show cause notice, persuade the CCI otherwise, the Phase II investigation will start. With a recent amendment to the CCI (Procedure in Regard to the Transaction of Business Relating to Combinations) Regulations 2011, the CCI now allows the parties to offer modifications (remedies) in response to a show cause notice, before the start of a detailed Phase II investigation.

Once the Phase II investigation commences, as a formal matter it is for the CCI to initiate the remedies process by proposing modifications to the transaction, although it will in practice allow the parties to set the ball rolling informally. The Competition Act provides in some detail the Phase II process for agreeing to modifications. Where the CCI proposes modifications to the proposed combination, the parties to the combination may carry out modifications within the specified period, or submit amendments to the modifications to the CCI within 30 working days. If the parties' proposed amendments are rejected, the parties have 30 working days to accept original modifications proposed by the CCI. If the parties fail to accept the original modifications or to implement them, the combination will be prohibited. It is relevant to note that in the *Dow/Dupont* and *Bayer/Monsanto* transactions, the CCI took over 500 days (including all-time exclusions) to conditionally approve the transactions, subject to modifications.

Therefore, the CCI's review period can end with a prohibition decision, an unconditional approval or an approval conditional on behavioural or structural remedies.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The CCI is yet to require remedies in foreign-to-foreign transactions, and none have been offered to date.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The CCI requires parties to file all ancillary arrangements along with the notification form. Approval for the combination thus also covers the ancillary restrictions.

There is guidance from the CCI in relation to the acceptable scope of non-compete arrangements (including in relation to duration, geographic and product scope). The CCI's guidance makes it clear that a restriction will be regarded as ancillary only where it is directly related to and necessary to the implementation of the transaction, taking account of the reasonableness of the restriction in terms of duration, subject matter and geographical scope. Where the covenants are for longer durations, the CCI will seek justifications from the parties.

If non-compete restrictions are not ancillary, they remain subject to review under sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act regarding anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position, respectively. The CCI does not conduct such analysis in its merger review process. However, its orders state that the non-compete restrictions are not ancillary to the transaction. In *SVF Doorbell* (C-2019/01/633), *CA Swift Investments* (C-2019/01/643) and *Atos/Syntel* (C-2018/08/592), the CCI approved the transactions, but noted that the duration and scope of non-compete provision were not ancillary to the transaction and were thus not covered by the approval order.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Third parties do not have a right to be involved in Phase I proceedings; however, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) can reach out to third parties and those third parties may make representations to the CCI during Phase I. If the CCI forms a prima facie opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition, it shall, after considering the response of the parties to the combination or receipt of the report from the Director General, whichever is later, direct the parties to the combination to publish details of the combination in daily newspapers. The CCI may then ask any person or member of the public affected or likely to be affected by the combination to file objections in writing within 15 working days of the date on which the details of the combination were published. The person filing objections is required to substantiate his or her claim that he or she is adversely affected or is likely to be affected by the combination by producing supporting documents. Third parties can only present their opinions in writing to the CCI and there is no provision for an oral hearing before the CCI.

The CCI is free to contact customers, competitors and suppliers of the parties to the combination during the course of the investigation and has done so informally even during the Phase I review period. In complex transactions with significant overlaps, the CCI is increasingly relying on these powers and has reached out to competitors and customers, as well as sectoral experts, to gather information as well as verify the information and claims made by the notifying parties. The CCI has also increased international cooperation, especially in its review of global, multi-jurisdictional transactions.

In August 2018, in *Walmart/Flipkart*, the CCI approved the acquisition of majority stake in Flipkart by Walmart. Notably, a number of market players and pressure groups voiced criticisms of Flipkart's business practices. The CCI found that a majority of these concerns were unconnected to the transaction and many had nothing to do with competition law. However, the CCI took note of concerns of deep discounting and preferential treatment to select retailers in online marketplaces, but held that these were not specific to the notified transaction. As the purpose of merger review was to consider the effects of combinations, such conduct was not subject to the merger review process.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Parties are required to submit a 1000-word summary of the transaction (not containing any confidential information), which is uploaded on the CCI website as soon as parties file their notification form with the CCI.

The CCI allows requests for confidentiality by parties, when these requests are specifically made in writing along with the notification



form, or along with any other information submitted to the CCI. The CCI requires that the parties submit detailed reasons and justifications in support of their confidentiality claims. The CCI has required such reasons to be provided in an affidavit. Once accepted, the CCI will not publish information on which the parties have requested confidentiality without first obtaining the permission of the parties. As a general matter of practice, the CCI grants confidentiality for three years.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The CCI has signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with various competition authorities, including with the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, the US Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, the Canadian Competition Bureau, the European Commission, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to enhance cooperation between the authorities. The CCI is in the process of signing similar MOUs with other key jurisdictions.

The MOUs, which are very general in nature, are intended to increase cooperation and communication between the competition authorities. The CCI has stated that it has reached out to other competition authorities during the review process in a number of cases. It regularly seeks waivers from parties to share information with other authorities in large global transactions.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Any person aggrieved by an order of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) approving or prohibiting a transaction may appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) within 60 days. Appeals previously lay before the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) which was dissolved in May 2017. Orders of the NCLAT (and of the COMPAT) can be further appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

In 2013, a 'concerned citizen' appealed the *Etihaad Airways/Jet Airways* decision before the COMPAT in *Jitender Bhargava v Competition Commission of India & Ors* (Appeal No. 44 of 2013). The appeal was dismissed as the appellant did not have locus standi to appeal the CCI's decision as he was not a 'person aggrieved' as required by the Competition Act.

In 2014, Thomas Cook appealed the CCI's decision in *Thomas Cook/Sterling Holidays* (Appeal No. 48 of 2014), and the COMPAT set aside the 10 million rupees penalty imposed by the CCI for a delayed filing. The CCI appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of India which upheld the CCI's decision and restored the penalty on Thomas Cook in its recent order. The penalty of 20 million rupees imposed on the acquirer in *SCM Sailfert* for consummating strategic open market purchases in the target enterprise without prior approval from the CCI was upheld in appeal both in the COMPAT and the Supreme Court.

In 2016, *Dalmia Cements* appealed the CCI's supplementary order passed in *Holcim/Lafarge* on the grounds that the CCI did not have the power to pass such an order under the Competition Act. The COMPAT granted interim relief to Dalmia Cements, staying the operation of the CCI's supplementary order; however, Dalmia Cements withdrew its appeal prior to the COMPAT finally deciding the case.

In *Agrium/PotashCorp*, upon rejection of the counterproposal made by the parties to divest shareholdings in two entities as opposed to three entities that were proposed by the CCI to remedy coordinated effects in the market, the parties filed an appeal before the NCLAT. In the first ever appeal against a CCI modification proposal, the NCLAT provided

six weeks' time to the parties and the CCI to arrive at a consensus and resolve the matter. Subsequently, the parties submitted a new proposal which was accepted by the CCI; this was approved by the NCLAT, which accordingly disposed of the appeal.

In August 2018, the Confederation of All India Traders, a trader's collective, filed an appeal before the NCLAT, challenging the approval order passed by the CCI in *Walmart/Flipkart* on the grounds that the CCI failed to look into the anticompetitive effects arising out of the combination. The NCLAT dismissed the appeal stating that the appellant could not make any prima facie case.

Recently, the NCLAT for the first time, set aside a CCI decision to impose a penalty (on *Eli Lilly*) for not notifying a transaction that was covered under the Target Exemption (the CCI had wrongly held that the thresholds of the Target Exemption did not apply to the business being acquired, but rather to the target's parent).

The NCLAT has also dismissed a long-pending appeal by Piyush Joshi against the *Shell/BG* acquisition (Competition Appeal No. 32 of 2017) by holding that the appeal was not maintainable, and 'intimation' given by the CCI to him did not fall under section 53A(a) of the Competition Act.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Section 53B(5) of the Competition Act provides that appeals before the NCLAT shall be dealt with expeditiously and the NCLAT shall endeavour to dispose of appeals within six months. Appeals of merger decisions have generally been completed within this period.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Since the merger control provisions came into force in June 2011, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has cleared almost all notifications in the Phase I review period. Public orders have been published in *Sun/Ranbaxy*, *Holcim/Lafarge*, *PVR/DT*, *Dow/DuPont*, *Bayer/Monsanto*, *Agrium/PotashCorp*, *Linde/Praxair*, *Schneider/L&T*, which were all approved subject to remedies after a Phase II review. Show cause notices were issued in *Mumbai International Airport* (C-2014/0/164), *Nippon Yusen Kabushiki* (C-2016/11/459), *ChemChina/Syngenta* and *ZF/WABCO*; however, these transactions were cleared before Phase II was initiated. To date, there have been no prohibition decisions.

In the last year, the CCI unconditionally approved *CTrip/MMT* (C-2019/05/664), *Mahindra/Ford* (C-2019/12/707), *Laptev/Welspun* (C-2019/09/684), *Saudi Aramco/SABIC* (C-2019/09/683), *Toyota/Suzuki* (C-2019/10/692) whereas, it approved *Tata/GMR*, *ZF/WABCO*, *Hyundai/Kia* and *Canary/Intas* (C-2020/04/741) subject to voluntary remedies in Phase I.

Recently, the CCI appears to have paid particular attention to the technology, logistics and e-commerce sectors in its merger review process.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

On 20 February 2020, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs published the Draft Competition (Amendment) Bill, seeking public comments. The proposed changes reflect recommendations made by the Competition Law Review Committee in its July 2019 Report. The bill has yet to be presented to the Indian parliament and some delay may be expected given the effects of the covid-19 outbreak.



A number of proposed amendments may result in more transactions being subject to CCI review. It is proposed to allow the central government to introduce deal value, market share or other notifiability criteria. This may result in strategic high-value transactions, especially in digital markets, becoming subject to merger review.

The Draft Bill also affirms the CCI's shifting stance on the issue of control. Having started with a test of 'decisive influence', the CCI has moved to the test of 'material influence', which is now sought to be codified.

Other amendments reflect the desire to reduce the burden of doing business in India. It is proposed to allow the central government to specify combinations deemed to be approved on submission of notice in a given format (as seen above, the CCI has already introduced a 'green channel' route to speed clearance of certain non-problematic transactions). It is also proposed that the central government may specify criteria for exempting transactions in the public interest.

Another amendment dilutes the obligation not to implement a merger before CCI clearance (the standstill obligation) in the case of open offers or acquisitions through a series of transactions on a regulated stock exchange.

Finally, in an attempt to speed up the review process, it is proposed that the current overall 210-day review period be reduced to 150 calendar days.

In May 2020, the CCI published a proposal to remove the requirement to provide information on non-compete restrictions in Form I, requiring parties to ensure that their non-compete arrangements comply with section 3, prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, and section 4, prohibiting abuses of dominant positions, of the Competition Act.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The sectors under scrutiny in 2019 included e-commerce, logistics, digital and automotive sectors. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) is increasingly witnessing private equity and institutional investor acquisitions.

A major and welcome change was the CCI's introduction of a 'green channel' whereunder notifiable combinations are, subject to certain conditions and safeguards, deemed to be approved on notification where the parties have no horizontal overlaps, no vertical relationships and no complementary businesses. The CCI has so far cleared about 12 transactions under the green channel route. However, the CCI has modified the existing Form I, making it generally more onerous.

There has been a proposal to allow the central government to introduce deal value, market share or other notifiability criteria. This may result in strategic high-value transactions, especially in digital markets, becoming subject to merger review. The proposed amendment also affirms the CCI's shifting stance on the interpretation of 'control'. Having started with a test of 'decisive influence', the CCI has moved to the test of 'material influence', which is now sought to be codified.

The CCI has also consulted on the dilution of standstill obligations in the case of share acquisitions pursuant to a public bid or on a stock exchange. Under proposed amendments, those acquisitions would not be regarded as gun jumping provided the notification was made 'without delay' after the acquisition, and the acquirer did not exercise any right attached to the shares or influence the target enterprise in any manner, until CCI approval was received.

The CCI has continued to take a pragmatic approach to remedies in merger cases. In clearing the *Schneider/L&T* transaction the CCI proposed to address serious competition concerns by requiring divestments of the target's business in a number of products. However, citing



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practice in the European Union, the acquirers successfully argued for a package of solely behavioural remedies including white-labelling, the subsequent provision of non-exclusive technology licences and price caps. The CCI's interest in portfolio and innovation aspects also remains high, as seen from the *ZF/WABCO* transaction, which required divestment of a joint venture stake by the acquirer in India where the deal has been unconditionally cleared in the European Union. The CCI also took into account the proposed divestments offered to the US Department of Justice in relation to the transaction while assessing the overlaps in India.

The CCI also cleared two transactions based on voluntary undertakings – *Tata/GMR*, which was based on firewalls and information exchange protocol, and *Hyundai/Kia*, which was based on commitments in relation to strategic collaboration and market behaviour of the target ride-sharing company Ola.

The CCI has continued its hardline stance in relation to failures to notify notifiable transactions and implementation before clearance, namely gun jumping. In fact, the CCI also published its first section 43A (gun-jumping) order, which also involved proceedings under section 44 (providing false or incomplete information). The CCI has imposed the lowest possible fine (5 million rupees) for breach of section 44. The entire penalty proceedings were initiated based on press releases issued by the parties themselves. The CCI held that it will not restrict its analysis to transaction documents, and will also look into other available evidence or documents. The CCI also sought emails between parties to examine the purpose and intention of the transaction (up to now, review of emails has not been a very common feature in merger control cases, but this could become more common).

At the time of writing, India is addressing the effects of the covid-19 pandemic. The CCI has risen to the challenge. It has remained as open for business as it can in the circumstances. Where CCI personnel cannot travel to the office, they should work from home. There are limits to external engagement and physical face-to-face hearings or meetings have not been possible during the lengthy period of lockdown. The CCI has provided that notices of combinations may be filed electronically. Parties to a proposed combination may avail of pre-filing consultation through videoconference. The CCI has stated that it will 'endeavour to process the new and pending cases subject to the availability of necessary information and material'.

# Ireland

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Ireland's merger control regime has its legal basis in Part 3 of the Competition Acts 2002 to 2014 (the Act) as amended by the Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2014.

The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) is primarily responsible for the enforcement of the Irish merger control regime. The CCPC shares responsibility for the review of media mergers with the Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment. The Irish courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate on any allegation of breaches of the Act and on any appeal against a merger decision.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Irish merger control regime applies to 'any merger or acquisition', which is defined by section 16(1) of the Act as including transactions where:

- two or more undertakings, previously independent of one another, merge;
- one or more individuals who already control one or more undertakings, or one or more undertakings, acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings; or
- the acquisition of part of an undertaking, although not involving the acquisition of a corporate legal entity, involves the acquisition of assets that constitute a business to which a turnover can be attributed, and for the purposes of this paragraph, 'assets' includes goodwill.

The concept of 'undertakings involved in the merger or acquisition' is broadly equivalent to the concept of 'undertakings concerned' under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EUMR).

Mergers and acquisitions (mergers) that meet the turnover thresholds set out in section 18(1) of the Act are subject to mandatory notification to the CCPC. Where these requirements are not met, mergers may still be notified to the CCPC on a voluntary basis under section 18(3) of the Act (see below for turnover thresholds and voluntary notification).

There are different thresholds that apply to media mergers under the Act (see below).

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Only full-function joint ventures (ie, those that perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity) constitute a merger for the purposes of the Irish merger control regime. The relevant definition is included in section 16(4) of the Act.

The CCPC adopts an approach mostly consistent with the European Commission in identifying whether joint ventures are subject to Irish merger control law. Where a joint venture does not qualify as full-function, the CCPC may assess it under section 4 of the Act, which is based on article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Typically, the CCPC will have regard to the European Commission's Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements and the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints when undertaking such an assessment.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Irish merger control regime does not regulate the acquisition of interests other than those conferring 'control' over an undertaking or part of an undertaking.

The definition of control that applies under the Act is based on the concept of 'decisive influence', derived from the EUMR.

The following non-exhaustive list of the circumstances that can give rise to control is included in section 16(2) of the Act:

- ownership of, or the right to use all or part of, the assets of an undertaking; and
- rights or contracts that enable decisive influence to be exercised with regard to the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Irish merger control regime is mandatory where, for the most recent financial year:

- the aggregate turnover in the state of the undertakings involved is not less than €60 million; and
- the turnover in the state of each of two or more of the undertakings involved is not less than €10 million.

These revised thresholds came into effect on 1 January 2019. References to 'the state' are references to Ireland, excluding Northern Ireland.

There are different thresholds that apply to 'media mergers' under the Act.

The CCPC can also investigate mergers falling below the turnover thresholds under sections 4 and 5 of the Act (ie, where it believes, respectively, either that the merger could have as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, or involves the creation or strengthening of a dominant position). In practice, the CCPC will contact parties to a merger falling below the turnover thresholds, where that merger raises potential competition concerns, and request that they notify the merger on a voluntary basis under section 18(3) of the Act.

For example, through its market surveillance the CCPC became aware in February 2017 that Mediawatch Limited (trading as Kantar Media), a wholly owned subsidiary of WPP plc, was to acquire sole control of Newsaccess Limited. Notwithstanding the fact that the proposed merger fell below the turnover thresholds that trigger mandatory notification, the CCPC undertook a preliminary assessment, which found that the merger would result in Kantar Media removing its closest and most substantial competitor from the market. The CCPC therefore informed the parties that they should make a voluntary notification of the merger. The parties did so and the CCPC eventually cleared the merger with binding commitments.

The CCPC has stated in its published guidance that if, having been contacted by the CCPC, parties to a non-notifiable merger that raises competition concerns inform the CCPC that they do not intend to notify, the CCPC will carry out a preliminary inquiry to determine whether to open an investigation under section 4 or 5 of the Act. The CCPC may then seek an undertaking from the parties not to implement the merger or, where necessary, may seek an injunction to restrain implementation of the merger. Where a non-notifiable merger raising competition concerns is implemented, the CCPC will conduct an investigation and in appropriate cases invoke the Irish Court's equitable jurisdiction to restore the status quo, which may result in the merger being reversed. Such an eventuality has not occurred to date.

The CCPC has not issued detailed guidance on its approach to the calculation of turnover but tends to follow the principles set out in the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under the EUMR on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2008 (the Commission Jurisdictional Notice).

One exception is the CCPC's approach to geographic allocation of turnover. A guidance note by the CCPC provides that 'turnover in the state' means sales made or services supplied to customers within the state. The CCPC follows this approach even in cases involving financial institutions where the Commission Jurisdictional Notice would suggest that turnover should instead be allocated on a 'branch basis'.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory for mergers that meet the turnover thresholds. No exceptions exist.

Section 18(3) of the Act provides for voluntary notification of a merger that does not meet the jurisdictional thresholds.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Any merger that involves undertakings meeting the turnover thresholds in the state as set out in the Act must be notified to the CCPC.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

No special rules apply to foreign investment.

Special rules apply where two or more undertakings carry on a media business in the state or one or more of the undertakings involved carry on a media business in the state and one or more undertakings carry on a media business elsewhere.

The definition of 'carrying on a media business in the state' requires undertakings involved to have either a physical presence in the state and make sales to customers located in the state, or to have made sales in the state of at least €2 million in the most recent financial year.

The term 'media business' is broad and includes newspaper publishing, radio and TV broadcasting and production of news and current affairs programming, including online news sources and broadcasting.

Where a merger qualifies as a media merger, the substantive test is 'whether the result of the media merger will not be contrary to the public interest in protecting the plurality of the media in the state' and this includes a review of 'diversity of ownership and diversity of content'.

Undertakings involved are required to make two notifications of a media merger. One notification is sent to the CCPC, which determines whether the merger is likely to give rise to a substantial lessening of competition (SLC). A separate notification is sent to the Minister for Communications, Climate Action and Environment. This is in a prescribed form, last updated in 2015. A fee is payable for each notification.

The Minister will commence a separate review of the media merger 10 days after the CCPC determination is made (ie, consecutively). If the media merger does not raise concerns, it will usually be cleared within 30 working days of the commencement of the Minister's review. However, if the Minister is concerned that the media merger may be contrary to the public interest in protecting plurality of the media, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (BAI) will carry out a 'Phase II' examination. The BAI has 80 working days to prepare a report to the Minister, which includes recommending whether the merger should be put into effect (with or without conditions). An advisory panel may be set up to assist the BAI in its review. The Minister will make the decision of whether to approve (with or without conditions) or prohibit the merger, taking into account the BAI report and, if applicable, the views of the advisory panel. The Minister must take this decision within 20 working days of receipt of the BAI report.

To date, there has been only one Phase II examination of a media merger, the acquisition of seven regional newspapers (part of Celtic Media Group) by Independent News & Media (INM). This examination was not completed, as the merger was terminated by mutual consent of the parties.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A filing must be submitted to the CCPC prior to the implementation of the merger, and may be made so long as the undertakings involved demonstrate a good faith intention to conclude an agreement. This approach is in line with the European Commission's practice under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004.

Under sections 18(9) and 18(10) of the Competition Acts 2002 to 2014 (the Act), failure to notify a merger that meets the turnover thresholds is a criminal offence punishable by fines of up to €250,000, plus €25,000 per day for a continued breach. The CCPC cannot impose administrative fines but must refer the matter to the Director for Public Prosecutions to initiate either summary prosecution or prosecution on indictment.

Liability attaches to the undertaking required to make the notification, or the person in control of that undertaking. Section 18(11) of the Act provides that the 'person in control' of an undertaking is:

- in the case of a body corporate, any officer of the body corporate who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention;
- in the case of a partnership, each partner who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention; or
- in the case of any other form of undertaking, any individual in control of that undertaking who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention.

Following a Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) investigation, on 8 April 2019, Armalou Holdings Limited (Armalou) pleaded guilty in the Dublin Metropolitan District Court to a breach of

section 18. Armalou pleaded guilty to six charges arising from its failure to notify the CCPC of its acquisition of Lillis-O'Donnell Motor Company Limited in December 2015. Subsequently, on 10 May 2019, Airfield Villas Limited (formerly known as Lillis-O'Donnell Holdings Limited), also pleaded guilty to six charges arising out of its failure to notify the CCPC of the same transaction. This was Ireland's first criminal prosecution involving 'gun jumping'. In both cases, the District Court decided to apply the Probation Act 1907 on condition that each company made a charitable donation of €2,000 and pay a contribution of €2,070 towards the Director of Public Prosecutions legal costs and the CCPC's witness expenses.

## 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Each 'undertaking involved' in the merger must submit a merger filing. In practice, joint filings are submitted and the purchaser tends to lead on drafting the filing. A filing fee of €8,000 (for each filing) currently applies.

## 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

A Phase I clearance determination must be issued by the CCPC within 30 working days of the 'appropriate date', which means the date on which a full and complete filing by the merging parties is made, unless either the CCPC has used its power to 'stop and restart the clock' by issuing a formal requirement for information (RFI), which has the effect of resetting the clock and it only restarts when the RFI is complied with, or where the parties and the CCPC are negotiating remedies, in which case the Phase I period is extended to 45 working days. The CCPC also issues 'informal' requests for information that do not stop and restart the clock.

A Phase II clearance determination must be issued by the CCPC within 120 working days of the appropriate date. If the CCPC issues a formal RFI in the first 30 working days of the Phase II period, this has the effect of stopping and restarting the clock in the same way as at Phase I. If the parties and the CCPC are negotiating remedies, the Phase II period is extended to 135 working days.

Media mergers are subject to the waiting periods for notification.

A suspensory obligation is included in the Act. Section 19(1) of the Act imposes a prohibition on the merging parties putting a merger that has been notified (both mandatory and voluntary) into effect prior to the issue of a clearance determination.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Section 19(1) prohibits the putting into effect of a notifiable merger until the CCPC has reached a determination that it may be put into effect.

In *M/16/013 INM/Greer*, INM completed the acquisition of assets of Greer Publications prior to notification in breach of section 19(1) of the Act. The CCPC accepted the notification on the basis that INM would not, prior to receiving CCPC clearance, combine or change the structure of the target assets, integrate any retailing or advertising functions of the target assets into INM, cross-sell advertising space between INM and the target assets or share commercially sensitive information between INM and the target assets. The CCPC subsequently cleared the merger.

Section 19(2) of the Act provides that a notifiable merger that is notified to the CCPC, but put into effect prior to a clearance determination, is void. The Act does not state whether a merger that is completed prior to clearance is rendered void for all time, or merely until such time as the CCPC issues a clearance determination. The CCPC has previously expressed the view that a notifiable merger completed without

notification remains void until the date of a clearance determination (*M/04/003 Radio 2000/Newstalk 106*).

Completing after notification but prior to clearance (ie, where clearance is ultimately given) is not a criminal offence.

While the CCPC has permitted the parties to submit a late notification of a completed merger, it has released statements that parties have breached the Act by closing before clearance. For example, in *M/10/043 Stena/DFDS*, the merging parties completed the merger prior to notification and the CCPC issued a press release stating that the parties had infringed section 19(1) of the Act, and therefore that the implementation of the acquisition was void under section 19(2).

## 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The same legal rules apply to all cases involving closing before clearance, regardless of whether or not the transaction is a foreign-to-foreign merger.

## 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

No formal guidance has been published by the CCPC on whether structures such as 'hold-separate' undertakings might enable parties to avoid a legal breach of the suspensory obligation under section 19(1) of the Act. In general, we would expect the CCPC to follow the same approach as the Commission with regard to its approach to carve-outs or close-arounds.

Where such mechanisms have been used in Ireland, the CCPC has publicly criticised the merging parties for doing so. In *M/12/031 Top Snacks/KP Snacks*, the CCPC stated in its determination that the Act does not permit partial implementation of a merger or acquisition even where a 'framework agreement' or other kind of hold-separate arrangement is put in place with regard to certain parts of the business within the state. The CCPC might be less likely to initiate court proceedings for breach of section 19(1) or section 19(2) in cases where the Irish businesses of the merging parties were being held separate pending the grant of clearance by the CCPC. In *M/16/013 INM/Greer*, the CCPC accepted the notification of the merger after completion on assurances from INM that it would not, prior to receiving the CCPC's determination, integrate the relevant target assets into its business. Parties should seek legal advice on a case-by-case basis and consider engaging with the CCPC in pre-notification discussions.

### Public takeovers

## 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Section 18(1A) of the Act provides that, where the turnover thresholds are met, the making of a public bid may be notified by any of the undertakings involved to the CCPC once one of the undertakings involved has publicly announced an intention to make a public bid or a public bid is made but not yet accepted.

### Documentation

## 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

There is a standard form for notifying the CCPC. All parts of the notification form must be completed, unless a conditional approval has been granted by the CCPC in pre-notification discussions. For example, where there is no overlap between the parties' activities, it is usual practice to

request an exemption from completing some or all of section 4 of the form, which requires a description of the conditions of competition in relation to all markets where there is a horizontal or a vertical overlap.

No market share threshold applies for the identification of overlaps.

The form requests details of the proposed merger, the parties involved, the overlapping products or services, any ancillary restraints and copies of any non-privileged competition assessments of the merger. The Act requires 'full details' of the proposed merger to be notified to the CCPC.

In terms of media mergers, a notification form and guidelines have been issued by the Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment. The content required in the merger notification form includes a description of the proposed merger, and significant details on the undertakings involved. Market share details (both pre and post-merger) are required for each media business of the undertakings involved, in terms of readership, listenership, viewership and page impression hits. The undertakings involved must submit detail on compliance with industry codes of practice, relevant regulatory bodies and applicable legislation. Detail is also required on grievance procedures for employees, and employment tribunal proceedings involving employees. The notification form states that an undertaking's record in respect of industrial relations and Labour Court rulings may be examined as part of the assessment.

The undertakings involved must provide information on the 'editorial ethos' of each media business, including data on editorial control, editorial structure and positions taken regarding political endorsements and issues of debate or controversy. A breakdown of content for each media business is also required as well as details of any future plans of the undertakings; for example, whether the undertakings to be acquired will continue as separate enterprises (eg, a newspaper and a radio station) and whether there will be changes to editorial and key content-producing staff.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

#### Pre-notification

- Request conditional approval not to complete the entire notification form (where no overlaps); and
- meeting or conference call to discuss the proposed merger (for difficult cases, expedited cases or requests only).

#### Phase I

- Submit filing to the CCPC (one hard copy only is required plus an electronic copy of the merger notification form in Word format);
- publication of notice on the CCPC's website within seven days recording fact of filing and parties' names with a call for submissions or comments from third parties (generally a 10-day period);
- possibility of a formal requirement for information that stops and, when complied with to CCPC's satisfaction, restarts the Phase I timetable;
- possibility of an informal request for information that does not impact on the Phase I timetable;
- discussion of remedy proposals from the parties (if applicable), which extends the Phase I period to 45 working days;
- notice to parties of determination (clearance, conditional clearance or Phase II; with press release for noteworthy mergers);
- merging parties may request redactions from the public version of the determination; and
- publication of Phase I determination within 60 working days of date of adoption.

#### Phase II (if applicable)

- Communication from the CCPC setting out its decision to move to Phase II giving limited details;
- call for submissions or comments from third parties;
- possibility of a formal requirement or informal request for information;
- the CCPC may commission a market survey or economic analysis from consultants;
- meeting between the parties and the CCPC (optional);
- early determination approving the merger can be issued within 40 working days of the beginning of Phase II (rather than 120 working days from notification; this is the usual Phase II outcome) or if the investigation is to progress, the CCPC sends the parties an assessment setting out its concerns about the merger;
- oral hearing (if requested within five working days of receipt of the CCPC's assessment);
- access to the CCPC's file;
- discussion of remedy proposals from the parties (no later than 15 working days after receipt of the CCPC's assessment);
- market testing of remedy proposals of parties (depending on circumstances and at the discretion of the CCPC);
- notice to parties of determination (clearance, conditional clearance or blocking) and press release;
- merging parties may request redactions from the public version of the determination; and
- publication of Phase II determination within 60 working days of date of adoption.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The CCPC has a period of 30 working days in which to decide whether to grant a Phase I clearance, and a period (from initial notification) of 120 working days in which to decide whether to grant a Phase II clearance.

The Act does not provide for an accelerated investigation and there is no guidance issued by the CCPC on this point. However, in practice, merging parties can request an accelerated investigation and the CCPC has issued expedited clearance decisions in cases not raising competition concerns. For example, M/12/029 *Endless/VION* was cleared in 11 days, and in cases that involved strict insolvency procedure timetables, such as M/09/002 *HMV Ireland/Zavvi*, the clearance determination was issued in nine days. More recently, in M/16/053 *Anchorage Capital/Eircom*, the CCPC cleared that 'no issues' merger in 11 days.

The CCPC can reduce the normal period of 10 days allowed for public comment after publication of notice of a merger notification on its website in individual cases, if circumstances so require. For example, in M/12/048 *Endless/Imtech Suir*, the notification period was reduced from 10 days to five days where Imtech Suir's parent company had been declared insolvent and consequently Imtech Suir was in financial jeopardy and unlikely to operate as a going concern. In that case, the CCPC issued a clearance determination in six days.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Section 20(1)(c) of the Competition Acts 2002 to 2014 (the Act) provides that the substantive test for assessment of competition issues is 'whether the result of the merger or acquisition would be to substantially lessen competition in markets for goods or services in the state' (the SLC test). The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) interprets the SLC test in terms of consumer welfare, which



depends on a range of variables. In particular the CCPC will assess whether a merger would be likely to result in a reduction in choice or a price rise for consumers. This is a similar test to that applied by other jurisdictions, such as the UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).

A merger that would otherwise give rise to an SLC may nonetheless be cleared by the CCPC where the failing firm or failing division test is met (as set out in Chapter 9 of the CCPC's Guidelines for Merger Analysis) and therefore the relevant counterfactual is not the prevailing conditions of competition. For example, in *M/15/026 Baxter Healthcare/Fannin Compounding*, the CCPC identified competition concerns related to the reduction in competition for the commercial supply of compounded chemotherapy medicines to hospitals in the state. However, the parties submitted that Fannin Compounding was a 'failing division' of Fannin Limited and that the assets involved would exit the market if the merger was prohibited. The CCPC investigated this argument and engaged Grant Thornton to independently examine financial information pertaining to Fannin Compounding. The CCPC ultimately cleared the merger. It found that the most likely outcome absent the merger would be that Fannin Compounding would close and its assets would exit the market. Thus, the competitive structure of the relevant market would deteriorate to at least the same extent in the absence of the proposed acquisition.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No. Joint ventures that are notifiable under section 16(4) of the Act must satisfy the same SLC test.

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The CCPC's October 2014 Guidelines on Merger Analysis states that the CCPC will examine unilateral, coordinated, conglomerate and vertical effects (including the loss of actual 'or potential' competition). Like the European Commission, the CCPC in practice tends to focus on the risk of horizontal unilateral effects, although coordinated effects and vertical mergers are occasionally examined.

For example, in *M/17/005 Vhi Investments/Vhi Swiftcare Clinics*, the CCPC investigated potential vertical concerns arising from the acquisition by VHI Healthcare (the state's largest health insurer) of the remaining 50 per cent interest in each of two 'Swiftcare' clinics offering primary care services in Dublin and one clinic in Cork. Specifically, the CCPC investigated an input foreclosure theory of harm whereby VHI could potentially exclude other competing insurers from offering their policyholders access to these clinics. However, the CCPC determined that the clinics formed a small part of the overall primary care market (which included GP clinics and hospitals in those areas) and therefore the merger would not lead to input foreclosure.

Separately, in *M/17/035 Dawn Meats/Dunbia* the CCPC investigated whether the merger could give rise to an increased risk of coordinated effects and undertook econometric analysis to test this point, though it ultimately did not identify any concerns.

### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Aside from media mergers, non-competition issues are not relevant under the Act. However, the CCPC does sometimes consider wider welfare factors. For example, in *M/17/035 Dawn Meats/Dunbia*, the CCPC investigated whether the merger would give Dawn Meats the

ability and incentive to lower the prices it pays to farmers for live cattle for slaughter in the state. The CCPC did not find evidence to support this potential concern.

### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The CCPC's October 2014 Guidelines on Merger Analysis state that it will consider efficiency arguments, but the burden of proof is on the parties to demonstrate that the claimed efficiency gains are as a direct result of the merger.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Upon the completion of a Phase II investigation, the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) may clear a merger subject to conditions or block a merger outright if the CCPC forms the opinion that the merger would lead to a substantial lessening of competition in markets for goods or services in the state.

### Remedies and conditions

## 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Section 20(1)(b) of the Competition Acts 2002 to 2014 (the Act) provides that the CCPC may enter into discussions with the merging parties with a view to identifying measures that would ameliorate any negative competitive effects of the merger. These discussions can have as their outcome divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies. Section 20(3) of the Act provides that the negotiation of remedies or commitments may be commenced at any stage of a Phase I or Phase II investigation.

The CCPC has previously accepted both divestment undertakings and behavioural remedies as conditions to clearance determinations.

For example, in *M/16/008 PandaGreen/GreenStar*, CCPC clearance was obtained where PandaGreen made divestment undertakings in relation to Greenstar's domestic waste collection businesses in Fingal and Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown. In *M/14/026 Valeo/Wardell/Robert Roberts*, the acquirer undertook to divest the YR brand of brown sauce to address the CCPC's concern that the acquirer's large post-merger market share in the market for the supply of brown sauce to the retail sector would incentivise it to increase prices to retailers, with insufficient competitive constraint from competitors or countervailing buyer power. Divestment undertakings were also accepted in *M/15/020 Topaz/Esso*, where Phase II clearance was subject to divestment commitments relating to Esso's interest in a fuel terminal at Dublin Port and certain fuel retail sites. This interest was subsequently divested to Applegreen during the course of 2017, with a binding commitment that Applegreen would import and supply refined fuel products, including aviation fuel (Jet A1), through the JFT.

In *M/17/012 Kantar Media/Newsaccess*, Kantar agreed to divest fixed assets and release a number of contracted customers from their fixed-term contracts. Finally, in *M/17/027 Dalata/Clarion Liffey Valley/Clayton Cardiff Lane*, the CCPC took the somewhat unusual step of requiring Dalata to commit to voluntarily notify the CCPC any time it begins operating a hotel in the state on behalf of a third party, where this would not otherwise be notifiable to the CCPC or EU Commission or give rise to potential competition concerns.



In *M/18/36 Enva/Rilta*, Enva agreed to divest property and fixed assets to ameliorate concerns identified by the CCPC in the waste-processing market as a result of its Phase II investigation. Enva also agreed to certain access proposals relating to the processing of waste lubricant oil and hazardous contaminated soil.

**26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?**

There is a 45-working-day statutory period for the issue of a conditional clearance at Phase I.

In practice, the Phase I deadlines tend not to allow merging parties sufficient time to design and obtain approval for any 'complex' remedies.

The Phase II timetable allows the merging parties more time to satisfy the CCPC that their remedies proposal effectively resolves any identified 'theories of harm' or competition law concern. The CCPC may 'market test' a remedies proposal during both Phase I and Phase II investigations.

**27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?**

The CCPC has not required remedies or commitments in foreign-to-foreign mergers, to date.

### Ancillary restrictions

**28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?**

A merger clearance determination by the CCPC covers not only the notified merger but any arrangements constituting restrictions that are directly related and necessary to the implementation of the merger, and that have been described by the merging parties to the CCPC in the notification form.

In practice, the CCPC tends to follow the principles included in the European Commission's Notice on Ancillary Restraints in this regard.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

**29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?**

Section 20(1)(a) of the Competition Acts 2002 to 2014 (the Act) provides that, within seven days of receipt of a merger notification, the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) must publish a request for comments from third parties (including customers and competitors). Generally, a 10-working-day period is allowed for the submission of third-party comments during Phase I, and a 15-working-day period is allowed for the submission of third-party comments during Phase II (this 10-working-day period may be reduced depending on the facts of the merger).

In practice, the CCPC will often proactively seek submissions from competitors and customers during both Phase I and Phase II investigations.

Section 20(1)(b) of the Act provides that the CCPC may enter into discussions with third parties (including customers and competitors), with a view to identifying remedies.

The CCPC will consider all third-party submissions and, at its discretion, may meet with interested competitors and customers during the review process.

### Publicity and confidentiality

**30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?**

The CCPC publishes on its website notices of all mergers notified to it, written determinations and any press releases by the CCPC on particular cases.

Notifying parties can identify commercially sensitive information that they believe should remain confidential when submitting a notification. Notifying parties are also afforded the opportunity to submit comments on the deletion of confidential information from the public version of the CCPC's determination.

In the event that the CCPC seeks to include information provided by a third party in its determination, that third party will also be offered the opportunity to protect confidential information. Similar provisions apply in access to the file in Phase II.

The CCPC tends to accept all reasonable requests to maintain confidentiality in its written determinations.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

**31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?**

Section 23 of the 2014 Act permits the CCPC to enter into arrangements with other competition authorities in other countries for the exchange of information and the mutual provision of assistance.

The CCPC maintains regular contact with competition authorities in other jurisdictions, including in particular the UK's Competition and Markets Authority and the European Commission regarding, respectively, cases that are subject to parallel reviews in the United Kingdom and Ireland and EU cases that may impact on Ireland. For example, in 2018, the CCPC closely followed the European Commission's investigations into a number of proposed mergers that it considered to be of significant interest to Ireland, including the following:

- M.8306 *Qualcomm/NXP Semiconductors*;
- M.8677 *Siemens/Alstom*;
- M.8736 *Toohil Telecom/Eircom*;
- M.8792 *T-Mobile NL/Tele2 NL*;
- M.8084 *Bayer/Monsanto*;
- M.8882 *Kennedy Wilson/AXA JV*; and
- M.8900 *Wieland Werke/Aurubis & Schwermetall*.

Finally, the CCPC is an active member of the European Competition Network, the International Competition Network and the OECD Competition Committee.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

**32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?**

Merging parties may appeal a determination of the CCPC prohibiting a merger or imposing conditions on a point of fact or law to the Irish High Court. There is a possibility for merging parties or the CCPC to make a subsequent appeal of a High Court decision, but only on a point of law. The Competition Acts 2002 to 2014 (the Act) provides no right of appeal in respect of a determination to clear a merger and third parties are not given a right of appeal.

## Time frame

### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An appeal to the High Court must be lodged within 40 working days of the CCPC's published determination, or, in the case of a media merger, within 40 working days of the Minister for Communications informing the relevant party of his or her determination. The High Court will issue a decision within two months, if this is practicable.

To date, the only successful appeal to the High Court from a determination of the CCPC blocking a merger was in September 2008, when Kerry Group successfully appealed the determination of the CCPC blocking its proposed acquisition of Breeo. The CCPC lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court in respect of the High Court judgment but decided in April 2016 not to proceed with the appeal.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2017, there were 72 notifications to the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC), of which two were voluntarily notified (M/17/036 *Sean Loughnane/Crinkle Foods* and M/17/012 *Kantar Media/Newsaccess*) and one was withdrawn at the request of the parties (M/17/055 *Siris/Synchronoss*). Of the nine extended Phase I investigations, four required binding commitments at Phase I (M/17/012 *Kantar Media/Newsaccess*, M/17/021 *Applegreen/50% of Joint Fuels Terminal*, M/17/027 *Dalata/Clarion Liffey Valley/Clayton Cardiff Lane* and M/17/036 *Sean Loughnane/Crinkle Fine Foods*). There were no Phase II investigations or prohibitions in 2017. Four media mergers were notified to the CCPC in 2017.

In 2018, there were 98 notifications to the CCPC. Of the fourteen extended Phase I investigations, three required Phase II investigations (M/17/068 *Irish Times/Sappho (Irish Examiner)*, M/18/016 *Trinity Mirror/Northern & Shell* and M/18/036 *Enva/Rilta*) and five required formal commitments to alleviate competition concerns. The types of commitments obtained from the parties range from requirements to divest significant business facilities (M/18/036 – *Enva/Rilta* and M/18/009 – *BWG Foods/4 Aces*) to restrictions on access to confidential information among parties (M/18/031 – *Uniphar/SISK Healthcare*, M/18/042 – *Oaktree/Alanis/Lioncor (JV)* and M/18/016 – *Trinity Mirror/Northern & Shell*).

Four media mergers were notified to the CCPC in 2018 (M/18/001 *CMNL/North Dublin Publications*, M/18/016 *Trinity Mirror/Northern & Shell*, M/18/046 *Virgin Media/Casey Cablevision* and M/18/092 *FormPress Publishing (Iconic)/assets of River Media*). All were cleared at Phase I.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Following a consultation in late 2017, the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation issued a Ministerial Order on 2 October 2018 revising the financial thresholds at which notification of a merger or acquisition to the CCPC is required.

As of 1 January 2019, pursuant to the Competition Act 2002 (section 27) Order 2018 (SI No. 388 of 2018), the CCPC must be notified of a proposed transaction where, for the most recent financial year:

- the aggregate turnover in the state of all of the undertakings involved is not less than €60 million; and
- the turnover in the state of each of two or more of the undertakings involved is not less than €10 million.



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## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

There was a record number of notifications to the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) in 2018. In total, 98 mergers were notified, of which 14 resulted in extended Phase I investigations and three required Phase II investigations (M/17/068 *Irish Times/Sappho (Irish Examiner)*, M/18/016 *Trinity Mirror/Northern & Shell* and M/18/036 *Enva/Rilta*).

Five mergers resulted in formal commitments to alleviate competition concerns. The types of commitments obtained from the parties ranged from requirements to divest significant business facilities (M/18/036 – *Enva/Rilta* and M/18/009 – *BWG Foods/4 Aces*) to restrictions on access to confidential information among parties (M/18/031 – *Uniphar/SISK Healthcare*, M/18/042 – *Oaktree/Alanis/Lioncor (JV)* and M/18/016 – *Trinity Mirror/Northern & Shell*). This continues a trend by which the CCPC addresses vertical concerns identified in Phase I using behavioural remedies.

Following the introduction of the revised financial thresholds on 1 January 2019, there has been a significant reduction in the number of notified transactions (with only 16 mergers notified as of 20 June 2019 compared to 50 for the same period in 2018). Further, on 14 June 2019, the CCPC confirmed that it would move forward with plans to introduce a simplified procedure for mergers satisfying the revised threshold that result in only limited overlaps (ie, 15 per cent combined share or lower, in horizontal cases and 25 per cent or lower, in vertical cases). The CCPC intends on publishing draft guidance later in 2019, with the procedure expected to be adopted in early 2020.

\* The information in this chapter was accurate as of August 2019.

# Italy

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Law No. 287 of 10 October 1990 (the Law) (in particular, articles 5 to 7 and 16 to 19) contains the rules on antitrust control of concentrations and joint ventures. Presidential Decree No. 217 of 30 April 1998 (the Regulation) contains procedural and enforcement rules. The Law is enforced by an independent body, the Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) in Rome. There are also specific merger control regimes for utilities and other sectors.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Law applies to concentrations. A concentration occurs where:

- two or more undertakings merge;
- an undertaking or a person already controlling an undertaking acquires sole or joint control over the whole or parts of another undertaking; or
- two or more undertakings form a concentrative joint venture through the establishment of a new company.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The wording of the Law does not contain a clear definition of 'concentrative' and 'cooperative' joint ventures.

Generally, the incorporation of a jointly controlled undertaking or the acquisition of joint control over a previously existing undertaking will give rise to a 'concentrative joint venture' (caught by the Italian merger control regime) provided that:

- the joint venture is a full-function joint venture; and
- the joint venture's main object or effect is not the coordination of the competitive behaviour of the parent companies.

This second part of the test is what differentiates the assessment of joint ventures in Italy with respect to the current EU merger law (as it remains consistent with the previous definition of concentration included in the pre-March 1998 EU law). This difference from the current EU merger control regime has been increasingly believed to be just theoretical, but recent cases have shown that this is not the case.

To assess whether a joint venture is concentrative or cooperative, the 1994 European Commission Notice on the distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ventures must be kept under consideration. Accordingly, full-function joint ventures are treated as 'cooperative' and appraised under the rules on agreements between undertakings (and not under the merger control rules) if, after the transaction, both parents will remain actual or potential competitors in

the same geographical and product market as the joint venture, or in a market that is upstream or downstream or neighbouring with respect to that of the joint venture, if certain conditions are met. Full-function joint ventures that are not 'cooperative' (concentrative joint ventures) will be treated as concentrations.

Concentrative joint ventures must, therefore, be notified to the IAA for appraisal under the merger rules and procedures described in this chapter.

'Cooperative joint ventures', in turn, are subject to the rules on restrictive practices. Article 2 of the Law, like article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits agreements and concerted practices between undertakings that have as their object or effect a substantial restriction of competition in the national market or in a substantial part thereof. Under the Law, such agreements may be individually authorised, for a limited period of time, on grounds similar to those provided for under article 101(3) of the TFEU. Articles 4 and 13 allow undertakings to notify an agreement to the IAA for negative clearance or individual exemption. Following the entry into force of EU Regulation 1/2003, which mandates national competition authorities to apply articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU whenever the national competition laws are applied to cases where there is an 'interstate trade effect', the IAA has indicated that it will no longer accept filings for negative clearances or individual exemptions, even in the case of cooperative joint ventures, if they may affect interstate trade.

To obtain a negative clearance or an individual exemption for purely 'Italian' cooperative joint ventures (ie, where there is no interstate trade effect), the parties must file a request using a special form. Within 120 days of notification, the IAA must either declare that the cooperative joint venture does not infringe article 2 (negative clearance) or decide to initiate proceedings. The IAA, when initiating these types of proceedings, normally indicates a non-mandatory deadline of 120 days within which it will make a final decision.

At the end of proceedings, the IAA will issue a decision stating whether the joint venture infringes article 2 and if so, rule on the request for an individual authorisation.

Notification of cooperative joint ventures is not mandatory. However, if a joint venture may infringe article 2, the IAA may start an investigation on its own initiative or following a third-party complaint.

There is also the risk of claims by any party (including third parties) who has an interest in a declaration of nullity of the cooperative joint venture or in damages.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Article 7 of the Law contains a very broad definition of control for the purposes of merger control. First, the provision expressly refers to the definition of 'controlled companies' in the Italian Civil Code, namely:

- companies in which another company has the ability to control, directly or indirectly, including through fiduciary companies, the majority of votes at the shareholders' meeting;
- companies in which another company has, directly or indirectly, including through fiduciary companies, sufficient voting rights to exercise a dominant influence in its shareholders' meetings; and
- companies that are under the dominant influence of another company by virtue of contractual links.

Second, the concept of control also includes any legal or factual situation whereby one party can exercise (including jointly with another party) a decisive influence over an undertaking. Relevant factual or legal elements include ownership or other rights over the assets or part of the assets of the undertaking, and any rights, contracts or other legal relationships that confer a decisive influence in determining the composition, resolutions or decisions of the corporate bodies of an undertaking.

As a result (and also in light of the express general obligation contained in the Law to interpret its provisions in accordance with the relevant EU principles as developed by the EU institutions), the definition of control for merger control purposes under Italian law is very broad and substantially corresponds to the definition of control applicable under EU merger law. The Law may thus apply to the acquisition of minority shareholdings (provided that this is sufficient to confer joint or sole control over the acquired company – see below) and concentrative joint ventures. More precisely, consistently with relevant European Commission practice:

- a minority interest confers joint control over the acquired undertaking if, by virtue of the provisions of a shareholders' agreement or through other contractual or de facto mechanisms, the holder of the minority interest can exercise veto powers over certain 'strategic' decisions of the acquired company; and
- a minority interest can be sufficient to confer even sole control over an undertaking, given other factors, the most important of which is that the remaining shareholding is dispersed among a large number of shareholders.

Given the substantive approach to the notion of control, board or management representation that grants one minority shareholder a veto over strategic decisions, would be considered in assessing whether this minority shareholder holds joint or even sole control, and this irrespective of the actual shareholding held. Even merely contractual arrangements could give rise to a situation of control by a non-shareholder.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Law that provides two cumulative turnover thresholds was modified in August 2017, when the Italian parliament approved a law that decreased the first threshold (ie, the combined turnover of all undertakings concerned) from €499 million to €492 million, and – most importantly – introduced a twofold change of the second threshold by, on one hand, reducing from €50 million to €30 million the amount of the relevant turnover and, on the other, referring to the Italian turnover of each of at least two undertakings involved (and not, as it was under the old regime, only to the Italian turnover of the target). The thresholds are updated each year to reflect adjustments in the GDP deflator index, and the new figures are published in the IAA's Bulletin and on its website. The last change was in March 2020 and the test applicable since then requires that:

- the Italian turnover of all undertakings involved is higher than €504 million; and
- the Italian turnover of each of at least two undertakings involved is higher than €31 million.

Turnover is defined as the amount derived from the sale of products or the provision of services (excluding turnover taxes) in the preceding financial year.

In the case of banks and 'financial institutions' (ie, firms active in securities investment, asset management, consumer credit or leasing), the turnover used for the purpose of calculating the thresholds is equal to the value of one-tenth of their total assets, excluding memorandum accounts, and, in the case of insurance companies, the value of premiums collected. As a matter of practice, with regard to the turnover of credit and other financial institutions, the IAA, therefore, still follows the guidance contained in the old 1994 European Commission Notice on the calculation of turnover.

The Law will not apply to any transaction caught by the provisions of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), with the exception of referrals, as provided for in the EUMR (as set out in the European Union chapter).

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Pre-merger filing is mandatory.

There are, however, a few exceptions according to which an acquisition or merger is not considered a 'concentration' within the meaning of the Law and thus does not have to be notified. These are:

- acquisitions of shares by banks or other financial institutions, solely for resale, in undertakings being incorporated or in relation to capital increases, as long as the acquiring institutions do not exercise any voting rights attached to the shares acquired and sell them on within 24 months of the original acquisition (financial exception); and
- acquisitions of, or mergers with, companies that do not carry out any economic activity and do not have any direct or indirect control over another undertaking, nor hold licences, permits, concessions, or any other rights that would allow them to engage in business activities, nor have direct or indirect control over another undertaking holding any of those rights.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Concentrations between foreign companies must be notified to the IAA whenever, by virtue of their sales in Italy, the parties satisfy the cumulative turnover thresholds. The presence of assets or subsidiaries in Italy is not a relevant factor for the purpose of determining the existence of a notification obligation. The rules of the Law therefore also apply to foreign-to-foreign mergers. The cumulative nature of the two turnover thresholds means that the jurisdictional nexus between a foreign-to-foreign deal and Italy is satisfied every time the merger turnover thresholds are met. A 2017 change in the Law further reinforced the local nexus requiring that at least two of the undertakings concerned generate material turnover in Italy for a transaction to be reportable.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Special powers apply to a wide range of M&A transactions relating to assets in specific industries. These 'golden powers' (so called as they replace the former 'golden share' provisions) impose mandatory filing obligations on the parties involved in any deal where key strategic assets

and undertakings are being transferred and grant the government – not the IAA – far-reaching powers to impose vetoes and restrictions on such deals. Failure to comply with the new rules gives rise to heavy sanctions (see, for example, the approximately €74 million fine issued by the Office of the Prime Minister against Telecom Italia for failing to file about its acquisition of control by Vivendi – this fine is currently suspended). At the end of 2019 and in 2020, the government amended the ‘golden power’ rules, materially broadening the scope of review, including, in addition to original national defence and security:

- energy, communications and transportation;
- 5G networks;
- critical infrastructures, whether physical or virtual, including water, health, media, data processing or storage, aerospace, electoral or financial infrastructure and sensitive facilities;
- critical technologies, including artificial intelligence and robotics;
- the supply of critical inputs, including energy or raw materials;
- food security;
- access to sensitive information; and
- freedom and pluralism of the media.

This broadening was done in response to the covid-19 emergency and, following EU Commission guidelines issued on 25 March 2020 on the protection of European strategic assets and technologies, the Italian government issued Law Decree No. 23 of 2020 (the Decree), containing special measures for the protection of Italian assets. The Decree, converted with amendments into Law No. 40, dated 5 June 2020, expands the strategic sectors governed by the ‘golden power’ law on the review of foreign investments in Italian assets with new obligations until December 2020.

In addition, there are specific provisions applicable to special sectors, as outlined below:

- With regard to the cinema exhibition services, acquisitions leading to the creation of a market share of more than 25 per cent in one of the main Italian cities must be notified to the IAA.
- In the case of mergers involving banks, the IAA has to take a decision within 60 days of the submission date. The IAA will assess whether the concentration gives rise to any antitrust concerns, and the Bank of Italy, in line with its financial supervisory role, will assess the transaction under prudential rules in a parallel proceeding also lasting 60 days. In 2007, the Bank of Italy and the IAA signed a protocol agreement setting up procedural guidelines for the exchange of information in relation to concentrations with effects on banking markets.
- Mergers in the insurance sector are subject to the Law. However, IVASS, the relevant authority for insurance companies, which in 2013 became a division of the Bank of Italy, must be asked for a non-binding opinion before the IAA takes any measures.

Legislation prohibits ‘interlocking directorates’ in the banking, insurance and financial services sectors, making it illegal for individuals to sit on the board of more than one corporate body in competing undertakings in any of these sectors. Because the merger notification form requires the merging parties to fill in a section on interlocking directorates, merger control in the above-mentioned sectors can also be used as a means for spotting potential infringements of this law.

With regard to telecommunications, the 1997 Telecoms Law requires that before issuing a decision on any merger (or agreement) in the telecoms, broadcasting and media sector, the IAA must require a non-binding opinion from the Italian Communications Authority (AGCOM). Further, a resolution (last updated in 2016) of the AGCOM provides that any concentration (as defined under the Law) involving undertakings active in the media sector and that meets the relevant alternative turnover thresholds, equal to €482 million for all undertakings concerned

and €48 million for the target company, is subject to a mandatory notification to the AGCOM, which could block or impose conditions on the transaction if it is likely to threaten pluralism in the relevant area. This obligation is in addition to the possible parallel filing to the European Commission or the IAA.

Finally, when undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, or operating under a statutory monopoly, wish to operate in markets outside the scope of their current activity, they must do so through a separate company (corporate unbundling). The incorporation of such new companies, or the acquisition of a controlling interest in existing companies operating in new markets, is subject to a prior filing to the IAA and there are penalties of up to €51,645 for failure to notify. The filing obligation applies irrespective of turnover. The IAA has published a notice regarding the formalities applicable. In particular, the notice specifies the situations in which notification is required, and the minimum information required. Since the introduction of this specific filing obligation in 2001, the IAA has prosecuted undertakings for failure to comply with this obligation 28 times, with fines ranging between €1,000 and €50,000.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A concentration must be notified prior to its implementation, that is, before the purchaser has acquired the ability to exercise a decisive influence over the behaviour of the target undertaking.

The earliest a notification can be submitted is as soon as the parties have agreed on the essential terms of the transaction, which would allow the Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) to conduct a thorough appraisal. In general, the IAA prefers to be notified of a binding agreement; however, in exceptional cases, a filing has been accepted even before signing the final agreement, provided that the parties could assure the IAA that the main terms and conditions of the transaction – and in particular the aspects that are relevant for an antitrust analysis – would not change. While the IAA has generally adopted a strict approach to this issue, rejecting filings not supported by a binding agreement, its practice varies from one sectoral unit of the IAA to another, and it is advisable to discuss this with officials from the competent unit if necessary.

Fines for failure to notify may amount to up to 1 per cent of the worldwide turnover of the notifying party or parties in the last fiscal year. The IAA has informally indicated that it will adopt a zero-tolerance approach against those that disregard merger filing obligations. In 2016, the IAA opened two different proceedings concerning the banking sector, one against Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Roma and one against Banca per lo Sviluppo della Cooperazione di Credito for their failure to notify their acquisition of sole control, respectively, over Banca Padovana Credito Cooperativo in Liquidazione Coatta Amministrativa and Banca Romagna Cooperativa. The IAA closed both proceedings, imposing on the two banking institutions a €5,000 fine.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In the case of acquisition of sole control, the acquirer must make the notification. In the case of a merger or acquisition of joint control, each party that merges or acquires joint control is obliged to notify. The parties may, however, file jointly using the same form by appointing a common representative.

No filing fees apply.



### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

As a general rule, implementation of the transaction does not have to be suspended after filing but prior to clearance (although, as a matter of practice, in most cases the parties to a concentrative transaction make clearance by the IAA a contractual condition of closing). The IAA, when opening second-phase proceedings, may, however, order, with a formal decision in such regard, the parties not to implement the transaction until it concludes its Phase II review. However, this must be justified on the grounds that the transaction raises serious competition concerns. Since 1990, this has occurred only three times (the most recent case was *Unipol/Fondiaria* in 2012).

In any event, even if this order is issued, a public takeover offer may be completed during such a suspension period provided that the purchaser does not exercise voting rights at the acquired company's shareholders' meetings until the transaction has been cleared.

#### Pre-clearance closing

### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Implementing a transaction subsequent to notification but prior to clearance does not give rise to any infringement under the law and so no sanction is applied. Nevertheless, this course of action involves the risk that where a transaction raises serious competition problems, the IAA will decide not to authorise it or to authorise it subject to remedies. Thus, if a transaction is closed prior to clearance, the antitrust risk (ie, the risk of a prohibition or conditional approval decision) will be largely borne by the acquirer only, unless otherwise provided by specific contractual arrangements.

While the absence of a standstill obligation attenuates the risk of 'jumping the gun' in the pre-clearance phase in this regard, undertakings must remain wary that any interactions between them prior to clearance and completion of the deal remain subject to review by the IAA under article 2 of Law No. 287 of 10 October 1990 (the Law), the Italian equivalent of article 101 TFEU, as well as under the latter.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There are no sanctions for closing before clearance, provided completion occurs after a complete notification has been submitted.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

As indicated, a transaction, including a foreign-to-foreign deal, could be closed before clearance.

Thus, implementation of a foreign-to-foreign concentration, as well as concentrations involving national undertakings, can occur after having filed (and even before clearance), except where the IAA has issued a specific suspension order to the contrary when opening Phase II proceedings.

In relation to cases where the IAA has issued a specific suspension order, be it a foreign-to-foreign deal or not, while in principle acceptable, the actual feasibility of a local 'hold-separate' arrangement will ultimately depend on the geographic dimension of the relevant markets and how such arrangement would affect the potential restrictive effects of the proposed concentration.

#### Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

A national public takeover bid that may give rise, if completed, to a notifiable concentration must be submitted to the IAA at the same time it is filed with the Italian financial regulator (CONSOB). In the case of a national public bid (ie, public takeover subject to Italian capital market regulations), the term relating to the first-phase assessment period is reduced to 15 days. Where the IAA, having opened a second-phase investigation, issues a suspension order preventing the parties from closing, a public bid may nevertheless be completed provided that the purchaser does not exercise voting rights at the acquired company's shareholders' meetings until the transaction has been cleared. Non-national public takeover bids are subject to the provisions applicable to ordinary concentrations.

#### Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Parties may still notify a transaction by completing a form, two copies of which need to be submitted to the IAA along with the relevant attachments. However, the IAA promotes electronic filing by CD-ROM and it is also possible to file by certified email.

Completing the form can be time-consuming. The information required includes details of the parties, description and details of the transaction, and information about the markets affected by the concentration. Additional detailed information on the relevant market must be provided whenever:

- more than one party is active on a relevant market and, after the concentration, they will hold a combined market share of not less than 15 per cent;
- after the transaction, one party will hold a market share of not less than 25 per cent when at least another party is present in an upstream or downstream market; or
- the target undertaking holds a market share of more than 25 per cent even if the other undertakings concerned are not active in the same market or in upstream or downstream markets.

As a matter of practice, the IAA tends to require full filings even where the market share thresholds indicated above are not met. Accordingly, the undertakings concerned should be prepared to supply the IAA with extensive market information in any event.

A considerable amount of documentation must be provided, including all documents concerning the transaction (ie, the execution copies plus the relevant signatory pages and related attachments), balance sheets and annual reports of the companies involved relating to the three financial years preceding the transaction. A power of attorney for the representative signing the filing must also be enclosed (with no particular formalities required). In practice, it is very difficult to file a complete notification in less than two weeks (in particular because the active cooperation of the notifying party or parties and of the target is required). The notification must be submitted in Italian, while as a matter of practice the IAA accepts attached documents (ie, transaction documents) in the original language (if in English, French or Spanish, while a translation may be required in relation to other languages). The notifying party should indicate in its notification which information constitutes business secrets to be treated as strictly confidential (and the reasons for its confidentiality). Fines of up to €25,823 for failure or refusal to provide information and up to €51,645 for supplying false information may be imposed, but only in the case of Phase II proceedings. More broadly, depending on the relevance of the missing or false information



to be provided, any such conduct could potentially amount to a criminal offence (although this remains a remote scenario).

The IAA operates a voluntary pre-notification practice. In those cases, at least 15 days before the relevant formal filing, the parties may file with the IAA a briefing paper describing the essential terms of the transaction and the market or markets potentially involved. The parties and the IAA may then meet informally to discuss possible competitive effects of the transaction and the scope of the information to be provided in the actual filing.

Moreover, the IAA publishes a 'notice of merger submission' on its website (subject to the parties' consent). The notice contains a summary description of the transaction and of the affected economic sectors. Third parties are then entitled to submit their observations within five days of the publication.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The IAA has wide-ranging powers, which only apply, however, if second-phase proceedings are opened. It can gather all relevant information, order the production of documents, order inspections and make copies of corporate documents. Even during the first phase, it cannot be ruled out that the IAA may want to informally contact competitors, clients or suppliers to ask for comments or to verify whether the information submitted is true. In some cases, the officials may contact the parties directly to ask for clarifications or explanations of the transaction. The parties may make submissions in writing and may apply to be heard at hearings. Fines of up to €25,823 for failure or refusal to provide information and up to €51,645 for supplying false information may be imposed, but only in the case of Phase II proceedings.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

A first-stage investigation takes 30 calendar days (15 for national public bids), after which the IAA may:

- clear the transaction if it does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the Law; or
- open second-phase proceedings if serious doubts concerning the compatibility of the transaction with the Law arise.

Usually, the IAA does not issue a first-phase decision much earlier than 30 days from receipt of notification. This is because of various factors such as the amount of the information that the officials must consider, the internal procedural rules of the IAA and its considerable workload. However, in the least problematic cases the issuing of a decision before the expiry of the 30-day period cannot be ruled out.

If the IAA considers that the parties have not provided complete information, it may formally require such information to be submitted, and this interrupts the running of the 30-day period. This term will run afresh from the moment the IAA considers that the information is complete. It is not uncommon for the IAA to interrupt the 30-day review period through such information requests. However, as a matter of practice, the IAA's officials will normally seek to obtain the relevant information from the parties in an informal way (ie, over the phone), though this is typically done by setting very short deadlines (normally, two to three days, sometimes even less). In principle, only when these deadlines are not complied with does the IAA issue a formal letter interrupting the 30-day first-phase period. The new procedure entailing an informal pre-notification meeting operated by the IAA has been introduced, in part, to avoid these interruptions. During such a meeting, the IAA would generally make clear to the parties all the information that it

needs to assess the competitive effects of the transaction, so that the parties will be able to provide a complete filing. Second-phase proceedings must be closed within 45 calendar days (unless the undertakings have failed to provide information available to them, in which case the term can be extended for a further 30 calendar days, although this extension can be made just once).

Accordingly, provided that the 30-day first-phase period is not interrupted, the overall duration of proceedings can run up to 105 calendar days.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A concentration is prohibited whenever it creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which competition is eliminated or substantially reduced in the Italian market. Despite this being in line with the pre-2004 EUMR substantive test, in practice the criteria for evaluating a merger are largely in line with the new EUMR test, and include market shares, the choice suppliers and users have, access to sources of supply or market outlets, the structure of the relevant markets, the existence of any barriers to entry, and supply and demand trends. The Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) in fact interprets the test broadly, thus effectively applying a test close to that of the current EUMR.

The IAA's approach has not been affected by the global economic crisis and, although in some cases the IAA has considered the current trends and companies' corporate restructuring in some markets as background elements of the transaction (for instance the *Stato Federale della Baviera/BayernLB Holding* case, a concentration related to a bank nationalisation in Germany and the *Quaestio capital management/Banca popolare di Vicenza* (2016), the *Quaestio capital management/Veneto banca* (2016), both concerning the banking sector, and *Ferrovie dello stato italiane/Ferrovie del sud est* (2016), concerning the rail transport sector), it does not appear that this has been a key element in its merger assessment. The IAA has, however, been prepared to accelerate the procedure in such cases. The IAA has not used the failing-firm defence or any similar 'failing firm' theory over the past few years. Notably, in the *Emmelibri/Effe 2005 Gruppo Feltrinelli/Newco* case (2014), the notifying parties, while putting forward defensive arguments highlighting that absent the merger, EFFE 2005 would have ceased its distribution activities, explicitly excluded any failing firm defence. In 2012, the IAA issued a temporary suspension order to prevent the implementation of the proposed acquisition of Fondiaria Sai, the second-largest insurer in Italy, by Unipol, also one of the key players in the Italian insurance market, despite the rationale of the transaction being that of rescuing the target company's group from financial difficulties. The transaction was eventually cleared subject to structural remedies.

The IAA has delivered on its stated goal of bringing its enforcement more in line with European 'best practices' by grounding its decisions increasingly on sophisticated substantive economic analysis and in recent retail cases it made use of various economic tools such as the diversion ratio and the gross upwards pricing pressure indicator (GUPPI) in the *Fratelli Arena/Rami di Azienda di SMA* (2019) and the *BDC Italia-CONAD/Auchan* (2020) acquisitions.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for concentrative full-function joint ventures, which are exclusively appraised under the broad 'dominance' test that applies to other concentrations. Cooperative joint ventures (and under Italian law this concept also includes full-function joint ventures where both parents remain in the same market of the joint venture) are

not treated as concentrations and are assessed under the restrictive practices test.

In January 2017, in the *Lottomatica/Admiral Entertainment/Newco* case the IAA, despite a referral back by the EU Commission, closed the proceedings considering that the notified joint venture had no structural nature and hence it did not amount to a concentration. In particular, it concerned the creation of a Newco (70 per cent by Lottomatica and 30 per cent by Admiral Entertainment – part of the Novomatic group) that would have been active in the gambling market (in the AWP and VLT machines segment). The parent companies would have remained active both in the gambling market at retail level and in the upstream market for the production and marketing of AWP and VLT software. Further, the transaction included a non-compete agreement between Lottomatica and Novomatic with regard to the Newco for the acquisition of gaming halls. Taking into account all these elements, the IAA considered that the transaction did not concern any transfer of business, but rather could lead to substantial cooperative effects, and therefore it opened proceedings under article 101 TFEU (the IAA closed the proceedings in May 2017, as the parties withdrew the transaction).

## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The IAA is required to follow European Commission case law and practice, including that on collective dominance in merger cases. Even before the 2004 EU reform, the IAA was ready to apply the theory of coordinated effects to block a merger (eg, the 2002 *Granarolo/Centrale del Latte di Vicenza* case). The IAA has so far never applied the pure 'unilateral effects' theory of harm, now possible under the EUMR, when the transaction does not involve or lead to a situation of dominance, and some authors believe that this would not be possible under Law No. 287 of 10 October 1990. In *Ardagh Glass/FiPar Finanziaria di partecipazioni Industriali* (2011), the transaction involved horizontal effects in the glass and metal packaging sector. While, depending on the relevant market definition, the transaction could be seen as a three-to-two deal, the IAA cleared it without conditions essentially in consideration of the likelihood of entry and the role of potential competition. In its assessment, the IAA carried out an in-depth economic analysis, taking into consideration a number of elements, such as the structure of the markets and the fact that the merged entity would have faced strong competitive pressure from other potential players. The IAA cleared the merger in Phase I, noting that the creation of a single or collective dominant position was unlikely. The most recent case blocked by the IAA was the 2013 *Italgas-Aceagas/Isotina Reti Gas* case. In particular, the IAA blocked the proposed change of control of Italian gas distributor Isotina Reti Gas also because no other competing undertakings active in other areas in Italy would have an interest in participating in tenders for the award of gas distribution services where the parties were already present. This case was upheld by the Council of State in January 2015, overturning the first instance decision that had quashed it.

The IAA's enforcement history also includes challenges to vertical mergers on the basis of their expected foreclosing effects; challenges to conglomerate mergers in relation to the related potential portfolio effects that they might generate; and the strengthening of a joint-dominance situation based on multi-markets contacts of the undertakings concerned.

Unilateral effects were considered a serious concern in the *Arnoldo Mondadori editore/RCS Libri* case (March 2016), involving two of the main operators in the book publishing and book retail sectors. The dominant position that would have been gained by Mondadori in four distinct markets and corresponding sub-segments could have resulted in entry barriers in the market for the acquisition of authors' rights. Also, the concentration would have likely resulted in the systematic refusal by

the merged entity to provide book catalogues to other distributors, thus having an anticompetitive impact on both the upstream and downstream markets. Ultimately, the IAA cleared with conditions the acquisition of RCS Libri by Mondadori.

On the other hand, in *Edenred Italia/Ristocheff* (2011), the IAA initiated a Phase II investigation as it was initially concerned by significant horizontal aspects, as the concentration could have strengthened the dominant position of the leading player in the luncheon vouchers market. The IAA eventually authorised the transaction without imposing conditions, as it concluded that, despite the large market share imputable to the combined entity post-merger, the operation did not produce significant anticompetitive effects on any of the relevant markets in light of factors such as the bidding nature of the relevant market and the absence of barriers to entry. By contrast, in March 2017 the IAA closed with commitments the *Gruppo Editoriale l'Espresso/Italiana editrice* case, concerning a transaction in the book publishing sector. According to the IAA, the transaction was likely to create or strengthen a dominant position in the advertising market for daily newspapers in the provinces of Turin and Genoa. In fact, the IAA noted that in the local area of Turin, the estimated combined market share post-merger would have been 90 to 95 per cent, while in the province of Genoa, the transaction would have led to a de facto monopoly. In this context, the IAA was concerned that third parties would have not been able to exercise any competitive pressure on the merged entity and the entry of new competitors was considered unlikely. The IAA accepted behavioural commitments consisting in the granting to third parties of licence agreements for advertising activities on the *Repubblica* newspaper both for Turin and Genoa local editions. In particular, the IAA considered the duration of these agreements (five years) sufficient to let third parties enter in the relevant market and exercise effective competition. The IAA took into account both horizontal and conglomerate effects in the 2016 *Reti Televisive Italiane/Gruppo Finelco* case, concerning a concentration in the radio broadcasting sector. In addition to the dominant position that the merged entity could have gained in the radio advertising market, the IAA also considered the dominant position already held by Reti Televisive Italiane in the free-TV advertising market. The IAA was concerned about the incentives that the merged entity would have had to foreclose in the sale of advertising space in both the radio and video advertising markets. Therefore, the acquisition was cleared with conditions. In particular, the IAA prohibited the merged entity from renewing any concession contracts through which the combined entity would have marketed the advertising space of two other radio broadcasters; in addition, the IAA required video and radio advertisements to be managed by two separate undertakings; lastly, the IAA imposed a four-year prohibition on acquiring new radio broadcasters and concluding new advertising concession contracts with other radio broadcasters.

The IAA is also interested in the 'harm to innovation' and 'common ownership' theories of harm to which the EU Commission has recently been paying attention; with regard to the former, when, in November 2018, the IAA authorised the *Luxottica Group/Barberini* merger upon commitments (ie, the merged entity would enter into supply agreements with all interested market operators), the imposed remedies were among other things based on IAA's concerns of reduction of ability to innovate by competitors. Lastly, also in its recent big data sector inquiry (see below), the IAA has displayed its interest in exploring the relationship between competitive harm and harm to consumer welfare.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

In principle, as a matter of law, a prohibited concentration may, exceptionally, be authorised by the IAA for reasons connected with the general

interests of the national economy. However, the applicability of this 'general interest exception' requires the prior issuance by the Italian government of the necessary guidance criteria, something that has not occurred yet and is unlikely to happen in the near future. Something arguably similar occurred in 2008 in respect of an acquisition by Alitalia (in a situation of distress), but the clearance was then adopted by the IAA pursuant to specifically adopted (and time-limited) legislation.

Moreover, even in ordinary merger procedures, notwithstanding clearance by the IAA, the president of the Council of Ministers may prohibit, for essential reasons of national economy, an acquisition of an Italian company by a foreign company if, in the country of origin of the buyer, Italian companies are subject to discrimination, in particular in relation to their ability to acquire local companies. This provision is intended to ensure reciprocity, but it has never been used to date.

Having said so as a matter of law, it is clear that social considerations may have some influence over the review of certain mergers, although the IAA has always tried to distance itself from any situation that could not be fully explained on purely technical grounds.

Finally, in the banking sector, the IAA may approve a concentration, following a proposal from the Bank of Italy, even if this leads to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, on financial stability grounds. Even if this power was not resorted to, in the *Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen dell'Alto Adige/Gruppo Bancario Cooperativo delle Casse Raiffeisen* merger, this transaction was unconditionally cleared in May 2018 after a Phase II investigation (despite the sometimes very high market shares (above 60 per cent or even 70 per cent in the local retail catchment areas)), commitments having originally been deemed necessary. Clearance was given taking into consideration the functional and structural peculiarities of the banks and the fact that these were cooperative banks also supporting local economies, which had to change their corporate nature pursuant to new sector legislation.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Thus far the IAA has made it clear, albeit informally, that efficiencies are not autonomously considered in the context of merger assessment. In light of the enhanced role of merger efficiencies under EU law and taking into account the economic approach to merger analysis adopted and developed throughout the years by the IAA, it is possible that the treatment of efficiencies will in the future also have some, although limited, direct relevance under Italian law. In a case concerning newspapers and periodicals distribution (*M-DIS – Servizi Stampa Liguria – Società di Edizione e Pubblicazioni/GE-DIS*, 2013), the IAA conducted an analysis of the horizontal and vertical effects of the merger and assessed the efficiency claims raised by the parties. Also in the *SEL-Società elettrica altoatesina/Azienda energetica* case (2015) concerning the creation of a joint venture active in the markets for gas and electricity distribution, the IAA assessed the efficiency claims raised by the parties (in particular in terms of production and distribution costs savings, which would have been ultimately transferred to consumers), but concluded that these efficiencies were not specifically attributable to the transaction and ultimately authorised the transaction subject to conditions. The same assessment was made in the *2i Rete Gas/Nedgia* case (2018), also regarding the market for gas distribution, where the IAA concluded that the efficiencies claimed by the parties could not be considered as merger specific. Most recently, the expected efficiencies deriving from the concentration (avoidance of certain organisational duplications) were deemed suitable to have a positive impact on consumers, which helped with the unconditional clearance (in May 2018) of the *Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen dell'Alto Adige/Gruppo Bancario Cooperativo delle Casse Raiffeisen* banks merger.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) may block a transaction or clear it subject to conditions (offered by the notifying party) or measures (imposed by the IAA), or both. If a prohibited transaction has already been implemented, the IAA may order all measures, including divestment, that are necessary to restore the parties to their pre-merger positions. Should the parties implement the transaction despite a negative decision or fail to comply with the relevant conditions, the IAA may also impose fines of between 1 per cent and 10 per cent of the turnover of the businesses party to the transaction. This principle has been confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court, which specified that the sanction for failure to comply with an IAA decision shall apply not only where the transaction was subject to an outright prohibition but also when the transaction is cleared subject to conditions and those conditions have not been complied with (*Edizione Holding/Autostrade*). Fines have been imposed in a number of cases, mostly in the maritime transport sector. In the *CIN/Ramo di azienda di Tirrenia di navigazione* case at the end of 2013, the IAA imposed fines of €500,000 and €271,000 for failure to comply with the conditions imposed in its conditional clearance decision adopted in June 2012. Later (April 2016), the IAA sanctioned Moby €374,000 as it did not respect clearance conditions for the merger with Toremar, which had been authorised in 2011.

In light of market changes and of corporate and legislative changes, in July 2016 the IAA resolved to remove certain measures previously imposed in the *Unicredit/Capitalia* case (2007), concerning the banking and insurance sectors, as such measures (consisting, among others, in eliminating certain commissions for cash withdrawals and avoid entering in any partnership with Generali insurance group) were no longer justified. Further, in July 2016 and later on in January 2017, the IAA resolved to amend the measures imposed in the *Enrico Preziosi-Artsana/Newco-Bimbo Store* case (2015), concerning the manufacturing and distribution of toys and other products for babies and children (healthcare, nursing, etc). In 2017, the IAA also resolved to amend one of the measures imposed in the *Gruppo Editoriale/l'Espresso* case concerning the book publishing sector.

In 2011 and 2013, the IAA blocked two mergers in the energy sector (*Compagnia Valdostana delle acque/Deval and Vallenergie* and *Italgas-Acegas/Isontina Reti Gas*) owing to the presence of barriers to entry and absence of potential competition.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

During both stages of the proceedings, the IAA may indicate to the notifying parties those elements of the proposed transaction that are likely to distort competition and ask the parties to eliminate or modify them as a condition for clearance. Negotiations are often carried out between the IAA and the parties, during which the IAA may ask for, or the parties propose, structural undertakings such as the sale or divestment of a part of their business or the transfer of a trademark, or behavioural undertakings aimed at maintaining an effective degree of competition on the market. Divestitures in Phase I do not technically amount to commitments (which are only available in Phase II under Italian law) and the IAA is more inclined to go to Phase II if the transaction calls for significant remedies. They are therefore not binding and in the case of violation, the IAA may only consider that the factual scenario on which it based its clearance decision has changed and, accordingly, that the

transaction that was cleared was different from the one actually implemented. The IAA cannot impose fines for their violation. This means that Phase I commitments have been very rare and must be clear-cut for the IAA to take them into consideration.

In a vast range of cases, commitments involve the adoption of structural remedies proposed by the merging parties. However, recent decisions also show a significant degree of flexibility (particularly if compared to the EU Commission) towards behavioural (rather than structural) remedies (at least, as far as vertical or foreclosure issues are concerned), with the IAA accepting partly or solely behavioural remedies, such as in *Emmeffe Libri/Centro Libri* (2020), and *F2i SGR/Persidera* (2019); or at the very least pairing behavioural remedies to structural ones. In the *Emmeffe Libri/Centro Libri* concentration, the IAA authorised the acquisition of sole control over independent book wholesaler Centro Libri by part of Emmeffe, a book wholesaler and marketing and commercial services provider, jointly controlled by editorial groups Messaggerie and Feltrinelli, on the condition that Emmeffe implemented a number of behavioural remedies, including not worsening both existing and future contractual conditions established with independent bookstores and editors for a certain time. Likewise, in *F2i SGR/Persidera*, investment management company F2i sought control of Persidera, active in the construction, maintenance and management of TV broadcasting facilities. At the time, F2i also held 40 per cent of TV, radio, and mobile services and facilities management company EI Towers. The IAA authorised the acquisition but imposed obligations to provide access to EI Towers' services and infrastructures at equitable and fair conditions, as well as measures related to the independence between the original and the acquired business units. In the *Ascopiave/Rami di Azienda di ACEGASAPSAMGA* (2019) operation, whereby multi-utility company Ascopiave acquired gas distribution business units of incumbent concessionaire ACEGASAPSAMGA, the IAA used a number of behavioural remedies to safeguard the ability of a potential future entrant on the market to challenge Ascopiave's incumbent position, including the commitment to allow a potential future entrant to pay in instalments – as opposed to a lump sum – the fees due to the exiting incumbent (so-called residual industrial value), as well as the obligation for Ascopiave, when eventually releasing the concession, to retain workers exceeding the potential future entrant's requirements, so that the latter should not have to shoulder the financial burden thereof.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

As for the substantive conditions, the IAA relies upon the principles laid down by the European Commission in its 2008 Commitments Notice. Remedies may be offered in both stages of the proceedings. There are no particular rules as to their timing. However, although usually not expressly mentioned in the official merger clearance decisions or subsequent decisions, the financial crisis most likely played an important role in the extensions granted by the IAA to merging Italian banks to implement some of the measures attached to the clearances – namely the divestment of a number of local branches, which might be greatly affected by the lack of liquidity, the current restructuring that most banking groups are going through, or both.

The IAA has indicated that behavioural remedies are the exception, in consideration of the difficulties associated with monitoring compliance (particularly, in relation to the 2000, 2002 and 2004 *Edizione Holding/Autostrade* cases). Nonetheless, along with structural measures the IAA has also continued to accept behavioural remedies.

Given the short Phase II timeline that the IAA must follow (45 calendar days that can be extended only once for an additional 30 days), there is not a specific timing for proposing remedies, which thus should be discussed very early in Phase II.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

In *Solvay Sodi*, which involved a foreign-to-foreign merger in the field of sodium carbonate, the IAA accepted a commitment by Sodi to dispose of a relevant part of the company's production in favour of a competitor established in Turkey and a commitment not to start anti-dumping action against imports in Europe by US competitors. The transaction was approved subject to these undertakings.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

As a rule, the IAA (unlike the European Commission) evaluates ancillary restrictions expressly together with the assessment of the related concentration. Their analysis takes into account the proportionality principle as well as the principles set out in the 2005 EU Notice on Ancillary Restrictions. As a rule, the IAA (unlike the European Commission) evaluates ancillary restrictions expressly together with the assessment of the related concentration. Their analysis takes into account the proportionality principle as well as the principles set out in the 2005 EU Notice on Ancillary Restrictions.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In Phase I, the Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) – with the express consent of the parties involved in the notified transaction – informs the public of the filing of a transaction through a notice on its website. Any interested party, including customers and competitors, may then submit observations on the notified concentration within five business days of the publication of the notice on the website. Since the introduction of such 'notice of merger', the disclosure that a notification has been submitted has had the effect of further increasing the numbers of third-party interventions during Phase I.

Decisions whereby the IAA opens Phase II proceedings are published in the Bulletin of the IAA and posted on its website, *inter alia*, for the purpose of enabling customers or competitors to intervene in the process through oral or written submissions. In many cases, customers and clients are contacted directly by the IAA, either informally or formally, by way of a request for information during the 'market test' phase. Experience shows that these contacts can influence the final decision of the IAA to a significant extent.

Third parties may lodge a complaint against a competitor that has not notified a concentration. Third parties must also be granted access to documentation under laws relating to the transparency of conduct that apply to public bodies. As recently stated by the Council of State (the Supreme Administrative Court deciding on second and last instance appeals against decisions of the IAA) third parties providing evidence that they have been harmed by a decision are entitled to bring an action for annulment of the decision before the relevant administrative courts.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The IAA now posts on its website a notice on the filing of any merger, inviting third parties to submit their observations. Further, decisions by



which the IAA opens Phase II proceedings or closes proceedings are publicised in the IAA Bulletin and posted on its website. Normally there are three weeks between the time a decision is taken and its actual publication (this period is reduced to approximately one week or less in relation to decisions by which the IAA opens a Phase II merger investigation).

The legal framework for disclosure and access to file is contained in the Regulation. All parties having an existing, direct and immediate interest in the merger proceedings may request access to the file. Access is not granted to documents containing business secrets. The IAA officials are bound by professional secrecy obligations.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The IAA is strongly in favour of full cooperation with the European Commission and the creation of a network with other national competition authorities for the joint examination of transnational cases. In practice, in merger cases, informal contacts between the European Commission and the IAA are frequent, especially in cases where, although the EUMR applies, there is a substantial impact in Italy. One of the units within the IAA is specifically dedicated to the relationship with the Commission and the other national competition authorities (NCAs) in the context of the European Competition Network. Finally, the IAA is an active member of the International Competition Network, one goal of which is to promote international cooperation among NCAs.

In 2010, the record shows only one referral under article 22 of the EUMR, which eventually became case *COMP/5959 SCJ/Sara Lee*, and one request for referral made by the IAA under article 9 (the Commission concluded, however, that there was no need for the matter to be examined by the IAA – Case *COMP/5960 Crédit Agricole/Cassa di Risparmio della Spezia/Agences Intesa Sanpaolo*). No referral from the IAA to the European Commission appears to have been made under article 22 in recent years. But there have been four voluntary referrals back to the IAA under article 4(4) EUMR (in the *Lottomatica/AdmiralEntertainment/Newco* case, the *Holcim Calcestruzzi-Colabeton/Conferimenti di impianti in Cava di Cusago* case, the *Sonepar Italia/Sacchi* case and the *CVC/La Gardenia/Limoni* case).

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Interested parties may appeal against a decision of the Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) to the TAR Lazio, which has exclusive jurisdiction in these matters. The TAR Lazio may annul a decision of the IAA only on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or competence, violation of the law, or abuse or misuse of powers. The discretionary judgment of the IAA is not subject to judicial review except in limited circumstances. Decisions of the TAR Lazio are subject to appeal before the Supreme Administrative Court (Council of State).

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Usually each judicial degree takes between one and two years and it is therefore possible to have judicial review completed in three to four years. However, the Supreme Administrative Court may transfer the case back to the IAA.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) reviewed 62 cases in the year 2019 (65 in 2018, 57 cases in 2017, 51 cases in 2016, 44 in 2015, 40 in 2014 and 59 cases in 2013). The 2017 change in the second threshold has led to a slight increase and was in fact triggered by the concern expressed by the IAA to the parliament that its merger jurisdiction had been narrowed down too far by an earlier reform.

In 2017, the IAA opened a Phase II investigation in only two cases. In the *Gruppo editoriale l'Espresso/Italiana Editrice* case, concerning the book publishing sector, the IAA's main concerns were the horizontal overlaps, as the merged entity would have had a 90 to 95 per cent market share in the local area of Turin and a de facto monopoly in the local area of Genoa, and the IAA was concerned that third parties would not have been able to exercise competitive pressure on the merged entity and the entry of new competitors was considered unlikely. The IAA accepted behavioural commitments to guarantee the entrance of new alternative operators and competitive pressure in the relevant market. In the *Italcementi/Cementir Italia* case, concerning the cement and ready-mix concrete sector, the IAA's main concerns were that Italcementi would have gained (or reinforced) a dominant position in the market as well as the fact that the transaction could have facilitated coordination among independent cement manufacturers, owing to the reduction of the number of undertakings. Moreover, the IAA also considered vertical effects, as the merged entity would have been also active in the ready-mix concrete sector. The IAA accepted structural commitments (ie, the divestment of some plants) as well as behavioural ones.

In 2018, the IAA pursued several Phase II investigations, particularly in the first months. In the *Profumerie Douglas/La Gardenia Beauty-Limoni* case, triggered by a voluntary referral under article 4(4), the transaction would have resulted in the aggregation of the first and second operators in the market, both being each other's closest competitor. As the combined entity would have gained a market share above 45 per cent in half of the relevant markets considered, and above 60 per cent in the other half, and as the IAA considered that the merged entity would not transfer to consumers any cost saving generated, it was eventually deemed necessary to divest a number of stores to avoid overlaps in excess of 45 per cent in any of the 14 identified micro-markets. In *2i Rete Gas/Nedgia*, regarding the distribution of gas in some regions in the south of Italy, the IAA was concerned that the concentration might lead to a strengthening of a dominant position in tenders for the awarding of the natural gas distribution service, which would have discouraged participation of competitors. In the *Cassa Centrale Raiffeisen Dell'alto Adige/Gruppo Bancario Cooperativo Delle Casse Raiffeisen* case, the IAA's main concerns (which were ultimately abandoned) were the horizontal overlaps in the bank funding market, as the merged entity would have had a 45 to 50 per cent market share in the local area of Bolzano. Finally, in the *NOAH2/Mondial Pet Distribution* case, concerning the distribution of pet products, the IAA found a potential significant impediment to effective competition, as the merged entity would have a market share well above 45 per cent in some local areas, and two divestitures were accordingly required. Later, in November 2018 the *Luxottica Group/Barberini* merger was authorised by the IAA upon commitments, which were mostly grounded on foreclosure concerns because of the integration of the parties' respective frames and lens capabilities.

In March 2019, a Phase II investigation was opened into the acquisition by Sky Italia of R2, the technical platform for the provision of terrestrial digital television services of Mediaset Premium. While this

transaction was abandoned – as anticipated – because of the concerns raised by the IAA, the case has been opened following a cooperation agreement between Sky and Mediaset that has already been in place for several months, and which, inter alia, resulted in the parties providing each other access to, and hosting in, the respective satellite and terrestrial digital platforms and channels, particularly after Mediaset's exit from the market of the pay-tv contents of Serie A and Champions League football games (somewhat anticipating the consequences of the deal).

Over the past years, the IAA, while dealing with a wide range of sectors, and especially towards the tail end of the supply chain (eg, retail banking and retail commerce) seems to have overall focused its attention on access to key inputs and facilities and barriers to entry, while paying close attention to the capacity of transacting parties to 'catch' consumers' business through geographical proximity.

With regard to the sectors currently under scrutiny, the energy sector (in particular gas distribution) seems to attract the IAA's attention: after clearing the acquisition of SNAM (which in turn controls the largest operator Italgas), the IAA blocked the *Italgas-Acegas/Isontina Reti Gas* merger. In *Compagnia Valdostana delle acque/Deval – Vallenergie*, the IAA determined that the merger would have created a near monopoly in the market for low-voltage retail energy sales to domestic clients in the Valle D'Aosta region. The merged entity would indeed have achieved a nearly 100 per cent share in terms of the number of points served in the domestic market and a more than 90 per cent share in the non-domestic market for low-voltage connections. A good portion of the IAA's analysis focused on the negative impact of the regional regulations that provided a barrier to entry. During the investigation, the IAA rejected the merging parties' price commitment (ie, to freeze prices in the free market at particularly affordable levels for two years, with a possible extension to four) as the IAA deemed this insufficient to achieve the long-term elimination of the competition issues. In 2015, the IAA cleared with conditions a concentration in the electricity energy sector between Società Elettrica Altoatesina and Azienda Energetica. The IAA was concerned that the merged entity could restrict competition in the future market for a tender for the distribution of natural gas in the local area of Bolzano given the fact that the parties already held control over incumbent operators. The IAA imposed the complete sale of one of the subsidiaries involved in the tender and the divestment of a business, amounting to the 30 per cent share held in the market for the supply of natural gas to small-sized customers. Further, recently the IAA focused also its attention in the publishing and advertising sector: in fact, in 2016 and 2017 the IAA cleared with conditions three such concentrations, namely *Reti Televisive Italiane/Gruppo Finelco*, *Arnoldo Mondadori Editore/RCS Libri* and *Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso/Italiana Editrice*.

The IAA has confirmed its increasing attention to market dynamics at the local level, and particularly identifying micro-markets through isochrone analysis, and requesting parties' and market data at such geographical level even for non-problematic concentrations. Local 'catchment' areas determined through isochrones were also considered for the banking sector in the *BPER Banca/Unipol Banca* (2019) mergers, ultimately cleared in Phase II, as well as in the supermarket sector in the *Fratelli Arena/Rami di Azienda di SMA* (2019) and the *BDC Italia-CONAD/Auchan* (2020) acquisitions. More specifically, all these cases entailed the transfer of a number of bank branches (in the *BPER* case) or retail sales points (*Fratelli Arena* and *CONAD*). The IAA evaluated the competitive pressure exerted by such retail activities in light of their 'catchment area' for consumers, or driving time (through isochrones) required to reach them, and therefore imposed remedies of divestment of the overlapping branches or sales points presumably on this basis.



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### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Over the past few years the IAA has considered aligning the substantive test and the treatment of concentrative and cooperative full-function joint ventures with the EU merger rules, and the introduction of a simplified procedure for non-problematic mergers, but no formal steps have been taken in this respect.

### UPDATE AND TRENDS

#### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) decided six Phase II cases during 2019, with one of them being reopened, and later decided, in 2020, alongside one more case as of April 2020. Overall, the IAA published 63 merger decisions in 2019 and 13 more in the first few months of 2020. The year 2019 marked a slight reduction in the number of cases compared to 2018. However, whereas the number of total notified concentrations decreased by 12.5 per cent, the number of Phase II investigations remained steady, indicating that the IAA is maintaining, if not increasing, its structural scrutiny.

In March 2019, the IAA opened Phase II proceedings on the acquisition by part of the Italian branch of television services provider Sky of the R2 unit Mediaset Premium, the technical platform for the supply of terrestrial digital television services of television content, and arguably the sole competitor of the Italian Sky branch. However, despite the formal abandonment of the deal by the parties, the IAA concluded with an innovative decision that the merger had in the meantime produced irreversible effects, having contributed to the exit of Mediaset Premium from the market and consolidating Sky's dominance. Consequently, the IAA imposed certain behavioural remedies to try to restore the competition conditions existing prior to the merger.

In addition, in 2019 the IAA concluded its sector inquiry analysing – jointly with the Communications Authority and the Data Protection Authority – potential competitive concerns related to the usage of big



data on the market, displaying its seriousness in potentially deploying enforcement firepower in relation to this phenomenon.

Finally, a new IAA chairman (Roberto Rustichelli, a Naples commercial judge) started work in early May 2019; the first year of Mr Rustichelli's tenure shows that, while merger control has not been a priority for the IAA compared to other areas of enforcement, the Authority has maintained – and even slightly increased, if adjusted for the number of notified operations – the number of reviewed transactions.

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# Japan

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Chapter 4 of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended) (the Anti-Monopoly Act (the Law)), along with the relevant provisions of the Cabinet Ordinance and Regulations for the Law (the Ordinance and Regulations), prohibits certain forms of transactions, including mergers and acquisitions, and sets out a filing requirement for certain transactions. The thresholds and detailed filing requirements are provided in the Law, together with its Ordinance and Regulations. Criteria for business combinations that would cause substantive restraint to market competition and, therefore, are prohibited are set out in the 2004 Guidelines on the Application of the Anti-Monopoly Act for Reviewing Business Combinations, as amended in June 2011 (the Merger Guidelines).

The Law is enforced by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC is an external agency of the Cabinet Office (which is, in principle, equated with other government ministries positioned under the Cabinet), but the Law declares its independence from any external pressure in respect of its operation. The empowered authority under the Law is the FTC, but almost all the implementation procedures are delegated to the General Secretariat except for ultimate high-level decision-making.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Share acquisitions, statutory mergers, statutory demergers, business transfers (ie, transfer of all or a significant part of the business of another company, transfer of all or significant business-related fixed assets of another company, leases of all or significant businesses of another company, delegation of management regarding all or significant businesses of another company, and contractual arrangements to share business profits and losses of another company) and the appointment of interlocking directorships are the categories of transaction regulated by the Law. Those transactions (or personnel arrangements) are prohibited if they cause a substantial restraint of competition.

The Law sets out special rules for companies engaged in banking and insurance. Those companies are prohibited from acquiring more than 5 per cent (for companies engaged in insurance businesses, 10 per cent) of voting rights in another Japanese company except for certain special cases, including when an approval by the FTC is obtained.

Share acquisitions, statutory mergers, statutory demergers and business transfers (transfers of businesses or business-related fixed assets only), if certain thresholds are met, are subject to a prior notification requirement. No filing requirement is imposed in respect of the creation of interlocking directorships.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

There are no specific, separate rules for joint ventures. Typically, the establishment of a joint venture is caught by the filing requirement as are the respective acquisitions of shares in the joint-venture company by the investors exceeding either the 20 or 50 per cent threshold. In contrast with the EU rules, no prima facie exemption is available based on the nature of the joint venture, such as whether it is full-function or whether it is not-for-profit, although those factors may be taken into account in the FTC's substantive review if it takes place.

The FTC normally examines, in the assessment of a joint venture, not only the possible unilateral anticompetitive effect potentially created by the joint venture itself, but also any coordinated anticompetitive effect on the competitive relationship between the parties to the joint venture. According to the Merger Guidelines, when each party transfers the entire business of a certain section or department to the joint venture, thereby creating a clear separation between the businesses of the joint venture and the parent companies, the FTC's examination is primarily limited to the unilateral anticompetitive impact of the joint venture itself. In other cases, the FTC also examines the risk that the parents of the joint venture are colluding with each other via the joint venture.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

In terms of the thresholds for the formal filing requirements, the present Japanese rules take a relatively simple approach. For share acquisitions, the Law provides thresholds defined by percentages (share acquisition to exceed 20 or 50 per cent), without using the concept of 'control' as in some other jurisdictions.

The concept of control is, however, used to define the scope of a group company. Given that the filing thresholds rely on the Japanese turnover on a group company basis, the concept of control plays a significant role. It is provided by the relevant regulation that a parent-subsidary relationship is recognised when a company has control over another company's business or financial decision-making, taking into account various factors, such as a minimum voting stake of over 40 per cent, board representation and loans.

For the purposes of substantive review, the concept of control is also relevant. The Merger Guidelines provide detailed criteria to decide whether a share acquisition should fall under the scope of the FTC's examinations in respect of the competitive impact, and the criteria are primarily based on the concept of control, although the word 'control' itself is not used. For example, when the share acquisition results in a stake of over 50 per cent in the target company, or when the share acquisition results in an over 20 per cent stake in the target company and the acquirer alone becomes the largest shareholder therein, the share acquisition qualifies for the FTC review (subject to certain exceptions) regardless of whether a formal filing obligation exists.

Also, when the share acquisition results in a stake of over 10 per cent in the target company and the acquirer ranks within the top three shareholders, various factors are considered to determine whether the FTC's substantive review should take place, such as the percentage of the resulting shareholding, the distribution of the stake between shareholders, mutual shareholding between the acquirer and the target, interlocking directorships between them and their business relationships.

There is no concept of 'joint control' unlike in other EU-style jurisdictions. As a result, if a joint venture is owned by two parent companies, each holding 50 per cent, with equal rights in terms of the number of board members or decision-making powers in key strategic issues (ie, deadlock relationship), none of the parents is regarded as having control over the joint venture; therefore, it is understood that the joint venture does not belong to either of the parents' groups for the purpose of merger control reportability. There is some room for case-by-case analysis, and this aspect should be carefully evaluated, but this principle is unique to the Japanese system.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Different thresholds apply depending on the transaction structures as illustrated below. The categorisation is based on structures used in the Companies Act, and, as a result, it is often difficult to decide which category a foreign transaction would fall under. Generally speaking, the FTC tends to take an analytical approach, looking at the exact contractual formats rather than the 'big picture'. For example, a foreign transaction that would be perceived as a transfer of business could be interpreted under Japanese law as a combination of multiple share acquisitions. When the reportability is unclear, it is safest to consult the FTC.

#### Share acquisition

A company acquiring shares in another company (where both are above a certain size, as described below) must file a notification with the FTC prior to the transaction when all the following thresholds are met:

- the ratio of voting rights held by an acquiring company in an issuing company exceeds either the 20 or 50 per cent threshold;
- the acquiring party as a group has a Japanese turnover of more than ¥20 billion; and
- the target as a group (the target entities and subsidiaries, not including the entities staying with the seller) has a Japanese turnover of more than ¥5 billion.

When calculating the Japanese turnover, in principle, both direct and indirect sales within and into Japan made by the company group during the most recent financial year should be included except intra-group captured sales.

There are separate rules for collective share transfers, which are a form of transaction available under Japanese corporate law that allows more than two companies to create a common holding company. For this form of transaction, when one of the parties as a group has a Japanese turnover of more than ¥20 billion and the other or another party has a Japanese turnover of more than ¥5 billion, the FTC filing is triggered.

#### Statutory merger or demerger

In respect of statutory mergers, a filing must be made with the FTC when both the following thresholds are met:

- one of the parties as a group has a Japanese turnover of more than ¥20 billion; and
- the other party as a group has a Japanese turnover of more than ¥5 billion.

There are more detailed rules for statutory demergers.

#### Business asset transfer

Regarding business or business-related fixed-asset transfers, a filing must be made with the FTC when the transferee company as a group has a Japanese turnover of more than ¥20 billion, and the target business or business-related assets satisfies any of the following:

- whole business of another company with a Japanese turnover of more than ¥3 billion;
- key business of another company with a corresponding Japanese turnover of more than ¥3 billion; or
- whole or key part of another company's business-related fixed assets with a corresponding Japanese turnover of more than ¥3 billion.

#### Substantive test

Even if a transaction does not meet this threshold, it is technically still subject to the FTC's substantive test. When the application of the substantive test is expected, parties are recommended to go through voluntary consultation with the FTC to avoid post-transaction remedy orders. This is not a legally binding rule, and the Law does not stipulate any threshold for parties to consider voluntary consultation. The Merger Guidelines, however, provide useful yardsticks in this respect.

The substantive test catches non-notifiable transactions if the anti-competitive effect is material, in which case the parties are advised to engage in voluntary consultation. In particular, when a transaction is subject to merger control in other jurisdictions (especially the United States and the European Union) and the anticompetitive impact in Japan is expected to be substantial, the FTC tends to obtain the information via intergovernmental channels and sometimes contacts the parties, even in the absence of a filing obligation.

#### Voluntary filing for large transactions with an impact on the Japanese market

The FTC amended the Procedural Merger Guidelines in December 2019 to encourage parties to a large non-reportable transaction to make a voluntary filing where an impact on the Japanese market is expected. This amendment is designed to capture large technology mergers, but the rule itself is not sector-specific and applies across all industries if the conditions are met.

The amended Guidelines state that for merger proposals that do not require notification, parties are advised to consult the FTC if the total amount of consideration for the acquisition is expected to exceed ¥40 billion, and the merger proposal is likely to have an impact on domestic consumers by satisfying any of the following conditions:

- the target company's business sites and research and development centres are located in Japan;
- the target company conducts sales activities aimed at domestic consumers, such as operating Japanese-language websites or using pamphlets in Japanese; and
- the domestic turnover of the target company exceeds ¥100 million.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory if the relevant conditions are met. Transactions within the same company group are exempted from the filing requirement.

**7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?**

Yes, foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified. The same criteria apply to foreign-to-foreign transactions.

**8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?**

Yes. In respect of foreign shareholdings in Japanese companies, there are some regulated industries where foreign ownership levels are limited by specific sectoral legislation. For example, NTT, a holding company of the dominant national telephone carrier, must be less than 33.3 per cent foreign-owned. In addition, foreign shareholdings must be less than 20 per cent for terrestrial and radio broadcasters and less than 33.3 per cent for domestic airlines.

The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law applies to foreign direct inward investments to Japan, requiring a party that has made an investment in Japan to make a post-fact filing with the Ministry of Finance through the Bank of Japan within 15 days of the investment in most cases. For certain industries (such as the energy sector), prior filing is required.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

**9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?**

There is no deadline requiring a notification within a certain period of time following a particular transactional event (signing or board resolution, etc), although a notification must be made with the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) 30 days prior to the closing of the transaction. When a notification is submitted, the FTC issues an acceptance notice to confirm the filing date, and the parties are subject to a 30-day waiting period following that date.

If the parties fail to make the required filing or close in breach of the waiting period, a fine of up to ¥2 million may be imposed. However, to our knowledge no such criminal sanctions have ever been imposed, although parties that have failed to file are often requested to file a delayed report with a brief explanatory note setting out the reason for the delay and the measures to be taken to avoid future negligence. The FTC can also apply to the court for annulment of any statutory merger or demerger for which the parties failed to file, but it has never done so.

In 2016, the FTC formally criticised, although with no penalty, a specific two-step structure used in an auction transaction with the aim of expediting the closing timeline by avoiding an initial FTC filing. This two-step structure was also investigated by overseas authorities, including a financial penalty. This case demonstrated the FTC's increasing appetite to intervene more closely in potential gun-jumping attempts.

**10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?**

In the case of a statutory merger or demerger, both companies intending to effect the merger or demerger are jointly responsible for filing. For a business transfer or business-related fixed-asset transfer and share acquisition, the acquiring company is responsible. The FTC does not charge any filing fees.

**11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?**

Where a notification to the FTC is required, the parties cannot close the transaction for 30 days following the filing. When a notification is submitted, the FTC issues an acceptance notice to confirm the filing date. It is possible that the FTC does not accept an initial submission as a sufficient notification, in which case the parties should revise the notification to ensure that all the required information is provided in the notification. To avoid uncertainties, as a practice recommended by the FTC, companies normally submit a draft notification informally to the FTC in advance for the FTC to review even if there is no substantive competition issue.

As in pre-notification consultation in the European Union, the parties can discuss the substantive issues with the FTC before submitting the notification formally, and this process can take several months if there are several rounds of questions and market testing is conducted, before the FTC grants an informal greenlight to submit formally.

As a unique rule of Japanese law that is different from many other jurisdictions, once the 30-day waiting period lapses, the parties can close the transaction legally even if the FTC has not completed its substantive review, although the FTC can reserve the right to take action for a certain period of time by requesting additional material or information before the expiry of the 30-day waiting period.

If the FTC asks one or more of the companies during the waiting period to submit additional material or information, the FTC may still take action even after the expiry of the waiting period, subject to statutory time limitation: any action must be taken prior to the later of 120 days from the date of acceptance of the notification or 90 days from the date of submission of the additional material.

The FTC has the discretion to shorten the 30-day waiting period. In the old regime before the amendments in 2011, the FTC was reluctant to shorten the waiting period except for in very rare cases. However, in the new regime, the FTC is likely to be more generous in agreeing to shorten the waiting period, although there is some uncertainty in respect of whether a shorter period is always available if applied.

### Pre-clearance closing

**12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?**

There has been no precedent where the FTC challenged gun jumping with a penalty. It is, however, possible under the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended) (the Anti-Monopoly Act (the Law)) for the FTC to take measures against transaction parties who have actually or effectively closed the transaction before the required clearance.

In 2016, the FTC formally criticised, although with no penalty, a specific two-step structure used in an auction transaction with the aim of expediting the closing timeline by avoiding an initial FTC filing. Considering the increasing global trend to regulate gun jumping, a similar level of caution as used in the most aggressive jurisdictions, such as the United States and European Union, is also prudent with regard to the FTC.

### Criminal penalty

A person who closes a transaction (executing a share transfer or registering a merger or demerger in the relevant company registry) before the expiry of the waiting period is subject to a criminal penalty of up to ¥2 million. As is the case for other criminal penalties under the merger control regime, in practice, the FTC has so far not imposed such sanctions.

## Remedies

Apart from the criminal sanctions, the FTC may also order remedies that require the parties to take certain measures to restore competition in the relevant market if the transaction may restrict competition.

## Court action for annulment

Further, the FTC may petition the court for annulment of a merger or demerger on the grounds that a transaction requiring a notification has been closed during the 30-day period, and the court may invalidate the transaction. The FTC has, however, never yet done so.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There have been no cases in which a sanction has been imposed against any company, either Japanese or foreign, for closing before clearance. However, the rules allow the FTC to challenge foreign-to-foreign mergers as long as an impact exists and affects the Japanese market. The FTC proactively investigated BHP Billiton, as it was known then, at the time of its merger discussions with Rio Tinto, which indicates the FTC's general policy of not hesitating to investigate foreign transactions.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Under the Japanese rules, as long as the 30-day waiting period has lapsed, technically the parties can close a transaction legally without waiting for the FTC's substantive clearance (completion of substantive review). However, even after the expiry of the 30 days, the parties remain exposed to the risk of receiving an FTC remedy order in a case where substantial antitrust concerns are raised by the FTC. Very occasionally, closing before clearance could become an issue in a foreign-to-foreign merger under a pressing schedule that cannot afford even the 30-day waiting period, but because of this risk, most companies choose not to close before clearance. The prohibition of closing itself does not extend beyond the 30 days, but technically, the FTC may petition a court for an interim suspension of the deal.

It is not theoretically precluded that the parties try to agree with the FTC on a 'hold-separate' arrangement, but to our knowledge there is no precedent for such an attempt.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There are no competition law rules specifically applicable to public takeover bids. There is no clear rule in respect of when a notification can be filed with the FTC in the case of a takeover bid, but the announcement of the takeover bid is likely to become an important milestone for deciding the timing of notification, subject to case-by-case consultation with the FTC. It is generally understood that when a takeover bid requires an FTC notification, the registration statement for a takeover bid to be filed with the Financial Services Agency must disclose the merger filing requirements under the Law, and the offeror can express in the registration statement that failure to obtain the required antitrust clearance may cause the offeror to withdraw from the takeover bid.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

To file a transaction with the FTC, a company must comply with the format prescribed by the FTC (different forms are set out for each transaction category), which can be downloaded from the FTC's website. The filing, including parts of the additional documents to be attached to the form, must be in the Japanese language. As a result, when a foreign company prepares for a notification, sufficient time should be allowed for translation.

Unlike Form CO in the European Union, which has to be prepared in flowing text, the Japanese form simply sets out tables into which the reporting parties insert the relevant information and data. An applicant is not expected to provide its own economic analysis of the market or detailed market data (except for very high-level data) in the filing. The FTC format on its own does not require notifying parties to fully express its own argument to justify the transaction.

The following are the details, among other things, that should be included in the form:

- descriptions of the companies involved, including their affiliated entities and economic importance measured by assets or sales;
- the purpose and background of the transaction;
- information regarding shareholding relationships between the companies involved; and
- high-level market information, including the types of products or services subject to horizontal overlap or vertical relationship between the parties, geographical coverage of those businesses, ranking and market shares of key players.

Additional documents must be provided (different requirements apply depending on the transactional category of share acquisition, statutory merger, demerger and business transfer, respectively), including the latest annual report, balance sheet, a profit and loss statement, articles of incorporation, a copy of the transaction agreement and a record of the shareholders' approval of the transaction.

To supplement the relatively simple notification form for a difficult matter, parties can submit additional information to supplement the notification form in the course of pre-notification consultation with the FTC, as in the European Union, to avoid Phase II, which makes the timetable more unpredictable. The 2011 amendment clarified in the implementation regulations that parties can submit those supplementary documents.

During the review, the FTC requests additional information, and, sometimes, these requests are more demanding than those of other authorities, particularly around supporting evidence in respect of market definitions. In recent years, the FTC has also requested internal documents, although usually on a voluntary basis.

Submission of false information is subject to a criminal penalty of up to ¥2 million, but we are not aware of any cases where the penalty was actually imposed.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Parties can discuss issues with the FTC through pre-notification consultation as in the European Union. Companies are encouraged to use pre-notification consultation to avoid Phase II review by submitting extensive information proactively at this stage if the transaction is potentially problematic.

Once a notification is submitted, if the FTC finds that the filing raises any issues under the Law in Phase I, it is likely to contact the parties

informally first. The FTC can also formally request more information by a written request (report request), although such a formal request triggers Phase II review. Further, if the parties fail to respond properly to the FTC's request for information or the FTC otherwise considers that more proactive investigation is necessary, it may commence a formal investigation and has the power to interview relevant parties (eg, suppliers, competitors, employees, executives and customers) and examine related documents.

The FTC often interviews customers of the parties in addition to carrying out document-based assessment. If the parties are manufacturers with substantial production facilities, the FTC may visit those facilities. The interviews and site visits could potentially take place either during Phase II review or, depending on the case, at the pre-notification stage.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Following the submission of a notification, the FTC issues a notice that confirms the date when the FTC officially accepted the notification. The parties are subject to a 30-day waiting period starting from that date (Phase I). If the FTC requires one or more parties to the transaction to submit additional materials or information (report request) before the expiry of the waiting period, Phase II review is triggered. According to a literal reading of the Law, the parties can still complete the transaction upon the expiry of the 30-day period even when the FTC has not completed their substantive review, but once Phase II is triggered, the FTC may take action even after the expiry of the 30-day waiting period prior to the later of 120 days from the date of the FTC's acceptance of the notification or 90 days from the date of submission of the additional materials or information. Thus, the parties are subject to de facto prohibition from closing until a clearance is given.

The FTC issues a written confirmation of its clearance at the end of both Phase I and Phase II.

The FTC often shortens the waiting period in response to the parties' specific request. When Phase II review is triggered, the case is disclosed on the FTC website for third-party comments, and a summary of the FTC's analysis also appears on the website after the completion of the review.

Before the formal timeline starts, usually, in particular in a difficult case, there are informal pre-notification discussions as in the European Union. This process can take several months, especially where the FTC conducts market testing and there are several rounds of questions.

There have been some recent cases where the FTC has requested, on a voluntary basis, parties' internal documents. The requests were not as formal as those seen in the United States and European Union, but this may become a more common practice.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) reviews individual mergers and acquisitions in light of whether competition in the defined market will be substantially restrained.

#### Safe harbour

For horizontal transactions, the criteria suggested by the 2004 Guidelines on the Application of the Anti-Monopoly Act for Reviewing Business Combinations, as amended in June 2011 (the Merger Guidelines) are:

- the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) after the business combination (post-HHI) is not more than 1,500;

- the post-HHI is over 1,500 and not more than 2,500, and the increase in HHI is not more than 250; or
- the post-HHI is more than 2,500, and the increase of HHI is less than 150.

For vertical and conglomerate transactions, the suggested criteria are:

- the combined market share is not more than 10 per cent in any of the related markets; and
- the post-HHI is not more than 2,500, and the combined market share is not more than 25 per cent in any related market.

These numerical thresholds are not absolute but merely for indicative purposes, and the actual review process is conducted in the light of a number of factual elements, which are listed in the Merger Guidelines. It is also suggested in the Merger Guidelines that if the post-HHI is not more than 2,500 and the combined market share is not more than 35 per cent, the business combination is less likely to be regarded as restraining competition.

### Factors to be considered

Different sets of factors apply to assess unilateral conduct and coordinated conduct that are expected as a result of the transaction, but generally speaking, the following are among the factors listed in the Merger Guidelines: market position of the parties and the state of competitors, imports, entry, competitive pressure from related or neighbouring markets, competitive pressure from users, overall business capabilities, efficiency and financial strength of the company parties. 'Failing firm' defence is not something that is regularly used and acknowledged, but while the hurdle is not low, it is worth exploring where the claim is relevant.

### 2011 amendment of the Merger Guidelines

More detailed rules were included in the Merger Guidelines for the analysis of import pressure, and the possibility of defining 'global market' beyond the national market. This was to more accurately reflect the existing review practice of the FTC, and no significant change to its review policy in substance has been observed so far.

### 2019 amendment of the Merger Guidelines

The FTC amended the Merger Guidelines to reflect the already existing review practice, including various key considerations for digital mergers, overlaps in research and development activities and foreclosure using big data.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There are no specific criteria for joint ventures and, in principle, the FTC's substantive test also applies to joint ventures. The Merger Guidelines, however, include a few general statements regarding anticompetitive behaviour that may arise in joint ventures. For example, it is stated that in assessing the effect of a joint venture on competition, the commercial relationship between the investors in the joint venture should be examined, given that the investors could, without having any direct capital tie-up between them, indirectly create an anticompetitive business combination. In this respect, whether the investors have transferred the business in a given sector to the joint venture entirely or partially is also taken into account. In the case of a partial transfer of business where the investors still retain some interest or activities in the same business sector, the risk of an anticompetitive effect is likely to be higher as compared with a case of complete transfer in a certain sector.



## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

As a general principle, the Law prohibits and regulates three categories of anticompetitive activities of undertakings: private monopolisation, unreasonable restraint of trade (including cartels) and unfair trade practices. The rationale behind the merger control regulation is primarily to prevent private monopolisation. The Merger Guidelines do not directly address 'theories of harm' per se, and the underlying philosophy for merger control is ultimately governed by the general principle of 'whether a transaction would substantially restrain market competition'. However, it does provide different evaluation yardsticks for different transaction categories identified based on the structure and nature of the transaction. The Merger Guidelines have chapters on horizontal business combinations as well as vertical or conglomerate business combinations, and they also differentiate between the anticompetitive impact of unilateral conduct and that of coordinated conduct.

The FTC is currently considering the need to analyse the role and impact caused by big data possessed by the merger parties in the context of merger review. This follows various discussions held, particularly in the European Union, and will become an additional consideration in Japan, for instance, in mergers involving platform businesses.

Generally speaking, even compared to some other authorities, the FTC appears to be interested in hearing about new technologies and more generally 'innovation' aspects, so it is worth exploring this argument where it is relevant.

The concept of common ownership could be captured by the FTC, considering that the Merger Guidelines indicate that a mere 10 per cent shareholding could be considered as having a potential impact on competition; however, at least currently, we are not aware of any specific initiative by the FTC to pursue this aspect.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Merger Guidelines do not expressly include non-competition issues to be considered in the review process.

## Merger control in the context of specific industries

In certain regulated sectors, non-competition issues may be considered as part of the process of consultation with regulatory authorities. For example, for the purpose of certain telecommunications businesses, the transfer of a business licence as a result of a merger or acquisition is subject to approval by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Likewise, with regard to air transport, approval from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is mandatory with a view to transferring business licences following a merger or acquisition.

The Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended) (the Anti-Monopoly Act (the Law)) includes special rules for share acquisitions in the banking and insurance sector, and in examining applications for approvals, the FTC must consult with the Financial Services Agency (FSA). In addition to the Law, the Banking Law and the Law Concerning Insurance Businesses require banks and insurance companies to obtain FSA approval for certain mergers and acquisitions.

## Public interest

Public interest per se is not mentioned as a factor in the FTC review process, but especially in the context of regulatory assessment in a specific industry, public interest would be taken into account. This was debated in some expert communities in the context of a recent series

of FTC merger reviews involving local banks, where the FTC expressed concerns at potential concentration in the relevant local markets, whereas some interested groups argued the public interest to be recognised in rescuing troubled local banks. To our knowledge, the FTC does not openly acknowledge public interest as a factor in their review.

## De minimis market exemption

The 2019 amendment introduced a new paragraph that provides for effective exemption to two-to-one mergers where the relevant market is too small to support multiple players however efficient they may be. This addition to the guidelines appears to be intended to address some specific situations, such as a merger between regional banks within the same small region. However, as the wording itself does not limit the application of the paragraph, its actual scope of application is uncertain.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiency is listed in the Merger Guidelines as a factor to be considered in the review process. However, the extent to which the improvement of economic efficiency offsets the anticompetitive impact is restricted by the following conditions: the efficiency improvement must be specific to the business combination and not capable of being achieved by other available means; the efficiency improvement must be practically possible; and it must enhance users' welfare. The Merger Guidelines also state that a merger or acquisition would rarely fulfil these three conditions when it generates a monopoly or a situation close to monopoly.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

## Regulatory powers

### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) can either issue remedy orders to rectify a breach of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended) (the Anti-Monopoly Act (the Law)) or petition a court for annulment of the transaction, although no precedents exist for the latter. For the purposes of the former, the FTC must give prior notice and provide the parties concerned with an opportunity to make submissions. If the FTC issues such an order and the parties are dissatisfied, they may request the FTC to hold a hearing.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. The 2004 Guidelines on the Application of the Anti-Monopoly Act for Reviewing Business Combinations, as amended in June 2011 (the Merger Guidelines) clearly state that remedies can relate to the behaviour of the parties, although, in principle, a structural measure, such as divestment, is preferable. The Merger Guidelines list possible remedies, including divestment, such as a partial transfer of business in a given sector, or the termination of a business or capital relationship with other entities, or alternatively long-term supply agreements regarding the product concerned if the former is difficult to achieve. When those primary measures are not viable, the parties are advised to take, as secondary remedies, measures to promote imports or new entry into the relevant market, or to increase the independence of each undertaking (eg, by setting up an information firewall or prohibiting the purchase of raw materials from a communal seller).

Types of remedy that have been ordered in the past include partial disposal of shareholding, abolition of interlocking directorships, partial transfer of business facilities, technology licensing to a competitor, production of certain competitors' products and prohibition of the acquirer's intervention in the target's own business decision-making. Compared to the general tendency, for example in the European Union and United States, to clearly prefer divestiture, it appears that the FTC may be more open to behavioural remedy options.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

In terms of procedures to finalise the contents of remedies, the FTC introduced the Commitment System from the beginning of 2019, and the Guidelines clearly state that in the context of finalising merger remedies, the timeline and procedural requirements under the Commitment System will apply. It is not entirely clear from the Guidelines, but the general understanding is that the traditional procedures for merger remedies (ie, with no timeline or specific documents required except for that the parties must give details of the remedy in the final section of a formal filing once the remedy is decided) would technically continue to apply. As at the time of writing, this new mechanism has not been seen in operation in merger contexts, and, as a result, it is unclear how it operates and what the relationship exists between the old rules and the Commitment System.

The following describes the current system.

### Conditions

The basic condition applicable to a divestment order or other remedy is that the remedy is able to restore the competition that is likely to be undermined, by limiting the freedom of the merging parties to set market prices and other market conditions. Upon request by the parties, the FTC sometimes subsequently permits the parties to modify or terminate remedies, provided that this would not result in a substantive restraint to competition.

There is no independent format to submit a proposed remedy or to agree on a remedy. When a remedy is agreed between the parties and the FTC during the review, either Phase I or Phase II, after the submission of notification, the parties are requested to submit an amendment of the original notification to reflect the agreed remedy.

### Timing

In principle, remedy measures should be implemented before a transaction comes into effect. However, when a remedy is to be implemented only after the transaction enters into force, the deadline to implement the remedy must be specified clearly and appropriately. In particular, in the case of a partial business transfer, ideally, the purchaser should be decided and approval obtained from the FTC before the transaction takes effect, although unlike some other jurisdictions, the requirement to secure upfront buyers and have them approved is not regarded as an established precondition for the FTC's clearance. At present, there is no EU-style established rule or practice of involving trustees.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

As long as a substantial restraint to competition in the Japanese market is expected, remedies are required even for foreign-to-foreign transactions. Foreign companies have agreed and implemented remedies in a number of previous transactions reviewed by the FTC. There is no recent precedent where a cease-and-desist remedy order was issued for a foreign-to-foreign transaction, but this does not mean that the FTC is reluctant to order remedies regarding foreign-to-foreign transactions. It

is simply because of the common practice, up until now, of arranging remedies on a voluntary basis before a cease-and-desist order is issued. If remedies cannot be agreed by the end of Phase II, a cease-and-desist order may be possible.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

There is no express guidance in this respect either in the Law or the Merger Guidelines. In general, however, even if the FTC does not request or order remedies or bring court action for annulment regarding a transaction, the FTC can still challenge certain ancillary restrictions between the parties. In that sense, a merger clearance does not protect ancillary restrictions; therefore, ancillary restrictions are still subject to challenges on the basis of other competition rules. It is very likely, however, that the FTC would order the parties to exclude or amend anticompetitive ancillary provisions, if those arrangements are obvious at the time of merger control review. To that extent, it is worth considering putting any ancillary arrangements before the FTC as this may implicitly or explicitly provide a degree of comfort in implementing the arrangement.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Yes. The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) often interviews customers of the parties as well as competitors.

The law also stipulates as a general right that anyone (therefore including customers and competitors) who perceives an infringement of the law may report to the FTC the relevant facts and call for appropriate measures to be taken. It is possible, although at present uncommon, for customers or competitors to make a complaint to the FTC in respect of certain transactions during the course of the review process. In this event, the FTC must then investigate and, even if it decides not to take any measures, it must inform the complainant of its decision.

There has been a precedent where the FTC started to investigate a foreign-to-foreign merger in response to a complaint raised by customers, even though a transaction did not trigger a filing.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Reports filed with the FTC are not made public, although the contents could be partially summarised and disclosed if the transaction, either at Phase I or Phase II, has value as a precedent. In addition, in the rare event that the FTC issues a remedy order, detailed information will be fully disclosed. In 2017, the FTC started to disclose information on all filed cases to include parties' identities, the industry, the structure of the transaction, the clearance date and whether it was short-track.

### Website disclosure of Phase II cases

When Phase II is triggered, this fact is published on the FTC website for third-party comments. Further, in the case of a Phase II review, the final analysis and observations are made public as 'major business combinations' as an annual report on the FTC website, which is published every June. The FTC contacts the parties prior to the publication to ensure that the public disclosure does not include trade secrets or any other commercial information that the parties would not wish to be made public. The

parties can request the FTC to limit the information disclosed on the website to omit certain sensitive information. Some cases are disclosed on the website without disclosing the names of the parties involved.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The FTC cooperates very actively with other major jurisdictions on specific cases. It is, therefore, very important that submissions to the FTC are consistent with those made in other jurisdictions, particularly the United States, the European Union and Korea.

#### Cooperation in individual cases

In 1999, the governments of Japan and the United States concluded an agreement concerning cooperation on anticompetitive activities. Similar agreements were signed in 2003 with the European Union and in 2005 with Canada. The primary purpose of these bilateral frameworks is to promote collaboration between the competition authorities of both parties in terms of information gathering and implementation of each party's antitrust legislation.

Japan has also signed economic partnership agreements with Brunei, Chile, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and these contain a chapter on collaboration on antitrust issues. The actual status and development in the implementation of these bilateral instruments is not clear, particularly given the less active enforcement of merger regulations in some countries, but it seems that in respect of large-scale multi-jurisdictional transactions (especially when involving US, EU and Korean authorities), the FTC has extensive exchange of detailed information with other authorities in the course of its merger control review.

#### Other policy discussions

The FTC has been active in various international forums (the International Competition Network, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, etc) including general policy discussions and capacity building for developing countries in connection with antitrust legislation.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Under the previous rules, when the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) issued a cease-and-desist order and the parties to the transaction were dissatisfied, they could request the FTC to initiate the procedure for a hearing and file a court challenge if they were dissatisfied with the FTC's decision. Since April 2015, the FTC hearing proceeding has been abolished, and instead, the first-stage appeal of the FTC's cease-and-desist order will be made to the Tokyo District Court. There are various discussions among practitioners in respect of how this system should be used in practice.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

A legal action to challenge the decision of the FTC must be filed within 30 days of the date on which the decision became effective. According to a report by the FTC, the Tokyo High Court has rendered its decision within one year in recent cases.

The time limit for filing an appeal with the Tokyo District Court is subject to the general rules under which the plaintiff must file an appeal within six months.



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## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The latest data publicly available is for the fiscal year 2018 (1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019). In this period, a total of 321 filings were made.

The number of notified transactions slightly increased by 4.9 per cent compared with the fiscal year 2017.

Of the 321 cases filed during the fiscal year 2018, 315 were cleared in Phase I (98.1 per cent) and two cases were reviewed in Phase II (0.6 per cent).

In 2008, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) investigated the proposed acquisition of Rio Tinto by BHP Billiton. Under the old rules before the amendment in 2009, the acquisition did not trigger the formal filing requirement, but the combined market share via direct export into Japan was high. The acquisition in 2008 was aborted, and the investigation did not reach a final conclusion; however, this case is a clear manifestation of the FTC's intention to intervene in foreign-to-foreign transactions as strictly as in domestic transactions.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

No.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

During the second half of 2019, the Fair Trade Commission amended the 2004 Guidelines on the Application of the Anti-Monopoly Act for Reviewing Business Combinations (as previously amended in June 2011) and the Procedural Merger Guidelines to reflect their already existing practice in recent cases, including, for the substance of the review, additional review criteria for digital mergers, overlaps in

research and development activities, and de minimis exemption where the relevant market is too small to support more than one efficient competitor. For the procedural aspect, the amendments include voluntary filing for large but technically non-reportable mergers and review of internal documents.

# Kenya

Waringa Njonjo

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

In Kenya, merger control is regulated by the Competition Act No. 12 of 2010 as amended by the Competition (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 2016 (the Act) together with all subsidiary legislation and rules created thereunder. The Act is enforced by the Competition Authority of Kenya (Authority) and is headed by a Director General who is vetted by the National Assembly.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act defines a merger as an acquisition of shares, business or other assets, whether inside or outside Kenya, resulting in the change of control of a business, part of a business or an asset of a business in Kenya in any manner and includes a takeover. The Act also provides a non-exhaustive list of how a merger may be achieved, including:

- the purchase or lease of shares, acquisition of an interest or purchase of assets of the other undertaking in question;
- the acquisition of a controlling interest in a section of the business of an undertaking capable of itself being operated independently whether or not the business in question is carried on by a company;
- the acquisition of an undertaking under receivership by another undertaking either situated inside or outside Kenya;
- acquiring by whatever means the controlling interest in a foreign undertaking that has got a controlling interest in a subsidiary in Kenya;
- in the case of a conglomerate undertaking, acquiring the controlling interest of another undertaking or a section of the undertaking being acquired capable of being operated independently;
- vertical integration;
- exchange of shares between or among undertakings that result in a substantial change in ownership structure through whatever strategy or means adopted by the concerned undertakings; or
- amalgamation, takeover or any other combination with the other undertaking.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The Competition (General) Rules 2019 (the Rules) provide that a joint venture that is not full function does not qualify as a merger. A full-function joint venture is defined as a joint venture that must perform for 10 years or more and carries on all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

A person 'controls' an undertaking under the Act if that person:

- beneficially owns more than half of the issued share capital or business or assets of the undertaking;
- is entitled to a majority of the votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the undertaking, or has the ability to control the voting of a majority of those votes, either directly or through a controlled entity of that undertaking;
- can appoint, or veto the appointment of, a majority of the directors of the undertaking;
- is a holding company and the undertaking is a subsidiary of that company as contemplated in the Companies Act;
- in the case of the undertaking being a trust, can control the majority of the votes of the trustees or appoint the majority of the trustees or appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust;
- in the case of the undertaking being a nominee undertaking, owns the majority of the members' interest or controls directly or has the right to control the majority of members' votes in the nominee undertaking; or
- can materially influence the policy of the undertaking in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an element of control referred to in the points above.

Minority interests, board and management representations, contractual arrangements and other interests are captured where a person exercises 'control' as contemplated above. The Consolidated Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers (the Consolidated Guidelines), which have no force of law but are a guide on how the Authority assesses mergers, indicate that the Authority will not ordinarily view an acquisition of a minority interest below 20 per cent of the voting securities of an undertaking held only for the purpose of passive investment without exercising influence over the affairs of the undertaking as an exercise of 'control'. When assessing 'control' of a private equity fund, including a venture capital fund, the Rules stipulate that control will be deemed to rest with the general partner.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Rules contain the Merger Threshold Guidelines (the Guidelines) that serve to identify notifiable transactions and transactions that qualify for exclusion.

Notably, Kenya has now introduced a minimum threshold where the following transactions are excluded from notification:

- mergers where the combined turnover or assets (whichever is higher) of the merging parties does not exceed 500 million Kenyan shillings; or
- mergers where the transactions meet the COMESA (the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) Competition Commission Merger Notification threshold and at least two-thirds of the turnover or assets (whichever is higher) is not generated in Kenya.

The Guidelines state that mergers that meet the following thresholds must be notified to the Authority:

- where the undertakings have a minimum combined turnover or assets (whichever is higher) of 1 billion Kenyan shillings and the turnover or assets (whichever is higher) of the target undertaking is above 500 million Kenyan shillings;
- where the turnover or assets (whichever is higher) of the acquiring undertaking is above 10 billion Kenyan shillings and the merging parties are in the same market or can be vertically integrated, unless the transaction meets the COMESA Competition Commission Merger Notification Thresholds;
- in the carbon-based mineral sector, if the value of the reserves, the rights and the associated assets to be held as a result of the merger exceed 10 billion Kenyan shillings; and
- where the undertakings operate in the COMESA, their combined turnover or assets (whichever is higher) does not exceed 500 million Kenyan shillings and two-thirds or more of their turnover or assets (whichever is higher) is generated or located in Kenya.

The Guidelines also provide that the following transactions may be considered for exclusion from notification, but only after application to the Authority:

- where the combined turnover or assets (whichever is higher) of the merging parties is between 500 million Kenyan shillings and 1 billion Kenyan shillings; or
- if the firms are engaged in prospecting in the carbon-based mineral sector, irrespective of asset value.

Moreover, the Rules also provide that a merger shall not be subject to notification if it is taking place wholly or entirely outside of Kenya and has no local connection.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory for all mergers that are not excluded by the Guidelines. Even where a merger is not excluded by the Guidelines, but is eligible for consideration for exclusion, the approval of the Authority is required.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The Act has extraterritorial application with respect to the conduct outside Kenya by a citizen of Kenya or a person ordinarily resident in Kenya, or a body corporate incorporated in Kenya or carrying on business within Kenya, or any person in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services by that person into or within Kenya, or any person in relation to the acquisition of shares or other assets outside Kenya resulting in the change of control of a business, part of a business or an asset of a business, in Kenya.

The Guidelines also provide that the following transactions may be considered for exclusion from notification, however, upon application to the Authority:

- where the combined turnover or assets (whichever is higher) of the merging parties is between 500 million Kenyan shillings and 1 billion Kenyan shillings; or
- if the firms are engaged in prospecting in the carbon-based mineral sector, irrespective of asset value.

In determining whether it has jurisdiction over a foreign-to-foreign merger, the Authority considers both the merger notification thresholds and other economic and business factors to determine whether a foreign-to-foreign merger has a connection to competition within Kenya or a substantial part of Kenya. In particular, the Authority has identified the following as additional factors that it will consider in making that determination:

- whether an undertaking party to the merger has a significant presence in Kenya, as evidenced by turnover or assets in or into Kenya;
- whether revenue is generated in Kenya by an undertaking party to the merger; or
- whether an undertaking party to the merger acquires direct or indirect control over the strategic commercial affairs of the other undertaking party to the merger and such strategic commercial decisions will have an effect on trade in or into Kenya.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The Act makes no provision restricting or regulating foreign investments into Kenya. However, the insurance, IT, banking and air services industries are subject to sector-specific legislation that limits the extent to which non-Kenyan citizens can own undertakings licensed in Kenya. Moreover, mergers involving those industries must obtain approval from the relevant regulatory authorities concurrently with merger control approval from the Authority.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The Competition (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 2016 (the Act) has no deadlines for filing. However, parties to a merger are required to notify the Competition Authority of Kenya (the Authority) and obtain approval before implementing the proposed merger. Anyone who fails to comply with the Part IV notification and approval requirements commits an offence and is liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding 10 million Kenyan shillings, or both. The Authority may also impose a financial penalty for an amount not exceeding 10 per cent of the preceding year's annual gross turnover in Kenya of the offending undertakings.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The acquiring undertaking and the target undertaking in a proposed merger are each required to notify the Authority. Filing fees are payable based on the combined turnover or assets of the merging parties in Kenya. The Act does not prescribe which party is responsible for the payment of filing fees and in practice, the merging parties.



## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Ordinarily, the Authority acknowledges receipt of a merger application within three days of receipt. The Authority is required to make a determination:

- within 60 days of the date that it receives a merger filing;
- if the Authority has requested for further information, within 60 days of the date of receipt of such further information; or
- if the Authority has convened a hearing conference, within 30 days of the date of conclusion of the conference.

Moreover, if the Authority is of the view that a transaction is complex, it is permitted to extend the determination period by an additional 60 days prior to the expiry of any of the foregoing determination periods, by giving a written notice to the undertakings involved.

Implementation of the merger transaction is prohibited before clearance and therefore in Kenya, its implementation will have to be suspended by the merging parties.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Implementation of a merger transaction including the integration of activities of the merging businesses (even partly) prior to receiving clearance from the Authority is an offence under the Act. Payment of the full purchase price is deemed to be 'implementation' for purposes of the Act, but payment of a deposit of up to 20 per cent of the purchase price is permitted. A merger that is implemented without complying with the notification and approval requirements of Part IV of the Act does not have legal effect in Kenya and parties cannot enforce any agreement in that regard in any legal proceedings.

Moreover, anyone who fails to comply with the Part IV notification and approval requirements commits an offence and is liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding 10 million Kenyan shillings, or both. The Authority may also impose a financial penalty for an amount not exceeding 10 per cent of the preceding year's annual gross turnover in Kenya of the offending undertakings.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Yes, where the foreign-to-foreign merger is caught by the provisions of the Act.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Neither the Act nor the Consolidated Guidelines make any provisions for 'hold-separate/ring-fencing' arrangements being put in place in Kenya to enable foreign-to-foreign mergers to be implemented outside Kenya.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No, there are no special merger control rules. Where a public takeover is caught by the provisions of the Act, the provisions of the Act must be applied together with the requirements of the Capital Markets Act Chapter 485A, the Capital Markets (Takeover and Mergers) Regulations

2002, the Nairobi Securities Exchange Rules, the Companies Act 2015 and any other relevant sector-specific legislation.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The Competition (General) Rules 2019 provide for Form III, the Merger Notification Form (the Notification Form). Undertakings applying for exclusion from the provisions of Part IV of the Act and the Guidelines are required to complete and file Part I (questions 1 to 26) and Part IV of the Notification Form together with the requested documentation.

Mergers that are at or above the prescribed thresholds and where the undertakings do not operate in the same line of business or where no vertical relationship exists between the parties require the undertakings to complete and file Part I and Part IV of the Notification Form together with the requested documentation.

Mergers that are at or above the prescribed thresholds and where the merging parties operate in the same line of business, or where there are vertical relationships between the parties, require the undertakings to complete and file Parts I, II and IV of the Notification Form together with the requested documentation.

Mergers at or above the prescribed thresholds and where the merging parties operate in the same line of business, or where there are vertical relationships existing between the parties; or there is a high likelihood that the combined market share of merging parties falls above 3 per cent in one or more markets or one or more of the parties are dominant in at least one market require the undertakings to complete and file Schedules I, II, III and IV of the Notification Form together with the requested documentation.

The Authority is not restricted to the questions and responses in the Notification Form. Where the information provided by either of the undertakings is not sufficient for the purposes of determining a proposed merger, the Authority may within 30 days of receiving the notification request further information from the undertakings concerned.

Further, the Notification Form provides for all or some of the following documents to be filed together with the duly completed Notification Form (this will depend on which Parts of the Notification Form apply to the merger):

- a signed copy of the sale and purchase agreement;
- duly signed audited financial statements for the last three years;
- the latest annual reports;
- board resolutions and related documents regarding the merger;
- copies of certificates of incorporation or registration certificates and similar documents including other shareholder companies where there is chain ownership;
- breakdown of employees and plans to realise cost savings, efficiencies and plans documenting investment evaluations;
- documents prepared for the Board of Directors of regulatory bodies in relation to the transaction;
- reports, surveys, analysis or other documents assessing the transaction with respect to its impact on competition;
- latest business plans, marketing plans, sales report and strategic plans including for relevant subsidiaries and divisions;
- periodic (such as monthly and quarterly) review of sales and market trends including by consumer category and by different geographic areas for the last three years; and
- pricing schedules including terms of discounts and rebates offered.

Supplying the Authority with materially incorrect or misleading information is an offence under the Act and persons found guilty may upon conviction be liable to a fine of 5 million Kenya shillings or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

After a merger notification form is received at the Authority's offices, the Authority ordinarily acknowledges receipt of the submission in writing and a case officer is assigned to analyse the proposed merger. At first instance, the submission is evaluated to determine:

- its completeness, and where necessary additional information, may be requested, or clarifications sought;
- if the proposed merger is a 'merger' within the meaning of the Act;
- if the Authority has extraterritorial jurisdiction over the proposed merger;
- if the proposed merger meets the thresholds under the Merger Threshold Guidelines to determine if an application for exclusion from the provisions of Part IV of the Act is appropriate; and
- any requests for confidentiality that may have been sought, and if acceptable such confidentiality is granted by a letter early on in the evaluation process.

The case officer together with the Authority's mergers and acquisition division then undertake a complete merger assessment during which time, the Authority may conduct interviews with the merging parties or convene a hearing conference. The mergers and acquisition division then makes its recommendations to the Authority's board for a determination. The board then makes its determination, within the prescribed periods and its decision is communicated to the submitting parties.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Ordinarily, the Authority acknowledges receipt of a merger application within three days of receipt. The Authority is required to make a determination:

- within 60 days of the date that it receives a merger filing;
- if the Authority has requested for further information, within 60 days of the date of receipt of such further information; or
- if the Authority has convened a hearing conference, within 30 days of the date of conclusion of the conference.

Moreover, if the Authority is of the view that a transaction is complex, it is permitted to extend the determination period by an additional 60 days prior to the expiry of any of the foregoing determination periods, by giving a written notice to the undertakings involved.

Implementation of the merger transaction is prohibited before clearance and therefore in Kenya, its implementation will have to be suspended by the merging parties.

As a matter of practice, the Authority will in the case of a submission from exclusion of the provisions of Part IV of the Act, communicate its determination within 14 days of receipt of the merger notification form. Where the Authority determines that the proposed transaction is not a 'merger' or where an advisory opinion on a proposed transaction is sought, the Authority communicates its decision to the enquiring party in writing within 10 days.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Competition Authority of Kenya (the Authority) applies both the competitive effects test and the public interest test to any proposed

merger transaction. In assessing the former, the Authority seeks to determine whether the proposed merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition or create or strengthen a dominant position. In determining the latter, the Authority will assess whether the proposed merger conflicts with government policies.

In applying the competitive effects test and the public interest test, the Authority will among other factors consider the extent to which the proposed merger is likely to:

- prevent or lessen competition or restrict trade or the provision of any service or endanger the continuity of supplies or services;
- result in any undertaking (including a non-party) acquiring or strengthening a dominant position in the market;
- benefit the public;
- affect a particular industrial sector or region;
- affect employment;
- affect the ability of small undertakings to gain access or be competitive in any market;
- affect the ability of national industries to compete in international markets; and
- benefit research and development and have an impact on technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of goods and services or provision of services and access to markets.

Moreover, where a failing firm defence is used, the Authority considers the following:

- the failing undertaking would in the near future be forced to exit the market because of financial problems if not taken over by another undertaking;
- there is no less anticompetitive alternative acquisition other than the proposed merger; and
- in the absence of the proposed merger, the assets of the failing undertaking would inevitably exit the market.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures. The tests for clearance apply.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Consolidated Guidelines indicate that the Authority will investigate all plausible theories of harm that would apply to each merger on a case-by-case basis.

The Authority will investigate market dominance and in so doing will define and identify the market of the goods and services produced by the parties to the proposed merger. It will also assess the unilateral and coordinated effects of the proposed merger where it is investigating a horizontal merger, and the vertical and conglomerate effects where it is assessing a non-vertical merger.

In all instances, the Authority's primary concern will be to ensure that the impact of the merger will not result in the prevention or lessening of competition by allowing the creation or increasing of market power or assisting in its exercise.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Competition (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 2016 (the Act) requires the Authority to take the interests of the public into consideration when assessing any proposed merger. The Consolidated Guidelines clearly

indicate that the public interest test is applied regardless of the outcome of the competition test.

In considering the public interests, the Authority assesses the proposed merger's effect on employment, the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises to gain access to or be competitive in any market; and the ability of national industries to compete in international markets and in a particular industrial sector.

In recent years, employment has been a specific area of focus for the Authority and in its assessment, it has evaluated the track record of the merging undertakings in relation to labour-related issues. Should the Authority determine that the proposed merger may result in job losses, it would require the merging undertakings to provide a justification and evaluate such justification against the countervailing public interest justifying the job losses. It may ultimately grant a conditional approval of the proposed merger and require written undertakings from the merging parties not to pursue redundancies for a prescribed period.

The Authority will also be likely to consider the impact foreign direct investment may have post-merger. Of particular concern is the potential of a foreign entity to move its procurement of goods and services from the local markets to the foreign markets, therefore negatively impacting local suppliers' ability to compete and maintain jobs.

The public interest guidelines under the Act seek to enhance and sustain employment through supporting measures to ensure no substantial job losses occur as a result of mergers and that the effects on employment are mitigated in the short run and salvaging of failing and dormant undertakings.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Consolidated Guidelines indicate that economic efficiencies are an important pillar of the competition test applied by the Authority when reviewing a proposed merger. The extent to which the negative effects of a proposed merger will be compensated for by economic efficiency are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and it would appear only acceptable where there is no public interest concern.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition Authority of Kenya (the Authority) has the power to prohibit merger transactions or approve merger transactions with conditions.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes, it is possible to remedy competition issues. The Authority has the power to set conditions to a proposed merger that it deems anticompetitive or presents public interest concerns.

The Authority may require structural remedies to the proposed merger, which include among others:

- divestment of the whole or part of an undertaking's business;
- the immediate transfer of contractual rights; or
- an amendment to the intellectual property rights of an undertaking.

The Authority may also impose behavioural remedies (where structural remedies are not commercial feasible) that are intended to limit the

potential for the merged entity to behave anticompetitively in the post-merger market. The behavioural remedies include, among others:

- the periodic provision of information to the Authority;
- an order requiring the merged entity to supply goods and services to a specific customer segment or geographical region;
- undertakings for the implementation of non-discriminatory pricing and supply or access of goods and services to customers;
- undertakings on price caps;
- restrictions on expansion;
- undertakings on access to critical technology; and
- restrictions on the merged entity not to approach any customers of the sold or divested business.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The stated objective by the Authority is that any remedial package it imposes on a proposed merger (including a requirement for divestiture), is meant to 'restore or maintain competition while allowing for the realisation of merger-specific efficiencies and benefits.

The implementation period for each remedial package is agreed to by the Authority on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, each remedial package agreed to by the Authority (whether structural or behavioural) must include the following elements:

- address the major areas of competition concern;
- have a low level of risk of not being successful;
- be capable of practical implementation and monitoring in Kenya; and
- be capable of resolving the identified areas of concern within a specified, preferably short, time frame.

If the remedial package includes a divestment, the Authority may require the appointment of divestment trustees to ensure the business to be divested is sold off to a suitable purchaser where the merging parties have been unable to offload that business within the agreed divestment period.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Competition (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 2016 (the Act) does not distinguish between local mergers and foreign-to-foreign mergers. The Authority has therefore approved some foreign-to-foreign mergers with conditions to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the merger and ensure compliance with the Act.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The Authority will assess a proposed merger as a whole and where behavioural remedies are required, may impose ancillary restrictions. Such restrictions may include:

- restrictions on the merged entity not to approach any customers of the sold or divested business;
- a moratorium on job losses for a specified period;
- restrictions on output;
- restrictions on expansion; and
- restrictions on the merged entity changing existing business models, such as distribution chains for a specified period.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Competition (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 2016 (the Act) permits any person (including a customer or a competitor) who is not a party to a proposed merger to voluntarily submit information relating to such proposed merger to the Authority at the application stage. However, once the Authority makes a determination on a proposed merger, only a party to the proposed merger or any other person against whom an order is made by the Authority can appeal to the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal).

Additionally, subject to any rights of confidentiality granted by the Authority to the merging parties, the Authority as part of its assessment of a merger may consult competitors and customers as well as conduct market testing on the effects of a proposed merger or the effectiveness of a proposed remedial package.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The Act permits any person submitting information or documentation to the Authority to make a claim for confidentiality in respect of that information or documentation. The Authority has provided a prescribed form for this purpose. Upon receipt of such a claim, the Authority assesses the request and notifies the claimant of their decision. In circumstances where the Authority refuses to grant confidentiality, any information submitted will be treated as confidential for a period of 14 days.

A submitting party may withdraw any information submitted to the Authority within 14 days if a request to grant confidentiality on that information has been declined. A person aggrieved by the decision of the Authority in a request for confidentiality may appeal to the Competition Tribunal.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Act mandates the Authority to liaise with other regulatory and public bodies in all matters relating to competition and consumer welfare, and as a matter of practice, the Authority cooperates and shares information with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the prescribed merger notification forms require merging parties to inform the Authority if a proposed merger will be notified with other antitrust authorities. The Authority and the COMESA Competition Commission entered into a cooperation agreement that formally obliges each party to inform the other of any enforcement activities it becomes aware of that affect the other party's interests.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Competition (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 2016 (the Act) established the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal), which is mandated to hear and determine appeals against the decisions of the Authority. The Act requires the Authority and the Tribunal to give written reasons for their decisions. Both the Authority and an aggrieved party can appeal



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a decision of the Tribunal to the High Court of Kenya, whose decision shall be final.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An aggrieved party should give notice of its intention to appeal a decision to the Tribunal for review within 14 days of notice of the Authority's decision being published in the Kenyan Gazette and submit the substantive appeal 16 days thereafter. The Tribunal shall, within 30 days of receiving that application, give notice of the application in the Kenyan Gazette and invite interested parties to make submissions. If the application is designated by the Tribunal to be fast-tracked, the substantive hearing must be heard within six months of the application being so designated.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Authority has a mandate to enforce compliance with the Competition (Amendment) Act No. 49 of 2016 (the Act) and, in this regard, it regularly undertakes investigations into unauthorised implementations of mergers. In February 2020, the Authority penalised Asante Capital EPZ Limited (Asante) 549,019 Kenyan shillings for implementing a merger with Moringa Entities (Moringa SCA and Moringa Mauritius Africa) without seeking its approval. The Authority has, over the last few years, increasingly become concerned about the effects a proposed merger would have on public interest matters, such as the effects on employment and the competitiveness of SMEs in the Kenyan and international markets, as well as particular industries or sectors. The Authority has been known to give conditional clearances to mitigate these risks including obligations to maintain existing distribution chains or obligations to absorb employees or not to pursue redundancies for a prescribed period.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are no proposals to change legislation. The Authority has, however, published proposed changes to the Consolidated Guidelines for public comment.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year**

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The enactment of the Competition (General) Rules 2019 (the Rules), which came into force on 6 December 2019, are the main developments of the past year. These Rules introduced jurisdictional thresholds, which allow for certain transactions to be excluded outright, while certain thresholds allow for applications to be considered for exclusion. The Rules also provided clarity on the manner in which the Authority will conduct investigations, determine mergers and determine penalties and remedies.

# Liechtenstein

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Liechtenstein has been a member of the European Economic Area since May 1995. European Union directives are implemented into Liechtenstein's legal system. There is no automatic implementation of EU law, however, as the EEA Joint Committee must state first that a directive is part of the EEA 'acquis'. It is only with a respective resolution of the EEA Joint Committee that the obligation to incorporate arises.

Council Regulation No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EU Merger Regulation) regulates the control of mergers. The EEA Joint Committee has passed Resolution No. 78/2004 of 8 June 2004 confirming that the EU Merger Regulation is relevant for the EEA (Legal Gazette 2004 No. 234, LR 0.110.034.53).

Liechtenstein has no national merger control or antitrust law. The competition rules of the EEA Agreement (articles 53 to 60), and the EU competition law stated in Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement are applicable; in particular the EU Merger Regulation. The provisions of the EU Merger Regulation are directly applicable in Liechtenstein with minor non-material adaptations as set out in Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement.

According to the EU Merger Regulation, mergers that do not meet the turnover thresholds of the EU Merger Regulation fall within the competence of the EU member or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states' authorities in charge of merger control.

The Law on Persons and Companies (PGR) of 20 January 1926, in its presently valid version (Legal Gazette 1926, No. 4, LR 216.0), contains provisions on mergers of companies limited by shares (article 352(a) et seq PGR). Article 351 et seq PGR regulate national mergers within Liechtenstein, whereas article 352(a) et seq PGR transpose Directive 2005/56/EC of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies into Liechtenstein law.

In addition, the Law of 16 September 2009 on employee participation in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies (Legal Gazette 2009, No. 269, LR 216.222.3), in its presently valid version, has been enacted to transpose the Directive into Liechtenstein law. However, these Liechtenstein provisions on mergers of companies limited by shares as well as on employee participation in cross-border mergers do not contain a merger control provision in the sense of a control to prevent anticompetitive consequences. They stipulate a mere legality control of the merger.

The Liechtenstein Office of Justice controls the legality of the cross-border merger with respect to the execution and formation of a new company limited by shares under Liechtenstein law as a result of the merger. Further, it verifies the compliance with the law on the employee participation in a cross-border merger of limited liability companies. Each

of the following statements to the questions will contain a brief paragraph answering the question with respect to these national provisions, although strictly requirements imposed by company law are not considered to be part of the competition merger control regime. It needs to be kept in mind that they are only applicable for companies limited by shares.

The Law of 23 May 1996 on the Execution of the Competition Rules in the EEA (Legal Gazette 1996, No. 113, LR 172.013) in its presently valid version has been enacted in Liechtenstein to govern the execution of the competition rules in the EEA.

Pursuant to article 2 of the Law on the Execution of the Competition Rules in the EEA, the Office of Economic Affairs is the Liechtenstein authority with jurisdiction for the implementation of the competition rules in Liechtenstein, unless the jurisdiction of the national courts is provided. The Law foresees the necessary competencies for the Office of Economic Affairs to allow the surveillance authorities' investigations and to assist them.

Hence, as Liechtenstein has no national merger and antitrust laws of its own, the following answers are mainly based on the EU Merger Regulation and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing the EU Merger Regulation. According to our information, Liechtenstein has had no mergers with an EU or EFTA dimension since the entry into force of the EU Merger Regulation. As a consequence, Liechtenstein has so far had no practice or jurisdiction in this field.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Article 3 of the EU Merger Regulation defines a concentration as the change of control on a lasting basis, resulting from a merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or the acquisition of direct or indirect control of the whole or part of another undertaking.

The concentration needs to have an EU dimension, which is stipulated in article 1 of the EU Merger Regulation. Certain thresholds must be fulfilled.

Mergers of a Liechtenstein company limited by shares with a limited liability company formed in accordance with the law of an EEA member state and having its registered office, central administration or principal place of business with the EU are regulated according to article 352(a) et seq PGR.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

A joint venture is a relevant concentration under the EU Merger Regulation and thus, in Liechtenstein, provided it performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, is also caught. A distinction is made between a full-function joint venture and a non-full-function joint venture.

Joint ventures are not caught under the merger provisions for companies limited by shares in the PGR.



#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

As the EU Merger Regulation is applicable, control is defined according to article 3 of the EU Merger Regulation. It means in essence the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking regardless of the means. The ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking, or the rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking are particular examples of the possibility to exercise decisive influence on an undertaking.

Issues of lesser importance than control in the meaning of the exercise of decisive influence on the activity of an undertaking (which is assessed having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved) are not caught. The mere board or management representation, without a majority, regularly will not mean control in the sense of the above.

Control is not defined, nor are minority and other interests less than control caught by the merger provisions for companies limited by shares in the PGR.

#### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A concentration needs to have an EU or EFTA dimension. If the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than €5 billion and the aggregate EU-wide turnover or EFTA-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than €250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate EU-wide turnover of EFTA-wide turnover within one and the same EU member state or EFTA state, the threshold is met.

Even if the thresholds for a concentration with an EU or EFTA dimension are not met, the provisions of the EU Merger Regulation are nevertheless applicable where:

- the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than €2.5 billion;
- in each of at least three EU member states or EFTA states, the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than €100 million;
- in each of at least three EU member states or EFTA states, included for the purpose of the above point, the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than €25 million; and
- the aggregate EU-wide turnover or EFTA-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than €100 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate EU-wide turnover or EFTA-wide turnover within one and the same EU member state or EFTA state.

Further information depends on the competent authority, for example, if the forms differ or the request can be made by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). We are not aware of circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated.

So far, no concentrations falling under the EU Merger Regulation have been notified to the ESA. Neither has a case falling below the thresholds of the EU Merger Regulation been referred to the ESA.

The merger provisions of the PGR do not contain jurisdictional thresholds.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The notification of concentrations with an EU or EFTA dimension to the Commission is mandatory. However, the notification may already be made if the involved undertakings demonstrate good faith to conclude an agreement or to make a public bid that would result in a concentration with an EU or EFTA dimension (article 4 EU Merger Regulation).

According to article 4, section 4 of the EU Merger Regulation, a concentration may be referred to a certain EU member state or EFTA state if the concentration may significantly affect competition in a distinct market and should, therefore, be examined by that EU member state or EFTA state. If the case is referred by the Commission, no notification is required.

The filing of the merger to the Liechtenstein Office of Justice is mandatory insofar as the merger only becomes effective upon the entry in the Commercial Register (articles 351(h) and 352(h) PGR).

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Pursuant to recital 10 of the EU Merger Regulation, a concentration with an EU or EEA dimension is deemed to exist, regardless of whether the involved undertakings have their seat or their principal fields of activity in the European Union, on the condition they have substantial operations there and exceed the thresholds. Hence, foreign-to-foreign mergers may also fall under the EU Merger Regulation and may need to be notified, if the above prerequisites are met. There is no local effects test. There need to be substantial operations in the EEA; besides this, there is no local nexus test.

Foreign-to-foreign mergers do not have to be notified according to article 352(a) et seq PGR.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

In the course of a domestic or cross-border merger, an undertaking for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) may amalgamate with one or more other UCITS, irrespective of the legal form of the UCITS and whether the absorbing or transferring UCITS has its registered office in Liechtenstein. The merger of UCITS requires the prior approval of the Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority (FMA), if the transferring UCITS has its registered office in Liechtenstein (article 39 of the Law of 28 June 2011 on Certain Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (Legal Gazette 2011, 295, LR 951.31), in its presently valid version (UCITSG)). The rules on the merger of UCITS apply mutatis mutandis to other structural measures.

The domestic or cross-border merger of an alternative investment fund (AIF) with one or more other AIFs is admissible and requires the approval of the FMA (articles 76 and 78 of the Law of 19 December 2012 on alternative investment fund managers (Legal Gazette 2013, 49, LR 951.32, in its presently valid version (AIFMG)).

On structural measures between UCITS and AIF the provisions of the UCITSG apply. Regarding structural measures relating to exclusively managed AIF of the same AIF manager there is a duty to notify the FMA (article 76 paragraph 4 and 5 and article 33 AIFMG). Several Liechtenstein laws state filing requirements in case of the acquisition of significant participations in an undertaking or controlling influence on an undertaking such as the Liechtenstein Banking Law, the Law on Tender Offers, the Law on Financial Conglomerates, the Law on the Disclosure of Important Participations of Quoted Companies, the Law on the Surveillance of Insurance Companies, the Asset Management Law and the Law on Investment Funds.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The EU Merger Regulation does not determine deadlines for filing. However, the notification of the concentration needs to be made before its implementation.

Pursuant to article 14(2) of the EU Merger Regulation, the ESA and the European Commission may impose fines, when a concentration is intentionally or negligently not notified prior to its implementation, unless expressly authorised by article 7(2) or by a decision taken pursuant to article 7(3) of the EU Merger Regulation.

The merger plan must be filed with the Liechtenstein Office of Justice at least one month prior to the shareholders' general meeting, which is intended to resolve on the consent. If the merger plan is publicly accessible without cost on the website of each company, it is sufficient to place a notice on the website of the Liechtenstein Office of Justice referring to the companies' websites providing the merger plan and its publication date (article 351(d), sections 1 and 1(a) of the Law on Persons and Companies (PGR)).

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The parties to the merger or those acquiring joint control need to notify the concentration. In all other cases, the notification needs to be effected by the person or undertaking acquiring control (article 4(2) of the EU Merger Regulation).

The company management of the transferring and of the absorbing company must file the merger and its consequences to the Liechtenstein Office of Justice. However, the management of the absorbing company has the right to file the merger for the transferring company (article 351(g), section 1 PGR) as well.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

A concentration may not be implemented either before its notification or until it has been declared compatible with the common market, unless a derogation has been granted (article 7 of the EU Merger Regulation).

For a cross-border merger of a Liechtenstein company limited by shares, the Liechtenstein Commercial Register, which is a department of the Office of Justice, will verify whether the conditions precedent for a merger have been fulfilled and will issue a pre-confirmation (article 352(e) PGR).

Within six months of the issuance of the pre-confirmation, all involved companies need to file the merger plan as well as a possible agreement with the Liechtenstein Office of Justice, which controls the legality of the cross-border merger with respect to its execution and the formation of a new company limited by shares under Liechtenstein law as a result of the merger. Furthermore, it verifies the compliance with the Law on the employee participation in a cross-border merger of limited liability companies (article 352(f) PGR).

The registration of a cross-border merger in the Commercial Registry is only admissible after a legality control according to article 352(f) PGR (article 352(h), section 1 PGR).

The merger only takes effect after it has been entered in the Commercial Register of the absorbing company and it may only be entered in the Commercial Register of the absorbing company after it has been entered for the transferring companies (article 351(h) PGR). The transfer of the assets and liabilities and the dissolution of

the transferring companies takes effect together with the entry of the merger in the Commercial Register.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The ESA and the European Commission may fine a person or an undertaking for closing before clearance (article 14 of the EU Merger Regulation). The validity of any transaction (in connection with a concentration with an EC/EEA dimension) carried out before its notification or until it has been declared compatible with the common market shall be dependent on a decision of the European Commission or on a respective presumption (article 7, paragraph 4 of the EU Merger Regulation). Moreover, the Commission may take the appropriate measures to ensure that the undertakings concerned dissolve the concentration, or may take interim measures (article 8, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the EU Merger Regulation).

There are no recent cases where sanctions have been imposed.

There are no specific sanctions for closing before clearance for mergers of companies limited by shares in the PGR. Article 351(l) PGR states the liability of the members of the company management of the transferring company in relation to their shareholders for their negligent or wilful behaviour in the course of the preparation and accomplishment of the merger.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Sanctions could be applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers if they have substantial operations in an EU member state or an EEA state and exceed the thresholds. However, no such case has been reported for Liechtenstein.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

No such solutions exist in which it would be acceptable to permit closing before clearance.

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Article 7(2) of the EU Merger Regulation determines that a public bid or a series of transactions in securities, by which control is acquired from various sellers, may be implemented on the following conditions:

- the concentration is notified to the European Commission or the ESA without delay; and
- the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of its investments based on a derogation granted by the European Commission or the ESA.

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The special forms provided for in the Annexes of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing the EU Merger Regulation must be used for a notification of a concentration pursuant to the EU Merger Regulation: Form CO (Annex I) or Short Form CO (Annex II).

Generally, the Short Form CO may be used when a notification is submitted that is unlikely to raise completion concerns. The exact conditions are stipulated in paragraph 1.1, subparagraph 3 of Annex II of EC Regulation No. 802/2004 of 7 April 2004. In all other cases Form CO must be used.

Section 1 et seq of Annex II of EC Regulation No. 802/2004 states in detail the information that must be provided in the form (eg, description of the concentration, information about the parties, details of the concentration, ownership and control). All required information must be correct and complete. If a notification in any material respect is incomplete, the Commission informs the notifying parties in writing. In such a case the notification shall become effective on the date on which the complete information is received by the Commission (article 5, paragraph 2 Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004). To carry out the duties assigned to it by the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission by simple request or by decision may require the concerned persons to provide all necessary information (article 11, paragraph 1 EU Merger Regulation). The Commission may by decision impose fines to relevant persons (eg, where they intentionally or negligently supply incorrect information in response to a request (article 14, paragraph 1 EU Merger Regulation)).

The Ordinance of 11 February 2003 on the Commercial Register, in its presently valid version (Legal Gazette 2003, No. 66, LR 216.012) determines in articles 69 and 70 the required level of detail for the filing.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Before the notification, the European Commission may be consulted to informally and confidentially confirm the jurisdiction of the European Commission, identify key issues and possible competition concerns and ascertain deadlines.

In Phase I, the European Commission issues a formal clearance decision upon the notification of a concentration if the merger does not raise 'serious doubts as to its compatibility' with the common market.

If the concentration raises 'serious doubts', the European Commission issues a decision to initiate proceedings (ie, to proceed with an in-depth Phase II investigation).

The Phase II decision clears or blocks the merger.

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Pursuant to article 10 of the EU Merger Regulation, the European Commission or the ESA must decide within 25 working days and provide clearance in cases that do not raise 'serious doubts as to its compatibility' with the common market. The period begins on the working day following the receipt of the notification. Under certain conditions the period may be extended by 20 days. In all other cases, an in-depth investigation will follow, which takes 90 days and may even be extended to 105 days.

The concentration is deemed compatible with the common market if the Commission or the ESA have not taken a decision within the given time limits. The time frame for clearance cannot be speeded up.

As Liechtenstein has had no mergers with an EU or EFTA dimension since the entry into force of the EU Merger Regulation, there is no pertinent practice.

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

There is no particular substantive test for clearance with respect to Liechtenstein. However, the European Commission or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority (ESA) will apply the considerations stated in article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation.

A concentration may not significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it. The structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from undertakings located either within or outside the European Union or EFTA must be taken into consideration. In addition, the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition, must be assessed when deciding whether a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the common market. Moreover, the Commission may decide that an otherwise problematic merger is nevertheless compatible with the common market if one of the merging parties is a failing firm. The Commission considers the following three criteria to be especially relevant for the application of a 'failing firm' defence. First, the allegedly failing firm would in the near future be forced out of the market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another undertaking. Second, there is no less anticompetitive alternative purchase than the notified merger. Third, in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market (Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings VIII *re Failing Firm* (2004/C 31/03)).

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the Law on Persons and Companies (PGR).

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is also no particular substantive test for joint ventures with respect to Liechtenstein. The European Commission or the ESA assesses whether the joint venture significantly impedes effective competition. A joint venture may not result in an appreciable restriction of competition between undertakings that remain independent (recital 27 of the EU Merger Regulation).

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Liechtenstein Office of Economic Affairs does not assess and investigate itself whether a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the common market. It reports potential cases to the ESA. The ESA makes an overall assessment in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1 of the EU Merger Regulation. The ESA (or the Commission) for such an assessment applies several theories of harm (eg, for horizontal mergers it considers whether by such merger there is a reduced competitive pressure and thus an increased ability to raise prices). Furthermore, for vertical mergers the ESA may examine whether by such merger there is an input foreclosure (ie, a restriction of competitor access to procurement markets) or a customer foreclosure (ie, a restriction of competitor access to sales markets).

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

There is no particular substantive test for clearance with respect to Liechtenstein. However, the European Commission or the ESA will apply the considerations stated in article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation.

Among others, the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition, must be assessed when deciding whether a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the common market.

Moreover, the Liechtenstein Office of Economic Affairs does not assess and investigate itself whether a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the common market. It reports potential cases to the ESA. The ESA makes an overall assessment in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1 of the EU Merger Regulation. The ESA (or the Commission) for such an assessment applies several theories of harm (eg, for horizontal mergers it considers whether by such merger there is a reduced competitive pressure and thus an increased ability to raise prices). Furthermore, for vertical mergers, the ESA may examine whether by such merger there is an input foreclosure (ie, a restriction of competitor access to procurement markets) or a customer foreclosure (ie, a restriction of competitor access to sales markets).

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

There is no particular substantive test for clearance with respect to Liechtenstein. However, the European Commission or the ESA will apply the considerations stated in article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation.

Among others, the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to

competition, must be assessed when deciding whether a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the common market.

Moreover, the Liechtenstein Office of Economic Affairs does not assess and investigate itself whether a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the common market. It reports potential cases to the ESA. The ESA makes an overall assessment in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1 of the EU Merger Regulation. The ESA (or the Commission) for such an assessment applies several theories of harm (eg, for horizontal mergers it considers whether by such merger there is a reduced competitive pressure and thus an increased ability to raise prices). Furthermore, for vertical mergers, the ESA may examine whether by such merger there is an input foreclosure (ie, a restriction of competitor access to procurement markets) or a customer foreclosure (ie, a restriction of competitor access to sales markets).

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

At the request of the European Commission, the Liechtenstein Office of Economic Affairs may, according to article 3 of the Law on the Execution of the Competition Rules in the EEA and article 12 of the EU Merger Regulation, require information from the involved Liechtenstein undertakings of a concentration, inspect business files or may have the files inspected and verified by an expert. Apart from that, the Liechtenstein Office of Economic Affairs may ask the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority to control a merger.

The European Commission may conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings and associations of undertakings. It may impose fines, require the undertakings concerned to dissolve the concentration or, if a restoration is not possible, any other measure appropriate to achieve such restoration as far as possible, take interim measures appropriate to restore or maintain conditions of effective competition (article 8 of the EU Merger Regulation).

The merger only becomes effective after it has been entered in the Commercial Register in the case of national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the Law on Persons and Companies (PGR). Hence, the Office of Justice may refuse to enter the merger in the Commercial Register if the legal requirements have not been fulfilled.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

It is possible to remedy competition issues. However, the European Commission usually applies behavioural remedies rather than structural remedies.

A merger only becomes effective after it has been entered in the Commercial Register in the case of national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR. Hence, the Office of Justice may refuse to enter the merger in the Commercial Register if the legal requirements have not been fulfilled.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The conditions are that a concentration has already been implemented and that a concentration has been declared incompatible with the common market, or that a concentration has been implemented in breach of a condition included in a decision, or in cases where a joint venture

constituting a concentration would not fulfil the criteria laid down in article 81(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The Liechtenstein Office of Justice controls the legality of the cross-border merger with respect to the execution and formation of a new company limited by shares under Liechtenstein law as a result of a merger. Furthermore, it verifies the compliance with the law on employee participation in a cross-border merger of limited liability companies. It does not assess the effects of a merger on the market. If the legal requirements of articles 351 to 352(k) PGR for the merger with respect to the execution and formation of a new company limited by shares are not met, the entry of the merger to the Commercial Register (and thus the validity of the merger) may be postponed or refused.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The European Commission may impose remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers if they fall within the application of the EU Merger Regulation as in mergers involving undertakings from EU member states or EEA states.

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

A decision declaring a concentration compatible is deemed to cover restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration (article 8(2) of the EU Merger Regulation).

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the PGR.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The European Commission may hear other natural or legal persons showing sufficient interest (article 18(4) of the EU Merger Regulation). Furthermore, the European Commission may interview any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an investigation (article 11(7) of the EU Merger Regulation).

The Commission must base its decision only on objections on which the parties have been able to submit their observations. The rights of defence must be fully respected in the proceedings (article 18(3) of the EU Merger Regulation).

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the Law on Persons and Companies (PGR).

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Only general information or surveys that do not contain information relating to particular undertakings or associations of undertakings may be published. Information acquired through the application of the EU Merger Regulation and covered by the obligation of professional secrecy may not be disclosed. All information acquired as a result of

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the application of the EU Merger Regulation may only be used for the purpose of the relevant request, investigation or hearing (article 17 of the EU Merger Regulation and article 4(b) of the Law on the Execution of the Competition Rules in the EEA).

Decisions of the European Commission are published, but shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets (article 20(2) of the EU Merger Regulation).

The documents provided to the Commercial Register for the registration of the merger may be inspected by parties having a justified interest (article 953 PGR and article 18 of the Ordinance of 11 February 2003 on the Commercial Register).

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Liechtenstein Office of Economic Affairs and the Liechtenstein EEA Coordination Unit cooperate with the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority. As Liechtenstein, as far as we have seen, has not had a case under the EU Merger Regulation so far, there exists no practice with respect to the cooperation between antitrust authorities.

In case of a cross-border merger of a company limited by shares under the PGR, the Office of Justice informs the involved foreign authorities (article 352(h) PGR).

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

## 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority may be reviewed by the European Court of Justice or the EFTA Court (article 16 of the EU Merger Regulation).

### Time frame

## 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

No general comments can be made as there has been an insufficient number of cases to calculate an average time frame.

**ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS****Enforcement record**

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The European Commission pursues foreign-to-foreign mergers if they have an EU or EEA dimension and the aggregate turnover of the concerned undertakings exceeds the thresholds given by the EU Merger Regulation.

This question is not applicable for national or cross-border mergers of companies limited by shares under the Law on Persons and Companies.

No current enforcement concerns of the authorities are known with respect to Liechtenstein.

**Reform proposals**

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

No, there are no current proposals to change the Liechtenstein legislation.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year**

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

No updates at this time.



# Malaysia

Shanthi Kandiah

SK Chambers

## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Malaysia's general competition legislation, namely the Competition Act 2010 (CA), sets out prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements and abuses of dominance, but not merger control. Although mergers are not expressly excluded from the scope of the CA, there is acceptance that the competition regulator, the Malaysia Competition Commission (MyCC), has no merger control mandate.

There are sector-specific laws and guidelines that regulate the antitrust aspects of mergers in the aviation services sector and the communications and multimedia sectors, enforced by the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM), and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) respectively.

The MAVCOM has competition policy powers under the Malaysian Aviation Commission Act 2015 (MACA). This is presently the only statutory merger control regime in Malaysia.

The MAVCOM has published the following guidelines on mergers:

- Guidelines on Substantive Assessment of Mergers (the SAM Guidelines);
- Guidelines on Notification and Application Procedure for an Anticipated Merger or a Merger (the NAP Guidelines); and
- Guidelines on Aviation Service Market Definition.

For the communications and multimedia sectors, the existing Guideline on Substantial Lessening of Competition (the SLC Guideline) issued by the MCMC expressly states that the regulator considers that mergers involving telecommunications and multimedia licensees must be investigated as 'conduct which has the purpose of substantially lessening competition in a communications market' (under section 133 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA)). On 17 May 2019, the MCMC issued the final versions of the following guidelines:

- Guidelines on Mergers and Acquisitions (the M&A Guidelines); and
- Guidelines on Authorisation of Conduct.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

##### Aviation services sector

The MACA encompasses both horizontal and non-horizontal mergers (vertical and conglomerate). A merger is deemed to occur if:

- two or more undertakings, previously independent of one another, merge;
- one or more persons or other undertakings acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings;
- as the result of the acquisition by one undertaking (the first undertaking) of the assets (including goodwill), or a substantial part

of assets, of another undertaking (the second undertaking) is to place the first undertaking in a position to replace or substantially replace the second undertaking in the business or, as appropriate in the part concerned of the business in which the undertaking was engaged immediately before the acquisition; or

- a joint venture is created to perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous entity.

Section 48 of the MACA, read together with the Third Schedule, lists excluded commercial activities, agreements and mergers.

##### Communications and multimedia sectors

The MCMC's SLC Guideline provides that the MCMC regards mergers to be 'conduct' falling within the scope of sections 133 and 139 of the CMA. The definition of M&A under the M&A Guidelines is similar to that set out in the MACA.

The competition regulation regime established by the CMA does not contain any express provisions for merger control and assessment. As such, there is no process nor is there a legal requirement that parties to an M&A should notify the MCMC in respect of such transactions. Despite the lack of clear provisions, the MCMC has said that it will assess mergers affecting the communications and multimedia sector that are voluntarily submitted to it in the manner set out in the M&A Guidelines. The advantage that the procedures established through the M&A Guidelines is that it enables merging parties to:

- obtain the MCMC's view in respect of the competitive effects of an M&A; and
- decide whether to apply to the MCMC for authorisation of an M&A where it is consistent with national interest subject to various undertakings or in a restructured form to avoid breaching the provisions of the CMA.

It is likely that the MCMC is attempting to replicate the informal clearance regime that operates in Australia. There is a natural incentive for merging parties to seek clearance of any anticipated or completed merger, to ensure that mergers are not subject to an unexpected review by the MCMC, thereby providing greater transaction certainty.

The competition provisions under the CMA apply only to licensees. The four (major) individual licence categories under the CMA require licensees to be companies incorporated in Malaysia as a standard licence condition.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

##### Aviation services sector

The MACA treats full-function joint ventures as mergers. The SAM Guidelines explain that such a joint venture 'operates in an aviation service market and performs the functions normally carried out by enterprises in that market'. Factors to determine 'intention' include:

- commitment of resources by the parent enterprises – the period of the joint venture must be long enough to cause a lasting change in the structure of the enterprises concerned or provide for continuation beyond such specified period;
- joint ventures established for a short definite period and to carry out a specific project may be considered as not having an operation on a lasting basis; and
- joint control by the parties to the joint venture where such enterprises are capable of exercising decisive influence with regard to the activities of the joint venture.

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

The CMA does not define 'joint venture'. However, the M&A Guidelines describes an approach similar to that in the MACA.

**4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?**

The MACA and the SAM Guidelines explain that 'control' can exist via:

- ownership of the assets of the enterprise;
- the right to use all or part of the assets of the enterprise; or
- the rights or contracts that enable the exercise of decisive influence regarding the composition, voting or decisions of the enterprise.

Control can be acquired directly or indirectly. Examples of direct control are by becoming holder of the rights or contracts, whereas indirect control may occur through acquisition of the power to exercise rights. It can be determined by examining links between the acquirer and the enterprise having indirect control such as the source of funding and family relations between the acquiring person or enterprise.

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

'Control' is not defined or explained under the CMA. The M&A Guidelines explains that control can be achieved through:

- amalgamating with another firm to form a merged entity;
- acquiring the assets of another firm and replacing that firm; or
- through acquiring direct or indirect control over another firm.

The test for control is whether a firm can exercise 'decisive influence' over the activities of another firm by reason of rights, contracts or other means. 'Control' can be obtained through:

- legal control (ie, having more than 50 per cent ownership of all voting rights); or
- de facto control (ie, circumstances that allow one firm to influence another's activities to affect key strategic commercial behaviour).

**Thresholds, triggers and approvals**

**5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?**

**Aviation services sector**

For notification and assessment of a merger, parties should self-assess whether a merger can give rise to a substantial lessening of competition within any market affecting Malaysia, and whether a merger notification should be made to the MAVCOM. The MAVCOM is more likely to investigate a merger or anticipated merger where:

- the combined turnover of the merger parties in Malaysia in the financial year preceding the transaction is at least 50 million ringgit; or
- the combined worldwide turnover of the merger parties in the financial year preceding the transaction of the merger parties is at least 500 million ringgit.

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

The MCMC has not prescribed any jurisdictional thresholds but has taken the position that a market share of more than 40 per cent is indicative of dominance.

The M&A Guidelines provides guidance on thresholds for notification and assessment:

Type of merger	Notification threshold
Proposed horizontal merger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least one of the parties to the merger is a licensee in a dominant position; or</li> <li>• if the threshold above is not met, the merger would result in the proposed merged firm obtaining a dominant position. A post-merger market share of the proposed merged entity of 40 per cent or more would be indicative of this.</li> </ul>
Completed horizontal merger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The merged entity is a licensee in a dominant position.</li> </ul>
Proposed non-horizontal merger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At least one of the parties to the merger is a licensee in a dominant position.</li> </ul>
Completed non-horizontal merger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The merged or acquired entity is a licensee in a dominant position.</li> </ul>

**6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?**

**Aviation services sector**

The MACA has a voluntary notification regime.

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

The regimes for both notification and assessment of a merger, as well as authorisation of conduct, are voluntary.

**7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?**

There are no such special notification requirements for either sector.

Under the MACA, a local effects test is applied (ie, whether a merger transacted or executed outside Malaysia has an effect on competition in any aviation service market in Malaysia).

The CMA applies extraterritorially to licensees or providers of relevant facilities or services in a place within Malaysia.

**8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?**

**Aviation services sector**

Applicants for an air service licence, air service permit or group handling licence must either be a Malaysian or a company incorporated in Malaysia under direct or indirect control of a Malaysian. It is understood that foreign shareholding is allowed subject to significant local shareholding.

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

Licences are only offered to Malaysian incorporated companies. In 2011, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's liberalised foreign shareholding thresholds to 70–100 per cent, depending on licence category. However, the MCMC, as the licensing authority, permits 30–49 per cent foreign shareholding for certain licence categories and higher shareholding requests will be entertained on a case-by-case basis. Import permits are required for importation of communications equipment.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

- 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

#### Aviation services sector

Merger parties have the option of notifying both completed and anticipated mergers. For anticipated mergers, notification and application can be made to the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM) when:

- merger parties have a bona fide intention to proceed with the anticipated merger;
- details of the anticipated merger are available; and
- the anticipated merger has been, or may be, made public.

For completed mergers, notification can be made at any time, but merger parties are encouraged to do so as soon as possible after the merger is completed. There are no sanctions for failing to file, per se, but the MAVCOM in its final decision can impose a financial penalty if it is satisfied the infringement was intentional or negligent.

#### Communications and multimedia sectors

For notification and assessment, parties should submit their transactions prior to completion. An application for authorisation of conduct can be made before, during or after submitting an application for assessment pursuant to the Guidelines on Mergers and Acquisitions (the M&A Guidelines).

- 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

#### Aviation services sector

A party to an anticipated merger or involved in a merger is responsible for filing. The MAVCOM does not presently impose such fees but will do so via regulations in future.

#### Communications and multimedia sectors

Licensees can apply to the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) for authorisation of conduct and notification and assessment. Under the M&A Guidelines, the MCMC will not accept multiple parallel applications for assessment of a merger. The M&A Guidelines provide that the acquiring party (for a proposed M&A) or the merged entity or entity that has acquired control (for completed mergers) are the appropriate parties.

- 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

#### Aviation services sector

The regime is non-suspensory, but parties proceed at their own commercial risk as the MAVCOM has the power to unwind mergers and impose financial penalties for infringement. The duration for the assessment of an application will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

#### Communications and multimedia sectors

In theory, the notification and assessment regime under the M&A Guidelines appear to be a non-suspensory regime. Parties can proceed with the M&A without automatic sanctions.

Similarly, where parties apply for authorisation, the regime is non-suspensory as licensees can apply before, during or after submission of an assessment application. There is no requirement to seek authorisation.

### Pre-clearance closing

- 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

There have been no reported cases in which a sanction was imposed for closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance. However, that the laws do not prevent the relevant regulators (ie, MAVCOM and MCMC) from applying the following sanctions where applicable.

#### Aviation services sector

Where an application for an anticipated merger to be considered has been made to the MAVCOM and the anticipated merger is carried into effect before the MAVCOM makes a decision of whether there is an infringement, the MAVCOM may either treat the application as if it were an application for the resulting merger, or refuse to make any decision in respect of such anticipated merger and require any party involved to apply to the MAVCOM for the merger to be considered under the relevant provisions of the Malaysian Aviation Commission Act 2015 (MACA) as a merger instead.

Where the MAVCOM has commenced, but not completed, an investigation, the MAVCOM may impose interim measures by directing parties to suspend the effect of, or desist from acting in accordance with any agreement, desist from any conduct that is suspected to infringe a prohibition or to do, or refrain from doing, any act (but that shall not require the payment of money).

#### Communications and multimedia sectors

The MCMC may direct a licensee in a dominant position in a communications market to cease a conduct in that communications market that has, or may have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in any communications market, including requirements that the licensee must not continue with or complete the M&A and must not transfer any licenses or spectrum assignments granted pursuant to the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) to another entity.

The MCMC may seek for an interim or interlocutory injunction in response to any failure by parties to an M&A to comply with the prohibition against conduct that substantially lessens competition in a communications market, or to prevent further integration between the parties to the M&A, or to prevent the merged or acquired entity from trading.

- 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There have been no reported cases in which a sanction has been applied against any company, either local or foreign, for closing before clearance. However, the laws do not prevent the relevant regulators (ie, MAVCOM and MCMC) from challenging foreign-to-foreign mergers that substantially lessen competition in their respective markets in Malaysia, where applicable.

- 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The regime in the aviation services as well as the communications and multimedia sectors are non-suspensory and parties can proceed with the M&A before clearance. Having said that, the relevant regulators have the powers to, among other things, direct a person to cease a conduct pursuant to the relevant legislation as well as to impose interim measures and financial penalties for infringement of any prohibited conduct. In this regard, it is not precluded that the parties try to agree

with the relevant regulator on a hold-separate arrangement to permit closing before clearance although there has not been any reported precedent on this.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

All persons engaged in any takeover and mergers in Malaysia are subject to the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 2016 and Rules on Takeovers, Mergers and Compulsory Acquisitions 2016, which are issued and administered by the Securities Commission Malaysia.

### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

### Aviation services sector

The Guidelines on Notification and Application Procedure for an Anticipated Merger or a Merger provide that a notification and application shall be made in the form and manner determined by the MAVCOM, supported by the required documents and information. In the Notification and Application form for an anticipated merger or a merger published by the MAVCOM, the information and supporting documents required by MAVCOM consist of, among other things:

- details of the parties to the merger;
- information on the merger including description of the turnover of the merger parties, structure of the merger and change on the ownership structure of the merged entity;
- description of the relevant aviation service market, including the relevant service market, geographic market and temporal market where applicable;
- competitive effects of the merger including unilateral and coordinated effects of the merger, barriers to entry, and countervailing buyer power;
- economic efficiencies (if any) including description of significant economic efficiencies and nature of the economic efficiencies; and
- social benefits (if any) including description of significant social benefits and the nature of the social benefits.

The MAVCOM may refuse to accept incomplete or incorrect applications.

Failing to disclose relevant information, evidence, documents or providing false or misleading information, evidence, documents to the MAVCOM in response to a direction issued by the MAVCOM, is an offence carrying a fine of up to 500,000 ringgit, imprisonment up to three years, or both.

### Communications and multimedia sector

For authorisation of conduct, applicants will need to prepare Form 2 and the relevant supporting documents as stated in Annexure 3 of the Guidelines on Authorisation of Conduct (the AC Guidelines). The following information, among others, needs to be submitted:

- description of the proposed conduct and any documents detailing terms of such conduct;
- the relevant markets that the conduct is likely to affect;
- market characteristics;
- the time frame for which authorisation is sought and supporting reasons;
- benefits of the conduct from the perspective of the national interest;
- who is likely to benefit from the conduct;
- how are the benefits distributed; and
- how the conduct has been framed to minimise anticompetitive effect.

Failure to provide sufficient information may render the application to be invalid. If applicants knowingly give false or misleading information, they commit an offence that carries a fine of up to 20,000 ringgit, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both.

For notification and assessment, applicants will need to prepare Form 1 and Form 2 as well as the relevant supporting documents, full details of which can be found in Annexures 1 and 2 of the M&A Guidelines. Incomplete applications will be rejected by the MCMC. The MCMC may revoke a notice of no objection to a notification and assessment that was approved, if, among other things, the information provided by a licensee was materially incomplete, false or misleading. The CMA also provides that knowingly giving false information is an offence that carries a fine of up to 20,000 ringgit, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

### Aviation services sector

For notification and assessment, upon receiving a complete application, the MAVCOM will first determine whether the merger or anticipated merger falls within the meaning of section 54 of the MACA. If it does, the MAVCOM will publish a summary of the application for public consultation.

Next, the MAVCOM will proceed with two phases of its assessment – Phase I involves evaluating the possible competitive effects through gathering of information. The MAVCOM will then issue a proposed decision and publish it for public consultation. Following this, the MAVCOM will make a final decision of non-infringement or proceed to Phase II, which involves a more detailed and extensive examination of the effects of the merger or anticipated merger. A proposed decision will be published for public consultation and applicants can make written representations in response to a finding of infringement. The MAVCOM will then consider public feedback and written representations before making its final decision. The duration for the assessment of an application will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The MAVCOM also has the power to investigate a merger or anticipated merger that raises competition concerns under the MACA. The process of such an investigation is not expressly spelled out.

### Communications and multimedia sectors

The assessment for notification is proposed to be broken down into two phases under the M&A Guidelines and is similar to the MAVCOM's approach. The M&A Guidelines also indicate time frames for investigation – Phase I should be completed within 30 business days from receipt of a valid Form 1 application, Phase II should commence within 10 business days of a valid Form 2 application and is expected to complete within 120 business days. The time frame for an investigation for both Phase I and Phase II may be completed in less or more time than indicated if the MCMC considers that it is warranted in the circumstances of the M&A being assessed.

If the MCMC reaches the view that it is likely to issue an unfavourable decision, it will issue an applicant with a statement of issues setting out its preliminary findings and the grounds on which it reaches its conclusions. The applicant will be given 30 days to provide the MCMC with submissions in response. The MCMC will then object or not object to the merger and issue the relevant notices.

A similar process and time frames are envisaged for an authorisation application as provided in the AC Guidelines.

These timelines may be extended by the MCMC at its absolute discretion and may be reviewed by the MCMC, taking into account the practical considerations.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

### Aviation services sector

For notification and assessment, upon receiving a complete application, the MAVCOM will first determine whether the merger or anticipated merger falls within the meaning of section 54 of the MACA. If it does, the MAVCOM will publish a summary of the application for public consultation.

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A similar process and time frames are envisaged for an authorisation application as provided in the AC Guidelines.

These timelines may be extended by the MCMC at its absolute discretion and may be reviewed by the MCMC, taking into account the practical considerations.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

## 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

### Aviation services sector

Mergers that have resulted or may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition in any aviation service market are prohibited.

The 'failing firm' defence is available. This will be considered in the counterfactual analysis where a merger party may claim that, without the merger, it would exit the relevant market and competition would be lost anyway.

### Communications and multimedia sectors

Section 133 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) prohibits 'any conduct which has the purpose of substantially lessening competition in a communications market'.

The failing firm defence is available where:

- the financial situation of the firm has deteriorated to such an extent that without the M&A, it and its assets would exit the market in the near future;
- there are no serious prospects for restructuring the business; and
- there are no less anticompetitive alternatives to the M&A.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

### Aviation services sector

The Malaysian Aviation Commission Act 2015 (MACA) treats full-function joint ventures as mergers. The Guidelines on Substantive Assessment of Mergers explain that such a joint venture 'operates in an aviation service market and performs the functions normally carried out by enterprises in that market'. Factors to determine 'intention' include:

- commitment of resources by the parent enterprises – the period of the joint venture must be long enough to cause a lasting change in the structure of the enterprises concerned or provide for continuation beyond such specified period;
- joint ventures established for a short definite period and to carry out a specific project may be considered as not having an operation on a lasting basis; and
- joint control by the parties to the joint venture where such enterprises are capable of exercising decisive influence with regard to the activities of the joint venture.

### Communications and multimedia sectors

The CMA does not define 'joint venture'. However, the Guidelines on Mergers and Acquisitions (the M&A Guidelines) describes an approach similar to that in the MACA.

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

### Aviation services sector

Generally, the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM) will look at whether a merger or anticipated merger is likely to lead to substantial lessening of competition by way of unilateral and coordinated effects. To determine unilateral effects, the MAVCOM would consider:

- the profitability of any price increase or reduction of supply;
- whether other competing enterprises would increase their capacities or expand their commercial operations in response to any price increase or reduction of supply;
- the existence of any close substitutes of the service provided by the merger parties;
- the ease and likelihood of buyers switching to the services of other competing enterprises; and
- the possibility of new competitors entering the relevant aviation service market.

In assessing coordinated effects, the MAVCOM will consider the structure and characteristics of a relevant aviation service market, any history of coordination in the said market, factors that would indicate the characteristics of a relevant aviation service market such as the level of concentration in the market and the existence and degree of barriers to entry and how those factors would impact the coordinated effects of a merger.



### Communications and multimedia sectors

As per the M&A Guidelines, when assessing whether a merger results in coordinated effects of horizontal mergers on competition, the MCMC will attempt to establish whether a merger materially increases the likelihood that firms in a market will successfully coordinate their behaviour or strengthen any existing coordination, and will take into account the following conditions:

- the ability of firms to align on the terms of coordination;
- incentives to maintain coordination; and
- weak competitive constraints.

In determining unilateral effects of horizontal mergers, the MCMC will consider:

- whether the products and services sold by each party to the M&A are close substitutes;
- whether rivals have an incentive and the ability to respond to a price increase;
- the significance the merger parties have to the competitive process; and
- the competitive constraint each of the merger parties exerted on each other prior to the merger.

For non-horizontal mergers, the MCMC also looks at coordinated effects and unilateral effects. For coordinated effects, the same factors for establishing coordinated effects in a horizontal merger will be relevant to non-horizontal mergers. For unilateral effects, the MCMC will take into account foreclosure, barriers to entry and access to commercially sensitive information.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

#### Aviation services sector

A party affected by an infringement decision by the MAVCOM may within 14 days of the date notice of the decision is given, apply to the Minister (of Transport) for the anticipated merger or merger to be exempted from the prohibition on the ground of public interest considerations. This exemption will be confined to matters of public or national security and defence.

### Communications and multimedia sectors

Section 140(2) of the CMA states that the MCMC can authorise a conduct if it is satisfied that the authorisation is in the national interest. The MCMC will use the national policy objectives in section 3(2) of the CMA as the basis to decide whether or not the conduct should be authorised.

A cost-benefit analysis is used to examine if a conduct promotes national policy objectives. This analysis is guided by four steps – market definition, market structure analysis, analysis of economic impact, and analysis of benefits from the perspective of national interest. The MCMC can exercise its discretion and vary these steps, if necessary.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

#### Aviation services sector

A merger party may claim that there are significant economic efficiencies arising directly from the merger, including supply-side or demand-side efficiencies. Examples of supply-side efficiencies that may be considered include cost reduction, removal of double marginalisation in vertical mergers, increase in investment, differentiation of aviation services, and increase in capacity and network of aviation services. Examples of demand-side efficiencies include increased network of aviation services

available to buyers, price effects of complementary aviation services, and benefits of 'one-stop shopping'.

### Communications and multimedia sectors

As part of the process of conducting a cost-benefit analysis in relation to authorisation of conduct, detrimental effects of a conduct will be analysed from the perspective of economic efficiency, namely production efficiency, allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency – examples specified are economies of scale and scope and pooling of resources.

For the notification and assessment regime, efficiencies (including economic efficiencies) will be considered as part of the assessment of whether there is a substantial lessening of competition.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

#### Aviation services sector

If an infringement is found in a merger or an anticipated merger, the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM) can take the following actions:

- order to cease infringement promptly;
- specify steps that should be taken by the infringing enterprise in order to bring the infringement to an end;
- impose financial penalties that shall not exceed 10 per cent of worldwide turnover of the infringing enterprise over the period that the infringement occurs; and
- provide any other direction as the MAVCOM deems appropriate.

The Guidelines on Notification and Application Procedure for an Anticipated Merger or a Merger (the NAP Guidelines) provide examples of directions:

- prohibiting an anticipated merger from being carried into effect;
- ordering a merger to be dissolved or modified;
- requiring parties to enter into agreements designed to lessen or prevent the anticompetitive effects arising from a merger or an anticipated merger;
- requiring a merger party to dispose its businesses, assets, shares or rights in a specified manner; and
- providing a performance bond, guarantee or other form of security on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the MAVCOM.

Additionally, the MAVCOM may issue interim measures in the context of an investigation (but not for notification and assessment):

- suspending the effect or desisting from acting in accordance with any agreement suspected of infringing any prohibition;
- desisting from any conduct that is suspected of infringing any prohibition; and
- to do or refrain from doing any act, but that shall not require payment of money.

### Communications and multimedia sectors

The Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) sets out administrative actions available to the Minister (of Communications and Multimedia) or the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC):

- The Minister can modify, vary, revoke, impose further special or additional conditions of an existing individual licence.
- The Minister, on the MCMC's recommendation, can suspend or cancel an individual licence.
- The MCMC can direct a licensee in a dominant position to cease conduct that substantially lessens competition and implement appropriate remedies.



No specific provision for remedies can be found in the CMA. The MCMC has the power to determine the appropriate remedy subject to ministerial direction and the object of the CMA.

In administering the section 133 of the CMA prohibition and failure to comply with the MCMC's directions pursuant to section 139 of the CMA, the MCMC may enforce the following remedies:

- interim or interlocutory injunction against any prohibited conduct; and
- fine up to 500,000 ringgit or imprisonment up to five years or both upon conviction. Offenders would also be liable for a further fine of 1,000 ringgit per day or part of a day during which the offence is continued after conviction.

Under the Guidelines on Mergers and Acquisitions (the M&A Guidelines), the MCMC is also empowered to include the following directions in its notice of objection, including requirements that the licensee:

- must not continue or complete the M&A;
- must not transfer any licences or spectrum assignment granted pursuant to the CMA to another entity for a proposed merger; and
- must not further integrate with another merger party if a merger has completed and involves a licensee in a dominant position and has the effect of substantially lessening competition in a communication market. The MCMC may also prevent the merged entity from trading.

## Remedies and conditions

**25** | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

### Aviation services sector

A merger party may, voluntarily or upon invitation, propose an undertaking to do or refrain from doing anything, which the MAVCOM has the right to accept or reject. If the MAVCOM accepts, it must close the investigation without finding of infringement or imposition of a penalty. Undertakings can be both structural and behavioural.

### Communications and multimedia sectors

In respect of authorisation, the MCMC can require a licensee to submit an undertaking regarding its conduct in any matter relevant to the authorisation. Licensees can subsequently withdraw such undertaking and the authorisation that was granted based on the undertaking provided will be deemed to have never been given.

With respect to the notification regime, it is not clear if the MCMC would be prepared to accept voluntary commitments offered by parties to a merger as part of the informal assessment process without having to go through a formal authorisation clearance pursuant to section 140 of the CMA.

**26** | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

### Aviation services sector

The MAVCOM can impose remedies upon finding an infringement by taking into consideration:

- whether the remedial action can restore the competition that would be substantially lessened as a result of a merger or an anticipated merger;
- whether the remedial action would be effective to stop the infringement or to remedy, mitigate or prevent a substantially lessening of competition effect arising from the merger or an anticipated merger; and
- the cost of monitoring the remedial action.

The NAP Guidelines spell out conditions applicable to the sale of business as a structural remedy:

- such business is required to be capable of being fully separated from the merger party;
- the approval of the purchaser may be required prior to the sale of the business; and
- to consider an enterprise that is willing to pay a commercially reasonable price for a business as an alternative purchaser even if the price is lower than the price that a merger party is willing to pay for the acquisition of that business.

In this regard, the MAVCOM may specify that the sale must be completed within a certain period of time, failing which an independent trustee may be appointed, to monitor the operation of the business pending disposal or to handle the sale at the expense of such merger party.

The MAVCOM may consider behavioural remedies in the following situations:

- divestment of business would be impractical or disproportionate to the nature of the competition concerns; and
- behavioural remedy is necessary to support structural divestment; for example, the MAVCOM may direct a merger party to refrain from approaching buyers of the divested business for a specified period so as to allow the buyers of the divested business to be a viable and effective competitor.

## Communications and multimedia sectors

The MCMC is given the power to request for an undertaking regarding a licensee's conduct in any matter relevant to the authorisation. Undertakings that the MCMC may require with an authorisation of conduct may include:

- proceeding with the merger in a substantially restructured form;
- a specific division to be sold off;
- the negative competitive effects of the merger to be addressed in some other form;
- expand or allow fair and reasonable access to vital infrastructure or services to customers or competitors;
- not acquire assets within a specific time period, if doing so would have the effect of strengthening the merged or acquired entity's market power; and
- in the case of a firm acquiring direct or indirect control of another, all dealings between the parties will continue on arm's length basis and measures will be put in place to ensure this remains the case.

**27** | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

None published.

## Ancillary restrictions

**28** | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The powers given to the MAVCOM and the MCMC (in the M&A Guidelines) appear to be wide enough to make decisions covering ancillary restrictions, but the circumstances in which decisions by the MAVCOM and the MCMC would cover ancillary restrictions is unclear.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

#### Aviation services sector

Customers and competitors may be contacted for information gathering under the Phase I assessment and public consultation. It is unclear who would be the parties involved in an investigation where the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM) is not notified.

Any individual or enterprise may make a complaint to the MAVCOM regarding any suspected infringement of Part VII of the Malaysian Aviation Commission Act 2015 in the aviation services. Those who suffer loss or damage as a result of infringement have a right to civil action.

#### Communications and multimedia sectors

Under the Guidelines on Mergers and Acquisitions (the M&A Guidelines), the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC)'s assessment of competitive effects of an M&A involves public consultation with competitors, customers and even suppliers.

A person can lodge a written complaint regarding any suspected infringement to the MCMC. However, the MCMC may decide whether to give a complainant the opportunity to appear before the MCMC in relation to an investigation. As mentioned above, an interim or interlocutory injunction can be sought by anyone, against any prohibited conduct under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998.

#### Publicity and confidentiality

30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

#### Aviation services sector

Commercial information is not automatically treated confidentially. Confidentiality is available to claims that the MAVCOM determines to have merits prior to issuance of its proposed decision and a decision in a voluntary regime. There is no mention of confidentiality safeguards in relation to the MAVCOM's public consultations. Hence, it is prudent for a merger party to specify that the information disclosed to the MAVCOM is of a 'commercial and confidential' nature.

#### Communications and multimedia sector

The Guidelines on Authorisation of Conduct allow a licensee to provide confidential information in a separate annexure from the application form, clearly marked as 'confidential'. A public inquiry may form part of the investigation process under this route if the conduct in question is of significant interest to consumers or licensees. The MCMC may decide not to publish evidence or material presented to the inquiry or lodged with the MCMC that it considers to be confidential in nature.

Confidentiality is partially warranted in the M&A Guidelines. An applicant has to redact commercially sensitive or confidential information to be used in the MCMC's consultations with third parties.

Under the M&A Guidelines, the MCMC would conduct a limited confidential assessment of an M&A where its confidentiality needs to be preserved.

#### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

None published.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

#### Aviation services sector

Persons affected by the Malaysian Aviation Commission (MAVCOM)'s decisions may apply to the Minister (of Transport) for a merger or anticipated merger to be exempt from the prohibition on the ground of public interest. The MAVCOM's decision, act, omission, refusal, direction or order can also be challenged in the High Court.

#### Communications and multimedia sectors

An applicant's right to appeal against the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC)'s decision to the Appeal Tribunal exists under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA). The Guidelines on Mergers and Acquisitions explains that M&A parties may appeal for review of the MCMC's decision. Appeals are not available to third parties nor on the MCMC's determinations that an M&A party is in a dominant position.

A person affected by the decision or other action of the Minister (of Communications and Multimedia) or the MCMC may apply to the court for a judicial review upon exhausting all other remedies under the CMA.

#### Time frame

33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

#### Aviation services sector

Applications for exemption must be made within 14 days of the date of the MAVCOM's notice. Appeals to the High Court must be made within three months of the date on which the decision was communicated.

#### Communications and multimedia sector

There is no time frame prescribed by the CMA for appeal to the Appeal Tribunal at this juncture.

As a general rule according to the Rules of Court 2012, the time period for application for judicial review is three months from the date the grounds of application first arose or when the decision was first communicated to the applicant.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

None that have been made public.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Based on news reports previously, it was understood that the Malaysia Competition Commission (MyCC) had begun the process of seeking legislative amendments to include new provisions on mergers and acquisitions into law and a merger control regime was expected to be implemented by the end of 2019. However, following the recent change of government in Malaysia on 1 March 2020, there remains some level of uncertainty as to the policies and approach that will be taken by the new government. It is also unclear at this juncture whether the new Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs will continue the initiatives that were taken by the previous Minister to introduce the merger control regime. Until this amendment to the law is made, Malaysia remains a notable exception to the general trend within jurisdictions in East Asia to adopt a merger

control regime as part of their competition law framework. In this regard, the MyCC has previously clarified that it is not in a position to evaluate or prevent anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions from taking place. It can only act if the merged entity starts abusing its dominant position.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

Based on prior news reports, it was understood that the Malaysia Competition Commission (MyCC) had begun the process of seeking legislative amendments to include new provisions on mergers and acquisitions into law and a merger control regime was expected to be implemented by the end of 2019. However, following the recent change of government in Malaysia on 1 March 2020, there remains some level of uncertainty as to the policies and approach that will be taken by the new government. It is also unclear at this juncture whether the new Minister of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs will continue the initiatives that were taken by the previous Minister to introduce the merger control regime. Until this amendment to the law is made, Malaysia remains a notable exception to the general trend within jurisdictions in East Asia to adopt a merger control regime as part of their competition law framework. In this regard, the MyCC has previously clarified that it is not in a position to evaluate or prevent anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions from taking place. It can only act if the merged entity starts abusing its dominant position.



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# Malta

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The principal legislation governing mergers is the Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs). The CCRs have been issued as subsidiary legislation (SL 379.08) under the Competition Act (CA, Chapter 379 of the Laws of Malta), which is the main legislation regulating competition in Malta, together with the relative provisions of EU law.

Merger control is regulated exclusively by the CCRs, with the exception of partial-function joint ventures regulated by the relevant provisions of the CA, including articles 5 and 9 that implement articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The relevant regulatory body is the Director General (DG) who heads the Office for Competition, which is a key player in all stages. Concentrations must be notified to the DG, who then has the obligation of conducting the prescribed assessment within the established time frames. The undertakings' concerned and interested third parties may file an application before the Civil Court (Commercial Section) on points of law or fact, and request an appeal from the decision of the DG.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The CCRs apply to a 'concentration' defined as follows: the merging of two or more undertakings that were previously independent of each other; or the acquisition by one or more undertakings or the acquisition by one or more persons or undertakings already controlling at least one undertaking, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings, whether occurring in Malta or outside Malta when in the preceding financial year the aggregate Maltese turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeded €2.3 million and each of the undertakings concerned had a turnover in Malta equivalent to at least 10 per cent of the combined aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The CCRs specifically provide that the creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, namely a 'full-function joint venture', is considered to be a 'concentration'. Accordingly, such joint ventures, or the acquisition of control of joint ventures are also caught by the CCRs and the CA.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

'Control' is defined as having the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular:

- through ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; or
- through rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking, provided that even persons or undertakings not holding such rights or entitled to such rights under the contract concerned are deemed to have acquired control if they have the power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom.

Minority and other interests are not specifically mentioned in the legislation, but if they bring about a change in control, there will be a concentration within the meaning of the CCRs.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The CCRs establish a series of thresholds that have to be met for a concentration to be notifiable to the DG. Those thresholds are based on turnover.

In the case of mergers or takeover bids occurring in or outside Malta, in the preceding financial year, the aggregate turnover in Malta of the undertakings concerned exceeded €2.3 million and each of the undertakings concerned had a turnover in Malta equivalent to at least 10 per cent of the combined turnover in Malta of the undertakings concerned. The Office for Competition has always interpreted the 'aggregate turnover' threshold to relate solely to turnover in Malta.

In the case of concentrations consisting of the acquisition of parts, whether or not constituted as legal entities, of one or more undertakings, only the turnover relating to the parts that are the subject of the transaction are taken into account with regard to the seller or sellers. Nonetheless, where two or more such transactions take place within a two-year period between the same persons or undertakings, they are treated as one and the same concentration arising on the date of the last transaction.

In the case of credit institutions and other financial institutions, the turnover includes the sum of the following income items, after deductions of value added tax and other taxes directly related to such items, where appropriate, that are received by the institution or its branch in Malta:

- interest income and similar income;
- income from securities;
- income from shares and other variable yield securities;
- income from participating interests;

- income from shares in affiliated undertakings;
- commissions receivable;
- net profit on financial operations; and
- other operating income.

In the case of insurance undertakings, the turnover consists of the value of gross premiums written. This comprises all amounts received and receivable in respect of insurance contracts issued by or on behalf of the insurance undertakings, including outgoing reinsurance premiums and after deduction of taxes and parafiscal contributions (payments made by the employer to family compensation funds) or levies charged by reference to the amounts of individual premiums or the total volume of premiums.

The aggregate turnover of an undertaking concerned is calculated by adding together the respective turnovers of the following:

- 1 the undertaking concerned;
- 2 those undertakings in which the undertaking concerned, directly or indirectly:
  - owns more than half the capital or business assets;
  - has the power to exercise more than half the voting rights;
  - has the power to appoint more than half the members of the board of directors or other body or bodies legally representing the undertakings; or
  - has the right to manage the undertakings' affairs;
- 3 those undertakings that have in the undertaking concerned the rights or powers listed in (2);
- 4 those undertakings in which an undertaking as referred to in (3) has the rights or powers listed in (2); and
- 5 those undertakings in which two or more undertakings as referred to in (1) to (4) jointly have the rights or powers listed in (2).

Where undertakings concerned by the concentration jointly have the rights or powers listed in (2) above, in calculating the aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned, no account shall be taken of the turnover resulting from the sale of products or the provision of services between the joint undertaking and each of the undertakings concerned or any other undertaking connected with any one of them, as set out in (2) to (5) above, but account shall be taken of the turnover resulting from the sale of products and the provision of services between the joint undertaking and any third undertakings, this turnover being apportioned equally among the undertakings concerned.

The CCRs bestow numerous powers upon the DG to be able to carry out his or her duties and undertake all necessary investigations into undertakings and associations of undertakings. Thus, the DG has the power:

- to examine the books and other business records;
- to take or demand copies of or extracts from the books and business records;
- to ask for oral explanations on the spot; and
- to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings.

The undertakings and associations of undertakings must in turn submit to such investigations, ordered by decision of the DG.

Similar investigative powers are also provided in the Competition Act. In such cases, the DG may request any undertaking or association of undertakings to furnish him or her with any information or document in its possession that he or she may have reason to believe is relevant to the matter under investigation, within such time as in the circumstances of the investigation the DG may consider reasonable. The DG's power is only limited with respect to documents or the disclosure of information subject to the duty of professional secrecy.

The DG only has the power to investigate transactions that meet the turnover thresholds set out in the CCR.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing of a notification to the DG is mandatory for all types of concentrations. The CCRs contain a concentration notification form (Form CN) that must be followed in all cases.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Although no specific reference to foreign mergers is made in the relevant laws, it is nonetheless quite clear that foreign-to-foreign mergers are also caught. This, inter alia, emerges from the inclusive definition of 'concentration', which catches mergers and takeovers 'whether these occur within or outside Malta', thereby including foreign-to-foreign mergers. In addition, the definition of concentration requires each of the undertakings concerned to have a turnover in Malta.

The CCRs adopt a local effects test in prohibiting concentrations that might lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the Maltese market or part thereof.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Apart from tax rules, money laundering and the legislation on collective investment schemes, there are no rules or provisions concerning foreign investment or foreign direct investment.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Concentrations shall be notified to the Director General (DG) prior to their implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest, within 15 working days. For a concentration to be considered as complete, the notification must be carried out in accordance with the rules set out in the CN Form to the Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs) and the notification fee specified in the same CN Form must be paid on notification. In default, the DG will declare the notification to be incomplete and hence invalid.

Penalties between €1,000 and €10,000 may be imposed the Civil Court (Commercial Section) (the Court) for failure to file a notification before implementation.

The Court will impose a penalty of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of an undertaking or association of undertakings concerned in the preceding business year for putting into effect a concentration before its notification.

To date, the DG has never applied any of these penalties.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Notification is to be effected by the person or undertaking acquiring control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings. This means that in the case of the acquisition of a controlling interest in one undertaking by another, the acquirer must complete the notification; in the case of a public bid to acquire an undertaking, the bidder must complete the notification. However, in the cases where the concentration consists of a merger or the acquisition of joint control, the notification is to be made jointly by the parties to the merger or by those acquiring joint

control as the case may be. Each party completing the notification form is responsible for the accuracy of the information that it provides. The notification fee, which was introduced in 2007 by Legal Notice 49 of 2007, must be paid by the notifying party or parties on submission of the duly completed notification form and such fee amounts to €163.06.

It is also relevant to point out that, although pre-notification meetings with the DG are not mandatory, they are recommended. In fact, the Form CN explicitly states that pre-notification meetings are extremely valuable to both the notifying parties and the DG in determining the precise amount of information required in a notification and, in the large majority of cases, will result in a significant reduction of the information required. Accordingly, notifying parties are encouraged to consult the DG regarding the possibility of dispensing with the obligation to provide certain information.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Following the submission of all the required information, the DG has to take a decision regarding the applicability of the CCRs to a concentration within six weeks. Where he or she finds that the notified concentration falls within the scope of the CCRs, the DG will initiate proceedings. In a Phase I proceeding, the law, however, allows the extension of this period to two months in cases where, at any time during the first five weeks, the undertakings concerned submit commitments aimed at modifying the concentration in such a way as to make it compatible with the CCRs. Up until the fifth week, the notifying party may also request a moratorium of three weeks to discuss and present substantially revised commitment proposals. However, it is up to the DG to decide whether to accede to such a request. If, following modifications, the DG finds that the concentration does not infringe the CCRs, the DG shall issue a decision declaring such concentration to be lawful. The decision is also considered to cover restrictions that are directly related and necessary for the concentration's implementation. The DG may also choose to attach conditions and obligations to ensure that the undertakings comply with the commitments they entered into.

Where the DG finds that a concentration raises serious doubts as to its lawfulness in terms of the CCRs and decides to initiate Phase II proceedings, the DG must, save in the case of modifications, issue a decision declaring that the concentration is unlawful within not more than four months from the date on which proceedings were initiated. However, when the undertakings concerned submit commitments with a view to rendering the concentration lawful in terms of the CCRs, following the DG's initiation of the said proceedings and within three months of the initiation of the said proceedings, they may request that this four-month period be suspended for up to one month for proper consideration of such commitments, thereby extending it to a possible five months.

The CCRs also provide for a simplified procedure in cases of concentrations deemed not to raise serious doubts as to their legality in terms of the CCRs. Where the simplified procedure applies to a transaction, the DG must issue a short-form decision to that effect within four weeks of notification. The simplified procedure applies to the following categories of concentrations that are deemed not to raise serious doubts as to their legality in terms of the provisions of the CCRs, unless the DG, in exceptional cases and in view of the economic conditions pertaining to the market and the parties to the concentrations, deems otherwise:

- two or more undertakings acquire joint control of a joint venture, provided that the joint venture has no, or negligible, actual or foreseen activities in the territory of Malta because the turnover of the joint venture or the turnover of the contributed activities, or both, is less than €698,812.02 in the territory of Malta and the total value of assets transferred to the joint venture is less than €698,812.02 in the territory of Malta;

- two or more undertakings merge, or one or more undertakings acquire sole or joint control of another undertaking, provided that none of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same product and geographical market, or in a market that is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other party to the concentrations is engaged; or
- two or more undertakings merge or one or more undertakings acquire sole or joint control of another undertaking and two or more of the parties to the concentrations are engaged in business activities either in the same product and geographical market and their combined market share is less than 15 per cent or in a product market that is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other party to the concentration is engaged and their combined market share is less than 25 per cent.

The simplified procedure is available where there is not going to be a substantial lessening of competition.

The implementation of the transaction must be suspended until clearance. The DG shall examine the notification and shall determine within a six-week period whether to proceed with one of the following methods:

- conclude that the concentration notified does not fall within the scope of these regulations and record that finding by means of a decision;
- conclude that the concentration notified, although falling within the scope of these regulations, does not raise serious doubts about its lawfulness in terms of the CCRs and decide not to oppose it; the DG shall declare it to be a lawful concentration and such a declaration shall also cover restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration; or
- initiate proceedings after concluding that the concentration notified falls within the scope of these regulations and raises serious doubts as to its lawfulness in terms of the provisions of these regulations. All proceedings are deemed to be closed by means of a decision, which, subject to certain exceptions, must be taken within not more than four months of the date on which proceedings are initiated.

Where the DG finds that, following modification by the undertakings concerned, a notified concentration no longer raises serious doubts as to its lawfulness, the DG may decide to declare the concentration to be a lawful concentration.

The CCRs state that all the aforementioned time periods shall be suspended in a number of cases where, inter alia, the information given is not provided in full.

Where the DG has not taken a decision within the time limits set in the CCRs, the regulations state that the concentrations shall be deemed to be lawful.

The general rule states that a concentration shall not be put into effect either before its notification or until it has been declared lawful. However, this rule does not apply in cases of a public bid that has been notified to the DG and on the basis of a special derogation granted by the DG, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments. Furthermore, in all cases, the DG may, upon a reasonable request and after having taken into account the effect of a suspension (eg, major financial risks) and the threat of competition, grant a derogation from the obligation to suspend transactions prior to clearance, and this derogation may be subject to conditions and obligations to safeguard effective competition.



## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If a transaction is carried out before clearance, apart from any penalties that may be levied for this breach, its validity will depend on whether clearance is eventually granted. If the result is that the concentration is allowable under the CCRs, then it is likely that the transactions will be deemed valid.

The CCRs contain special rules regarding securities. The suspension of concentrations rule does not apply to transactions in securities, including those convertible into other securities admitted to trading on a market, which is regulated and supervised by the competent authorities appointed under the law and that operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the public, unless the buyer and seller knew or ought to have known that the transaction was carried out in contravention of the provisions of the CCRs.

A concentration shall not be put into effect either before its notification or until it has been declared lawful pursuant to a decision or on the basis of a presumption according to Regulation 9(7), that is, where the DG has not taken a decision in accordance with the time periods stipulated under the CCRs.

The CCRs also provide for penalties in situations where clearance or derogations from suspension are granted subject to certain conditions or obligations, which are then breached by the undertakings. Accordingly, in respect of persons or undertakings that intentionally or negligently fail to comply with an obligation imposed by decision pursuant to the provisos to Regulations 7(3) (derogation from suspension) or 8(2) (authorisation decision with commitments); put into effect a concentration in breach of the suspension of concentrations rule; or put into effect a concentration declared unlawful in terms of the provisions of the CCRs, the Court will impose a penalty of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of an undertaking and, or association of undertakings concerned in the preceding business year.

### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

No specific reference is made to foreign-to-foreign mergers in the relevant laws and the normal provisions are applicable.

### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Local authorities are empowered to take the necessary remedial action in the case of a foreign-to-foreign merger that is in breach of the CCRs. Naturally such a merger would be acceptable if it has a minimal effect on the Maltese market. 'Hold-separate' arrangements may be used, but, nevertheless, the merger is likely to be caught under the CCRs if, notwithstanding the arrangement, it results in a lessening of competition in the Maltese market.

## Public takeovers

### 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

A public bid that has been properly notified is not suspended before clearance, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the security or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments and on the basis of a derogation granted by the DG in terms of the CCRs.

The CCRs stipulate that the bidder acquiring an undertaking or part thereof must submit the notification. Furthermore, in such cases, Form CN specifically requires:

- a declaration of whether any public offer for the securities of one party by another party has the support of the former's board of directors or other bodies legally representing that party; and
- a copy of the offer document, which, if unavailable at the time of notification, should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than when it is posted to shareholders.

## Documentation

### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The notification of concentrations is to be made in accordance with the provisions of the Form CN contained in a schedule attached to the CCRs. This form requires the applicants to supply details about, inter alia:

- the notifying party and all parties to the concentration;
- the nature of the concentration;
- the extent to which the parties are involved in the concentration;
- the economic and financial structure of the concentration;
- the proposed structure of ownership and control;
- the worldwide and Maltese turnover;
- details on product and market descriptions (including structure of supply and demand, market entry and pre-existing agreements in the market) together with all supporting documentation; and
- all ancillary restraints entered into by the parties to the concentration and other involved parties (including the seller and minority shareholders).

Until all the required information is supplied, the notification will be deemed to be incomplete and no time frames shall commence until all the necessary information and details are supplied.

The CCRs list four types of documents to be submitted:

- copies of the final or most recent versions of all documents bringing about the concentration, whether by agreement between the parties of a public bid;
- in a public bid, a copy of the offer document; if it is unavailable at the time of notification, it should be submitted as soon as possible and not later than when it is made available to the shareholders;
- copies of the most recent annual reports and accounts of all the parties to the concentration; and
- where at least one affected market is identified: copies of analyses, reports, studies and surveys submitted to or prepared for any members of the board of directors, the supervisory board, or the shareholders' meeting, for the purpose of assessing or analysing the concentration with respect to competitive conditions, competitors (actual and potential) and market conditions.

Where a party supplies incorrect or misleading information relating to a deal, intentionally or negligently, they may be liable to an administrative fine of not less than €1,000 and not more than €10,000, as imposed by the DG. In addition, the DG may also revoke his or her decision on the compatibility of a notified concentration where it is based on incorrect information for which one of the undertakings is responsible.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The investigative process can be broadly divided into two separate phases. The first phase commences from notification and lasts until the

initial decision is issued, whereby the DG determines whether to start proceedings. The second phase comes into effect when, upon finding that a concentration raises serious doubts as to its lawfulness in terms of the CCRs, the DG initiates proceedings to further investigate and, if need be, induces modification by the applicants of the said concentration to bring it within the parameters of the CCRs.

Within this second phase, undertakings may submit commitments with a view to rendering the concentration lawful and the DG may in turn request the supply of certain additional information as well as order certain investigations to be carried out. At the end of this phase, the DG either declares the concentration to be in breach of the CCRs and therefore prohibits it, or else finds it to be allowable subject to the imposition of certain conditions, restrictions or modifications and issues a decision to that effect.

In the case of concentrations deemed not to raise serious doubts as to their legality in terms of the CCRs and falling within the ambit of the simplified procedure, the DG shall issue a short-form decision to that effect within four weeks from notification.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Although there are no specific exemptions to speed up the process, in practice pre-notification meetings with the DG and consultation on determining the precise amount of information required in a notification, explaining the product market concerned and identifying key issues and possible competition concerns, usually enables the DG to process the CN Form within shorter time frames, although legally he or she is not obliged to do so.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

To determine whether a concentration is deemed to be legal, the Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs) require the Director General (DG) to take into account, inter alia, the need to maintain and develop effective competition in the Maltese market, the geographical and product markets and potential competition from other undertakings. The test for product markets stipulates, inter alia, the need to give regard to issues of substitutability, conditions of competition, prices and cross-price elasticity of demand. The geographic market test comprises an analysis of the area in which conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and distinct from neighbouring areas. In this regard, the Maltese market, when distinct from the EU market, is generally considered as one single geographical area.

Other factors taken into account in making an assessment of a notified concentration include:

- whether the business or part of the business of a party to the concentration has failed or is likely to fail (to the best of our knowledge, there have not been any instances where this failing-firm defence has been raised);
- the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power;
- the alternatives available to suppliers and users and their access to supplies or markets;
- any legal or other barriers to entry;
- supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services;
- the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers;
- the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition; and

- the nature and extent of development and innovation in a relevant market.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

As explained previously, certain joint ventures fall under the CCRs. In addition to a general substantive test applicable to concentrations in general, in case of a joint venture the DG should have particular regard as to whether two or more parent companies retain significant activities in the same market as the joint venture or in a market that is neighbouring, downstream or upstream from that of the joint venture, and as to whether the coordination resulting from the joint venture affords the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products or services in question.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Office for Competition would request all the information as set out in Form CN for the purposes of assessing a concentration. This would include an investigation and determination of:

- its market share thresholds;
- whether there is overlap between the relevant geographic market and relevant product market;
- market power; and
- whether there is an effect on the competition in the Maltese market.

It will also consider whether the benefits derived from the merger outweigh the effects on competition in Malta. However, the company has to prove that these efficiency gains cannot otherwise be attained, are verifiable and likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, or greater innovation, choice or quality of products or services.

The Office for Competition is concerned with mergers that have horizontal effects (where two or more parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in the same product market and where the concentration will lead to a combined market share of 15 per cent or more) and vertical effects (where one or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business activities in a product market that is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other party to the concentration is engaged, and any of their individual or combined market share is 25 per cent or more, regardless of whether there is or is not any existing supplier or customer relationship between the parties to the concentration). Mergers having vertical effects will most probably create barriers to entry in the market or will increase the possibility of parties colluding in the market.

The Office for Competition is also concerned with the following issues:

- supply and demand, including supply and distribution structures, maintenance of service networks and the identity of major suppliers and customers;
- existing cooperative agreements within the market; and
- certain cases of conglomerate mergers, especially where the merger creates or enhances portfolio power.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The CCRs grant the Director General (DG) discretion to hear other persons or undertakings showing a sufficient interest in the concentration. Therefore, apart from representatives of the administrative or managerial bodies of the undertaking concerned, any third parties

showing a sufficient interest in the concentration may apply in writing to the DG to make known their views in writing or orally. However, the CCRs are clear on the relevant assessment to be made and non-competition issues are not relevant to the review process.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The CCRs lay down the framework for various economic considerations to be made. In determining whether a concentration is prohibited or not, the DG is obliged to take into account, inter alia, whether the business or part of the business, or a party to the concentration has failed or is likely to fail; and the economic and financial power of the undertakings concerned.

Concentrations that bring about or are likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than and will offset the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition resulting from or likely to result from the concentration are allowed if the undertakings prove that such efficiency gains cannot be attained otherwise and are verifiable in the form of lower prices, greater innovation and choice or quality of service to consumers.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The merger control legislation in Malta allows the relevant authority to perform the following:

- the imposition of conditions and restrictions upon the applicants when granting clearance, thereby regulating the transactions to be performed;
- revocation of clearance where:
  - the decision is based on information supplied by the undertakings that turns out to be incorrect or obtained by deceit; or
  - the undertakings concerned commit a breach of a commitment attached to the decision;
- the imposition of penalties on the undertakings concerned where such undertakings are in breach of any of the provisions of the Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs); and
- a declaration of invalidity of concentrations.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Notifying parties that are informed by the Director General (DG) that the concentration they notified raises serious doubts as to its lawfulness under the CCRs, may, within the prescribed time frames, enter into negotiations with the DG and effect modifications or otherwise submit commitments and restrictions to which the concentration will be subjected in case of clearance. There are no restrictions as such as to the method to be proposed by the notifying parties and the undertakings concerned are given adequate opportunities to remedy the situation by proposing a remedy, which can be structural as well as behavioural, including divestments. Clearance will only be given, however, if the remedies have been agreed to by the DG and the concentration will not lessen effective competition.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

No specific conditions for such remedies are established by law. The conditions would generally be stipulated by the DG and may include a time frame within which divestments or other remedies must be implemented. The DG generally adopts an approach that is similar to that adopted by the European Commission and the European courts.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Although there are foreign-to-foreign mergers that, from time to time, are notified to the Maltese authorities, so far, no occasions have arisen where such mergers were objected to in Malta. Generally, where the Maltese authorities may have had cause to object to any such merger, this would also have been stopped or objected to by authorities within the European Competition Network.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

If the parties to a concentration or other involved parties (including seller and minority shareholders), or both, enter into ancillary restraints that are directly related to and necessary to implement the concentration, these restrictions may be assessed in conjunction with the concentration itself.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs) place a considerable emphasis on customers and the preservations of their rights. In fact, Form CN requires the provision of details of the five largest independent customers of the parties to the concentration in each affected market. Within this framework, it may be envisaged that the Director General (DG) will consult these customers to determine the effect that the proposed concentration will have upon them. Moreover, the notification is required to be published and upon such publication, any interested third party, including competitors, may come forward and present their objections to the DG.

Furthermore, before taking any second-phase decision, the DG may, if he or she deems it necessary, request information from or hear other persons or undertakings that show sufficient interest in the concentration. A request of information to a third party by the DG, which, in the course of his or her investigations has not been answered, operates to suspend the running of time within which the DG is bound to give a decision, although this shall not extend the maximum allowable time frame for a decision.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Following notification, the proposed concentration is published in a local daily newspaper and in the government gazette, inviting third parties to make submissions. The information given concerns the actual notification, the names of the parties, the nature of the concentration and the economic sectors involved.

The CCRs do, however, oblige the DG, who is bound by professional secrecy, to take account of the legitimate interests of the undertakings concerned in the protection of their confidentiality and business secrets. Furthermore, information acquired by the DG during hearings or following a request made to the parties for an investigation shall be used only for the purposes of that hearing and information requested may not be disclosed.

Finally, decisions taken by the DG are published, but the CCRs once again oblige the DG to have regard for the legitimate interests of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Office for Competition is the designated competition authority under article 35 of EC Regulation 1/2003 and, as such, must cooperate with the European Commission. The Office for Competition is also a member of the European Competition Network, and is often involved in cooperation relating to various matters including investigations, interpretations and liaison with foreign authorities.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Throughout the investigation process preceding the decision, all parties may make new submissions and proposals to remedy any situation that may raise doubts as to the lawfulness of the concentration.

Persons, undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned, or any third party entitled to a hearing in accordance with the Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs), may, within 20 days of notification or publication of the decision, file an application before the Civil Court (Commercial Section) (the Court) on points of law or fact, and request an appeal from the decision of the Director General (DG). The appeal application filed does not have the effect of suspending the decision unless the Court, upon a reasonable claim raised by the party concerned in the proceedings, and after considering the submissions of all parties to the proceedings, suspends the decision under such conditions as it may deem fit.

The Court has the power to substitute its discretion for that of the DG, including the power to either confirm, modify or quash in whole or in part, the decision of the DG; where the Court quashes all or part of the decision of the DG, it may refer the matter back to the DG to take a new decision.

There is also a right to appeal on points of law or fact before the Court of Appeal by any party to the proceedings before the court who feels aggrieved by the judgment delivered by that court within 20 days from the date of the judgment of the court.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Persons, undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned, or any third party entitled to a hearing in accordance with the CCRs, may, within 20 days of notification or publication of the decision, file an application before the Civil Court (Commercial Section) (the Court) on points of law or fact, and request an appeal from the decision of the Director General (DG). The appeal application filed does not have the effect of suspending the decision unless the Court, upon a reasonable claim raised by the party concerned in the proceedings, and after considering the submissions of all parties to the

proceedings, suspends the decision under such conditions as it may deem fit.

There is also a right to appeal on points of law or fact before the Court of Appeal by any party to the proceedings before the court who feels aggrieved by the judgment delivered by that court within 20 days from the date of the judgment of the court.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Following 2011 amendments to the Competition Act, the enforcement regime was changed so that the Director General (DG) assumed the power to investigate and sanction behaviour deemed to restrict competition and if necessary impose an 'administrative fine' of 10 per cent of the turnover from the undertaking. However, in May 2016, the Maltese Constitutional Court adopted its judgment in *Federation of Estate Agents v Director General (Competition)* (3 May 2016), which held that certain provisions of the Competition Act breached the right to a fair hearing enshrined in the Constitution and, therefore, legislative amendments were required for the Office to be able to adopt any decisions finding infringements or impose penalties. Accordingly, until the Competition Act was amended, the DG was unable to impose administrative fines if there was a breach of the substantive provisions of the Competition Act.

On 31 May 2019, Act XVI of 2019 entered into force, amending the Competition Act so that the imposition of penalties can resume, but subject to a new enforcement regime. Under the Competition Act as amended, if the Office for Competition, following an investigation, considers that a breach of competition law has occurred, the DG can no longer issue a decision itself. Rather, it must file a sworn application (ie, a statement of claim confirmed on oath) before the Civil Court (Commercial Section) (the Court) against the suspected undertaking or undertakings concerned. The sworn application must contain, among other things, a summary of the facts that led the DG to find a suspected infringement of competition law and a demand to impose a fine (penalty) or other remedy on the undertaking or undertakings concerned for that breach.

As a consequence, under the Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs), although the DG may issue a decision in terms of the CCRs, the penalties contemplated under the CCR may only be imposed by the Court.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

No.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The Office for Competition has taken a more proactive approach in keeping markets under review and intervening on possible transactions, which although not notified, could give rise to a concentration in terms of the Control of Concentrations Regulations (CCRs).

In the year 2019, the Office for Competition issued 12 decisions, which were approved under the simplified procedure. Since the enactment of the CCRs, most of the transactions assessed under the CCRs have been authorised under the simplified procedure. This is owing in

part to the turnover thresholds, which may be too low and therefore capture any transaction despite not having an effect on the Maltese market in terms of the substantial lessening of competition test.

On the 5 June, 2020, the Director General issued its first decision concerning a Phase II investigation. The decision concerned the creation of a joint venture, which would take on the operations of eight retail supermarkets and one convenience shop in Malta. This is the second of the only two Phase II investigations initiated under the CCRs. A Phase II investigation was officially initiated on 13 February 2020 after the Office concluded that prima facie there was the possibility of substantial lessening of competition when defining the relevant geographic market at a local level. In delineating the relevant markets, the Office relied on three important sources of information: (1) requests for information to the market players asking their views of the boundaries of the relevant market; (2) evidence from recent local and foreign case law and market studies on the subject that offer actual examples of product and geographic substitutability including the views of competitors; and (3) a survey aimed at eliciting the views and preferences of customers on the boundaries of the product and geographic market. On the basis of the data gathered, it was decided that the transaction was not expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition in Malta. As a result, the Office declared the concentration lawful in terms of the provisions of the CCRs.

# CAMILLERI PREZIOSI

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# Mexico

Gabriel Castañeda

Castañeda y Asociados

## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The original Federal Economic Competition Law came into force in 1993 (amended in 2006 and 2011), and its implementing regulations governed merger control. Enforcement was the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Competition Commission (FCC). In 2013, the FCC was substituted by a new agency, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE).

In June 2013, stemming from an unprecedented constitutional reform in the field of telecommunications, two new agencies were created, the aforementioned COFECE and the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT), both autonomous bodies, with legal personality. The IFT is the agency that reviews pre-merger notifications related to the telecommunications and broadcasting industries, and the COFECE reviews the rest of the premerger notifications in the other areas of the economy.

The Federal Economic Competition Law (FECL) was approved in Congress and was published in the Official Gazette on 23 May 2014. The FECL replaces the 1993 Act and came into force on 7 July 2014. The core of the merger analysis was not changed, but the order of the Chapter of Merger Control and its articles was modified. The FECL preserved most of the substantive provisions of the old Act; however, it created a newly designed agency.

Organic statutes for both the COFECE and the IFT were issued in July 2014 and September 2014 (modified in October 2014) respectively. The last reform of COFECE's organic statute was published on July 2020.

In November 2014, the COFECE issued the FECL's Regulatory Provisions (updated in February 2018), while in January 2015 the IFT issued the FECL's Regulatory Provisions for the Telecommunications and Broadcasting Industries.

COFECE issued its Guidelines for merger review in October 2015 (updated in April 2017 and August 2019) and is achieving notable influence, both in merger enforcement and advocacy functions.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Article 61 of the FECL employs a very broad interpretation of 'concentrations', a term that includes mergers, acquisitions of control or any acts by which shares, trusts, equity, partnerships and assets of any kind are concentrated. Straightforward business vehicles that meet monetary thresholds should thus be informally referred to the COFECE before filing.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Under Mexican competition law, joint ventures above jurisdictional thresholds are subject to clearance before they are completed. Assessment of these cases is similar to that of other concentrations.

Although joint ventures are not addressed directly in the statute or regulations, current practice considers such arrangements as concentrations and thus subject to pre-notification rules if and when thresholds are met. Joint ventures are currently subject to rule-of-reason analysis, and where there are substantial horizontal or vertical issues in a particular case, it is therefore strongly advisable to explain and be prepared to substantiate the absence of anticompetitive concerns and efficiencies expected to arise from the joint venture to avoid incurring outright prohibition.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The FECL does not provide an explicit definition of control. However, the Supreme Court has stated that a firm can exert decisive influence or control over others *de jure* or *de facto*. Transactions meeting the broad definition of 'concentration' (merger, acquisition of control or any act) and the monetary thresholds must be notified, regardless of the nature of what is being acquired. However, minority interests, non-controlling or any other ancillary participation should be claimed as of lesser concern (or mitigating factors) in merger review. Transactions that meet the pre-merger notification thresholds, including transactions related to minority or other interests less than control, must be filed before the authority.

Minority and other interests less than control are caught, and COFECE has not formally considered 'non-controlling' interests as of lesser concern. Certain minority acquisitions are not subject to merger control, especially acquisitions by investment funds (less than 10 per cent), provided certain requirements are met.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

There are three monetary thresholds defined in article 86 of the FECL. It is sufficient to trigger one of the three sections to be bound to notify a transaction.

### Section I

The value of the transaction must exceed the threshold of 18 million times the Unit of Measure and Update (UMU), a benchmark common to all legal thresholds, currently about US\$65.1 million, considering an exchange rate of 24 Mexican pesos per US\$1. By 'value', COFECE considers the price (or consideration agreed upon) paid by the purchaser, including money, liabilities or some type of exchange of shares or other assets to be paid in Mexico.



## Section II

It has two components: the first part refers to the transfer of at least 35 per cent of shares, assets or other form of participation; and the second part is to determine if the agent object of the transaction owns assets or had sales in Mexico, regardless of destination, for more than 18 million times the UMU (about US\$65.1 million).

## Section III

It also has two components. The first one refers to the accumulation of assets or stockholders' equity for more than 8.4 million times the UMU (about US\$30 million). In case the transaction does not refer to the acquisition of all the shares of the target, the proportional value that is actually acquired is taken into account. With respect to this component, the value of the assets actually accumulated is assessed, and the value considered, refers to the higher figure between the commercial value and the value stated in the financial statements.

With respect to the second part of this section, COFECE considers the sum of assets or annual sales of the parties involved, located or generated in Mexico, separately or jointly, with a value that exceeds 48 million times the UMU (about US\$173.7 million).

## Sources of information for notification purposes

For the determination of the value of assets, sales, shares, or income and stockholders equity, the source of information is the financial statements. The required financial statements must be audited. Exceptionally, in the event of not having audited financial statements, internal financial statements may be submitted, as long as they comply with accepted financial information standards in Mexico or the country of the notifying agent.

The relevant variables to be considered in these financial statements are as outlined below.

### Value of assets

For this test, COFECE considers the higher value of the: total value of the assets as stated in the balance sheet; or commercial value of the assets, which may differ from the value stated in the financial statements.

In the case of accumulation of assets consisting of shares, the value of these will be obtained from the seller's financial statements. In cases where that value cannot be obtained, the amount of the assets can be calculated as a proportional amount of the assets of the acquired object.

### Value of sales

The FELC refers to annual sales. COFECE may also assess the concept of 'income', which appears in the statement of income of the financial statements.

Concentrations that are below the thresholds provided for in article 86 the FELC may result as questionable and thus become subject to investigation.

COFECE welcomes informal inquiries from parties regarding specific questions as to threshold analysis. Written but non-binding comfort letters may be requested if parties are clearly identified and proper powers of attorney are submitted with sufficient data to assess the specific problems prompting such inquiry.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The FECL provides for mandatory pre-merger notification only, that is, those mergers or 'concentrations' meeting or exceeding the monetary thresholds prescribed by law. However, parties may voluntarily file a notification even if the transaction does not meet or exceed the thresholds and the agency may process it as a mandatory filing, or parties may ask COFECE for guidance for planning purposes.

The FECL exempts from notification (article 93 of the FECL) among others, the following:

- mergers where the acquirer increases its participation in the acquired party over which the acquirer holds control since its incorporation or starting of operations dates, or when the COFECE has already authorised the acquisition of such control;
- corporate restructures (ie, when all participating parties belong to the same 'control group' with no third party involved);
- transactions involving firms listed on stock exchanges (Mexican or foreign) where the acquirer is allowed to purchase in one or several acts less than 10 per cent of the corresponding stock or title, and said acquirer may not exercise control over or influence the administration or corporate strategy, and may not exercise voting rights for 10 per cent or more of the stock, and may not appoint or remove the target's members of the board, directors or managers; and
- acquisitions of stock, trusts, investments or similar titles by one or more purely speculative investment fund provided that they do not already own assets or participation in any target's competitors.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

It should be expected that all mergers affecting assets or operations of economic agents doing business in Mexico will in principle be subject to pre-merger notification. However, article 86 of the FECL states that thresholds are to be assessed on a national impact basis: 'assets' are understood to include only those located within Mexican territory; and 'sales' are now understood to be only sales originated in Mexico. Only parties with combined worldwide assets or sales of approximately US\$173.7 million or more will have to notify foreign-to-foreign transactions provided that the target (worth about US\$30 million or more) is located in Mexico. There is no nexus test.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Mergers in some sectors or areas restricted for purposes of foreign investment also need to be cleared with the relevant authorities. Mergers in telecommunications are heavily regulated and will not be cleared by COFECE, but a specialised sectorial agency (IFT). In any event, compliance with legislation and other administrative filings should be consistently planned to avoid further requests or unwanted delay. COFECE does not prejudge about other authorisations the involved economic agents must obtain from other authorities.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The Federal Economic Competition Law (FECL) provides that mergers reaching or exceeding legal thresholds must be notified to the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) or the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT) before they are carried out. A general recommendation regarding a deal with evident complexity or antitrust concerns would be:

- to consult on complex horizontal mergers with the respective agency before any important information is actually shared between parties;
- to exchange letters of intent or enter into similar agreements, subject to COFECE or IFT approval;

- to refrain from actual transfer of assets or administration; and
- to refrain from publicly announcing completion or closing.

If a special time frame for the deal or special confidential arrangements are needed, it is advisable to approach the agencies to obtain their approval of such arrangements.

Penalties for not filing reportable transactions may be up to 5 per cent of the turnover in Mexico of the parties involved.

#### 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Article 88 of the FECL provides that all participating parties must file, but at the same time accepts that one party may act as a common representative. Parties should be seen to be disclosing the information needed for a proper assessment of the merger. Because each merger may raise different economic and legal issues, according to the specific market circumstances of the case, it is advisable to make sufficient plans before appearing before the respective competition agency so that information that is best suited to the purpose of convincing the authorities can be supplied, thereby avoiding requests that may delay full completion of the deal. In any case, once all the data has been gathered and the briefs or questionnaires have been completed, it is generally advisable to have access to both parties' data and information, except for information that is clearly confidential. The filing fee for a notification is the equivalent to about US\$8,000.

#### 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Article 87 of the FECL orders parties not to close all reportable transactions until the final resolution is issued. Thus, there are no waiting periods. However, it is possible to sign the merger's contracts establishing a suspensive condition to obtain COFECE's approval.

#### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

While there are no specific sanctions for closing before clearance, article 127, section VII states that penalties for 'illegal transactions' may be up to 8 per cent of parties' involved turnover in Mexico. A non-reported transaction may be deemed an 'illegal transaction'. Two recent transactions were fined for closing before notification (fines between US\$1 million and US\$3 million).

#### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

No. Foreign-to-foreign transactions with no effects in Mexico are not bound to be notified. But if the transaction has to be notified and the parties close before clearance, penalties will be triggered therein.

#### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Foreign-to-foreign transactions with no effects in Mexico are not bound to be notified. Foreign-to-foreign transactions with effects in Mexico must be authorised before closing.

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No.

#### Documentation

#### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Filings can be of two basic kinds. The 'general' procedure, with ordinary time frames (60 working days to issue a resolution), and a 'fast-track' procedure for simple and evident cases, with a shorter time frame (15 working days, as discussed in the following sections). The information that should be submitted is the same for both procedures, but the fast-track procedure requires further detail to prove that it is 'evident' that the merger is not anticompetitive and that the parties are not 'potential competitors', which requires a higher burden of proof. Parties usually opt to file under the ordinary procedure, which requires the data and information necessary to define the relevant market and to assess market power, in which case they are faced with a rather cumbersome requests for information or with preparing a technical brief addressing the competition issues and even offering econometric analyses to support complex cases.

Solid market data and economic reasoning offer the best guarantee of good results and of avoiding misunderstandings of a factual or analytical nature. A balance must be struck between the quantity of data and simplicity of the argument. Most of the time spent before filing should be dedicated to the planning of information gathering so as to avoid delays and minimise the risk of the competition agencies' opposition.

All information must be in Spanish, with proper translations of non-Spanish material.

Depending upon the complexity of the transaction and the extent and quality of the information available, a typical filing may be 10 to 40 pages long (excluding the formal and analytical annexes). It may take anything from one to six weeks to complete the filing in non-complex cases.

Article 89 of the FECL points out the notification brief must include:

- names of the parties involved in the transaction;
- names of legal representatives (and public documents to demonstrate the representation);
- description of the transaction (and relevant transaction documents);
- explanation of the rationale of the transaction;
- incorporation deeds and public by-laws of the parties involved;
- financial statements of the parties;
- description of the parties' stock structure;
- activities of economic agents involved to the transaction, about holding an interest in the capital stock, management or in any activity of companies which may produce or trade similar or related goods or services to or having substantial relationship with the goods and services of the economic agents participating in the concentration;
- parties' and competitors' market share information;
- location of parties' facilities;
- description of products or services manufactured or sold by the parties involved; and
- any other important information.

If the notifying parties fail to submit the information requested in article 89 of the FECL, COFECE may declare the transaction as not filed (section II, article 90 of the FECL). In addition, parties may be fined for up to approximately US\$635,000 for submitting false information.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Parties are welcomed by the staff to engage in pre-notification informal conversations. Article 92 of the FECL grants parties the right to request, from the day of filing, that the transaction should be reviewed under a 'fast-track' procedure if the parties can convince COFECE that the proposed transaction evidently may not lessen, harm or impair the competitive process. If the parties are successful, COFECE shall issue a ruling within 15 business days (15 days from the issuance of an admissibility ruling issued by COFECE stating that no further information is needed for assessing the transaction). The fast-track analysis includes a general principle subject to several conditioning factors: parties must state that the acquirer does not already participate in markets related to the target's relevant market. In practice, fast-track proceedings are rarely used.

When the written notification fails to comply with the requirements established in article 89 of the FECL, the authority, within the following 10 business days after the notification has been filed, shall inform the notifying parties that their notification is not complete and will grant an additional 10-business-day period for the parties to submit the missing information or documents. Said period may be extended per request of the notifying party in duly justified cases (the 'basic information request').

Once the notification brief is complete, the competition agency may issue a second request of information and data within 15 business days.

After the additional information request for information is met, the competition agency has 60 business days to issue a ruling. If the authority fails to issue such ruling, under a 'sunset provision' the filing is deemed approved by default (although this is a most uncommon event). Before the 60-business-day period elapses, the authority may extend this period by up to an additional 40 business days, which would bring the whole filing review period to a total of around 105 business days, depending on when time is counted from in each specific case. In extreme cases, however, the final resolution could take up to 155 business days.

A hands-on and fully cooperative approach by the parties may shorten the review process. The staff is usually expected to verify key data/information.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The timetable for clearance is the same as for the investigation.

In addition, parties may be asked to explain, orally or in writing, some of the data or arguments in the filing (a formal second request for information). The respective competition agency may conduct an investigation to complement information contained in the filing, which may involve requesting data or information from competitors, clients or suppliers. Each agency's enforcement branch then produces a report with a recommendation to be submitted to each authority's seven-member Commissioners' Panel. This panel issues a ruling. Parties may appeal against the ruling before a federal judge strictly on constitutional grounds.

Article 90 of the FECL defines the timeline for clearance since notification to the final resolution.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The main substantive test is whether the transaction will reduce, impair or prevent competition. Theoretically, the pro-competitive effects of the proposed transaction should be weighed against the anticompetitive effects.

The main test is then broken down into three sub-tests:

- acquisition of market power to the extent of being able to determine price levels or restrict output in the relevant market;
- intent to displace or the effect of displacing competitors orientated to obstruct or with the effect of obstructing market entry; and
- intent to facilitate, or the effect of facilitating monopolistic practices by merging parties (rule-of-reason offences or 'abuse of dominant position' such as refusals to deal, exclusivity agreements, resale price maintenance, boycotts, predatory pricing, discrimination, cross-subsidies and other vertical conduct cases, as well as potential incentives to incur in horizontal behaviour).

In May 2015, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) issued a Resolution related to the technical criteria for calculating and applying a quantitative index in horizontal merger analysis. According to this Resolution, COFECE uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and the proposed 'safe harbours' are:

- the value of the increase of HHI ( $\Delta$ ) is less than 100 points;
- the value of HHI after the transaction is below 2,000 points; and
- the value of HHI after the transaction is between 2,000 and 2,500 points,  $\Delta$  is located between 100 and 150 points, and the resulting economic agent after the transaction is not one of the four largest economic agents in the relevant market.

The history of rulings shows that special circumstances, such as an alleged failing firm, although sometimes addressed in the past, are rarely awarded notable influence.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Precedents or practice may not be associated with any single theory of harm. Depending on the case at hand, the agencies focus on the analysis of a combination of the following outcomes: market dominance, joint dominance, unilateral effects, coordinated effects and vertical foreclosure. However, no special predominance on any theory may be singled out. However, rulings to condition or block transactions show mostly concerns over high combined market shares, even in the presence of broad geographical market definitions such as, for example, the 'North American Area'.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The 2013 constitutional reform created the new COFECE and the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT) as autonomous bodies. Therefore, when reviewing mergers, non-competition issues should not be relevant for the review process.

However, because COFECE and the IFT are still young agencies, there are no public precedents regarding this particular issue.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Article 55 of the Federal Economic Competition Law formally recognises that the agency must review claimed efficiency gains stemming from the merger (or the conduct) that favourably affect the competition process. These efficiency gains may include the following: the introduction of new products, products on bargain sale, defective or perishable products, cost reductions arising from the creation of new technologies and production methods, integration of assets, increases in the scale of production, the introduction of technological innovation, the combination of productive assets or investments to improve the quality or extend the attributes of goods and services, improvements in quality, and others that do not cause a significant increase in prices or a significant reduction in consumer choice, and others causing such net contributions to consumer welfare that outweigh anticompetitive effects.

However, at the time of writing, no transaction has been cleared under findings based on economic efficiencies. Despite theoretically being accepted by the statute, in practice the agency is rather resistant to admit allegations thereon: in a transaction that was blocked in 2017 by COFECE (*REA/Magnekon*), the parties appeared to have submitted a comprehensive study of merger-specific efficiencies with quantitative support. Moreover, alleged efficiencies represented potential reductions in variable costs, which are generally expected to benefit final customers. In addition, the parties submitted alleged evidence of a recent transaction in the same relevant market in which the efficiencies originally estimated in that case were obtained and actually passed through customers. COFECE concluded that many of the claimed efficiencies had positive effects, but decided to rule that the parties failed to prove that those efficiencies would be passed on to consumers. The resolution did not include estimations of potential harm to allow balancing procompetitive effects against expected anticompetitive effects.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The competition agencies may order divestiture of assets, impose conditions or block the whole transaction outright. The Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) has imposed stringent conditions in several cases.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. Article 90, penultimate paragraph, of the Federal Economic Competition Law allows parties to offer undertakings that may remedy potential antitrust concerns during the review process, including divestment of certain assets or behavioural remedies as a condition for clearance. The notifying parties may submit, from the moment the written notification is filed and until one day after the concentration is scheduled for a Board of Commissioners session, draft conditions to avoid impairing, damaging or preventing the competitive process and free market access as a result of the concentration.

Rulings show that the COFECE often addresses or accepts undertakings related to divestment of assets.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The conditions will depend upon the nature and extent of the antitrust concerns at hand; however, COFECE may accept schedules that set up timing and other relevant facts to ensure that parties comply with agreed undertakings. COFECE may appoint a trustee, for example, to oversee specific divestiture procedures. The Commission's Technical Secretariat performs these oversight and compliance functions.

Regarding transactions considered to pose possible risks to the competitive process, COFECE informs the notifying parties about the risks identified (within a 10-day period prior to the case being scheduled for a Board of Commissioners session), to allow the parties to propose conditions or remedies that may correct the aforementioned risks.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There is no public track record of a special nature, as foreign-to-foreign mergers with no effects in Mexico are not bound to be notified. For transactions with effects in Mexico from 2013 to 2019, 18 transactions were subject to undertakings; some of them were even subject to investigation or penalties stemming from the lack of compliance thereof.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

It is not uncommon for COFECE rulings to include restrictions concerning potential spillover effects over related markets under its powers to prevent anticompetitive conduct. In addition, COFECE may impose remedies to address the effects of anticompetitive restrictions. COFECE has published guidelines regarding ancillary restraints, mostly referred to non-compete covenants.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In complex cases, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) issues requests for information to customers, suppliers, competitors, or other authorities strengthen its analysis (notifying parties do not have access to these responses). Third parties have no legal rights to access a merger file. Filings and submitted documents, as well as third parties' responses of information, are not public.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Notifications and the process of merger review are not public. The only publicity given to any process is the publication of a redacted version of the final decision.

According to article 124 of the Federal Economic Competition Law (FECL), the information and documents obtained directly by the competition agencies during its investigations and inquiries will be considered as reserved information, confidential information or public information, under the terms of article 125 of the FECL.

During the investigation, access to the file is forbidden to third parties, and, in the aftermath of the procedure, only firms with legitimate legal interest may have access to it, with the exception of information classified as confidential.

Public officials will be subject to responsibility of the information they are presented with. When an order of a competent authority compels the presentation of information, the COFECE and the aforementioned authority shall dictate the measures that will be in place to protect the confidentiality in the terms of the FECL.

Article 125 of the FECL states that confidential information will only be considered as such when requested by the economic agent, and proves its confidentiality. That is, the merging parties involved are asked to identify their confidential information and to prove that the standards of confidential information protection are applicable. Under no circumstances will COFECE or the Federal Institute of Telecommunications be compelled to provide confidential information, nor will it be able to publish it. It will have to keep the information safe to this effect.

The public officials of the competition agencies shall abstain from publicly issuing declarations or revealing information related to the files or matters in process at the respective agency and that could cause harm or directly affect the parties involved, until the economic agent subject to investigation has been notified of the final resolution, preserving at all times the obligations that result from this article.

The COFECE has a strong reputation for keeping the confidentiality of all data and documents provided.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Mexico has entered into several international arrangements (agreements implementing competition chapters, annexes or memoranda of understanding) to coordinate and cooperate in competition enforcement matters, including: NAFTA (NAFTA was signed in 1994, but the competition cooperation agreement implementing the competition chapter is dated July 2000), the European Union (2000), the European Free Trade Association (2000), the United States (2000), Israel (2000), Canada (2001), Chile (2004), Korea (2004), Japan (2004), El Salvador (2007), Russia (2010), Nicaragua (2011) and the Dominican Republic (2012). Such arrangements provide the usual positive comity, exchange of non-confidential information, coordination, cooperation and related items.

Waivers are commonly requested in multi-jurisdictional transactions.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

From the creation of the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFT) as autonomous constitutional bodies, and as stated in article 28 of the Mexican Constitution, actions or omissions of COFECE and IFT may be challenged only through indirect *Amparo* (recourse on constitutional grounds) judgment.

The 2013 constitutional reform states that the resolutions issued by COFECE or IFT may be contested only by the filing of indirect *Amparo* and will not be subject to suspension. In cases in which COFECE imposes fines or orders the divestiture of assets, those resolutions will be executed until the *Amparo* proceeding is resolved. The *Amparo* proceeding is conducted by specialised judges and courts in the terms of article 94 of the Constitution. In no case will ordinary or constitutional remedies against proceeding acts be accepted.

The judiciary has set up specialised tribunals of circuit and district courts in areas of economic competition, broadcasting and telecommunications. Since the 2013 constitutional reform, legislation or regulations offer little incentives for recourse of merger cases before courts. The specialised circuit courts and district judges have reviewed *Amparo* lawsuits related to the imposition of conditions (for example, for the *Soriana* merger case (file CNT-021-2015) in which conditions were imposed (COND-001-2016 (JA-067-2019)) or transactions that were not authorised, but were reviewed by courts (for example, file CNT-025-2019, another transaction related to the *Soriana* merger).

In addition, the courts have reviewed cases in which COFECE has imposed fines on unreported transactions and have confirmed COFECE's decisions.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

For court recourse, parties must file petitions within 15 business days of being notified of the final resolution. A district judge may take several months to issue its ruling. Parties may appeal before a circuit tribunal as a last resort. The appeal may take between one and five years to be ruled upon. As indicated in the previous question, the Council of the Federal Judiciary has established new specialised circuit tribunals and district courts in the fields of economic competition, broadcasting and telecommunications.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2019, the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) resolved 134 cases. Of those cases, two were blocked and none was conditioned. The most recent notable case reviewed in 2019 was *Walmart/Cornershop*.

Current enforcement concerns for both agencies include the implementation of the Federal Law of Economic Competition, the publication of refined technical criteria and predictable rulings, lack of procedural transparency and the effectiveness and incentives of recourse to competition and telecomm courts.

COFECE is currently facing considerable challenges in enforcing competition principles amid wider government efforts to return influence to state-controlled entities in industries such as oil and energy.

As of 24 January 2020, the notification of a concentration can only be made through COFECE's electronic system, which simplifies the procedures and reduces costs and time.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

No. The current Federal Law on Economic Competition was approved in Congress, published in the Official Gazette on 23 May 2014, and came into force on 7 July 2014.

In June 2013, Congress made amendments to article 28 of the Mexican Constitution concerning telecommunications industries. The amendments include the creation of the Federal Institute of Telecommunications, which is entitled to review competition issues (mergers, acquisitions and monopolistic practices) in telecommunications industries.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

#### Walmart/Cornershop

The Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) blocked the concentration between Walmart and Cornershop. COFECE concluded that, if the deal went through, Walmart could unduly displace its competitors in the relevant market for logistical services for the exhibition, the purchase and immediate delivery of products sold by supermarkets and membership price clubs through websites and mobile apps to final consumers.

Among those aspects analysed by COFECE in this file, the following potential risks were identified: Cornershop could refuse to offer its services to Walmart competitors; Walmart could refuse to retail its products on platforms operated by Cornershop's competitors; and the new economic agent resulting from the transaction could induce Walmart's competitors to abandon the Cornershop platform through the strategic use of information produced and provided by competitors to retail their products. In this case, commitments proposed by Walmart and Cornershop were insufficient as they did not avoid the concentration's possible negative effects. Thus, COFECE resolved not to authorise the concentration.

#### BorgWarner/Remy Holdings

COFECE cleared the transaction between BorgWarner and Remy Holdings International; however, they were fined for failing to notify the concentration before closing the operation. The transaction between Remy and BorgWarner exceeded the thresholds the Federal Economic Competition Law stipulates. The transaction was carried out in October 2016, but it was not notified to COFECE until October 2018. Considering the aforementioned, COFECE fined each economic agent involved in the transaction for 1.4 million Mexican pesos (approximately US\$70,000 in January 2019).

**CASTAÑEDA Y ASOCIADOS**  
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# Morocco

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Moroccan merger control rules used to be laid down in Law No. 06-99 of 5 June 2000 (Dahir No. 01-00-225) on free pricing and competition and its enforcement Decree No. 2-00-854 (the former legal framework).

Under the former legal framework, the Chief of Government had decision-making power and the Competition Council had a consultative role when the notified concentration was likely to infringe competition. The opinions of the Competition Council mentioned in this article were released by the Competition Council under the former legal framework.

The new Moroccan merger control rules are set out in Law No. 104-12 of 30 June 2014 (Dahir No. 1-14-116) on free pricing and competition (the Competition Law) and its enforcement decree No. 2-14-652 of 1 December 2014 (the Decree) and in Law No. 20-13 relating to the Competition Council of 30 June 2014 (Dahir No. 1-14-117) and its enforcement Decree No. 2-15-109 of 4 June 2015.

The Competition Law and Law No. 20-13 significantly modify the roles of the merger control authorities:

- the merger control function has been transferred to the Competition Council; and
- the administration, through the Chief of Government or the delegated governmental authority, retains residual powers (in particular, an evocation power on the decisions of the Competition Council for matters of public interest).

The Competition Law had, in principle, entered into force in December 2015, after the issuance of the ministerial order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Governance No. 3633 (3 December 2015) referred to the Minimis Rules, but has only been applicable since the appointment of the new president and members of the Competition Council, which occurred at the end of 2018.

When the notified concentration concerns specific sectors, sectoral regulators are consulted by the Competition Council. This includes the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ANRT) for the telecommunications sector; the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA) for the audiovisual market; the Bank Al-Maghrib for banks; the Financial Market Authority (AMMC) for the capital market; the Supervisory Authority for Insurance and Social Security; and the National Ports Agency (ANP) for ports.

Article 109 of the Competition Law provides that, unless the relationship between the Competition Council and the sectoral regulators is addressed in the constitutive texts of these institutions, the Competition Council will, from a date defined by a future regulation, exercise its jurisdiction on all sectors.

In the specific case of the telecommunications industry, it should be noted that Law No. 24-96 authorises the ANRT to enforce the concentration control provisions in its industry.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

According to article 11 of the Competition Law, a concentration occurs where:

- two or more previously independent undertakings merge;
- one or more persons, already controlling at least one undertaking, acquire, directly or indirectly, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings; and
- one or more undertakings acquire, directly or indirectly, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, control of the whole or parts of one other or more other undertakings.

The Competition Law also states that the creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an economic entity shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of the Moroccan merger control law.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures might fall under the scope of the Competition Law provided that they perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an economic entity (article 11 of the Competition Law).

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Law defines control under article 11 as resulting from rights, contracts or any other means that confer, either separately or in combination, having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, the possibility to exercise a decisive influence on the activity of an undertaking and, notably:

- ownership rights or rights of use over all or parts of the assets of an undertaking; or
- rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Competition Law and the Decree have introduced additional turnover notification thresholds to the pre-existing market-share threshold. Under this framework, a concentration must be notified to the Competition Council when one of the three following conditions is fulfilled:

- the combined aggregate worldwide pre-tax turnover of all the undertakings or groups of natural or legal persons parties to the concentration is equal to or more than 750 million dirhams;
- the aggregate Moroccan-wide pre-tax turnover of at least two of the undertakings or groups of natural or legal persons concerned by the concentration is equal to or more than 250 million dirhams; or
- the undertakings that are parties to the concentration, or that are the subject of the concentration, or the undertakings that are economically linked to them, have generated altogether, during the previous calendar year, more than 40 per cent of the sales, purchases or other transactions on a national market of identical or substitutable goods, products or services, or on a significant part of such market.

The Decree provides that different turnover thresholds may be established for certain specific sectors or geographic areas by the Chief of Government or the government authority delegated by the latter for this purpose.

The Moroccan legislation does not define the undertakings that are 'economically linked' to the undertakings that are parties to the concentration or the subject of the concentration and we assume that this term includes at a minimum their subsidiaries, their parent companies and their sister companies.

According to the Competition Council, it is necessary to notify a transaction when only one of the parties involved, for example the target company, has a market share exceeding the 40 per cent threshold and when the planned concentration will thus not lead to any addition of market shares. The Competition Council has already examined concentrations where the acquirer was not present in the same sector as the target company in Morocco (for example, Opinion No. 36/13 relating to the acquisition of 6 per cent of the capital of CMA CGM by the Strategic Investment Fund) and where only the target company was active in Morocco (for example, Opinion of November 2011 relating to the acquisition by CCPL of Ono Packaging Maghreb and Opinion No. 37/13 relating to the acquisition of 49 per cent of the shares and voting rights of Terminal Link by China Merchants).

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Under article 12 of the Competition Law, the filing is mandatory and the Moroccan legislation does not provide for any exception to this rule.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified where they fulfil one of the thresholds for notification.

### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Concerning foreign investments, a convertibility regime is set up in favour of foreign investments by the 'Instruction Générale des opérations de change 2020' of the Foreign Exchange Office. Concerning foreign exchange regulations, the convertibility regime guarantees to the foreign investors concerned freedom to carry out their investment operations, as defined by the Instruction, in Morocco, transfer any income from such investments, and transfer back any income resulting from the transfer or liquidation of their investments when the investments have been made in foreign currencies. To proceed with the transfer, the foreign investor must provide the bank in charge of the transfer with some supporting documents. Moreover, the convertibility regime holds that an investor must, within four months of the date of the foreign investment, file a report with the Foreign Exchange Office including all the details and supporting documents of the transaction (investor's identity, business sector, amount, bank certificates, etc) and must also file an annual summary declaration within four months of the end of the calendar year.

Certain sectoral authorities are in charge of the regulation of special sectors:

- telecommunications – ANRT;
- the audiovisual market – HACA;
- banks – Bank Al-Maghrib;
- the capital market – AMMC;
- insurance – the Supervisory Authority for Insurance and Social Security; and
- ports – ANP.

According to Law No. 20-13, the Competition Council shall seek the opinions of the sectoral regulators on competition issues relating to their sectors of activity. Article 8 of Law No. 20-13 provides for a consultation procedure.

Article 109 of the Competition Law provides that, unless the relationship between the Competition Council and the sectoral regulators is addressed in the constitutive texts of these institutions, the Competition Council will, from a date defined by a future regulation, exercise its jurisdiction on all sectors.

In 2019, the Competition Council entered into a cooperation agreement with the Bank Al-Maghrib to specify their collaboration concerning the competitive issues in the banking industry.

In the specific case of the telecommunications industry, Law No. 24-96 and its enforcement decree authorises ANRT to enforce the concentration control provisions in its industry. To the best of our knowledge, this jurisdiction has never been implemented by the ANRT (however, in 2020, the ANRT applied the provisions of the Competition Law prohibiting the abuses of a dominant position to impose on Maroc Telecom a fine of 3.3 billion dirhams).

Moreover, specific turnover thresholds may be established for certain specific sectors or geographic areas by the Chief of Government or the government authority delegated by the latter for this purpose.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The transaction must be notified to the Competition Council before its completion, as soon as the parties concerned are able to present a sufficiently concrete file to allow the investigation of the case and,

in particular, when they have entered into an agreement in principle, signed a letter of intent, or as of the announcement of a public offer.

The sanctions for not filing are as follows:

- for legal entities responsible for filing: a fine amounting to a maximum of 5 per cent of the pre-tax turnover made in Morocco during the last fully closed financial year, increased, when applicable, by the turnover made in Morocco during the same period by the acquired company; and
- for natural persons responsible for filing: a fine of a maximum amount of 5 million dirhams.

Moreover, upon failure to file a notification, the Competition Council compels the parties, subject to a daily penalty payment, to notify the operation, unless they revert to the previous state of affairs.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

This notification obligation is the responsibility of the natural or legal persons who acquire control of all or part of an undertaking or, in the case of a merger or the creation of a joint venture, of all parties concerned, who must then notify jointly.

There are no filing fees.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The Competition Council must rule on the transaction within 60 days of receipt of the complete notification file (Phase I). In case of opening of an in-depth investigative phase, the Competition Council has 90 additional days to take its decision (Phase II). These time limits may be extended or suspended.

Under article 12 of the Competition Law, the filing has a suspensive effect. The parties are thus not entitled to implement their concentration plan as long as the Competition Council (or the administration, if it takes on the case) has not authorised the transaction.

Nevertheless, in case of duly motivated need, the parties can ask the Competition Council for an exemption to this suspensive effect, allowing them to actually complete all or part of the transaction without waiting for an authorisation decision of the competition authorities and without prejudice of this decision (article 14, paragraph 2 of the Competition Law).

#### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

According to article 19 of the Competition Law, closing a concentration before clearance may lead to the application of the fines imposed for failure to file a concentration.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

No specific rules concerning the sanctions to apply in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers are established by the Moroccan competition legislation and the sanctions for closing before clearance should be applicable in these cases.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Moroccan legislation provides no specific solutions permitting closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger.

In case of duly motivated need, the parties to a foreign-to-foreign merger can, however, ask the Competition Council for an exemption to the suspensive effect to allow them to close the transaction before clearance (article 14, paragraph 2 of the Competition Law).

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No specific merger rules are applicable to public takeover bids. The Competition Council seems to apply the general rules and principles of the Moroccan legislation to assess such concentration, as illustrated for example in its Opinion No. 9/10 relating to the public takeover bid launched by Kraft Foods Inc over Cadbury Plc.

#### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The notification file submitted to the Competition Council must contain specific information and documents listed in the Decree as regards:

- the contemplated operation (including a copy of the agreement subject to the notification);
- the undertakings concerned and the groups to which they belong (including, in particular, their annual accounts, a list of their main shareholders, etc);
- a presentation of the relevant product and geographic markets concerned (including the markets shares of the parties); and
- when a market is affected, a detailed presentation of this market and of the firms active in this market (including the market shares of the parties).

A market is considered to be affected when:

- one or more undertakings operate on the concerned market and have an aggregated market share reaching 25 per cent or more;
- at least one of the concerned undertakings operates on the concerned market and another of the concerned undertakings operates on the upstream, downstream or associated market, whether or not there exist supplier relations, as long as all the concerned undertakings reach a 25 per cent market share; or
- the operation leads to the eviction of a potential competitor on the market.

In case of wrong or missing information in the notification file, the Competition Council can impose the fines for failure to file a concentration and also withdraw its authorisation decision. Unless the parties revert to the previous state of affairs, they must once again notify the transaction within one month from the withdrawal of the decision.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

No pre-notification contacts are required.

Upon receiving a notification file, the Competition Council must publish a release containing, in particular, a non-confidential summary of the transaction and the time frame in which interested third parties are invited to make observations.

During Phase I, the Competition Council will examine the file and designate a case officer to follow up the file and conduct the investigation.

The case handler organises a meeting to discuss the case and check the completeness of the file.

If the Competition Council considers, at the end of Phase I, that serious doubts remain as to the risk of infringing competition (or at the request of the governmental authority in charge of competition), a Phase II investigation is opened to conduct an in-depth analysis of the transaction.

During Phase II, a report is sent to the parties and to the Government Commissioner. This report contains a statement of the facts as well as the elements of information on the basis of which the case officer has based its analysis and the observations of the parties, if any.

Hearings at the Competition Council are not public. Only the concerned parties and the Government Commissioner may attend such hearings. The Competition Council may also hear all persons in a position to contribute information on the case.

At the end of Phase II, a draft of the decision is communicated to the concerned parties who may present their observations within 10 days.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The timetable for clearance is as follows.

#### Phase I (60 days)

According to article 15 of the Competition Law, the Competition Council must rule on the transaction within 60 days of receipt of the complete notification file.

If commitments are offered by the parties, this 60-day time limit is extended by 20 days.

In case of particular necessity, such as the finalisation of the commitments, the parties may ask the Competition Council to suspend the deadline for a maximum of 20 days.

At the end of Phase I, the Competition Council may either:

- decide that the notified transaction does not fall under the scope of the merger control;
- authorise the operation subject, where applicable, to the effective implementation of the remedies proposed by the notifying parties;
- open an in-depth analysis of the transaction (Phase II) if it finds that serious doubts remain as to the risk of infringing competition; or
- refrain from adopting any of the above decisions.

Within 20 days after having received a copy of the decision or having been informed of it by the Competition Council, the government authority in charge of competition may ask the Council to open a Phase II investigation.

The transaction is deemed to be authorised upon the conclusion of this 20-day time limit.

#### Phase II (90 days)

According to article 17 of the Competition Law, the Competition Council must determine within 90 days whether the transaction is likely to infringe competition, notably by creating or strengthening a dominant position or a buying power that places suppliers in a position of economic

dependency. The Competition Council also assesses whether the contemplated transaction brings a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

If the notifying parties offer commitments to remedy the anticompetitive effects of the contemplated operation less than 30 days before the end of the 90-day deadline, the deadline will then expire 30 days after the reception of the commitments. Moreover, the 90-day deadline may be suspended for up to 30 days at the parties' request in case of particular necessity, notably to finalise their commitments.

The deadline may also be suspended by the Competition Council, in particular when the notifying parties have failed to provide it with the requested information or to inform it of the occurrence of a new material event. The time limit resumes when the cause of the suspension has been addressed.

The Competition Council may, at the end of the Phase II, either:

- authorise the operation subject to, where applicable, the effective implementation of commitments offered by the notifying parties;
- authorise the operation, while requiring the parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure sufficient competition or to comply with instructions destined to provide a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements; or
- prohibit the concentration and require the parties, when applicable, to take all appropriate measures to re-establish sufficient competition.

Upon receiving a copy of the decision or being informed of it by the Competition Council, the Chief of Government, or the delegated government authority, may within 30 days exert its power and issue a decision on the transaction for reasons of public interest (such as industrial development, competitiveness of the companies within the international context or job creation).

The transaction is deemed to be authorised when this 30-day time limit has expired.

The Moroccan competition legislation does not contain any accelerated procedure.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance is whether the planned concentration is likely to infringe competition, notably by creating or strengthening a dominant position or a buying power that places suppliers in a position of economic dependency.

During Phase II, the Competition Council also takes into account whether the contemplated concentration brings a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The Moroccan legislation does not provide for a special substantive test for joint ventures.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Competition Council assesses the effects of the concentration on competition and determines whether the transaction would lead to:

- horizontal effects: the Council examines whether the concentration would lead to an overlap of the merging parties' activities and to an addition of their market shares that would create or reinforce

- a dominant position on the relevant market and allow the merging parties to act independently from their competitors and customers;
- vertical effects: the Competition Council assesses whether the concentration would foreclose the access to the upstream markets (for example, Opinion relating to the acquisition by Vitol and Helios of Shell du Maroc and Butagaz Maroc);
- conglomerate effects: the Competition Council examines whether the concentration would lead to an expansion and a diversification of the merging parties' product ranges and trademarks that would increase their market power and enable them to impede competition through practices such as tie-in sales or bundled rebates (for example, Opinion No. 31/12 relating to a concentration concerning the SNI and Kraft Foods Maroc); and
- coordinated effects: the Competition Council assesses whether the merging parties will, after the transaction, be able to coordinate their behaviour on the market and whether the transaction will thus lead to the creation or the strengthening of a collective dominant position (for example, Opinion No. 9/10 relating to the public takeover bid launched by Kraft Foods Inc over Cadbury Plc).

To carry out this assessment, the Competition Council defines the relevant product or services market and the geographical dimension of these relevant markets and conducts in particular an analysis of the market structure, the market shares of the parties involved and of their actual and potential competitors, the entry barriers, the importations and exportations on the relevant markets, the customers and the suppliers of the parties involved.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

During Phase II, the Competition Law requires the Competition Council to assess whether the operation concerned provides a sufficient contribution to the economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

Thus, the Competition Council conducts not only a competitive assessment, but also an economic assessment of the concentration.

For example, in its Opinion relating to a concentration concerning the SNI and Danone (No. 32/12), the Competition Council had taken into account the fact that Danone's strategy was in line with the goals of a Moroccan environmental programme.

Therefore, the parties involved in the concentration are also asked by the Competition Council about the aim of the transaction and its impact on Moroccan economic situation (the contemplated investments, the anticipated impact of the transaction on the employment situation, the evolution of the range of products or services offered to the consumers, etc).

Non-competition issues are also taken into account when the Chief of Government, or the delegated government authority, exercises its power and issues a decision on the transaction for reasons of public interest (such as industrial development, the competitiveness of the companies within the international context or job creation).

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies should be taken into account in Phase II of the review process, during which the Competition Council has to assess whether the concentration provides a sufficient contribution to economic progress to compensate for its anticompetitive effects.

The efficiencies that are taken into account by the Competition Council are, in particular, the improvement of product quality, product diversification, technical improvement in the relevant sector, price

reductions, job creations, increase in exports, and the stimulating effect of the transaction on the competitive environment of the relevant market.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition Council may prohibit a transaction at the end of Phase II and, if necessary, require the parties to take all appropriate measures to re-establish sufficient competition.

The Council can also authorise the operation, while requiring the parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure sufficient competition or to comply with instructions destined to provide a sufficient contribution to economic progress to offset the competition infringements.

Similarly, at the end of Phase II, the Chief of Government or the delegated governmental authority may prohibit a transaction after having considered the case.

In addition, according to article 20 of the Competition Law, if an undertaking abuses its dominant position or a state of economic dependency, the Competition Council may enjoin the undertakings concerned to modify, complete or terminate all of the agreements and measures that gave rise to the concentration of economic power that enabled these abuses. The Competition Council can apply these provisions even if these measures have already been subject to the merger control process.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Structural or behavioural remedies can be proposed by the notifying parties or imposed by the Competition Council to remedy or compensate for the adverse effects of the planned concentration on competition.

In 2012, the Competition Council rendered its first opinion regarding commitments (Opinion No. 31/12 relating to a concentration concerning the SNI and Kraft Foods Maroc) where it recommended the Chief of Government authorise the transaction subject to Kraft Foods respecting various behavioural commitments, such as not practising tie-in sales or offering bundled rebates, and complying with the competition code of conduct and compliance programme. The Council highlighted the fact that these commitments should be made public.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The parties are allowed to propose commitments:

- along with the notification file;
- at any moment before the end of Phase I; or
- during Phase II, as soon as they have been informed of its opening.

When commitments are offered by the parties during Phase I, the 60-day time limit is extended by 20 days and may be suspended for a maximum of 20 days at the parties' request to finalise their commitments.

If commitments are offered by the parties during Phase II less than 30 days before the end of the 90-day deadline, the deadline will expire 30 days after the reception of the commitments. The Phase II deadline may also be suspended for up to 30 days at the parties' request to finalise the commitments.

The Competition Council, at the end of Phase I or Phase II, and the Chief of Government (or the delegated government authority) if it evokes the case, may authorise the operation subject to the effective implementation of commitments by the parties.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To the best of our knowledge, the Competition Council has not yet required remedies in a foreign-to-foreign merger.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

To date, this is uncertain. The Competition Law and the Decree do not address this issue. The decisional practice of the Competition Council will certainly clarify this point in the future and should follow the position of the European Commission.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

After receiving the complete notification file, the Competition Council publishes a press release that contains a non-confidential summary of the transaction and indicates the time frame in which interested third parties are invited to make observations.

In addition, the Competition Council has the faculty to hear any third party in a position to contribute to its information and to conduct a market test.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Upon receipt of a notification file, the Competition Council publishes a press release that indicates:

- the names of the concerned parties;
- the nature of the transaction;
- the concerned economic sectors;
- the time frame in which interested third parties are invited to make observations; and
- a non-confidential summary of the transaction provided by the parties.

When parties communicate documents or information to the Competition Council, they must indicate which elements they consider as business secrets. The General Rapporteur ensures that this information is reserved to the Competition Council and the Government Commissioner and that a non-confidential version of the documents is prepared, if needed.

Except in cases where the communication or the consultation of documents containing business secrets is necessary to the exercise of the rights of defence of a concerned party, the president of the Competition Council may deny to a party the communication or consultation of these documents.

Moreover, the disclosure by one of the undertakings involved of information obtained during the process concerning another party or a third party is punishable by a 10,000 to 100,000 dirham fine.

According to article 13 of the Decree, the merger decisions of the Competition Council and of the government authority in charge of competition are published in the Official Bulletin and are available on their websites.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Since its reactivation in 2008, the Moroccan Competition Council has started to liaise with foreign antitrust authorities and this cooperation has strengthened since 2019.

Indeed, an association between Morocco and the member states of the European Communities was established by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement in 2000 and a mechanism of cooperation between European and Moroccan competition authorities was put into place by Decision No. 1/2004 of the EU-Morocco Association Council of 19 April 2004 adopting the necessary rules for the implementation of the competition rules. In 2020, the Moroccan Competition Council and the EU announced a partnership aiming at harmonising and converging their respective legislation in competition law matters.

A bilateral cooperation has also been established with Tunisia and many exchanges have since taken place (training courses, conferences, etc).

Furthermore, the Competition Council has been a member of the International Competition Network (ICN) since April 2010.

The Moroccan Competition Council was also a founding member of the Euro-Mediterranean Competition Forum (EMCF), an informal regional network that was set up in 2012.

The Moroccan Competition Council also entered into a cooperation agreement with the competition authority of China in 2017 and announced in 2019 new exchanges of information and expertise for the years 2019–2020.

Moreover, in 2019, the Moroccan Competition Council announced an agreement with the National Commission of Market and Competition of Spain, a strengthening of its bilateral cooperation with the Portuguese Competition Authority and its cooperation with the Chilean National Economic Prosecutor.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

## 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Merger decisions of the Competition Council and of the Chief of Government (or the delegated government authority) may be appealed to the administrative chamber of the Moroccan Supreme Court.

### Time frame

## 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Article 46 of the Competition Law provides that an appeal against merger decisions must be lodged by the concerned parties or the Government Commissioner within 30 days of receipt of the merger decision notification.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

## 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Competition Council has handled more than 60 merger control cases in 2019 and more than 20 filings in 2020.

The Competition Law has only been enforced by the Competition Council since it became operational again at the end of year 2018 and its enforcement concerns should be clarified in its first annual report for 2019.



## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are no current proposals to change the legislation, as the Competition Law and Law No. 20-13 were adopted in June 2014 and have only been applicable since the appointment of the new president and members of the Competition Council in November and December 2018.

However, certain points of the legislation (concerning, for example, the worldwide turnover threshold) should be clarified, completed or amended in the future.

Moreover, the Competition Council is currently drafting a circular note about the investigation of merger control cases.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The application of the Competition Law and Law No. 20-13 relating to the Competition Council, which transfer the merger control function to the Competition Council, took effect after the appointment of the Competition Council's new president and members in November and December 2018.

Therefore, 2019 was the first year of application of the new merger control regime. More than 80 transactions were notified to the Competition Council in 2019 and 2020. Most of these cases were authorised at the end of Phase I. However, a Phase II was, in particular, opened in 2019 in the merger between Uber and its competitor Careem.

The Competition Council also established in 2019 several internal documents, such as its rules of procedure.

The Competition Council has been operational during the state of public health emergency linked to the covid-19 crisis.



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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation is the Dutch Competition Act of 22 May 1997 (the Act), which entered into force on 1 January 1998. The general rules on administrative procedure, as laid down in the General Act on Administrative Law, cover enforcement of the Act as well as various procedural aspects.

The body in charge of enforcement is the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), which is competent to take decisions pursuant to the Act. On 1 April 2013, the ACM was created through the merger of the Netherlands Consumer Authority, the Netherlands Independent Post and Telecommunication Authority and the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). The ACM is authorised to initiate proceedings, to order parties infringing the Act to cease their behaviour and to take administrative measures. The ACM is an independent agency, as was its predecessor in competition enforcement, the NMa, since 2005. The Minister of Economic Affairs remains responsible for competition policy and may give the ACM general policy instructions but may not give instructions in specific cases. The ACM is headed by a board consisting of three members. Martijn Snoep has been chairman of the board since 1 September 2018.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act applies when any of the following operations occur:

- two or more previously independent undertakings merge;
- one or more undertakings acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings; or
- a joint venture (whether concentrative or coordinative) is established that performs, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

'Full-function' joint ventures (ie, joint ventures that perform, on a lasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous economic entity) are caught by Dutch merger control. Cooperative aspects of joint ventures are not caught by Dutch merger control, but governed by the cartel prohibition contained in article 6 of the Act, which closely resembles article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

'Control' is defined as the ability to exercise a decisive influence on the activities of an undertaking on the basis of factual or legal circumstances. The term control does not refer to day-to-day management but to important strategic decisions. Minority shareholdings and other interests that give rise to 'control', for example, as a result of contractual veto rights or if a smaller shareholding allows blocking of important strategic decisions because of qualified majority voting requirements, are also caught. If a company is governed by the rules applicable to statutory two-tier entities (ie, with a separate board of directors and supervisory board), the ACM takes the view that this does not mean that the majority shareholders are not able to have decisive influence within the meaning of the Act.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A concentration falls within the scope of the Act if:

- the aggregate worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned in the previous calendar year exceeds €150 million; and
- the individual turnover in the Netherlands of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned was at least €30 million in the previous calendar year.

The interpretation of 'undertaking concerned' is similar to that applied under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Where the concentration is implemented through the acquisition of control over parts, whether or not constituted as legal entities, of one or more undertakings, only the turnover relating to the parts that are subject to the transaction will be taken into account in the determination of turnover.

Turnover refers to the net turnover as defined in the Dutch Civil Code. This is the income from the supply of goods and services from the business of the legal person after the deduction of rebates and the like and of tax on turnover. The ACM has indicated that the interpretation of 'tax on turnover' is similar to that applied under the EUMR.

For credit and financial institutions, the general thresholds apply, but the calculation of the turnover differs. The turnover is, in general terms, calculated by taking the sum of interest income and similar income, income from securities, commissions receivable, net profit on financial operations and other operating income, after the deduction of VAT and other taxes directly related to these items.

For insurance companies, the €150 million threshold also applies, but it refers to the value of gross premiums that was received from Dutch residents. With respect to pension funds within the meaning of the Dutch Pension Act, alternative thresholds apply: €500 million

combined gross written premium of which at least two undertakings concerned received €100 million from Dutch residents.

Separate thresholds apply in relation to the healthcare sector if at least two of the undertakings concerned have achieved a turnover of €5.5 million from the provision of healthcare in the preceding calendar year. If that is the case, the concentration falls within the scope of the Act provided that:

- the aggregate worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned in the previous calendar year exceeds €55 million; and
- the individual turnover in the Netherlands of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned was at least €10 million in the previous calendar year.

Concentrations that fall below these thresholds can in principle not be reviewed by the ACM unless the companies infringe other parts of the Act. The Minister of Economic Affairs can, however, temporarily reduce the thresholds for certain categories of undertakings, although this measure does not apply retrospectively. The reduction lasts five years, but can be prolonged.

If there is any doubt about the necessity of a notification, the ACM encourages 'pre-notification' meetings to discuss such jurisdictional difficulties.

Transactions that fall within the scope of the EUMR do not (with limited exceptions provided for in the EUMR, as set out in the European Union chapter) fall under the Act.

A prior mandatory notification to the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) needs to be made if a merger involves a healthcare provider that employs 50 or more persons. The NZa will apply primarily a procedural test, to see whether the parties have taken due account of the interests and opinions of stakeholders. If an NZa notification is required, the transaction cannot be implemented until the NZa has provided clearance (and cannot be implemented until the ACM has also provided clearance if a subsequent ACM notification is needed). In 2017, the NZa, for the first time, imposed a fine of €70,000, for the failure to notify a healthcare merger. The ACM will only accept a notification if the NZa has provided prior clearance. These rules are expected to change. The additional test applied by the NZa will be performed by the ACM after legislative changes have been implemented.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory. The Act prohibits the implementation of concentrations that fall within the scope of the Act before they have been notified to the ACM and a period of four weeks has passed. With regard to the acquisition of shares, the ACM is of the opinion that concentrations are implemented when the shares in question are transferred. The ACM may, at the request of the notifying party, grant a (conditional) exemption to the prohibition to implement the transaction before clearance.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

With respect to the geographical allocation of turnover, the ACM follows the guidance as provided by the European Commission's Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice in attributing turnover to the Netherlands.

If the turnover thresholds are met, foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified, even if the companies concerned do not have a physical presence in the Netherlands. Joint ventures may also need to be notified, if the parent companies meet the notification thresholds, even if the joint venture is not active in the Netherlands. The substantive test only applies to impediments to competition on the Dutch market or parts thereof.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Specific rules pertaining to special sectors govern a few Dutch markets. Concentrations involving companies in the banking and insurance sectors are subject to the merger control provisions of the Act. A protocol has been drawn up between the ACM and the Dutch Central Bank, setting out rules for the exercise of supervisory powers in these sectors in cases requiring urgent action. It describes the cooperation between the ACM and the Dutch Central Bank in concentrations involving the financial sector in which there is extreme urgency (such as a possible insolvency) to ensure that emergency situations are dealt with quickly. This protocol was applied for the first time to the acquisition of Friesland Bank by Rabobank. Friesland Bank was in financial difficulty and could not continue independently. The competition authority and the Dutch Central Bank granted Rabobank permission to acquire Friesland Bank without going through the normal notification process.

The ACM agreed a protocol for cooperation in mergers with the NZa. The protocol specifies how the ACM and the NZa will keep each other informed in merger cases, how information is exchanged between them and how they can consult each other on, for example, market definition issues. The ACM has entered into a number of cooperation agreements with other authorities and government departments, including for example the financial markets supervisor, the authority for personal data and the Dutch gambling authority.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Like the EU rules, the Act provides for a two-phase filing procedure: the notification (first stage) and the licence (second stage). The Act does not require that an agreement be signed or that a controlling interest be acquired before notification is possible. A concrete intention to engage in a transaction is sufficient. The Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) has to decide whether a licence authorising the transaction is required within four weeks starting the day after the receipt of the notification. If a licence is required, a second-phase examination will be necessary. To initiate the second phase, the parties (or party) concerned must submit a separate application. The ACM must decide on the licence application within 13 weeks.

The implementation of a concentration before the ACM has provided clearance can lead to administrative penalties. If the parties provide incorrect or incomplete information in their notification, the ACM can impose a fine of €900,000 or 1 per cent of the annual worldwide turnover of the company (whichever is higher).

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In case of a merger, the acquiring companies have to notify the transaction. Where a company acquires control of another company, the obligation to notify applies to the acquiring company. With regard to public bids, the bidder has to notify the transaction. The filing fees are €17,450 for the notification and €34,900 for the licence application.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The implementation of a concentration pending the statutory waiting period of four weeks following notification of the proposed concentration is prohibited. There are two exceptions to this rule. The implementation of a public bid is not prohibited if the ACM is notified immediately and the acquirer does not exercise its voting rights. Further, the ACM may in exceptional circumstances (such as risk of irreparable harm) grant a derogation from the prohibition at the request of one of the notifying parties. The ACM quite regularly grants exemptions to the standstill obligation in cases involving a target company in financial distress. If the parties go ahead with implementation of the transaction prior to obtaining clearance, they assume the risk that competition concerns are subsequently identified by the ACM, which may require amendment or even unwinding of the transaction.

If the ACM decides that an application for a licence is required, the concentration will be further suspended for the 13-week period following the application for a licence. Here again, an exemption can be granted upon request to prevent serious damage.

The four-week and 13-week periods will be suspended from the day on which the ACM requires further information from the undertakings involved in the concentration until the day on which such information is provided. The ACM frequently makes use of its power to request additional information. Parties should take possible requests for additional information and following up on those requests into account when planning the timing of the notification and the implementation of a concentration.

The notifying parties have the possibility to submit a reasoned request to suspend the four-week period. The ACM will allow such a suspension if it assists in the assessment of the notification. This voluntary suspension may only be requested once. In addition, the 13-week period can be suspended, at the request of the notifying party or at the initiative of the ACM. In both cases, written assent of all undertakings concerned is required.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The implementation of a concentration before the ACM that has been notified thereof or during the subsequent period of four weeks, or of a concentration for which a licence is required where no licence is granted, may result in a void transaction. In addition, the ACM can impose administrative penalties, such as fines up to a maximum of €900,000 or 10 per cent of the annual turnover of the company (whichever is higher), which can be imposed on each party that is responsible for filing.

The ACM may also make an order, backed by periodic penalty payments, that the undertakings concerned cease or reverse the infringement.

The competition authority has imposed fines for implementing a concentration without having notified and received clearance in several cases, indicating that it is fully prepared to impose tough sanctions for gun-jumping violations. An example is the sale by the Dutch state of shares in Fortis Corporate Insurance to Amlin. Amlin did not notify this transaction before transferring the shares. The competition authority therefore imposed a fine of €1,366,000 on Amlin. In 2012, the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry ruled that the seller is not responsible for filing the proposed transaction and that therefore the competition authority is not entitled to impose sanctions on the seller. In addition, in 2013, the District Court Rotterdam ruled that the fine imposed on Amlin should be reduced to €130,000 because the method used to calculate the

fine led to an arbitrary result. The ACM had imposed the fine in the year after the concentration was implemented, meaning that the turnover of Fortis Corporate Insurance was also taken into account when determining the amount of the fine. Had the authority imposed the fine during the year that the concentration was implemented, the Fortis turnover would have been excluded, resulting in a much lower fine.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The ACM is prepared to impose sanctions for gun-jumping violations. The Dutch competition authority has also shown its willingness to impose sanctions in foreign-to-foreign mergers that have not been notified before implementation. An example concerns the acquisition of Vinnolit and Vintron by Advent. Vinnolit and Vintron were both German undertakings that were acquired by Advent. Because of an incorrect calculation of the turnover of Advent in the Netherlands, the parties had determined that a notification in the Netherlands was not necessary. After implementation, however, Advent noticed its mistake and voluntarily informed the competition authority. The competition authority found that the parties had violated the Act and imposed sanctions on Advent and the sellers.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Specific solutions are not available, but a divestment or other measure before closing, so that the notification thresholds are no longer met, means that clearance is no longer required. In addition, the parties also have the opportunity to request a derogation from the prohibition on implementing an intended concentration before clearance from the ACM.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The implementation of a public bid is exempt from the prohibition on implementing an intended concentration before clearance provided that the ACM is notified immediately and the acquiring party does not exercise its voting rights.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Standard forms (in Dutch) must be used for both the notification and the licence application (an unofficial English language version is available on the ACM's website). The notification form requests information on the undertakings concerned such as a description of their business activities, a description of the sectors in which they are active, information on the group (if applicable), and a financial outline of the preceding year showing the total turnover and the turnover in the Netherlands. Further, the notification form requests a description of the transaction and supporting documentation (the supporting documents can be submitted in another language, though the ACM may ask for a translation), such as the most recent annual accounts and reports of the undertakings, the most recent documents showing the intent to effectuate the concentration and the granting of powers of attorney by the undertakings concerned to the designated contact person or persons. Parties must also submit market research reports and, if there is an overlap between their activities, information on their major competitors, customers and trade organisations active in the sectors in which the parties' activities overlap. Moreover, parties must indicate whether there are any ancillary restraints and if

they wish the ACM to declare whether they fall within article 10 of the Act. If there are markets to be investigated, parties should provide both value and volume-based market share figures. Parties are also asked to indicate whether the concentration has been or will be filed with any other competition authority in the EU and, if so, to provide details.

The ACM has the authority to impose fines of up to €900,000 or 1 per cent of the relevant turnover of the undertaking concerned (whichever is higher), if it has been provided with wrong or misleading information. Such fines are imposed only very rarely. An example is a fine of €468,000 (reduced on appeal to €312,000) for providing incomplete information regarding activities of subsidiaries and for understating market shares. It cannot be excluded that the ACM may follow the recent practice of the European Commission whereby the provision of accurate and complete information is more critically assessed and more sanctions are imposed in this respect.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Cases that do not present substantive competition concerns are typically submitted to the ACM after a brief call to indicate that the filing will be submitted. Cases that do potentially present substantive competition concerns are typically submitted to the ACM after pre-notification discussions. However, pre-notification discussions are optional and parties may choose to immediately make a formal filing even if it raises competition concerns.

Upon receipt of the notification, the ACM must take a decision within four weeks (this period can be suspended, if a reasoned request is submitted by the notifying parties). This period will start running the day after the receipt of the notification provided that it is not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday. The ACM will publish the fact of notification within a few days, assess the notification and, when necessary, ask the undertakings involved for further information. Information may also be requested from third parties such as customers, suppliers and competitors. Third parties with sufficient interest are allowed to intervene. The parties will be informed of the conclusions of the investigation and requested to indicate the parts of the decision that they consider confidential. The decision is then published. The vast majority of cases are decided within four weeks. Some cases take longer, owing to suspension of this time period resulting from requests for additional information and replies to these.

If the ACM considers that it cannot clear the concentration within the first phase, it will determine that a licence is required. Following receipt of the application for a licence, an in-depth second-phase investigation will commence. The ACM must take a decision within 13 weeks following the application for the licence. It will ask the notifying parties, as well as third parties, for further information and can also commission expert reports. If the assessment reveals competition concerns, the ACM will usually (although it is not obliged to do so) communicate its preliminary assessment in writing to the undertakings concerned and to affected third parties. The undertakings may respond to this document, propose remedies or do both. The ACM is also, in certain circumstances, willing to organise intermediate state of play meetings.

If a notified case fulfils certain requirements, the ACM may issue a summary decision. The ACM has published guidelines on when a case definitely does not fulfil these requirements, and is therefore not a candidate for a short-form decision. It will normally issue a short-form decision if it is clear that Dutch merger control is applicable, that the concentration does not raise any competition concerns and if there are no objections from third parties. The adoption of a short-form decision may speed up the process.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The vast majority of cases are cleared through a short-form decision. Those cases, which do not present substantive competition concerns, are usually cleared in three to four weeks from notification. The ACM is willing to provide clearance even faster when the parties can explain the need for doing so. Examples include financial distress of the target company and the need to safeguard business continuity. The ACM's approach to pre-notification meetings is set out in guidelines. Simple cases do not require lengthy pre-notification discussions. Informally announcing the notification a few days in advance is sufficient for cases that do not raise potential concerns.

For more complex cases, if the ACM decides that a licence is required that triggers an in-depth second-phase investigation, a decision will need to be adopted within 13 weeks of the application for the licence. However, the ACM often stops the clock to request further information, which extends the time frame for obtaining a second-phase decision significantly. To illustrate, second-phase investigations in recent years on average lasted more than 280 days in total.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A licence application will be required where the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) considers that a concentration may significantly impede effective competition (SIEC) in the Dutch market or any part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. A licence will be granted if the ACM concludes after its second-phase investigation that this will not occur. As this test mirrors the SIEC test in the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), it will cover all competition issues raised by mergers, including unilateral effects cases.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Joint ventures performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity are dealt with under Dutch merger control, but are subject to the same substantive test as other concentrations.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Since the 2007 amendment to the Act, the test applied is whether a proposed transaction significantly impedes effective competition in the Dutch market or any part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. In applying the test, the ACM generally applies the same criteria and theories of harm as used by the European Commission, including the criteria set out in the horizontal and non-horizontal guidelines, and by the European courts.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Only competition issues are relevant in the ACM's review process. However, if the ACM refuses to issue a licence authorising an envisaged concentration, the Minister of Economic Affairs may, in response to a request to that effect, decide that a licence will be granted if this is desirable for general interest reasons – either economic or non-economic

– that outweigh the expected detriment to competition. It should be noted that this is a separate power of the Minister, not a right to give instructions to the ACM in specific cases.

In 2019, the ACM prohibited the acquisition by PostNL of Sandd as it considered that it would result in a postal delivery monopolist that would be able to increase prices for business mail by 30 to 40 per cent. For the first time, the Minister made use of its power to grant a licence for general interest reasons. The Minister concluded that the benefits of the acquisition to the public would outweigh the detriment to competition as envisaged by the ACM, and granted a licence subject to certain conditions (to prevent the price increases that could result from the transaction). In 2020, that decision by the Minister was overturned by the Rotterdam District Court.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Dutch competition authority has generally not paid specific attention to economic efficiencies in the review process. Since the alignment of the test with the EUMR in 2007, there is more room for taking efficiencies into account. In 2009, the competition authority considered an efficiency defence in a case concerning the merger of two hospitals in the province of Zeeland. In that case, at first instance, the competition authority had concerns regarding the market power of the combined entity as there appeared to be no real alternatives to these hospitals. After the hospitals submitted an 'efficiency defence' claiming that the merger would lead to consumer benefits, the competition authority stated that the present Act leaves room for the competition authority to take such efficiencies into account. Subsequently, the competition authority concluded that, in that case, the parties' claim was 'unsubstantiated' and could, therefore, not be accepted. The parties thereafter submitted a significant remedy package, which was accepted by the competition authority. The transaction was ultimately cleared. It is believed that the ACM will be as reluctant as the Commission in accepting efficiencies as a justification for clearing a concentration that would otherwise fall foul of competition law. The authority will especially focus on whether it is credible that efficiency gains will be passed on to consumers.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If a concentration is implemented despite a standstill obligation, it is null and void and the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) may order it to be reversed within a specified time limit. Contravention of the standstill obligation as well as of several other merger control provisions (eg, supply of incorrect information) may be sanctioned with fines or an order to remedy the infringement, subject to periodic penalty payments on non-compliance with such order, or by a combination of these sanctions.

The administrative fine for refusal to cooperate amounts to €900,000 or a maximum of 1 per cent of the relevant turnover of the undertaking concerned (whichever is higher).

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Since 1 October 2007, the Act has provided the possibility of offering remedies during the notification stage of the investigation. This possibility exists if the competition problem is clear and it is certain that the

remedies will remove this problem. The ACM may attach conditions to the decision. The Act provides that if the ACM imposes conditions in the notification stage, the suspension obligation stays in place until the conditions are fulfilled. This reduces the importance of this possibility in practice. It is also possible to make amendments to the original notification, thereby alleviating the concerns of the ACM. If the original notification is amended, the transaction (as notified in the amended notification) may be closed after the decision is adopted.

The ACM may attach conditions to the granting of a licence in the second phase; for example, that changes be made to the intended transaction, or certain aspects of it.

The competition authority's 2007 guidelines on remedies set out both its procedural and substantive policy. They are similar to the approach of the European Commission in that both divestment (ie, structural remedies) and behavioural remedies are possible, though structural remedies are preferred. In relation to some past concentrations involving hospitals, the ACM accepted a behavioural remedy in the form of a price cap to address competition concerns. However, in the more recent *Stichting Albert Schweitzer Ziekenhuis/Stichting Rivas Zorggroep* (2015) case involving hospitals, the ACM indicated that it considered a behavioural remedy in the form of a price cap to be unsuitable. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the ACM will accept a behavioural remedy in the form of a price cap in relation to hospitals in the future, similar to its position with respect to other sectors. The ACM will only accept an amendment of the original notification if a structural remedy is used.

In 2019, the ACM accepted behavioural remedies in relation to the acquisition by Sanoma Learning of Iddink Holding, relating to the distribution of school books and learning materials via digital platforms.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The remedy guidelines set out the basic conditions for a divestment or other remedy. The guidelines are modelled closely on the European Commission notice on remedies and Commission practice.

The undertakings concerned should take the initiative in proposing adequate remedies, preferably in the pre-notification discussions. Structural remedies are preferred to behavioural remedies and, according to the guidelines, the ACM does not accept behavioural remedies in the notification phase.

Proposals offered by the undertakings concerned must include an adequate and proportional solution to the competition concerns of the ACM. The conditions that the ACM includes in a first-phase decision must remove the identified competition concerns and be implemented before the transaction is closed. Conditions that the ACM includes in a second-phase decision must ensure that the concentration does not significantly impede effective competition. These conditions generally involve divestment of the businesses that give rise to the impediment of competition, or severance of links between the undertakings concerned and these businesses. Where divestments are involved, the purchaser must be independent of the undertakings concerned and should have sufficient expertise and financial resources to guarantee the continuity of the activities of the business. As the divestment is intended to ensure that the market remains competitive, the ACM has the right to approve the prospective purchaser. Where the undertakings concerned are not able to divest the businesses concerned, the ACM may require the appointment of a trustee who will ensure that this process is carried out. The undertakings concerned must ensure that prior to the sale, the activities of the business to be divested remain intact and that their continuity and position on the market are not jeopardised. Where the conditions laid down are aimed at ensuring that a certain business remains independent of the parties involved in the



takeover, the undertaking concerned must take measures to guarantee that such independence will continue to exist in the future. The ACM may supervise the divestment process for a limited time (and may require the divestment of the activities concerned). On timing, the guidelines clearly favour discussing remedies in the pre-notification meetings and strongly recommend submission of remedies at least one week prior to the end of the four-week time limit. With remedies in the licence phase, the guidelines state that, as a general practice, the ACM will inform the parties of the competition problems it perceives in its preliminary assessment, typically after eight weeks. This gives parties the opportunity to submit remedies should they not have done so at an earlier stage. At this stage, remedies in the licence phase should be proposed at least three weeks prior to the deadline for the decision.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

In the ACM's decisional practice there have only been a limited number of cases involving remedies. To date, we are not aware of any that involved foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, parties have amended their filing in response to the competition authority's concerns in at least one concentration involving two foreign-owned undertakings, which sought to take joint control over two Dutch undertakings.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

When submitting a notification, parties must indicate whether there are any ancillary restraints. Parties may ask the ACM to declare that the related arrangements fall within article 10 of the Act, meaning that they are directly related to and necessary for the implementation of the concentration as a result of which the cartel prohibition contained in article 6 of the Act does not apply to the restraint.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) may request information from customers, suppliers and competitors on the envisaged transaction or relevant markets. Third parties whose interests are directly involved may submit their comments on the proposed transaction to the ACM and are invited to express their view on the preliminary assessment issued by the ACM eight weeks after the application for a licence. In practice, the ACM attaches value to observations made by third parties. This is especially the case in relation to concentrations involving hospitals, where the ACM will attach significant importance to the opinion of health insurers and patients.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

After a notification, and following the filing of an application for a licence, the ACM publishes an announcement in the Official Gazette and on its website, inviting interested parties to submit their views on the proposed transaction. Decisions by the ACM, including a decision that a licence is required and decisions to end procedures, are also made public. Sensitive information (ie, business secrets) is omitted from these

publications. Prior to publication, parties are given the opportunity to submit a reasoned request that certain information is to be treated confidentially and removed from public documents. If the ACM disagrees, it will inform the parties in due time, so as to allow them to file for an injunction against publication.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The ACM cooperates formally and informally with foreign competition authorities; for example, as a member of the European Competition Authorities and the International Competition Network and with the Commission, as a member of the European Competition Network. It may inform the relevant competition authorities if it requests information from foreign companies and may provide competition authorities in other jurisdictions with information it has collected. The ACM contacts other competition authorities where a transaction is filed in several jurisdictions and may exchange information or coordinate its proceedings with these authorities. The notification form also requests parties to indicate whether the transaction has been, or will be, notified to other antitrust authorities.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

## 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Appeals against decisions by the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) must be lodged with the District Court of Rotterdam (Chamber of Administrative Law). The judgment of the District Court may be further appealed to the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry in The Hague. Any person whose interests are directly affected may appeal against a decision. The Minister of Economic Affairs may, in response to a request, grant a licence for an envisaged concentration even though the ACM has refused to grant one. Decisions of the Minister are also subject to judicial review.

In 2016, the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry annulled the ACM's 2012 prohibition decision involving biscuit producers AA ter Beek and Continental Bakeries. Continental Bakers produces private label biscuits while AA ter Beek produces private label biscuits in addition to branded biscuits. According to the ACM, the upstream market for the production of biscuits comprises both private label and branded products, meaning that the combined market share of the parties would be very high. The market definition was based on reasoning by the ACM that, when purchasing biscuits, retailers will take into account pricing for both private label and branded biscuits. The court annulled the decision on the basis that the ACM had not investigated and explained properly why and how the upstream market should cover private label and branded products, as a result of the purchasing behaviour of retailers.

In 2016, the Rotterdam District Court upheld, on appeal by Vodafone, a 2014 ACM clearance decision in relation to the acquisition of sole control by Dutch incumbent telecom operator KPN in Reggefiber, a fibre optics cable operator. KPN already had joint control in Reggefiber, which was cleared in 2008 subject to remedies. The ACM had cleared the change from joint to sole control unconditionally, on the basis of sector-specific regulation that, in its view, prevented competition concerns. The sector-specific regulation, inter alia, requires KPN to put in place Chinese walls, act in a non-discriminatory manner and it imposes maximum prices. The District Court agreed that the sector-specific regulation could be taken into account by the ACM in its prospective analysis when assessing the effects on the concentration. The court accepted that the sector-specific regulation is sufficient to prevent concerns.

In 2017, the Rotterdam District Court dismissed two appeals against ACM clearance decisions. One case related to the clearance decision by the ACM of the acquisition by the Lotto of the Staatsloterij, which was appealed by Stichting Speel Verantwoord and Lottovote. The Rotterdam District Court dismissed the appeal and the case is still pending in the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry. The other case the Rotterdam District Court dismissed related to the clearance of the acquisition by Brocacef of Mediq, which was appealed by Mosadex. Mosadex subsequently appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry.

In 2019, the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry dismissed Mosadex's appeal against the clearance decision of ACM in relation to the acquisition by Brocacef of Mediq.

In 2020, the Rotterdam District Court annulled the Ministerial decision to grant a licence to the *PostNL/Sandd* concentration. After the ACM had prohibited the concentration, the Minister of Economic Affairs made use of its power to grant a licence for compelling reasons of general interest. The Rotterdam District Court has now upheld appeals submitted by several interested third parties and annulled the decision for both procedural (interested third parties not having been sufficiently heard) and substantive grounds (predominantly relating to insufficient motivation of the decision).

Currently, the ACM's clearance decision regarding the acquisition by Sanoma Learning of Iddink Holding is being appealed before the Rotterdam District Court.

## Time frame

### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

While the time frame for appeal and judicial review will depend on the courts' agendas and workloads, litigation may take up to a year, and perhaps longer. The Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry considers that appeal at the District Court level as well as subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry should each take at most two years, to prevent a violation of the right of a fair trial as contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2010, the competition authority imposed fines in three cases for breaching article 34 of the Act (ie, implementing a concentration without having notified and therefore failing to receive clearance prior to closing). In 2001, a fine was imposed in the case of a foreign-to-foreign merger: only German undertakings were involved in the transaction. The competition authority repealed this fine in 2002.

At the beginning of 2020, the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) published its agenda for 2020–2021, which focuses on two main topics: the digital economy and energy markets in transition. As part of its focus on the digital economy, the ACM indicated that it would dedicate more resources to the protection of the 'online consumer'. Although this will predominantly be relevant in the context of fields other than merger control, parties that operate digital platforms or have interaction with online consumers should expect close scrutiny of their mergers.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

It is expected that new legislation will enter into effect by which the ACM will take over the test currently performed by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) in relation to concentrations involving healthcare



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providers. This test, which will apply in addition to ACM's merger control assessment, consists primarily of a procedural test, to see whether the parties have taken due account of the interests and opinions of stakeholders. The legislative proposal was amended at the beginning of 2020, following input from the NZa and the ACM. It is uncertain when this legislative proposal will be introduced.

In addition, some mostly technical changes to the Dutch Competition Act are expected, although it is unclear when these will be introduced. This includes the removal of an existing legal requirement, in case of conditions attached to a Phase I clearance decision, to observe the conditions prior to being allowed to implement the concentration.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In 2019, 134 merger notifications and seven licence notifications were submitted to the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) and one merger notification was withdrawn. Out of the 134 merger notifications, 25 related to the healthcare sector. Out of the seven licence notifications, three related to the healthcare sector. The ACM issued 127 Phase I clearance decisions, referred eight cases to Phase II, issued two licences and prohibited one concentration (although that concentration was later granted a licence by the Minister of Economic Affairs). The vast majority were short-form decisions. Out of the 127 Phase I clearance decisions, 21 related to the healthcare sector. Out of the eight cases that were referred to Phase II, four related to the healthcare sector. None of the three Phase II decisions (two licences and one prohibition) related to the healthcare sector, as described below.

In August 2019, the ACM granted a licence to Sanoma Learning for its acquisition of Iddink Holding, subject to certain commitments. Sanoma is active as a publisher of learning materials, and Iddink is a distributor of school books and provides learning materials and school management systems via digital platforms. ACM accepted commitments proposed by Sanoma that according to Sanoma would ensure access for competing publishers to its digital platform and data generated on this platform under a FRAND regime.

Also in August 2019, the ACM granted a licence to Active Capital Company for its acquisition of LipsPlus. During its Phase I investigation, the ACM identified prima facie concerns that competition on the potential national market for textile care services for hospitals would be limited as a result of the transaction. On the basis of further investigation during Phase II, the ACM eventually concluded that no significant impediment to effective competition would be likely as a result of the transaction, and therefore granted a licence.

The merger case to which ACM devoted most resources in 2019 led to its prohibition of PostNL's acquisition of Sandd on 5 September 2019. PostNL and Sandd were the only two companies that offered certain postal services, predominantly in relation to business mail. The ACM considered that the acquisition would result in a postal delivery monopoly and that the post-merger monopolist would be able to increase prices for business mail by 30 to 40 per cent. Subsequently, for the first time, the Minister of Economic Affairs made use of its power to grant a licence for general interest reasons. On 27 September 2019, the Minister granted a licence subject to certain conditions and indicated that the benefits of the acquisition to the public would outweigh the detriments to competition as envisaged by the ACM. The conditions related to a ceiling on returns of 9 per cent on Dutch postal services (including business mail) to prevent the anticipated price increases and a commitment to grant competing postal services providers access to its network. That decision by the Minister was overturned by the Rotterdam District Court on 11 June 2020.

The ACM identified four key priorities in its 2018 agenda: the digital economy, energy markets in transition, prescription drug prices and ports and transport. Indeed, throughout 2018 and 2019, the ACM focused on these areas. At the beginning of 2020, the ACM published its agenda for 2020 to 2021, which focuses on two main topics: the digital economy and energy markets in transition. As part of its focus on the digital economy, the ACM indicated it would dedicate more resources to the protection of the 'online consumer'.

# New Zealand

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

New Zealand's merger control legislation is contained in Part 3 of the Commerce Act 1986 (the Act). New Zealand's competition law regulator is the Commerce Commission (NZCC). The NZCC adjudicates on applications for clearance, or authorisation, of mergers and can take enforcement action in the courts. Interested third parties can also enforce the Act directly.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act prohibits any person (including bodies corporate) from acquiring 'assets of a business' or shares if that would, or would be likely to, substantially lessen competition in a market in New Zealand.

The phrase 'assets of a business' is not defined and, therefore, can potentially include any asset owned by a business. However, this has been interpreted to refer to a collection of assets sufficient to run a business, or business division.

The term 'acquire' includes both legal and beneficial acquisition, including entry into an agreement to acquire assets or shares that is not conditional on clearance.

Partial acquisitions of shares can be caught, and there is no de minimis transaction, asset, or turnover value threshold.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures that involve an acquisition of assets or shares can be caught by the merger control provisions. Joint ventures that do not involve the acquisition of assets or shares can be caught by the Act's restrictive trade practices prohibitions contained in Part 2 of the Act.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

There is no definition of 'control' in the Act's general merger control regime. Acquisitions of assets or shares, including minority or partial acquisitions, may breach the Act where:

- the acquirer will be able to 'directly or indirectly exert a substantial degree of influence over the activities of the other' (interpreted as 'able to bring real pressure to bear on the decision-making process' of the target); and
- that influence is likely to substantially lessen competition in the market.

The NZCC's general working approach (although not determinative) is that:

- a shareholding of less than 15 per cent does not give rise to the necessary degree of influence;
- a shareholding between 15 and 20 per cent is unlikely to give rise to a substantial influence unless there are special circumstances;
- a shareholding between 20 and 30 per cent is likely to give rise to a substantial influence only if there are 'other factors', for example, evidence of influence on management and policy; and
- a shareholding between 30 and 50 per cent is likely to give rise to substantial influence.

The NZCC has recently investigated the acquisition of 19.99 per cent of the shares in a listed company, and blocked the proposed acquisition of an interest of 22.5 per cent of the shares in a listed company (where there was also a cooperation agreement between the parties).

There is an additional process that may be triggered where an overseas person acquires a 'controlling interest' in a New Zealand company.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

There are no asset or turnover thresholds. The test is simply whether the acquisition of assets or shares will or would be likely to substantially lessen competition in a market in New Zealand.

The NZCC's Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines (the M&A Guidelines) include post-merger market share 'concentration indicators' that it uses to 'identify those mergers that are less likely to raise competition concerns'. These are:

- where the merged firm's post-merger market share is less than 40 per cent in a non-concentrated market (where the three largest firms have a combined market share of less than 70 per cent); and/or
- where the merged firm's post-merger market share is less than 20 per cent in a concentrated market (where the three largest firms in the market have a combined market share of 70 per cent or more).

The NZCC stresses these are 'only initial guides' and that a 'merger not exceeding these indicators may still substantially lessen competition'. For this reason, the NZCC no longer refers to these indicators as 'safe harbours' as it considered that term indicated a 'degree of safety that did not exist'. Accordingly, market share measures remain insufficient in themselves to establish whether a merger is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Merger filings in New Zealand are voluntary. Parties can (but are not obliged to) seek clearance or authorisation of a proposed merger but there is no statutory obligation to. However, if:

- a merger has been implemented, or is no longer conditional on NZCC approval, it cannot then be cleared or authorised retrospectively; and
- if parties reach that point without obtaining NZCC approval, the NZCC may choose to open an investigation, and it has a range of enforcement options at its disposal.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The merger control prohibitions in the Act extend to acquisitions outside New Zealand, 'to the extent that the acquisition affects a market in New Zealand'.

Accordingly, an offshore merger involving two or more major suppliers of a product or service to New Zealand, both where there is no New Zealand presence and where there is a New Zealand subsidiary, could potentially be caught by the Act.

However, the practical ability of New Zealand authorities to enforce any orders made against offshore companies may limit the recoverability of any penalties from foreign firms.

To address such limits in respect of acquisitions by Australian businesses, New Zealand has legislation (the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010) and a mutual enforcement treaty with Australia that effectively removes the bar on the NZCC enforcing penalties against Australian companies and directors.

In respect of acquisitions by businesses from other countries, an additional process was introduced in 2017 enabling the NZCC to seek remedies where an 'overseas person' acquires a 'controlling interest' in a New Zealand company through an acquisition outside New Zealand ('controlling interest' defined to be control of the board, or the ability to control greater than 20 per cent of the voting rights, issued shares or dividend entitlements). Under this regime the NZCC can apply to the High Court, within 12 months of the acquisition, for a declaration that the acquisition will substantially lessen competition in a market in New Zealand. If the High Court makes such a declaration, it may make an order requiring the New Zealand company to cease carrying on business in New Zealand or dispose of shares or assets. Contravention of any such declaration is subject to the same penalties as for a breach of the usual merger control provision (the difference being that the penalties are enforceable against the New Zealand company, rather than the overseas acquirer).

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Foreign investment in New Zealand is governed by the Overseas Investment Act 2005 (OIA), and the Takeovers Act 1993 can apply to acquisitions of public companies.

Under the OIA consent is required if an overseas person proposes to directly or indirectly:

- acquire an interest in 'sensitive land';
- acquire a 25 per cent or more ownership or control interest in a New Zealand entity (or increase an existing 25 per cent interest) and either:
  - the consideration exceeds NZ\$100 million; or
  - the gross value of the entity's assets in New Zealand exceeds NZ\$100 million;
- incur more than NZ\$100 million in capital expenditure to establish a new business in New Zealand; or

- acquire assets in New Zealand that are used to carry on business in New Zealand for consideration greater than NZ\$100 million.

Higher thresholds than the NZ\$100 million threshold above apply to investments by non-government related investors from countries with trade agreements with New Zealand.

There is currently a bill before Parliament (expected to be passed within the next 12 months) that proposes certain amendments to the OIA, including introducing a 'backstop' national interest test and special powers in relation to 'strategically important businesses' (such as critical infrastructure, media, businesses with national security risk, etc).

In light of the recent covid-19 pandemic, an urgent amendment to the OIA was passed, introducing a temporary zero-dollar notification threshold when an overseas person acquires a 25 per cent or more interest in a business or its assets. This came into force on 16 June 2020.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

As notification is voluntary, no sanctions apply for failure to file. However, mergers cannot be cleared or authorised retrospectively and the Commerce Commission (NZCC) may investigate non-notified mergers that it considers could negatively impact competition in New Zealand.

In the 2018/19 financial year, the NZCC concluded seven investigations into non-notified mergers. The NZCC's last challenge of a merger was in respect of First Gas Limited's acquisition of certain gas distribution assets.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Applications for clearance or authorisation of a merger are made by the purchaser. The fee is NZ\$3,680 to seek clearance or NZ\$36,800 to seek authorisation (including goods and services tax (GST)).

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The Act provides the NZCC 40 working days to decide on clearance applications and 60 working days for authorisation applications, but in practice the NZCC invariably seeks extensions. If applicants do not agree to such an extension, the application is deemed to have been declined if the NZCC has not made a decision by the deadline. This means, in practice, merging parties always agree to extensions sought by the NZCC.

The NZCC's average time to reach a decision is 60 working days for clearances, and 130 working days for authorisations.

As the NZCC cannot grant clearance or authorisation retrospectively, any proposed merger that might give rise to competition issues should be made conditional on NZCC approval and should not complete until approval is obtained.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Mergers cannot be cleared or authorised retrospectively, so a transaction agreement must remain conditional on regulatory approval until clearance or authorisation is obtained.

If the NZCC believes that a merger (that is no longer conditional) may breach the Act, it can investigate and, if necessary, take proceedings. Courts can impose penalties of up to NZ\$5 million on bodies corporate (NZ\$500,000 for individuals), and impose injunctions and make divestiture (and other) orders. If the NZCC was in the process of considering a clearance or authorisation application at the time of completion it would close that clearance investigation and open an investigation into a potential breach.

In 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld penalties for a breach of the merger provisions of the Act (*New Zealand Bus Ltd v Commerce Commission* [2008] 3 NZLR 433). In that case, the purchaser had filed for clearance, but subsequently withdrew its application and completed the acquisition. The NZCC brought proceedings alleging the acquisition was likely to substantially lessen competition, and the High Court ordered the purchaser to pay a penalty of NZ\$500,000. Two directors of the vendor were found liable as accessories for agreeing to waive the clearance condition.

Accordingly, both acquirers and vendors need to be aware that, while merger clearance remains voluntary:

- seeking clearance may be the safest option for potentially problematic mergers; and
- withdrawing a clearance application and completing a transaction is likely to be high risk.

In addition, until closing, merger parties are treated as separate businesses for the purposes of the Act's restrictive trade practices prohibitions. As a result, any integration between the parties prior to closing gives rise to 'gun jumping' risks under the restrictive trade practices prohibitions. In 2010 the NZCC successfully prosecuted two pathology businesses for agreeing not to compete pending a proposed merger (*Commerce Commission v New Zealand Diagnostic Group Ltd and Ors* HC Auckland CIV 2008-404-4321, 19 July 2010). The Court ordered the parties to pay penalties of NZ\$65,000 and NZ\$35,000, respectively. Those fines would likely be significantly higher in today's context (and intentional cartel conduct will be a criminal offence from April 2021).

The government has recently announced its intention to increase the maximum penalties for breaching the merger control prohibition.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers that close before clearance is granted are subject to the same potential sanctions as domestic mergers. However, in practice there are limits on the ability of New Zealand authorities to enforce any orders made against offshore companies. Therefore, there is an additional process for the NZCC to seek remedies in respect of acquisitions by 'overseas persons'. While the NZCC has not, to date, used these new 'overseas persons' powers, it has opened investigations into foreign-to-foreign mergers since then.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The NZCC does not have jurisdiction to clear any merger after closing. Accordingly, the New Zealand aspect of the merger would need to remain conditional until clearance is obtained if clearance is required.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No; however, in practice the NZCC applies lower thresholds for finding a 'substantial degree of influence' in the case of public companies than

private companies (for a public company the NZCC normally examines shareholdings of 15 per cent or more).

The Takeovers Code (the Code) also applies to listed public companies. The Code is administered by the Takeovers Panel, which is separate from the NZCC. The Code is far-reaching and should be considered carefully in the case of public company acquisitions.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

There is a prescribed application form for both clearances and authorisations. The forms require information concerning the transaction, the parties, the rationale, the markets, etc. Economic evidence is often advisable for more complex clearance cases. In an application for authorisation, economic analysis of public benefits and detriments is invariably required.

The applicant must also provide the documents bringing about the merger and ancillary agreements; documentation that has been prepared for or considered by senior management and directors that sets out the rationale for the merger, analyses the merger or competitive conditions, and includes the business plans; annual reports; and management accounts.

While there are no sanctions for not providing all required information, until the NZCC is satisfied that it has received all required information, it will not register the application.

There are sanctions for deliberately providing incorrect information, including deliberately misleading the NZCC about the existence of requested information as it is an offence under the Act to deceive or knowingly mislead the NZCC. Companies found in breach can be fined up to NZ\$300,000, and individuals up to NZ\$100,000.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

There are no phases to a clearance process mandated by statute. However, the NZCC has published guidance setting out its expected process and timelines for clearance applications.

Prior to formal filing, merger parties are encouraged to contact the NZCC as early as possible to inform it of potential applications and engage in a pre-notification consultation. In most cases, this enables the NZCC to plan ahead, which can help to expedite the process. The NZCC generally expects a substantially developed draft to be provided, alongside supporting documents, at least a week prior to pre-notification consultations. The NZCC will generally advise the parties or whether they need to supplement their application with further information before the NZCC would be willing to register a formal filing.

Once the NZCC registers a formal filing, it will publish a media release on its website announcing that it has received the application. Following that, according to the NZCC's indicative time frames (although these can vary depending on complexity and opposition):

- On approximately the fifth working day, a draft investigation timeline will be published on the NZCC's website, and the NZCC will release a 'Statement of Preliminary Issues'. This sets out the issues the NZCC intends to explore and invites submissions from third parties (which are typically due by approximately the 15th working day).
- The NZCC aims to complete initial interviews and information gathering by the 30th working day.
- By working day 40, the NZCC is required to either reach a determination or obtain an extension. If the NZCC has not granted



clearance by working day 40, it will seek an extension and publish a 'Statement of Issues' setting out the issues it continues to investigate. Both the merger parties and third parties are able to submit in response, with those typically due by the 65th working day.

- If the NZCC has not granted clearance by the 90th working day, it will likely issue a 'Statement of Unresolved Issues', setting out those issues that it considers have not been satisfactorily addressed. Merging parties and third parties will then have until approximately working day 110 to make submissions.
- Following submissions on the Statement of Unresolved Issues (working day 130+) the NZCC will decide to either grant or decline clearance.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The Act provides the NZCC 40 working days to decide on a clearance application and 60 working days to decide on an authorisation, but in practice the NZCC invariably seeks extensions. If applicants do not agree to such an extension, it is open to the NZCC to simply fail to make a determination in the prescribed time, in which case the application is declined. This means that merging parties, in practice, always agree to extensions sought by the NZCC.

The NZCC's average time over the past decade to reach a decision for clearances is 60 working days, and for authorisations is 130 working days.

The best ways to expedite the NZCC's process are to:

- contact the NZCC as early as possible to inform it about potential applications and engage in a pre-notification consultation;
- have all required information ready to submit to the NZCC at least one week prior to the targeted formal filing date; and
- respond expeditiously to all NZCC information and interview requests.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

In order to grant clearance, the Commerce Commission (NZCC) must be satisfied that the merger will not have, or would not be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. If the NZCC is not so satisfied, it must decline to give clearance.

Analytically, this test requires the NZCC to compare the state of affairs if the transaction does not go ahead (the counterfactual) against the state of affairs if the transaction does go ahead (the factual). In assessing the counterfactual, the NZCC must consider any possible hypothetical that has a 'real chance' of eventuating. New Zealand courts have stated that a hypothetical can have a 'real chance' of occurring despite it being less likely than not. This means the NZCC can consider multiple counterfactual outcomes, and will compare the factual against the most competitive of these (effectively a 'worst case scenario' analysis).

There is no separate 'failing firm' defence in the Act. However, as the NZCC's analysis is forward-looking, it is open to the parties to argue that at least one of their businesses will leave the market if the transaction does not proceed. The NZCC has accepted such arguments provided this can be demonstrated to a satisfactory level of probability. The NZCC's M&A Guidelines include a separate appendix setting out its approach to assessing failing firm arguments.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No. To the extent the formation of a joint venture involves the acquisition of business assets or shares, it will be analysed as any other merger.

However, other aspects of a joint venture relationship, such as any ongoing collaboration, are analysed pursuant to the restrictive trade practices regime in Part 2 of the Act, which prohibits:

- 'cartel' arrangements between actual or potential competitors (such as price fixing, output restriction, or market allocation arrangements) (section 30); and
- arrangements that have the purpose, effect, or likely effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market in New Zealand (section 27).

There is a 'collaborative activities' exception to section 30. This exception is intended to be less technical in its application than the 'joint venture' exception it replaced in 2017. The NZCC has issued Competitor Collaboration Guidelines to provide guidance on the application of the collaborative activities exception. This exception does not provide protection from the section 27 prohibition.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Broadly speaking, the NZCC will consider the extent to which an acquisition will increase the risk of:

- 'Unilateral effects', where an acquisition removes a competitor that would otherwise provide a significant competitive constraint (particularly relative to remaining competitors) such that the combined firm can profitably increase prices (often said to be by 5 per cent or more) without the profitability of that increase being thwarted by rival firms' competitive responses.
- 'Coordinated effects', namely the scope for an acquisition to increase the potential for the combined firm, along with some or all of the remaining competitors, to (implicitly) coordinate their behaviour so that prices increase in the market. This typically occurs in highly concentrated markets (four or fewer competitors) where the remaining competitors are of a similar size or market share to each other.
- 'Conglomerate effects', where the purchaser's products and the target's products are complementary or adjacent to one another, such that the acquisition could result in the purchaser having an unmatched portfolio of products that it can use to lessen competition in the market by bundling or tying products together across that portfolio.
- 'Vertical input foreclosure', where the purchaser is acquiring an upstream supplier that it can use to lessen competition by cutting off access to inputs from its competitors.
- 'Vertical customer foreclosure', where the purchaser is acquiring a downstream customer that it can use to lessen competition by cutting off access to customers from its competitors.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The NZCC is an independent Crown entity and is not subject to direction from the government. Despite this, section 26 of the Act provides that when exercising its powers and functions, the NZCC must 'have regard to' the economic policies of the government where such policies are provided to the NZCC in writing by the Commerce Minister and laid before Parliament. This is a highly transparent process and such

statements are not issued regularly. However, they have been issued in relation to specific applications before the NZCC. Nevertheless, the ultimate decision remains with the NZCC and while it must give attention to such a statement, the statement does not change the competitive, or public benefits and detriments, assessment that the NZCC must make.

Besides the potential for a section 26 statement, non-competition issues are not relevant in the clearance context (which focuses on whether or not there is a substantial lessening of competition).

Parties may also apply for authorisation for a merger, where the NZCC can approve a transaction that would otherwise substantially lessen competition where that transaction would be likely to result in public benefits that outweigh the detriments arising from the lessening of competition. Public benefits and detriments have historically been predominantly economic efficiencies. However, in its 2017 decision to decline the merger of the two media organisations Fairfax New Zealand Limited and NZME Limited, the NZCC took a loss of media plurality into account as a public detriment in its analysis. This consideration was upheld on appeal, and so the NZCC's Authorisation Guidelines now set out 'benefits or detriments can relate to matters such as the environment, health, media or social welfare'.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

When considering an application for clearance, the only question is whether the merger has the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. That test implies some consideration of efficiencies within the affected market or markets, as it is a 'net effects' test. However, the NZCC considers it is rare that efficiencies would be sufficient to outweigh what would otherwise be a substantial lessening of competition. Accordingly, a merger that relies on efficiencies is better dealt with under the authorisation regime.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Commerce Commission (NZCC) cannot unilaterally prohibit a transaction, declare the Act has been breached, or impose penalties. It can, however, bring an action in the High Court seeking remedies such as:

- an injunction preventing a proposed merger;
- a declaration that a merger breaches (or would breach) the Act;
- an order for divestiture of assets or shares; or
- penalties of up to NZ\$5 million per offence for bodies corporate and NZ\$500,000 per offence for individuals.

The Act also gives the NZCC broad powers of investigation and failure to comply with any compulsory NZCC request can give rise to penalties of up to NZ\$300,000 for a company and NZ\$100,000 for an individual.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The NZCC can accept undertakings to divest assets or shares in the context of either a formal clearance or authorisation application, or in an investigation of a merger (where the parties have not sought clearance or authorisation). The NZCC cannot accept behavioural undertakings in relation to mergers.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

If given in the context of a formal clearance or authorisation process, a divestment undertaking may be proposed as part of the initial application, or as an amendment to an application, but must be offered prior to the NZCC's final determination. If an undertaking is accepted by the NZCC, it is deemed to form part of the application. Merging parties typically will then have 12 months to fulfil the undertaking. Potential purchasers of assets or shares do not have to be identified at the time the undertaking is given, but must ultimately be approved by the NZCC.

If an acquirer of assets or shares does not fulfil a divestment undertaking by the specified date (which is negotiated with the NZCC), the parties lose the benefit of the clearance. If the NZCC is satisfied that there is a contravention of an undertaking, it can apply to the court for a divestment order or pecuniary penalties.

Outside of a formal clearance or authorisation process, the NZCC also has a separate power to accept a written undertaking to dispose of assets or shares. Again, if the NZCC considers that a person has breached such an undertaking, it may apply to the High Court for orders directing the person to comply with the undertaking; pay to the Crown an amount reasonably attributable to the breach; or any consequential relief that the court considers appropriate.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Historically, the same remedies that had been available for purely domestic mergers were also available in respect of foreign-to-foreign mergers.

In August 2017 the Act was amended to permit the NZCC to apply to the High Court for a declaration if an overseas person acquires a controlling interest, either directly or indirectly, in a New Zealand body corporate through an acquisition outside New Zealand. The NZCC has not, to date, used these new powers, although it has investigated foreign-to-foreign mergers since then, including one where it is understood a divestment remedy was provided to the NZCC to resolve its concerns.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The NZCC can only give merger clearance for the acquisition itself. Ancillary restraints will be governed by the restrictive trade practices provisions of Part 2 of the Act, which prohibit cartel provisions or arrangements that have the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in any market.

There is an exemption from these restrictive trade practices prohibitions for covenants in business acquisition agreements that are 'solely for the protection of the purchaser in respect of the goodwill of the business'. This provides an exception for restraints imposed on vendors that are reasonable in both scope and duration to protect the goodwill being acquired.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Commerce Commission (NZCC) seeks information from competitors, suppliers and customers to 'test' the information provided by the applicant. The NZCC publishes a public version of the application on its

website to enable third parties to make submissions. In addition, during its clearance process the NZCC publishes statements on its website outlining the issues under consideration to allow interested parties the opportunity to submit. The NZCC will typically upload a version of any third-party submission (redacted for confidentiality) to its website to allow the merger parties to respond.

If an acquisition occurs in the absence of a clearance or authorisation, then both the NZCC and interested parties have the ability to apply to the court for relief. At that stage, the usual court rules relating to disclosure and documents apply.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

When an application is received by the NZCC it will issue a media release announcing the fact of the application, the identities of the parties, and a link to the public version of the application document (confidential or commercially sensitive information, including the parties' estimates of market share, is excluded from the public version).

Subsequent to that, the NZCC will publish on its website any statement of preliminary issues, statement of issues, statement of unresolved issues, final decision, and public versions of any further submissions (from the parties or third parties).

As a public body, the NZCC is subject to the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA), meaning that any person can request information held by the NZCC, which includes any information submitted as part of a merger process. Under the OIA's principle of availability, such information should be disclosed unless there is good reason not to (such as where disclosure would disclose a trade secret or unreasonably prejudice the commercial position of the provider). The NZCC will consider requests for information against its obligations under the OIA. The NZCC has a good track record of resisting disclosure of genuinely confidential or commercially sensitive information.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The NZCC regularly cooperates with overseas regulators in relation to merger applications. The NZCC has a particularly close relationship with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The two regulators coordinate through the formal cross-appointment of commissioners, including by having the NZCC cross-appointee appointed to the panel deciding on ACCC decisions that involve both Australia and New Zealand (and vice versa).

In addition, the NZCC has statutory powers to enter into 'cooperation agreements' with its overseas counterparts to enable it to share compulsorily acquired information and perform searches for the purposes of assisting an overseas regulator. However, unless such a cooperation agreement has been entered into, confidential information provided to the NZCC cannot be shared with another regulator without a waiver from the provider of the information, as New Zealand's domestic confidentiality and privacy laws will continue to apply. To date, the NZCC has entered into formal cooperation agreements with the ACCC and the Canadian Competition Bureau.

The NZCC is also a member of the International Competition Network and maintains contact to overseas regulators through that network.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Appeals of a Commerce Commission (NZCC) clearance or authorisation decision may be made to the High Court by giving notice of appeal within 20 working days after the date of the NZCC's decision, or within such further time as the court allows. Such appeals proceed by way of rehearing. Persons entitled to bring an appeal are:

- the applicant;
- the target; and
- in the context of authorisations, any person who has a direct and significant interest in the application (provided they participated in the NZCC's process leading up to its decision).

Third parties cannot appeal an NZCC clearance decision but can judicially review the clearance process.

The court on appeal can confirm, modify or reverse the NZCC's determination, or exercise any of the powers that could have been exercised by the NZCC. The court can also direct the NZCC to reconsider, either generally or in respect of specified matters, the matter to which the appeal relates. Parties can subsequently appeal a High Court decision to the Court of Appeal and, if leave to appeal is granted, the Supreme Court.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Appeals may be made to the High Court by giving notice of appeal within 20 working days after the date of the NZCC's decision.

It is difficult to assess the 'usual' time frame for appeals against the NZCC's merger determinations as there have been very few. The most recent appeals to be heard in both the High Court and Court of Appeal were appeals by the media organisations Fairfax New Zealand Limited and NZME Limited against the NZCC's decision to decline their application for clearance or authorisation to merge. The NZCC declined the application on 3 May 2017. The parties filed a notice of appeal on 26 May 2017, and the High Court hearing was held from 16–27 October 2017. On 18 December 2017, the High Court issued its judgment, in which it upheld the NZCC's decision. On 22 February 2018, the High Court granted leave to appeal its decision to the Court of Appeal. The hearing was held between 5 and 8 June 2018. On 26 September 2018, the Court of Appeal issued its judgment, in which it upheld the NZCC's decision.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2018, the Commerce Commission (NZCC) identified 'an increase in non-notified mergers' (ie, merger parties relying on their own 'self-assessment' in the context of New Zealand's voluntary merger filing regime). As a result, the identification and investigation of non-notified mergers has become a publicly stated priority of the NZCC. Consequently, there have been a number of non-notified mergers in recent years that have been investigated, subject to enforcement action, or have required commitments from the merger parties to resolve NZCC concerns. This applies across all industries and sectors.

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The government has recently announced its intention to increase the maximum penalties for breaching the merger control prohibition, to align them with the maximum penalties for other prohibited restrictive trade practices. This would increase the maximum penalty for bodies corporate from NZ\$5 million to the greater of NZ\$10 million or three times the value of any commercial gain, or 10 per cent of turnover if commercial gain cannot be ascertained. If passed, these changes are expected to take effect in 2021.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The most significant development in recent times is the Commerce Commission's (NZCC) publicly stated priority on identifying and investigating non-notified mergers. As a result, in the 2018/19 financial year the NZCC:

- concluded seven investigations into non-notified mergers (compared to four investigations in total for all of 2014 to 2017);
- obtained divestments from two parties before withdrawing its opposition to mergers; and
- brought court proceedings in relation to two mergers, with those proceedings being the first merger control proceedings brought by the NZCC since 2008.

In the first of those enforcement proceedings, in February 2019 the High Court ordered First Gas Limited (a provider of reticulated gas transmission and gas distribution services) to pay penalties of NZ\$3.4 million in relation to its acquisition of the gas distribution assets of GasNet Limited. This was significant as in addition to a breach of the merger control prohibition, the NZCC also successfully prosecuted First Gas in relation to a restraint of trade in the merger agreement. This is the first time that an ancillary restraint in a merger agreement has been subject to proceedings. Of the NZ\$3.4 million penalty, approximately 20 per cent of the penalty was said to relate to restraint of trade – namely, approximately \$680,000. Moreover, the NZ\$2.7 million penalty or breach of merger control was significantly higher than the NZ\$500,000 penalty ordered against New Zealand Bus in 2008. This demonstrates that the upward trajectory in penalties, as observed in relation to other parts of the Act, also applies to merger control.

In April 2020, in response to the covid-19 pandemic, the NZCC announced that it would 'seek to prioritise any requests for merger approvals where the financial viability of a firm is in jeopardy because of the current economic circumstances'. In assessing such applications, the NZCC has said that it 'will continue to assess each application on a case-by-case basis' but that it will take into account 'the longer-term impact on competition from any change in the structure of markets.' This demonstrates that the NZCC will continue apply its usual legal threshold, but that it will take into account the challenges facing businesses in making that assessment.

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# North Macedonia

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) is a primary source of competition law in North Macedonia, whose purpose is to ensure free competition on the domestic market to stimulate economic efficiency and consumer welfare. LPC entered into force on 13 November 2010 (Official Gazette No. 145/10), and was subsequently amended and supplemented in 2011, 2014, 2016 and again in 2018. It replaced the former competition legislation from 2005.

In 2012, on the basis of the LPC, the government of North Macedonia adopted nine by-laws (Decrees):

- on the detailed conditions for block exemption of certain types of agreements for transfer of technology, licence or know-how;
- on the detailed conditions for block exemption of certain types of research and development agreements;
- on the conditions for block exemption of certain categories of horizontal agreements for specialisation;
- on block exemption of certain categories of insurance agreements;
- on block exemption of certain categories of agreements on distribution and servicing of motor vehicles;
- on block exemption of certain categories of vertical agreements;
- on the detailed conditions on agreements of minor importance (*de minimis*);
- on the form and content of the notification for concentration and the documentation to be submitted with the notification; and
- on the detailed conditions and procedure under which the Commission for Misdemeanour Matters decides on immunity from fines and reduction of fines (*leniency*).

They regulate some specific institutions that are prescribed within the LPC to enable the proper enforcement in the practice of, as well as total harmonisation with, EU principles, especially the secondary legislation of the European Union.

The body responsible for implementing the LPC is the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission), as an independent state body.

The Commission supervises the application of the provisions of the LPC by monitoring and analysing the conditions of the market to the extent necessary for the development of free and efficient competition, as well as conducting procedures and making decisions in accordance with the provisions of the law.

The misdemeanour procedure is conducted and the misdemeanour sanction is imposed by a separate Commission for Misdemeanour Matters within the competition authority.

From 2012 to the end of 2016, the Commission adopted a set of various guidelines aiming to elaborate in more detail the provisions of

the LPC and the Decrees, as well as to give instructions on the manner of proceeding of the Commission and assessment of various competition issues:

- Guidelines on the term concentration (2012) – harmonised with the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings;
- Guidelines for the method of submission and filing of notifications for concentration (2015) – harmonised with Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004, dated 21 April 2004 for implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between enterprises;
- Guidelines on determining the cases in which the Commission shall pass a decision on assessment of the concentration in simplified form (2012) – harmonised with the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (2005/C 56/04);
- Guidelines for the assessment of horizontal concentrations for the purposes of the LPC (2015) – harmonised with the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal C 31, 5 February 2004, pages 5 to 18;
- Guidelines for the assessment of vertical and conglomerate concentrations (2015) – harmonised with the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings Official Journal C 265 of 18 October 2008;
- Guidelines for possible amendments and undertaking of commitments with regard to the notified concentrations, acceptable for the Commission, according to the LPC (2015) – harmonised with the Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004;
- Guidelines for defining the cases in which the Commission shall usually determine that certain concentrations assessed are compliant with the law (2016) – harmonised with the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (2013/C 366/04);
- Guidelines on the application of article 7, paragraph 3 of the LPC (2012) – harmonised with the Commission Notice – Guidelines on the application of article 81(3) of the Treaty (text with EEA relevance);
- Guidelines for the vertical restrictions (2015) – harmonised with the Commission notice – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Official Journal C 130, 19 May 2010, page 1;
- Guidelines for the implementation of article 7 of the LPC for horizontal agreements for cooperation (2015) – harmonised with the Guidelines on the applicability of article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements, Official Journal C 11, 14 January 2011, pages 1 to 72;

- Guidelines for detecting collusive agreements in the procedures for granting public procurement agreements (2015) – harmonised with the recommendations for prevention and avoiding of collusive tendering of international organisations, such as the OECD; and
- Guidelines for immunity or reduction of fines – leniency (2016).

## Scope of legislation

### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The LPC's merger control rules are based on the concept of change of control. A concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a lasting basis results from:

- the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings; or
- the acquisition of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings by one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by means of an agreement or in other manner stipulated by law.

### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture that permanently performs all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint ventures) shall constitute a concentration according to the provisions of the LPC (ie, the acquisition of direct or indirect control).

The Guidelines on the term concentration closely defines the specific requirements under which the joint venture would be considered a concentration.

The joint venture must fulfil the full-functionality criterion to constitute a concentration, irrespective of whether the joint venture is created as a 'greenfield operation' and whether the parties contribute assets to the joint venture that were previously in individual ownership. It is sufficient for the joint venture to be autonomous in an operational respect.

Full-functionality means that a joint venture must operate on the market, performing functions that are normally carried out by the undertakings operating on the same market. For that purpose, the joint venture must have a management dedicated to its daily operations and access to sufficient resources including finance, personnel and assets (tangible and intangible) to perform its business activities on a permanent basis within the framework determined in the joint venture agreement.

The Guidelines on the term concentration outlines more specific directions with respect to the situations that would be considered when examining the notification of concentration in cases involving joint ventures (for example, the sufficient resources to operate independently on a market, the activities outside the specific function of the ruling or parent undertakings, sale and purchase relations with the ruling or parent undertakings, sustainable operations on a lasting basis, and changes in the activities of the joint venture).

### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The concept of control, under the LPC, comprises rights, contracts or any other means that either separately or in combination, and having regards to the factual or legal conditions confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular through:

- ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; or
- rights or contracts that confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of the undertaking.

Control is acquired by persons or undertakings who are holders of the rights or have acquired the rights under the contracts referred to above, or that still have the power to exercise such rights under the contracts even though such persons or undertakings have not been holders of such rights or have not acquired the rights under the contracts.

Minority interests may fall within the definition of control if they are associated with veto rights over strategic decisions of the undertaking. Contractual arrangements, such as: organisational contracts under law; or lease of the enterprise's business, which grants control over the management and the resources; or right to use the enterprise's assets, may also lead to change of control on a lasting basis, despite the fact that property rights or shares are not transferred.

With the Guidelines regarding the term concentration, the Commission provided more information and instructions to questions when the concentration arises in accordance with article 12 of the LPC, thus specifying the types of control.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The participants in a concentration are obliged to notify such concentration to the Commission, if:

- the collective aggregate annual income of all the participating undertakings, generated by sale of goods or services on the world market, exceeds the equivalent amount of €10 million expressed in denars counter value, made during the business year preceding the concentration, and where at least one participant is registered in North Macedonia;
- the collective aggregate annual income of all the participating undertakings, generated by sales of goods or services in North Macedonia, exceeds the equivalent amount of €2.5 million expressed in denars counter value, made during the business year preceding the concentration; or
- the market share of one of the participants exceeds 40 per cent or the total market share of the participants in the concentration exceeds 60 per cent in the year preceding the concentration.

The LPC does not specify any conditions under which the Commission would be competent to investigate transactions falling below the above-mentioned thresholds.

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing is mandatory and there are no exceptions provided in the law. Therefore, any merger qualifying as a concentration that meets the turnover thresholds or market share thresholds must be filed.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The implementation of the LPC is not limited only to practices undertaken within the territory of North Macedonia, but also abroad if they produce certain effects on the territory of North Macedonia. The LPC shall be applied to all forms of prevention, restriction or distortion of competition that produce an effect on the territory of North Macedonia, even when they result from acts carried out or undertaken outside the territory of North Macedonia.

If the thresholds are fulfilled, the presumption stands that a foreign-to-foreign merger produces effects in North Macedonia, and it has to be notified in North Macedonia.



## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no special provisions on foreign investments or on special sectors in the LPC; the general rules shall apply.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The deadline for filing the notification is generally described: the participants are obliged to notify the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission) before implementation of the concentration and following the conclusion of the merger agreement, or the announcement of a public bid for the purchase or acquisition of a controlling interest in the charter capital of the undertaking.

Failure to notify represents a misdemeanour penalised by a fine amounting to up to 10 per cent of the value of the aggregate annual income of the undertaking made in the business year preceding the year when the misdemeanour was committed. In addition to the fine, the Commission for Misdemeanour Matters may impose to the legal person a temporary ban on the performance of specific activity in duration of three to 30 days, and to the natural person – a ban on the performance of an occupation, activity or duty in duration of three to 15 days.

The competition authority in North Macedonia has had a past track record of sanctioning the undertakings for failure to notify the concentration when the jurisdictional thresholds were met (even for foreign-to-foreign mergers).

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Merging undertakings or acquirers of joint control are obliged to submit a joint notification of the concentration arising as a result of a merger or of a concentration resulting from the acquisition of a joint control.

In all other cases the notification shall be filed by a person or undertaking that acquires control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings.

The initial filing fee amounts to 6,000 denars and is payable with filing. An additional fee of 30,000 denars will be charged for a decision declaring the concentration compliant with the provisions of the LPC, and is payable after the concentration has been appraised by the Commission.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The concentration shall not be performed either before its notification to the Commission or after the submission of the notification until a decision is made declaring the concentration compliant with the LPC or before the expiry of the legal terms in which the Commission should pass the decision. This shall not prevent the implementation of a public bid for the purchase of securities or a series of securities transactions, including those convertible into other securities for the purpose of trading on the market if the concentration has been notified to the Commission without delay, and the acquirer of securities does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question, or does so only to the extent that is necessary to maintain the full value of its investment and based on a Commission's decision for exemption.

After the complete notification is received, the Commission has up to 25, or at most 145 business days, depending on the case, to pass its decision.

#### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If the undertakings do not comply with the suspension obligation as stipulated in article 18 of the LPC, they can be fined for a serious misdemeanour with up to 10 per cent of the value of the total annual income of the undertaking (respectively, of the group) realised in the business year preceding the year in which the concentration was performed. The total annual income is calculated under article 16 of the LPC. In addition, the Commission may impose temporary bans on the performance of specific activity in duration of three to 30 days, and to the natural person – a ban on the performance of an occupation, activity or duty in duration of three to 15 days.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

If the undertaking does not file a notification on concentration in cases of foreign-to-foreign mergers that fall under the provisions of the LPC, the Commission for Misdemeanour Matters shall impose a fine amounting to up to 10 per cent of the value of the aggregate annual income of the undertaking made in the business year preceding the year when the misdemeanour was committed. In addition to the fine, the Commission for Misdemeanour Matters may impose temporary bans.

The Commission for Misdemeanour Matters imposed fines in several cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

All mergers (not only foreign-to-foreign) that fulfil the thresholds can apply for an exemption from the suspension obligation by submitting a justified written request, which is subject to approval by the Commission (article 18 of the LPC).

The Commission may, upon a reasoned request by the participants in a concentration, decide and allow an exemption from the obligations that the concentration shall not be performed before its notification and clearance. In deciding upon the request for exemption, the Commission shall, inter alia, take into account the effects of the suspension of the concentration on one or more undertakings concerned by the concentration or on a third party, as well the threat to the competition posed by the concentration. This exemption may be subject to imposing of conditions and obligations to ensure an effective competition. The exemption may be applied for and granted at any time, that is, prior to filing of the notification or following the transaction that refers to the public bid for the purchase of securities or a series of securities transactions, including those convertible into other securities for the purpose of trading on the market. The Commission prescribed a special form of request for exemption, regulating in general manner its content; however, details of the documents to be enclosed to the request are not provided. The decision following the request for exemption has to be issued within 15 days of the day of receipt of the complete documentation necessary to assess the request.

#### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There are no special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The LPC does not prescribe a special form for submission of the notification. It only stipulates that the notification of the concentration must include (original or a verified transcript of): the legal act that is the basis for the creation of the concentration; financial reports of the participants regarding the business year preceding the concentration; certificate from the trade register or other register of legal persons containing the basic information on the undertaking, the registered office and the scope of operation of the participants; and data regarding the market shares of the participants and the shares of their competitors. The Commission ex officio obtains the financial reports and registration documents for the participants in the concentration registered in North Macedonia.

However, the 'Regulation on the form and content of the notification of concentration and necessary documentation that shall be submitted along with the notification' sets out detailed rules with regard to the notification's content and format (written and electronic) as well as additional enclosures. Inter alia, the notification on concentration should contain the following information: a short resume on the notification – excluding any confidential information (to be published on the Commission's website), exact data on the participants in the concentration (name, address, business activity, and annual income gained on a group level in the business year preceding the concentration – worldwide and on the North Macedonian market, calculated under article 16 of the LPC), detailed description and legal basis of the concentration, relevant markets and market shares of the participants in the concentration and their main competitors, etc.

The notification for concentration should mandatorily include a statement signed by or on behalf of the notifying party (in the practice it should be signed by all the participants in the concentration) relating to the accuracy of the data, information and documents enclosed to the notification. In the case of submitting false or misleading data to the Commission, a misdemeanour fine could be imposed on the notifying party of up to 1 per cent of the value of its total annual turnover, calculated under article 16 of the LPC; and more importantly, the Commission may revoke its decision declaring the concentration as compliant with the provisions of LPC if it was adopted on the basis of such false or incomplete data for which one of the participants in the concentration is responsible or it was obtained by way of deceit, and it had a decisive influence when adopting the decision.

In addition to the compulsory data, the Commission may require the submission of all other data considered necessary for the evaluation of the concentration. In particular, this would take place in cases of horizontal relations (where two or more of the participants in the concentration are engaged in business activities related to the same market of goods and geographical market) or vertical relations (when one or more of the participants in the concentration are engaged in business activities on the market of goods that is upstream or downstream in relation to the market of goods in which any other participant in the concentration participates) between the participants in the concentration, provided that in cases of horizontal relations their mutual market share is higher than 15 per cent, and in cases of vertical relations their individual or mutual market shares are equal to or higher than 25 per cent.

The 'Guidelines for submission and filing of the notification for concentration' prescribe the form and content of the introductory (first) page of the notification for concentration, which is of a very general nature. In addition, the Guidelines provide some more technical details about the form, content and technical description of the elements of the notification of concentration (all mandatory data to be provided on

a separate sheet of paper, to include description of the circumstances related to the concentration, or to indicate and elaborate that such information is not relevant for the assessment of the concentration, to provide a detailed list of all enclosures, etc).

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The Commission shall examine the notification once it is received, and decide:

- that the notified concentration does not fall under the provisions of the LPC; and
- to declare the concentration as compliant with the provisions of the LPC if:
  - it finds that the concentration notified, although falling under the provisions of the LPC, shall not have as its effect significant impediment of effective competition on the market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position (significant impediment of effective competition);
  - the participants, after the notification is filed, have modified the concentration, and the Commission finds that as result of those changes the concentration shall no longer have as its effect significant impediment to effective competition; or
  - to initiate an in-depth procedure if it finds that the concentration notified falls under the provisions of the LPC and may have as its effect the significant impediment of effective competition. No appeal or legal action on instituting an administrative dispute is allowed against this procedural order.

In August 2016, the Commission adopted separate Guidelines that define the cases in which it will usually declare certain concentrations compliant with the competition rules in a simplified procedure (within the term of 25 working days), aiming to make the merger control procedure more focused and effective.

During the in-depth procedure the following steps may occur:

- the Commission may decide to adopt a decision declaring that the concentration is compliant with the provisions of the LPC, if after the notification is filed or after the performed concentration modifications by its participants, the Commission finds that the concentration shall not have as its effect significant impediment of effective competition;
- the participants in the concentration may enter into commitments with the Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compliant with the provisions of the LPC. In this case, the Commission may adopt a decision declaring that the concentration is compliant with the provisions of the LPC and in the same decision shall determine the conditions and impose obligations intended to insure that the participants act in line with the commitments undertaken with the Commission; any breach of the commitment attached to the decision declaring the concentration as compliant with LPC is justified reason for the Commission to revoke such decision; or
- the Commission may adopt a decision declaring that the concentration is not compliant with the provisions of the LPC if it finds that the concentration shall have as its effect a significant impediment of effective competition.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Once the Commission receives all the data and documents, it shall issue a certificate of completeness and start to examine the notification of the concentration. Within 25 working days of receipt of the complete notification, the Commission shall make the decision on the compatibility of the merger with the LPC, or it shall make a procedural order initiating an in-depth procedure if it finds that the notified concentration falls under the provisions of the LPC, but might not be compliant with the LPC.

This term may be extended up to 35 working days if the participants in the concentration undertake commitments in relation to the Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compliant with the LPC.

If an in-depth procedure has been initiated, the decision appraising the concentration has to be passed within 90 working days of the date of initiating the procedure. The time limits may be extended by the Commission in agreement with the participants in the concentration at any time after initiating the procedure and the total duration of each extension may not exceed 20 working days.

If the Commission has not adopted a decision within the prescribed deadlines, the concentration shall be considered to be compliant with the provisions of the LPC.

By exception, the legal time limits shall not be binding on the Commission when, as result of circumstances for which one of the participants is responsible, the Commission had to request ex officio from the undertakings to submit necessary data regarding their economic-financial standing, their business relations, data regarding their statutes and decisions, and the number and identity of the persons affected by such decisions, as well as other necessary data, or if the Commission had to perform other relevant actions by inspection and obtaining of evidence on the site.

The procedure cannot be speeded up.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A concentration that significantly impedes the effective competition on the market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position of its participants, is not in compliance with the provisions of the Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC).

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

To the extent that the creation of a joint venture constituting a concentration has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings – part of the joint venture that remains legally independent, such coordination shall be appraised according to the criteria applicable to the prohibited agreements, decisions and concerted practices as well as the exemptions thereof.

In making such appraisal, the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission) in particular shall take into account whether the parties to the joint venture continue to retain, to a significant extent, the activities on the same market as the joint venture or on the market that is downstream or upstream from that of the joint venture or on a neighbouring market closely related to the market of the joint venture; and the coordination that arises as a direct effect from the creation of the joint venture affords the parties in the joint venture the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods or services in question.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Commission shall investigate whether the concentration shall significantly impede the effective competition on the market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position of its participants.

In making the appraisal of the concentration, the Commission especially takes into account:

- the need to maintain and develop effective competition on the market or in a substantial part of it, especially in terms of the structure of all markets concerned and the actual or potential competition from undertakings located in and outside North Macedonia; and
- the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, the supply and alternatives available to suppliers and users, as well as their access to the supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry on and exit from the market, the supply and demand trends for the relevant goods or services, the interest of the consumers and the technological and economic development, provided this is benefit for the consumers and the concentration does not form an obstacle to competition development.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues are not reviewed by the Commission.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Commission will take into account economic efficiencies to the extent that the parties are able to offer a defence that the efficiency gains will benefit consumers.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Interim measures for restoring or maintaining effective competition may be imposed when the concentration has:

- been implemented before filing the notification and its clearance (as compliant with the Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC));
- been implemented contrary to the conditions and commitments attached to the decision for its clearance; and
- already been implemented and declared not compliant with the provisions of the LPC.

The Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission) has the power to annul its decision for clearance of the concentration and to declare that the concentration is not compliant with the LPC, and, if necessary, impose measures and obligations to restore effective competition on the relevant market. In this procedure, the Commission is not bound by the time limits outlined in the statutory timetable for clearance.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes, it is possible to remedy competition issues.

After the notification is filed, the participants may enter into commitments (divestiture or behavioural remedies) with the Commission. In its decision the Commission shall attach conditions and impose obligations intended to insure that the participants act in line with the commitments entered into with the Commission, with a view to rendering the concentration compliant with the provisions of the LPC.

In December 2015, the Commission adopted the latest Guidelines for possible amendments and undertaking of commitments with regard to the notified concentrations, acceptable for the Commission, according to the LPC.

### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

There are no strict provisions in the LPC related to the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedies; the situation is appraised by the Commission on a case-by-case basis.

Under the Guidelines for possible amendments and undertaking of commitments with regard to the notified concentrations, the parties may modify the concentration to eliminate the competition concerns and obtain clearance of the concentration. Such modifications have to be fully implemented in advance of a clearance decision.

However, it is more common that the parties submit commitments (adequate to eliminate the competition concerns and to ensure competitive market structures) with a view to rendering the concentration compliant with the LPC, and that those commitments are implemented following clearance.

The commitments could include the following.

#### Divestiture

Sale of a business unit (assets or part of the business) to a suitable purchaser – which is used to eliminate competition concerns resulting from horizontal overlaps, and may also be the best means of resolving problems resulting from vertical or conglomerate concerns.

The divestiture has to be completed within a fixed time period agreed between the parties and the Commission: a period for entering into a final agreement ('first divestiture period' – to take around six months, and 'trustee divestiture period' – to take additional three months), and a further period for the closing of the transaction (to take three months). The deadline for the divestiture shall normally start on the day of the adoption of the Commission decision. These periods may be modified on a case-by-case basis.

#### Removing links between the parties and competitors

This may be done in cases where these links contribute to the competition concerns raised by the merger (such as divestiture of a minority shareholding in a joint venture, or waiving of rights linked to minority stakes in a competitor, comprehensively and in a permanent way, or termination of agreements with companies supplying the same products or providing the same services).

#### Other structural remedies

Other structural remedies include granting access to the key infrastructure, networks, key technology, including patents, know-how or other intellectual property rights, and essential inputs on non-discriminating terms – which may be suitable to resolve all types of concerns if those remedies are equivalent to divestitures in their effects.

## Commitments

Commitments are possible relating to the future behaviour of the undertaking after the concentration, which may be acceptable only in very specific circumstances (such as change of long-term exclusive contracts, other non-divestiture remedies – such as promises by the parties to abstain from certain commercial behaviour, eg, bundling products, only in cases of conglomerate structures).

The parties have to submit enough information relevant for assessment of the commitments. The Commission may grant waivers or accept modifications or substitutions of the commitments only in exceptional circumstances. This will very rarely be relevant for divestiture commitments.

### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To date, there has been one foreign-to-foreign merger with remedies imposed, which have been duly fulfilled by the merging parties. On 8 July 2015 and 4 July 2018, the Commission conditionally approved another two mergers; fulfilment of the commitments is ongoing.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

If the concentration is approved, it is considered that the clearance decision includes the ancillary restrictions. The Guidelines on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations from 2011 sets out principles for assessing whether and to what extent the most common types of agreements (non-competition clauses, licence agreements, purchase and supply obligations) are deemed to be ancillary restraints. It introduces the principle of self-assessment of the ancillary restrictions; however, the parties may request from the Commission to provide its opinion on the residual character of the restrictions with regard to specific novel or unresolved issues giving rise to genuine uncertainty, when such case is not already covered with the Guidelines. The provisions of article 7 (regulating prohibited agreements, decisions and concerted practices) and article 11 of the LPC (regulating abuse of dominant position) shall apply to restrictions that cannot be regarded as ancillary restrictions.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

After the short resume of the notification of the concentration (which includes the name, headquarters and subject of activity of the participants, the type of concentration – merger, or acquiring a joint control, etc) is published on the website of the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission), all interested parties (including the customers and competitors) can provide their comments, opinions and remarks regarding the concentration concerned within the deadline stipulated by the Commission. Their input will be adequately assessed by the Commission and addressed in the decision upon the notified concentration.

## Publicity and confidentiality

### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The participants in the concentration should clearly mark all the confidential data in the notification. However, the Commission shall accept the classification of data as a business secret if it concerns data that has economic or market value and whose discovery or use may lead to economic advantage of other undertakings. When submitting data classified as a business secret, the undertaking is obliged to justify such determination by indicating objective reasons.

The short resume of the notification of concentration should not contain any confidential data and business secrets, as it is published on the Commission's website, and is a forum for interested parties to provide their comments, opinions and remarks.

After adopting a decision on concentration, the Commission delivers the decision to the notifying party, asking it to clearly mark all confidential data.

The non-confidential versions of the decisions of the Commission and the Commission for Misdemeanour Matters are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia and on the website of the Commission. The judgments, that is, the decisions of the court, are published only on the Commission's website.

The president and the members of the Commission and its employees, as well as the president and the members of the Commission for Misdemeanour Matters, are obliged to keep business or professional secrets regardless of how they have been learnt. This obligation lasts for five years as of the termination of the employment with the Commission or after the expiry of the term of office of the president or the Commission member. The above persons may not give public statements that could harm the reputation of the undertaking or statements on the measures they have undertaken or the procedures they have initiated while performing the activities under their competence until they are final, unless it regards the announcement of general information.

The parties in the procedure are not entitled to inspect, transcribe or copy any documents that are a business or professional secret within the definition under the Law on the Protection of Competition.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Commission participates in the implementation of projects of international authorities and the authorities of the European Union, and cooperates with the competition authorities and institutions of other countries, mainly through sharing the experience. The Commission has signed memorandums of cooperation with the competition authorities of countries in the region (such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey). North Macedonia has been a member of: the International Competition Network; the OECD Regional Centre for Competition (RCC), established in 2005 for the south-eastern European countries; and the Energy Community Competition Network, established in 2012 within the frameworks of the Energy Community by the competition authorities of the signatories of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Energy Community.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Participants in the procedure are entitled to lodge lawsuits with the Administrative Court of North Macedonia against administrative and misdemeanour decisions of the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission). Judgments of the Administrative Court can be appealed to the Higher Administrative Court. The Supreme Court decides on extraordinary legal remedies against decisions of the Higher Administrative Court.

The Law on Administrative Disputes applies to disputes initiated in accordance with the above.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The legal term to file a lawsuit to the Administrative Court is 30 days of receiving the decision; while the lawsuit shall not defer the enforcement of decisions adopted in administrative procedure, it will suspend the enforcement of decisions on misdemeanour matters.

Judgments of the Administrative Court can be appealed to the Higher Administrative Court within 15 days of receiving the first instance court decision.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

So far, all of the Commission's merger decisions have been complied with.

The Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) introduced misdemeanour procedures in which the Commission for Misdemeanour Matters shall simultaneously determine the existence of violation of the LPC, the existence of a misdemeanour, and it shall also impose certain fines as sanctions for such behaviour. It is expected that the LPC would further expedite the enforcement and the system of sanctioning LPC violations, as it would no longer be necessary for the violation to be initially determined in an administrative procedure, which would then be followed by a separate misdemeanour procedure.

On 8 July 2015, the Commission conditionally approved a merger in the telecommunication sector; on 4 July 2018, the Commission conditionally approved a foreign-to-foreign merger in the sector of construction materials (modular suspended ceilings); fulfilment of the commitments in both cases is ongoing.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

At present there are no proposals for adoption of regulations or for any changes (amendment and supplement of the current regulation) pending. The by-laws adopted in March 2012 are still in force. With this set of by-laws, competition legislation under the LPC is up to date with the most important parts of EU legislation. The Commission regularly adopts and publishes on its website specific guidelines on various competition issues.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year****36** | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The merger control track record in 2019 includes 50 unconditionally approved concentrations. No misdemeanour sanction for failure to notify concentration was imposed in the past year; the same refers to the conditionally approved transactions, temporary measures and annulled decisions (referring to previously approved mergers).

The average duration of the procedure in 2019 was 15 business days from the day of receipt of complete notification.

The Commission continues to monitor fulfilment of the commitments (structural remedies) in the telecommunications sector undertaken by the parties (Case Up No. 08-1 from 2015), as well as the commitments in the sector of construction materials – modular suspended ceilings (Case Up No. 08-4 from 2018).



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# Norway

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Merger control in Norway is regulated by Chapter 4 of the Norwegian Competition Act and the Regulation on Notification of Concentration. Both the Competition Act and the Notification Regulation was amended in 2016 and are now to a large extent harmonised with the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR).

The primary enforcer of merger control is the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA). All appeals are handled by the Norwegian Competition Tribunal, an independent and court-like administrative body for competition cases established in 2017. Decisions of the Competition Tribunal are appealed to the Gulating Court of Appeal.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Merger control in Norway applies to concentrations. According to section 17 of the Competition Act, a concentration is deemed to arise either where:

- two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings merge; or
- one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings, acquire direct or indirect control on a lasting basis of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.

The concept of 'concentrations' under the Competition Act is harmonised with the EUMR and encompasses lasting changes to the structure of the market. Case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission's jurisdictional notice and decisional practice are relevant to the assessment of the concept of 'concentrations' pursuant to the Competition Act.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity constitutes a 'concentration' and is, therefore, subject to merger control. The concept of a full-function joint venture is the same as under the EUMR.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

As defined in section 17 of the Competition Act, control is constituted by the possibility in law or facts of exercising decisive influence on a company. Also, the concept of control is the same as under the EUMR.

Minority shareholdings that do not confer control are not subject to a mandatory filing requirement. However, it follows from section 16(a) of the Competition Act that the NCA can intervene against acquisitions of non-controlling stakes if it has ordered the acquirer to submit a notification within three months from the final agreement.

In addition – pursuant to section 16(a) – if an anticompetitive, minority stake in another company has been achieved through successive purchases, the NCA can intervene against all of the transactions that have taken place within two years from the date of the most recent acquisition.

Under the present Competition Act, the NCA has only intervened once against an acquisition of a minority shareholding that did not confer control. That happened in March 2019, when the NCA intervened against Sector Alarm's acquisition of 49.99 per cent in its competitor Nokas.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A concentration must be notified to the NCA if:

- at least two of the undertakings concerned each have an annual turnover in Norway exceeding 100 million kroner; and
- the combined annual turnover in Norway of the undertakings concerned exceeds 1 billion kroner.

The principles for calculation of turnover in Norway are the same as under the EUMR.

The NCA can choose to investigate transactions falling below the thresholds and require a notification if there are reasonable grounds to assume that competition will be affected by the concentration. The order must be given within three months of the final agreement or the acquisition of control, whichever comes first. In a 2019 case (Sector Alarm's acquisition of 49.99 per cent in its competitor Nokas), the NCA also ordered Sector to submit a notification about its acquisition of sole control over Nokas's security alarm portfolio, which had revenue below the thresholds. On appeal, the Competition Tribunal upheld the NCA's decision to require a notification.

In 2020, the NCA has on two separate occasions already ordered parties to submit notification of concentration with competitors below the thresholds: in February 2020, the media group Amedia was ordered to submit a notification about the acquisition of the local newspaper company Nu Publishing, although the latter only had a marginal turnover. In March 2020, the media group Schibsted was ordered to submit a notification about its acquisition of Nettbil – a start-up that offers a digital marketplace for auction-based car sales to dealers in Norway. This underlines that the NCA is not afraid to intervene below the notification threshold in concentrated sectors.

If the turnover thresholds of the EUMR are met, the NCA will not be competent to review the merger and no notification is required in Norway – except for transactions involving markets for products that fall outside the scope of the EEA Agreement. The rules of the EUMR on referral of cases between the European Commission and national competition authorities are largely applicable to Norway through Protocol 24 of the EEA Agreement.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Notifications of concentrations above the jurisdictional turnover thresholds are mandatory. Concentrations below the thresholds and acquisition of minority shareholdings, on the other hand, can be notified voluntarily. There are no exceptions from the mandatory notification obligation except for foreign-to-foreign mergers with no local effects.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Neither the Competition Act nor the Notification Regulation contains an explicit exception for foreign-to-foreign transactions. The turnover thresholds apply regardless of whether the undertakings concerned are established in Norway or not. However, the Competition Act only applies to transactions that have an effect, or are liable to have an effect, within Norway or in a market of which Norway is a part.

The NCA has confirmed that a merger filing is not required where a transaction does not meet this 'local effects test'. As regards the meaning of local effects, the NCA has taken the position that only effects on competition are relevant and that such effects must pertain to a market within Norway or a wider market that includes Norway. Accordingly, transactions that only affect competition in markets outside Norway will not meet the local effects requirement.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There is no general legislation in Norway applicable to foreign investments. In some sectors, there is special legislation on concessions, limitations on ownership etc, particularly in the finance, aquaculture, telecom and energy sectors.

The Norwegian Media Authority's control over media ownership was abolished on 1 July 2016, rendering a review of changes in media ownership the exclusive responsibility of the NCA.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no filing deadline pursuant to the Competition Act. As long as the transaction is not implemented, it is for the parties to decide when to submit the notification.

The Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) may impose fines of up to 10 per cent of the undertaking's turnover for not filing. In practice, the NCA will fine the undertaking for implementing the transaction in breach of the standstill obligation if it has failed to notify.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The parties or party responsible for the notification of the concentration to the NCA varies:

- In the case of mergers, the obligation to file rests with the merging parties jointly.
- If two or more undertakings acquire joint control over one or more other undertakings, the obligation to file rests with the acquiring undertakings jointly.
- If a single undertaking acquires control over one or more other undertakings, the obligation to notify rests with the acquiring undertaking alone.

No filing fees are required.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

An automatic standstill rule applies to all concentrations that are subject to notification to the NCA. The transactions cannot be implemented until the NCA has concluded its handling of the case in question or an express exemption from the standstill obligation has been obtained.

The NCA has granted a number of exemptions from the standstill obligation on a case-by-case basis. This includes several cases concerning acquisition where the target has been in financial difficulties and where the value of the target business could be significantly diminished if the parties could not begin implementation prior to the NCA's clearance. The last example is from February 2020 when the ultimate owners of the sports retailer Sport1 were given partial exemption from the standstill obligation to implement the proposed takeover of its bankrupt competitor Gresvig.

#### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Infringement of the standstill obligation can lead to significant fines. Fines may be imposed both in case of full and partial integration of the parties' businesses before the end of the standstill obligation.

Pursuant to the Competition Act, the NCA may issue a fine of up to 10 per cent of the undertaking's turnover for infringements of the standstill obligation. In February 2015, the NCA issued a record fine of 25 million kroner for failing to notify a concentration.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Sanctions may also be imposed in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers, provided that the concentration is notifiable in Norway owing to local effects. There are no examples in the NCA's decisional practice of sanctions in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Competition Act does allow for an exemption from the standstill obligation on a case-by-case basis. By obtaining such exemption, the parties to a foreign-to-foreign merger may be allowed to close the proposed transaction as long as Norwegian markets, or markets of which Norway forms part, are not affected. An exemption on this basis has so far only been granted in one case.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

A specific regulation provides for an exemption from the automatic standstill obligation for public takeover bids. The regulation corresponds to article 7(2) of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR).

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The level of detail required in a notification depends primarily on the existence of affected markets, namely an overlap between the businesses of the undertakings concerned, and the position of the undertakings in those markets. The requirements are relatively extensive if the undertakings have a combined market share of more than 20 per cent in a market or more than 30 per cent in markets that are vertically connected. These market share thresholds correspond to Form CO of the Implementing Regulation under the EUMR.

Notifications are to include the following categories of information:

- contact information;
- description of the transaction;
- descriptions of the undertakings concerned;
- descriptions of affected markets, including as a minimum a description of the market structure, lists of the most important competitors, customers and suppliers, and a description of barriers to entry;
- account of any efficiencies;
- information on whether the concentration is subject to notification to other competition authorities;
- latest version of the agreement giving rise to the concentration, including any attachments; and
- annual reports and financial statements of the undertakings concerned.

Notifications must be submitted in Norwegian if there are affected markets.

Any business secrets must be clearly marked in the notification and all confidentiality claims must be substantiated for the notification to be regarded as complete by the NCA. Furthermore, a proposal for a public version of the notification is to be included with the notification. The NCA is required to publish some basic information about every notification on its website.

The Notification Regulation includes a system of simplified notifications. On conditions similar to those of the 'Simplified Procedure' under the EUMR, the notifying parties may submit a simplified notification. Such notifications can be submitted in Norwegian, Swedish, Danish or English.

If the parties do not satisfy the requirements for notification, the deadlines for the NCA's handling of the case will not start running until the information requirements are met. Section 32 of the Competition Act provides a legal basis to impose fines, or in the most severe cases, criminal sanctions, if the parties provide the NCA with incomplete, incorrect or misleading information.

Like other national and supranational competition authorities, the NCA has recently strengthened its focus on misleading or incorrect information. In March 2020, the NCA fined the Norwegian state-owned train operator Vygruppen 7.5 million kroner for giving incorrect information when notifying a joint venture. From the NCA's decision, it follows that there is a fairly low threshold for such sanctions if the NCA first finds that incorrect or misleading information about relevant topics has been provided. The decision is not yet final.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The parties are under no obligation to consult with the NCA before notifying a merger. However, in complex cases, it is often advisable to approach the NCA at an early stage and present the main issues and the available data, and to enter into pre-notification discussions. Confidentiality is respected, so that discussions with the authority may take place before the deal is public.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

#### Phase I

From the date when the notification is submitted, the NCA has 25 working days to give notice that intervention may take place. In its notice, the NCA must briefly state its reasons for intervention. If no notice of possible intervention is given, the transaction is cleared. In non-problematic cases, the practice of the NCA is to clear the transaction before the Phase I deadline by way of an informal notice.

If the notifying parties present remedies within 20 working days of submission of the notification, the initial deadline of the NCA is extended by 10 working days. In such a case, it may accept and make binding the remedies within the extended deadlines. In November 2019, the NCA made its first remedy decision in Phase I according to this procedure in the case concerning the proposed merger between Tieto and Evry.

#### Phase II

If the NCA gives notice of a possible intervention, it has 70 working days (ie, 45 additional working days) from receipt of the notification to either accept and make binding any remedies presented by the notifying parties or issue a reasoned draft decision of intervention. If the notifying parties present remedies later than 55 working days after submission of the notification, the deadline is extended accordingly.

The parties have 15 working days to submit their comments to the draft decision of intervention. After the parties submit such comments, the NCA has 15 working days to issue its decision. If remedies are presented to the NCA after it has issued its reasoned draft decision, the final deadline can be extended by 15 working days. The NCA can also, on request or approval from the parties, extend its final deadline to issue a decision with 15 additional working days. In such cases, the maximum timetable for clearance is, therefore, 145 working days.

It follows that the deadlines of the NCA are primarily prolonged owing to incomplete notifications and presentation of remedies by the parties. The NCA has a strict approach to the marking of business secrets and substantiation of confidentiality claims, and has on numerous occasions not accepted notification as complete on those grounds.

If the NCA considers intervention in Phase II, and if acceptable remedies are not presented at an early stage, the NCA will usually exhaust its deadlines before making a final decision. The review process in such cases could take about six months if remedies are submitted during the in-depth investigation.

Owing to the covid-19 outbreak, there is an interim regulation in place until 31 October 2020, which extends the most important procedural deadlines by 15 working days. Addressees of intervention decisions adopted by the NCA are also afforded an extension of the deadline to appeal by 15 working days.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Under the Competition Act, the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) shall intervene against concentrations that significantly impede effective competition (the SIEC test), in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The substantive test is harmonised with that of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). It follows from the preparatory works to the Act, that the decisional practice under the EUMR is directly relevant for the interpretation of the Competition Act.

Until July 2016, the NCA was obliged to intervene against concentrations that significantly lessened competition (the SLC test). Under the SLC test, if a significant restriction of competition were deemed to have existed pre-merger, there was no de minimis threshold with respect to concentrations that would entail a further reduction of competition. Under the current SIEC test, the threshold for intervention is arguably higher in such cases. However, according to the preparatory works of the Act, the change from the SLC to the SIEC test is not to have any practical significance for NCA's ability to intervene against such concentrations.

Under the SIEC test, the NCA also has to assess whether the transaction generates efficiencies that outweigh the anticompetitive effects, as well as assessing the parties' arguments relating to a potential 'failing firm' defence. The NCA's practice indicates a very high threshold for clearing a concentration owing to efficiencies or the failing firm defence, but there are examples of both.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Section 16 of the Competition Act contains a special substance test for joint ventures. Similar to article 2(4) of the EUMR, the NCA shall consider whether the joint venture has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent. That coordination shall be appraised in accordance with section 10 of the Competition Act (which corresponds to article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The NCA will investigate possible unilateral, coordinated, vertical and (theoretically) conglomerate effects of the concentration. The notices, guidelines and decisional practices of the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority in the field of merger control have direct relevance for the NCA's intervention competence.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues cannot be taken into account by either the NCA or the Competition Tribunal when reviewing merger cases. Moreover, as of April 2017, the government's prerogative to decide in merger cases involving questions of principle or interests of major significance to society has been removed.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The NCA's practice indicates a very high threshold for clearing concentrations on efficiencies. In intervention decisions, alleged efficiencies are normally dismissed by the NCA as undocumented. However, some Phase II clearance decisions refer to efficiencies as part of the ground for clearing the concentration, although the level of scrutiny of efficiencies may not have been as high as in intervention decisions.

In an anomaly decision from April 2017, the NCA cleared Telia's acquisition of the mobile service provider Phonero on efficiencies, although it found that the concentration would significantly impede effective competition. The outcome was most likely due to service providers having considerable and easily verifiable marginal costs compared with mobile network operators.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If the conditions for intervention are fulfilled, the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) must either prohibit the concentration or accept and make binding the remedies presented by the notifying party or parties.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Both structural and behavioural remedies can be offered to remedy competition issues. Divestitures are in general considered more likely to succeed than behavioural remedies. Proposed remedies are, however, assessed on a case-by-case basis and the NCA has recently approved both categories of remedies.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

For a remedy to be approved, it must be considered by the NCA as being sufficient to alleviate the competition concerns raised by the transaction.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Since the entry into force in 2004 of the current Competition Act, the NCA has intervened against four transactions in which both parties were headquartered outside Norway:

- First, the NCA required the divestiture of the Norwegian subsidiaries of one party in a case relating to oil drilling services. The concentration was, however, cleared on appeal.
- Second, the NCA accepted behavioural remedies in a case regarding ticket services. On appeal, the behavioural remedy was replaced by a structural remedy – the divestment of the acquirer's Norwegian subsidiary.
- Third, the NCA imposed a structural remedy in a case concerning laboratory services. The acquirer was required to divest its Norwegian subsidiary.
- Fourth, the NCA accepted behavioural commitments in a case concerning two Sweden-based suppliers of car spare parts.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Ancillary restrictions are covered by the clearance decision. Ancillary restrictions are treated in the same way as under the EU Merger Regulation. The restrictions are cleared automatically and the NCA does not normally assess ancillary restrictions in individual cases.

Restrictions are considered 'ancillary' if they are directly related to the concentration and necessary to its implementation. A further condition is that the concentration, together with the ancillary restriction, does not significantly impede effective competition.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Third parties, and customers and competitors in particular, are regularly involved in the merger procedures before the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA), primarily as sources of market information. Third parties also have the possibility to bring, on its own initiative, arguments before the NCA.

The NCA will normally conduct relatively extensive investigations into proposed concentrations, including written requests for information to third parties, in particular in cases that go to Phase II. Furthermore, the NCA will usually turn to third parties if in doubt as to whether to close a case in Phase I and to market test any proposed remedies from the merging parties.

The formal rights of third parties and complainants are limited to a right to see non-confidential versions of the documents in the case file. If so requested, affected third parties will normally be allowed a meeting with the NCA to express their views on a concentration.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The NCA is obliged by law not to disclose business secrets and other confidential information. However, the general rule pursuant to Norwegian public administration law is that all documents are public. Therefore, it is only the information that can be considered business secrets, such as market shares, strategies and other competitively sensitive information, that is kept confidential.

Any business secrets must be clearly marked in the notification and all other documents submitted during the merger procedure, and any secrecy claim must be substantiated. Furthermore, a proposal for a public version of the documents submitted must be included.

The NCA is required to publish some basic information about every notification on its website. It is also required to publish non-confidential versions of any commitment or prohibition decision adopted. It will in practice also make public the main reasons for closing cases in which a Phase II investigation has been initiated.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The NCA is part of the network of European Competition Authorities (ECA) and exchanges basic information about notified concentrations within the network on a regular basis.

The NCA has close contact with the other Nordic competition authorities, both on a general basis and in individual cases where such contact is advantageous to the NCA's case handling, including in merger cases. In 2018, a new cooperation agreement between the Nordic authorities entered into force, expanding the level of cooperation. The Nordic competition authorities may now, to a greater extent, exchange confidential information with each other, and get access to information submitted by companies located in another Nordic country.

The NCA is also a member of the EFTA Network of Competition Authorities. The members are the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the national competition authorities of the EFTA states party to the EEA Agreement. The NCA is also regularly invited to participate in meetings and working groups of the European Competition Network (ECN). However, these networks are not primarily established to be forums for discussions about individual merger cases.

Finally, the NCA is a member of the International Competition Network (ICN) and also regularly participates in meetings and discussions within the OECD involving competition issues.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

All decisions from the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) can be appealed to the Competition Tribunal. It is only decisions from the Competition Tribunal that can be subject to judicial review. Neither the Competition Tribunal nor the courts have yet handled appeals against merger decisions from the NCA. However, if appealed, the Competition Tribunal and the courts have the power to assess the merger in full.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions from the NCA to intervene against concentrations – in practice, prohibition decisions, but theoretically also remedy decisions – may be appealed to the Competition Tribunal within 15 working days. Appeals are sent to the NCA, which has 15 working days from receipt to (change its decision or) forward it to the Competition Tribunal. The Competition Tribunal must provide its decision no later than 60 working days after its receipt of the appeal.

Decisions from the Competition Tribunal may be appealed to the Gulating Court of Appeal. The appeal must be submitted within three months of the parties' receipt of the Competition Tribunal's decision. In a case before the Court of Appeal there are no fixed deadlines; the case will follow the normal procedure for civil cases.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Since the entry into force of the present Competition Act in 2004, the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) has intervened in a total of 47 merger cases (as of May 2020). Of the intervention decisions, 32 cases were approved subject to remedies and the remaining 15 blocked. Only a small minority of these cases have been appealed, and only one case has been appealed to the Competition Tribunal after it was established as the appellate body in 2017.

Of the 45 intervention decisions of the NCA, four concerned transactions in which both parties were headquartered outside Norway.



In the past 10 years, the NCA has, inter alia, focused on the following markets in which competition in the NCA's view faces special challenges: the end-user market for electrical power, the TV market, the retail fuel market, the telecoms market, the grocery market and the dairy products market. Merger cases within these sectors will likely be monitored with particular attention.

Lately, the NCA has paid particular attention to the following markets: retail banking, books, broadband, mobile telephony, taxis, security services, local and regional newspapers, recycling and groceries.

Finally, the NCA has continued its focus on the effect on competition in local markets and its use of quantitative methods (eg, diversion ratios and Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI) analyses).

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are no current proposals to change the legislation. There have been major revisions to the Competition Act during the last couple of years:

- As of 1 July 2016, the substantive test was harmonised with the SIEC test of the EU Merger Regulation. This included the introduction of a consumer welfare standard in Norway. Several other changes to the Competition Act and the Notification Regulation entered into force at the same time.
- As of 1 April 2017, the Competition Tribunal handles all appeals against decisions of the NCA. The Competition Tribunal is an independent body even though it is administratively subordinated to the Ministry. Decisions of the Competition Tribunal may be directly appealed to the Gulating Court of Appeal. As of the same date, the government's prerogative in rendering decisions in merger cases on other ground than competition concerns was removed.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In the past year – May 2019 to May 2020 – the Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) blocked one merger and cleared one merger subject to remedies. The number of interventions are on par with previous years and any small variation in number of interventions is probably a matter of coincidence based on case-specific circumstances.

The NCA's prohibition decision concerned the proposed concentration between Prosafe and Floatel. Both companies supply semi-submersible offshore accommodation support vessels to oil and gas companies, inter alia, to the UK Continental Shelf and the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The NCA identified a separate market for accommodation support vessels that satisfied the special regulatory requirements for the Continental Shelf in Norway. It subsequently found that the companies had considerable market shares, few competitors and were each other's closest competitors. According to the NCA, the findings were supported by analyses of the companies bidding history.

The NCA's decision to block Prosafe's proposed takeover was appealed to the Competition Tribunal, as the first merger case. That appeal was later withdrawn when Prosafe abandoned its anticipated takeover owing to the concerns from the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in the United Kingdom. There are some variations between the assessments of the NCA and the CMA. For example, the NCA concluded that there was a separate market for accommodation support vessels that met the regulatory requirements for the Norwegian Continental Shelf while the CMA found that all semi-submersible accommodation support vessels in NW Europe belonged to the same market. This highlights the NCA's tendency to define narrow geographical markets.

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The NCA's remedies decision concerned the proposed merger between Tieto and Evry, which was cleared in Phase I subject to structural remedies. Both companies are large providers of software and IT services and had, according to the NCA, considerable overlap as suppliers of case management and archiving systems to the public sector in Norway. Based on the concerns from the NCA, the companies committed to divest Evry's case management and archiving systems business to a suitable buyer subject to the NCA's approval. Again, the NCA suggested that there was a separate market for software systems to the public sector in Norway owing to specific regulation, further highlighting the NCA's tendency to define narrow markets.

Merger control in Norway has to a limited degree been affected by the covid-19 outbreak. Interim regulation on the procedural rules in the Competition Act has extended all merger deadlines by 15 working days. Moreover, the Director General of the NCA has advocated strict merger control also in times of economic crises. However, the NCA has not made any official policy statements to that regard.



# Pakistan

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant merger control legislation in Pakistan is primarily the Competition Act, 2010 (the Act) and the Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2016 (CMCR 2016). The Act is a piece of federal legislation (ie, an Act of Parliament) and succeeds the successive presidential ordinances (temporary legislation enacted in 2007, 2009 and 2010 by the president of Pakistan) on the subject of anticompetitive practices. The Act is enforced by the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) – established by the Act as an independent regulator at the federal level. The CCP's top tier consists of members (appointed by the federal government) from among whom one is appointed by the federal government as the chairman. Many substantive and procedural details of merger control are set forth in the CMCR 2016, which has repealed the earlier Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2007 that were issued under a temporary legislation (under a presidential ordinance in 2007).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The definition of 'merger' in the Act and CMCR 2016 covers mergers, acquisitions, amalgamations, combinations or joining of two or more undertakings or parts thereof. If a merger that meets or exceeds specified thresholds 'substantially lessens competition by creating or strengthening a dominant position', it is caught by the competition regime. Without prejudice to this, any merger that meets or exceeds thresholds specified by CMCR 2016 has to receive clearance from the CCP. This is a mandatory requirement.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures are covered within the definition of merger under the Pakistani competition law regime. However, joint ventures are only caught if (1) thresholds specified by CMCR 2016 are met, (2) the joint venture results in the creation of a new entity by two or more collaborators, (3) the new entity is subject to joint control, performing functions independently on a lasting basis, and (4) results in substantial lessening of competition by creating or strengthening a dominant position. However, if conditions (1) and (2) are met, then clearance has to be obtained for setting up a joint venture.

The CCP has generally made clear its view while granting clearances in the past that if two independent or even related companies collaborate on a particular (usually a one-off) project without creating a new entity, then with all other things being equal, no clearance would be required from the CCP.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The primary legislation (ie, the Act) does not provide any definition of 'control'. However, Regulation 3 of CMCR 2016 provides an 'explanation' regarding 'control'. 'Control' can exist either in relation to assets, or composition, voting or decisions of an entity. This explanation sets out a fairly loose definition of control by defining it as influence capable of being exercised as a result of securities (being not less than 10 per cent of their market value), contracts or any combination thereof. For the purposes of determining control, securities shall mean shares in the share capital of an undertaking carrying voting rights and includes any other security that entitles the holder thereof to obtain or exercise voting rights. This influence, in the case of assets, covers ownership of or the rights to use all or even a part of the assets of an undertaking. Alternatively, control is defined as influence capable of being exercised by reason of rights or contracts that enable decisive influence to be exercised with regard to composition, voting or decisions of any organs of an entity. Hence, in the case of assets control has not been defined in terms of decisive influence and under this broader definition any ownership or right to use even a part of the assets of an undertaking would be covered.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

If the thresholds laid down in CMCR 2016 are met, filing a pre-merger clearance before the CCP is mandatory. Thresholds have been specified in relation to the value of gross assets of merging parties or their annual turnover linked with the value of the transaction or voting shares. Pre-merger clearance has to be obtained if the following thresholds are met:

- the value of gross assets of the acquirer undertaking exceeds 300 million Pakistani rupees or the combined value of parties to the acquisition transaction or merging entities is 1 billion Pakistani rupees; or
- the annual turnover of the acquirer in the preceding year was 500 million Pakistani rupees (or more) or the combined turnover of parties to the acquisition transaction or merging entities is 1 billion Pakistani rupees or more; and
- the transaction relates to shares or assets of the value of 100 million Pakistani rupees or more (ie, value of transaction threshold); or
- the acquisition results in the acquirer holding (post-merger) more than 10 per cent of the voting shares.

In a nutshell, if either one of the first two thresholds is met then the CCP examines whether either one of the third or fourth thresholds is

met. Where this condition is satisfied, it becomes mandatory to file – provided one or both parties do business in Pakistan.

Generally, merger parties being asset management companies (AMC) carrying out asset management services may not be required to make an application for clearance unless:

- the merger results in a situation where post-merger the collective exposure of the AMC for itself and in all of its collective investment schemes in a single entity is more than 25 per cent of total voting rights, then pre-merger clearance has to be obtained; or
- if post-merger, the value of total assets under the management of the AMC will be 1 billion Pakistani rupees or more, then pre-merger clearance has to be obtained; and
- the transaction relates to acquisition of shares or assets of the value of 100 million Pakistani rupees (or more); or
- in case of acquisition of shares by an undertaking, if an acquirer acquires voting shares, which taken together with voting shares, if any, held by the acquirer shall entitle the acquirer to more than 10 per cent voting shares.

Therefore, in case of AMCs the CCP examines whether the transaction meets either one of the first two thresholds and one of the third or fourth thresholds.

Furthermore, transactions that do not meet the prescribed thresholds will not be required to obtain pre-merger clearance. However, such transactions may still be subject to investigation in case they contravene any other provision of the Act.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing is mandatory as per the Act and CMCR 2016. Exceptions exist in certain cases even if thresholds are met. The following exceptions are specified in CMCR 2016:

- if a holding company increases its stake in a subsidiary;
- if a holding company merges or enters into a joint venture with one or more of its subsidiaries or if the subsidiaries of a holding company merge with each other or enter into a joint venture with each other;
- if a bank, insurance company or investment company engages in trading of shares for its own account for earning of dividend income with no intention of acquiring a controlling interest in the company it invests in;
- if shares have devolved by inheritance or through a gift deed or a will;
- voting shares acquired by securities underwriters;
- voting shares pursuant to a right issue unless acquirer's percentage share in outstanding voting securities increases directly or indirectly;
- real property or goods acquired in the ordinary course of business as long as the acquirer does not hold on to 'substantially all' of the relevant assets; and
- unexplored real resource property acquired for development or exploration purposes.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The law catches all transactions where the parties do business in Pakistan and meet the relevant thresholds. The way the CCP interprets 'doing business in Pakistan' is quite broad; direct sales as well as sales through a third party are covered. If foreign-to-foreign mergers meet the relevant thresholds and the merger can affect competition within Pakistan then these have to be notified to the CCP. Usually, the CCP will only look to the effects on competition in the local market where foreign players have a local presence. A recent example of this is the merger between Nestlé SA (incorporated in Switzerland) and Pfizer (incorporated

in Delaware, US), where Nestlé SA acquired Pfizer's nutrition food business. Nestlé Pakistan Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestlé SA in Pakistan. Pfizer's subsidiary also exists in Pakistan. Since products of both companies are available in Pakistan and since both had a local presence, the CCP required parties to file a clearance application.

There is no specific local effects test laid down by the CCP. However, the Act covers all matters that occur and distort competition within Pakistan – this has been interpreted to mean that only the effects in the local market have to be seen, even if the origin is elsewhere.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Foreign investors coming into Pakistan are advised to engage a law firm to approach the Board of Investment, which offers a one-window facility for all relevant approvals and documentation required by the federal and provincial governments. If a foreign company is setting up a place of business in Pakistan or incorporating a local subsidiary, it shall have to approach the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) for the relevant registration. The SECP will also require details of any foreign national directors of a local company or a foreign company setting up a branch office in Pakistan. The Ministry of the Interior coordinates with the Board of Investment in granting security clearance to foreign nationals who are directors of local companies or foreign companies entering Pakistan. Details of these procedures can be provided by local lawyers.

Sector-specific regulators exist, among others, for sectors such as banking, aviation, insurance companies, capital markets, non-banking finance companies, telecoms, media, oil and gas as well as the electricity or power sector. Depending on the type of activity, licences may be required and the details of these application and processing procedures should be sought from local law firms.

With the promulgation of the Companies Act 2017, a merger may also require approval from SECP. Advice should be sought from local law firms on ensuring compliance with provisions of this law, where it is applicable.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The Competition Act 2010 (the Act) and the Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2016 (CMCR 2016) lay down that pre-merger clearances have to be filed as soon as an agreement in principle for the merger takes place, or a non-binding letter of intent to proceed with the merger is signed.

Section 11(12) of the Act sets out that sanctions can be imposed where parties have consummated a merger without complying with the pre-merger clearance procedure. Sanctions include the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP)'s power to undo a merger or prohibit it altogether. However, this can only be done after issuance of a show-cause notice and the opportunity of a hearing at the end of the Phase II review (if any). Penalties under the Act also include fines of up to 75 million Pakistani rupees or up to 10 per cent of the annual turnover of the undertaking or entity involved.

While the CCP has imposed heavy penalties in cases involving abuse of dominant position or prohibited agreements, it has never imposed a penalty for non-compliance with merger control provisions. In practice, where undertakings file for clearance with any delay they also file an application for lenient treatment (note, not leniency) and condoning of the delay. These have, up until 2014, been routinely granted.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Parties to the merger are equally responsible for the filing, although in practice the parties usually decide between themselves who should file the application. In the case of an acquisition of shares or assets, the acquiring party must be the notifying party to the merger application in accordance with section 11(2) of the Act. The party filing the application is supposed to issue a notice of filing to all other parties to the merger, with a copy of such notice to the CCP, stating that the application will be or has been made.

Filing fees are required and vary with turnover of parties to the merger or value of assets under management (the latter in case of AMCs). The minimum filing fee is 300,000 Pakistani rupees and depending upon the size of the parties to the transaction can go up to 2.25 million Pakistani rupees.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The CCP is bound under the Act and CMCR 2016 to decide pre-merger applications within a specified number of days. Initial filing begins in the Phase I review. No objection in 30 working days means, as per the law, that the CCP has no objection to the merger. Normally, the CCP will issue a clearance within 30 days. If the CCP wants to take the merger application to a Phase II review, it shall take this decision within 30 working days of filing and communicate this to the parties. However, a Phase II review has only been initiated in six cases since the CCP's inception in 2007.

If and when a Phase II review is initiated by the CCP (and this happens very rarely) the CCP then has another 90 days within which to conduct an extended review. If no decision is made within 90 days of starting of the Phase II review, then as per the law the CCP shall be deemed to have had no objection and the proposed merger shall be deemed cleared.

Since the scheme of the law is that clearance has to be obtained before consummation of the merger, the CCP expects parties not to complete or implement the transaction until clearance has been granted. However, if the filing is late or if the parties satisfy the CCP that the matter will not go beyond a Phase I review, the transaction does not have to be suspended. If the parties have already completed the merger, it is good practice to place on record an application requesting the condoning of the delay without imposition of any penalties.

Where, after a Phase II review, the CCP wants to prohibit or undo a merger, it shall issue a notice after an inquiry report. Thereafter, a hearing is held (normally within 15 days of the issuance of the notice) and after a quasi-judicial proceeding a final order is passed.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The sanctions applicable to closing before clearance will essentially be the same as sanctions for not filing. Closing or non-filing will both violate section 11(12) of the Act which, read with sections 38 and 31 of the Act, provides for the penalties mentioned above. However, as explained above, the CCP has never applied sanctions since its inception in 2007 for non-filing or closing before clearance. When it comes to mergers, its focus has been ensuring awareness and implementation of the law rather than its enforcement with penalties.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There are no examples of sanctions having been applied in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The law envisages asking for pre-merger clearance before closing. However, in practice the CCP has always condoned delays as long as parties seek clearance for the merger and give sufficient reasons with a request for condoning of the delay.

In practice, the CCP's mergers department takes the position that there is no bar to a 'hold-separate' arrangement. However, this facilitative approach is different from the letter of the law which requires pre-merger clearance. The safest way would be to notify the CCP of the merger and ensure requisite filing with the commitment that, until final clearance is given, the parties will put in place a 'hold-separate' arrangement.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Under the competition law regime, there are no special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids. Generally, public takeovers are regulated by the SECP and the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The Securities Act, 2015 (Securities Act) and the Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Take-Overs) Regulations 2008 (Take-Over Regulations) prescribe a separate procedure for offers to acquire shares of a public listed company. The Securities Act is a piece of federal legislation and repeals the previous Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Take-Overs) Ordinance 2002 (Repealed Take-Over Ordinance), which related to the substantial acquisition of voting shares and takeovers of listed companies. The Securities Act along with the Take-Over Regulations, made under the Repealed Take-Over Ordinance and validated by the Securities Act, regulate takeovers. This supplements and does not exclude the Act and CMCR 2016.

The Securities Act does not apply to, inter alia, mergers under any law for the time being in force except in cases of acquisition of voting shares in a listed company. The Securities Act prescribes thresholds regarding the aggregate percentage of shareholding to be acquired in a listed company, which if met, trigger disclosure requirements or obligations of making a public offer of the acquisition of voting shares, as the case may be.

Advice should be sought from local law firms on ensuring compliance with provisions of this law, where it is applicable.

If the thresholds are met, the CCP clears public takeover bids following the Act and CMCR 2016.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Significant details go into preparation of a filing and local legal practitioners specialise in this field. The repealed Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2007 had appended a form in its schedule that was to be filled out along with supporting evidence for purposes of a filing. As per the said form, the information that needs to go into a filing includes (but is not limited to):

- corporate information about the parties and their holding and subsidiary companies;
- details of the transaction and consideration involved;
- nature of the merger and the markets on which it will have an impact;
- copies of all relevant agreements, analyses, reports provided to board of directors of relevant companies;
- market shares (pre- and post-merger) along with details of sales, production, volumes as the case may be;
- relevant market studies and anticipated changes in the market post-merger;
- explanation of the relevant market (product-wise as well as geographical);
- copies of business plans for the current year and the preceding five years;
- cooperative effects of any joint ventures and justifications; and
- any ancillary restraints being imposed or anticipated and their necessity.

Although the CMCR 2016 refers to the said form, the same has not been annexed to the CMCR 2016. However, as a matter of practice, the CCP continues to process applications made in accordance with the form appended with the repealed regulations. Giving false or misleading information or impeding the work of the CCP carries a penalty of up to 1 million Pakistani rupees.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The statutory timetable for clearance is 30 days for a Phase I review. This 30-day period begins from the date of filing the pre-merger clearance application. Most applications, unless they raise serious concerns, receive clearance within 30 days of filing. Except for rare cases, most mergers are granted clearance after a Phase I review – within 30 days. If a Phase II review begins in the wake of serious competition-related concerns, the time period (once the Phase II review begins) is 90 days within which the CCP will make a decision. In practice a decision is usually made within two to two-and-a-half months. The time frame also depends on how quickly parties respond to any queries by the CCP. Two worrying instances of slight delays in recent years involve applications by GlaxoSmithKline plc and Novartis AG. In GlaxoSmithKline's case the Phase II review began on 13 November 2014. Final clearance was given through an order dated 20 February 2015 – slightly longer than the statutory period of 90 days. And in the case of application by Novartis AG, the clearance was sought through an application on 29 August 2014 but the final approval after a Phase II review was given on 9 February 2015. However, these two cases represent the exception rather than the rule.

Failure to make a decision within the relevant 30- or 90-day period has been deemed by law to mean that the CCP has no objection to the merger.

The only way of speeding up this process is to file a formal application before the CCP to expedite the process. Arrangements should also be made with lawyers to follow it up on the administrative side with the CCP.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The law prescribes a 30-working-day period for clearance of all Phase I applications. Most transactions are cleared in Phase I. The law specifically says that if the CCP does not raise any objection to a transaction within 30 working days of it being notified, the transaction is deemed

cleared. In practice, the CCP says that this 30-day period only begins to run from when a complete application is submitted. This means that when an application is filed before the CCP, it will usually write back within a week or two and demand more information. Once that information is provided, the CCP will say that the time is now running. There is no set timeline for how long it takes for a decision. In most cases, a decision is given within four weeks from the time of initial filing. In other cases, it has taken up to six weeks, since the CCP cites an initially incomplete application. Very few cases involving mergers actually result in a formal investigation or inquiry since most cases are cleared after a Phase I review. The inquiry or investigation for a Phase I review is largely informal in the sense that no formal reports are compiled and only final clearances are issued. Lawyers and representatives routinely meet officers of the CCP's mergers department to explain their transactions after filing of formal clearance applications – although such meetings are not mandatory or necessary in each case. In the event the CCP feels the need for a detailed formal investigation or inquiry, the process involves the following steps:

- appointment of inquiry officers by the CCP through a written authorisation;
- gathering of preliminary information by an inquiry team – this information may have come into the possession of the inquiry team as a result of its independent efforts or by virtue of the CCP's general powers to call on undertakings to furnish information on matters that may have an adverse impact on competition;
- interviews with representatives of relevant undertakings; however, this is not a mandatory step since the CCP interprets the law as not requiring any right of hearing at the investigation or inquiry stage. This view, it is submitted, is consistent with the letter and spirit of the law. However, at times the CCP will of its own accord interview representatives of relevant undertakings; and
- once the inquiry is complete, the inquiry officers will make a recommendation – either for issuance of a show-cause notice and initiation of proceedings or closing the file because of insufficient evidence.

No penalty has been imposed by the CCP since its inception in 2007 on parties to a merger transaction.

The investigation procedure outlined herein would generally only take place if a third party files a formal complaint regarding the merger or if the CCP intends to proceed against merger parties for not notifying a merger that meets the thresholds.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance is whether the merger will result in a substantial lessening of competition by creating or strengthening a dominant position of the undertaking in the relevant market. The term 'relevant market' has been defined by the Competition Act 2010 (the Act) in a way similar to the European jurisdiction with a focus on a product and a geographic market. Price, characteristics and intended uses are the criteria used to determine substitutability when defining the relevant market.

The Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2016 (CMCR 2016) also sets out the factors to be considered by the CCP when determining whether there is likely to be substantial lessening of competition. These include but are not limited to:

- actual and potential level of import competition in the market;
- ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers;

- level and trends of concentration and history of collusion in the market;
- degree of countervailing power in the market;
- dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation and product differentiation;
- nature and extent of vertical integration in the market;
- whether the business or part of the business of a merger party or merger has failed or is likely to fail; and
- whether the merger situation will result in the removal of an effective competitor.

Even if the CCP determines after a Phase II review that a merger substantially lessens competition it can still allow the merger if it can be shown that:

- the merger contributes substantially to economic efficiencies related to production or distribution of goods or provision of services;
- the said efficiency could not reasonably have been achieved by a less restrictive means of competition;
- in a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of such efficiency clearly outweigh adverse effects on competition; and
- the undertaking adopted the least anticompetitive option for a failing undertaking's assets when faced with actual or imminent financial failure.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special test for joint ventures. The substantive assessment remains pegged to substantial lessening of competition by creating or strengthening a dominant position. In a nutshell, a joint venture would be caught by Pakistani competition law if:

- thresholds specified by CMCR 2016 are met;
- the joint venture results in creation of a new entity by two or more collaborators;
- the new entity is subject to joint control, performing functions independently on a lasting basis; and
- it results in substantial lessening of competition by creating or strengthening a dominant position.

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The substantive test expressly focuses on substantial lessening of competition by creating or strengthening a dominant position in the relevant market. This test, however, is slightly at odds with the rest of the Act since section 3 of the Act (prohibition against abuse of dominant position) does not prohibit a dominant position per se but only its abuse. When it comes to mergers, a dominant position itself may not be prohibited but the focus is on whether the merger results in a substantial lessening of competition.

However, since its jurisprudential development under this relatively new law is a work in progress, it cannot be said with certainty that the CCP has closed itself off to any theories of harm. Any potential theory of harm that will allow the CCP to evaluate substantial lessening of competition will be used. This includes but is not limited to unilateral effects, coordinated effects, conglomerate effects, vertical foreclosure as well as an evaluation of any likely horizontal effects, boycotts, predatory pricing, likelihood of tie-ins and refusal to deal, etc.

### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The CCP is largely motivated by public interest and makes significant efforts to be seen as an enforcement organisation or regulator that is receptive and responsive to the concerns of the market – particularly vulnerable market players such as consumers or smaller competitors. However, the focus on public interest has thankfully not been allowed to lead to a situation where some abstract standards have been developed while ignoring the law itself. The review and evaluation still largely focuses on the law and economics involved along with a healthy regard for the public interest.

### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies play an important role in the review process. This has been commanded by the Act itself and is reflected in the CCP's practice. Even if the CCP determines after a Phase II review that a merger substantially lessens competition it can still allow the merger if it can be shown that:

- the merger contributes substantially to economic efficiencies related to production or distribution of goods or provision of services;
- the said efficiency could not reasonably have been achieved by a less restrictive means of competition;
- in a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of such efficiency clearly outweigh the adverse effects on competition; and
- the undertaking adopted the least anticompetitive option for a failing undertaking's assets when faced with actual or imminent financial failure.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If after a Phase II review the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) feels that a merger will substantially lessen competition, it can, after issuance of a notice and hearing the parties, decide to:

- prohibit the merger or unwind it;
- approve it subject to conditions; or
- approve it subject to undertakings regarding agreements that merging parties enter into contracts specified by the CCP.

It is also worth noting that while a Phase I or II review is under way and the CCP feels that there is a strong prima facie case of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market along with likelihood of immediate harm, it can also pass interim orders under the Competition Act 2010 (the Act) and the Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2016 (CMCR 2016). However, to date, this power to pass interim orders has not been exercised in cases involving clearances for mergers.

### Remedies and conditions

## 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes, the CCP is quite accommodating when it comes to listening to the merging parties about solutions that would allay the regulator's concerns. Divestment undertakings as well as behavioural remedies



can be suggested to the CCP to persuade it to grant clearance. However, these are likely to be necessary only after conclusion of a Phase II review where the CCP thinks the merger will substantially lessen competition.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

If during a Phase I review the CCP raises concerns about the merger, the parties or undertakings are free to approach the CCP with any suggestions for divestment. There are no strict conditions or timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy. Where a divestment is adopted as a remedy, the CCP is likely to pass an order saying that it shall occur within a specified time (and this may vary from case to case). As long as parties give an undertaking thereafter to comply with the CCP's directions or address its concerns, the clearance is likely to be granted.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

If the CCP feels that foreign-to-foreign mergers will produce effects in Pakistan then it can require remedies. A recent example of this is the acquisition of Pfizer's nutrition business by Nestlé, which resulted in the CCP demanding an undertaking from Nestlé to the effect that Pfizer's products will continue to be available to consumers in Pakistan for three years. By way of background it is submitted that the CCP's central concern was that a foreign-to-foreign merger should not result in a situation where choices available to consumers in Pakistan are immediately eliminated.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The sample clearance application being used for applications under CMCR 2016 clearly expects parties to set out and justify ancillary restraints along with an explanation as to why any less restrictive means could not have been adopted. Therefore, as per general practice, if an undertaking (and its lawyers) is detail-oriented and takes the care to set out related arrangements and explain how these are linked to the clearance requested, then the clearance decision will cover ancillary restrictions.

As has been the case in the recent past, if any ancillary restrictions or arrangements are part of the merger application, the CCP's merger clearance order becomes conditional upon the merger parties seeking an exemption in accordance with section 5 of the Act.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

When conducting an assessment, the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) will take a holistic view and will factor in the views of customers and competitors. However, this will not always be done by the CCP and this practice is more likely to be followed where there is some doubt as to whether clearance should be granted after a Phase I review.

A formal complaint can be filed as per the detailed formalities laid down in the Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2016 (CMCR 2016) and the CCP's General Enforcement Regulations 2007. A complainant has a right to be heard during the hearing and make formal representation through a lawyer or other experts.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Unless the merger involves large companies with a very public profile, the process is not given and does not receive a lot of publicity. However, each merger clearance is notified on the CCP's website, which is regularly updated.

Both the Competition Act 2010 (the Act) and CMCR 2016 expressly envisage protection of commercial information including business secrets. Any confidential information must be so identified when being provided to the CCP, if the applicant fails to specify any part thereof as confidential, the CCP may treat the application as non-confidential. An explanation as to why the information is confidential is also required.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The CCP cooperates with antitrust authorities in the South Asian region as well as globally. However, this cooperation has largely focused on capacity building rather than working together on particular cases.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

## 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Dealing with statutory appeal first, if an adverse order is passed by a single member of the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP), an appeal lies within 30 days of passing of the order before the Appellate Bench of the CCP. If an order is passed by two or more members of the CCP then the appeal lies within 60 days of communication of the order before the Competition Appellate Tribunal (CAT). Appeals against decisions of the CAT can be filed before Supreme Court within 60 days of the order.

The CAT is distinct from the CCP. It has only recently become functional again as the federal government has finally appointed new members to it.

As a matter of general practice, the CCP ensures that two or more members pass all orders. This is a reaction to the criticism of the CCP that its members sitting on the Appellate Bench of the CCP hear appeals from decisions made by their colleagues and, therefore, are likely to be biased.

Judicial review petitions before a High Court can be filed under article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. A direct petition can also be made under article 184(3) to the apex court of the land (ie, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan). In practice, it is usually more convenient and common to first approach one of the High Courts. The constitutionality of the Competition Act 2010 (the Act) is currently under challenge in various High Courts in the country. Undertakings from the sugar, cement and telecoms sectors (among others) have challenged this law. One major argument is that the Federation cannot enact a law such as the Act in exercise of its power to regulate inter-provincial trade and commerce. The other argument relates to the exercise of judicial power by members of the CCP as well as members of the CAT, since they are not a formal part of the judicial system as laid down by Pakistan's Constitution. The petitions are currently pending before the Islamabad and Sindh High Courts. The Lahore High Court initially reserved judgment on the cases argued before it; however, it has now asked the counsel to reargue the matter.



## Time frame

### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

There is no limitation period for judicial review. Decisions can take anywhere between a couple of weeks, months or years, depending on the complexity of the case.

Appeals before the Appellate Bench of the CCP have traditionally been decided within two to four months. Appeals before the CAT have generally been decided within three months. The CAT has recently become functional – earlier it did not have the requisite number of members. There is a powerful criticism of the CAT that since the appointments to it are purely within the domain of the Executive, its existence therefore violates constitutional guarantees of due process, a fair trial and independence of the judiciary.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) has taken the position that as long as a foreign-to-foreign merger is likely to affect competition within Pakistan and the transaction falls within the jurisdictional thresholds for merger clearance, pre-merger clearance should be obtained. However, the CCP is bound by the requirement of the law that one or both parties should be doing business in Pakistan. In practice, the CCP will only act regarding foreign-to-foreign mergers if the merging undertakings have a local presence – whether through branch offices, subsidiaries or operations.

No penalty has ever been imposed because a foreign-to-foreign merger was consummated without first receiving complete clearance from the CCP.

In the past two years, a number of Phase II merger reviews have received clearance from the CCP; one in the financial services market, one in the telecom market and another in the market for ride-hailing apps as Uber acquired its competitor Careem. The first of these involved the merging of three stock exchanges in the country (in the cities of Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore) into one national stock exchange, now called the PSX. Members of the three stock exchanges have been given membership of PSX. This amalgamation was envisaged by a law focusing on demutualisation of each of the three stock exchanges that existed as companies limited by guarantee. However, the three stock exchanges applied for clearance from the CCP. The clearance, however, was never in any doubt.

The second major merger review case involved the acquisition of a competitor in the telecom services market. Warid (which had a market share of 10 per cent) was acquired by the relevant market's biggest player Mobilink, which at the pre-merger stage had a share of 29 per cent. This will result in a post-merger share of 39 per cent – virtually touching the 40 per cent threshold in the law where dominant position is presumed. The merger received clearance with conditions and involved the passing of, until now, the most detailed order in a merger review case. The current federal government in Pakistan has made clear its agenda regarding the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. The current enforcement concerns of the authorities significantly revolve around the market power that will be created or strengthened as a result of privatisation as large local and foreign entities compete for entry into the aviation, oil and gas, electricity distribution, railway and other sectors. The role of the CCP in clearing acquisitions or mergers as a result of privatisation is significant, but one cannot be sure how well it will perform. There are legitimate fears that the CCP is understaffed and needs to improve its capacity to perform better. The vision of its leadership will also make a big difference.

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## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

None have been made public by the federal government.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The most significant activity in the area of mergers last year was the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP)'s clearance to the *Uber/Careem* transaction in which Uber acquired its major competitor in the Pakistan market. The merger received clearance with conditions. Since the onset of covid-19, the CCP has introduced an online filing mechanism that is rather clunky, and parties are best advised to follow a regular hard copy filing process. With staff rotating because of the covid-19 pandemic, it is expected that clearance time might increase at the CCP; in practice, this will mean that the CCP will take longer to confirm that an application filed is complete for purposes of processing and it is only when an application is confirmed as complete that the 30-working-day period (for mandatory clearance of Phase I cases) starts running.

The CCP has also seen a change in leadership. Three members out of five were removed by the federal government in a recent reshuffle. This has resulted in former director-general of the Cartels and Trade Abuses Division, Shaista Bano being appointed chairperson for the time being. She is an experienced hand and the CCP will likely improve for the better under her leadership. However, with three members removed, the federal government will need to appoint three new members soon to ensure that the CCP is fully functional.

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# Poland

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The basic act regulating merger control in Poland is the Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection (the Act). Other major legislation on this issue includes:

- the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 23 December 2014 concerning the notification of the intention of concentration of undertakings (establishing, inter alia, the official filing form); and
- the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 23 December 2014 concerning the method of calculation of the turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration.

Although not legally binding, there is another regulatory instrument worth mentioning because of its considerable practical significance, namely the Guidelines on the criteria and procedure of notifying the intention of concentration to the OCCP (the Guidelines), which were issued by the Polish competition authority, the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP). The aim of the Guidelines is to help entrepreneurs assess how the OCCP generally understands procedural aspects of the Act. Additionally, the authority also published Clarifications concerning the assessment by the OCCP of the notified concentrations on its website. These Clarifications provide a discussion and explanation of the substantive aspects taken into account in the framework of the assessment of concentrations carried out by the Polish competition authority.

In Poland, the OCCP is the sole authority responsible for the enforcement of competition rules, including merger control.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The following types of transactions are subject to the notification obligation:

- a merger of two or more independent undertakings;
- one or more undertakings to take direct or indirect control over one or more undertakings, whether by acquisition of stocks, shares or other securities, or otherwise;
- several undertakings to create one joint undertaking; and
- acquisition by the undertaking, of a part of another undertaking's property, if the turnover generated by the assets in any of the two financial years preceding the notification exceeded the equivalent of €10 million on Polish territory.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

There were some doubts as to whether the notification requirement should also extend to a situation where one undertaking first creates another undertaking and then disposes its shares to others. The Guidelines and case law (Decision No. DKK-104/10 of 10 November 2010, *PGNiG/Tauron*) confirm that such a scenario requires notification. However, there is no such certainty with regard to the treatment of situations where a company exists on the market for some time and then a new shareholder acquires a minority interest (which does not give control over the company). The Guidelines seem to suggest that such a situation also needs to be notified. However, it is difficult to agree with this approach (the acquisition of a non-controlling minority interest was removed from the list of concentration types several years ago). It may be thus assumed that a situation where one undertaking creates a joint venture and then transfers it to another party shall be notifiable when this is in fact one functionally linked process of creation of a new undertaking, albeit divided into stages and not a situation where a minority stake in an already running business is acquired.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Act defines 'takeover of control' as a situation where an undertaking acquires in any form, whether directly or indirectly, such rights which, whether individually or jointly and taking into account all legal or factual circumstances, allow it to exercise a decisive influence upon another undertaking or other undertakings; in particular, such powers are created by:

- holding directly or indirectly a majority of votes at the shareholders' meeting or general meeting of shareholders, also in the capacity of a pledgee or user, or on the management board of another undertaking, also under agreements with other persons;
- the right to appoint or dismiss a majority of members of the management board or supervisory board of another undertaking, also under agreements with other persons;
- appointing members of one undertaking's management board or supervisory board to form more than half of the members of another undertaking's management board;
- holding, directly or indirectly, a majority of votes in a dependent partnership or at the general meeting of a dependent cooperative, also under agreements with other persons;
- the ownership of all or some of the assets of another undertaking; or
- an agreement for the management of another undertaking or transfer of profit by such undertaking.

The above is not a close-ended list.

The Act does not provide for an obligation to notify a concentration where the acquisition involved is that of a minority or other interests

that does not result in a takeover of control. Nevertheless, acquisition of control may also take place in case of some factual circumstances that eventually lead to takeover of control (eg, possession of a substantial package of shares, not giving the right to more than 50 per cent of votes in the bodies of another undertaking, but for example to 40 per cent of votes with the significant fragmentation of votes of other partners).

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

An intention of concentration is notifiable where:

- the combined worldwide turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration in the financial year preceding the year of the notification exceeds the equivalent of €1 billion; or
- the combined turnover of undertakings participating in the concentration in the territory of Poland in the financial year preceding the year of the notification exceeds the equivalent of €50 million.

The turnover of an undertaking that is jointly controlled by any member from the capital group of a party to the concentration will be attributed to such capital group in proportion to its interest in the jointly controlled undertaking.

In the case of acquisition of control, the turnover mentioned above relates to the turnover generated by the buyer's group as well as to the turnover generated by the target and its subsidiaries. In the case of acquisition of property of another undertaking, the turnover mentioned above relates to the turnover generated by the buyer's group as well as to the turnover generated by the acquired property.

In the case of separate concentrations occurring between the same groups of undertakings taking place within a period of two years, the turnover figures of the acquired targets have to be added together. This is meant to prevent undertakings from circumventing the obligation to notify by splitting a larger transaction into smaller parts that would not qualify for the notification if considered separately.

Apart from the aforementioned, there are no other thresholds (eg, related to market shares of the participants). This means that even those transactions that have de minimis impact on competition on the relevant markets are caught by the merger control regime, if only at least one of the thresholds is met. There are, however, exemptions from this general rule.

#### 6 Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Under the Act, filing is mandatory when the jurisdictional thresholds are met and no exemptions from the notification obligation apply. The obligation to notify an intention of concentration does not apply in the following cases:

- the turnover generated by the undertaking over which the control is to be taken (the target undertaking and its subsidiaries) in the territory of Poland did not exceed the equivalent of €10 million in each of the two financial years preceding the notification;
- the turnover of none of the undertakings taking part in a merger or founding a joint venture exceeded in the territory of Poland €10 million in each of the two financial years preceding the transaction;
- where control is taken over an undertaking or a group of undertakings belonging to the same capital group and simultaneously a part of the assets of the undertaking or the group of undertakings belonging to the capital group is acquired – if the turnover of the undertaking or undertakings to be taken over and the turnover

generated by the part of assets to be acquired did not exceed in the territory of Poland €10 million in each of the two financial years preceding the transaction;

- a financial institution, the normal activities of which include investing in stocks and shares of other undertakings, for its own account or for the account of others, acquires or takes over, on a temporary basis, stocks and shares with a view to reselling them provided that such resale takes place within one year from the date of the acquisition or taking over, and that:
  - this institution does not exercise the rights arising from these stocks or shares, except from the right to dividend; or
  - this institution exercises these rights solely to prepare the resale of the entirety or part of the undertaking, its assets, or these stocks and shares;
- an undertaking acquires or takes over, on a temporary basis, stocks and shares with a view to securing debts, provided that such undertaking does not exercise the rights arising from these stocks or shares, except from the right to sell;
- the concentration arises as an effect of insolvency proceedings, excluding the cases where the control is to be taken over or the assets are to be acquired by a competitor or a participant of the capital group to which the competitors of the undertaking to be taken over or whose assets are to be acquired belong; and
- the concentration applies to undertakings participating in the same capital group.

#### 7 Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

There may be situations where foreign-to-foreign transactions will have to be notified to the OCCP. Under the Act, the notification obligation (even with respect to a transaction to be finalised outside the territory of Poland) exists where a concentration causes or may cause effects in the territory of Poland.

The Act is silent on what criteria are to be taken into account when assessing the effect. According to the Guidelines, it can be presumed that if at least one of the participants of the concentration (in practice, any member of the capital group to which the buyer, the seller or the party to the JV belongs) generates any turnover in the territory of Poland, the local effects test is met and such transaction has to be notified to the OCCP.

The broad interpretation of the local 'effect' applied by the Polish competition authority may mean that, in the case of formation of joint ventures especially, many foreign-to-foreign concentrations will formally be caught by the Polish merger control rules. For example, if 'A' and 'B' intend to form a joint venture in the United States, and 'A' and 'B' have joint worldwide turnover in excess of €1 billion, it will be sufficient for the obligation to notify to arise if any of 'A' or 'B', or any entity from the capital group of 'A' or 'B', has any (even insignificant) turnover in Poland.

#### 8 Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

No. There are no special rules with respect to foreign investment. However, there are special rules for financial institutions when it comes to calculation of turnover for threshold purposes. Moreover, according to other special legislation, transactions in sectors such as banking may require special approval from regulatory bodies other than the OCCP.

On 30 September 2015, the Act on Control of Certain Investments (ACCI) entered into force. According to the ACCI, the Minister of Energy as well as the Prime Minister becomes another authority empowered to scrutinise mergers and acquisitions in Poland (the Control Body). The

ACCI aims to create mechanisms to protect against hostile takeovers of companies operating in key sectors of the Polish economy. According to the ACCI, prior to the acquisition of shares of strategic companies (including the acquisition of proprietary interests in entities or their enterprises) the purchaser will need to notify the Control Body and get the required approval. The obligation to inform the Control Body is to apply to transactions involving the acquisition of at least a 'material stake' in companies doing business in the sectors that are deemed strategic for the Polish economy (ie, companies operating in the gas, power generation, chemical, petrochemical and defence sectors). Because of an amendment that entered into force on 6 February 2016, the application scope of the ACCI covers also transactions undertaken by firms operating in the production of rhenium and the extraction and processing of metal ores used in the manufacture of explosives, weapons and ammunition as well as products and technologies intended for military or police purposes. Upon the receipt of the notification, the Control Body will assess the impact of a given acquisition on strategic sectors of the Polish economy. The ACCI provides for broad and general criteria for assessment ('the market share of the entity in question'; 'the scale of the business', as well as the transaction's potential to 'upset public order or public security'). The Control Body has 90 days from the receipt of the notification or from the initiation of proceedings in a given case to decide whether or not to object. A decision is preceded by a non-binding recommendation presented to the Control Body by the Consultative Committee, an advisory body that involves representatives of relevant ministries and state authorities. As a rule, an objection made by the Control Body (as well as a transaction undertaken without prior notification) will result in rendering the acquisition null and void or in making it impossible to exercise rights attached to shares (except for the right to sell such shares) and in declaring the invalidity of resolutions adopted by the decision-making bodies of companies.

In 2020, Poland adopted an amendment to the ACCI as part of the 'Anti-Crisis Shield 4.0'. The law expands the state's control over M&A transactions in some strategic sectors of the economy. These provisions came into force on 24 July 2020, and there is a risk that they will be deemed to also apply to ongoing transactions (those not closed before that date).

The new provisions have been prepared to protect the Polish industry against 'hostile takeovers' performed by investors from outside the European Union, the European Economic Area (EEA), and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The carve-out for investors from OECD was added at the very last stage of the parliamentary works, and it significantly softens the impact of the new law, as not only investors from the European Union, but also those from Australia, Canada, Israel and the United States, as well as Japan or South Korea, will benefit from the carve-out.

The new act will have a significant impact on M&A transactions, as it:

- concerns enterprises active in numerous sectors of the economy;
- establishes a low materiality threshold for transactions (transactions regarding enterprises with an annual Polish turnover exceeding €10 million are subject to notification);
- grants the competent authority – that being the OCCP – far-reaching powers (one of the conditions triggering their objection is a mere potential threat to the public policy or public security of the Republic of Poland, or public health in the Republic of Poland); and
- provides for strict financial penalties, as well as imprisonment for natural persons, in the event of a violation of the duties resulting from the draft act.

The list of entities covered by the new regulations (protected entities) is relatively broad and includes, among others:

- public companies;
- entities that hold assets listed as 'critical infrastructure'; and

- entities doing business in certain sectors of the economy: IT (software developers dedicated to certain specified sectors), entities involved in electricity generation (both conventional and renewables), entities involved in the transmission and storage of fuel and gas, telecommunication companies, entities in the medical and pharmaceutical industry (the manufacture of medical devices and instruments, as well as medicines and other pharmaceutical products, etc), as well as entities involved in the generation, transmission and distribution of heat, and also the processing of meat, dairy, grain and fruits and vegetables.

Only those transactions undertaken by entities from outside of the European Union, EEA and OECD are subject to control.

The Act concerns actions that may lead to the acquisition of dominant control or 'significant participation' (meaning acquiring or crossing the 20 per cent or 40 per cent shareholding thresholds). The law covers not only the direct acquisition of shares, but also indirect acquisitions through subsidiaries, asset deals and all types of indirect means of taking control or gaining influence over another entity (eg, mergers, demergers, amendments to articles of association, redemptions of shares, as well as all other transactions or acts resulting in the indirect acquisition of significant participation or control, including those performed on the basis of foreign transactions under foreign law).

The new law will only apply to cases where the target enterprise has achieved a turnover in excess of €10 million in the Republic of Poland in at least one of the previous two financing years.

The OCCP is intended to undertake the control of foreign investments. Therefore, it is possible that certain transactions may, in practice, require two approvals from the same government body, issued on the basis of different conditions.

In principle, a transaction must be notified prior to its consummation. Unfortunately, the amended ACCI Act is also imprecise in this regard, since in other sections it imposes an obligation to notify prior to the conclusion of 'any agreement creating an obligation to acquire', and, in relation to public companies, requires notification prior to the announcement of a public tender offer (which may indicate that it is impermissible to announce a public tender offer conditional on approval – in practice, this may create certain difficulties, including, for example, the leak of the intention to announce a tender offer prior to it being announced). The transaction should not be completed prior to clearance being granted or the lapse of the statutory time period for the issue of the clearance decision.

Approval of a transaction that does not raise any issues, or confirmation that the transaction is not subject to control, will be given within 30 business days. Cases requiring review from a public security or public policy perspective will be completed within 120 calendar days (where the clock stops any time the OCCP seeks additional information).

Any acquisition made without the required notification shall be invalid. Moreover, the draft provides for both very strict financial (fines up to the maximum amount of 50 million zlotys) and penal (up to five years' imprisonment) responsibility for non-compliance with the new regulations. These penalties may be imposed both on the entity acquiring an interest without notification, as well as natural persons acting on its behalf.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

- 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The Act does not provide for a specific deadline as such for the filing of the notification. The 'intention of concentration' has to be notified. It

means that the notification has to be submitted before the concentration is implemented (ie, prior to closing). In other words, the parties to a concentration are obliged to refrain from implementing the transaction until (unconditional or conditional) clearance is obtained or a one-month waiting period elapses without the authority making its decision (the 'guillotine effect'). However, it should be added that clearance by the mere passage of time is rather unlikely to occur.

It is worth noting that the Act provides for a worldwide bar on closing.

If an undertaking has implemented a concentration, even if unintentionally, without the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP)'s clearance, the Act allows the OCCP to fine the undertaking by way of a decision, with a fine not to exceed 10 per cent of the turnover earned by the undertaking in the financial year preceding the year in which the fine is imposed.

Moreover, article 108 of the Act authorises fines on persons holding managerial positions or members of managing bodies of such undertakings if the persons or members have not notified an intention of concentration. The fine may be up to 50 times the average monthly remuneration in the business sector in Poland in the last month of the quarter preceding the day of issuance of a decision.

Additionally, the OCCP may revoke its decisions if they were based on misrepresentations for which the undertakings participating in the concentration were responsible or where undertakings did not comply with the conditions (remedies) specified by the OCCP. Once revoked, the decision may be re-adjudicated by the OCCP on the merits of the case.

If, in cases described above, the concentration is already implemented and restoration of the competition in the market is otherwise impossible, and if the intention to concentrate has not been notified, or if a concentration ban has not been respected, the OCCP may order such measures as division of the merged undertaking, disposal of the undertaking's assets, disposal of stocks or shares conferring control, or dissolution of a jointly controlled company.

Sanctions were imposed, for example, in Decision No. DKK-1/07 of 12 July 2007, where the OCCP fined Sobieski Trade 40,000 zlotys for failure to notify. In Decision No. DKK-37/09 of 18 June 2009, the OCCP imposed a fine of 70,000 zlotys on Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe 'Porty Lotnicze' (the national airport operator) and the provincial government of the Subcarpathian Voivodeship, again, for failure to notify. Moreover, in 2012 the OCCP issued two decisions and in 2013 only one decision imposing fines for non-compliance with the obligation to notify the concentration. Among more recent cases, note two decisions from 2017: in Decision No. DKK-86/2017 of 5 June, the grocery wholesaler Bać-Pol SA was fined of 527,000 zlotys for failure to notify of the takeover of a portion of assets of another company called Klementynka. The authority initiated proceedings against Bać-Pol after receiving information that one of its subsidiaries implemented a concentration without prior authorisation by the OCCP. In a second case the consumer eggs producer was obligated to pay 339,000 zlotys for failure to notify of its takeover of a portion of the assets of another company operating in the same relevant market (Decision No. DKK-145/2017 of 19 September).

All fined undertakings were Polish-based companies. No penalties on individuals (management board members) were imposed.

Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no cases so far in Poland where the focus of the OCCP was on actions of the undertaking concerned that could qualify as a 'gun jumping' (ie, a de facto implementation of the concentration prior to clearance). The only cases that have been made public are the cases where the concentration has been consumed (ie, the transaction has been closed or the joint venture has been formed and registered) prior to clearance. Moreover, such fines were imposed on undertakings that have notified a merger already, but their action was taken too late.

## 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The intention of concentration should be notified by:

- the merging undertakings jointly;
- an undertaking taking over the control;
- jointly all undertakings participating in the creation of a joint undertaking; or
- an undertaking acquiring some of the assets of another undertaking.

The general rule is that the notification has to be submitted by the undertakings directly participating in the concentration. However, where a dominant undertaking implements a concentration through at least two dependent undertakings, the notification should be submitted by the dominant undertaking. Moreover, if the undertakings directly participating in the concentration include a corporate vehicle established only for the purpose of the transaction and to which the intent of concentration cannot be attributed, the notification can be submitted by the dominant undertaking with respect to such a corporate vehicle. However, in such a case the notifying party has to clearly indicate in the notification that the undertaking taking over control is a corporate vehicle only.

The fee to be paid for an application to initiate proceedings in concentration cases was raised on 1 January 2017 and currently amounts to 15,000 zlotys.

## 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The undertakings whose intention of concentration is to be notified are under an obligation to refrain from implementing the concentration until the OCCP issues its decision or the time limit to issue the decision lapses.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Under Polish merger control regime sanctions, closing before clearance is treated similarly as the failure to notify. As a result, the consequences for both types of infringements are the same.

In practice, the OCCP rarely imposes fines for such infringements. In 2010, there was one decision imposing a fine on an undertaking for not notifying the intended concentration. In 2011, there were no cases of this kind. In 2012, there were two decisions and in 2013 only one such decision. In 2014, there was also only one decision of this kind. In 2015 and 2016, there were no cases of this kind. An upward trend can, however, be observed with two decisions in 2017 and three in 2018 (2019 statistics were not available at the time of writing; however, from the press releases we know about at least two such cases).

## 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

In the case of closing the transaction without (or before) the OCCP's clearance, the undertaking in question as well as persons holding managerial positions or members of managing bodies of such undertakings can be fined. The same rule applies equally to Polish and foreign-to-foreign mergers.

Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge so far, cases where fines for closing transaction without (or before) the OCCP's consent involved purely domestic transactions.



#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Act provides for a worldwide bar on closing. However, in one of the decisions issued by the OCCP (No. DOK-37/2007 *Olympus Capital Holdings Asia/Arysta Life Science*, 6 April 2007), the competition authority seemed to hold that the concentration may be completed before its clearance, as long as the parties refrain from implementing its Polish aspect that has local effects in Poland. In this decision, the OCCP did not question the rationale for completing the transaction before clearance. The OCCP only pointed out that no relevant evidence was offered to show that the parties refrained from implementing that aspect of the transaction that had local effects in Poland. Because there is only one such decision and the Guidelines suggest that this scenario is unlikely, such solutions will always be associated with risk and need a case-by-case analysis.

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The same rules and requirements apply. However, the bar on closing will not be considered breached by implementing a public offer to purchase or exchange stocks that has been notified to the OCCP prior to implementation, provided that the buyer does not exercise the voting rights arising from the acquired stocks or exercises them solely to maintain the full value of its capital investment or to prevent substantial damage that might affect the undertakings participating in the concentration.

#### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The official filing form (the list of information and documents (LID)), as established by way of a regulation of the Council of Ministers, requires rather detailed information regarding the planned transaction to be provided by the notifying party in the notification (even if there are no overlaps between the undertakings concerned). Section 1 of the LID contains questions relating to the undertakings concerned (inter alia, data identifying undertakings involved, authorities authorised to represent them and the subject of the actual activity as well as the detailed description of intended concentration is included); section 2 involves information on the relevant markets and the effects of the transaction on the market.

A detailed market analysis is necessary when the market is affected horizontally or vertically or when the market is affected by a conglomerate concentration.

The LID, as well as the application itself, has to be submitted in Polish. Normally, the application runs to around 35 to 40 pages, plus attachments.

The LID has to be submitted together with certain documents, such as, inter alia, excerpts from relevant commercial registers for the applicants, executed versions of most relevant transaction documents, most recent financial statements of the parties concerned, structure charts of the parties concerned. Documents prepared in foreign languages have to be sworn translated into Polish.

In terms of possible sanctions, under the Act providing untrue data in a transaction notification may result in a financial sanction in the equivalent of up to €50 million. Such fines are rather uncommon in practice. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that, in 2012, the OCCP imposed on UPC Polska a fine amounting to 775,000 zlotys for providing false information regarding possessing documents material

for an assessment of the pending merger proceedings (Decision No. DKK-6/2012, *UPC Polska/Aster*, 30 January 2012). In short, UPC applied to the OCCP for the consent to acquire Aster. The OCCP addressed the undertaking to complete the notification, inter alia, with providing information if the company and the to-be-acquired entity possessed any reports, analyses or marketing enquiry concerning the access market to pay TV in Poland. During the proceedings, it transpired that UPC concealed the market analysis containing significant information for the examined transaction. The document not revealed by the company confirmed, inter alia, the OCCP's opinion, stating that the concentration would have a significant impact on local markets of particular cities. This was contrary to the stance of UPC Polska, which claimed during the pending proceedings that the market of pay TV shall be defined on a nationwide level.

There were cases where OCCP imposed fines on the third parties (competitors, clients and suppliers of the parties to the concentration) for not providing information in the course of a market test carried out in a merger control case (such penalties were relatively low and aimed at disciplinary effect).

#### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

In 2015, Poland finally adopted a two-stage merger review procedure – something that has been desired since the first modern competition legislation was adopted in 1990.

The Act currently stipulates that the antimonopoly proceedings in non-problematic concentration cases should be finalised within one month from commencement (first stage review). Complex cases, cases that can cause competition concerns (where there is a risk that a significant impediment to competition might occur) or that require a sector inquiry will enter (by way of a resolution of the OCCP that cannot be appealed) a second stage of the review. This will entail a four-month extension of the process, prolonging the duration of the whole procedure to five months in total.

However, the OCCP is able to stop the clock – in any of the stages – each time it asks questions or requires new data or documents to be provided in the course of the proceedings. The deadline may also be extended if a statement of objections is issued or remedies are being discussed.

The Act does not provide for any measures to speed up the proceedings. Neither are there any fast-track procedures available.

On 31 March 2020, the Polish parliament enacted legislation aimed at mitigating impact of the covid-19 pandemic in Poland. The legislation was immediately signed by the president and published in the official journal, thus entered into force.

The legislation, among other things, has an impact on the deadlines in the administrative proceedings, including those before the OCCP. Based on the new law, the statutory deadlines in all administrative proceedings before the OCCP:

- do not start to run if proceedings were opened during the state of epidemic threat or state of epidemic (retroactively, proceedings opened after 14 March 2020 when the state of epidemic threat was announced in Poland); and
- are suspended if proceedings opened prior to the announcements of the state of epidemic threat or state of epidemic (retroactively, proceedings opened before 14 March 2020 when the state of epidemic threat was announced in Poland).

This legislation will last for an indefinite period of time (until the state of epidemic threat or state of epidemic is repealed by the Polish government). The new legislation, in practice, means that:



- notifications shall still be filed to the OCCP (where the relevant thresholds are met);
- based on the notification, the OCCP opens and carries out merger control proceedings; and
- decisions are issued.

However, the OCCP is not bound by the statutory deadlines.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The Act sets out a two-stage merger review procedure, where the first stage takes up to one month, potentially extendable to five months if the concentration requires an in-depth review in the second stage.

There are no official pre-notification contacts before the formal submission of the notification. However, the Guidelines indicate that it is possible to contact the OCCP before filing.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) will clear concentrations that do not result in significant impediment to competition in the market, in particular, by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the market. This means that, in practice, the Polish competition authority follows the significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) test.

The Act defines 'dominant position' as the position of the undertaking that allows it to prevent effective competition within a relevant market, thus enabling it to act to a significant degree independently of competitors, contracting parties and consumers. It is assumed that the undertaking holds a dominant position if its market share exceeds 40 per cent.

The OCCP may also issue conditional decisions (in 2011, there were three such decisions issued, in 2012 there was only one, in 2013 there were two such decisions issued, in 2014 there were four conditional clearances issued, in 2015 there was one such case and in 2016 two such decisions were issued) or a decision under article 20.2 of the Act, the latter offering clearance despite significant impediments to competition (there were no such decisions issued during the period 2011–2017).

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No, there is no special substantive test for joint ventures. Both full-function and non-full-function joint ventures are caught by the Polish competition law.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

In assessing concentrations, the OCCP focuses mainly on whether the SIEC test is met, especially where a dominant position is created or strengthened. In practice, post-merger market shares, concentration of the market (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) and post-merger market structure still play a crucial role in the assessment of concentrations by the OCCP.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The OCCP may clear a concentration that will significantly impede competition in the market, including by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, in any case where it is justifiable, including especially where the concentration is expected to contribute to economic development or technical progress or may have a positive impact on the national economy.

In Decision No. DKK-32/07 of 28 September 2007, the OCCP concluded that even though the concentration could pose a significant risk to the competition at that particular moment, the following reasons should be taken into account: the transaction will contribute to the economic and technological development and will have a positive impact on the national economy as well as other benefits. In another decision of 8 March 2007, No. DOK-29/07, the OCCP pointed out that the concentration could pose a significant risk to competition, but there were arguments for clearance to be given (such as ensuring Poland's energy security). As a result, the OCCP issued unconditional clearance in both cases.

However, it should be stressed that those are exceptions and later decisions (in particular Decision No. DKK-1/2011 of 13 January 2011) suggest that the current approach is different and the authority is unwilling to follow the above rationale.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Act does not explicitly provide for efficiencies to be a reason to clear a transaction that may otherwise in principle harm competition. However, in some cases, the authority took that into account when assessing the transaction. In one of their decisions (Decision No. DKK-1/2011 of 13 January 2011 *PGE/Energa*) the OCCP took into account the economic efficiencies in the process of examining the concentration. However, finally the OCCP prohibited this transaction.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) may, by means of a decision, prohibit implementation of the concentration if it results in a significant impediment to competition in the market, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

If the decision is not complied with, the OCCP may, if strict conditions are met, apply restorative measures, for example, order a division of the undertaking.

The OCCP may also impose a fine if the transaction is closed despite its veto.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. Under the Act, the OCCP may clear a concentration provided the undertakings concerned fulfil certain conditions (conditional clearance).

These conditions may involve, in particular:

- disposal of all or some of the assets of one or several undertakings;
- divestiture of control over an undertaking or undertakings, in particular by disposing of a block of stocks or shares, or dismissal

- of one or several persons from the management or supervisory board; or
- granting a competitor exclusive rights.

The decision will determine the time limit for meeting the conditions.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

In the case of transactions that are considered to significantly restrict the competition on the relevant market (owing to substantial aggregation of market share or reduction of strong competitors on the market), the OCCP will likely issue conditional decision including commitments. Commitments are intended as a means to ensure that affected markets remain competitive. The Act provides for two types of commitments: behavioural and structural. The OCCP is willing to impose structural rather than behavioural remedies, such as the obligation to permanently dispose of specified assets (eg, Decision No. DKK-9/09 of 25 February 2009, Decision No. DKK-64/10 of 12 July 2010, Decision No. DKK-128/2011, Decision No. DKK-70/11 and Decision No. DKK-40/2014 of 31 March 2014). Regarding behavioural remedies, note the OCCP's Decision No. DKK-49/08 of 19 June 2008, where the OCCP gave clearance on condition that the undertaking withdraw from and not initiate any actions designed to acquire any ownership rights in the other undertaking and Decision No. DKK-156/2017 of 4 October 2017 where the OCCP gave clearance on condition that the acquirer within agreed time period would sell all the electric energy produced in one of the assets of the acquired company through the commodity exchange. In one of its recent decisions (No. DKK-51/2019 of 25 February 2019) the OCCP combined both structural (divestment of part of the business) and behavioural (certain length of the contracts with the clients, price limits for the certain clients) remedies to allow for the concentration and protect the competitive landscape of the markets concerned.

In practice, parties submit their proposal of commitments to the OCCP when the latter raises concerns over transaction. Although the commitment proposal is subject to the OCCP's revision, the conditional clearance may be issued only if the party consents to the type and scope of commitments. Otherwise, the OCCP issues a prohibition decision. The authority is entitled to determine, at its sole discretion, the type and scope of commitments. Moreover, the addressee of the conditional decision is required to provide the OCCP with information regarding enforcement of commitments. The authority obliges the acquiring party to submit such information in a period of time prescribed in the commitment decision.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To the best of our knowledge, there is no such track record. However, in principle, remedies apply also to foreign-to-foreign mergers.

In Decision No. DOK-36/2004 of 18 May 2004, the OCCP gave clearance on condition that an undertaking based in France shall dispose of its assets, including those located in France, to a third party, which proves that the remedies may also involve assets located outside Poland.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The matter of ancillary restrictions is not regulated in the Act. However, the Guidelines Regarding the Assessment of Concentration clearly state that ancillary restraints are not the subject of examination or assessment during the concentration proceedings. Therefore, the clearance

of the OCCP does not extend to the anticompetitive contractual clauses accompanying the concentration. In practice, during the concentration procedure, the OCCP may inform the notifying undertakings that the contractual provisions accompanying the concentration raise doubts as to their conformity with the ban on anticompetitive agreements and therefore, if the undertakings refuse to change them, it may result in instigation of the antimonopoly proceedings to assess whether the anticompetitive arrangement infringes Polish competition law. It means that, in principle, the OCCP does not make the clearance for concentration dependant on the previous amendment of ancillary restraints. To sum up, although the Guidelines are not legally binding on undertakings, in practice the OCCP's decisions do not automatically cover ancillary restrictions (that are directly related to, and necessary for, the implementation of the concentration). Therefore, caution and a case-by-case approach may be necessary while dealing with ancillary restraints in Poland.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Customers and competitors are not parties to the proceedings. That means that they do not have access to files nor can they appeal against the decision. However, third parties may at their own initiative file comments or they may be asked by the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) to file input regarding important aspects of the case.

The OCCP keeps a register of all notified concentrations, which may be helpful for third parties. It is available on the authority's website.

When it comes to complicated transactions, the OCCP will, in principle organise a market test and send questionnaires to competitors, clients as well as suppliers, allowing them to take a position.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The fact that a notification has been submitted, the date of submission, the notifying party and the current status of the proceedings are available at the OCCP's website.

During antimonopoly proceedings, undertakings are obliged to disclose all information available, including information that may involve business secrets. The OCCP may, on an ex officio basis or on application of the undertaking concerned, limit access to some information for other parties (if there is more than one party to the proceedings). In such a case, the undertaking should file all documents in two versions, one confidential and the other non-confidential. The latter is available for all parties. In March 2017, the OCCP published guidelines providing further clarifications on what conditions the undertaking should meet under, to successfully apply for limitations on other parties' access to the case files (including merger control proceedings) on the grounds of business secrets protection.

Since January 2015, the notifying party is obliged to submit a brief (up to 500 words) description of the intended concentration. This description is posted on the OCCP's website immediately after notification and should therefore be drafted in such a way that it does not contain secret information.

Furthermore, in the case of imposing conditions on an undertaking, the OCCP on application of the undertaking concerned does not disclose deadlines for fulfilling the imposed conditions. The obligation

in question is valid until the fulfilment of these conditions, but not later than the expiry of the deadline for their fulfilment. Moreover, in case of the above-mentioned application, the OCCP does not involve such deadlines in the publicly available version of the decision. The amendment in question is aimed at protecting commercial interests of the undertakings concerned.

Notwithstanding that, there is a general obligation on the OCCP employees to protect business secrets. This may mean having to mark information for treatment as a business secret even if there is only one party to the proceeding. Additionally, when the OCCP prepares the statement of reasons for its decision, it shall not disclose information marked as a business secret.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The OCCP is a member of numerous international working groups (eg, the ICN), the most important of which being those involving the competition authorities from other EU member states. The officials from the Polish competition authority attend meetings of the Advisory Committee established by Regulation 139/2004. This Regulation provides for detailed rules of cooperation between member states and the Commission in concentration cases.

There are currently three binding bilateral agreements between the OCCP and its Ukrainian, Russian and Hungarian counterparts.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

An appeal arises from a decision of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection. The appeal must be lodged within one month of the date on which the decision is served (owing to amendments, the time limit to lodge an appeal has been extended from 14 days to one month). Upon appeal, the OCCP should, without delay but not later than within three months of the date of filing the appeal, transmit the appealed decision to the court together with the record of proceedings. Where the OCCP considers the appeal to be justified, it may repeal or amend the decision, whether in whole or in part, without transmitting the record to the court. Any such repeal or amendment must be notified to the party concerned without delay by sending it a new decision; such a new decision is also open for appeal. Where justified, prior to transmitting an appeal to the court or repealing or amending his or her decision, the OCCP may also perform additional activities to clarify objections presented in the appeal.

To the best of our knowledge, widely recognised in Poland, one of the merger appeal cases – a prohibition decision in the energy sector *PGE/Energa* case (Decision No. DKK-1/2011) – was upheld by the court of consumer and competition protection. The second case, the OCCP's prohibition for the takeover of Merlin by NFI Empik (Decision No. DKK-12/2011) – intended concentration on the online sale of non-specialised books and music CDs – was withdrawn by the undertaking that lodged the appeal a few days before the court hearing.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The usual time frame for judicial review (in the first instance) is one to two years. The whole appeal process (the first and second instance and cassation to the Supreme Court) may take up to five years.



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## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

OCCP activities in numbers – 2018	Number		
New concentration control proceedings	252		
<b>Issued decisions</b>			
Concentration approval	228		
Including Phase I approval	220		
Including Phase II approval	8		
Conditional approval	0		
<b>Other data</b>			
Discontinuance of proceedings	1		
Return of the notification of the intended concentration	10		
<b>To the applicant</b>			
Proceedings moved to the Phase II stage	12		
Average time of proceedings conducted in Phase I	36 days*		
Average time of proceedings conducted in Phase II	199 days <sup>†</sup>		
Cases are given an opinion in terms of the impact of concentration on the Polish market in connection with proceedings before the EC	390		
New explanatory proceedings <sup>‡</sup>	7		
<b>Concentration approvals in years 2015-2017</b>			
	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>
Concentration approvals	194	205	228
Conditional approvals	2	1	0

\* The actual case settlement period, taking into account the dates subject to exclusion under article 96, section 2 of the Act.

<sup>†</sup> The actual case settlement period, taking into account the dates subject to exclusion under article 96(a), section 8 of the Act.

<sup>‡</sup> It pertains to the level of concentration in the economy and determination of the obligation to report concentration.

Source: OCCP (there are no statistics for 2019 available).

**Reform proposals**

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

All changes to the merger control regime in Poland have been covered by the amendments to the Act that came into force on 18 January 2015.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year**

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

No updates at this time.

# Portugal

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Merger control is governed by Law No. 19/2012 of 8 May 2012 (the Act), which enacted the current Portuguese competition legal regime superseding the previous regime enacted by Law No. 18/2003 of 11 June 2003, as amended (the former Competition Act).

Decree-Law No. 125/2014 of 18 August 2014 adopted and approved the current statutes of the Competition Authority (the Competition Authority or the Authority).

The Competition Authority is entrusted with the mission of implementing competition rules, including those on merger control. It is a public entity endowed with administrative and financial autonomy, management autonomy and organic, functional and technical independence. It has been granted statutory independence for the performance of its activities, without prejudice to certain acts that are subject to ministerial approval (eg, the budget, the multi-annual plan and the management report and the accounts, including the balance sheet). The member of government in charge of economic affairs (currently the minister of economy) may also be called to intervene in merger control proceedings through an extraordinary appeal.

Without prejudice to the competence of the government as regards competition policy, the members of the Board of the Competition Authority shall be heard by the relevant parliamentary committee, whenever they are requested for such purposes, to provide information or clarification on their activities and on competition policy matters.

The Code of Administrative Procedure applies on a subsidiary basis to the procedure to be followed in the area of mergers.

The Code of Procedure in Administrative Courts applies on a subsidiary basis to the judicial review of the Competition Authority's administrative decisions, including merger control.

The General Regime on Quasi-criminal Minor Offences (enacted by Decree-Law No. 433/82 of 27 October 1982) applies on a subsidiary basis to the sanctioning procedure and decisions, and to their judicial review.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Portuguese competition law applies to mergers that occur in Portuguese territory or that may have an effect within it. A concentration is deemed to exist when a lasting change of control over the whole or part of an undertaking occurs, as a result of the following situations:

- two or more previously independent undertakings or parts thereof merge;
- one or more persons or undertakings who already have control of at least one undertaking acquire control, directly or indirectly, of

the whole or parts of the capital stock or of assets of one or several other undertakings; or

- two or more persons or undertakings create a joint venture that is intended to perform on a lasting basis the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

However, a concentration does not exist in case of an acquisition of shareholdings or assets by an insolvency receiver in the framework of an insolvency procedure; the acquisition of a shareholding merely as a guarantee; or the acquisition by credit institutions, financial companies or insurance companies of shareholdings in undertakings with a corporate object different from that of any of these three types of companies, when the acquisition is made with a mere temporary nature and for resale purposes. As for this latter case, the concentration does not exist as long as the acquisition is not made on a lasting basis, the voting rights associated with the acquired shareholdings are not exercised with the purpose of determining the competitive behaviour of the concerned undertakings or are solely exercised with the purpose of preparing the total or partial transfer of such undertakings, the assets thereof or the acquired shareholdings, and also provided that such transfer occurs within one year from the date of acquisition (which may be extended by the Competition Authority if the acquirers show that the transfer was not possible within such period because of reasons worthy of consideration).

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

As stated above, merger control provisions apply to joint ventures that are intended to perform on a lasting basis the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint ventures).

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Under the Act, 'control' is any act of whatever form that confers the ability to exert on a lasting basis, separately or jointly, a decisive influence, in the given legal and factual circumstances, on the activities of an undertaking. In particular, it is the case of the acquisition of the whole or part of the capital, the acquisition of ownership or of the right to use or enjoy the whole or part of the assets of an undertaking, or the acquisition of rights or the conclusion of contracts that confer a decisive influence on the composition or on the decisions of the corporate bodies of an undertaking. So far, nothing has been provided for outside the above boundaries.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Concentrations are subject to prior notification if one of the following conditions occurs:

- as a result thereof, a share equal to or higher than 50 per cent of the national market for a particular good or service or for a substantial part of it is acquired, created or reinforced;
- as a result thereof, a share equal to or higher than 30 per cent and lower than 50 per cent of the national market for a particular good or service or for a substantial part of it is acquired, created or reinforced, provided that in the preceding financial year the individual turnover in Portugal, net of directly related taxes, of at least two undertakings taking part in the concentration exceeds €5 million; or
- in the preceding financial year, the group of undertakings taking part in the concentration have recorded in Portugal a turnover exceeding €100 million, net of directly related taxes, provided that the individual turnover in Portugal of at least two of these undertakings exceeds €5 million.

In addition, two or more concentrations made within a period of two years among the same individuals or legal entities, which considered individually would not be subject to prior notification, are deemed to be a sole concentration subject to such prior notification when the set of concentrations reaches the turnover figures set out above.

Several rules on the calculation of both market share and turnover are established in the Act.

Only concentrations that meet one of the above conditions and that are therefore subject to prior notification may be investigated under the merger control rules. Concentrations that do not meet any of such conditions may, nevertheless, be investigated as restrictive practices.

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Notification to the Competition Authority is mandatory where the statutory thresholds are met. No exceptions are admitted.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

As stated above, the Act applies to mergers that occur in Portuguese territory or that have or may have an effect within it. Accordingly, foreign-to-foreign mergers that have or may have effects within the Portuguese territory (ie, those where the statutory thresholds are met) are subject to the Act.

### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The Act is applicable to all economic activities, be they permanent or occasional, in the private, public and cooperative sectors. There are no provisions in the Act relating to specific sectors, other than the indication that the Competition Authority's powers over concentrations in regulated sectors are exercised in cooperation with the corresponding regulatory authorities, from which the Authority, prior to the adoption of a decision within a merger control procedure in the corresponding sector, shall request the position on the notified operation. Such powers do not interfere with the regulatory authorities' own legally attributed powers. In the cases of concentrations in the media sector (newspaper,

news, television or radio companies), a negative opinion of the media regulator (ERC) is binding upon the Authority to the extent that it is grounded on risks to the freedom of expression and to the plurality of opinions.

Provisions influencing, directly or indirectly, mergers in specific sectors may also be found in the concerned area's legislation.

With reference to companies, which, by law, are in charge of the management of services of general economic interest, or companies that have the nature of a legal monopoly, they are subject to the provisions of the Act to the extent that the application of such rules does not constitute an obstacle to the fulfilment of the particular mission with which they have been entrusted.

In other contexts too, merger operations must comply notably with the relevant provisions of the Commercial Companies Code and with the applicable rules of the Securities Code.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Concentrations must be notified after the conclusion of the corresponding agreement and before they are carried out or, whenever relevant, after the date of disclosure of the preliminary announcement of a public takeover bid or of an exchange offer or the date of disclosure of the announcement of the acquisition of a controlling shareholding in a listed company, or, in the case of a public procurement procedure, after the definitive award of the contract and before the closing of the transaction. In these latter cases, the awarding public entity shall, in the public procurement programme, set the rules regarding the interplay between the public procurement procedure and the merger control regime established in Law No. 19/2012 of 8 May 2012 (the Act).

Furthermore, when the undertakings taking part in the concentration show to the Competition Authority a serious intent of concluding an agreement or, in the case of a public takeover bid or of an exchange offer, the undertakings show the public intent to carry out such bid or offer, the concentration may be notified to the Competition Authority before the above deadlines.

Under the Act, projected concentrations may be the object of pre-notification evaluation by the Authority, which shall be carried out in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the Authority on 27 December 2012.

Implementation of a concentration that is subject to prior notification without fulfilling such requirement may give rise to a sanctioning procedure launched by the Authority, which shall be subject to the opportunity principle set out in the Act, pursuant to which the Authority may, on public interest grounds, grant different degrees of priority in respect of the matters it is called to assess.

The said implementation without prior notification is punishable with fines, which, for each of the concerned undertakings, cannot exceed 10 per cent of the corresponding turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the final decision adopted by the Competition Authority. In cases where under the Act individuals (eg, directors) are held responsible for the infringement, the applicable fine cannot exceed 10 per cent of the corresponding remuneration in the last full year in which the infringement took place.

In addition, the Competition Authority may decide to impose periodic penalty payments, not exceeding 5 per cent of the average daily turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the Competition Authority's decision, per day of delay, counted from the date the decision is notified. Furthermore, an ex officio merger control procedure may be initiated by the Competition Authority. This ex officio procedure



has been initiated by the Authority notably in the case of the acquisition of the Hospital of São Gonçalo de Lagos by the Grupo HPA, a transaction implemented by the end of 2017 that albeit subject to mandatory prior notification has not been notified to the Authority, which the acquirer did only after the ex officio procedure was initiated.

The above-mentioned sanctions are, in principle, applied in practice, as shown, notably, in decisions of 26 June 2014, of 27 December 2017 and of 19 March 2020.

In the first decision, the Authority imposed fines of approximately €6,900 and approximately €112,000 on the National Pharmacies Association (ANF) and on Farminveste, respectively, for failure to notify the acquisition of the control over Consiste and Glintt, a transaction where the statutory thresholds for mandatory notification were exceeded. No fine was imposed on a third concerned undertaking, Farminveste 3, as it had no revenues in 2013.

In the second decision, the Authority imposed a fine of €38,500 to two companies of the Vallis group, for failure to notify the acquisition of the exclusive control over a network of dental clinics a transaction where the statutory thresholds for mandatory notification were also exceeded.

In the third decision, the Authority imposed on Grupo HPA a fine of €155,000 for failure to notify the acquisition of the exclusive control over the Hospital S Gonçalo de Lagos a transaction where the statutory thresholds for mandatory notification were also exceeded.

In all three cases, the fines imposed resulted from settlement proposals submitted by the concerned companies, which the Authority accepted.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In the case of full mergers, creation of joint ventures or the establishment of common control over the whole or part of one or several undertakings, notification must be made by the group of undertakings jointly, through a common representative. In other cases, notification is filed by the undertaking (or persons) intending to acquire control of the whole or part of one or more undertakings.

Pursuant to the Act, a filing fee shall be due for the assessment of concentrations subject to prior notification. In addition, a notification shall only be effective if filed together with the document that confirms the payment of the due fee.

As regards filing fees, according to Regulation No. 1/E/2003 of 3 July 2003, of the Competition Authority (which having been adopted pursuant to the former Competition Act has not been repealed or replaced), the basic fee payable for the appraisal of concentrations has been established in the following amounts:

- €7,500, when the previous financial year's combined turnover in Portugal for the companies involved in the concentration, calculated according to the relevant provisions of the Act, is equal to or less than €150 million;
- €15,000, when the previous financial year's combined turnover in Portugal for the companies involved in the concentration, calculated according to the relevant provisions of the Act, exceeds €150 million and is equal to or less than €300 million; and
- €25,000, when the previous financial year's combined turnover in Portugal for the companies involved in the concentration, calculated according to the relevant provisions of the Act, exceeds €300 million.

The aforementioned fees shall be doubled when the Competition Authority decides to initiate proceedings in the following cases:

- concentrations of which the Competition Authority becomes aware and that, though subject to mandatory notification, have not been notified;

- concentrations for which the express or tacit decision of non-opposition was grounded on information provided by the participants in the concentration that was false or inaccurate with regard to essential elements for the decision; and
- concentrations in which there has been total or partial disregard of the obligations or conditions imposed at the time of the decision of non-opposition.

Also, if the Competition Authority, during the first phase of the merger control procedure, considers that the transaction is likely to affect competition and decides to proceed with an in-depth investigation, a further fee of 50 per cent of the basic fee shall be payable.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The waiting period for a Phase I decision is 30 working days from the date on which the notification is effective. This deadline may be suspended if requests for additional information are made by the Authority. It may also be suspended for 20 working days if the notifying party offers commitments. Prior hearing of the notifying party and of interested third parties that have submitted observations also suspends the deadline.

When a Phase II in-depth investigation takes place, it must be completed within a maximum of 90 working days from the effective date of the notification. This deadline may be suspended if requests for additional information are made by the Competition Authority. It may also be suspended for up to 20 working days upon request of the notifying party or with the latter's agreement. Prior hearing of the notifying party and of the interested third parties that have submitted observations, which must take place no later than 75 working days from the effective date of the notification, also suspends the deadline.

The Act prohibits the implementation of concentrations subject to prior notification before this latter is filed. Furthermore, until tacit or express clearance is granted, a concentration subject to prior notification shall not be put into effect. However, this does not prevent the implementation of a public takeover bid to purchase or an exchange offer that has been duly notified to the Competition Authority, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question. Upon reasoned request from the participant, undertakings submitted before or after the notification of the obligations of not putting into effect a concentration or of not exercising voting rights may, in exceptional cases, be subject to a derogation granted by the Competition Authority, which may attach conditions or obligations to such derogation to ensure effective competition. Legal transactions carried out in breach of the prior notification or suspension obligations are ineffective.

In addition, and without prejudice to the applicable sanctions, after the notification of a concentration implemented in breach of the above obligations and before a decision is adopted by the Competition Authority, the individuals or legal entities that acquired the control must immediately suspend the corresponding voting rights and the management body shall not perform any act outside the normal course of business, the transfer of shareholdings or assets of the acquired undertaking being prohibited. Upon reasoned request from the concerned individuals or legal entities, these obligations may, in exceptional cases, be subject to a derogation granted by the Competition Authority, which may attach conditions or obligations to such derogation to ensure effective competition.

Furthermore, the Competition Authority may adopt measures it considers necessary or adequate to restore the situation existing prior to the breach, notably divestment.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Until tacit or express clearance is granted, a concentration subject to prior notification shall not be (partially or totally) put into effect and legal transactions carried out in breach of such suspension obligation are ineffective. Furthermore, the violation of such suspension obligation is punishable with fines, which, for each of the concerned undertakings, cannot exceed 10 per cent of the corresponding turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the final decision adopted by the Competition Authority. So far, the Authority's decision record does not include any case concerning the specific violation of the suspension obligation (all cases refer to implementation of concentrations that were not notified albeit subject to mandatory prior notification). However, this should not allow for the conclusion that the Authority shall not investigate and punish any such violation.

### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

So far the Authority's public record of decisions does not include any case concerning the violation of the suspension obligation. As also stated, this should not allow for the conclusion that the Authority shall not investigate and punish any such violation, including in cases of foreign-to-foreign mergers.

### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The law does not specifically address this situation; solutions must therefore be found on a case-by-case basis, and would not differ from those applicable to local mergers.

## Public takeovers

### 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There is no other reference in the merger control rules to public bids specifically. Such bids are, in any event, subject to other rules, notably those provided for in the Securities Code and the Commercial Companies Code.

## Documentation

### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Notifications must, in principle, be filed according to a 'Regular Notification Form' that was adopted by the Competition Authority as an attachment to its Regulation No. 60/2013 of 14 February 2013.

Pursuant to said Regulation, the following information must, notably, be provided in a notification:

- a summary of the transaction;
- the identity of the parties including the indication of their activities (and, in the case of the notifying party, of the activities of the entities with which it has interdependence links), the indication of their turnovers for the last three years and the submission of their individual and consolidated accounts and reports;
- the indication of other competition authorities to which the transaction is being notified;
- the indication of the activities subject to sectoral regulation;

- the nature (merger, acquisition of exclusive or joint control or joint venture) and the type (horizontal, vertical or conglomerate) of the concentration;
- a description of the concentration, which shall include the submission of the relevant contractual, public bid or public tender documents (as applicable), its economic and financial structure, the estimated timing and required acts, the existing financial support, if any, and the submission of reports, studies or other documents prepared for the purposes of assessment of the notified transaction;
- the control structure of the participant undertakings, including:
  - a list of the undertakings that control, or are controlled by, the participants or are part of the participants' group of undertakings;
  - the turnover in Portugal of such undertakings;
  - the identity of the members of their boards of directors;
  - copies of the articles of association;
  - copies of shareholders' agreements, when relevant for the concentration; and
  - if the transaction will create a joint venture, a detailed description of the decision-making rules and of the demonstration that it shall perform on a lasting basis the functions of an autonomous economic entity;
- the personal and financial connections of the participant undertakings (list of undertakings active in the relevant markets in which the directors of the participants hold similar positions or in which the participants hold a minority shareholding);
- a reasoned identification of the relevant product and geographical markets;
- identification of the relevant product and geographically related markets with indication of the estimated market shares of the participant undertakings and of the five major competitors in the past three years in each of such related markets;
- information on the relevant markets; notably, their size in value and in quantity in the last three years and the description of facts that influence the entry in and the exit from the relevant markets;
- the offer structure in the relevant markets (including an indication of the participants' turnovers and market shares in the past three years and of the five major competitors and estimated market shares in the same period);
- the demand structure in the relevant markets by indicating, notably, the consumers' or end users' preferences as to certain products or brands, after-sales services, network effects and consumption habits;
- information on the participants, which must include the indication of the 10 major suppliers and the 10 major clients; and
- other information that the participants may deem relevant, including the reasons why they consider that the notified transaction should be cleared.

The aforementioned Regulation No. 60/2013 covers in a very detailed manner not only the above information but also other information that may be deemed relevant for the review procedure.

To preserve confidentiality, notifying parties may identify in a reasoned manner the information to be considered confidential and file non-confidential versions of the notification.

Regulation No. 60/2013 also includes a Simplified Notification Form that requires a lower level of information to be provided within each of the above categories of data, as listed in detail in the regulation. The Simplified Notification Form is to be used in concentrations that, on a preliminary assessment, do not create significant impediments to competition, in accordance with the following criteria established in Regulation No. 60/2013:

- none of the parties to the concentration performs economic activities in either the same relevant geographic or product markets

- (no horizontal overlap) or in markets that are located upstream or downstream in the production or commercialisation process (no vertical effects), or in neighbouring markets (no conglomerate relationships), in which operate any other parties to the concentration. This criterion also applies to situations of change from joint to exclusive control, in which prior to concentration the party acquiring exclusive control is not active outside the joint venture in markets where this latter is present or in upstream or downstream vertically related markets, or in neighbouring markets. It further applies to situations of change from exclusive to joint control, in which prior to concentration the undertakings acquiring the joint control (other than the undertaking that had exclusive control) are not active outside the joint venture in markets where this latter is present or in upstream or downstream vertically related markets, or in neighbouring markets;
- when the parties to the concentration are engaged in activities in the same relevant geographic or product markets (horizontal overlap) provided that within the geographical scope of the market, as defined by the notifying parties, and in the national territory their combined market share does not exceed 15 per cent; or their combined market share exceeds 15 per cent, but is lower than or equal to 25 per cent, and the corresponding increase of market share does not exceed 2 per cent;
  - when the parties are engaged in activities in markets vertically related, provided that the individual or combined market shares at any level of the production or commercialisation process (upstream or downstream) within the geographical scope of the markets, as defined by the notifying parties and in the national territory do not exceed 25 per cent; and
  - when the parties to the concentration are engaged in activities in neighbouring markets, provided that the individual or combined market shares in any of these markets, within the geographical scope of the markets, as defined by the notifying parties, and in the national territory does not exceed 25 per cent.

If the notification is incomplete or includes inaccurate data, the Authority shall, within seven working days of the filing, invite the notifying party to complete the notification. In such a case, the notification becomes effective only on the date the missing elements are filed.

In addition, in the cases where the concentration was cleared on the basis of false information provided by the concerned undertakings that was essential to the decision, the Authority shall revoke such clearance decision and may also adopt measures necessary or adequate to re-establish, to the extent possible, the situation existing prior to the concentration, notably divestment.

Furthermore, the provision of false or inaccurate information in response to an Authority's request for information in merger control proceedings is punishable with fines, which, for each of the concerned undertakings, cannot exceed 1 per cent of the corresponding turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the decision adopted by the Competition Authority. In cases where, under the Act, individuals (eg, directors) are held responsible for the infringement, the applicable fine ranges between 10 and 50 'account units' (currently an 'account unit' corresponds to €102).

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The timetable for the merger clearance procedure is as follows:

- if the notification is complete, it becomes effective on the date it is filed together with the document that confirms the payment of the due filing fee. If the notification is incomplete or includes inaccurate

data, the Authority, within seven working days, invites the notifying party to complete the notification and the notification becomes effective on the date the missing elements are filed. The notifying party may at any time withdraw the notification or waive its rights or legitimate interests;

- within five working days of the date on which it is effective, the Competition Authority shall publish the essential elements of the notification in two national newspapers, at the expense of the notifying party, so that any interested third parties may submit their observations within the prescribed time, which may not be less than 10 working days; and
- within 30 working days of the date on which the notification is effective, the Competition Authority shall complete the investigation and shall accordingly decide:
  - the concentration is not subject to prior notification;
  - not to oppose the concentration, with or without conditions or obligations attached thereto; or
  - to initiate an in-depth investigation when it considers that the concentration in question is likely to create significant impediments to competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it.

The above 30-working-days deadline may be suspended if requests for additional information are made by the Competition Authority. It may also be suspended for 20 working days if the notifying party offers commitments. Prior hearing of the notifying party and of interested third parties that have submitted observations also suspends the deadline.

The lack of a decision within the period of 30 working days referred to above (plus suspensions) shall be considered as a decision of non-opposition to the concentration.

This initial 30-day period may be shortened under the simplified decision procedure, introduced on 24 July 2007. This procedure, which currently is merely an internal guideline, is applied on a case-by-case basis depending on the specifics of each transaction. It may apply, in particular, to transactions that do not result in a significant change in the competitive structure of the market (for example, because they only consist of a transfer of a market share, as opposed to an increase).

If the Competition Authority decides to initiate an in-depth investigation, this must be completed within a maximum of 90 working days of the effective date of the notification. This deadline may be suspended if requests for additional information are made by the Competition Authority. It may also be suspended for up to 20 working days upon request of the notifying party or with the latter's agreement. Prior hearing of the notifying party and of the interested third parties that have submitted observations, which must take place no later than 75 working days from the effective date of the notification, also suspends the deadline.

Until the end of this period, the Competition Authority must either authorise the concentration, with or without conditions or obligations attached thereto, or prohibit the concentration if it considers that the concentration, as initially notified or following the amendments made by the notifying party, is likely to create significant impediments to competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it. In this latter case, the Competition Authority shall prescribe appropriate measures should the concentration have already been implemented. The lack of a decision within the 90-working-day period referred to above (plus suspensions) shall also be considered as a decision of non-opposition to the concentration.

In the case of concentrations that occurred in less than five years of which the Competition Authority becomes aware and that, though subject to mandatory notification, have not been notified, the procedures initiated ex officio by the Competition Authority shall be subject to the above time limits.

The above delays may, to a certain extent, be accelerated if, during a pre-notification assessment, all the required data and all relevant competition issues are discussed and clarified with the Authority, thereby avoiding future suspensions and allowing for a more swift response by the Authority. Typically, non-complex merger control proceedings may take approximately one month.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The timetable for the merger clearance procedure is as follows:

- if the notification is complete, it becomes effective on the date it is filed together with the document that confirms the payment of the due filing fee. If the notification is incomplete or includes inaccurate data, the Authority, within seven working days, invites the notifying party to complete the notification and the notification becomes effective on the date the missing elements are filed. The notifying party may at any time withdraw the notification or waive its rights or legitimate interests;
- within five working days of the date on which it is effective, the Competition Authority shall publish the essential elements of the notification in two national newspapers, at the expense of the notifying party, so that any interested third parties may submit their observations within the prescribed time, which may not be less than 10 working days; and
- within 30 working days of the date on which the notification is effective, the Competition Authority shall complete the investigation and shall accordingly decide:
  - the concentration is not subject to prior notification;
  - not to oppose the concentration, with or without conditions or obligations attached thereto; or
  - to initiate an in-depth investigation when it considers that the concentration in question is likely to create significant impediments to competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it.

Delays may, to a certain extent, be accelerated if, during a pre-notification assessment, all the required data and all relevant competition issues are discussed and clarified with the Authority, thereby avoiding future suspensions and allowing for a more swift response by the Authority. Typically, non-complex merger control proceedings may take approximately one month.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Concentrations falling within the scope of Law No. 19/2012 of 8 May 2012 (the Act) are forbidden if they create significant impediments to competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it, in particular if such impediments result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Pursuant to the Act, notified concentrations shall be appraised to determine their effects on the competition structure, having regard to the need to preserve and develop effective competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it, in the interests of users and consumers.

The following shall notably be taken into account:

- the structure of the relevant markets and the existence or absence of competition from undertakings established in such markets or in distinct markets;
- the position of undertakings participating in the relevant markets and their economic and financial power, in comparison with their main competitors;

- the potential competition and the existence, in law or in fact, of entry barriers to the market;
- the opportunities for choosing suppliers and users;
- the access of the different undertakings to suppliers and markets;
- the structure of existing distribution networks;
- supply and demand trends for the products and services in question;
- special or exclusive rights granted by law or attached to the nature of the products traded or services provided;
- the control of essential facilities by the undertakings in question and the access opportunities to such facilities offered to competing undertakings;
- technical and economic progress to the extent that it does not create an obstacle to competition and as long as the concentration provides efficiency gains to end users and consumers; and
- the contribution that the concentration makes to the international competitiveness of the Portuguese economy.

Failing firm defence and other special circumstances may be taken into account in terms similar to those applied by the European Commission in the assessment of concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). As regards the failing firm defence, in its Guidelines on the Economic Analysis of Concentration Operations the Authority specifically considers that it may be used as a potential argument to be taken into account in the appraisal of a concentration, provided that the alleged firm whose insolvency is imminent is indeed in financial difficulties and alternative scenarios with a less serious impact on competition may be excluded. Reportedly, the failing firm defence has only been used twice by the Competition Authority, the latest in *Grupo HPA/Hospital S Gonçalo de Lagos* (Case 45/2018).

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Joint ventures, which have as their object or effect the coordination of competitive behaviour between the undertakings that remain independent, shall – as regards those coordination aspects – be assessed under the provisions of the Act governing prohibited agreements and practices.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Concentrations are forbidden if they create significant impediments to competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it. In the above-mentioned Guidelines on the Economic Analysis of Concentration Operations, the Authority addresses various aspects it considers in the assessment of a concentration, which include market dominance (market shares, levels of concentration), unilateral effects, coordinated effects, conglomerate effects, common ownership concerns (including going from joint control to exclusive control) and market foreclosure.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The former Competition Act had already eliminated the possibilities contemplated in the previous competition regime of special justification criteria for the approval of concentrations, which inevitably gave room to the application of non-competition criteria and even to possible industrial policy considerations.

Since then, a more rigorous and competition-oriented system of merger control has been in place.

Nevertheless, the statutes of the Competition Authority, adopted and approved by the above-mentioned Decree-Law No. 125/2014, have, in very debatable terms, maintained one possibility, already contemplated in the Competition Authority's former statutes, of application of non-competition criteria, which despite its exceptional nature, may bring about some distortions to the system.

In fact, prohibition decisions adopted by the Competition Authority may be appealed by the notifying parties to the member of the government responsible for the economy (extraordinary appeal), who in turn may, with a duly reasoned decision, authorise the concentration at stake, whenever the resulting benefits to fundamental strategic interests of the national economy are deemed to exceed the inherent disadvantages for competition. The ministerial decision that authorises a concentration, under the extraordinary appeal regime, may contain conditions and obligations that minimise its negative impact on competition. The extraordinary appeal has been used in *Brisa/AEA* (Case 22/2005). The terms of the ministerial decision adopted in this case do not remove the concerns that the procedure may raise. In fact, the overall broadness of the vocabulary and grounds of the decision may have set a precedent and an incentive that may be invoked too often whenever the Authority issues a prohibition decision.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Besides the basic substantive test, the main criteria for the appraisal of concentrations essentially follow the structure established at EU level. Accordingly, pursuant to the Act, notified concentrations shall be appraised to determine their effects on the competition structure, having regard to the need to preserve and develop effective competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it, in the interests of users and consumers. As stated above, in the assessment of concentrations the Authority takes into account a number of aspects, including the technical and economic progress where the concentration provides efficiency gains to end users and consumers. In the above-mentioned Authority's Guidelines on the Economic Analysis of Concentration Operations, the Authority also addresses efficiencies, referring notably that it will only consider efficiencies with a high likelihood of being implemented, efficiencies that are specific to the concentration and verifiable efficiencies. According to these guidelines, it is up to the concerned undertakings to allege and demonstrate possible efficiencies, in a timely fashion, that may be associated with a concentration.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition Authority may prohibit or interfere as follows:

- Prohibit a concentration. If the transaction has already been carried out, appropriate measures to re-establish effective competition may be ordered, including divestment.
- Approve a concentration, subject to conditions and obligations.
- Begin proceedings on its own initiative in the case of concentrations that occurred in less than five years of which the Competition Authority becomes aware and that, though subject to mandatory notification, have not been notified, adopting measures necessary or adequate to re-establish, to the extent possible, the situation existing prior to the concentration, notably divestment.
- Revoke its decisions in the cases where the concentration is put into effect in breach of the conditions or obligations attached to the

clearance decision or when a decision not to oppose a concentration was based on false information, provided by the concerned undertakings, that was essential to the decision. In these cases, the Authority may also adopt measures necessary or adequate to re-establish, to the extent possible, the situation existing prior to the concentration, notably divestment.

- Following a sanctioning procedure (subject to the opportunity principle), impose fines of up to 10 per cent of the turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the final decision adopted by the Competition Authority where undertakings fail to give prior notification of concentrations under the Competition Act, execute concentrations that had been suspended or prohibited by the Competition Authority, or do not comply with the conditions or obligations imposed.
- Following the aforementioned sanctioning procedure, impose fines of up to 1 per cent of the turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the final decision adopted by the Competition Authority where undertakings refuse to provide or provide false information.
- Following the aforementioned sanctioning procedure, impose periodic penalty payments of up to 5 per cent of the average daily turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the Competition Authority's decision, per day of delay counted from the date the decision is notified, where the undertakings:
  - do not comply with a Competition Authority decision that imposed a sanction or ordered the adoption of certain measures; or
  - fail to give prior notification of concentrations under the Competition Act.

Legal transactions relating to a concentration are null and void if they put into effect operations condemned by an order that prohibited the concentration, if they breach the conditions and obligation attached to a clearance decision or if they disregard measures imposed to re-establish effective competition.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The notifying party may, at any time during the merger control proceedings, offer commitments to preserve effective competition, in which case the review period is suspended. Such commitments may include divestment or other structural or behavioural remedies. During the suspension, the Authority may request information it deems necessary to assess the commitments offered. Moreover, the authorisation of a concentration may be subject to conditions or obligations designed to maintain effective competition. Furthermore, if a prohibited transaction has already gone ahead, the Competition Authority may impose appropriate measures to ensure effective competition such as divestment, or the relinquishing of corporate control.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

At any time during the merger control proceedings, the notifying party may offer commitments, including divestment and other structural or behavioural remedies to preserve effective competition. For this purpose, the Authority issued on 28 July 2011 the Guidelines on the Adoption of Commitments in Merger Control, which address the selection, design, execution and monitoring of commitments in merger control proceedings. While the Authority expresses in these guidelines its preference for structural remedies, such preference is not so clearly reflected in the existing case law. In fact, both structural and behavioural remedies



have been implemented (see, notably, *Sonaecom/PT*, Case 8/2006; *BCP/BPI*, Case 15/2006; *Arena Atlântida/Pavilhão Atlântico\*Atlântico, SA*, Case 38/2012; *Kento\*Unitel\*Sonaecom/ZON\*Optimus*, Case 5/2013; and *Rubis/Repsol Assets*, Case 39/2017). Behavioural remedies and the corresponding supervision obligations were applied for periods ranging from two to five years (see *Unibetão/Sicóbetão*, Case 30/2005; *TAP/PGA*, Case 57/2006; *Sonae Distribuição/Carrefour*, Case 51/2007; *Pingo Doce/Plus*, Case 01/2008; and *TRPN/Internorte*, Case 49/2010).

Furthermore, the Authority may adopt measures, notably divestment, necessary or adequate to re-establish effective competition, in case a prohibited concentration was already put in effect (see *TAP/SPdH*, Case 12/2009), in case of ex officio proceedings initiated by the Authority in respect of concentrations that occurred in less than five years, of which the Authority becomes aware and though subject to mandatory notification have not been notified, and in case of revocation, by the Authority, of clearance decisions.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Two cases may be mentioned where remedies were applied in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

In the *Dreger Medical/Hillenbrand* merger (Case 44/2003), the Competition Authority imposed the following conditions:

- the keeping of a second distribution channel in a non-exclusive regime for a period of three years;
- the keeping of non-discriminatory conditions for a period of three years;
- keeping the product available as long as there was demand for a period of three years;
- refraining from directly selling products in Portugal for three years; and
- keeping spare parts available for seven years after the production of the last device.

In *SC Johnson/Sara Lee's Insecticide Business* (Case 25/2010), the clearance decision was subject to SC Johnson divesting a number of assets previously controlled by Sara Lee related to certain insecticide businesses.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Under Law No. 19/2012 of 8 May 2012, restrictive provisions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration are presumed to be also covered, within certain terms, by the decision clearing such concentration.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In the absence of a required notification, the Competition Authority may initiate proceedings ex officio, on the basis of information on the transaction it has obtained, which may include facts brought to its attention by third parties.

In addition, all holders of rights or legally protected interests that may be affected by the concentration who submit to the Authority their observations on the notified transaction are eligible to intervene in the concerned merger control proceedings. For these purposes, the

Competition Authority publishes the essential elements of a notification in two national newspapers, at the expense of the notifying party, fixing a deadline, which may not be less than 10 working days, for submission of observations. Before the adoption of final decisions by the Competition Authority, any interested parties that have submitted observations shall be heard by the Competition Authority.

Furthermore, during the investigation, the Authority may request from any private or public entities the information it may deem necessary for the decision.

The Competition Authority's powers over concentrations in regulated sectors are exercised in cooperation with the corresponding regulatory authorities, from which the Authority, prior to the adoption of a decision within a merger control procedure in the corresponding sector, shall request the position on the notified operation. Such powers do not interfere with the regulatory authorities' own legally attributed powers. In the cases of concentrations in the media sector a negative opinion of the ERC is binding upon the Authority to the extent that it is grounded on risks to the freedom of expression and to the plurality of opinions.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Within five working days from the date the notification becomes effective, the Competition Authority shall publish the essential elements thereof in two national newspapers, at the expense of the notifying parties, so that any interested third parties may submit their observations within the prescribed time, which may not be less than 10 working days. The notifying party may request that parts of the information provided are kept confidential. To preserve confidentiality, the notifying party may file non-confidential versions of the notification or of any further information provided during the procedure.

Under the Act, confidentiality of commercial information provided by third parties within the merger control proceedings may also be protected.

The Competition Authority's merger database, which may be accessed through its website, provides information on all concentration cases that have been notified and decided by the Competition Authority since its creation in January 2003. Besides giving access to non-confidential versions of the decisions adopted since the Competition Authority's creation, the merger database also provides other data relating to the procedure, including relevant dates, a description of the undertakings involved and the economic activities in question in the operation.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

According to its statutes, the Competition Authority is responsible notably for keeping contacts with other countries' competition authorities and establishing cooperative links with such authorities, as well as with EU and international authorities, carrying out the tasks conferred upon member states' administrative authorities by EU law in the field of competition, and representing the Portuguese state in the European Union or international institutions in competition matters.

As regards the merger control area, the above responsibilities indicate that the Competition Authority is expected to maintain informal contacts with other competition authorities in multi-jurisdiction filings. However, no formal agreements with other competition authorities regarding merger control are publicly known. Nevertheless, at a multilateral level, the Competition Authority participates in various



fora and groups, notably the European Competition Network and the International Competition Network.

The notification form includes, as mandatory information, the indication of the other member states' competition authorities with which the notifications are also being filed.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Law No. 46/2011 of 24 June 2011 determined the creation of a specialised court to handle competition, regulation and supervision matters (Court of Competition, Regulation and Supervision (the Specialised Court)), which was established in the town of Santarém as of 30 March 2012. The Specialised Court is now the exclusive first instance for review of all the decisions adopted by the Competition Authority.

Therefore, decisions of the Competition Authority adopted in merger control proceedings, as well as decisions of the member of government responsible for the economy within the 'extraordinary appeal' proceedings referred to above, may be appealed to the new Specialised Court. This court's rulings are subject to review by the Appellate Court of Lisbon, the decisions of which, though limited to matters of law, may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice. Appeals of the decisions in question that exclusively involve matters of law are filed directly with the Supreme Court of Justice.

The decisions of the Competition Authority adopted in proceedings initiated regarding infringements of merger control rules (under Law No. 19/2012 of 8 May 2012, these infringements constitute quasi-criminal minor offences) may also be appealed to the Specialised Court. The decisions of this court may be appealed to the Appellate Court of Lisbon, as a court of last resort, if they:

- apply a fine higher than €249.40;
- impose ancillary sanctions;
- acquit the defendant or close the case in situations where either the Competition Authority has imposed a fine higher than €249.40 or such fine has been claimed by the public prosecutor's office; or
- reject the appeal of the Competition Authority's decision.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

As regards judicial review, it is not possible to establish a typical time frame until a final decision is adopted, as this depends on factors such as the relevant courts' workload and the complexity of the case under review. However, in general terms, one may expect that judicial proceedings, including appeals, might take months or even years before they come to an end.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2019, 59 merger control cases were concluded by the Competition Authority, with the following outcomes:

- 52 clearance decisions without conditions or obligations attached;
- five decisions where it was found that the notified transaction was not subject to prior notification; and
- two decisions closing the proceedings following the withdrawal of the corresponding notification.

By 3 June 2020, 16 merger control cases had been concluded by the Competition Authority, with the following outcomes:

- 15 clearance decisions without conditions or obligations attached; and
- one decision closing the proceedings following the withdrawal of the corresponding notification.

Competition in specific sectors, such as telecommunications, energy, oil and ports' operations, continues to be a cause for concern of the Competition Authority.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Following a long-awaited reform of the competition regime, Law No. 19/2012 of 8 May 2012 (the Act) enacted the current competition regime, superseding the previous regime enacted by Law No. 18/2003 of 11 June 2003. Pursuant to the Act, the current regime should be reviewed in accordance with the evolution of the EU competition law regime.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

There have been no key developments to highlight to date.

A reference may nonetheless be made to the impact of the covid-19 pandemic in the merger control area. In this respect, the Competition Authority announced that it has implemented a contingency plan that notably limits the contacts and meetings to those made through electronic means, also inviting the stakeholders to use the available electronic channels, notably the Electronic Notification System available for concentrations.

In addition, owing to covid-19, all administrative deadlines established for private parties (eg, any deadline for an interested party to provide observations as to a notified transaction or for a notifying party to respond to an Authority's request for additional information) were suspended. That suspension has meanwhile been revoked and any deadline established for private parties that would expire during the suspension period or up to the 20th working day following the effective date of the revocation (3 June 2020) shall expire within 20 working days from 3 June 2020; as to deadlines that would expire after the 20th working day following 3 June, they expire on the originally established date.

As regards decisions on cases, one case may be highlighted, taking into account the merger control issues involved: *Grupo HPA/Hospital S Gonçalo de Lagos* (HSGL).

The case is noteworthy in two aspects, outlined below.

### Gun jumping

The transaction, through which the Grupo HPA would strengthen a market share higher than 50 per cent in the market for healthcare services provided by private hospitals in the region of Algarve (in the south of Portugal), thereby being subject to mandatory prior merger notification to the Authority, was implemented without such notification.

In fact, the transaction had already been implemented on 21 November 2017, but only on 9 November 2018 was it voluntarily notified to the Authority, following an investigation opened by the Authority in September 2019. Under Law No. 19/2012 of 8 May 2012 (the Act), the implementation of a transaction that, albeit subject to prior notification, is not notified, may be punished with a fine that cannot exceed 10 per

cent of the corresponding turnover in the year immediately preceding that of the final decision adopted by the Competition Authority for each of the concerned undertakings. In cases where, under the Act, individuals (eg, directors) are held responsible for the infringement, the applicable fine cannot exceed 10 per cent of the corresponding remuneration in the last full year in which the infringement took place.

While the transaction was reviewed within the merger control proceedings initiated with the said notification (Case 45/2018), the Authority investigated the failure to notify within separate sanctioning proceedings, which are governed by the Act and, on a subsidiary basis, by the General Regime on Quasi-criminal Minor Offences.

In the latter proceedings, the Authority took into account the Grupo HPA's appropriate cooperation with the Authority in both the merger control proceedings and in the parallel sanctioning proceedings, as well as the fact that the transaction was ultimately notified on a voluntary basis.

Eventually Grupo HPA submitted a settlement proposal, which the Authority accepted and the fine applied was of €155,000.

This is the third time since 2014 in which the Authority has imposed a fine for gun jumping.

### Application of the failing firm defence

As stated above, through the transaction, which was notified on 8 November 2018, the Grupo HPA would strengthen a market share higher than 50 per cent in the market for healthcare services provided by private hospitals in the region of Algarve.

On 14 May 2019, the Authority initiated a Phase II in-depth investigation because it considered that the transaction raised competition concerns in respect of the healthcare services offered by private hospitals in Algarve, as well of the outpatient consultation services in the areas covered by the HSGL.

The above concerns notwithstanding, the Authority found evidence permitting the conclusion that the failing firm defence could apply. The Authority considered the financial constraints affecting the HSGL at the time of the acquisition by the Grupo HPA, without perspectives of recovery, as well as the lack of alternative offers for the acquisition of HSGL or its assets, which could raise fewer competition concerns than those raised by the transaction.

Accordingly, the Authority, while referring to the exceptional nature of the failing firm defence (which reportedly it has only used twice) nonetheless considered its application to the case at issue and thus cleared the transaction.




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# Romania

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Merger control, as well as the other main areas of competition law, is governed primarily by the Competition Law 21/1996 (the Competition Law), as republished and amended. The provisions of the Competition Law are further completed by the provisions of the Regulation on Economic Concentrations (the Merger Regulation) approved by RCC Order No. 431/2017, as well as the provisions of the Guidelines on the concepts of concentration, concerned undertaking, full-function joint ventures and calculation of turnover, approved by RCC Order No. 386/2010 (the Guidelines). Ancillary restraints are covered by the Guidelines regarding ancillary restraints approved by RCC Order No. 387/2010 (the Ancillary Restraints Guidelines). Remedies are covered by the Guidelines on remedies in the merger sector, approved by RCC Order No. 688/2010 and the relevant market by the Guidelines on the definition of the relevant market approved by RCC Order No. 388/2010. Finally, on 8 June 2017, Emergency Government Ordinance 39/2017 (EGO 39) entered into force, transposing the EU Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) into Romanian law, which mainly aims at facilitating private enforcement of claims before national courts for damages suffered from competition law infringements.

The authority in charge of enforcing the merger control rules in Romania is the Romanian Competition Council (RCC). Furthermore, the approval of the Superior Council for National Defence (SCND) is required in the case of mergers that take place in sectors that may impact national security.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

A merger is defined, for the purposes of the Competition Law, as being a transaction that results in a change of control over an undertaking or undertakings, or parts of an undertaking or undertakings on a lasting basis.

As such, there are two types of mergers:

- a merger between previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings; and
- the acquisition of control over one or more undertakings or parts of one or more undertakings by one or more natural persons already controlling at least one undertaking or by one or more undertakings.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture may amount to a merger, provided that the joint venture is a full-function joint venture (ie, an undertaking that carries out its activity on a lasting basis and that performs all functions of an autonomous economic entity).

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Control is defined by article 9(6) of the Competition Law as the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking. Control may arise on the basis of rights, contracts or any other elements that, either separately or taken together, and taking into account the legal or factual considerations involved, allow a party to exercise a decisive influence over the behaviour of an undertaking, in particular through:

- ownership or rights to use over all or part of the assets of an undertaking; or
- rights or contracts conferring a decisive influence over the structure of an undertaking, the voting process or the decision-making process of the management bodies of an undertaking.

The acquisition of a minority shareholding may amount to a notifiable concentration if – and only if – it is considered to amount to an acquisition of control, in particular through the existence of veto rights concerning certain strategic decisions of the respective undertaking.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The merger control provisions are applicable to concentrations where the undertakings concerned generated combined worldwide turnover exceeding the equivalent of €10 million in the previous financial year and each of at least two of the undertakings concerned achieved Romanian turnover exceeding the equivalent of €4 million in the previous financial year.

The RCC will not investigate any economic concentration that does not meet the said requirements. To avoid any potential risks, the parties to a merger that falls below the thresholds are advised to notify the RCC and, if the case may be, the SCND for the merger.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing is mandatory and there are no exceptions.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign transactions are subject to merger control by the RCC, whenever the turnover thresholds for notification are met. The lack of local effect, while not removing the requirement for notification, may lead to the concentration being assessed under the simplified procedure.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Concentrations in certain sectors, such as the financial sector, media sector, energy sector and telecoms sector, may be subject to a notification obligation to the sector regulator. There are no specific rules on foreign investment. Notably, any transaction potentially impacting national defence is subject to further clearance by the SCND and since the legal definition of matters with potential impact on national security is very broad, most of the transactions are notified by the RCC to the SCND, for approval purposes.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Economic concentrations that meet the turnover thresholds mentioned above must be notified to the Romanian Competition Council (RCC). The notification may be submitted following the entry into a binding agreement concerning the transaction (for example, share or asset purchase agreement, but even a letter of intent, memorandum of understanding, etc, outlining the main points of the transaction, such as the parties, the object or the price) or, in case of an acquisition of control over traded companies, following the announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest.

There is no specific deadline for filing, as the Competition Law states that it must be made before implementing the transaction and, consequently, there are no sanctions for late filing.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The notification must be filed by the party or parties acquiring control. Should the transaction involve a merger or the creation of a full-function joint venture, the parties will file the notification.

An initial filing fee of approximately €1,000 is payable prior to the submission of the notification, and proof of payment must be submitted to the RCC together with the notification. An additional fee between €10,000 and €25,000, for Phase I or between €25,001 and €50,000 for Phase II, depending on the turnover of the target, is payable within 30 days after the RCC issues a clearance decision.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

An economic concentration that meets the thresholds outlined above cannot be implemented prior to clearance (standstill obligation). The RCC may, in particularly justified cases, upon request of the parties, grant a derogation from standstill obligation.

#### Pre-notification

According to the Merger Regulation, parties are advised to initiate pre-notification contacts with the RCC at least two weeks prior to the submission of the notification. While not mandatory, such informal discussions are useful to clarify certain aspects of the concentration with a view to expediting the process.

#### Completeness of filing

Within seven days of the filing, the RCC will inform the parties whether the notification meets the formal requirements.

#### Effective date

The notification shall become effective on the date of registration at the RCC. Where the notification is incomplete in any material respect, the RCC has 20 days from filing to request the parties to complete the notification. The deadline for submitting information is up to 15 days as of receiving the request. There may be several requests for information before a notification is effective.

The RCC can declare a notification effective either in an express manner – official letter – or tacitly, by not requesting additional information within the 20-day period. In practice, the effective date is always confirmed in writing.

#### Phase I proceedings

The RCC has 45 days from the effective date to either:

- issue a letter if the concentration notified does not fall within the scope of the law;
- issue a clearance decision authorising the merger if the transaction raises no competitive concerns or if those concerns have been removed through the commitments put forth by the parties; or
- launch a Phase II investigation if the transaction raises competitive concerns and those concerns have not been removed through the commitments put forth by the parties.

In accordance with the past reports of the RCC, the average duration of a Phase I merger notification, from filing to clearance, was approximately two months.

#### Phase II proceedings

Following the launch of a Phase II investigation, the RCC has five months from the effective date to:

- issue an unconditional authorisation decision;
- issue a conditional authorisation decision, subject to commitments; or
- issue a negative decision, prohibiting the merger.

Both the 45-day period and the five-month period mentioned above are mandatory and cannot be extended. Should the RCC fail to issue a decision within the said deadlines, the transaction will be deemed tacitly approved and closing is allowed.

#### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

As a general rule, breaching the standstill obligation may result in a fine ranging from 0.5 to 10 per cent of the total turnover obtained in the previous financial year or, if the sanctioned company did not generate turnover in the previous year, of the last turnover registered by the company. If the offending company is a non-resident entity, the turnover on the basis of which the fines are assessed is replaced with the sum of the following:

- turnover achieved by each of the companies registered in Romania and controlled by the infringing party;
- turnover derived in Romania by each of the non-resident companies controlled by the infringing party; and
- any turnover obtained in Romania by the infringing party and accounted for in its financial statements.

Newly established companies that have yet to register turnover may be sanctioned with fines between approximately €3,100 and €515,000. In addition to the fines, the RCC may order, following the examination of the transaction, any interim measures aimed at restoring and maintaining the conditions of effective competition in the relevant market.

In practice, the RCC does sanction companies for failure to comply with the standstill obligation. In 2019, the RCC imposed no fines related to unlawful completion of concentrations prior to the receipt of the required Romanian merger clearance.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for implementing the merger before receiving clearance from the RCC are also applicable in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

While the Competition Law does not expressly provide for carve-out solutions, there are two potential solutions to the problem outlined above, as follows.

The RCC may, in particularly justified cases, upon request of the parties, permit certain limited actions relating to the implementation of the notified concentration before the expiry of the applicable waiting period. Whenever such occasional requests arise, the RCC will assess them on the merits and, provided that the requests are justified, prior implementation will be granted; as such, in 2015, in relation to a merger in the banking sector, the RCC allowed the acquirer to implement the concentration prior to obtaining clearance and to offer the retail customers of the target, which had entered into mortgage agreements based on loans in Swiss francs, certain customised solutions.

Otherwise, the Competition Law prohibits the implementation of the merger, rather than the corporate closing of the merger. Prohibited implementation measures of the buyer include, inter alia, the following:

- exercising voting rights in respect of the strategic business decisions of the target;
- changing the scope of the business or the commercial name of the target undertaking;
- causing the market entry or exit of the target;
- restructuring, dissolution or spin-off of the target;
- selling assets of the target;
- laying off of employees of the target;
- initiating the conclusion or termination of long-term or other important agreements between the target undertaking and third parties; and
- listing of the target undertaking on a stock exchange market.

In conclusion, it is conceivable that the acquirer could close the transaction prior to receiving approval from the RCC, provided that it refrains from undertaking any implementation measures until clearance is received. As this measure is not tested in practice, prior notification of the RCC would be advisable.

#### Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The merger filing in connection to a public bid must be submitted following the announcement of the public bid. Furthermore, the public takeover bid may take place and the securities may be acquired provided that the acquirer does not exercise its voting rights before the clearance decision or before it receives a special derogation from the RCC.

#### Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The standard notification form and simplified notification form are provided as an Annex to the Merger Regulation and are similar to the forms applied by the European Commission (EC).

Inter alia, the following needs to be provided:

- information on the parties to the concentration (eg, names, registered seats, excerpts from the commercial register, nature of the business, ownership and control; description of the undertakings' business; annual financial reports for the preceding business year);
- power of attorney;
- description of the intended concentration;
- certified copies or originals of all documents on the basis of which the concentration takes place;
- definition of the relevant markets;
- market shares held by the undertakings concerned in the relevant markets;
- information on main competitors and their market shares in the relevant markets;
- information regarding the top five suppliers and customers of the undertakings concerned;
- description of the distribution and retail networks in the relevant markets, relevance of research and development;
- economic rationale of the concentration;
- description of the benefits expected to result from the concentration for consumers; and
- (if available) copies of analyses, reports or studies related to the relevant markets.

Supplying inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information in the filing process, intentionally or not, may result in a fine ranging from 0.1 to 1 per cent of the total turnover obtained in the previous financial year.

The Competition Law also envisages the possibility of submitting a simplified notification in certain cases that usually do not give rise to competition law concerns, as follows:

- when parties acquire joint control over an undertaking that does not carry out any business in Romania or has only an insignificant business in Romania (ie, has a turnover below the €4 million threshold);
- transactions where there is no horizontal overlap or where parties are active on non-related markets;
- transactions where the horizontal overlap is limited (aggregate market share of less than 20 per cent) and neither party operating on an upstream or downstream market to another party has a market share exceeding 30 per cent; or
- when one of the parties holding joint control over an undertaking acquires sole control over the respective undertaking.

The RCC may, at any time, move from a simplified notification to a full-form notification.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

As a matter of principle, the vast majority of the concentrations are cleared in Phase I.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

### Pre-notification

According to the Merger Regulation, parties are advised to initiate pre-notification contacts with the RCC at least two weeks prior to the submission of the notification. While not mandatory, such informal discussions are useful to clarify certain aspects of the concentration with a view to expediting the process.

### Completeness of filing

Within seven days of the filing, the RCC will inform the parties whether the notification meets the formal requirements.

### Effective date

The notification shall become effective on the date of registration at the RCC. Where the notification is incomplete in any material respect, the RCC has 20 days from filing to request the parties to complete the notification. The deadline for submitting information is up to 15 days as of receiving the request. There may be several requests for information before a notification is effective.

The RCC can declare a notification effective either in an express manner – official letter – or tacitly, by not requesting additional information within the 20-day period. In practice, the effective date is always confirmed in writing.

### Phase I proceedings

The RCC has 45 days from the effective date to either:

- issue a letter if the concentration notified does not fall within the scope of the law;
- issue a clearance decision authorising the merger if the transaction raises no competitive concerns or if those concerns have been removed through the commitments put forth by the parties; or
- launch a Phase II investigation if the transaction raises competitive concerns and those concerns have not been removed through the commitments put forth by the parties.

In accordance with the past reports of the RCC, the average duration of a Phase I merger notification, from filing to clearance, was approximately two months.

### Phase II proceedings

Following the launch of a Phase II investigation, the RCC has five months from the effective date to:

- issue an unconditional authorisation decision;
- issue a conditional authorisation decision, subject to commitments; or
- issue a negative decision, prohibiting the merger.

Both the 45-day period and the five-month period mentioned above are mandatory and cannot be extended. Should the RCC fail to issue a decision within the said deadlines, the transaction will be deemed tacitly approved and closing is allowed.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test applied by the Romanian Competition Council (RCC) in merger control proceedings is the same test applied by the EC (ie, whether a concentration leads to a significant impediment to effective competition on the Romanian market or a substantial part thereof, in particular through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position).

The failing firm defence may be invoked in front of the RCC, but we are not aware of any cases where it has been successfully invoked.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special test for joint ventures. Having said that, if the RCC finds that the effect or object of a full-function joint venture is not the creation of an autonomous economic entity performing on a lasting basis, but the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent, such coordination will be assessed in the context of anticompetitive agreements.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The RCC will evaluate all mergers to determine whether or not they are compatible with a normal competitive environment. Within this evaluation, the RCC will take into account the following:

- the need to protect, maintain and develop effective competition on the relevant market;
- the market position of the parties and their competitors, both actual and potential, as well as their economic and financial power;
- alternatives available to suppliers and users and their access to supply sources or markets;
- any barriers, legal or otherwise, to entry into the market;
- the development of offer and demand for the relevant goods and services;
- the interests of the intermediary customers and consumers; and
- technical and economic progress, insofar as it benefits the consumer and is not an impediment to competition.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

While the main factor taken into account in the assessment of a merger is the effect on competition of the said merger, non-competition issues may also be taken into account, for example, when the implementing measures prior to clearance are mainly for the benefit of consumers.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

While economic efficiencies are not expressly provided for in the Merger Regulation, it is arguable that one of the theories of harm (technical and economic progress, insofar as it benefits the consumer and is not an impediment to competition) refers to efficiencies. In practice, the RCC uses the approach taken in the EC guidelines when confronted with a case where the aggregate market shares come close to 40 per cent, and it looks at reduction of costs and prices, increase in innovation or improvement of supply when assessing efficiencies.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Other than the Romanian Competition Council (RCC), only the Superior Council for National Defence can prohibit a merger based on national security concerns.



## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

If, during their analysis, the RCC representatives identify any competition concerns raised by the transaction, they may bring up the question of commitments. The parties are free to offer both behavioural and structural remedies, with structural remedies being preferred. According to the applicable regulations, the commitments proposed have to be sufficient to remove the competition concerns and contain sufficient information and data to allow an evaluation of their effectiveness (market test) to be carried out by the RCC. The parties are free to initiate preliminary contacts with the RCC before formally transmitting their proposed commitments to better understand the competition concerns raised by the transaction as well as to discuss the envisaged commitments.

Possible remedies encompass one or more of the following:

- divestments;
- termination or amendment of existing exclusive agreements;
- granting access to necessary infrastructure, networks or key technologies by way of licence agreements or otherwise; and
- behavioural remedies, such as price-reporting obligations and mechanisms designed to prevent customer discrimination.

The RCC, for example, imposed structural remedies in a case concerning the acquisition of a retail chain by a competitor, obliging the acquirer to divest two stores operated in a certain geographical area. In a separate transaction concerning the same market, the RCC imposed behavioural remedies and required the acquirer to refrain from increasing prices charged in a particular store above the prices charged in other stores, which were located in a more competitive geographical market.

### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Remedy proposals may be submitted in both phases of a merger control proceeding.

In Phase I, remedies should be submitted before the notification becomes effective or, at the latest, within two weeks of the effective date.

In Phase II, remedies should be submitted within 30 days after the opening of the Phase II proceedings. In exceptional circumstances, the parties may request an extension up to 15 days to find an acceptable solution.

Should the remedies be accepted, the RCC will issue a conditional clearance decision expressly stating the commitments and the time frame for implementation.

Failure to properly implement the commitments may result in the revocation of the decision by which to restore the situation prior to the implementation of the merger or the levying of a fine between 0.5 and 10 per cent of the total turnover.

### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The RCC has required remedies in foreign-to-foreign transactions.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

As a matter of principle, in accordance with the Merger Regulation, a clearance decision covers the related ancillary restraints. Having said that, the parties will carry out an individual assessment as to what

amounts to an ancillary restraint, taking into account the Ancillary Restraint Guidelines.

In practice, the RCC will usually inform the parties as to the existence of any restrictions that, prima facie, do not qualify as ancillary restraints.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

As a matter of practice, the Romanian Competition Council (RCC) will publish a short press release on its website stating that they are currently analysing or investigating a merger and anyone interested is free to submit observations. In particular, in cases that raise competition concerns, the RCC may actively request the opinion of the competitors, clients, suppliers or other relevant authorities, such as the sector regulators, regarding the merger.

Furthermore, should the parties propose commitments and those are accepted by the RCC, these are published on the RCC website and all interested parties can submit observations within a set time frame.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The RCC and its representatives are under an obligation not to disclose business secrets, namely, information that is defined as a business secret by law or by the undertakings concerned. Business secrets, *inter alia*, encompass any business information that has actual or potential economic and market value, and the disclosure of which could seriously harm the interests of undertakings concerned.

To ensure the effective protection of commercial information, it is advisable to mark such information as confidential in all documents sent to the RCC. The RCC will publish a non-confidential version of the clearance decision on its website. Also, other documents published by the RCC (ie, press releases, proposals for commitments) do not contain any business secrets or other confidential information.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The RCC is a member of the International Competition Network and the European Competition Network and can therefore request documents and information from other national authorities regarding merger cases. In addition, the RCC may provide confidential information to other competition authorities in merger cases that are notifiable in more member states based on the Waiver Form, annex to the Merger Regulation.

The RCC, as a national competition authority of an EU member state, has all the rights and obligations pursuant to the Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EU Merger Regulation). The RCC has an active contribution and cooperation role within the European Competition Network, in the form of informal and formal exchange of information between national competition authorities depending on the merger cases at issue.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

All Romanian Competition Council (RCC) decisions, including those in merger cases, can be challenged in front of the Bucharest Court of Appeals within 30 days of being served. The judgment of the Bucharest Court of Appeal can be further challenged by means of a final appeal before the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

To the best of our knowledge, there have been no recent cases challenging a merger decision of the RCC.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The actual duration of the judicial proceedings can vary significantly depending on the complexity of the case and the procedural steps employed (ie, naming an expert, requesting the intervention of the EC as an amicus curiae and requesting that a preliminary ruling procedure in front of the European Court of Justice is initiated). Usually, the appeal proceedings in front of the Bucharest Court of Appeals last between three and nine months from the first hearing, while the proceedings before the High Court of Cassation and Justice last between three and six months from the first hearing. However, because of the high number of cases pending in front of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the first hearing may take place only 12 to 18 months after filing the appeal.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The number of merger cases in Romania has seen a steady increase, from around 45 cases per year between 2011 and 2015 to 62 cases in 2016, 60 cases in 2017 and 57 cases in 2018, as a direct result of the encouraging economic growth experienced by Romania. Similar to other years, the vast majority of the cases were cleared unconditionally in Phase I, with a few cases being cleared subject to commitments. There has been a significant drop in standard procedure clearances of approximately 30 per cent compared to 2012; conversely, simplified procedure clearances have seen an increase of roughly 35 per cent compared to 2012. In 2019, the Romanian Competition Council (RCC) cleared 75 mergers, only one of which was cleared subject to conditions and obligations.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The amended version of the Merger Regulation, adopted in September 2017, has not been changed or updated.

Romania has implemented Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the member states and of the European Union. On 8 June 2017, Emergency Government Ordinance 39/2017 (EGO 39) entered into force and brought a number of important changes to the Romanian Competition law. The EGO 39 introduces a number of other changes including, inter alia: a specific obligation incumbent upon modern retailers to provide (upon request) information to the Competition Council regarding their resale prices; and additional powers for the RCC when carrying out dawn raids. Broadly, the EGO 39 assumed all the provisions enacted by the Damages Directive.

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## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

As regards merger control, we are not aware of any landmark cases, judgments or legislative developments in the past year.

# Russia

Alexander Viktorov

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Russian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC) entered into force in October 2006 and has been amended several times since its enactment. The LPC governs, inter alia, merger control in commodity and financial markets and applies to transactions in which the targets are Russian entities or foreign entities operating in Russia (including those that do not have a physical presence there).

The Russian merger control provisions are enforced by the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) and a large network of its local agencies established in 84 Russian regions. The FAS is subdivided into several divisions, each of which deals with a specific economic sector. More detailed information on the structure and powers of the FAS can be found on its website.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The LPC sets out a comprehensive list of events constituting economic concentrations and falling within the control of the FAS. The most important events triggering merger control are:

- the acquisition of (direct or indirect) rights to determine the business activities of a Russian company by one or several enterprises (through shareholdings, agreements, voting arrangements, rights, etc);
- the acquisition of certain blocks of shares in another company, resulting in the acquirer and its group holding in total over 25, 50 or 75 per cent of voting shares in a Russian joint-stock company or over 33.3, 50 or 66.6 per cent of the shares in a Russian limited liability company;
- the incorporation of a company by contribution of assets or shares in a Russian company;
- the consolidation of two or more companies resulting in the formation of a new company and the end of the corporate existence of the consolidated companies; or the merger of one company into another resulting in the former no longer having separate corporate existence;
- the acquisition of more than 20 per cent of fixed production (subject to certain exceptions) or intangible assets located or registered in the territory of Russia from another company;
- the acquisition of certain blocks of shares, resulting in the acquirer and its group holding in total over 50 per cent of voting shares in a foreign company if its Russian turnover in the preceding year exceeded 1 billion roubles;
- the acquisition of (direct or indirect) rights to determine the business activities of a foreign company (through shareholdings,

agreements, voting arrangements, rights, etc) if its Russian turnover in the preceding year exceeded 1 billion roubles; and

- entry into agreements between competitors providing for their joint activities in the territory of Russia.

Internal restructurings in which an intra-group transfer is made to a transferee in which the transferor directly or indirectly holds more than 50 per cent of voting shares or that directly or indirectly holds more than 50 per cent of voting shares in the transferor are exempt from the filing requirements. However, certain intra-group mergers are still subject to the prior approval requirement, but may alternatively be subject to post-completion notification. In particular, a post-completion filing is permitted if one of the group entities files a list of its group members with the FAS no later than one month before completion. The list should specify the reasons for inclusion in the group for each of the group members. Within 14 days of receipt of this list, the FAS informs the applicant either that it accepts the submitted list or that the list does not comply with the statutory requirements. The FAS will make the list publicly available on its official website.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Joint ventures are subject to the general rules set out above. There are no specific rules on full-function and non-full-function joint ventures. The amendments to the LPC known as the Fourth Antimonopoly Package, which came into effect in 2016, introduced new rules with respect to agreements on joint activities between competitors in the territory of Russia. Entry into such agreements is now subject to mandatory merger control filing if the parties' groups' assets or turnover exceed certain thresholds, namely if the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all parties (and their groups) exceeds 7 billion roubles or their aggregate turnover on a worldwide basis exceeds 10 billion roubles for the calendar year preceding the entry into joint venture agreement. A joint venture agreement may be either a 'concentrative' (or corporate) joint venture or 'cooperative' joint venture.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The LPC contains a definition of 'control' for the purposes of certain clauses of the LPC, including for disclosure of the group of the acquirer and the target in a merger control filing. 'Control' means the ability of an individual or a legal entity to determine, directly or indirectly, the decisions to be taken by another legal entity (including the ability to determine the terms of conduct of business by another legal entity), through holding more than 50 per cent of the voting shares in such legal entity; or acting as an executive body of such legal entity.

Under Russian merger control provisions, acquisition of interests less than control are caught. Even an acquisition resulting in a holding of

more than 25 per cent in a joint-stock company or an acquisition of more than 20 per cent of the fixed production (subject to certain exceptions) or intangible assets of another legal entity constitutes economic concentration under the LPC.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Pre-approval of an acquisition is required if:

- the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all companies within the acquirer's group and the target's group exceeds 7 billion roubles and the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all companies within the target's group exceeds 400 million roubles; or
- the aggregate turnover on a worldwide basis of all companies within the acquirer's group and the target's group exceeds 10 billion roubles and the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all companies within the target's group exceeds 400 million roubles; and
- for joint venture agreements between competitors: the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all parties (and their groups) exceeds 7 billion roubles or their aggregate turnover on a worldwide basis exceeds 10 billion roubles for the calendar year preceding the entry into joint venture agreement.

Different thresholds apply to transactions with financial entities as targets.

If the thresholds for a notification are not met, the transaction is not subject to merger control.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory. There are no exceptions.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Under the LPC, foreign mergers are subject to Russian merger control if they have or may have an impact on competition in Russia. The acquisition of shares, resulting in the acquirer and its group holding directly or indirectly in total over 50 per cent of voting shares in, or of rights to determine the business activities (through shareholdings, agreements, voting arrangements, rights, etc) of a foreign company is caught by Russian merger control rules if the target's Russian turnover in the preceding year exceeded 1 billion roubles.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

For transactions in which financial organisations and natural monopolies are targets, special rules apply.

The LPC defines 'financial organisations' as banks, legal entities carrying out transactions or providing services in the securities market, insurance services or other services of a financial nature under an appropriate licence, non-government pension funds and their managing companies, managing companies of share investment trusts, leasing companies, credit consumer unions and other organisations, and individual entrepreneurs carrying out operations and transactions in the financial services market.

Companies providing, inter alia, the following services are deemed 'natural monopoly entities': gas and oil pipeline distribution, electricity transmission, rail transport, services provided at transport terminals (including sea ports and airports) and public electronic and postal

communications and telecommunications providers. Law No. 147-FZ of 17 August 1995 on Natural Monopolies, in addition to the LPC, governs Russian merger control with respect to transactions involving natural monopolies. Recent amendments to the relevant legislation abolished the requirement to submit post-closing notifications of share transactions involving natural monopolies under Law No. 147-FZ.

Federal Law No. 57-FZ on the Procedure for Making Foreign Investments in Business Entities with Strategic Value for the Defence of the Country and Security of the State (the Strategic Investments Law) became effective in 2008 and has been amended several times since its enactment. Under this law, the state controls transactions relating to the acquisition by foreign investors of Russian companies engaged in businesses that have strategic political interest for Russia and are active in the sectors listed in this law, namely, weaponry and military, nuclear, aviation, space exploration, explosives, etc. Depending on the subject matter of the transaction (eg, the acquisition of direct or indirect control over a 'strategic' company, the acquisition of a minority stake in it, or veto rights in relation to it), it may require prior approval and/or submission of a post-completion notification or disclosure of information on controlling parties, beneficiaries and beneficial owners of foreign investors.

Furthermore, in accordance with Federal Law No. 160-FZ of 9 July 1999 on Foreign Investments in Russia (the Foreign Investments Law) if a company owned or controlled by a foreign state or international organisation intends to acquire, directly or indirectly, a stake in a Russian company (including any company – not necessarily a 'strategic' one) that exceeds 25 per cent, or an ability to block, on any grounds, corporate decisions, such foreign company must make a filing under the procedure set out in the Strategic Investments Law. The amendments to the Foreign Investments Law, which came into effect in 2017, introduced a new rule according to which the Chairman of the Government Commission for Control over Foreign Investments in Russia can decide that any transaction to be entered into by a foreign investor in relation to any Russian entity (ie, including 'non-strategic' entities) requires, in order 'to ensure defence of the country and the security of the state', prior approval of the Government Commission and, accordingly, submission of a separate filing. Such decisions are made 'with the view of securing national defence and security of the state' and are based on the opinions of the government authorities, including the authorities supervising the sectors in which the entity concerned operates. As a practical matter, according to the FAS's officials, such decisions have been passed several times since that rule was introduced.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There are no legal deadlines for a pre-completion filing. Merger control clearance must be obtained before completion and the filing must be made well in advance of the envisaged completion date. The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS)'s clearance decision is valid for one year from its issue.

Failure to submit a required pre-completion filing can be penalised by fines on legal entities and on managers. These penalties are regularly applied.

In addition, the FAS may apply to a court to invalidate, in full or in part, agreements and other transactions for which its prior authorisation was required but has not been obtained, or to liquidate a company if it was incorporated without prior approval, provided that the relevant transaction or incorporation results in limitation of competition. These penalties are applied rarely.

## 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Pre-completion notifications should be filed with the FAS by the acquirer of the shares, rights or assets. In the case of incorporation, a filing should be submitted by all parties that take decisions on incorporation. In the case of a joint venture agreement, a filing should be submitted by the parties to the agreement. The administrative liability for failure to submit a filing is borne by the party responsible for the filing. Pre-completion filings are subject to a fee of 35,000 roubles per filing.

## 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The FAS is obliged to consider pre-completion filings within 30 days of the filing date. However, if the FAS determines that further disclosure, documents or information is needed or that the transaction may result in limitation of competition, the FAS may extend the term of review by up to another two months. In the latter case, the FAS will publish information on the transaction on its website and invite interested parties to file submissions on the impact of the transaction on the Russian market. Moreover, the FAS may return the filing as incomplete and in this case the review period will start anew as soon as the full set of documents is submitted.

In the event of a possible impact on competition, the FAS may also delay clearance until the parties perform certain actions. The FAS will then set a term for performance of such actions, which may not exceed nine months.

If a transaction is also subject to prior approval in accordance with the Strategic Investments Law or the Foreign Investments Law the anti-monopoly clearance will not be issued until the 'strategic' or 'foreign investments' clearance is granted. The 'strategic' process, by statute, may take up to six months but, in practice, may take longer. There is no statutory deadline for the 'foreign investments' process (ie, where the Russian target is not a 'strategic' entity), but in practice it takes usually one to two months to obtain clearance (which is in fact a FAS letter to the effect that 'strategic' clearance is not required).

In pre-completion filings, implementation of the transaction should be suspended until clearance, regardless of whether the statutory waiting period has expired.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Completion of transactions and integrating the activities of the merging businesses (if such integration results in the acquirer actually beginning to control the target, eg, by way of giving binding instructions to it) before clearance may result in fines and invalidation of the transaction, as in the case of a failure to file.

In a recent merger control review, the FAS concluded that the transaction notified also required prior consent under the Strategic Investment Law and extended the review period until receipt by the notifying party of such consent. The notifying party apparently disagreed with the FAS and closed the transaction without applying for consent and, accordingly, before merger control clearance was issued. The FAS viewed such closing as 'conscious disrespect' for Russian law, imposed a fine and brought court proceedings seeking to deprive the acquirer of the voting rights at the meeting of shareholders of the Russian target, which is the regular procedure in case of non-compliance with the Strategic Investment Law. The FAS decision was upheld by courts at three instances.

## 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

We are not aware of any sanctions applied for closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, it can reasonably be assumed that the FAS would apply sanctions in such cases. There are cases involving deals between foreign and Russian legal entities, where the FAS applied sanctions for closing before clearance and the courts upheld the FAS decisions. By way of example, in one case the company made a pre-completion filing two months after the transaction had been completed. The FAS discovered this violation during the review of the filing and applied administrative sanctions.

Sanctions for failure to submit a pre-completion filing may even be applied on formal grounds in circumstances where the parties make a filing, obtain FAS clearance and then change the structure of the transaction with the actual result remaining unchanged. For example, in one case a foreign legal entity applied for FAS consent to the acquisition of the shares in, or direct control over, Russian legal entities and obtained clearance. Subsequently, control over these Russian entities was obtained indirectly by way of acquisition of direct control over a 100 per cent parent company (a foreign entity) of the Russian legal entities. In this case the FAS applied sanctions for closing without clearance and the courts upheld the FAS's decision.

There have been several cases in which foreign-to-foreign transactions were invalidated by courts or other sanctions were applied on the grounds of non-compliance with the requirement to obtain consent pursuant to the Strategic Investments Law.

## 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Hold-separate arrangements are not provided for by the Russian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC) and have rarely been used where Russian issues held up a larger foreign-to-foreign transaction. In principle, such arrangements are only possible with regard to the acquisition of the rights to determine the business activities of a company, but even for those transactions they are not a 100 per cent 'clean' solution.

### Public takeovers

## 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There are no special merger control rules and notably no exemptions from the prohibition on completing the transaction before clearance.

### Documentation

## 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The LPC lists the documents and information that must be collected for the filing. These include agreements or other documents relating to the transaction, corporate documents of the acquiring party and the target, information on the business activities of the parties and the target with exact production and sales figures for the past two years, information on the companies of the acquirer's and the target's groups and also on the ultimate beneficiaries of the groups. Failure to provide all documents and information required under the LPC may result in the FAS rejecting the application as incomplete.

The information and documents included in the filing must be accurate and complete. Provision of false information may be sanctioned by fines on both legal entities and managers and, more generally, serve as grounds for refusing clearance. In practice, incomplete information



is qualified by the FAS as false information, and the provision of incomplete information, therefore, entails the risk of the same sanctions as those for submission of false information.

Documents issued abroad must carry an apostille (if the country where a document is issued is a party to the 1961 Hague Convention on Apostille) or be legalised. They need to be translated into Russian and the translator's signature must be certified by a Russian notary.

The nature of the filing is rather technical. The waiting period begins after the filing has been submitted to the FAS.

There are specific procedures for filing of certain intra-group transfers. In particular, a post-completion filing is permitted if one of the group entities files a list of its group members with the FAS no later than one month before completion. The list should specify the reasons for inclusion in the group for each of the group members. Within 14 days of receipt of this list, the FAS informs the applicant either that it accepts the submitted list or that the list does not comply with the statutory requirements. The list as filed is published on the FAS website.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

After submission of the filing, the FAS must decide within 30 days whether to clear the merger or, if the transaction raises competition concerns, whether to enter into a second-stage investigation or impose conditions for clearing the transaction. The second-stage decision must be rendered within a further two months. If clearance is delayed until the parties perform certain actions, the deadline for such actions must not be longer than nine months.

Cases that raise no competition concerns and filings that are complete and meet all requirements (such as, for example, formalisation of documents) are typically cleared within 30 days of the filing date. At the same time, the timing of the review process is not always predictable, as the FAS has broad discretion in determining whether the deal gives rise to concerns and, accordingly, whether to extend the review period. If the FAS requires additional information or clarifications, it typically issues a formal written request, which may result in an extension of the review period, and from that perspective it is advisable to try to avoid them, by making the filing as complete as possible and trying to pre-empt the FAS's queries.

There are no legal means to speed up clearance.

Pre-notification consultations with the authority are not required but are possible. The notifying party may inform the FAS of the proposed transaction prior to submission of the filing, provide the authority with the relevant documents and information and suggest remedies for discussion. Such pre-notification contacts do not influence the timing or procedure of the review of the formal filing and the authority is not bound by the results of such pre-notification discussions. That said, when taking the decision in relation to the deal after it is formally filed, the authority is obliged to take into account the materials disclosed in the course of such pre-notification consultations. As a practical matter, such pre-notification contacts are recommendable in cases that may give rise to competition concerns.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Upon filing, the set of documents and information as filed is forwarded to the department of the FAS dealing with the relevant market sector.

The FAS will review the relevant market shares of the parties to the transaction (including the target market share) and investigate whether the transaction will influence competition in the Russian market. The FAS officials may use, apart from the filed documents, any sources

of information, such as statistics from the databases of the Russian Statistics Committee and the Russian Customs Service, their own databases, and information from the internet and press, etc. They may also request additional information directly from the parties, competitors or other companies and individuals concerned.

If the transaction does not limit competition in the Russian market, the FAS is supposed to issue clearance within 30 days of receipt of the filing.

If competition concerns are identified, within 30 days the FAS either issues a prohibition order or informs the applicant in writing that the review period will be extended for up to two months (second-stage investigation) or that clearance can only be provided after the parties have fulfilled certain conditions. After the second stage, the FAS will issue either a prohibition or a clearance decision (conditional or unconditional).

The FAS usually meets the deadlines. That said, the timing of the review process is not always predictable as the FAS has broad discretion in determining whether the deal requires further analysis and, accordingly, whether to extend the review period. As a practical matter, in the absence of substantive issues, an extension is unusual.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

A merger must be prohibited or made conditional by the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) if it leads to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the relevant Russian market sector or otherwise leads to a limitation of competition in the Russian market.

Dominance is defined in the Russian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC) as the position of one or several companies or groups in the market for a specific product or service that allows it or them to seriously influence the terms of trade of such product or service or to impede other companies' access to this market sector. If a company holds less than 35 per cent of the market, it may not be found dominant, except in case of collective dominance or if an industry-specific dominance threshold applies. Such industry-specific thresholds may be set by the federal laws regulating particular industries; for example, in wholesale and retail electricity markets an electricity generation company holding a market share of 20 per cent or above is deemed dominant. As a general rule, companies are deemed dominant if their market share is over 50 per cent. For companies with 35 to 50 per cent market share, additional criteria, such as competitive structure of the market and barriers to entry, are used to determine whether a company is dominant. Financial organisations are subject to a special dominance test.

The LPC does not provide for any special circumstances that would require, permit or encourage the FAS to qualify a 'problematic' merger as acceptable. That said, the parties are allowed to submit efficiency arguments to try to convince the FAS that the merger is permissible despite a dominance issue or any other potentially anticompetitive effects of the transaction.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The general merger control rules apply to joint ventures. Also, the Fourth Antimonopoly Package introduced a special merger control regime for joint venture agreements between competitors. The amendments provide for a mandatory pre-transaction clearance for agreements between competitors providing for their joint activities in the territory of Russia if the worldwide aggregate book value of all parties (and their groups) exceeds 7 billion roubles or their worldwide aggregate turnover



exceeds 10 billion roubles for the calendar year preceding entry into the joint venture agreement. If the thresholds are not met, the application can still be submitted on a voluntary basis.

### Theories of harm

**21** | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The FAS investigates whether the transaction may lead to limitation of competition in the Russian market, signs of which may be:

- a reduction in the number of companies in the relevant market sector that do not belong to the same group;
- an increase or decrease in the price for a product or a service that is not because of market forces;
- the abandonment of independent action in the market by companies not belonging to the same group;
- the determination of the conditions of trade in a product or service in the market by companies not belonging to the same group through agreements or concerted practice; or
- other circumstances that allow a company or several companies to unilaterally influence trade in a commodity or service in the market.

Creating or strengthening dominance is also considered harmful to the market.

### Non-competition issues

**22** | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Generally, the legal test for clearance is competition-related. However, the FAS may also refuse clearance if it finds out that information provided in the filing that has significance for the FAS decision is false or insufficient (eg, the ultimate owners or beneficiaries of the acquirer's or target's groups were not disclosed).

Clearance may also be delayed if the filed documents do not comply with the mandatory rules of Russian law.

Also, political considerations may have an impact on the review process. Some transactions relating to certain 'sensitive' sectors (military, aircraft industry, energy, insurance, etc) have given rise to political rather than competition-related decisions in the past, with clearance denied or made conditional on behavioural commitments, or the approval process taking much longer than usual.

Furthermore, public interest seems to be taking on increased importance in the review process. By way of example, in a recent *Bayer/Monsanto* case, the FAS came to the conclusion that the transaction might have a negative impact on the Russian agricultural technologies market and required that Bayer should transfer certain of its technologies to Russian companies and give them access to certain of its digital solutions so that the Russian companies could compete with foreign companies on equal terms.

There are no formal tests for assessing whether or not a deal gives rise to political or public interest concerns, so in practice assessment is made by the FAS in cooperation with other government authorities, including those supervising the relevant markets.

### Economic efficiencies

**23** | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The task of the FAS is to find a compromise between protection of competition and economic development in Russia. The FAS takes the economic efficiency of the transaction into account and may give clearance even if the transaction results in limitation of competition, provided

that the parties perform certain actions aimed at mitigating or eliminating the negative effects and achieving positive effects, including, for example, actions aimed at improvement of the local production or distribution processes.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

**24** | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) is authorised to either prohibit a transaction that has an adverse effect on competition or to require the parties to fulfil certain conditions before a clearance is issued or before completion of the transaction. In such cases, the FAS issues binding orders aimed at protecting competition (eg, divestiture or conclusion, amendment or termination of agreements). If a transaction that leads to a limitation of competition in the Russian market is closed without FAS approval, the FAS can challenge the transaction in court. The FAS has recently become more active in combating anticompetitive behaviour.

### Remedies and conditions

**25** | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The FAS may delay clearance of the transaction until the parties perform certain actions aimed at protection of competition (eg, grant access to important assets or information, provide third parties with industrial property rights, divest assets or claims to third parties or restructure their respective groups – that is, divest company shares).

Also, the FAS may make clearance of the transaction conditional on the parties' compliance with certain requirements, such as amending or entering into contracts; carrying out specific economic, technical or information measures to prevent the creation of discriminatory conditions in the market; granting access to assets or information; and divesting assets or, on the contrary, not transferring any important assets, as well as notifying the FAS of the intention to carry out particular actions.

If a transaction is likely to lead to distortion of competition in Russia, it is advisable to discuss with high-level FAS officials how to remedy such effects. The parties may propose certain undertakings to mitigate the effect of the transaction on competition.

**26** | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The basic condition for a divestment or another remedy is mitigation of the negative effects of the transaction by encouraging competition in the market.

The FAS usually sets a term within which the relevant remedy should be implemented, or the term during which the remedy should be maintained. Where the FAS delays clearance until performance of the remedies by the parties, this term may not exceed nine months.

**27** | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The remedies required in foreign-to-foreign mergers could be the same as in Russian local mergers. In the past, the FAS has usually applied remedies in Russian-to-Russian or Russian-to-foreign transactions rather than in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Related arrangements are covered to the extent that full information on these arrangements has been provided to the FAS and that such arrangements are not subject to approval themselves. If the transaction involves several arrangements that each require clearance, the FAS consent in relation to such arrangements should be sought either in one filing or in separate filings, depending on the subject matter of each particular arrangement.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

During the review process, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) may invite customers and competitors to give their opinion on the contemplated transaction. Applications for clearance should contain information on all customers that buy over 5 per cent of the production or sales volume of the relevant party and all sellers supplying over 5 per cent of its purchases or consumption volume.

If the FAS suspects a competition issue, it may extend the review for up to two months (second-stage investigation) with a simultaneous publication on its website, so that any interested parties can provide information on the effects on competition of the transaction. Moreover, as a matter of law the FAS must publish information on all filings submitted to it on its website (except where the government of Russia determines that the FAS has the right not to publish information on any particular transaction) so that any interested third parties can provide comments on the possible impact of the transaction on competition. Analysis of information posted on the FAS's website shows that information on filings submitted is published randomly, although the number of those publications has increased over the past year.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Commercial information, including business secrets, cannot be withheld in a filing. The FAS has the right to demand it from the parties and extend the review period if it is not provided promptly.

The FAS is under an obligation not to disclose commercial secrets (provided that they are designated as such) contained in filings. FAS officials are criminally liable for unauthorised disclosure, and the damage done by such disclosure is to be compensated from the Russian federal budget. However, the information required for filings sometimes does not meet the criteria of commercial secrets as provided for by Russian law and thus remains unprotected.

Under the Russian Law on Protection of Competition, general information on the transaction notified to the FAS is public and the FAS must publish information on all filings submitted to it on its website (except where the government of Russia determines that the FAS has the right not to publish information on any particular transaction). Also, until recently, the FAS information policy required it to publish on its website all decisions (including binding orders, if any) issued upon review of the filings. However, it follows from the recent changes to the FAS information policy that such decisions and binding orders are no longer public, so, currently, their publication is not mandatory. As a practical matter, the FAS publishes some decisions but this is done randomly. The

changes to the information policy did not affect the rules on disclosure of group-related information, under which the FAS may publish a list of the companies of the group for the purposes of a post-completion notification.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The FAS cooperates with the antitrust authorities of the former socialist countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), Commonwealth of Independent States countries, some EU member states (Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy and Sweden), Asian states (China and Korea), the United States and South American states (Argentina and Bolivia).

Cooperation between Russia and the European Union with regard to competition was established by the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. In 2003, the FAS proposed to the Russian government to enter into a positive comity agreement with the European Union.

Finally, Russia, represented by the FAS, cooperates with antitrust authorities of other countries in the International Competition Network, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, of which Russia is a member.

The FAS has recently become more active in contacting antitrust authorities of other countries in the context of merger control and has issued recommendations 'On applying waivers of confidentiality when considering merger transactions'. The recommendations describe the mechanism for the use of waivers by the FAS when reviewing cross-border transactions and set out the principles of using this tool.

We are aware of several cases where the FAS contacted antitrust authorities in other countries (India, China, Germany, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, South Africa and the United States) during the review of large foreign-to-foreign mergers to discuss the influence of the relevant transactions on competition in the respective jurisdictions.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) may be challenged within three months of their issue before Russian courts in a civil law procedure. The parties concerned may challenge FAS decisions denying clearance or granting conditional clearance, or the lack of decision within the legal waiting period.

The majority of FAS rejection decisions are issued on the grounds of incompleteness of information provided in the filing (such as information on the ultimate beneficiaries). Some of those rejection decisions have been challenged in courts. Court practice is inconsistent – some court decisions uphold the FAS's formal position and some overrule them on the grounds that the FAS's requests contain excessive requirements that, from the courts' perspective, are irrelevant for the purposes of merger control.

Where rejection decisions are issued on the ground that the transactions notified would have anticompetitive effects, the decisions may not necessarily be final and may be reconsidered by the FAS if the applicant submits a new filing in which it substantiates why the deal is permissible. Recent cases show that the parties, having received a rejection decision from the FAS, could be better off if they first resubmitted the filing to the FAS instead of challenging the FAS's decision in court. By way of example, the FAS initially blocked the proposed acquisition by Elutek Beteiligungs GmbH of control of 11 Alutech Russian subsidiaries

located in various cities and regions of Russia on the grounds that the acquisition would result in Elutek becoming dominant in certain regions of Russia. However, subsequently, Elutek submitted a new filing in relation to the same transaction, in which it provided evidence that the deal is permissible under the Russian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC), and upon review of that filing the FAS ultimately cleared the transaction subject to behavioural remedies.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The Russian judicial process takes up to six months in the court of first instance, and up to two months at each of the two further review levels – the court of appeal and the court of cassation. A further appeal may be filed with the Collegium of the Supreme Court of Russia in charge of considering commercial disputes, which only accepts the cases for consideration in exceptional circumstances (ie, if there are severe violations of substantive or procedural law). The Collegium's resolution could finally be referred to the Presidium of the Supreme Court within three months of the date of the resolution. The judicial process at the Collegium and Presidium of the Supreme Court could take up to three months. So, it could take more than a year to overturn a decision of the FAS.

If the claimant or another participant in the court action is a foreign company, judicial review may become a very lengthy process. If the foreign participant is incorporated (located) in a country that is a party to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (1965), the Russian court may need to serve judicial documents on such company through a special authority in the country of such company's incorporation (location), which will lead to delay at each level of review for up to a year. However, if the parties to a dispute agree on direct delivery of judicial documents by post this may significantly reduce the time.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2019, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) reviewed 1,196 merger control filings, out of which 99 were cleared subject to binding orders (approximately 8 per cent of all filings reviewed) and, in 40 cases, clearance was denied (approximately 3 per cent of all filings reviewed). According to FAS officials, the changes to merger control rules that have been gradually introduced since the Russian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC) came into effect in 2006 have resulted in a significant reduction of filings.

The FAS aims to further transform merger control in Russia from a formal procedure into actual control by enabling it to have a better focus on mergers of particular interest to it by reducing the total number of filings.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The LPC is an evolving statute. Following the Fourth Antimonopoly Package, which came into effect in 2016, several further amendments relating to merger control rules were made. However, these did not cover all open issues in Russian anti-monopoly legislation. In recent years, several complex global transactions reviewed by the FAS, including the *Bayer/Monsanto* transaction, revealed a number of problem areas in the merger control rules that require changes to



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the legislation, especially in high-technology sectors. The FAS took the relevant experience into account in the course of preparation of a new set of amendments to the LPC, called the Fifth Digital Antimonopoly Package. Some of the proposed changes relate to the merger control procedure. More specifically, the proposed amendments provide that the authority will have the right to extend the review period for a term significantly longer than currently provided by the LPC (those extensions, however, will be subject to approval by the Russian government and may be applied in relation to multi-jurisdictional cross-border transactions only). Furthermore, as part of the new merger control rules, the FAS will have to prepare a report setting out the details of the assessment and send it to the parties before issuance of the final decision, so the parties can submit additional evidence that the notified transaction is permissible. The parties will also have the right to offer remedies to the authority in the course of the review of the filing. Also, it is expected that a new notification threshold will be introduced, which will be based on the value of the proposed transaction, namely, if the value of the proposed transaction exceeds 7 billion roubles, the transaction will require clearance even if the relevant asset or turnover thresholds are not met. Furthermore, the proposed changes envisage the introduction of an institute of independent trustees that will control and monitor the implementation of remedies imposed.

The amendments are yet to be approved by the Russian government and the State Duma.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

No updates at this time.

# Saudi Arabia

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The New Saudi Arabian Competition Law (the Competition Law) was adopted by Royal Decree (M/75) dated 29/06/1440 Hijri (corresponding to 6 March 2019) and came into force on 24/01/1441 Hijri (corresponding to 23 September 2019), replacing the previous competition law. The overall objective of the Competition Law is to protect and encourage fair competition and to combat and prevent monopolistic practices that affect lawful competition or consumer interest to lead to an improved market environment and economic development.

The General Authority for Competition (GAC) is the regulatory body in charge of implementing and enforcing the Competition Law. The GAC has primary jurisdiction over any matters arising from the application of the Competition Law and the Implementing Regulations even in cases of conflict or overlap with the jurisdiction of other government bodies.

New implementing regulations (the Implementing Regulations) were issued by the GAC board of directors (the Board) and came into force on 25/01/1441 Hijri (corresponding to 24 September 2019).

The GAC has also issued specific guidance regarding its interpretation of the rules relating to economic concentration transactions and the circumstances under which transactions (including foreign-to-foreign transactions) are notifiable in Saudi Arabia (the EC Guidelines). The EC Guidelines, among other matters, set out who the GAC considers as parties to an economic concentration transaction, and the method for calculating turnover.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Notification of an economic concentration transaction is required where the combined global turnover of the entities party to the economic concentration transaction exceeds 100 million Saudi riyals. There is no minimum local turnover threshold.

An economic concentration transaction is defined by the Competition Law as:

*any act that results in the total or partial transfer of ownership of assets, rights, equity, shares, or obligations of an entity to another, or the joining of two or more administrations in a joint administration or any other form that leads to the control of a firm(s) including influencing its decision, the organization of its administrative structure, or its voting system.*

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The definition of economic concentration under the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulations, which covers any transaction combining the management of two or more entities into one joint management, is widely drafted and may therefore apply to a broad range of joint ventures. The EC Guidelines provide that the Competition Law requires notification of full-function joint ventures, both in the case of newly formed joint ventures or where a new entity acquires control of an existing joint venture. However, the EC Guidelines do not define what constitutes a 'full function' joint venture nor do they detail what constitutes a newly formed joint venture.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Law and its Implementing Regulations do not provide a definition of what constitutes control, and no guidance has been issued by the GAC in this regard.

Minority interests may be caught under the regime, as a concentration may arise where there is a partial transfer of ownership rights and no minimum level is specified for such partial transfers. Other interests, notably usufruct, are also caught.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The KSA regime requires notification of an economic concentration transaction where the combined global turnover of the entities party to the transaction exceeds 100 million riyals. The GAC considers the entities party to the transaction to include the purchaser, seller and target.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory and must occur at least 90 days prior to the completion of a prospective transaction.

The Competition Law does not apply to public establishments and fully owned state enterprises, provided that those entities are solely authorised by the Saudi government (by virtue of Royal Decree or Council of Ministers' Resolution) to provide the goods, services, or commodities subject of the transaction.

It is possible for the GAC to grant exemptions, on a case-by-case basis, to transactions that result in economic concentration if the exemptions would lead to better market performance, provide benefits to consumers that outweigh any detrimental effects to competition, and do not grant exempted entities conditions that would enable them to

force competitors out of the relevant market. Decisions relating to such exemptions will be based on a recommendation of a technical committee formed by the GAC to study those exemptions.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The Competition Law expressly captures foreign-to-foreign economic concentration transactions (as defined above) that have an effect on the Saudi market or on fair competition in Saudi Arabia and that meet the combined worldwide turnover test for the parties engaged in the transaction.

The Competition Law and Implementing Regulations do not include a market nexus test. The GAC has, in the past, considered that, if any of the entities party to the transaction have turnover in Saudi Arabia, the transaction is notifiable.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Yes. Foreign investment is not permitted in a number of sectors, which are specified in a list maintained by the Ministry of Investment of Saudi Arabia (MISA). The relevant sectors include:

- oil exploration, drilling and production;
- catering to military personnel;
- security and detective services;
- tourist orientation and guidance services related to Hajj and Umrah;
- real estate investment in Makkah and Al Madinah;
- recruitment offices;
- commission agents;
- services provided by midwives, nurses, physical therapy services and certain quasi-doctoral services;
- fisheries; and
- poison centres, blood banks and quarantine.

In addition, in 2016, MISA, previously known as the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, announced that they would permit 100 per cent foreign ownership in certain sectors (eg, retail and wholesale trade) subject to a number of obligations and requirements, including a minimum share capital requirement of 20 million riyals. In addition, entities with 100 per cent foreign ownership are obliged to invest at least 200 million riyals over five years after their licence is granted. Previously, a minimum of 25 per cent Saudi participation was required.

For other sectors, non-Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) must apply for and obtain a foreign investment licence from MISA.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Transactions resulting in an economic concentration must be notified to the General Authority for Competition (GAC) at least 90 days prior to their effective date.

Failure to file can result in a fine of up to 10 per cent of the total annual sales value of the products or services subject of the violation. If it is impossible to estimate the annual sales, that fine may not exceed 10 million riyals.

The GAC may also, at its discretion, impose a fine not exceeding three times the gain made by a violating entity as a result of the transaction if aggravating circumstances are present.

Separately, the GAC has the power to require violating entities to:

- remove a violation;
- dispose of certain assets, shares or property rights, or perform any other act to ensure the removal of the violation;
- pay a daily fine not exceeding 10,000 riyals until such violation is removed (that fine may be doubled if the violation is not removed within the time period specified by the GAC); or
- temporarily close down an entity for a 30-day period if a violation is not removed within 90 days of the GAC's notification of violation.

The GAC can increase penalties from the above-mentioned limits should an entity be a recidivist (ie, a repeat offender).

The Competition Law also establishes a right of action before the competent courts for natural or legal persons who suffer harm as a result of a violation of the Competition Law.

To date, there are no public records of the GAC imposing a fine for failure to file.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The obligation to file falls on all parties to an economic concentration transaction (ie, the seller, purchaser and target).

The GAC board has set the filing fee at 0.0002 of the combined turnover of all parties participating in the transaction with a cap of 400,000 riyals in total.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The GAC has 90 calendar days to provide a decision following the formal filing. If no decision is reached after 90 days, the parties may proceed with their transaction.

The regime is suspensory and does not provide any exceptions to the suspension obligation.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing a transaction prior to receiving clearance from the GAC can result in the same fines as those that apply to failure to file.

The GAC may also require the parties to terminate or unwind the transaction.

To date, there are no public records of the GAC imposing a fine on parties for closing a notifiable transaction prior to receiving clearance.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Closing a foreign-to-foreign transaction prior to receiving clearance from the GAC can result in the same fines as those that apply to domestic transactions.

To date, there are no public records of the GAC imposing a fine on parties for closing a notifiable foreign-to-foreign transaction prior to receiving clearance.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

In theory, hold-separate arrangements may be a solution, but those arrangements have not yet been tested with the GAC.



## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The Competition Law applies to public takeovers but does not provide special rules for them.

The Merger and Acquisition Regulations (the M&A Regulations) issued by the Saudi Capital Markets Authority require that, where a public offer for shares would, if completed, be subject to the Law, the offeree company and the offeror must, inter alia, notify the GAC pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Law.

The M&A Regulations further provide that an offer that is subject to the Law must contain a condition that the offer will lapse if the GAC notifies the offeror or the offeree company in writing that it objects to the deal or has placed it under study and review as specified in the Law.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The filing must be made using the forms published by the GAC with initial notification made through an online portal. Separate forms must be completed with respect to each entity involved in the economic concentration transaction.

The notification must include, for example, information on the relevant markets, the value of the notifying party's (or parties') sales in those markets, positive effects of the concentration on the market, and competitive dynamics in the market. Supporting documentation, namely the signed transaction agreement and the constitutional documents and financial statements of the entities party to the transaction must also be provided.

The Competition Law and Implementing Regulations do not contemplate derogations from the amount of information to be provided.

Provision of false information or failure to provide required documentation within 15 days of the GAC's request could result in invalidating an approval, rejection of a filing or the imposition of a fine not exceeding 2 million riyals.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Upon notification, the GAC will verify whether all the necessary information has been provided. If the notification is complete, the GAC will notify the relevant party (or parties) to pay the filing fees. Once the payment of filing fees is made, the GAC will provide a confirmation of the commencement of the review period. If the GAC requires additional information, or certain information is missing from the filing, the relevant party or parties shall be informed of the missing information that must be provided.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The GAC can take up to 90 calendar days to provide a decision following formal filing. The GAC can either: approve, conditionally approve or reject the filing. The 90-calendar-day period begins from the date on which the GAC accepts the completed file and can be paused if it requires additional information as part of its review and there is delay in provision of that information.

In practice, the GAC has provided approvals within shorter time frames where they saw no competition concerns, although this cannot be guaranteed.

There currently is no fast-track review procedure.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

When reviewing economic concentration transactions the General Authority for Competition (GAC) is required to maintain and encourage fair competition in Saudi markets, and will take into account the following factors:

- the structure of the relevant markets and level of actual or potential competition between firms in Saudi Arabia or abroad;
- the financial positions of the parties;
- availability and existence of alternative commodities or services that are available to consumers, vendors and clients;
- product differentiation;
- consumer interest and welfare;
- the potential impact of the transaction on prices, quality, diversification, innovation or development in the relevant market;
- actual or potential harm or benefits to competition as a result of the transaction;
- growth in supply and demand and trends in the relevant market or commodities;
- barriers to entry or exit in the relevant market, including the continuation or expansion of such barriers and regulatory barriers;
- whether the transaction will create or strengthen a significant market concentration or dominant entity (or group of entities) in a relevant market;
- the level and historical trends of anticompetitive practices in a relevant market, either by parties to the transaction or entities influential in such markets; and
- the views of the public, the parties and sector-specific regulators.

The Implementing Regulations further require that conditional approvals and rejections be reasoned.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The factors set out in the Competition Law and Implementing Regulations for the consideration of economic concentrations suggest that the GAC's review will entail an economic analysis based on the effects of the merger on competition and will look beyond the market shares of the merging entities.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

In the context of exemptions, the GAC can consider other non-market factors relating to a transaction; however, those factors are not set out in detail and will be balanced against effects on competition.



## Economic efficiencies

- 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies are a factor for consideration in the GAC's review of a filing, although these are balanced against potential effects on fair competition.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

- 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The General Authority for Competition (GAC) may exercise a number of powers to interfere or prohibit transactions, including:

- imposing conditions on the parties as part of its approval;
- prohibiting the transaction; and
- requiring parties to dispose of assets.

### Remedies and conditions

- 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. The GAC may adopt a clearance decision subject to conditions.

- 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The Competition Law and Implementing regulations do not specify the conditions or the timing relating to remedies.

- 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The GAC has required firms to comply with conditions in foreign-to-foreign transactions (most notably in the Authorities clearance decision of Uber's acquisition of Careem in late 2019).

### Ancillary restrictions

- 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

There is no specific guidance as to whether a clearance decision would cover ancillary restrictions.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

- 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Yes, the Implementing Regulations permit the General Authority for Competition (GAC) to consider the views of the public, market participants and sector-specific regulators in its review of a transaction.

Separately, the Implementing Regulations allow any natural person or any concerned party to raise an objection or report an anticompetitive practice to the GAC. The complaint can be anonymous.

The Competition Law also establishes a right of action before the competent courts for natural or legal persons who suffer harm as a result of a violation of the Competition Law.

## Publicity and confidentiality

- 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Commercial information will normally be protected from disclosure through the confidentiality obligations to which the GAC is subject under the Competition Law. Specifically, the Law requires the GAC's members and employees to maintain the confidentiality of information and documents that are obtained from firms through investigations and prohibits them from providing such information to any other party without the approval of the GAC.

Separately, the filing forms for economic concentration contain statements relating to the GAC's obligation to maintain the confidentiality of information provided.

The Law also provides, on the other hand, that a firm may not conceal information from the GAC on the pretext of confidentiality or for any other reason.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

- 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Competition Law permits the GAC to liaise with competent foreign authorities with respect to practices occurring outside Saudi Arabia that have an effect on competition within Saudi Arabia.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

- 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the General Authority for Competition (GAC) with respect to violations of the Competition Law are heard before the GAC Committee on the Adjudication of Violations (the GAC Committee), who also issue the GAC's decisions in relation to violations.

A decision of the GAC Committee can be appealed before the competent court within 30 days of notification of the decision, after which the decision becomes final.

Decisions relating to fines or the temporary suspension of business are, in principle, effective and enforceable upon issuance (rather than on the determination of any appeal), unless a decision is issued by the competent court to stay their enforcement.

### Time frame

- 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

A decision of the GAC Committee can be appealed before the competent court within 30 days of notification of the decision, after which the decision becomes final.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

- 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Based on publicly available information, there has not been any enforcement action by the GAC in the context of foreign-to-foreign mergers.

In July 2014, the GAC issued its first prohibition decision, in relation to Saudi Vitrified Clay Pipe Co's proposed acquisition of Ceramic Pipes Co (Al Khazif for Pipes Co). Details of the prohibition decision have not been published. The transaction related to Saudi entities.

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The Gulf Cooperation Council is currently considering draft legislation that would create a 'unified competition law' applicable to all Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The clearance decision in the Uber acquisition of Careem contained the first publicised list of conditions relating to a foreign-to-foreign notifiable transaction.



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# Serbia

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Since 1 November 2009, the Serbian merger control regime has been governed by the Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC). It replaced the Competition Act 2005 (CPL). The LPC introduced some changes. In essence, however, it maintained the competition law framework established under the CPL. Since its entry into force, the LPC was further amended and its current version has been applicable since 8 November 2013. In addition to the LPC, the Serbian government has passed two regulations regarding merger control aspects: the Regulation on the Form and Manner of Filing a Notification of a Concentration (newly adopted version applicable since 2 February 2016) and the Regulation on the Criteria for Determining the Relevant Market.

The relevant authority for merger control (and competition law in general) is the Commission for the Protection of Competition (the Commission), which is competent for reviewing notifications and issuing decisions on notified concentrations. The Commission was established on 12 April 2006 and reports on its activities to the Serbian parliament. The Commission consists of the Council and the Technical Service. The Council consists of the president of the Commission as a separate body and four members who are each appointed for a term of five years (renewable for an additional five-year term) by the Serbian parliament.

More information on the Commission may be found on its website.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The LPC defines the following as concentrations:

- mergers and amalgamations of undertakings within the meaning of company law;
- the direct or indirect acquisition of control over all or part of an undertaking by one or more undertakings; and
- the creation of a full-function joint venture.

The temporary acquisition of shares or a participating interest by banking, insurance or other financial institutions for the purpose of resale does not qualify as a concentration, provided that the resale occurs within 12 months from the date of the acquisition and that, during that period, the ownership status has not been used to influence the undertaking's market behaviour. Also, the acquisition of control by a bankruptcy administrator in the course of bankruptcy proceedings is not deemed to be a concentration. In addition, the acquisition of shares or a participating interest in an undertaking by a company for the management of investment funds or an investment fund does not qualify as a concentration, provided that the ownership status has not been used to influence the undertaking's market behaviour

and provided that this status is only used to maintain the value of the investment.

The Commission will prohibit concentrations if they significantly restrict, distort or limit competition on the Serbian market, in particular where such restriction, distortion or limitation of competition results from the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The LPC distinguishes between full-function joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures. The creation by at least two independent undertakings of a joint venture that will perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an independent business entity is deemed to be a concentration. On the other hand, the creation of a joint venture aiming at coordinating the market activities of two or more undertakings that maintain their legal autonomy does not constitute a concentration within the meaning of the LPC. The latter may be subject to provisions on restrictive agreements.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The LPC (article 5(2)) defines control as the ability to exert decisive influence on an undertaking's business activities, in particular on the basis of:

- shareholders' rights (corporate governance on the basis of company law);
- the ownership of or other proprietary rights to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking;
- contractual rights, covenants or securities; or
- claims, means of securing claims, or de facto due to existing business practice determined by the controlling undertaking.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Commission must be notified of a concentration when in the business year preceding the concentration:

- the combined worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeded €100 million and the turnover of at least one undertaking concerned exceeded €10 million in Serbia; or
- the combined turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeded €20 million in Serbia and the turnover of each of at least two undertakings concerned exceeded €1 million in Serbia.

In addition, the LPC provides for a filing obligation in the case of certain public takeover bids even where the above thresholds are not met. This provision generally relates to joint-stock companies, the shares of

which are traded on a Serbian stock exchange. Under certain conditions, public takeover bids may be implemented prior to clearance.

Further, the LPC introduced the possibility of opening an ex officio investigation into concentrations where, even when the turnover thresholds set out above are not met, the undertakings concerned have a market share in Serbia of at least 40 per cent. However, there is no Commission practice yet in this regard.

The aggregate turnover of an undertaking concerned shall not include the sale of products or the provision of services between the undertakings affected by the concentration (thus, intra-group or mutual transactions are not taken into account).

In the case of undertakings providing financial services, insurance companies and companies engaged in the reinsurance business, the turnover is to be calculated as follows:

- for credit institutions and other financial institutions, as the sum of the following income items, after deducting VAT and other taxes directly related to those items:
  - interest income and similar income;
  - income from securities (ie, income from shares and other variable yield securities; income from participating interests; or income from shares in affiliated undertakings);
  - commissions receivable;
  - net profit on financial operations; and
  - other operating income; and
- for insurance companies and undertakings engaged in the reinsurance business, as the sum of gross premiums (all amounts received and receivable) with respect to insurance and reinsurance contracts issued by or on behalf of the insurance undertaking, after deducting the taxes charged by reference to the amounts of the individual premiums or total volume of such premiums.

Two or more business transactions between the same undertakings concerned within the last two years are deemed to constitute one single concentration that occurred on the date of the occurrence of the last transaction.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If the jurisdictional thresholds are met, the filing of a notification to the Commission is mandatory.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are subject to Serbian merger control if the turnover of the parties to the concentration exceeds the jurisdictional thresholds set out above. To date, the Commission's practice has not developed a de minimis or effects-based exemption. In the past few years, most of the cleared concentrations have been foreign-to-foreign mergers. The nexus test is equally not yet developed.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The most important rules in this context are as follows.

### Banking

In addition to scrutiny by the Commission, the acquisition of a qualified shareholding (ie, 5, 20, 33 and more than 50 per cent) in a Serbian bank and the acquisition of control over a company active in the financial sector or the establishment of such company by a Serbian bank are subject to prior approval by the National Bank of Serbia.

The Commission and the National Bank of Serbia signed a Protocol on Cooperation in Antitrust Matters in the Financial Sector on 11 February 2008. In the Protocol, the two institutions undertook to exchange information and operate jointly and in a harmonised manner in the event of a violation of competition in the financial sector. In 2015, changes to the Banking Law were adopted; making it clear that the Commission (and not the National Bank of Serbia) is competent to review anticompetitive aspects of concentrations in the financial sector.

### Insurance

All corporate transformations of insurance companies (including mergers) must also be approved by the National Bank of Serbia.

There are similar rules for investment funds, voluntary pension funds, the telecommunications industry and the media sector.

### Public takeover bids

The LPC provides for a filing obligation in the case of a public takeover bid even where the jurisdictional thresholds are not met. The provision generally relates to the (direct or indirect) acquisition of control over open joint-stock companies, the shares of which are traded on the Serbian stock exchange (exceptionally also closed joint-stock companies can be caught).

On 11 November 2009, the Commission issued a statement on the filing deadline for notifications in the case of public takeover bids. The statement had been requested by the Serbian Securities Commission because of the unclear wording of the LPC. The LPC provides that the notification must be filed within 15 days of the announcement of the public takeover bid or its closing (whichever occurs first). The confusion occurred because of the fact that an undertaking launching a takeover bid does not know the exact percentage of the shareholding it will have acquired until the bid is closed (and, respectively whether such shareholding will confer control to the bidder once the bid is closed). The Commission clarified that in such situation the notification will be deemed timely even if submitted within 15 days of the date of the closing of the bid. Another point raised with the Commission with respect to public takeover bids was the question of whether a notification is always required when a public takeover bid is – by law – required in Serbia. On 16 December 2009, the Commission stated that if there is no change of control, there is no filing obligation (irrespective of the fact that a public takeover bid is required in Serbia).

It remains to be seen how the above rules will affect foreign-to-foreign transactions. The Serbian Securities Commission stated that a public takeover bid in Serbia would be required, under certain conditions, if a change of control occurs in a foreign undertaking (that controls a Serbian joint-stock company) (ie, there is an indirect change of control over a Serbian undertaking). Thus, in such cases, an argument can be made that a notification to the Commission would also be required in Serbia (regardless of whether jurisdictional thresholds are met). The Commission has not opined on this issue to date. However, the Serbian takeover legislation has been amended in the meantime to support the aforementioned interpretation of the Serbian Securities Commission.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

The Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) provides that a merger notification has to be submitted to the Commission within a period no later than 15 days after the signing of the relevant agreement, the announcement of a public offering, the announcement of the start or end date of a public takeover bid, or the acquisition of control (whichever of these triggering events occurs first).

The filing may already be submitted at the time at which the parties have a serious intention to conclude the relevant agreement; that is, they sign a letter of intent, or announce their intention to make a public offer for the purchase of shares in an undertaking.

Late filing may lead to the imposition of a fine by the Commission on the notifying party in the range of €500 to €5,000 per day (but capped at a maximum of no more than 10 per cent of the total annual turnover of that undertaking). The deadline for payment of such procedural penalty is set out in the Commission's decision imposing such penalty and cannot be less than one month or more than three months following the delivery of the decision.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Article 63(3) of the LPC provides that the notification has to be submitted by the person or undertaking acquiring control of all or part of one or more undertakings. In all other cases, the undertakings concerned must jointly submit the notification of a concentration.

The filing fees are determined by a specific tariff (which has been revised as of 14 July 2011), and amount to the following:

- for an expedited procedure (Phase I), the fee is calculated at 0.03 per cent of the combined turnover of all undertakings concerned for the preceding year, but is capped at €25,000; and
- for the regular procedure (Phase II), the fee is calculated at 0.07 per cent of the combined turnover of all undertakings concerned for the preceding year, but is capped at €50,000.

The filing fee for Phase I has to be paid within three days of submission of the merger notification. The filing fee for Phase II (ie, up to additional €25,000) must be paid after the Commission has decided to open Phase II.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The LPC provides that the intended concentration must not be implemented until the Commission issues a decision authorising the transaction or until the expiry of the waiting period.

The duration of the waiting period depends on whether Phase I or Phase II proceedings are applied.

The Commission decides in Phase I proceedings if the concentration will not prevent, restrict or distort competition on the market, especially by creating or strengthening a dominant market position. The Commission then must issue its decision within one month of the submission of the notification. After expiry of this period, it is presumed by law that the concentration has received approval.

In cases that may raise competition concerns, the Commission may initiate Phase II proceedings within one month of submission of the complete notification. The Commission must then issue a decision within four months of initiating such proceedings. Again, after expiry of this period, it is presumed by law that the concentration has received approval.

The suspension obligation does not prevent the implementation of a takeover bid of which the competent authority has been notified in accordance with the regulations on public takeovers or on privatisation. This applies only under the condition that the filing was submitted on time, and that the acquirer does not exercise its voting rights, or does so only to maintain the full value of the investment and based on an explicit written approval of the Commission.

We are not aware that the Commission's approach to the suspension obligation has changed as a consequence of the economic crisis.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

In the case of closing before clearance, the Commission may require the undertakings concerned to:

- dissolve the concentration, sell shares, terminate a contract or take other measures necessary to re-establish the same status that existed before the implementation of the concentration (the measure of de-concentration); and
- impose a fine of up to 10 per cent of the total annual turnover of the responsible undertaking generated in the territory of Serbia in the preceding financial year (the protective measure). The deadline for payment of the fine is set out in the Commission's decision imposing this fine and cannot be less than three months or more than one year following the delivery of the decision. Fines may not be imposed after the expiry of five years following the prohibited implementation of the concentration. Because this five-year period restarts with each Commission's action directed at discovering the breach, the Commission ultimately loses the right to prosecute the infringement after the expiry of an overall period of 10 years. Once the Commission's decision imposing the fine becomes enforceable or final, it may only be enforced within five years.

We are not aware that the above measure of de-concentration has so far been applied in practice. However, there are indications that the Commission's willingness to investigate and sanction infringements of the standstill obligation may be increasing. In April 2013, the Commission opened an investigation against a Serbian company for failure to file (the investigation was based on an anonymous hint and information the Commission extracted from the publicly accessible corporate registry). In the course of that proceeding, the company having infringed the filing obligation submitted the outstanding notification and the Commission cleared the transaction in July 2013. The acquirer was not fined for late filing or for failure to file. However, the Commission, before clearing the case, opened Phase II proceedings and thus the acquirer was required to pay the higher Phase II fees amounting to €50,000 (instead of only €25,000 for Phase I). The Commission applied the same (punitive) approach in at least three other cases in the course of 2014 (all involving unreported acquisitions by a major Serbian telecommunications operator).

Further, in 2014, the Commission opened investigative proceedings against a Russian company for failure to file its acquisition of a 50 per cent share in a Serbian company running one of the oldest Serbian daily newspapers. In the course of the proceedings, the Commission adopted a procedural measure forbidding any disposal of the disputed shareholding until all the relevant facts were established. The Russian company was also required to notify the transaction and, in 2015, the Commission imposed on the Russian company a procedural fine of €143,500 for failure to provide certain information during the merger control proceedings. That was the first time a fine had been imposed by the Commission on a foreign undertaking.

In early 2016, after several public invitations to undertakings to comply with their local notification obligations, the Commission opened investigative proceedings against a local bank for its failure to notify the acquisition of certain real estate property (business premises) in Serbia. These proceedings were stopped in early 2017 owing to the Commission's finding that no concentration in fact occurred.

In late 2016, the Commission opened investigative proceedings against a local software developer for not reporting its acquisition of sole control in a local computer retailer (the software developer had previously reported its acquisition of joint control in the latter). The

company was eventually fined in 2017 with a fine amounting to 0.25 per cent of its turnover generated in Serbia in the preceding year (ie, approximately €56,000).

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for closing before clearance are also applicable in case of foreign-to-foreign mergers. However, we are not aware of any cases where the Commission has applied these sanctions to such mergers since the introduction of the LPC in November 2009. Under the provisions of the Competition Act 2005, only one case has been reported where misdemeanour proceedings were initiated against a Croatian company in connection with a foreign-to-foreign merger.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

There have been indications in practice that in certain instances the Commission may find local 'hold-separate' arrangements acceptable to permit the implementation of foreign-to-foreign mergers outside Serbia before clearance in Serbia. However, such arrangements have not been tested formally with the Commission and the Commission has not issued a written opinion in this regard.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The LPC provides for a filing obligation in the case of a public takeover bid even where the jurisdictional thresholds are not met. The provision generally relates to the (direct or indirect) acquisition of control over open joint-stock companies, the shares of which are traded on the Serbian stock exchange (exceptionally also closed joint-stock companies can be caught).

On 11 November 2009, the Commission issued a statement on the filing deadline for notifications in the case of public takeover bids. The statement had been requested by the Serbian Securities Commission because of the unclear wording of the LPC. The LPC provides that the notification must be filed within 15 days of the announcement of the public takeover bid or its closing (whichever occurs first). The confusion occurred because of the fact that an undertaking launching a takeover bid does not know the exact percentage of the shareholding it will have acquired until the bid is closed (and, respectively whether such shareholding will confer control to the bidder once the bid is closed). The Commission clarified that in such situation the notification will be deemed timely even if submitted within 15 days of the date of the closing of the bid. Another point raised with the Commission with respect to public takeover bids was the question of whether a notification is always required when a public takeover bid is – by law – required in Serbia. On 16 December 2009, the Commission stated that if there is no change of control, there is no filing obligation (irrespective of the fact that a public takeover bid is required in Serbia).

It remains to be seen how the above rules will affect foreign-to-foreign transactions. The Serbian Securities Commission stated that a public takeover bid in Serbia would be required, under certain conditions, if a change of control occurs in a foreign undertaking (that controls a Serbian joint-stock company) (ie, there is an indirect change of control over a Serbian undertaking). Thus, in such cases, an argument can be made that a notification to the Commission would also be required in Serbia (regardless of whether jurisdictional thresholds are met). The Commission has not opined on this issue to date. However, the Serbian takeover legislation has been amended in the meantime to support the aforementioned interpretation of the Serbian Securities Commission.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

On 2 February 2016, a new Regulation on the Form and Manner of Filing a Notification of a Concentration (the Filing Regulation) entered into force. The new Filing Regulation determines the information to be submitted in a merger filing and, for the first time, distinguished between a short and long-form filing.

A short-form notification is sufficient where the undertakings concerned have no overlapping activities in Serbia or where the competitive impact of the transaction would be small (ie, where the combined market share of the undertakings concerned in a horizontal merger is below 20 per cent, and where the individual or combined market shares of the undertakings concerned in a product market which is upstream or downstream of a product market in which any other undertaking concerned is engaged (vertical relationships) is below 30 per cent; or where the combined market share of the undertakings concerned in a horizontal merger is below 40 per cent, and the change (delta or  $\Delta$ ) of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is below 150). Concentrations concerning changes from joint to sole control will also benefit from a short-form notification. However, even in all these cases, the Commission can ask for a long-form notification under certain conditions (one of such conditions being that a relevant market is a highly concentrated one (ie, where HHI is equal or above 2,000) and the HHI  $\Delta$  is equal or above 150). Where the notifying party wishes the authority to review and assess restrictions that are directly related and necessary to the transaction (otherwise known as ancillary restraints), it will need to submit a long-form notification.

Short-form filings must in principle provide certain basic information about the business activities of the undertakings concerned, their representatives, revenues and local Serbian activities, as well as their suppliers and customers. Furthermore, the transaction structure must be explained (including the expected deadline for its closing) as well as the markets concerned and the competitive situation therein. To the extent possible, the market and business information provided should also be supported by documentation; apart from that, the authority expects to receive at least the following formal supporting documents: power of attorney, certificates of incorporation and annual reports of the undertakings concerned, and a copy of the transaction documents. Except for the power of attorney (which must be provided as original and addition must also be legalised), simple copies are sufficient (instead of originals).

If a long-form notification is required, the level of detail to be provided with respect to the relevant market increases significantly. In particular, market data must be provided for the last three completed business years (instead of only for the last year prior to the transaction).

The Commission has the right to require additional information and documents. If the notifying party is not able to submit some of the documents or information required, it should provide a brief explanation as to why a particular document or piece of information is not available.

Providing wrong information or ignoring the Commission's requests for information may lead to fines in the range of €500 to €5,000 per day (but capped at a maximum of no more than 10 per cent of the total annual turnover of the undertaking).

The notification and all documents attached need to be submitted in the Serbian language.



## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The concentration must not be implemented until the Commission issues its decision authorising the transaction or until the expiry of the waiting period. In Phase I proceedings, the Commission decides within one month of the submission of a complete merger notification. In Phase II proceedings, the Commission has to issue a decision within four months of initiating such proceedings. If the Commission does not decide within these waiting periods, the concentration is deemed to be approved. In our experience, the Commission typically decides within the given deadlines.

The LPC does not provide the possibility for the parties to obtain a waiver or to apply for expedited proceedings.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The Commission may apply Phase I proceedings if an accurate assessment of the case may be undertaken already based on the submitted evidence or if the assessment can be based on facts already known to the Commission, and it may be reasonably assumed that the concentration is likely not to impede effective competition, mainly by not creating or strengthening a dominant position in the market.

In more complex cases that do not satisfy these criteria, the Commission may initiate Phase II proceedings. Apart from the four-month deadline for decision-making, the procedural setup of such in-depth investigations is largely unregulated and thus subject to the Commission's discretion.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Commission determines in its assessment whether the notified concentration will lead to a significant prevention, restriction or distortion of effective competition; in particular, whether it will result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the relevant market.

The Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) provides the following general criteria for the assessment as to whether a concentration prevents, restricts or distorts competition:

- the structure of the relevant market;
- actual and potential competitors;
- the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power;
- the alternatives available to suppliers and users in the relevant market;
- legal and other barriers to entry on the relevant market;
- the domestic and international competitiveness of the undertakings concerned;
- supply and demand trends for the relevant goods or services (or both);
- the development of technical and economic progress; and
- the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers.

In the proceedings, the Commission will assess the effect that the intended concentration is likely to have (even if the 'failing firm' defence is pleaded with respect to the target). In practice, the Commission often relies on criteria developed by the European Commission.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures, but the Commission would assess whether the establishment of the joint venture is likely to trigger 'spillover' effects on the competitive behaviour of the parent companies.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The theory of harm applied by the Commission is in general very much in line with the approach under EU competition law. In addition to a test of dominance (over 40 per cent market share), the Commission will consider anticompetitive effects that could potentially arise out of a concentration (eg, loss of current and potential competition, unilateral effects resulting from horizontal mergers, joint dominance, conglomerate effects and vertical effects).

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The LPC exempts companies performing activities in the public interest as well as official monetary institutions if the application of the LPC could prevent them from performing activities in the public interest (ie, from performing entrusted affairs).

According to its 2009 Report, the Commission rejected a merger notification regarding the acquisition of 51 per cent of the shares in the public Serbian petroleum company NIS owing to a lack of jurisdiction. The Commission took the view that the Law on Confirming the Agreement in the Oil and Gas Sector (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – International Agreements, No. 83/2008), which required the Republic of Serbia to sell 51 per cent of the shares in NIS to the acquirer, constituted a *lex specialis* and that therefore it did not have jurisdiction to assess this concentration.

We are not aware that the Commission's approach has been affected by the economic crisis.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Commission will, to some extent, take into account economic efficiencies in assessing whether a concentration prevents, restricts or distorts competition. However, as the Commission is a relatively new institution, there is hardly any precedent in the merger control sector on the Commission's approach in this respect.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Commission is competent (*inter alia*) to issue a clearance decision, a conditional clearance decision or to prohibit the concentration.

The Commission will prohibit the concentration if the conditions for approval are not fulfilled. If the Commission understands (following a first assessment of the case) that the notified concentration may not fulfil the conditions for approval, it will inform the notifying party about the relevant facts, evidence and other elements on which this assessment is based. The notifying party may then present its view before the

Commission and propose modifications (conditions and obligations) to meet the requirements for approval within a given time frame set by the Commission. If the Commission, after the modification of the notification, concludes that the concentration no longer raises serious doubts, it shall issue a conditional clearance decision providing conditions and obligations intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they entered into with the Commission to approve the concentration. Such commitments are binding for the parties and, in the case of a breach, the Commission may repeat the proceedings.

As regards ancillary restraints, these are for the first time now specifically addressed in the new Filing Regulation, which became applicable in February 2016. The Filing Regulation makes clear that the notifying party needs to submit a long-form notification if it wishes the Commission to review and assess restraints that are directly related and necessary to the transaction. For the time being, there is no further guidance available on how the Commission will assess them.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) provides for the undertakings concerned the possibility to propose conditions and obligations to remedy competition concerns. However, the LPC does not specify the type of remedies acceptable to receive merger clearance. Hence, they have to be negotiated in the course of the proceedings on an individual basis.

In 2009, the Commission issued two conditional clearance decisions. In the first case, the acquirer was ordered to maintain certain current lease agreements of which the target company was the lessor and to annually report on the status of those agreements for the next three consecutive years. In the second case (a foreign-to-foreign transaction in the aviation business) the undertakings concerned were obliged to maintain an existing code-share agreement for a certain flight route to or from Belgrade and to abstain from increasing the ticket price on that flight route for a certain period of time without prior approval from the Commission. We are not aware that any conditional clearance decisions were issued by the Commission in 2010. In 2011, after exhaustive negotiations, the Commission prohibited the implementation of a concentration in the sugar sector, as it found that the remedies proposed were insufficient to compensate for the distorting effects caused by the concentration. However, this decision was overturned on appeal by the Administrative Court and the Commission conditionally approved the concentration ultimately in early 2013 (the commitments, inter alia, included the divestment of a part of the target's business in Serbia to an unrelated, financially sane buyer with experience in the sugar business).

In 2012, the Commission issued conditional clearance decisions in the context of the acquisition of a bankrupt company in the retail sector and with regard to a merger relating to the sector of e-prepaid top-up cards and services for mobile phones. In 2013 the Commission cleared a concentration between two retail chains prescribing structural and behavioural remedies. In 2014, two more conditional clearances were issued, one in the cement sector (with one undertaking committing to divest all of its Serbian business operations) and one in the airline industry (where the commitments of the undertakings concerned included, among other things, an obligation to release certain daily slots in relevant airports to one or more new interested market entrants). The Commission issued no conditional clearance decisions in 2015, but issued one decision subject to conditions, in the sugar industry, in 2016 and one, in the telecommunications sector, in 2017. In the 2016 conditional clearance decision, the acquirer committed to various reporting remedies as well as to offer for sale the underperforming sugar factories prior to any business decision to permanently close such factories. The

conditional clearance decision of 2017 combined a divestiture commitment and behavioural remedies. The incumbent telecommunication services operator committed to divest a part of its network infrastructure in the territory of the city of Belgrade, where overlapping activities were found to exist. This was combined with reporting commitments as well as the commitment by the acquirer to offer an alternative solution to the current service users of the target company when entering into an agreement with them. In 2018, one further conditional clearance followed in the yeast sector that subjected the undertakings concerned mostly to reporting. In 2019, at least two more conditional clearances followed – one in the retail sector of domestic home appliances, TV audio and video equipment, mobile and fixed phones, computers and IT equipment (where the acquirer committed to either divest, sublease or terminate the lease on a number of retailing outlets in several cities in Serbia) and the other in the sector for the production and selling of fresh bread in several cities in Serbia (where the acquirer committed to various reporting obligations, including regarding its future wholesale prices and rebate policy).

The overall number of conditional clearances issued since the Commission was first set up in 2006 is approximately 20.

### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

As there are no specific provisions in the LPC that identify the type of remedies acceptable and the practice of the Commission in this regard is scarce, much is left to the discretion of the Commission. The 2014 conditional clearance cases were interesting in the sense that the commitment processes (including the timing issues related thereto) followed the procedural steps and formalities applicable under the EU regulatory framework. This may have been a consequence of the fact that the undertakings concerned had to coordinate their commitment process before the Commission with the respective case pending before the European Commission. For future cases and to improve legal certainty, guidelines by the Serbian Commission on the procedural steps to follow and on the formalities and provisional timing of the proposed remedies or commitments would be welcomed.

### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

See above.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Where the notifying party wishes the authority to review and assess restrictions that are directly related and necessary to the transaction (otherwise known as ancillary restraints), it will need to submit a long-form notification.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In Phase I proceedings, customers and competitors are typically not involved in the review process.

In Phase II proceedings, the Commission may require information and data from the undertakings concerned, competitors, customers, complainants, public bodies and organisations (eg, communal

authorities, statisticians and tax authorities). Also, third parties can submit observations to the Commission.

The Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) explicitly defines who is not considered to be a party in the proceedings:

- providers of information and data;
- experts and organisations whose analysis is used in the procedure; and
- other public entities and organisations cooperating with the Commission in the proceedings.

### Publicity and confidentiality

**30** | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

In line with the LPC, the Commission publishes in the Official Gazette and on the website of the Commission general information about decisions made on the infringement of competition (eg, the infringement of the filing or standstill obligation) and orders to initiate ex officio proceedings. Notice on the submission of a merger filing is not published.

In recent years, the Commission has gradually developed its approach regarding the publication of decisions. In a first step, in early 2012 the Commission started making public the operational part of its decisions (and in some exceptional cases even whole decisions). In mid 2013, the Commission began publishing complete non-confidential versions of its decisions (ie, entire decisions with confidential data redacted). Information is redacted from the decision only following the party's well-founded request accompanied by a reasonable explanation as to why confidentiality is of utmost importance (instead of simply stating that it considers the case and related information to be confidential).

Only the parties to the proceedings may request access to the file. Third parties that may have an interest in monitoring the procedure receive only general information on the course of the proceedings.

A party that provided information to the Commission may request from the Commission that it protects its source of information or the information itself, provided that there is a justified reason to believe that the disclosure of the source or the information itself may cause substantial damages. The president of the Commission is competent to issue the respective order on the protection of the source or the protection of information.

Merger filings also receive some publicity from the Commission's annual report on its activities for the preceding year.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

**31** | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Commission generally cooperates with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions, in particular with those from the region (ie, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia). In June 2010, it concluded a memorandum of understanding with the Austrian Federal Competition Authority that, inter alia, refers to the exchange of case-related information. In 2011 and 2012, the international cooperation has been further increased (eg, in 2012, cooperation agreements were signed with the competition authorities of Kazakhstan, Romania and Russia; in 2013, cooperation agreements were signed with Slovenia and Croatia). Most recently, cooperation agreements were signed with the competition authorities of Belarus and Turkey.

In addition, the Commission cooperates with a number of international organisations that are (to some extent also) involved in antitrust matters. Such organisations include the International Competition Network, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development, the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development and the Network for the Protection of Competition in South Eastern Europe. In September 2013, the Commission also became a member of the Merger Working Group.

Within the framework of Serbia's Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the Commission also cooperates on a regular basis with the European Commission and the Delegation of the European Union to Belgrade.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

**32** | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Against the final decision of the Commission, a legal action may be filed with the Administrative Court (which became operational in 2010). For a recent example of judicial review see, for example, the successful appeal submitted in a case relating to the sugar industry.

### Time frame

**33** | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The legal action has to be filed within 30 days of the date the decision was submitted to the party concerned. The Administrative Court shall then decide at the latest within a period of three months. However, the law does not provide for a sanction if the court fails to issue its decision within this period. In practice, judicial review may take several months, depending on the complexity of the case.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

**34** | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In 2008, according to publicly available information, the Commission (still under the provisions of the Competition Act 2005) initiated with regard to a foreign-to-foreign merger misdemeanour proceedings against a Croatian company (and a responsible person within such company) with a misdemeanour court for implementing a concentration without obtaining the Commission's prior approval. When the misdemeanour court rejected the Commission's request, it filed an appeal, the outcome of which has not been published. Further details of this case have not been made public. In 2017, the Commission imposed its first fine for failure to notify. In general, enforcement activities of the Commission are increasing.

One of the current concerns of the Commission is the possibility of enforcing sanctions in the event of a foreign-to-foreign merger (ie, in situations where the undertakings concerned, although they do not have a registered entity in Serbia, realise income on the basis of their product sales in this market, thus meeting the turnover thresholds).

### Reform proposals

**35** | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Following the remarks and recommendations of the European Commission expressed in its 2012 Progress Report for Serbia, the Law on the Protection of Competition (LPC) was amended in late 2013. Furthermore, a new Filing Regulation started to apply in February 2016. In 2018, a new set of amendments to the LPC was prepared by the working group within the Serbian government, which currently continues to be subject to public debate. The Commission is also expected to provide guidance on frequently asked questions in the merger control sector.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year****36** | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The working group set up within the Serbian government to prepare a new Competition Protection Law circulated the first proposal of the new law for comments by the public in 2018. The proposal was updated and circulated for an additional round of comments in early 2019. On the one hand, the proposal attempts to consolidate into existing rules the Commission's practices of the past 14 years and, on the other, to reconcile the procedural aspects of the Commission's work with recently enacted Law on Administrative Proceedings.

As regards merger control, it is proposed that the jurisdictional thresholds for notifiable concentrations are increased (something that has long been lobbied for by industry representatives) as well as to introduce a mandatory filing obligation regarding acquisitions leading to shares of more than 40 per cent in a product market in Serbia (ie, regardless of whether the turnover thresholds are met). The existing exceptions from the notion of a 'concentration' are restricted insofar as, for example, acquisitions by investment funds can no longer benefit from this exception. The time limits for the submission of the notification and for deciding on the case are prolonged. Furthermore, the procedure for requesting a derogation from the suspension obligation (eg, in cases of public takeovers or privatisations) shall be facilitated.

In early 2019, the Serbian Commission also initiated two Phase II merger control proceedings: one in the sector of retailing of home appliances and the other in the telecommunications sector. The former ended with a conditional clearance and the latter was unconditionally cleared.

In late 2019, the Commission's leadership (the president and most members of the Council) changed.

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# Singapore

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation is the Singapore Competition Act (Cap 50B) (the Competition Act), which was passed in October 2004. The Competition Act is administered and enforced by the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (formerly known as the Competition Commission of Singapore) (the Commission), which was established as a statutory body under the Competition Act, and is under the purview of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Commission has powers to investigate and impose sanctions. The Competition Act, with some exceptions (set out in its Third and Fourth Schedules), applies generally to prohibit:

- anticompetitive agreements (section 34 prohibition);
- the abuse of a dominant position (section 47 prohibition); and
- mergers and acquisitions that substantially, or may be expected to substantially, lessen competition within any market in Singapore (section 54 prohibition).

The Competition Act was implemented in three phases. On 1 January 2005, the provisions establishing the Commission came into force. The provisions on anticompetitive agreements, decisions and practices, abuse of dominance, enforcement, appeal processes, and other miscellaneous areas under the Competition Act came into force on 1 January 2006. The provisions relating to mergers and acquisitions came into force on 1 July 2007. On 1 November 2016, the Commission released revised versions of its guidelines. Particularly in respect of mergers, the Commission issued the CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers 2016, which took effect on 1 December 2016.

In addition to enforcing the Competition Act, with effect from 1 April 2018, the Commission took over the role as the government agency responsible for administering and enforcing the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (Cap 52A) (CPFTA). The CPFTA sets out provisions for the protection of consumers against unfair practices, and gives consumers certain statutory rights in respect of goods that do not conform to contract, and related matters. The Commission will assume investigative and enforcement powers to take timely action against recalcitrant retailers. For example, the Commission's investigative powers include the power to require documents, articles or information, the power to enter premises with and without warrant, and the power to examine and secure the attendance of any person who appears to be acquainted with any of the facts or circumstances relevant to an investigation.

Laws against anticompetitive behaviour in respect of particular industry sectors such as telecommunications, media, post, gas and electricity can be found in certain statutes that regulate such sectors, and are enforced by industry-specific regulators. These industry sectors

are carved out from the Competition Act. On cross-sectoral competition matters, the Commission will work with the relevant sectoral regulator to determine which entity is best placed to handle the case in accordance with the legal powers given to each. The Commission and the sector-specific regulators will cooperate and coordinate closely to prevent double jeopardy and to minimise the regulatory burden in dealing with the case. The lead will be taken by the agency best placed in terms of the ability to investigate the alleged anticompetitive conduct and impose any necessary remedies.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Subject to certain exclusions and exemptions, mergers and anticipated mergers that result, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition within any market in Singapore will be caught.

Under section 54(2) of the Competition Act, a merger is regarded as occurring for the purpose of the Competition Act if:

- two or more undertakings, previously independent of one another, merge;
- one or more persons or other undertakings acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings; or
- the result of an acquisition by one undertaking (the first undertaking) of the assets (including goodwill), or a substantial part of the assets, of another undertaking (the second undertaking) is to place the first undertaking in a position to replace or substantially replace the second undertaking in the business or, as appropriate, the part concerned of the business in which that undertaking was engaged immediately before the acquisition.

Section 54(7) of the Competition Act provides that a merger shall not be deemed to occur if:

- the person acquiring control is a receiver or liquidator acting as such or is an underwriter acting as such;
- all the undertakings involved in the merger are, directly or indirectly, under the control of the same undertaking;
- control is acquired solely as a result of a testamentary disposition, intestacy or the right of survivorship under a joint tenancy; or
- control is acquired by an undertaking, the normal activities of which include the carrying out of transactions and dealings in securities for its own account or for the account of others under the circumstances set out in section 54(9) of the Competition Act.

As set out in the Fourth Schedule to the Competition Act, the section 54 prohibition does not apply to any merger:

- if the economic efficiencies arising or that may arise from the merger outweigh the adverse effects because of the substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market in Singapore;

- approved by any minister or any regulatory authority (other than the Commission) where the requirement for approval is imposed by written law (in the case of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the section 54 prohibition also does not apply where the requirement for approval is imposed by instruments issued under written law);
- under the jurisdiction of another regulatory authority under any written law relating to competition or a code of practice relating to competition issued under any written law (eg, in the energy, telecommunications and media industries); or
- relating to the supply of licensed and regulated ordinary letter and postcard services, potable piped water, waste water management services, licensed and regulated bus services, licensed and regulated rail services, or licensed and regulated cargo terminal operations.

Where the Commission proposes to make an unfavourable decision, the merging parties may apply to the Minister for Trade and Industry, within 14 days of the date of the notice given by the Commission, for the merger to be exempted on the grounds of any public interest consideration. The CCCS Guidelines on Merger Procedures 2012 clarify the meaning of 'public interest consideration' with reference to section 2 of the Competition Act. 'Public interest consideration' for the purposes of the Competition Act refers to 'national or public security, defence and such other considerations as the Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, prescribe'. Therefore, for a matter to qualify as a 'public interest consideration' for the purpose of an exemption from section 54 of the Competition Act, such a matter will first have to be gazetted. The Minister's consideration of an application for a transaction to be exempted on the grounds of any public interest consideration is hence limited to matters of national or public security and defence, unless other matters are gazetted as such. The decision of the Minister for the exemption will be final. The Minister may revoke any exemption of a merger (or anticipated merger) that has been granted if he or she has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the information on which he or she based the decision was incomplete, false or misleading in a material particular. As of 1 May 2020, the Minister has not exercised the power to gazette any matter as a 'public interest consideration' set out under section 2 of the Competition Act.

### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

A joint venture is subject to the section 54 prohibition if it is considered a 'merger' under the Competition Act. A joint venture constitutes a merger when:

- it is subject to joint control;
- it operates in the market and performs all the functions of an autonomous economic entity operating in that market; and
- it is intended to operate on a lasting basis.

Joint ventures are broadly defined as collaborative arrangements by which two or more undertakings devote their resources to pursue a common objective.

Joint control exists where two or more parties have the possibility of exercising decisive influence over the undertaking, including the power to block actions that determine the strategic commercial behaviour of the undertaking. It is characterised by the possibility of a deadlock resulting from the power of two or more parent companies to reject proposed strategic decisions, and a requirement that these shareholders must reach a consensus in determining the commercial activities of the joint venture.

A joint venture is subject to the section 54 prohibition only if it operates in the market and performs the functions normally carried out by undertakings operating in that market. Joint ventures that take over

one specific function – for example, R&D or production – without access to the market will generally not be caught. However, a joint venture that uses the distribution network of its parent companies or relies heavily or entirely on sales to its parent companies may be performing the functions of an autonomous economic entity, as may a joint venture performing the normal functions of a trading company operating in a trade market.

Joint ventures are subject to the section 54 prohibition only if they operate on a lasting basis. This may be shown by the commitment of resources from parent companies to perform its functions. Provisions that provide for the dissolution of the joint venture, the withdrawal of parent companies or a fixed duration for the joint venture do not prevent the joint venture from being considered as operating on a lasting basis. For joint ventures of a fixed duration to be considered as operating on a lasting basis, it must be sufficiently long to bring about a lasting change in the structure of the undertakings concerned, or where the agreement provides for possible continuation of the joint venture beyond this period. On the other hand, a joint venture will not be considered to operate on a lasting basis where it is established for a short, finite duration.

### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The essence of 'control' is the ability to exercise 'decisive influence' in relation to an undertaking.

For this purpose, control over an undertaking is defined by section 54(3) of the Competition Act to exist if, by reason of rights, contracts or any other means, decisive influence is capable of being exercised with regard to the activities of the undertaking and, in particular, by:

- ownership of, or the right to use all or part of, the assets of an undertaking; or
- rights or contracts that enable decisive influence to be exercised with regard to the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.

The Commission considers that decisive influence is generally deemed to exist if there is ownership of more than 50 per cent of the voting rights. Where the ownership is between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of the voting rights of the undertaking, there is a rebuttable presumption that decisive influence exists. 'Voting rights' refers to all the voting rights attributable to the share capital of an undertaking that are currently exercisable at a general meeting. However, these thresholds are only indicative and control could potentially be established at levels below these thresholds if other relevant factors provide strong evidence of control. Other forms of voting rights will also be taken into account in assessing control.

Besides legal ownership through the acquisition of property rights and securities, de facto control may also be established. As there are no precise criteria for determining when an acquirer gains de facto control of an undertaking's activities, the Commission will adopt a case-by-case approach taking into account all relevant circumstances.

In determining whether decisive influence is capable of being exercised, all relevant circumstances must be considered, and not solely the legal effect of any instrument, deed, transfer, assignment or other act.

It is possible that decisive influence may be capable of being exercised by a person who has only a minority interest. For example, control may exist where minority shareholders have additional rights that allow them to veto decisions that are essential for the strategic commercial behaviour of the undertaking, such as the budget, business plans, major investments, appointment of senior management or market-specific rights.



## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

In general, mergers should be notified to the Commission if the merger parties think the merger may result in a substantial lessening of competition within any market in Singapore. Merger parties should note the risk that, if a merger is not notified, the Commission may investigate a merger or anticipated merger on its own initiative if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the section 54 prohibition has been infringed or will be infringed, and has the ability to subsequently make directions or impose financial penalties in respect of any infringement.

The Commission is unlikely to consider a merger or anticipated merger to give rise to competition concerns unless it meets or crosses the following indicative thresholds:

- the merged entity will have a market share of 40 per cent or more; or
- the merged entity will have a market share of between 20 and 40 per cent and the post-merger market share of the three largest firms, that is, the concentration ratio of three largest firms (CR3), is 70 per cent or more.

If the merger situation meets or crosses either of the two thresholds, the Commission may review the merger situation further. However, because market concentration is only one of the various factors used in assessing a merger situation, a merger that does not cross the thresholds but raises competition concerns may still be subject to the Commission's consideration.

The Commission is also unlikely to investigate a merger situation that only involves small companies, namely where the turnover in Singapore in the financial year preceding the transaction of each of the parties is below S\$5 million and the combined worldwide turnover in the financial year preceding the transaction of all of the parties is below S\$50 million.

The above thresholds are merely indicative, and the Commission may investigate merger situations that fall below these indicative thresholds in appropriate circumstances. Conversely, merger situations that meet or exceed the thresholds stated in the CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers 2016 are not necessarily prohibited by section 54 of the Competition Act.

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Notification to the Commission for a decision in respect of a merger or anticipated merger is voluntary. Merger parties may either make an application to the Commission in respect of an anticipated merger that has been made known to the public, or in the alternative, merger parties may wait until the anticipated merger has been carried into effect before making an application. If a merger or anticipated merger meets or exceeds the thresholds for notification, the Commission encourages merger parties to consider making an application for a decision, as the Commission is likely to give further consideration to the merger situation before being satisfied that it does not raise any competition concerns under the Competition Act.

To assist with the planning and consideration of future mergers, in particular at the stage when the merger parties consider it necessary to preserve the confidentiality of the transaction, the Commission is prepared to give confidential advice on whether or not a merger is likely to raise competition concerns in Singapore, with the necessary qualification that such advice is provided without having taken into account third-party views. The Commission also qualifies that confidential advice is only available in certain circumstances, and at the absolute discretion of the Commission, so that its resources may be managed appropriately.

Following self-assessment, merger parties may approach the Commission for confidential advice if the following conditions are met. First, the merger must not be completed but there must be a good faith intention to proceed with the transaction, as evidenced to the satisfaction of the Commission by the party or parties requesting the confidential advice.

Second, the merger must not be in the public domain. In exceptional circumstances, the Commission may consider giving confidential advice in relation to mergers that are no longer confidential, but the requesting party or parties must provide good reasons as to why they wish to receive confidential advice and not proceed with a notification. In this regard, the Commission has clarified in its response to the public consultation on the amendments to the Competition Act (that came into effect on 16 May 2018) that, while section 55A(2) of the Competition Act allows for the Commission to give the advice where information about the anticipated merger enters the public domain after the Commission accepts an application for confidential advice, the Commission will only do so if the parties provide good reasons why they are not applying for a decision under section 57 of the Competition Act. Where information about an anticipated merger is already in the public domain, the Commission will not entertain requests for confidential advice.

Third, the merger situation must raise a genuine issue relating to the competitive assessment in Singapore. For example, there may be a genuine issue if there is a lack of relevant precedents and, therefore, the Commission's approach to the merger situation is genuinely in doubt. On the other hand, there would be no genuine issue if, for example, both merger parties have an insignificant market presence in Singapore. Finally, the requesting party or parties are expected to keep the Commission informed of significant developments in relation to the merger situation in respect of which confidential advice was obtained, for example, completion date or abandonment of the merger.

Prior to 1 July 2012, the Commission was unable to accept the notification of an anticipated merger if it was still confidential. This process, introduced as part of the Commission's revisions of the merger procedures, allows parties to obtain guidance from the Commission early in the merger process without having to wait until the public announcement of the transaction.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

With regard to foreign-to-foreign transactions, merger parties should note that the Competition Act will apply to any merger or anticipated merger that substantially lessens competition or that may substantially lessen competition in any market in Singapore for goods and services, notwithstanding that the merger takes place outside Singapore or that any party to the merger resides outside Singapore.

### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Singapore does not have general legislation prohibiting, or requiring consent for, foreign investment. Some sectors and industries, however, have specific requirements on foreign ownership. For example, sections 11 and 12 of the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (Cap 206) require the approval of the Minister for Communications and Information before any person can become a substantial shareholder (5 per cent), a 12 per cent shareholder, or an indirect controller of a newspaper company. The Telecommunications Act requires that approval from the Info-communications Media Development Authority be obtained before any party becomes a 12 per cent controller, a 30 per cent controller, or obtains effective control over a designated telecommunications licensee, or acquires any business (or any part of such business) of a designated telecommunications licensee as a going concern.

In addition to the general framework provided by the Competition Act, there are also sectoral competition regulatory frameworks.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Notification is voluntary and the Competition Act does not specify any deadlines for notification. If the merger parties wish to notify their merger to the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (the Commission) for a decision, they may do so at any time before, during or after the merger. In the case of completed mergers, parties are encouraged to notify as soon as possible after completion. Parties that wish to apply for a decision for an anticipated merger should only do so when the anticipated merger is no longer confidential. In deciding whether to notify a merger and when to notify the Commission, merger parties should bear in mind that the Commission may 'unwind' a merger that has already been effected, and (in the case of intentional or negligent infringements) impose financial penalties, if the Commission decides that the merger infringes the section 54 prohibition.

There are no deadlines for notification or sanctions for failure to notify as Singapore operates a voluntary merger regime. Merger parties have the option of proceeding, at their own commercial risk, with any merger during the notification process, before notifying the Commission, or without notifying the Commission at all. The risk is that the Commission may investigate a merger or anticipated merger on its own initiative if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the section 54 prohibition has been infringed or will be infringed, and has the ability to subsequently make directions or impose financial penalties in respect of any infringement.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Any party to a merger or anticipated merger may apply to the Commission for a decision. The Commission encourages joint filing.

In general, the filing fees for mergers or anticipated mergers are as follows:

- where the turnover of the target undertaking or asset is equal to or less than S\$200 million, the fee payable is S\$15,000;
- where the turnover of the target undertaking or asset is between S\$200 million and S\$600 million, the fee payable is S\$50,000; and
- where the turnover of the target undertaking or asset is above S\$600 million, the fee payable is S\$100,000.

If the merging parties are small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or if the acquiring party is an SME and direct or indirect control in the small or medium-sized enterprise will not be (or has not been) acquired, the filing fee will be S\$5,000. SMEs have been defined in the Competition (Fees) Regulation 2007 as undertakings with annual sales turnover of not more than S\$100 million or employing no more than 200 staff.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Waiting periods are set out in the timetable for clearance. Notification is voluntary and there is no requirement to suspend the implementation of a merger or anticipated merger prior to clearance.

However, parties who give effect to or proceed with mergers prior to clearance by the Commission should note that they do so at their own commercial risk.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

As mentioned above, no requirement to suspend a merger or anticipated merger is specified in the Competition Act. However, where there is completion before clearance and the Commission subsequently finds that the merger infringes or is likely to infringe the section 54 prohibition, the Commission may take action to remedy, mitigate or prevent the harmful effects of infringement and prevent the recurrence of infringement. The Commission has the power to, inter alia, require a merger to be dissolved or modified.

Parties should also note that the Commission has the power to impose interim measures where it has not completed its investigations but has a reasonable suspicion that the section 54 prohibition has been infringed or will be infringed. It may make such directions as it considers appropriate for the purpose of preventing merger parties from taking any action that might prejudice the Commission's ability to consider the merger situation and to impose the appropriate remedies; preventing serious, irreparable damage to a particular person or category of persons; or protecting the public interest. These measures could include a direction that the merger or anticipated merger be suspended. As a matter of practice, the Commission is unlikely to use these powers unless it believes that there is a real possibility of the merger situation raising serious competition concerns. In view of the risks involved in proceeding to implement a merger that may infringe the prohibition, parties may choose to voluntarily suspend implementation in whole or in part.

As at 1 May 2020, the Commission has only exercised its power to take interim measures once, namely in the *Grab/Uber* case where the parties, without seeking clearance from the Commission, proceeded to complete Grab's acquisition of Uber's Southeast Asian business in exchange for Uber's acquisition of a 27.5 per cent stake in Grab.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Notification of a merger is voluntary and merger parties may, at their own risk, proceed with closing before clearance or without seeking clearance. This applies equally to foreign-to-foreign mergers. Parties should take note of the actions that the Commission may take if the merger is found to have an anticompetitive effect in Singapore.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

There is no prohibition against closing before clearance. However, parties should take note of the actions that the Commission may take if the merger is found to have an anticompetitive effect in Singapore.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There are no special rules in the Competition Act itself. Takeovers and mergers in Singapore are subject to non-statutory rules in the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers, which is administered by the Securities Industry Council. Parties involved in public takeover bids should refer to the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers and the Securities Industry Council Practice Statement on the Merger Procedures of the Competition Commission of Singapore for further information.

An offeror making a 'mandatory general offer' subject to the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers is required to include a precondition that the offer lapses if the Commission proceeds to a Phase II review or prohibits the acquisition before the close of the offer. If the Commission prohibits the acquisition, the Securities Industry Council may require the offeror to reduce its shareholding back to the level before the mandatory general offer was triggered.

An offeror making a 'voluntary general offer' subject to the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers is required to impose a precondition that the offer lapses if the Commission proceeds to a Phase II review or prohibits the acquisition before the close of the offer, and may include further conditions that the Commission's favourable decision must be on terms acceptable to the offeror.

## Documentation

### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Before submitting Form M1 and commencing the formal notification process, merger parties intending to make an application may approach the Commission for pre-notification discussions (PNDs), to facilitate their preparation of the form and to expedite the review process. PNDs are intended to help merger parties ascertain what information will be required by the Commission during the merger review process, and to help the Commission plan its work to facilitate an expeditious merger review process. The Commission is prepared to engage in PNDs for anticipated mergers not yet in the public domain, but will not entertain discussions on purely speculative or hypothetical transactions.

Merger parties seeking a PND should contact the Commission by phone through its hotline or email. The formality and length of the PND process depends on the preference of the merger parties, the complexity of the transaction, and the potential concerns raised by the merger. The Commission considers PNDs to be most useful where parties can provide a draft Form M1.

During the PND, the Commission will help to identify the information needed to provide a complete submission and any other useful information that might expedite its review. For mergers that involve more complex products or that raise potential competition issues, PNDs minimise the risk that the mergers will not be cleared in Phase I. The Commission will generally not, in the context of PNDs, give its views on whether a merger situation is likely to require a Phase II assessment or if it would lead to a substantial lessening of competition.

The Commission will review a merger situation in one or two phases and the level of detail required will increase with each phase. For each phase, merger parties must submit the duly completed merger review Forms M1 and M2 respectively (available on the Commission's website).

Form M1 requires information relating to, inter alia:

- ownership structure;
- the notified transaction;
- the activities of the merger parties;
- the industries affected;
- the market definition;
- market shares;
- efficiency gains; and
- ancillary restrictions, if they are included in the notification.

Merger parties are also required to provide their competitive assessment of the transaction, including:

- their assessment of the counterfactual (the competitive situation without the merger);
- competitors in the market;
- barriers to entry;

- existing and future countervailing buyer power;
- coordinated and non-coordinated effects of the transaction;
- vertical effects, if there is a potential vertical relationship between the merger parties; and
- cooperative effects of the joint venture, if the transaction is a joint venture.

Form M2 requires further information relating to, inter alia:

- the market conditions in the relevant markets, including the structure of demand and supply;
- the importance of research and development;
- the prevalence of cooperative agreements;
- possible efficiency gains arising from the merger;
- the likely effects of the merger; and
- any applicable failing firm or division arguments that the merger parties wish to submit.

The information required in Form M2 may also be submitted voluntarily by the applicant when submitting Form M1 to expedite the process in more complex cases. Otherwise, the submission of Form M2 will only be required when the Commission is of the view that it is necessary to proceed to a Phase II review, and in which case the applicant will be notified accordingly.

Parties should note that even where the applicant has submitted complete Forms M1 or M2, the Commission may require the applicant to provide additional information, over and above that which is required under Forms M1 and M2 during its review process in order to enable it to assess the merger situation.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

There are two phases of review. The Commission's Guidelines give an indicative time frame of 30 working days to complete a Phase I review and this time frame commences from the date on which the Commission accepts a complete Form M1 and receives the requisite filing fee. Should the Commission find that it is necessary to proceed to a Phase II review, the indicative time frame for completion is 120 working days, commencing from the date on which the Commission receives a complete Form M2 and a response to the Phase II information request that is deemed satisfactory by the Commission.

The receipt of an application by the Commission does not indicate that the application is complete. The indicative time frames for the review of the merger notification commence only when the Commission receives a complete form that meets all the applicable filing requirements, accompanied by the relevant supporting documents and the appropriate fee. To avoid any unnecessary delay, merger parties should therefore ensure that the relevant forms are complete and meet all the filing requirements upon submission.

While the Commission typically reviews mergers within the indicative time frames, the time frames are not binding on the Commission and the Commission may 'stop the clock' in a review, inter alia, if the merger parties do not respond to the Commission's request for information within the stipulated time period or when commitments are being considered. The indicative time frames may also be extended by the Commission to accommodate the commitments process.

The Commission strongly encourages merger parties to engage the Commission in PNDs. PNDs permit the parties to ascertain information that will be necessary for their notification and help the Commission to plan its work to facilitate an expeditious merger review process.

Merger parties may also wish to request confidential advice from the Commission to seek the Commission's view on whether the merger

is likely to raise competition concerns in Singapore and whether a notification is necessary. However, the Commission's confidential advice is not binding and the Commission reserves the right to investigate mergers in all cases where confidential advice is given.

## 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Two separate processes are available to parties before notification to the Commission. First, parties may seek confidential advice from the Commission on whether or not a merger is likely to raise competition concerns in Singapore and therefore whether a notification is advisable. Second, parties may engage the Commission in PNDs to discuss the content and timing of their notifications in order to expedite the merger review process.

Confidential advice may be requested through the Commission's hotline or by email. The Commission will then agree on a provisional timeline for the parties to submit full information similar to that required in Form M1. Third-party contact details are not required and third-party views will not be sought, and the Commission does not expect to request further information by way of written questions to the requesting party. The Commission will carry out an internal assessment of the merger and may meet with the requesting parties, and expects to provide its confidential advice in the form of a letter stating whether the merger is likely to raise competition concerns in Singapore and whether notification is advisable, within 14 working days of receiving all the required information. The advice is not binding on the Commission and the merger may be investigated regardless of the advice given.

PNDs are similarly commenced by contacting the Commission through its hotline or by email. No specific timetable is given, although the Commission states that their length and formality depend on the preference of the merger parties, the complexity of the transaction and the concerns that the merger may raise. The Commission states that PNDs are most useful where a draft Form M1 is provided.

The formal notification process begins with the filing of Form M1 with the Commission. The Commission will first determine if the application is complete, with the necessary supporting documents and filing fees. Once a completed Form M1 that meets all the applicable filing requirements is accepted, the indicative time frame of 30 working days for Phase I review commences and the Commission will review the transaction to determine whether it falls within the meaning of a 'merger' or 'anticipated merger' as defined in the Competition Act, and whether the transaction is excluded under paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Fourth Schedule to the Competition Act.

The Commission adopts a two-phase approach when evaluating applications.

### Phase I

Phase I review entails a quick review and allows merger situations that clearly do not raise any competition concerns to proceed without undue delay.

The Commission expects to complete a Phase I review within 30 working days commencing from the date on which the Commission receives a completed Form M1, accompanied by relevant supporting documents and the appropriate fee. The Commission may extend the Phase I review period in exceptional circumstances. By the end of this period, the Commission will decide whether to issue a favourable decision to allow the merger situation to proceed or to carry on to a Phase II review.

### Phase II

If, during the Phase I review, the Commission is unable to conclude that a merger situation does not raise competition concerns and is of the view

that a more detailed examination of the merger is required, it will notify the merger parties of the decision to carry out a more detailed assessment (ie, Phase II review). The indicative time frame of 120 working days for a Phase II review commences when the Commission receives a complete Form M2 and a response to the Phase II information request that is deemed satisfactory by the Commission. The Commission may extend the Phase II review period in exceptional circumstances.

During the review, the Commission may impose interim measures to preserve its ability to review the merger situation further or preserve its ability to impose appropriate remedies later, or both. Interim measures may also be imposed as a matter of urgency to protect public interest or to prevent serious, irreparable damage to persons.

Apart from notifications, the Commission may also investigate a merger arising from a third-party complaint or other sources of information if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the section 54 prohibition has been or will be infringed. The Commission may exercise its powers of investigation, which include the right to require the production of specified documents or information, the power to enter premises with or without a warrant, and the power to search premises with a warrant. In the recent amendments to the Competition Act that came into effect on 16 May 2018, the Commission's powers were widened to enable enforcement officers empowered or authorised to enter any premises for the purposes of an investigation, to conduct interviews with persons on the premises without having to issue a notice under section 63(1) to any of such persons (as currently required). The Commission may also invite comments from interested third parties on the merger situation under investigation through a notice on the Commission's website.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

## 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

For the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (the Commission) to clear the merger or anticipated merger, it must be satisfied that the merger does not, or will not be expected to, result in a substantial lessening of competition within any market in Singapore for goods or services. In applying the substantial lessening of competition test, the Commission will evaluate the prospects for competition in the future with and without the merger (commonly termed as a comparison between the 'factual' and the 'counterfactual'). In many cases, the best guide to the appropriate counterfactual will be the prevailing conditions of competition in the market without the merger. However, the Commission will take into account likely and imminent changes in the structure of competition in order to reflect as accurately as possible the nature of rivalry without the merger. For instance, where one of the parties is a failing firm, pre-merger conditions of competition might not prevail even without the merger.

Further, a merger or anticipated merger may be exempted on the grounds of any public interest consideration with the approval of the Minister for Trade and Industry, or by virtue of one of the exclusions specified in the Competition Act itself.

As set out in the Fourth Schedule to the Competition Act, the section 54 prohibition does not apply to a merger:

- if the economic efficiencies arising, or that may arise, from the merger outweigh the adverse effects because of the substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market in Singapore;
- approved by any minister or any regulatory authority (other than the Commission) where the requirement for approval is imposed by written law (in the case of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the section 54 prohibition also does not apply where the requirement for approval is imposed by instruments issued under written law);

- under the jurisdiction of another regulatory authority under any written law relating to competition or a code of practice relating to competition issued under any written law (eg, in the energy, telecommunications and media industries); or
- relating to the supply of licensed and regulated ordinary letter and postcard services, potable piped water, waste water management services, licensed and regulated bus services, licensed and regulated rail services, or licensed and regulated cargo terminal operations.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No, the same test applies.

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Commission has set out the factors that it will take into account in its assessment of the competitive effects of a merger in the CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers 2016.

In the case of horizontal mergers, the Commission has stated that a horizontal merger may result in a substantial lessening of competition by virtue of coordinated or non-coordinated effects, or both.

Non-coordinated effects may occur where, as a result of a merger, the merged entity could raise prices (or reduce output or quality) with the objective of increasing profits because of the loss of competition between the merged entities. Other firms in the market may also find it profitable to raise their prices because of the loss of competitive pressure arising from the merger. For example, the higher prices of the merged entity's products may cause some customers to switch to rival products, thereby increasing demand for the rivals' products.

Coordinated effects may arise where the merger increases the possibility that, post-merger, firms in the same market may find it profitable to coordinate their behaviour by raising prices or reducing quality or output. The Commission will also consider the structure of the market, its characteristics and any history of coordination in the market concerned.

In the case of non-horizontal mergers, the CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers 2016 describe situations in which vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers may trigger competition concerns. With respect to vertical mergers, factors that the Commission will consider include the possibility of foreclosure, the increased potential for collusion, and the creation of barriers to entry.

With respect to conglomerate mergers, factors that the Commission will consider include the likelihood of the conglomerate merger increasing the feasibility of anticompetitive strategies and whether it may facilitate coordination. In assessing whether a conglomerate merger could have anticompetitive effects, the Commission will consider the ability of customers to exercise countervailing power and whether another firm could replicate the portfolio of products offered by the merged entity. The Commission will also consider whether the creation of the portfolio of products itself represents a strategic barrier to entry.

### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Minister for Trade and Industry has the power to exempt a merger or an anticipated merger on the grounds of any public interest consideration. The power may be exercised on the application of a merger party, which has been notified that the Commission proposes to issue a decision that the section 54 prohibition has been infringed.

### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Competition Act allows the Commission to take efficiency gains into account at two separate points in the analytical framework. First, efficiencies may be taken into account where they increase rivalry in the market so that no substantial lessening of competition would result from a merger. For example, the efficiency gains from a merger between two of the smaller firms in a market may enable the merged entity to exert greater competitive pressure on its larger competitors. Second, efficiencies may also be taken into account where, despite not averting a substantial lessening of competition, they are of sufficient magnitude that the merger could be said to give rise to net economic efficiencies in markets in Singapore.

In order to be taken into account by the Commission, efficiencies must be demonstrable (in that they are clear and quantifiable), likely to arise from the merger within a reasonable period of time, sufficient in extent and merger-specific. Such efficiencies could include lower costs, greater innovation and greater choice or higher quality.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Where the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (the Commission), upon completion of its investigations, decides that there has been an infringement of the section 54 prohibition or that an anticipated merger, if carried into effect, will infringe the section 54 prohibition, it will decide on the appropriate action to remedy, mitigate or prevent the harmful effects of such practice and to prevent the recurrence of infringement.

The Commission may implement the remedies by issuing directions or by accepting commitments. The direction may prohibit an anticipated merger from being carried into effect or require a merger to be dissolved or modified in such manner as directed. The direction may also require the merger parties to:

- dispose of such operations, assets or shares of the undertaking as may be specified by the Commission in such a manner as the Commission may require;
- enter into such legally enforceable agreements as may be specified by the Commission and designed to prevent or lessen the anticompetitive effects that have arisen;
- provide a performance bond, guarantee or other form of security on such terms and conditions as the Commission may determine; or
- pay to the Commission such financial penalty in respect of the infringement as the Commission may determine if the Commission is satisfied that the infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently.

The financial penalty imposed by the Commission may not exceed 10 per cent of the turnover of the business of each relevant merger party in Singapore for each year of infringement, up to a maximum of three years. The Commission's basis of calculation of financial penalties is based on an undertaking's relevant turnover of the financial year preceding the end of the infringement (rather than of the financial year preceding the infringement decision). Information on the calculation of financial penalties is generally set out in its Guidelines on the Appropriate Amount of Penalty in Competition Cases 2016, and particularly in respect of infringements of the section 54 prohibition, its Guidelines on Merger Procedures 2012.



The Commission may accept commitments at any time during a review or during an investigation before a final decision on whether there has been an infringement is made. Commitments are generally proposed by the merger parties. If the Commission considers the proposed commitments to be acceptable, it will seek public comments on its website and solicit third-party views. The commitments, if accepted, will be published as part of a favourable decision. The favourable decision may be revoked if the commitments are breached. Applications may be made to the Commission to vary, substitute or release a commitment.

Both directions and commitments are enforceable in the District Court.

The Competition Act also gives the Commission the power to take interim measures.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Merger parties may propose, and the Commission may accept, commitments at any time during a review or during an investigation, before a final decision on whether there has been an infringement is made. Commitments are generally proposed by the merger parties, although the Commission may invite merger parties to consider whether they want to offer commitments. The commitments must aim to prevent or remedy the adverse effects to competition identified. If the Commission considers proposed commitments to be acceptable, it will seek public comments on its website and solicit third-party views. The commitments, if accepted, will be published as part of a favourable decision. The favourable decision may be revoked if the commitments are breached. Applications may be made to the Commission to vary, substitute or release a commitment.

Generally, the Commission will only accept commitments that sufficiently and clearly address the adverse effects to competition and are proportionate to them. According to the CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers 2016, a precondition to accepting any commitment is that the Commission must be confident that the competition concerns identified can be resolved through the commitment. Further, the commitments must not give rise to new competition concerns or require substantial monitoring by the Commission.

There are broadly two types of remedies that the Commission may consider: structural remedies and behavioural remedies.

Structural remedies are generally preferred to behavioural ones because they clearly address the market structure issues that give rise to the competition problems and require little monitoring by the Commission. Typically, structural remedies require the sale of one of the overlapping businesses or assets that has led to the competition concern. The CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers 2016 states that ideally, this should be a self-standing business that is capable of being fully separated from the merger parties, and in most cases, will be part of the acquired enterprise. The sale should be completed within a specified period.

In appropriate cases, the Commission will consider other structural or quasi-structural remedies, for example, the divestment of the buyer's existing business (or part of it) or an amendment to intellectual property licences. Before the sale of any business, the Commission must approve the buyer. This is to ensure that the proposed buyer has the necessary expertise, resources and incentives to operate the divested business as an effective competitor in the marketplace. If that is not the case, it is unlikely that the proposed divestiture will be considered as an effective remedy for the anticompetitive effects previously identified.

The Commission will consider behavioural remedies in situations where it considers that divestment will be impractical or disproportionate

to the nature of the concerns identified. Further, behavioural remedies may sometimes be necessary to support structural divestment.

In general, in assessing which remedies would be appropriate and comprehensive, the Commission will take into account how adequately the action would prevent, remedy or mitigate the competition concerns caused by the merger. The Commission's starting point will be to choose the remedial action that will restore the competition that has been, or is expected to be, substantially lessened as a result of the merger. Given that the effect of a merger is to change the structure of the market, remedies that aim to restore all or part of the pre-merger market structure are likely to be a more direct way of addressing the adverse effects, although other remedies may be considered in view of the associated costs and effectiveness.

### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

In the CCCS Guidelines on Merger Procedures 2012, the Commission specifically sets out a process whereby the Commission and the merger parties can resolve competition concerns in Phase I by way of commitments. Merger parties are encouraged to take the initiative to propose suitable commitments that can appropriately resolve any competition concerns that they foresee arising from the merger situation. This can be done at any time during the review process.

The Commission will indicate its competition concerns in an 'issues letter' to the merger parties where the Commission considers that a Phase II review may be appropriate, although this letter does not constitute a decision to proceed to a Phase II review. At this stage, parties may propose commitments to address the competition concerns in Phase I.

If, towards the end of a Phase II review, the Commission is of the preliminary view that the merger situation is likely to give rise to a substantial lessening of competition, it will issue a Statement of Decision (Provisional) to the merger parties, stating the facts on which the Commission relies and its reasons. The Statement of Decision (Provisional) may outline remedies that the Commission considers appropriate. The Commission will give the parties an opportunity to make written representations to the Commission, which will also be the last opportunity to propose commitments or to give their views on remedies proposed by the Commission. The Commission may consider and impose alternative remedies different from those proposed by the parties.

If the Commission considers the proposed commitments to be acceptable, it will seek public comments on its website and solicit third-party views. The commitments, if accepted, will be published as part of a favourable decision. The favourable decision may be revoked if the commitments are breached.

Applications may be made to the Commission to vary, substitute or release a commitment. Such applications must be made in writing and include an explanation as to whether the competition concerns addressed by the commitment still exist and what impact the variation, substitution or release of the commitment will have on the competition concerns. The Commission may consult with persons it thinks appropriate by publishing a notice on its website.

It is likely that Phase I will have to be extended to accommodate the commitments procedure. Phase II may also have to be extended if a commitments procedure is commenced in Phase II. Time extensions are at the discretion of the Commission, which also reserves the right to terminate the commitments process at any time.



## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

From the publicly available decisions as of 1 May 2020, three mergers were cleared conditional upon the Commission receiving remedies or commitments: the Commission's decision on the notification for decision of the proposed acquisition by Seek Asia Investments Pte Ltd of the Jobstreet Business in Singapore (which was granted on 13 November 2014), the Commission's decision on the notification for decision of the proposed acquisition by ADB BVBA of all the shares of Safegate International AB from Fairford Holdings Private AB (which was granted on 29 January 2016) and the Commission's decision on the notification for decision of the proposed acquisition by Times Publishing Limited of Penguin Random House Pte Ltd and Penguin Books Malaysia Sdn Bhd (which was granted on 25 September 2017). In 2008, in the Commission's decision on the Notification for Decision: Merger between The Thomson Corporation and Reuters Group Plc, the Commission considered that the commitments offered to other competition authorities (namely the European Commission and the United States Department of Justice) had a worldwide effect and that competition concerns arising in Singapore would be sufficiently addressed as such. The Commission stressed, however, that the fact that commitments were accepted by overseas competition authorities does not necessarily imply that the Commission will allow the merger to proceed in Singapore and any overseas commitments must be viewed in light of the facts and circumstances of the case to see whether they are capable of addressing competition concerns arising in Singapore, if any.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Ancillary restrictions to a merger or anticipated merger are defined in the CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers 2016 as restrictive agreements, arrangements or provisions that are directly related and necessary to the implementation of a merger. Such ancillary restrictions are excluded from the prohibition against anticompetitive agreements (section 34 prohibition) and the prohibition against abuse of dominance (section 47 prohibition) under the Third Schedule to the Competition Act. To be directly related, the restriction must be connected with the merger but ancillary or subordinate to its main object. A restriction is likely to be necessary if, for example, in the absence of the restriction, the merger would not go ahead or could only go ahead at substantially higher costs, over an appreciably longer period, or with considerably greater difficulty. In addition, in determining the necessity of the restriction, considerations such as whether its duration, subject matter and geographical field of application are proportionate to the overall requirements of the merger will also be taken into account. Merger parties must demonstrate that they have chosen the option that is the least restrictive of competition.

Merger parties should conduct a self-assessment as to whether any agreements, arrangements or provisions that are not integral to the merger, but that are concluded in conjunction with the merger, qualify as ancillary restrictions.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (the Commission) also requires the contact details of the five most significant competitors and customers to be provided in the notification forms, as well as of the five most significant end users if these are not customers. The Commission may contact them to solicit feedback in relation to the notified mergers.

The Commission will gather information about the competitive effect of the merger situation from the applicant and from third parties, including customers, competitors, suppliers, and other regulatory bodies and government departments, where relevant. The details of the merger will be published on the public register on the Commission's website.

Complainants may make complaints to the Commission by its online form (as found on the Commission's website), fax, telephone or email. The Commission will acknowledge receipt of the complaint within three working days and may ask for further information and may launch a formal investigation if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the merger may result in a substantial lessening of competition. The Commission prefers that complaints are not anonymous, although the Commission will protect the complainant's identity as far as possible.

Parties that suffer loss or damage as a result of the infringement will have a private right of action to seek relief in civil proceedings. Such rights of private action will only arise after the Commission has made a decision that a merger has infringed the section 54 prohibition and the appeal period has expired or, where an appeal has been brought, upon the determination of the appeal. There is also a two-year time bar from the time the Commission has made its decision or from the determination of the appeal, whichever is later. The relief that the court may grant includes an injunction or declaration, damages, and such other relief as the court deems fit.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Upon acceptance of a satisfactory application, the Commission will publish the details of notified mergers or anticipated mergers on the public register on the Commission's website. The information provided will usually include:

- the names of the merger parties;
- a description of the transaction;
- a description of the business activities of the merger parties world-wide and in Singapore;
- a description of the overlapping goods or services, including brand names;
- a description of substitute goods or services; and
- the applicant's views on the definition of the relevant markets, the way in which competition functions in these markets, barriers to entry and countervailing buyer power, and the competitive effects of the merger.

Third parties are invited to comment on the merger via an invitation to comment on the Commission's website, and when the Commission consults on commitments.

When applying to the Commission, merger parties must include all relevant information, including information that may be confidential.

When submitting an application, parties must provide the Commission with both confidential and non-confidential versions. Non-confidential versions are necessary for the Commission's purposes of facilitating discussions and meetings with third parties and publishing a non-confidential version of its decision.

In the confidential versions of submissions, confidential information must be enclosed in square brackets. In non-confidential versions, redactions must be marked by square brackets containing the word 'confidential', with a separate annex identifying the confidential information and giving reasons why the information should be treated as confidential.

Information is confidential only if, in the Commission's opinion, disclosure of the information would:

- significantly harm the legitimate business interests of an undertaking, where it is commercial information;
- significantly harm an individual's interest, where it relates to an individual's private affairs; or
- be contrary to the public interest.

Where excessive or unreasonable confidentiality claims are made, the Commission may stop the working time frame until the applicant files an acceptable non-confidential version. In the CCCS Guidelines on Merger Procedures 2012, the Commission specifically cautioned against blanket and overly wide confidentiality claims.

The Commission will generally treat parties' submissions on confidentiality seriously. In exceptional circumstances, the Commission may wish to disclose confidential information, in which case it will discuss with parties in advance to minimise any detriment to them. The Commission will give applicants the opportunity to review its draft decision before publication to determine whether it contains confidential information, though the Commission maintains ultimate discretion in relation to decisions on confidentiality.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Under the Competition Act, the Commission has the ability to enter into cooperation arrangements with any foreign competition body with approval from the Minister for Trade and Industry. Cooperation may take the form of information exchange or any other assistance as necessary to assist in the enforcement or administration of competition laws.

It appears that the Commission intends to cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions. Form M1 includes specific questions on which other jurisdictions' parties intend to notify (or have notified) the merger. Parties are requested to notify the Commission of any material change in status in relation to any of the notifications to overseas competition agencies, including, for example, approvals, unfavourable decisions and negotiations of commitments. Parties are also asked if they would be willing to provide the Commission with a waiver allowing the Commission to exchange confidential information with competition agencies in other jurisdictions.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

There is a right of appeal to the Competition Appeal Board (the Board) against any decision by the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (the Commission) in respect of a merger or anticipated merger or any direction (including interim measures) imposed by the Commission. An appeal against the Commission's decision in respect

of a merger or anticipated merger may be made by any merger party, while an appeal against a direction may be made by the person to whom the Commission gave the direction. The Board can confirm, impose, revoke or vary a direction, or make any other direction or decision, as long as it is a decision or direction that the Commission itself could have given. There is no right to appeal to the Board against the Commission's refusal to accept any commitments offered, but appeals may be made against the Commission's refusal to vary, substitute or release existing commitments. An appeal to the Board against a direction imposed will not operate to suspend that direction, except in the case of appeals against financial penalties. The infringement decision and the direction will remain in effect (unless suspended by an interim order made by the Board or, in the case of a further appeal, the relevant appeal court).

Parties may make further appeals against the decisions of the Board to the High Court and then to the Court of Appeal, but only on points of law and the quantum of the financial penalty. Such an appeal can only be made by a party to the proceedings in which the decision of the Board was made. The High Court may determine any such appeal by confirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the Board and making such further or other order on appeal.

It is also possible to bring an action in judicial review. To do so, parties must make an application under Order 53 of the Rules of Court, before a judge, for leave to bring an action in judicial review. Once leave is granted, parties must make the judicial review application within 14 days.

As at 1 May 2020, there is an appeal pending before the Board in respect of the Notice of Appeal submitted on 20 October 2018 by Uber with regard to the Commission's decision issued on 24 September 2018, which found that Grab and Uber had infringed the section 54 prohibition. This is the first appeal in respect of the section 54 prohibition before the Board, and as at the time of writing the Board has not released its decision in the appeal. Separately, there have been 18 appeals (three of which were withdrawn by the appellants) in respect of infringement decisions relating to anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance. There have to date been no appeals from the Board to the High Court, and no cases of judicial review in respect of Commission decisions.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

A party who wishes to appeal to the Board must lodge a notice of appeal in the prescribed form within four weeks of the date on which the appellant was notified of the contested decision or the date of publication of the decision, whichever is the earlier. The Board may, on the application of the appellant, in its discretion extend the time limit provided for the lodgement of the notice of appeal.

As soon as is practicable, the Board shall set a timetable outlining the steps to be taken by the parties in preparation for the oral hearing of the appeal, whether pursuant to the directions of the Board or otherwise, fix the date for the oral hearing, notify the parties in writing of the date and place for the oral hearing and of any timetable for that hearing, and, if it considers it necessary for the expeditious disposal of the appeal, send the parties a report that contains a summary of the factual context of the case and the parties' principal submissions.

The Competition Act does not prescribe a time frame or limitation period for judicial review. Accordingly, the time frame is prescribed by the Rules of Court of Singapore. Under Order 53, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, no application for a mandatory, prohibiting or quashing order may be made unless leave to make such an application has been granted. For quashing orders, leave will not be granted to apply for the same unless the application was made within three months of the date of the proceedings.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The provisions relating to mergers and acquisitions came into force on 1 July 2007. As of 1 May 2020, a total of 80 mergers have been notified to the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (the Commission), of which 71 have been cleared, four have been withdrawn, two anticipated mergers abandoned and three mergers pending. Regarding the abandoned anticipated mergers, on 11 March 2015, the Commission informed the parties of its provisional decision to block the proposed acquisition by Parkway Holdings Ltd of RadLink-Asia Pte Ltd. However, the anticipated merger was subsequently abandoned and the sale and purchase agreement relating to the proposed merger lapsed and ceased to be in effect as of 13 March 2015. More recently, on 30 July 2018, the Commission formally ended its assessment of Wilhelmssen Maritime Services AS's (WMS's) proposed acquisition of Drew Marine's technical solutions, fire, safety and rescue businesses after WMS announced on 22 July 2018 that the parties would abandon the proposed acquisition. The Commission had issued its provisional decision on 25 May 2018, which found that the proposed acquisition was likely to be in breach of the section 54 prohibition.

In addition to the notified mergers, the Commission on 27 March 2018 commenced an investigation into Grab's acquisition of Uber's Southeast Asian business in exchange for Uber's acquisition of a 27.5 per cent stake in Grab. The investigations concluded with the Commission issuing an infringement decision finding that Grab and Uber have contravened the section 54 prohibition. Uber filed a Notice of Appeal on 20 October 2018 against the Commission's decision, and as at the time of writing the Board has not released its decision in the appeal.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

While there are no current public proposals to revise or change the Competition Act, the Commission has indicated that it will be undertaking a comprehensive review of the Competition Act with a view to recommending changes to balance regulatory and business compliance costs against the benefits from effective competition. Amendments to the Competition Act were passed by Parliament on 19 March 2018 and came into effect on 16 May 2018.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

#### Grab/Uber merger

Over the past year, one of the more notable cases concerns Grab's acquisition of Uber's Southeast Asian business in exchange for Uber's acquisition of a 27.5 per cent stake in Grab. The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (the Commission) issued an infringement decision against the transaction on 24 September 2018, and Uber subsequently filed its Notice of Appeal to the Board against the Commission's decision on 20 October 2018. This is the first appeal before the Board in respect of the section 54 prohibition. Grab did not appeal against the Commission's decision.

This case is significant as it marked the first time that the Commission has publicly investigated a merger that was not notified



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to the Commission, for which financial penalties and remedies were imposed. The significant aspects of the case are as follows.

First, the parties did not voluntarily notify the merger to the Commission. Following the parties' announcement of the merger on 26 March 2018, the Commission sent a letter to the parties requesting clarification on the details of the merger, and whether the parties intended to notify the merger to the Commission. As the parties had begun transferring Uber's assets to Grab immediately after the announcement, the Commission commenced an investigation into the merger on its own accord on 27 March 2018, as there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the section 54 prohibition had been breached.

Second, while investigations were ongoing, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Interim Measures Directions on 30 March 2018, which was finalised on 13 April 2018 as the Commission's first-ever Interim Measures Directions (IMD) issued in respect of a merger. The purpose of the IMD was to preserve and, to the extent possible, restore competition and market conditions to the pre-transaction state until the completion of the Commission's investigations or the resolution of any competition concerns that may arise from the transaction, or both, unless otherwise varied or revoked by the Commission owing to material changes in market conditions. The IMD required the parties to, inter alia, not take any action that may lead to the integration of the parties' businesses in Singapore, reduce the viability and saleability of the parties' businesses, and prejudice in any manner the giving of any direction by the Commission under section 69 of the Competition Act. Subsequently, the Commission issued a proposed infringement decision against the parties on 5 July 2018 (which was finalised on 24 September 2018), finding that the acquisition has led to a substantial lessening of competition in the provision of ride-hailing platform services in Singapore.

Apart from directing the parties to take certain remedial measures, the Commission also imposed a total of around S\$13 million in financial penalties on Grab and Uber for completing an irreversible merger that harmed competition, as the transfer of acquired assets between the parties rendered it practically impossible to restore competition and the market conditions to the pre-transaction state. This marked the first time in the Commission's history that financial penalties were imposed in respect of mergers that contravened the section 54 prohibition, which also highlights the risk that companies face when deciding to proceed with a merger without notifying the Commission.

**Commission joins new framework on procedural fairness in antitrust enforcement**

On 16 May 2019, the Commission announced that it has joined the International Competition Network's Framework on Competition Agency Procedures (CAP) as a founding member. The CAP advances basic and non-binding principles on procedural fairness and transparency among competition agencies, and enables closer cooperation between participating agencies through dialogues to better understand each other's processes.

**Commission enters into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Competition Bureau Canada on cooperation of competition and consumer protection laws**

On 17 September 2019, the Commission announced that it has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Competition Bureau Canada (CBC) to facilitate cooperation between the Commission and the CBC in the enforcement of their respective national competition and consumer protection laws. This is the first MOU between the Commission and an overseas enforcement agency that covers both competition and consumer protection laws. The MOU seeks to formalise and reinforce existing cooperation and technical assistance activities between the Commission and the CBC, including areas such as case notification, information exchange, enforcement coordination, as well as technical cooperation and experience sharing.

**Impact of covid-19 on merger control**

As at 1 May 2020, the Commission has not issued any guidance on its approach to investigating and enforcing competition laws in the context of the covid-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, the Commission has stated that it remains operational, albeit with the vast majority of its team telecommuting. Parties seeking to file a merger or other notification are encouraged to contact the Commission via email, and the Commission will provide guidance on the filing of such notifications.

# Slovakia

Zuzana Hodoňová

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Merger control, as well as other aspects of competition law, is substantially governed by Act No. 136/2001 on Protection of Economic Competition (the Act). The Act became effective on 1 May 2001 and was last amended by Act No. 350/2016 with effect from 27 December 2016.

Details concerning the content of the notification and the respective documents required are set forth in Decree No. 170/2014, which entered into force on 1 July 2014. In addition, some other aspects are regulated by soft law, such as the guidelines on pre-notification contacts, turnover calculation, details of simplified notification, details of granting an exemption from the prohibition of merger implementation and the guidelines on ancillary restraints.

The filing fee is determined by the Act on Administrative Fees. The General Administrative Procedural Act applies to any procedural matters not specifically regulated in the Act.

The relevant authority for merger control (and competition law in general) is the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO). More information on the AMO may be found on its website.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act defines the following as a concentration (if on a lasting basis):

- a merger or amalgamation of two or more separate undertakings (including mergers and amalgamations pursuant to special legislation, as well as 'economic mergers', namely, situations whereby the undertakings concerned become economically combined, while retaining their legal independence, especially in the case of joint economic management);
- the acquisition of direct or indirect control by an undertaking or several undertakings over another undertaking, its part or their parts; or
- the creation of a joint venture controlled by two or more independent undertakings, performing all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint venture) on a lasting basis.

A concentration does not arise if banks, branches of foreign banks, insurance companies or other financial institutions, the normal activities of which include trading in securities on their own accounts or on the accounts of others, temporarily acquire securities with a view to reselling them. This exemption only applies if they do not exercise voting and other rights with a view to influencing the competitive behaviour of that undertaking or if they exercise these voting rights only with a view to preparing for the sale of the entire undertaking or part thereof or the sale of securities, and upon such sale, they will lose the control,

provided that this sale is effected within one year of the date of acquisition of the securities. If the disposal is not reasonably possible within this period of time, it may – upon request – be extended by the AMO. Further exemptions exist under special laws; for example, regarding the acquisition of control over an undertaking by liquidation trustees under the Commercial Code or by the bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy Act.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture controlled by two or more independent undertakings, performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint venture), constitutes a concentration. If the creation of such joint venture has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings, the AMO appraises such coordination in accordance with the cartel prohibition (articles 4 and 5 of the Act).

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

According to the Act, 'control' is the ability to exercise a decisive influence on the activities of an undertaking, especially by means of:

- ownership rights or other rights; and
- rights, contracts or other facts allowing the exercising of a decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions taken by bodies belonging to the undertaking.

Minority interests are caught only provided that they confer control by any of the means described above.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The AMO must be notified of a concentration where in the business year preceding the concentration:

- the combined aggregate Slovak turnover of the undertakings concerned amounted to at least €46 million and each of at least two of the undertakings concerned achieved a turnover of at least €14 million in Slovakia; or
- the worldwide aggregate turnover of at least one of the undertakings concerned amounted to at least €46 million; and
- in case of a merger or amalgamation of two or more separate undertakings (including mergers and amalgamations pursuant to special legislation, as well as 'economic mergers' (ie, situations whereby the undertakings concerned become economically combined, while retaining their legal independence, especially in

the case of joint economic management)) the aggregate turnover of at least one other undertaking concerned amounted to at least €14 million in Slovakia; or

- in case of the acquisition of direct or indirect control by an undertaking or several undertakings over another undertaking or part of another undertaking or undertakings, the target (different from the undertaking meeting the worldwide €46 million threshold) generated an aggregate turnover of at least €14 million in Slovakia; or
- in case of the creation of a joint venture controlled by two or more independent undertakings, performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint venture), the aggregate turnover of at least one undertaking concerned creating a joint venture (which must be different from the undertaking meeting the worldwide €46 million threshold) amounted to at least €14 million in Slovakia.

For the purpose of turnover calculation, 'turnover' means a total of revenues, yields or incomes from the sale of goods or services, to which – if applicable – in addition, financial assistance granted to the undertaking has to be added. Financial assistance means financial aid granted from public sources, which concerns an activity performed by the undertaking and will be reflected in the price of its goods, and the undertaking is the recipient of the respective aid.

The aggregate turnover of an undertaking concerned includes:

- 1 the turnover of the undertaking concerned;
- 2 the turnover of undertakings in which the undertaking concerned directly or indirectly:
  - holds more than 50 per cent of the share capital;
  - is entitled to exercise more than 50 per cent of the voting rights;
  - has the right to appoint more than 50 per cent of the members of bodies belonging to the undertaking; or
  - has the right to manage the undertaking;
- 3 the turnover of undertakings having the rights referred to in (2) in an undertaking concerned;
- 4 the turnover of undertakings in which the undertakings referred to in (3) have the rights referred to in (2); and
- 5 the turnover of undertakings in which two or more undertakings referred to in (1) to (4) have joint rights as referred to in (2).

In case of an acquisition of direct or indirect control over an undertaking or part of one undertaking or several undertakings, only the turnover pertaining to the acquired undertaking (or the relevant parts thereof) being subject to the concentration is taken into account for the purpose of turnover calculation.

Turnover generated by sales or services between companies belonging to the same group is not taken into account. The turnover generated from the sales between the joint venture and other undertakings shall be proportionally divided among the parties to the concentration.

Two or more concentrations that are effected between the same undertakings or between undertakings from the same respective economic groups within two years are deemed to constitute one single concentration that occurred on the date of the occurrence of the last concentration.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If a transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Act and exceeds the jurisdictional thresholds, filing is mandatory.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign transactions are subject to Slovak merger control if they qualify as a concentration and meet the jurisdictional thresholds set out above. The currently applicable jurisdictional thresholds (which entered into force in January 2012) intensified the local nexus requirement of notifiable concentrations. As a result, many foreign-to-foreign transactions that previously required a merger notification in Slovakia today usually fall outside the scope of the AMO's jurisdiction.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no special rules on foreign investments.

Approval or at least a notification of acquisitions of interests above certain thresholds is required in certain other sectors, including energy, finance and media.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no explicit filing deadline. However, in any event the concentration has to be notified to the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) prior to its implementation (ie, before any rights or obligations resulting from a concentration are executed) and after:

- an agreement on which the concentration is based has been concluded;
- the acceptance of a bid in a public tender has been announced;
- a state authority's decision has been delivered to an undertaking (eg, certain sector-specific approvals);
- announcement of a takeover bid;
- the day on which the European Commission informed an undertaking that the transaction falls within the jurisdiction of the AMO; or
- the day on which a particular event that led to the concentration occurred.

The notification can also be filed with the AMO prior to the conclusion of an agreement or other event causing the concentration to arise, provided that it results in a concentration that requires a filing with the AMO. Such notification must also contain reasoning and documents certifying the facts essential for the concentration.

In the event of a failure to notify the concentration, the AMO shall impose a fine of:

- up to 10 per cent of the undertaking's worldwide turnover generated in the preceding business year; or
- up to €330,000 on an undertaking that generated turnover not exceeding €330 or has not achieved any turnover, or when its turnover cannot be calculated.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The responsibility for the submission of the filing depends on the type of the concentration. Against this background, the filing has to be submitted:

- jointly by the parties to the concentration in the case of a merger or amalgamation of two or more independent undertakings;
- in the case of a public tender, by the selected bidder;



- in the case of a decision issued by a state authority on a merger or amalgamation of undertakings pursuant to special legislation, by the parties to the concentration jointly;
- in the case of a takeover bid, by the proposer of the takeover bid; and
- in any other cases, the notification has to be submitted by the undertaking or undertakings that acquire control over another undertaking or its part or other undertakings or their parts.

The filing fee is determined by the Act on Administrative Fees. It currently amounts to €5,000. As of 1 March 2016, the filing fee is paid based on the payment order issued by the AMO. If the parties wish to evidence the payment together with the merger notification (and thus avoid losing time with additional formal letters), the AMO should be contacted at least one day before the actual notification and application for the payment order.

### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The waiting period falls under the statutory timetable for clearance.

The intended concentration must not be implemented prior to clearance (ie, the undertakings concerned may not exercise rights or obligations arising from the intended concentration until the AMO issues a clearance decision (suspension obligation)).

However, Act No. 136/2001 on Protection of Economic Competition (the Act) recognises the following exemptions:

- In the case of a public tender, the selected bidder may make its bid provided that it does not exercise the voting rights arising in relation to the implementation of the bid.
- The implementation of a public takeover bid or of transactions with securities at the securities market through which control is acquired from various subjects, provided that:
  - such concentration is immediately notified to the AMO (ie, in practice, as soon as the acquirer learns that it has acquired control); and
  - the acquirer of the control does not exercise its voting rights related to these securities or only does so to maintain the full value of its investments based on an individual exemption granted by the AMO.
- Under exceptional circumstances, the AMO may (upon request of the parties) grant an exemption from the standstill obligation if there are 'serious reasons'; for example, serious financial problems or insolvency threats. The AMO has to decide on the exemption request within 20 working days of its submission (however, if the AMO asks for the further information, the clock may be stopped). The exemption should generally concern only the performance of certain urgent actions if no threat to competition is identified. The AMO may bind the grant of the exemption to conditions and commitments to ensure effective competition.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If the suspension obligation is breached (closing before clearance), the AMO shall impose fines.

In addition, the AMO may oblige the parties to restore the level of competition that existed prior to the implementation of the concentration, especially by ordering the division of a company or the transfer of rights, the imposing of other obligations.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for closing before clearance are applicable also in case of foreign-to-foreign mergers. During the past few years, the AMO imposed fines in the range of €1,000 to €600,000 for infringing the standstill obligation. In three instances, such fines have been imposed on undertakings based outside the Slovak Republic (in particular in the Czech Republic and Hungary).

On 16 October 2018, the AMO Department of Concentrations issued a decision imposing a fine in an aggregate amount of €600,000 on entrepreneur J&T Finance Group SE, Czech Republic (JTFG), and a fine in an aggregate amount of €7,751 on Ladislav Bődök, Slovak Republic (LB). In the decision, the AMO submitted that the parties to the proceedings breached the Act as they failed to notify a concentration resulting from the acquisition of joint control by the entrepreneurs JTFG and LB over PantaRhei. The parties to the proceedings also breached the Act as a result of exercising their rights and obligations resulting from the aforementioned concentration before the issuance of a valid decision concerning that concentration, which had already been implemented to the fullest extent (ie, the entrepreneur JTFG had acquired an ownership interest in PantaRhei), and this was followed by exercising joint control over that company by the parties to the proceedings.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

In general, foreign-to-foreign concentrations are assessed and treated in the same way as domestic concentrations. The Act does not provide for hold-separate (carve-out) solutions.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Certain actions related to public takeover bids are – by law – exempted from the standstill obligation.

### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Details concerning the content of the notification and the respective documents required are set forth in Decree No. 170/2014, which entered into force on 1 July 2014. The Decree sets out the following situations where a short-form notification may be submitted:

- an undertaking intends to acquire sole control over another undertaking in which it already exercises joint control;
- there is no horizontal or vertical overlap between the undertakings concerned under any alternative definition of the relevant market; or
- the combined market share of the parties concerned (including their affiliated companies) is less than 15 per cent at the horizontal level and individually or combined less than 30 per cent at the vertical level, also under any alternative definition of the relevant markets.

A short-form notification must contain only a limited level of information, in particular:

- information on the parties to the concentration (ie, their business activities);
- description of the concentration;
- information on the capital, financial and personnel structure;

- general market information (eg, list of all categories of goods produced or imported including the respective territories, possible product or geographical market definition based on such product categories, statement on the (non-)existence of affected markets and the possibility to use the short-form notification, total market size, individual market shares held by the parties, most important competitors);
- information on cooperative effects of a joint venture;
- reasons for and effects of the concentration and the impact on competition;
- information on other applicable competition authorities; and
- underlying documentation.

If the criteria for the submission of a short-form notification are not met, the usual long-form notification must be submitted that requires the parties to submit, in addition to the limited information contained in a short-form notification, rather extensive data on the affected markets and their functioning.

Together with the notification, a power of attorney must be submitted, which is not, however, required to be notarised and apostilled. If some of the required information is not available or known, the parties may ask (in the filing) for a waiver from providing such data and provide their best estimates or at least an indication of from where the AMO could get the information. Also, if some information is not deemed as relevant for the assessment of the concentration, the parties may ask the AMO to agree with the waiver.

The filing and all documents must be submitted in the Slovak language with the certified translation or the affidavit that the uncertified translations are correct and complete. Also, if only copies are submitted, the affidavit declaring the identity of the copy with the original is required. In practice, the AMO tends to agree with the submission of certain documents (such as annual reports) in English or the translation of only certain parts thereof into Slovak.

The submission of false or incomplete information in a merger filing is subject to fines, which may amount up to 1 per cent of the total turnover for the preceding accounting period.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

In practice, it is our experience that the AMO adheres to mandatory deadlines and usually strives to clear cases within Phase I proceedings. The Act does not provide for the possibility to request expedited proceedings.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The AMO recommends that pre-notification contacts are initiated before the notification is formally submitted with the AMO, even if the case does not raise substantial merger control concerns. Although the provision of a draft merger notification is not mandatory, practice shows that this is usually welcomed by the AMO. Pre-notification contacts should be initiated at least two weeks prior to the intended formal submission of the notification to the AMO.

Following the formal submission of the notification, the AMO issues an official letter informing the parties about the initiation of proceedings. Then the AMO assesses the completeness of the filing. It is recommendable to be in contact with the authority during this stage to ensure that this period is short. If the AMO finds that the submitted notification does not contain all the required information, it will issue a request for additional information (which will stop the clock). Once the filing is accepted as 'complete', the AMO issues an official confirmation letter to this effect.

The subsequent handling of the case depends on whether Phase I or Phase II proceedings are applied.

If the concentration does not require an in-depth analysis owing to the identification of competition concerns as to its compatibility with the Slovak competition law rules, the AMO issues a decision within 25 working days of the receipt of the notification (Phase I proceedings). This decision usually contains only a 'simplified reasoning', essentially some general information about the parties to the concentration, the business sectors or relevant markets where they are active.

In cases that require in-depth analysis because of the identification of competition law concerns (Phase II proceedings), within the deadline for the Phase I proceedings the parties must be informed about the initiation of Phase II proceedings in writing. Once the AMO has initiated Phase II, it must issue a decision within 90 working days following the date of delivery of the written notification about the initiation of Phase II to the parties.

If the AMO requests from the parties additional information or documents that it considers relevant for the assessment of the case, this effectively stops the clock. If the notification contains false (misleading) information, the clock is reset and newly starts running only as of the day following the delivery of the true information. At the request of the parties or with their consent, the AMO may prolong the Phase I and II periods, even repeatedly, by a total of up to 30 working days at most.

If the concentration raises competition law concerns, the AMO may request the parties in writing (including reasoning) to propose conditions (commitments) within 30 working days upon delivery of such request. Such request effectively stops the clock, namely, the above-described Phase I and II review or decision-making periods are not in effect until the parties submit their proposed conditions or commitments or the expiry of the 30-working-day period (whichever occurs first). At justified request, the 30-working-day deadline may be prolonged or the AMO may accept the proposal even after its expiry in exceptional cases. Moreover, inspired by the European Commission's practice, the AMO may test the proposed conditions or commitments by addressing them to natural persons or legal entities, publishing or in another manner or may appoint an independent trustee to supervise the fulfilment of such conditions or commitments.

Before issuing its final decision in Phase II, the AMO is required to inform the parties about its assessment of the matter and conclusions and asks them to provide their comments (if any) in writing. Subsequently, the final decision is issued and delivered to the parties. The decision becomes valid and effective if it is not appealed within 15 days of the delivery or the parties waive the right of appeal.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) follows the significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) test, which is also applied by the European Commission. Therefore, the AMO assesses whether the concentration does not significantly distort effective competition on the relevant market, in particular owing to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. We are not aware of any cases where the AMO took into account the 'failing firm' defence.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures. The AMO has to assess additionally in the case of joint ventures, the possible coordination of competitive behaviour according to section 4 of the Act.

## Theories of harm

### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The AMO examines whether the concentration will not significantly impede effective competition in the relevant market, in particular owing to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

This may especially be the case if an undertaking or several undertakings are not subject to substantial competition or can act independently as a result of their economic power. As Act No. 136/2001 on Protection of Economic Competition (the Act) does not contain any market share presumptions, each case requires an individual assessment on a case-by-case basis.

The Act does not list specific additional factors to be taken into account by the AMO for the purpose of its assessment. In practice, however, the AMO usually considers various factors, including the market position of the undertakings concerned, market structure and possible future developments, barriers to entry, existence of competitors, intentions of companies to enter the market, supply and demand structure, price development, etc.

When assessing the concentration on this basis, the AMO enjoys wide discretion. Inter alia, it takes into account the European Commission's guidelines on the assessment of horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, the guidelines on the definition of the relevant market and other relevant soft law.

## Non-competition issues

### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Act does not expressly mention non-competition issues as being relevant for the assessment process. However, as the AMO enjoys wide discretionary powers for analysing the effects of the concentration and tends to follow in general the practice applied under the EU merger control regime, it is not unlikely that the AMO would take into account non-competition issues in a similar way as the European Commission.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Act does not expressly mention economic efficiencies. In practice, however, the AMO would most likely take them into consideration (in particular if the parties refer to them in the notification).

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Based on the assessment of the concentration under the substantial test, the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) may issue:

- a decision approving the concentration;
- a decision approving the concentration provided that certain conditions and obligations imposed on the undertakings concerned are observed and met; or
- a prohibition decision.

After clearance has been granted, the AMO:

- on its own initiative, has to reverse a decision that has been made subject to conditions and decide on the concentration anew if the parties fail to fulfil the conditions imposed;

- at the request of the parties, may change a decision that has been made subject to conditions if:
  - the situation on the relevant market has changed so substantially that the imposed conditions or obligations are no longer justified; or
  - the parties request the prolongation of the fulfilment deadline, because they cannot fulfil the conditions or obligations for serious reasons; or
- on its own initiative, may change or reverse a decision if:
  - information relevant for granting clearance later proves incomplete or wrong; or
  - the parties fail to fulfil the commitments related to the condition imposed in the decision.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

At the request of the AMO, the notifying party may submit proposals suggesting certain conditions and related commitments in view of eliminating competition law concerns. In general, the AMO accepts both structural and behavioural remedies.

The AMO may test draft conditions and commitments by directly inviting natural persons and legal entities to provide comments and observations, making them public on its website or in any other manner. Inter alia, the conditions and commitments may include an obligation to appoint an independent trustee who monitors the compliance with the agreed conditions and commitments at the costs of the parties.

### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

If the AMO identifies competition law concerns, the notifying party is obliged within 30 working days to provide a proposal for commitments and conditions. If the notifying party fails to meet this deadline, the AMO may prohibit the concentration. The AMO does not usually consider any proposals submitted after the expiry of the 30 working days deadline. However, upon a justified request, the AMO may accept them even after the expiry of the deadline provided that the remaining time period for issuing the decision still allows for a proper review or assessment of the proposal.

### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

We are not aware of any foreign-to-foreign mergers where the AMO has requested remedies.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The clearance decision of the AMO usually covers restrictions directly related to and necessary for the implementation of the intended concentration. Details are set out in the AMO's Guidelines on Restrictions of Competition Relating Directly to a Concentration and Being Essential for its Realisation.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The fact that a notification has been submitted is made public on the website of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) and the Commercial Bulletin, inviting third parties to submit their observations and comments on the intended concentration.

Although third parties thus have the right to be heard, they do not enjoy procedural rights comparable with those of the notifying parties (eg, third parties in particular generally have no right to appeal the AMO's decision). However, they may receive access to the file based on article 40(1) of Act No. 136/2001 on Protection of Economic Competition if they are able to demonstrate their legitimate interest.

The AMO may also gather information ex officio, in particular by contacting customers and competitors to get their opinions on the intended concentration or for requesting information, clarifications or documents related to the concentration. The AMO may also market test the proposals for conditions or commitments.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The fact that a notification has been submitted is made public on the website of the AMO and in the Commercial Bulletin. The AMO also publishes its decisions in a similar way. The AMO may, however, not disclose information or documents that contain business secrets subject to protection under special laws (eg, banking secrecy) or that are marked as confidential information. In practice, it is therefore recommended to explicitly mark any business or confidential information as such in the notification and any other comments, statements and documents sent to the AMO, including reasoning as to why confidentiality has been requested. To be specific, as regards notification of the concentration, the notifying party is obliged to provide reasons for the requested confidentiality and provide a non-confidential version of the notification. The AMO published guidance on the assessment of information marked as business secrets, confidential information or personal data.

Otherwise, the parties may be requested by the AMO to provide a non-confidential version of the information or documentation, including reasons for the requested confidentiality. Only under exceptional circumstances could the protected information be made accessible by the AMO to another party to the proceedings (with the consent of the affected party) or to its representative (in the absence of such consent). Decisions issued within Phase I are rather short and contain only the simplified reasoning.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The AMO is a member of the European Competition Network and the International Competition Network. It actively cooperates with competition authorities that are members of these networks. According to the annual report of the AMO, its employees were actively involved in European Commission cases as rapporteurs within the Advisory Committee as well as in various working groups with the European Commission. Moreover, the AMO maintains close cooperation with the Czech competition authority, including the regular exchange of experience and know-how, discussion of legal and other current issues and

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the organisation of seminars, conferences and workshops. Bilateral cooperation also exists with the Hungarian and Austrian competition authorities.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Within 15 days of its delivery, the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO)'s decision may be appealed with the Council of the AMO (the Council). The decision of the Council may be appealed with the Regional Court Bratislava within two months of its delivery. The decision of the Regional Court Bratislava may be challenged only in limited occasions with the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic based on the special remedy.

Filings with the courts do not have a suspensive effect. However, the courts may grant a suspension of the enforceability of the decision at the party's request, provided that serious harm would otherwise occur to the applicant.

There are only very few cases where the AMO has prohibited concentrations in the past (and thus merger control decisions of the AMO have been only very rarely challenged).

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The Council of the AMO is obliged to issue a decision within six months. However, this time frame may be (repeatedly) prolonged by up to 24 months in complex cases. The judicial review performed by the Regional Court Bratislava and the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic is not subject to any time restrictions; therefore, the time frame largely depends on the complexity of the case and cooperation of the parties.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

All notified concentrations in 2019 were approved. The numbers of both administrative proceedings and decisions concerning mergers have been stable over the past three years. In several cases where

the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) had competition concerns in recent years, parties have refrained from offering commitments to overcome those concerns and instead decided to discontinue the intended transaction, withdrawing the notification and closing the proceedings. In recent years, there has been a trend indicating increased activity of the AMO aimed at fining parties to non-notified mergers for the implementation of these mergers without having first obtained the AMO's clearance.

The AMO does not distinguish between local mergers and foreign-to-foreign mergers in its assessment. All foreign-to-foreign mergers that have been notified to the AMO have been cleared.

### **Reform proposals**

#### **35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?**

There is a proposal to further amend Act No. 136/2001 on Protection of Economic Competition in the near future, as well as a part of the act concerning merger assessments.

## **UPDATE AND TRENDS**

### **Key developments of the past year**

#### **36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?**

The past year has seen preparations made for an amendment to Act No. 136/2001 on Protection of Economic Competition, which should be presented in greater detail after being approved through the legislative procedure.

# Slovenia

Klemen Radosavljevic and Tjaša Lahovnik

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

In Slovenia, merger control, as well as other aspects of competition law, is substantially governed by the Act on the Prevention of Restrictions of Competition (the Act). The Act became effective in 2008 and was amended in June 2009, April 2011, November 2011, July 2012, August 2013, April 2014, October 2015 and May 2017.

The information and documents to submit in a merger control notification are set out in the Decree Defining the Contents of the Concentration of Companies Notification Form. The filing fees are determined by the Administrative Fees Act. With regard to procedural matters that are not specifically regulated in the Act, the General Administrative Procedure Act applies.

The relevant authority for merger control (and competition law in general) is the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA), which is competent for receiving, reviewing and issuing decisions on notified concentrations. In fulfilling its competencies, the CPA acts independently and autonomously.

The Agency Director and the Agency Council are the main bodies of the CPA. The latter consists of five members who are appointed by the parliament for a term of five years. The Agency Director is the chairman (president) of the Agency Council. For each case, the Agency Council sets up a separate decision panel (which consists of all members of the Agency Council who in turn appoint from their midst a panel chairman). The merger control review procedure until the adoption of the decision is then conducted by a public officer authorised by the Agency Director.

The decision to impose a fine (in cases envisaged by the Act) is adopted in a separate procedure that is decided by a panel composed of three members of the Agency Council and employees of the CPA. The panels adopt decisions by a majority of votes in sessions that are not open to the public. More information about the CPA and its activities can be found online.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act defines the following as concentrations:

- the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings;
- the acquisition of direct or indirect control of one or more other undertakings, in whole or in part, by one or more natural persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchasing of securities or assets, entering into a contract or by any other means; or

- creation of a joint venture by two or more independent undertakings, performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

A concentration does not arise if banks, insurance companies, savings institutions or other financial institutions, the normal activities of which include transactions and dealing in securities for their own account or for the account of others, hold business assets on a temporary basis that they have acquired in an undertaking with a view towards reselling them. This exemption only applies provided that they do not exercise any voting rights in respect of those business assets with a view towards determining the competitive behaviour of such an undertaking or that they exercise these voting rights only with a view towards preparing for the disposal of business assets and that any such disposal takes place within one year of the date of acquisition. If the disposal is not reasonably possible within this period of time, it may – upon request – be extended by the CPA.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a joint venture by two or more independent undertakings, performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity (full-function joint venture), constitutes a concentration. If the creation of this joint venture has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent (ie, the joint venture partners), the CPA appraises this coordination in accordance with the cartel prohibition (prohibition of restrictive agreements; article 6 of the Act). If the CPA concludes that the exemption criteria set out in article 6 of the Act are not met, it will not approve the concentration (article 11(3) of the Act).

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

According to the Act, 'control' may be obtained through rights, contracts or any other means that separately or together, taking into account facts and regulations, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking or part of an undertaking, in particular on the basis of:

- ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; or
- rights or contracts that confer a decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of an undertaking.

Control is acquired by individuals or undertakings that are holders of rights or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned, or while not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights under such contracts, have the power to exercise the rights deriving from the contracts.

Minority interests are caught only provided that they confer control by any of the means described above.



## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The CPA must be notified of a concentration where in the business year preceding the concentration:

- the combined turnover of the undertakings concerned (including undertakings belonging to the same group) exceeded €35 million in Slovenia; and
- either the turnover of the undertaking acquired (ie, the target), including undertakings belonging to the same group, exceeded €1 million in Slovenia, or in the case of the creation of a full-function joint venture, the turnover of at least two undertakings concerned (including undertakings belonging to the same group) exceeded €1 million in Slovenia.

Even where these turnover thresholds are not met, the undertakings concerned should inform the CPA of the implementation of a concentration, if a combined market share of the undertakings concerned exceeds 60 per cent in Slovenia. The CPA may then request a notification of the concentration within 15 days following the date on which the undertakings concerned informed the CPA (article 42(3) of the Act). At present, it is unclear whether the above market share test would also be met if one undertaking concerned alone represents a market share exceeding 60 per cent and there are no overlaps with the other undertaking or undertakings concerned.

The undertaking or undertakings concerned are the merging undertakings, the undertaking gaining control over another undertaking (ie, the acquirer), the acquired undertaking (target), and undertakings creating a notifiable joint venture.

For the purpose of turnover calculation, the net revenues from the sale of products and the provision of services in Slovenia have to be taken into account. Turnover generated by sales or services between companies belonging to the same group is not taken into account. Where the concentration consists of the acquisition of control in part of one or more undertakings, regardless of whether these parts qualify as a legal entity, only the turnover relating to the parts that are subject to the concentration are taken into account for the purpose of turnover calculation. Two or more transactions that take place within a two-year period between the same persons or undertakings are treated as one and the same concentration arising on the date of the last transaction.

Specific rules apply to the calculation of the turnover of credit and financial institutions where the financial income from shares, loans granted and operating receivables has to be taken into account. With regard to insurance companies, the amount of the gross premiums written is relevant, comprising all revenues and receivables from insurance contracts, including reinsurance premiums paid, after the deduction of taxes or contributions associated with insurance premiums.

Concentrations falling within the jurisdiction of the European Merger Control Regulation are not subject to the Slovenian merger control regime (one-stop-shop principle).

### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If a transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of the Act and exceeds the jurisdictional thresholds, filing is mandatory.

### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign concentrations are subject to merger control if jurisdictional thresholds are met. The undertakings concerned could be exposed to fines in the case of a breach of the filing obligation. It is not required that any of the undertakings concerned have a registered seat or local branch in Slovenia. To date, the CPA's practice has not developed a de minimis or effects-based exemption.

### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The Act does not contain any provisions that would specifically relate to foreign investment or special sectors. However, provisions related to merger control and other relevant approvals can be found, inter alia, in the following areas.

#### Media sector

The Act applies to media mergers in the usual way (ie, the CPA is competent to review, assess and clear or prohibit the concentration if the jurisdictional thresholds are met). However, according to the Media Act, in addition, a special consent granted by the Ministry of Culture is required for the acquisition of shareholdings (or voting rights) of 20 per cent or more in publishers of radio or TV programmes or printed daily newspapers. According to article 58(3) of the Media Act, the Ministry of Culture may refuse to grant such approval if the merger results in the creation of a dominant position:

- on the advertising market;
- in the media market where coverage of more than 15 per cent of analogue terrestrial radio programmes is reached on the Slovenian market for radio programmes transmitted via analogue terrestrial radio signals;
- in the media market where coverage of more than 30 per cent of analogue terrestrial television programmes is reached on the Slovenian market for television programmes transmitted via analogue terrestrial radio signals; or
- where the number of issues of daily newspapers exceeds 40 per cent of all sold issues of daily informative printed media in the Republic of Slovenia that is issued at least three times a week.

#### Energy sector

In the energy sector, the role of the market regulator is performed by the Agency for Energy. According to the Energy Act, it is, inter alia, competent to supervise the transparency and competitiveness of the electricity and gas markets. In this function, the Agency for Energy may be involved in the assessment of sector-specific mergers.

#### Electronic communications sector

The market regulator in the electronic communications sector is the Agency for Communication Networks and Services of the Republic of Slovenia (ACNS). The Electronic Communication Act provides specific rules for the cooperation between the ACNS and the CPA. Inter alia, both authorities are authorised to exchange relevant information and cooperate in determining and analysing relevant markets and identifying significant market power. The ACNS is also competent to define relevant markets and to assess significant market power. Hence, in practice, it is likely that the CPA will involve the ACNS when assessing sector-specific mergers.

#### Financial sector

In the case of the acquisition of 'qualified shareholdings' (ie, above 10, 20, 33 and 50 per cent), the laws regulating banks, insurance companies, stock brokerage companies and fund management companies

require the approval of the respective regulatory bodies. Obtaining such shareholding without the prior consent of the competent regulatory body results in the loss of voting rights based on the shares beyond the qualified shareholding.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A merger notification has to be submitted to the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA) no later than 30 days after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of a public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest (whichever of these triggering events occurs first). If the CPA requests the parties to notify the concentration because their combined market share in Slovenia exceeds 60 per cent, the merger notification must be submitted no later than 30 days from receipt of this request.

In the case of a failure to notify the concentration within the filing deadline, the CPA may impose fines in the amount of up to 10 per cent of the annual turnover generated by the undertakings involved in the concentration (including other undertakings belonging to the same group) in the preceding business year. In addition, a fine between €5,000 and €10,000 may be imposed on the responsible persons of such undertakings and (if applicable) a fine between €3,000 and €5,000 on a natural person already controlling at least one undertaking.

If the nature of the infringement of the filing obligation is particularly serious (eg, owing to the amount of damage inflicted, the pecuniary benefit, the infringer's intent or unlawful gain), a fine between €15,000 and €30,000 may be imposed on the responsible person of a legal entity, and (if applicable) a fine of between €10,000 and €15,000 on a natural person already controlling at least one undertaking.

With regard to the sanctions for closing before clearance.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Concentrations that consist of a merger or acquisition of joint control have to be notified jointly by the undertakings involved in the merger, or by those acquiring joint control. In all other cases, the undertaking acquiring control is responsible for the filing.

The filing fee is determined by the Administrative Fees Act. At present, it amounts to €2,000.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The intended concentration must not be implemented prior to clearance, as undertakings are not allowed to exercise rights and obligations arising from the intended concentration until the CPA issues a clearance decision (suspension obligation).

If the CPA requested the parties to notify the concentration because their combined market share in Slovenia exceeds 60 per cent, the undertakings must cease implementing the concentration as of the date of receipt of this request.

Under exceptional circumstances, the CPA may (upon the request of the parties) permit the implementation of the concentration prior to clearance, if such an implementation is essential to maintain the full value of the investment or to perform services of general interest.

The suspension obligation does not have an effect on the implementation of public bids pursuant to the Slovenian Takeovers Act, provided that the acquirer does not exercise voting rights (or exercises

them only according to a permit for early implementation granted by the CPA).

The duration of the waiting period depends on whether Phase I or Phase II proceedings are applied.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

In the case of closing before clearance, the CPA may impose fines.

In addition, the CPA may file a legal action with the competent civil court to declare the implementation (the exercise of rights and obligations), which is contrary to the suspension obligation, null and void (articles 12(4) and 44(3) of the Act on the Prevention of Restrictions of Competition (the Act)). We are not aware that this legal action has so far been filed by the CPA.

Also, according to article 53 of the Act, the CPA may impose measures on the undertakings concerned to restore the situation prevailing prior to the implementation, in particular through the division of the undertaking or the disposal of all the shares acquired. The latter of these measures has recently been applied in a merger between two Slovenian newspaper companies (the acquirer was ordered to dispose of the acquired 75 per cent shareholding).

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The sanctions for closing before clearance are also applicable with regard to foreign-to-foreign mergers. There is one case currently pending before the CPA, where the CPA is evaluating whether the implementation of a non-notified concentration was compatible with Slovenian competition rules. If it is established that the undertakings concerned did not comply with Slovenian competition rules, the CPA may apply sanctions and declare the concentration null and void. In the same case, the CPA already imposed a sanction for failure to notify in the amount of approximately €54 million. The CPA also seized the shares of the Slovenian subsidiary of the acquirer as collateral for the payment of the fine (once final).

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

In principle, foreign-to-foreign concentrations are assessed in the same way as local concentrations. Hence, under exceptional circumstances, the CPA may (upon the request of the parties) permit the implementation of the concentration prior to clearance, if such implementation is essential to maintain the full value of the investment or to perform services of general interest.

The Act does not explicitly provide for hold-separate (carve-out) solutions. Given that the Slovenian merger control regime assesses the effects of a merger in the Slovenian market, depending on the transaction structure, one could argue that it is possible to carve out the transaction steps related to the Slovenian market and to proceed with the implementation outside Slovenia without infringing the Slovenian suspension obligation. Although widely discussed in practice, we are not aware that such solutions have been tested with the CPA so far.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Public takeover bids are primarily monitored by the Slovenian Security Market Agency and subject to the provisions of the Slovenian Act on Takeovers. The CPA has to be informed of the intended public bid by a simple written notice on the day such intention is published. Also, the CPA must be provided with the bid document (ie, the prospectus).

Public takeovers that lead to notifiable concentrations within the meaning of the Act require the submission of a merger notification to the CPA no later than 30 days after the announcement of the public bid. Importantly, the suspension obligation does not apply to the implementation of public bids within the meaning of the Slovenian Takeovers Act, provided that the acquirer does not exercise voting rights or exercises them only according to permission for early implementation granted by the CPA.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The information and documentation to be submitted in a merger notification are set out in the Decree Defining the Contents of the Concentration of Companies Notification Form (the Form). The Form requires the parties to provide quite substantial information on the concentration, as well as on the relevant markets, market shares and market size. Inter alia, the following needs to be provided:

- information on the parties to the concentration (eg, name, registered seat, contact person, nature of business, ownership and control; personal and financial links and previous acquisitions; annual reports);
- description of the intended concentration;
- originals or certified copies of all documents on the basis of which the concentration takes place;
- definition of the relevant markets;
- the total size of the relevant markets and market shares of the undertakings concerned;
- information on main competitors, customers and suppliers, the structure of supply and demand, market entry, the relevance of research and development, efficiency gains, etc;
- information on indispensable ancillary restrictions; and
- (if available) copies of analyses, reports or studies related to the relevant market.

The Slovenian merger control regime does not provide for a short-form notification. Therefore, as a general rule, each notification has to include all the (detailed) information requested in the Form. However, if the (combined) market shares after the concentration are lower than 15 per cent (horizontal relationships) or 25 per cent (vertical relationships) in the relevant product market, the parties may limit information in relation to such markets. In any case, however, the parties must provide information on the size of the relevant markets, their turnover and market shares in such markets, and information about the largest competitors and their market shares.

The parties may also request from the CPA a waiver from providing certain information required by the Form, if the entire set of such information is, in the opinion of the parties, not necessary for the accurate and complete filing and the assessment of the case.

If some of the information requested in the Form is not available to the parties, this must be stated in the filing, together with information on where the CPA may obtain such information.

The notification and all documents attached thereto need to be submitted in the Slovenian language. Documents on the basis of which the concentration takes place must be provided in certified copies; all other documents attached to the filing may be provided in simple copies.

The notification needs to be complete and must include accurate and true information. If information is missing in the notification, the CPA may request from the notifying party to supplement the required information within the deadline set by the CPA. The notifying party's failure to supplement the notification will trigger a legal presumption that the transaction has not been filed and will make the notifying party subject to the sanctions for failure to notify concentrations.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The CPA decides in Phase I proceedings if the concentration does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the Slovenian competition law rules. The CPA then must issue its decision within 25 working days of the receipt of a complete notification.

In cases that raise serious doubts as to their compatibility with the Slovenian competition law rules, the CPA initiates Phase II proceedings within 25 working days of receipt of a complete notification. Once the CPA has initiated Phase II, it must issue a decision within 60 working days of initiating such proceedings.

If the parties propose remedies, the deadline for issuing the Phase I or Phase II decision is extended by an additional 15 working days.

The waiting period starts running only once a complete notification has been submitted. Hence, if the CPA finds that the submitted notification does not contain all mandatory information, it will issue a request for additional information and the clock does not start running.

There is no legal presumption that the concentration has received approval once the waiting period expires. In general, the parties may in such a case file a legal action with the Administrative Court of Slovenia.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The Act does not provide for the possibility of obtaining a waiver or expedited proceedings and there is no formal procedure in respect of extensions of the waiting periods. There is no legal presumption that the concentration has obtained approval once the statutory waiting period has expired. Therefore, depending on the workload of the CPA, in practice Phase I clearance decisions are often rendered around two to two-and-a-half months after the submission of the notification.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA) assesses whether the intended concentration would result in a significant impediment to effective competition within the territory of Slovenia, or in a substantial part of it, in particular because of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.

We are not aware of cases in which the CPA took somewhat special circumstances into consideration.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No. However, if the creation of a joint venture has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that

remain independent, such coordination is assessed in accordance with the criteria of article 6 of the Act on the Prevention of Restrictions of Competition (the Act).

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Inter alia, the CPA investigates the intended concentration on the basis of the following:

- market position of the undertakings involved in the concentration;
- options for financing the undertakings involved;
- the structure of the market;
- choices and alternatives that are available to suppliers and customers and their access to sources of supply or the market itself;
- barriers to entry;
- supply and demand projections with regard to the relevant markets;
- benefits to intermediate and final customers; and
- technical and economic development (provided that it is advantageous for consumers and does not hinder competition).

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Act does not expressly mention non-competition issues such as industrial policy or public interest issues as being relevant for the assessment process. In practice, however, it is not unlikely that the CPA would take into account non-competition issues in a similar way to the European Commission.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Economic efficiencies (described rather generally as 'technical and economic development') are part of the appraisal of the concentration and are taken into account under the condition that they are advantageous to the consumers and do not hinder competition.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA) assesses whether the intended concentration would result in a significant impediment to effective competition within the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, or on a substantial part of it, in particular owing to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The parties may propose remedies at any time and submit comments and evidence to remove the CPA's concerns. However, ultimately, if the remedies proposed or comments submitted by the parties cannot eliminate the CPA's concern, it may issue a decision declaring the concentration incompatible with Slovenian competition rules.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

According to article 51 of the Act on the Prevention of Restrictions of Competition (the Act), the notifying party may submit remedies to eliminate serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration with

Slovenian competition rules. The Act does not distinguish between structural and behavioural remedies. In practice, depending on the individual cases, both may be accepted by the CPA.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Remedies can be submitted at any time during the proceedings to remove serious doubts as to the compatibility of the concentration with Slovenian competition rules. In this case, the time limit for the CPA to issue its decision is extended by an additional 15 working days.

When assessing the proposed remedies, the CPA takes into account their nature and scope, as well as the likelihood of their effective and timely implementation. If accepted by the CPA, it specifies the adopted remedies, the obligations to ensure their implementation and supervision, and time limits for their implementation in the clearance decision.

Later on, the CPA may require the notifying party to provide a report on the implementation of the remedies imposed.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The CPA was in the past conducting a market test in relation to remedies proposed by undertakings participating in a foreign-to-foreign merger (the transaction concerns the market for the wholesale supply of sports television channels). However, according to public sources, the merger was not cleared.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

In the merger filing, inter alia, the parties have to provide information on indispensable ancillary restrictions related to the transaction. If the CPA issues a clearance decision, either in Phase I or Phase II, that decision is deemed to cover restrictions directly related to and necessary for the implementation of the intended concentration.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA) publishes a list of notified concentrations on its website. Phase I decisions are also made public on the CPA's website. In a similar way, in Phase II proceedings both the fact that such proceedings have been initiated and the final decision are published on the CPA's website. The information on the initiation of Phase II proceedings states the names of the parties, a brief summary of the grounds for initiation of the proceedings, and invites third parties to submit their observations and comments. Decisions of the court issued in a judicial review against the decisions of the CPA are published on the CPA's website in a non-confidential version.

Third parties able to demonstrate their legally recognised interest may lodge an application for participation in the proceedings. Such a request needs to be filed with the CPA within 30 days from the publication of the initiation of proceedings. If the participation in the proceedings is granted, the third party may take part in the entire proceedings, receive access to the file, lodge statements and opinions and, ultimately, challenge the final decision issued by the CPA.

Apart from the above, any third parties, even without formally joining the proceedings, may submit comments and statements to the

CPA at any stage of the Phase I and II proceedings. Although the CPA is not legally obliged to consider such information, it usually takes it into account when assessing the case.

Also, the CPA may, in the course of the proceedings, approach third parties (eg, competitors, customers, suppliers) on its own initiative, in particular via written requests for information.

### Publicity and confidentiality

**30** | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The CPA publishes a list of notified concentrations on its website. Phase I decisions are also made public on the CPA's website. In a similar way, in Phase II proceedings both the fact that such proceedings have been initiated and the final decision are published on the CPA's website. The information on the initiation of Phase II proceedings states the names of the parties, a brief summary of the grounds for initiation of the proceedings, and invites third parties to submit their observations and comments. Decisions of the court issued in a judicial review against the decisions of the CPA are published on the CPA's website in a non-confidential version.

Upon request, the CPA must protect the identity of the complainant or provider of other information, if this person requests protection, and shows that it is likely that disclosure may cause significant harm to it.

Access to the case file may only be granted to the parties to the proceedings. However, inter alia, the parties are not allowed to review or make copies of confidential information or information relating to confidential sources. The burden of proving the existence of such confidential information (eg, business secrets) rests with the undertaking claiming so. The parties may also be asked by the CPA to submit a non-confidential version of their respective documents. It is advisable to explicitly mark any confidential information as such already in the merger notification and any comments, statements and documents sent to the CPA.

The CPA may disclose confidential information that constitutes a business secret to the notifying parties if the need for disclosing this information prevails over the interest in protecting it. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any such case of disclosure with regard to merger proceedings.

Information on the initiation of the procedure as well as the Phase I and II decisions published on the CPA's website are non-confidential versions from which business secrets of the parties have been removed (the CPA requests the parties upfront to provide non-confidential versions of the decisions).

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

**31** | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The CPA is a member of the European Competition Network and the International Competition Network. It also cooperates with the OECD and maintains informal contacts with some competition authorities of non-EU countries in the region.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

**32** | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Legal actions for judicial review against the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA)'s decision can be filed with the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia. The court generally decides without an

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oral hearing. The plaintiff may not put forward any new facts or evidence, unless the plaintiff was not given the chance to put forward facts and evidence in the proceedings in front of the CPA. An appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia can be filed with the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia.

We are not aware of the merger cases that actually went through judicial review, as the undertakings involved usually satisfy the concerns of the CPA by offering corrective measures (commitments).

### Time frame

**33** | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The legal action has to be filed with the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia within 30 days of the date on which the decision of the CPA was served. Because the Administrative Court of the Republic of Slovenia has, in the course of the amendment of the Competition Act in August 2013, only recently become competent for judicial review in first instance, there is not yet much experience concerning its usual time frame for decision-making. The appeal procedure before the second instance court (ie, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia) usually takes between several months and one year until the court issues its decision.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

**34** | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

In the past year, the Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA) was deciding on several merger notifications, whereby the CPA cleared one merger only after the notifying parties proposed sufficient commitments. In several cases the CPA has conducted market tests in relation to the concentration or the proposed commitments. Otherwise the number of the notified (and cleared) mergers is relatively stable throughout recent years.

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

In 2019, the competent ministry prepared a proposed amendment of the Competition Act; the legislative proposal was published in the beginning of 2019. The proposal is aimed at introducing a simplified merger notification procedure. Another important change concerned the possibility of the imposition of fines on undertakings for, among others, infringements of the duty to file a merger notification and infringements of the standstill obligation. Under the current legislation, the CPA may only impose fines in a separate misdemeanour procedure, which is carried out once the administrative procedure has been completed. The legislative proposal, however, envisages merging the administrative and misdemeanour proceedings into one single proceeding that shall render the imposition of fines more efficient pursuant to the ECN+ Directive. However, the legislative proposal was criticised by many of the interested parties, including the CPA, and it was not yet submitted to the parliament to date.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The Slovenian Competition Protection Agency (CPA) appears to have become stricter in assessing the notified concentrations and also started to track non-notified concentrations (in particular foreign-to-foreign mergers). Concerning the latter, the CPA imposed a record fine of approximately €54 million for breaking merger control rules to date.



# South Africa

Burton Phillips and Shawn van der Meulen

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation is the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (the Act) and the regulations promulgated thereto. The Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018 (the Amendment Act), which, but for certain provisions, is now largely in force, has introduced several potentially far-reaching amendments that seek to address the high levels of economic concentration and the ownership profile of the South African economy.

The Act is enforced by the Competition Commission (the Commission), as an investigative body, and the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal), as the adjudicative body. Decisions of the Tribunal can be appealed or taken on review to the Competition Appeal Court (CAC). In circumstances where a competition matter raises constitutional issues or if the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance, such matters can also be referred to the Constitutional Court (CC).

The relevant legislation is the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (the Act) and the regulations promulgated thereto. The Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018 (the Amendment Act), which has been assented to by the president of South Africa, but at the time of writing has not yet come into force, seeks to address the high levels of economic concentration and ownership profile of the South African economy. As a result, several potentially far-reaching amendments have been introduced.

The Act is enforced by the Competition Commission (Commission) and the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal). Decisions by the Tribunal can be appealed or taken on review to the Competition Appeal Court (CAC). In circumstances where a competition matter raises constitutional issues or if the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance, such matters can also be referred to the Constitutional Court (CC).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act stipulates that parties to transactions that meet the following two requirements must notify and obtain the approval of the relevant competition authority. First, the transaction must constitute a 'merger' as defined in the Act. Second, the transaction must exceed the prescribed financial thresholds.

In terms of the Act, a merger occurs when one or more firms directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of another firm. The Tribunal has found that a business is something to which a market turnover can be clearly attributed, represents a measurable and relatively permanent transfer of market share or productive capacity from one firm to another, or tends to increase concentration or give the acquiring firm a larger market share even though the asset does not increase productive

capacity. It appears that the decision by the Tribunal was subsequently amplified by the CAC and that parties should consider whether a transaction results in the 'transfer of an identified set of activities and structures which can now be identified as a separate business undertaking and which could be pursued by the transferee'.

Mergers are categorised as either being small, intermediate or large depending on which threshold is met. Only intermediate and large mergers require merger control approval, although the Commission can request parties to a small merger to apply for merger control approval where the Commission considers that the merger may substantially prevent or lessen competition or cannot be justified on public interest grounds.

The Commission is responsible for investigating and issuing a decision in respect of small and intermediate mergers. Large mergers are adjudicated by the Tribunal following an investigation and recommendation by the Commission on whether the transaction should be approved, approved with conditions or prohibited.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The merger control provisions of the Act do not specifically refer to joint ventures, but the Act's definition of a merger is broad enough to catch any joint venture that results in an acquisition of control by the joint venture (and therefore the parents of the joint venture) over the businesses of the parents that are transferred or contributed to the joint venture.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Act provides a list of examples of situations in which a firm is deemed to control another firm, including if that firm beneficially owns more than half of the issued share capital of the other firm, holds or controls the majority of votes at the shareholder or board of directors levels of the other firm, or has the ability to materially influence the policy of the other firm in a manner comparable to, for example, a majority shareholder.

The competition authorities typically consider a firm to have material influence over the policy of another firm where the former has a required say on or veto over strategic issues such as the budget, business plan, appointment of senior management, and direction of commercial policy of the latter, or a casting vote in the event of a tie in voting in members meetings or board meetings of the latter (similar to the factors considered by the European Competition Commission).

However, this is not an exhaustive list, and there may be matters not involving the typical decisions referred to above, which are of such a nature that they are nevertheless material to the strategic direction of a particular business (such as approving borrowing plans in a capital-intensive business requiring large amounts of loan funding).

The question of whether parties to an internal reorganisation must apply for merger control approval has been a hotly debated topic in South Africa for many years. The Commission has taken a view that internal reorganisations are subject to the merger control provisions of the Act, whereas the CC's decision in *Competition Commission and Hosken Consolidated Investments Limited/Tsogo Sun Holdings Limited* seems to suggest that internal reorganisations need not be notified for merger control approval – this interpretation is untested.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Parties to an intermediate or large merger may not implement the merger until the relevant competition authority has issued a clearance certificate.

Parties to a merger that does not meet the relevant merger notification thresholds (a 'small merger') may implement the merger without the approval of the Commission. However, the Commission has the discretion to require parties to a small merger to apply for merger control approval within six months of the implementation date in circumstances where the Commission considers that the merger may substantially prevent or lessen competition or cannot be justified on public interest grounds. Moreover, the Commission's guidelines on small merger notifications state that, if at the time of entering into the transaction, any of the firms (or firms within their groups) are subject to a prohibited practice investigation by the Commission or respondents following a referral by the Commission of a prohibited practice investigation to the Tribunal, then the Commission will require the notification of the small merger. The Commission's guidelines on small merger notifications do not have the force of law and any merger parties may use their own discretion in deciding whether to voluntarily notify a small merger.

A merger will be categorised as an intermediate merger if:

- the turnover of the target firm in, into or from South Africa or asset value in South Africa (whichever the highest) equals or exceeds 100 million rand; and
- the combined turnover in, into or from South Africa or asset value in South Africa of the acquiring firm (whichever the highest) and the turnover or asset value of the target firm (whichever the highest) equals or exceeds 600 million rand.

A merger will be categorised as a large merger where:

- the turnover of the target firm in, into or from South Africa or asset value in South Africa (whichever the highest) equals or exceeds 190 million rand; and
- the combined turnover in, into or from South Africa of the acquiring firm (whichever is highest) and the turnover or asset value of the target firm (whichever the highest) equals or exceeds 6.6 billion rand.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Parties to a transaction that constitutes a 'merger' and meets the prescribed financial thresholds must apply for merger control approval and may not implement the merger until such time as the Commission or Tribunal (as the case may be) has issued a merger clearance certificate.

The Commission can call upon parties to a small merger to apply for merger control approval in which circumstances the Commission may ask the parties to take no further steps in implementing the merger.

Mergers involving banks and insurance companies may be excluded from the suspensory provisions of the Act in circumstances where

consent or approval is required in terms of the Banks Act, Financial Sector Regulation Act and Financial Markets Act and where the Minister of Finance has issued the relevant notice to the Commission.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The Act applies to all economic activity within or having an effect within South Africa. The competition authorities have taken a broad view on what constitutes 'economic activity' and it would cover circumstances where firms outside of South Africa render services or supply goods to customers in South Africa.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The Act provides that the Commission and Tribunal may not make an order in relation to an intermediate or large merger where consent or approval is required in terms of the Banks Act, Financial Sector Regulation Act and Financial Markets Act and where the Minister of Finance has issued a notice to the Commission certifying that it is in the 'public interest' that the jurisdiction of the Act is excluded.

This public interest requirement has typically only been applied in circumstances where applying for the approval of a merger by the Commission or Tribunal would result in systemic or economic risk (due to timing or confidentiality reasons) as a result of a failing financial institution. Nevertheless, there is precedent for the Minister of Finance excluding the jurisdiction of the competition authorities even after a merger application has been filed to reduce confusion arising from approval having to be obtained from more than one regulator.

The Amendment Act will introduce provisions that allow the president of South Africa to intervene in mergers where the acquiring firm is foreign and where the merger may adversely affect South Africa's national security interests. The intervention by the president will take place via a committee, which is to be appointed by the president and which will comprise of cabinet members and other public officials. At the time of writing, this provision is not yet in effect.

The foreign acquiring firm will be required to notify the committee of an intermediate or large merger. The committee must consider whether the merger will have an adverse effect on South Africa's national security interests, and in doing so, may consult and seek advice from the competition authorities or any other regulatory authority or public institution. The committee will effectively have a veto over mergers that are deemed to have a national security interest as the Commission and Tribunal may not consider a merger if the committee was not notified of the merger and may not approve the transaction if it was prohibited by the committee.

The president is required to publish a list of national security interests and must take into account the following factors in determining what constitutes a national security interest: the potential impact of the merger on defence capabilities; sensitive technology; infrastructure security; supply of critical goods or services; foreign surveillance risks; foreign relations; terrorism; and the economic and social stability of the country.

This new provision is exceptionally broad and may result in many foreign mergers being subject to an additional level of scrutiny, which in turn may lead to procedural and timing delays and additional costs.

**NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE**

**Filing formalities**

9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There are no deadlines for filing a merger, but intermediate or large mergers may not be implemented until the merger has been approved by the relevant competition authority. The sanctions for failing to notify an intermediate or large merger may include: an administrative penalty of up to 10 per cent of a firm’s South African turnover and or exports from South Africa; and any other order deemed appropriate by the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal), including the unbundling of the merger and divestiture (most likely only in mergers giving rise to competition concerns). In terms of the Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018, an administrative penalty of up to 25 per cent of the firm’s annual turnover in and exports from South Africa may also be imposed for a repeat contravention, and the administrative penalty may be increased to include the turnover of any firms controlling the respondent where the firms knew or should have known that the respondent was engaging in the prohibited conduct. Such firms may also be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the administrative penalty.

To date, the competition authorities have only imposed administrative penalties for failing to receive merger control approval and the penalties to date have typically ranged between 350,000 and 2 million rand.

10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The acquiring and target firm are responsible for filing a joint merger application. The applicable filings fees are set out in the table below.

Merger classification	Filing fee
Small merger	No fee
Intermediate merger	165,000 rand
Large merger	550,000 rand

11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The implementation of intermediate and large mergers must be suspended until the merger has been approved by the relevant competition authority. The waiting period for approval depends on whether the merger is intermediate or large. For intermediate mergers, the Competition Commission (the Commission) has an initial period of 20 business days within which to approve or prohibit a merger. This period can be extended by a further 40 business days, at the Commission’s discretion.

In the case of large mergers, the Commission has an initial 40 business days to investigate the merger and make a recommendation to the Tribunal to approve or prohibit a merger. The Commission can, however, apply to the Tribunal to extend the 40-business-day investigation period by 15 business days at a time. The merger parties may consent or object to such an extension request. The number of extensions requested by the Commission typically depends on the complexity of the merger. Once the Commission has made its recommendation to the Tribunal, the Tribunal must convene a hearing within 10 business days of the Commission making its recommendation to: make a final decision on the merger; or, in the case of a contested merger or a merger where third parties wish to participate in the Tribunal proceedings, determine the procedure and dates for the hearing of the matter,

including any interlocutory procedures (ie, discovery, procedures for intervening parties, filing of witness statements or expert reports, etc) as may be required.

**Pre-clearance closing**

12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The sanctions for implementing a merger before clearance are the same as the sanctions that may be imposed for failure to notify. The Commission published Guidelines for the determination administrative penalties for failure to notify mergers and implementation of mergers contrary to the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (the Act). The Guidelines could result in higher administrative penalties being imposed for prior implementation in future. The Guidelines set out a series of steps to be followed by the Commission when determining the administrative penalty.

Under the Guidelines, as a first step, the base amount for the administrative penalty will be double the filing fee (ie, 330,000 and 1.1 million rand for intermediate and large mergers, respectively). This step is followed by multiplying the base amount by a percentage relevant to the duration of the contravention. For example, if the conduct endured for less than a year, 50 per cent is added for every month during which the conduct was ongoing, 75 per cent and 100 per cent is added for every month if the conduct endured for between one and two years, or for longer than two years, respectively. Mitigating and aggravating factors can also be taken into account in determining the appropriate penalty.

13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Sanctions for closing before clearance apply equally to local and foreign-to-foreign mergers.

14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Act does not provide for any hold-separate arrangements, but parties who wish to implement foreign-to-foreign mergers prior to obtaining approval in South Africa have in the past established a ‘hold-separate’ arrangement to ring-fence the South African leg of the merger. While the Commission or Tribunal has not expressly proffered a view on such arrangements, it has in the past been accepted in circumstances where the parties are able to illustrate that the South African leg of a global merger can be ring-fenced and will not be implemented prior to approval being granted.

**Public takeovers**

15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There are no specific merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids. To the extent that such bids meet the definition of a ‘merger’ in the Act (ie, results in a firm acquiring control over the whole or part of the business of another firm), such bid requires the approval of the competition authorities, if the prescribed financial thresholds are met.

**Documentation**

**16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?**

The Regulations to the Act prescribes certain forms and schedules to be completed on behalf of the acquiring and target firm. The information required in these schedules include the control structure of the acquiring firm or group, its controlling interests in South Africa, details of the largest customers and competitors of the parties to the merger and the market shares of the parties in respect of each relevant market.

It is a criminal offence under the Act to provide the Commission with false information. The sanction for such offence is a fine of up to 500,000 rand, imprisonment for a period of up to 10 years, or both a fine and imprisonment. In addition, if information is missing or certain prescribed documentation is not provided, the filing may be deemed incomplete, and the review period will not commence until the outstanding information or documentation is provided.

Documents relating to the merger that must be filed include: all merger agreements, any document including minutes, reports, presentations and summaries prepared for or by the board of directors of both the acquiring and target firms relating to the transaction, financial statements and the parties' most recent business plan (or budget if a business plan is not available). If any of these documents are not available, the relevant firm must submit a sworn affidavit or declaration confirming why such documents are not available or do not exist.

**Investigation phases and timetable**

**17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?**

After a merger is filed with the Commission, an investigating team will be assigned. The investigating team will liaise with the parties' legal counsel throughout the investigation process. The typical steps taken by the investigating team during the investigation include contacting customers and competitors of the parties to get their views on the merger, sending out questionnaires to the parties or other market participants, conducting interviews or conference calls with relevant stakeholders, conducting site visits (if necessary) and meeting with the parties. Consultations with the Commission prior to filing a merger are not required. However, should the parties wish to meet with the Commission prior to filing, such a meeting can be arranged. These consultations may be helpful in extremely time-sensitive transactions, or transactions that are likely to have a substantial public interest impact (eg, significant job losses).

Once the investigating team has finalised its investigation, it will submit a report to the Commission's Executive Committee for decision-making.

**18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?**

The implementation of intermediate and large mergers must be suspended until the merger has been approved by the relevant competition authority. The waiting period for approval depends on whether the merger is intermediate or large. For intermediate mergers, the Commission has an initial period of 20 business days within which to approve or prohibit a merger. This period can be extended by a further 40 business days, at the Commission's discretion.

In the case of large mergers, the Commission has an initial 40 business days to investigate the merger and make a recommendation to the Tribunal to approve or prohibit a merger. The Commission can, however, apply to the Tribunal to extend the 40-business-day investigation period by 15 business days at a time. The merger parties may consent or object

to such an extension request. The number of extensions requested by the Commission typically depends on the complexity of the merger. Once the Commission has made its recommendation to the Tribunal, the Tribunal must convene a hearing within 10 business days of the Commission making its recommendation to: make a final decision on the merger; or, in the case of a contested merger or a merger where third parties wish to participate in the Tribunal proceedings, determine the procedure and dates for the hearing of the matter, including any interlocutory procedures (ie, discovery, procedures for intervening parties, filing of witness statements or expert reports, etc) as may be required.

The Commission published service standards for the review of mergers according to complexity. The table below summarises the Commission's service standards. These periods are not binding on the Commission and merely serve to indicate the typical time period within which the Commission seeks to review mergers.

Type of merger	Description	Service standard
Phase I	Non-complex Parties' market share is below 15 per cent, no complex control structure and no public interest concerns arise	20 business days
Phase II	Complex Transactions involving actual or potential competitors, parties in a vertical (supply) relationship, where the parties hold more than a 15 per cent market share, or raising public interest concerns	45 business days
Phase III	Very complex Transactions involving close competitors, high market shares, and requiring specific documents and information from parties (in addition to the prescribed documents and information) as well as third parties	60 business days (intermediate merger) 120 business days (large merger)

Although the Commission aims to finalise Phase III large mergers within 120 business days, these can often take much longer to finalise, particularly in circumstances where third parties have raised issues with the merger. There is no formal process in terms of which the merger review period can be fast tracked. However, with mergers that are extremely time sensitive and where delays could result in significant consequences, such as job losses or the closure of a firm, the parties can meet with the Commission prior to filing or during the investigation to explain the challenges and work with the Commission in an attempt to expedite the review.

**SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT**

**Substantive test**

**19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?**

The substantive test has two legs, a competition assessment and a public interest assessment. The competition assessment considers whether the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market, and if so, whether the merger can be justified on the basis of any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains that outweigh the anticompetitive effect of the merger. The public interest assessment considers the effect of the merger on certain public interest grounds set out in the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (the Act).

In considering whether a merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the competition authorities must assess the strength of competition in the relevant markets, and the probability that the firms in question would behave competitively or cooperatively, by taking into account any relevant factors, including:

- whether the merger is likely to result in the removal of an effective competitor;
- the actual or potential level of import competition;
- ease of entry into the relevant market;
- the level and trends of concentration and history of collusion in the market;
- the degree of countervailing power in the market;
- market dynamics such as growth, innovation and product differentiation;
- the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market; and
- whether the business or part of the business of a party to the merger has failed or is likely to fail (the failing firm defence).

Three further factors that Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018 (the Amendment Act) has introduced are: the extent of ownership by a party to the merger in another firm or other firms in related markets; the extent to which a party to the merger is related to another firm or other firms in related markets, including through common members or directors; and any other mergers engaged in by a party to a merger for such period as may be stipulated by the Competition Commission (the Commission).

In considering whether the merger can be justified on public interest grounds, the Commission or Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) must consider the effect of the merger on:

- employment;
- a particular industrial sector or region;
- the ability of small and medium businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons to effectively enter into, participate in or expand within the market; and
- the ability of national industries to compete in international markets.

In terms of the Amendment Act, firms now also need to consider the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons and workers in firms in the market.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No. The same substantive test as for clearance is applied to all transactions.

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The theories of harm investigated by the competition authorities typically depend on the type of merger being considered. In the context of horizontal mergers, the authorities will generally consider whether the transaction will result in any unilateral effects (ie, whether, post-merger, the parties will have the ability to profitably increase prices or otherwise unilaterally exercise market power) or coordinated effects (ie, whether the merger will increase the ability of the parties to coordinate their behaviour with that of their competitors). In this regard, the authorities also consider whether mergers are likely to result in information sharing between competitors because of firms having common shareholding or ownership in competing firms.

In vertical mergers, the primary theory of harm is whether the merger is likely to result in the foreclosure of any competitors of the merging parties at any level of the supply chain and whether this is likely to result in the substantial lessening or prevention of competition. This theory of harm is typically of concern when one or both of the parties have high market shares in their respective market or markets, or is a large customer or supplier of third parties within the supply chain, such that the vertical integration of the merging parties would result in

competitors being foreclosed from the relevant market. In the case of mergers involving firms in different product markets and no vertical relationship (conglomerate mergers), the authorities will consider whether the merger gives rise to any conglomerate or portfolio effects. This includes considering whether the merged entity could foreclose competitors through tying, bundling products, exclusive arrangements or otherwise give the merged entity market power.

### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified, the Act prescribes that the authorities must consider certain public interest issues. Public interest issues are therefore a critical part of the merger review process.

The Commission's Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in Merger Regulation sets out the general approach that the Commission will follow, and the information the Commission is likely to require in respect of each of the public interest factors listed in the substantive test. In terms of the Guidelines, the Commission will assess the effect of the merger on each of the relevant public interest factors with reference to whether: the effect is merger specific; substantial; and there are any remedies or conditions to address the negative public interest effect.

The effect of mergers on employment is a key concern for the competition authorities. Most mergers resulting in job losses (often even in cases where job losses are not substantial) are approved subject to one or more conditions relating to employment. For example, moratoriums on the number of job losses, commitments to train or reskill staff, commitments to redeploy staff in other areas of the parties' businesses or providing counselling and assistance in finding alternative employment.

Generally, public interest issues arising from a merger are addressed by way of conditions. Other conditions imposed by the Tribunal to address public interest concerns include:

- commitments by the merging parties to maintain local production facilities, arrangements with local manufacturers, local head offices and local supply or sourcing relationships;
- establishing supplier development funds for technical and financial support and assistance for small and medium-sized businesses or businesses owned by historically disadvantaged groups;
- commitments to develop communities where the merger parties conduct business activities;
- establishing skills development and training programmes; and
- commitments to make a specified investment within a certain period of time post-merger.

### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

To the extent that a merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the Act requires the authorities to consider whether there are any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains resulting (or likely to result) from the merger; which outweigh the negative effect of the merger on competition; and which would not likely be achieved without the merger. In terms of approach, given that efficiencies are only relevant in transactions that are likely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition, efficiency arguments need not be raised upfront, and parties often wait until the Commission has expressed a view as to the effect on competition before raising any efficiency arguments.



In the *Trident Steel/Dorbyl* transaction, the Tribunal adopted the following two-pronged approach to assessing efficiencies: where efficiencies can be qualitatively and quantitatively verified, it need not be shown that consumers will benefit from a merger (ie, evidence of consumer benefit will be less compelling); and, where efficiencies are not clearly verifiable, pass-through or benefit to consumers must be illustrated.

The most recent Tribunal decision dealing with efficiencies is the *Pioneer Hi-Bred/Pannar Seed* transaction. The merger was taken on appeal to the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) by the parties after initially being prohibited by the Tribunal (it was considered a three-to-two merger). On appeal, the CAC found that without the merger the business of the South African-based Pannar Seed would decline and ultimately fail. This would result in a loss of significant and important resources. The CAC also found that the merger would result in the market leader being constrained and will ultimately result in long-term dynamic efficiency improvements, improvements in the quality of seed produced and ensure competitive pricing. The merger was ultimately approved by the CAC, subject to various conditions, some of which were aimed at achieving these efficiencies.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Competition Commission (the Commission), in the case of small and intermediate mergers, or Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal), in the case of large mergers, can approve, approve subject to conditions or prohibit a merger. Parties to an intermediate merger can ask the Tribunal to reconsider a decision by the Commission to prohibit or approve a transaction subject to conditions, whereas a decision by the Tribunal can be appealed to the Competition Appeal Court.

In terms of the Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018 (Amendment Act), the Commission or Tribunal may make any appropriate decision regarding any condition relating to their prior approval of a merger.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

It is possible to remedy competition issues with divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies. The remedies are typically prepared by the merger parties with input from the Commission and both the Commission and Tribunal have a preference for the remedies to be tested with market participants before issuing a decision.

Over the past three years, some examples of prominent mergers approved with divestment undertakings include the *Bayer/Monsanto*, *Dow/DuPont*, and *Media24/Novus* mergers.

Over the same period, a number of mergers were approved subject to a range of behavioural remedies, primarily relating to information exchange and cross-directorships or shareholdings. In these instances, the mergers were approved subject to undertakings not to exchange competitively sensitive information and limitations on the appointment of common directors. Over the past few years, there have been noticeable increases in the number of mergers approved subject to these types of conditions, which are primarily aimed at preventing coordinated conduct between competitors and other potentially collusive activities.

Other common behavioural remedies include the obligation to amend restraint of trade clauses, notify composite acquisitions within specified time periods, notify acquisitions that do not meet the

prescribed thresholds, implement competition compliance policies, and continue existing supply arrangements.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The time periods relating to the implementation of remedies are usually agreed between the parties and the Commission, but the Commission typically requires that the remedies be implemented within a short period of time following approval (eg, 12 to 18 months).

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The competition authorities do not have a different approach in assessing foreign-to-foreign mergers compared to mergers involving local firms. However, the Amendment Act will introduce provisions that allow the president of South Africa to intervene in mergers where the acquiring firm is foreign and where the merger may adversely affect South Africa's national security interests. The intervention by the president will take place via a committee, which is to be appointed by the president and which will comprise of cabinet members and other public officials. At the time of writing, this provision is not yet in effect.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

It is not uncommon for the competition authorities to impose behavioural conditions that cover ancillary restrictions such as restraint of trades. For example, the scope or duration of the restraint could be limited. Generally, the competition authorities require that restraints of trade be reduced to three years, depending on the circumstances of each case.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The customers and competitors of the merger parties are typically contacted by the Competition Commission (the Commission) as part of its investigation of a merger. Depending on the complexity of the matter, the Commission may issue detailed information requests and ask customers and competitors to respond thereto.

Customers and competitors may also contact the Commission during the investigation period and make submissions on a voluntary basis and without being approached or asked to do so by the Commission.

Large mergers are adjudicated by the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) after a public hearing is held. The hearing represents a further opportunity for third parties to make submissions in circumstances where they do not agree with the Commission's recommendation. However, only the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition and trade unions or employee representatives of the parties have an automatic right of participation in merger proceedings. Other third parties will need to make a formal application to intervene and demonstrate that they have a material interest in the matter and can assist the Tribunal (by providing relevant information through discovery of documents, oral submissions or witnesses) in its adjudication of the matter. In practice, this is a low threshold.



## Publicity and confidentiality

### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Parties can claim information as being confidential if the information comprises of 'trade, business or industrial information that belongs [to the party], has a particular economic value, and is not generally available to or known to third parties'. The Commission may not disclose information over which a confidentiality claim has been filed. Third parties seeking access to information that has been claimed as confidential must apply to the Tribunal for an order granting them access to such information. The Tribunal will consider whether the information is confidential and make an appropriate order.

The Commission does publish a list of mergers filed, although this list is not frequently updated, and there is some publicity around the adjudication of mergers. The Commission issues weekly media statements wherein it identifies which intermediate mergers have been approved or prohibited by providing a concise summary of each adjudicated merger. The Commission is also required to publish in the government gazette a notice of its decisions and will make available to the merger parties a confidential version of its reasons for decision. In respect of large mergers, the Commission will in its media statement also indicate whether it has recommended that a particular merger be approved or prohibited.

The Tribunal issues weekly media statements indicating which large mergers will be heard by it in the coming week. The Tribunal's decision and reasons for decision are published on its website, but its reasons do not contain confidential information. The confidential version of its reasons for decision is only made available to the merger parties.

## Cross-border regulatory cooperation

### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Commission has concluded memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with several competition authorities, but there is no formal requirement for the competition authorities to cooperate. Irrespective of whether MOUs have been signed, the Commission does cooperate with other competition authorities where multijurisdictional mergers have been filed and in particular when there is a high-profile merger. In this regard, the authorities will exchange information relating to market definition, theories of harm and conditions to remedy competition or public interest concerns.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The merger parties can ask the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) to reconsider a decision by the Competition Commission (the Commission), whereas decisions by the Tribunal can be appealed to the Competition Appeal Court (CAC). In terms of the Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018, merger decisions of the Tribunal can now not only be taken on appeal by the merger parties, but also by the Commission and the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Appeal or review proceedings can take up to six months to complete from the date on which the appeal or review application is filed. The Tribunal and the CAC rules prescribe the time periods within which such

applications must be brought and the various answering and replying pleadings filed. Once pleadings have closed, the Tribunal or CAC will set down a date for the hearing of the appeal or review. Matters of an urgent nature can be expedited depending on the reasons for the urgency and the availability of the relevant decision-making body.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

During the 2018/19 financial year (ending March 2019), the Competition Commission (the Commission) finalised 336 merger investigations, 287 mergers were approved without conditions, 41 with conditions and four were prohibited.

The Commission has identified certain sectors that it considers priority sectors. In the context of mergers, these are sectors that the Commission views as having high levels of concentration. These sectors include food and agro-processing, infrastructure and construction, energy, banking and financial services, IT, healthcare and intermediate industrial products. In terms of the Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018 (the Amendment Act), the competition authorities are mandated to address economic concentration and to promote economic transformation. Therefore, going forward, the competition authorities, in the context of mergers, will focus particularly on addressing concentration levels in these sectors as well as the participation by small, medium and micro-sized businesses in the economy and ownership or control of businesses by historically disadvantaged groups.

The Commission is also conducting a number of market inquiries in different sectors. These include private healthcare, public passenger transport and the grocery retail sector. Although these inquiries are distinct from the Commission's merger investigations, mergers in these sectors are likely to attract closer scrutiny.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The Amendment Act was signed into law on 14 February 2019 and, excluding certain provisions, is mostly now in effect. The Amendment Act provides, inter alia, for changes to the merger control rules and the introduction of national security clearance for certain deals involving foreign purchasers. The Amendment Act introduces additional factors to be considered by the authorities in assessing the competition and public interest factors.

The national security clearance provision provides for the president to constitute a Committee with powers to intervene in respect of mergers involving foreign acquiring firms, and which may adversely affect the country's national security interests. The president is required to publish a list of national security interests, taking into account factors such as the potential impact on defence capabilities, sensitive technology, infrastructure security, supply of critical goods and services, foreign surveillance risks, foreign relations, terrorism and national stability. A foreign firm filing a merger would be required to file a notice with the Committee. At the time of writing, this provision is not yet in effect.

The amendments are aimed at achieving the government's objectives of dealing with the high levels of economic concentration in South African markets, and the lack of transformation of the ownership (by historically disadvantaged groups) demographics of South African businesses. This is likely to result in the authorities seeking various conditions or undertakings from parties aimed at achieving these objectives.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

A number of key merger-related decisions have been handed down over the past year:

- In January 2019, the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) prohibited a merger between Greif International Holding BV and Rheem South Africa (Pty) Limited. The Tribunal found that the firms were close rivals in a duopoly, barriers to entry were high in this market and the merger would result in an effective competitor exiting the market. The merger would also have effectively resulted in the reversal of black economic empowerment objectives by reducing the share of its black shareholders and therefore negatively affect public interest.
- In May 2019, the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) dismissed an appeal by the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union to set aside the Tribunal's approval of the merger between Sibanye Gold Limited and Lonmin PLC. The CAC concluded that the merger parties had established that the determination of the number of jobs to be lost as a result of the merger was rational, and that the public interest in preventing employment loss had been balanced.
- In August 2019, the Tribunal approved the acquisition by British American Tobacco South Africa Holdings Limited (BATSA) of Twisp (Pty) Limited, a leading supplier of e-cigarette devices and flavours in South Africa. The merger was initially prohibited by the Competition Commission (the Commission) on the basis that it would result in the removal of a potential competitor (since BATSA allegedly had plans to introduce its own vaping product). Following various interlocutory proceedings, production of discovery documents and exchange of factual and expert witness statements the Commission changed its recommendation to a conditional approval. Competitors of BATSA then intervened in the proceedings raising issues around BATSA dominance in the cigarette market being leveraged into the e-cigarette market. The transaction was ultimately approved by the Tribunal subject to certain conditions, including to the allocation of retail and shelf space.
- In February 2020, the CAC overturned the Tribunal's prohibition of a merger between Mediclinic Southern Africa (Pty) Limited and Matlosana Medical Health Services (Pty) Limited. The merger raised concerns relating to increased costs and the substantial lessening of competition. However, the CAC concluded that the Tribunal erred in finding that there were substantial public interest grounds for prohibiting the merger on the strengths of price effects.
- In March 2020, the Tribunal conditionally approved the transaction in terms of which PepsiCo Inc, through its subsidiary Simba (Pty) Limited acquired Pioneer Food Group Limited. This was PepsiCo's largest acquisition outside the United States. The merger was the first transaction in which the new provisions of the Competition Amendment Act No. 18 of 2018 (the Amendment Act) relating to the level of ownership by historically disadvantaged persons was in issue. This resulted in a dispute between the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition and the merger parties as to the required post-merger shareholding to be held by historically disadvantaged persons. The Minister argued that the merger would result in a reduction of shares held by historically disadvantaged persons. The merger was ultimately approved subject to various public interest conditions, including an agreed percentage of shares to be held by historically disadvantaged persons.

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The enactment of a number of key provisions of the Amendment Act (in July 2019 and February 2020) has also been one of the most important legislative developments of the past year. The Amendment Act introduces some of the most significant changes to South African competition law since the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (the Act) came into force. This historic development marks the beginning of a new era of competition law, which is significantly more public-interest focused.

The Amendment Act provides, inter alia, for changes to the merger control rules (particularly the public interest assessment) and the introduction of national security clearance for certain deals involving foreign acquirers. Whether these changes will have an effect on potential M&A transactions depends on the deal in question. Parties will need to be sensitive to the government's objectives of tackling high levels of economic concentration in South African markets, and the lack of trans-formation of the ownership demographics of South African businesses.

The Commission has also gazetted final Guidelines for the determination of administrative penalties for failure to notify mergers and implementation of mergers contrary to the Act. The Guidelines present the general methodology that the Commission will follow in determining administrative penalties in cases where parties fail to notify a merger or implement a merger without the approval of the competition authorities.

# Spain

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Spanish competition legislation is contained in Law No. 15/2007 on the Defence of Competition (the Competition Act), which came into force in September 2007. The Competition Act regulates restrictive practices and abuses of dominant position (closely modelled on articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) as well as merger control and state aid. In February 2008, the government adopted Royal Decree No. 261/2008 (the Royal Decree), which implements the Competition Act.

After entry into force of Law No. 3/2013 setting up the National Markets and Competition Commission (the CNMC Act and the CNMC respectively), the authority entrusted with the enforcement of the Competition Act is the CNMC. The start of operations of the new CNMC and the subsequent ceasing of operations of the former National Competition Commission (CNC) took place on 7 October 2013. The CNMC is the entity resulting from the merger of the Spanish competition, energy, telecoms, railways, audiovisual, airports and postal regulators.

The CNMC is led by a board of 10 members entrusted with decision-making powers (the Council), which is divided into a competition chamber and a regulatory chamber. The CNMC has four sector-specific directorates: Competition, Telecommunications and Audiovisual, Energy, and Transport and Post. In August 2013, the government adopted Royal Decree No. 657/2013, approving the CNMC's statute, which further specifies its organisation and modus operandi. The Competition Directorate is entrusted with investigative powers for merger control.

Under the Competition Act, the CNMC has the final decision on merger control proceedings in the majority of cases, and the government has only some limited decision-making powers in merger control matters.

Although the Competition Act reinforced the role of the regional competition authorities of the different Spanish autonomous communities, merger control proceedings remain outside the scope of their jurisdiction.

The Sustainable Economy Act (Law No. 2/2011, of 4 March, of Sustainable Economy) entered into force on 6 March 2011. It brought about the first amendment in the Competition Act since its adoption in 2007 by introducing a de minimis exception to the mandatory merger filing obligation. In addition, Law No. 3/2013 amended the relevant filing fees, and Law No. 6/2018, of 3 July, of the Annual Budget of the State for 2018, amended the relevant filing fee for simplified procedure cases.

In November 2015, the CNMC issued a new version of the guidelines on simplified proceedings to adapt it to the new institutional framework brought about by the creation of the CNMC. The new guidelines reflect the nature of the CNMC (which results from the merger of the Spanish competition, energy, telecoms, railways, audiovisual, airports and postal

regulators). Consequently, since then mergers taking place in regulated sectors under supervision of the CNMC have benefited from short-form notifications, something that was explicitly excluded by the guidelines in the past as reports from the relevant regulatory authorities had to be obtained beforehand.

In late 2016, a new act on administrative proceedings came into force (Law No. 39/2015 on the standard administrative proceeding of public administrations) which, among other things, modifies the concept of working days. Under the aforesaid act, Saturdays are no longer working days as regards administrative deadlines, including those applicable to merger control proceedings.

In March 2017, the Spanish government launched a public consultation on a draft bill for yet another reorganisation of the institutional framework. This would demerge the current CNMC into two independent administrative authorities or AAI (*autoridades administrativas independientes*) and the CNMC would cease to exist. The draft bill entrusted enforcement to a new AAI for Competition (*Autoridad Independiente de Defensa de la Competencia* (AIDeCo)) while a new AAI for Supervision and Regulation of the Markets (*Autoridad Independiente de Regulación de los Mercados* (AIReM)) would be responsible for regulating and supervising energy, telecoms, railways, media, airports and postal markets.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Competition Act provides that transactions capable of being caught are 'any project or transaction involving a concentration of undertakings'. Concentrations are those transactions affecting on a lasting basis the structure of control of the undertakings concerned, normally through a merger between two or more formerly independent companies, the acquisition of control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings, or the creation of a joint venture and the acquisition of joint control of an undertaking that performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The Competition Act states that full-function joint ventures are caught by the merger control rules. Spanish merger control provisions are aligned with EU competition rules in this respect.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Act provides for a definition of 'control' that is modelled on the definition under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Under the Competition Act, control means the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking.

## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

### 5 What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Competition Act provides two alternative thresholds based on market share and turnover. It applies where:

- a share of 30 per cent or more of the national market or a 'defined' geographic market within it, of a given product or service, is acquired or increased unless the turnover in Spain in the preceding accounting period of the target (or of the assets being acquired) does not exceed €10 million and the individual or combined market share of the parties does not amount to 50 per cent or more in any 'affected market' in Spain or in any 'defined' geographical market within Spain; or
- the aggregate turnover in Spain of the companies involved exceeded €240 million during the last financial year provided that the turnover in Spain of each of at least two parties exceeded €60 million. The market share threshold can be satisfied by the target company only.

As provided for in the EUMR, the Royal Decree provides that the turnover is deemed to be the amount derived from the sale of products or the provision of services (excluding turnover taxes) in the preceding financial year in Spain, and must be considered for the acquirer on a group basis (the turnover of the target company should only include the amount derived from the sale of products or the provision of services attributable to the target company). In addition, there are sector-specific rules, in particular for banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings.

The CNMC has not referred to the Commission any cases below the thresholds set forth in the Spanish Competition Act.

The Competition Act will not apply to any transaction caught by the provisions of the EUMR (with exceptions, provided for in the EUMR).

The Competition Act provides for a consultation procedure so that the merging parties may, before notification, consult the CNMC as to whether their transaction amounts to a concentration or whether it exceeds the thresholds. Under the consultation procedure, the CNMC has a three-month deadline to issue a decision.

### 6 Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory for those transactions exceeding either of the two thresholds for notification. There are no exceptions.

### 7 Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified provided that they meet one of the two thresholds for notification. Indeed, foreign-to-foreign mergers have been notified to the Spanish competition authorities on several occasions. There is no local effects or nexus test (apart from the two thresholds). However, lack of local presence may in practice hamper enforcement of the final decision or other measures adopted by the competition authorities.

### 8 Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Spain has traditionally had separate rules on foreign investment that may be relevant to certain acquisitions and require specific notifications or prior approvals depending on the sectors involved.

However, on 18 March 2020, Royal Decree-Law 8/2020 on urgent extraordinary measures to deal with the economic and social impact of covid-19 (the State of Emergency Royal Decree-Law) was published and entered into force, declaring a state of emergency in Spain.

This included revised rules imposing restrictions on foreign investments in Spain, in line with EU Regulation 2019/452, establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union, which shall enter into force on 11 October 2020. Nevertheless, the rules of Royal Decree-Law 8/2020 (as amended by Royal Decree-Law 11/2020) are of an extraordinary nature to deal with the covid-19 crisis and are not meant to be the definitive implementation of the EU Regulation going forwards. Therefore, regulations further developing the existing foreign investment regime are expected to be approved in the future.

Under the new regime, investors from outside the European Union or EFTA are not allowed to acquire control or a stake equal to or greater than 10 per cent of the share capital of a Spanish company active in a 'strategic sector' without prior authorisation. These sectors comprise:

- critical infrastructure;
- critical technologies and dual-use items;
- supply of essential inputs (in particular, energy), raw materials and resources related to food safety;
- sectors with access to sensitive information (in particular, personal data); and
- communication media.

Authorisation is also necessary if the foreign investor is directly or indirectly controlled by the government of a third country; the foreign investor has made investments or participated in activities in sectors affecting security, public policy and public health in another member state; or administrative or judicial proceedings have been instituted against the foreign investor for engaging in criminal or illegal activities.

Transactions that were agreed before 18 March 2020 are also caught by the new regime, but they benefit from a simplified procedure and are reviewed within 30 working days, that is, effectively six weeks as opposed to six months for cases not qualifying for simplified treatment.

Filing is mandatory in Spain. Therefore, transactions executed without the required authorisation will be invalid and without any legal effect until approval has been obtained. Fines may also be imposed up to the transaction's financial value.

As regards the Competition Act, there are no special rules for specific sectors, except for specific turnover calculation rules for the financial and insurance sectors.

In terms of internal organisation within the CNMC, the roles formerly played by the National Energy Commission and the Telecommunications Market Commission are now mainly played by the CNMC.

To achieve internal coordination, in the case of merger control, the different sectoral directorates of the CNMC may notify the Competition Directorate of any merger within their respective sectors if they believe it might be caught by the merger control provisions of the Competition Act.

In the energy sector, certain acquisitions of interests or assets in the electricity and gas sectors need to be communicated to the CNMC. The CNMC is entitled to impose conditions on the acquisition: if the acquirer is not a European Union or European Economic Area country and in case of a real and sufficiently serious threat to the supply of electricity, gas or hydrocarbons.

Certain acquisitions in the Spanish banking, insurance, defence and media sectors may also require specific approvals from the relevant authorities in these sectors.

Likewise, in Phase II investigations of transactions that may have a significant impact in a specific Spanish region, a non-binding (but compulsory) opinion is requested from the relevant authorities of the affected region.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

Any project or transaction involving an economic concentration of undertakings caught by the Competition Act must be notified to the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) prior to completion (ie, prior to putting the transaction into effect). There are no specific deadlines for filing as long as the transaction has not been put into effect. However, as regards Spanish public takeover bids, filings must be made before, or up to five days after submitting the bid to the Spanish Securities Market Commission. Failure to notify within the five-day deadline may give rise to the imposition of fines of up to 1 per cent of the annual turnover of the undertakings concerned.

In addition, a 20-day deadline for filing is applicable only in cases where the CNMC requests parties for filing a transaction ex officio. Failure to notify within the said deadline may give rise to the imposition of fines of up to 1 per cent of the annual turnover of the undertakings concerned. In addition, such filings do not benefit from the legal deadlines to which the CNMC is bound.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The offeror or acquirer is responsible for filing in the case of an acquisition. For mergers, or in the case of the acquisition of joint control (ie, joint ventures), the filing must be made jointly by the merging parties or by the parties acquiring joint control respectively.

The following filing fees for merger control proceedings are payable:

- €5,502.15 if the Spanish turnover of all the companies involved in the transaction does not exceed €240 million;
- €11,004.31 if the Spanish turnover of all the companies involved in the transaction exceeds €240 million but not €480 million;
- €22,008.62 if the Spanish turnover of all the companies involved in the transaction is higher than €480 million and does not exceed €3 billion; and
- a fixed amount of €43,944 if the Spanish turnover of all the companies involved in the transaction exceeds €3 billion, plus an additional €11,004.31 for each €3 billion exceeding the aforesaid turnover, up to a maximum of €109,860.

The filing fee for mergers notified under the abbreviated form procedure is €1,545.45. The fee must be paid in advance and the notification form must have evidence of payment attached.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

As a general rule, the notified transaction may not be put into effect before clearance from the CNMC has been obtained. However, the Competition Act provides for the possibility for the parties to request a derogation from this duty from the CNMC, which may allow implementation of the transaction before clearance. In these cases, the transaction cannot benefit from the short-form notification and must be notified using the regular notification form. The CNMC will decide whether to grant the requested derogation in light of the specific circumstances of each case and the potential consequences of waiving the obligation to suspend. The derogation can be made subject to certain obligations and conditions to guarantee the effectiveness of the CNMC's final decision. If the transaction is purely foreign-to-foreign, where one of the parties does not make sales in Spain, this could be regarded as a reason to allow

the early implementation of the transaction before clearance. To date, such derogation has been granted in exceptional circumstances (see for instance, the *COPE/Vocento/Punto Radio* case (C/0493/13) where the CNMC conditionally allowed the parties, a week after a formal filing was carried out, to implement a temporary agreement on non-exclusive assignment of sports radio content – the transaction was subsequently cleared in Phase I with remedies). In November 2016, in the *Daimler/Hailo/MYTAXI/Negocio Hailo* case (C/0802/16), the CNMC allowed the parties to carve out Spain (by partially lifting the suspension obligation), that is, to close the deal on a global basis as long as the transaction was not implemented in Spain. This derogation was granted in exchange for a number of commitments submitted by Daimler and Hailo which, prior to clearance of the transaction by the CNMC, guaranteed the commercial autonomy of the Spanish subsidiary of the target company.

Similarly to the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), the Competition Act states that public takeover bids are not subject to the general suspension obligation provided that certain conditions are met.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The Competition Act provides for a fine of up to 5 per cent of the turnover of the notifying party or parties in the financial year in which the merger took place if the transaction is put into effect before clearance. The amount of the fines imposed by the CNMC can vary depending on the particular features of the transaction. The practice of the Spanish competition authorities is to take into consideration the Spanish turnover when determining the level of fines.

The CNMC has taken action against a number of non-filed mergers and has imposed several fines in this regard over the past years. For example, in late 2019, the CNMC fined Grupo Nufri €12,800 for failure to notify the acquisition of Grupo Indulleida. The CNMC noted that the purchase agreement did not contain a condition precedent by which closing of the transaction was made conditional upon clearance (or tacit approval) of the transaction. However, in assessing the infringement, the CNMC took into account that: Grupo Nufri voluntarily notified the transaction as soon as they were aware of the breach of the standstill obligation (ie, only three months after closing); the breach of that obligation had no adverse effects and did not create an illicit benefit for Grupo Nufri; and the transaction posed no competition concerns, given that once the transaction was notified it was unconditionally cleared in Phase I. Lastly, the infringing company benefited from a reduction of the proposed fine based on both the voluntary acknowledgement of the infringement and early payment of the fine.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Yes. The former National Competition Commission (CNC) initiated in 2011 for the first time an investigation for alleged gun jumping in the context of a foreign-to-foreign merger (ie, the parties did not have any relevant corporate presence in Spain). The acquisition by Dorf Ketal Chemicals (India) Private Limited of the titanates and zirconates business of El Du Pont De Nemours & Company was allegedly put into effect before it was authorised by the former CNC. The CNC fined Dorf Ketal Chemicals (India) Private Limited €35,400 (3 per cent of the parties' turnover in Spain). In the same vein, on 31 July 2014, the CNMC fined Essilor International SA €5,065 for gun jumping in the context of the foreign-to-foreign acquisition of Polycore Optical Ltd. In addition, on 31 July 2014, the CNMC fined Essilor International SA €5,065 for gun jumping in the context of the foreign-to-foreign acquisition of Polycore Optical Ltd. This



amount represented 0.0001 per cent of Essilor's worldwide turnover in 2013. The CNMC decided to impose a symbolic fine because there was an absence of bad faith; the company eventually notified the transaction and it was cleared in Phase I unconditionally as no possible harm to competition law was identified.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

In principle, there should be no reason for the Spanish authorities to object to a 'hold-separate' arrangement if it means that the implemented transaction has no impact on the Spanish market. In 2016, in the *Daimler/Hailo/MYTAXI/Negocio Hailo* case (C/0802/16), the CNMC allowed the parties to carve out Spain (by partially lifting the suspension obligation), that is, to close the deal on a global basis as long as the transaction was not implemented in Spain. This derogation was granted in exchange for a number of commitments submitted by Daimler and Hailo, which, prior to clearance of the transaction by the CNMC, guaranteed the commercial autonomy of the Spanish subsidiary of the target company.

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

For public takeover bids under Spanish law, filings must be made before, or up to five days after, submitting the bid to the Spanish Securities Market Commission (CNMV) and the bid will be conditional upon the outcome of the national merger control procedure. However, the Competition Act, in line with the EUMR, provides for the possibility to implement the public bid and acquire the shares before clearance has been obtained, provided that the transaction is filed with the CNMC within five days of submitting the bid to the CNMV and that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities acquired or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments and on the basis of a derogation granted by the CNMC.

#### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Notification is made to the CNMC using an official form (which is attached as Annex II to the Royal Decree). For straightforward cases raising no issues, which are specifically listed in article 57 of the Royal Decree (see below), a short form is available (Annex III to the Royal Decree). Notifications must be submitted in Spanish. The notifying party should indicate in its notification which data are business secrets in order for such data to be treated as strictly confidential and provide a non-confidential version of the notification form.

#### Notification form

The information required is similar to the information to be provided on Form CO under the EUMR (information on the parties, their turnover and business sectors, basic features of the transaction, details of ownership and control provisions, detailed market information, and the existence of cooperative and vertical aspects). Notification is a time-consuming and cumbersome exercise. It has to be complete and the Competition Act does not provide for the possibility of obtaining waivers of any of the information requirements. The CNMC can reject notifications for incompleteness, or require more detailed information to be provided during the investigation. It sometimes requires the clock to be stopped pending receipt of the information, which can significantly increase the length of the review period.

#### Short-form notification

The Competition Act introduced the possibility of short-form notification for straightforward cases that are unlikely to raise competition issues (similar to the Short Form CO under the EUMR). The short-form notification applies to concentrations when, inter alia:

- there are no vertical or horizontal overlaps between the parties' activities;
- the activities carried out by the parties in the markets affected by the transaction, because of their minor importance, are not capable of significantly affecting competition;
- there is a change from joint to sole control; or
- two or more undertakings acquire joint control over a joint venture, provided that the joint venture has no or minimal activity in Spain.

The 2012–2013 Annual Report of the former CNC stated that approximately 26 per cent of the merger control filings made in Spain during that period were short form. The proportion has since risen significantly, accounting for nearly 70 per cent of filings cleared during 2019.

There is no shorter timetable for clearance for notifications made under short form; however, in practice, in straightforward cases, the CNMC tends to issue a decision prior to the expiry of the one-month deadline for Phase I.

Finally, submitting incomplete, incorrect, misleading or false information is subject to fines of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover of the infringing undertaking.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

##### Phase I investigations

One month after filing, the CNMC must reach a Phase I decision, extendible by 10 working days if the parties submit commitments. Within this one-month period, the CNMC will carry out Phase I investigations, which will end with a non-binding report produced by the Competition Directorate. On the basis of the report, the Council will decide whether to clear the transaction, to clear the transaction subject to the commitments presented by the parties, to shelve the file, or to open a Phase II investigation if the transaction could impede effective competition.

During Phase I investigations, if the CNMC considers the notification incomplete and requires additional information, the one-month period may be interrupted and will start running again when the additional information is submitted. Experience shows that it is very useful (and customary in practice) to enter into pre-notification discussions and agree a draft notification form with the CNMC prior to formal submission to avoid unnecessary delays and tackle any technical discussions from day one.

There is a possibility of clearing the transaction during Phase I through commitments or undertakings presented by the parties. Recent precedents show the positive impact upon the timing of choosing to offer Phase I remedies where potentially required. In 2018, the *ServiRed/Sistema 4B/EURO 6000, BP/Petrocorner* and *Talleres Alegría/Duro Felguera Rail* transactions, where Phase I remedies were offered, were cleared in approximately two months from formal filing. More recently, in 2019, the *MIH Food Delivery Holdings/Just Eat* transaction, also subject to remedies, was cleared in Phase I in less than one month from formal filing. However, it is reasonable to assume that some of these deals entailed lengthy pre-notification contacts.

##### Phase II investigations

The basic period for Phase II investigations is two months, extendible by 15 working days where the parties submit commitments. In Phase II, the CNMC normally requests comments from 'interested third parties'



(although the CNMC has recently also conducted such requests in Phase I investigations). The merging parties may also request a hearing with the CNMC.

If the CNMC decides to clear the transaction unconditionally, such decision puts an end to the Phase II investigation, and thus the government cannot further intervene in the merger review process regarding such transaction.

Despite the statutory periods mentioned above, in practice, Phase II cases have taken much longer for clearance because of the possibility to stop the clock in case additional information is required. For instance, and as recent examples of Phase II case duration, the *Schibsted/Milanuncios* case was cleared in seven months, the *Telefónica/DTS* case was cleared in six months and the *JCDecaux/Cemusa* case was cleared in five months (time periods calculated from filing). In 2019, the *Quirón/Clínica Santa Cristina* case was cleared in approximately nine months from filing. Further, in late July 2019, the CNMC initiated Phase II proceedings in *Cimsa/Activos Cemex* and, at the time of writing, the case is still pending.

### Phase III investigations

However, in those cases where the CNMC decides either to prohibit the transaction or to clear it subject to commitments or conditions, the Ministry of the Economy may ask the government to decide whether to confirm the CNMC's decision or clear it, subject or not to commitments or conditions. In the second case, the government's decision must be based on certain specified public interest criteria other than competition. In such cases, the Ministry of the Economy has 15 days to decide whether to ask the government to intervene. If it does, the government has one month to decide on the transaction. The intervention of the government in merger control proceedings is informally known as 'Phase III'.

In practice, the government tends not to intervene in merger control proceedings. The *Antena 3/La Sexta* case (2012) is the only 'Phase III case' in Spain to date. The transaction was notified after the *Telecinco/Cuatro* merger, which had already reduced the number of private free-to-air television broadcasters from four to three; the *Antena 3/La Sexta* merger would leave only two such operators. The former CNC imposed conditions that were more severe than the remedies the former CNC had accepted in *Telecinco/Cuatro*. The Ministry of the Economy decided to refer the case to the government, arguing that the decision concerned 'reasons of general interest related to the guarantee of an adequate maintenance of sector-based regulation and the promotion of research and technological development'. The government softened the conditions originally imposed by the former CNC and declared that the conditions should be in 'line with those [conditions applied to other operators] in the sector'. The merger was finally approved eight months after the first notification to the former CNC.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

During Phase I, the CNMC must reach a decision within one month of formal filing, extendible by 10 working days if commitments are submitted. However, during this phase of the investigation, there is scope for contact with the authorities, particularly if they require additional information, either formally (which 'stops the clock') or informally. The Competition Directorate can also request information from third parties. For straightforward cases raising no issues, the CNMC tends to issue a decision prior to the expiry of the one-month deadline for Phase I. In fact, the average timeline for a decision to be delivered by the CNMC is 20 days, providing that there are no commitments submitted by notifying parties that need to be assessed. Recent experience shows that in short-form cases, clearance can be obtained in 10 working days (although this ultimately depends on the CNMC's workload at the time of filing).

Phase II investigations can last between two (basic period) and four months (due to the possibility to 'stop the clock' if additional information is required). During the Phase II investigation, the law provides for requests for information to 'interested third parties' (although the CNMC has recently also made such requests in Phase I investigations) and the possibility for the merging parties to request a hearing before the CNMC.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance is whether the transaction 'may prevent the maintenance of effective competition in whole or in part of the national market'. The test is set out in the Competition Act together with additional criteria that the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) may consider when adopting its decision on a proposed transaction such as structure of the relevant markets, competitive position and economic strength of the parties involved in the transaction, actual and potential level of competition, suppliers and consumers' available choices, existence of barriers to entry, supply trends, countervailing demand power, and efficiencies.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures and, therefore, joint ventures (either cooperative or concentrative) are assessed under the same substantive test provided for in the Competition Act (ie, whether they 'may prevent the maintenance of effective competition in the market').

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Spanish substantive test (ie, whether the deal prevents the maintenance of effective competition in whole or in part of the national market) is aligned with the present substantive test provided for in the EU Merger Regulation. The Spanish antitrust authorities may examine market dominance, unilateral effects, coordinated effects, conglomerate effects and vertical foreclosure when assessing mergers.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

In theory, the main criteria should be competition-related. The analysis by the CNMC should be strictly on competition grounds, although at the level of Phase II investigation, the relevant consumers' associations may be consulted.

However, if the government intervenes in the merger control review at Phase III, the Competition Act expressly states that such decision must be based on certain public interest criteria different from competition criteria:

- national defence and security;
- the protection of public security and public health;
- free movement of goods and services within the national territory;
- protection of the environment;
- the promotion of technical research and development; and
- the maintenance of the sector regulation objectives.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Competition Act allows the authorities in practice to take into account efficiencies in the review process. It explicitly mentions 'efficiencies' as one of the substantive criteria for assessing mergers. According to the Competition Act, the CNMC will only take into account efficiencies that are of direct benefit to consumers, merger-specific, substantial, timely and verifiable. In practice, this means that significant evidence will need to be adduced by the parties. To this effect, there is a specific section in the notification form dealing with efficiencies. The CNMC enjoys certain discretion in considering any efficiency claim.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) and the government may order any appropriate measures to restore effective competition, including divestments or the unwinding of the transaction. Fines of €12,000 may be imposed per day if the parties have been required to unwind the transaction and have delayed doing so or if the parties do not comply with the undertakings imposed by the CNMC or the government. Further, failure to comply with a decision issued by the CNMC in the context of merger control proceedings is a very serious infringement under the Competition Act. Fines foreseen for these types of infringements amount to 10 per cent of the infringing company's turnover in the last financial year.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The Competition Act allows the parties to offer commitments during Phase I and Phase II investigations. Such commitments are amendments to the transaction or other appropriate remedies to restore competition. The CNMC may market test such commitments with third parties to assess their effectiveness in addressing the competition concerns arising from the transaction.

Divestiture is certainly one of the options available to the parties, as well as any other appropriate measures to restore competition. However, the CNMC is keener to accept behavioural remedies than the European Commission is.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The CNMC may authorise structural remedies presented by the parties such as divestments. The parties to the transaction must submit a detailed plan to the CNMC setting out the steps they will follow to comply with these remedies. With respect to behavioural remedies, the CNMC is likely to impose an obligation upon the parties to submit information periodically to the CNMC to allow effective monitoring of the implementation of the remedies.

To date, the CNMC has closed 29 merger investigations subject to commitments in Phase I. More than half of these took place in the last four years (recent examples are the *ServiRed/Sistema 4B/EURO 6000, BP/Petrocorner, Talleres Alegría/Duro Felguera Rail* and *Naviera Armas/Trasmediterranea* cases in 2018, and the *Lyntia/Negocio Iberdrola, Cirs/GGSO, Cofares/Cofarta* and *MIH Food Delivery Holdings/Just*

*Eat* cases in 2019) showing that the CNMC and parties are becoming more ready to remedy competition concerns upfront and proceed with early closing of transactions. Likewise, the parties can offer remedies in Phase II cases (as was the case in *Quirón/Clínica Santa Cristina* in 2019) and, if the transaction is subject to Phase III, the government can impose on the parties any kind of remedies, including divestments, to clear the transaction. However, the government's decision will be based on public interest criteria that are different from competition criteria.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

To date, there are no precedents of remedies imposed by the CNMC on pure foreign-to-foreign transactions (ie, those where the parties involved did not have any corporate presence in Spain). In the *Integra/Codman Neurosurgery Business* transaction where Integra was active in Spain only through an independent distributor, the CNMC accepted remedies in Phase I consisting of the divestiture of a viable business in the market where competition concerns had been identified. The remedy ensured that the divested business would have the necessary means (eg, portfolio of products, brand licences, know-how, stocks, production facilities and supply agreements) required to sell the products and services concerned in Spain.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The Competition Act expressly states that ancillary restraints that are directly linked to and essential for implementing the concentration will be covered by the clearance decision. Contrary to the current 'self-assessment approach' followed by the European Commission, the Spanish competition authorities expressly deal with ancillary restraints in their clearance decisions. The notification form and short form contain a specific section on ancillary restraints, where the merging parties must provide detailed information on ancillary restrictions.

The CNMC will analyse carefully the validity of ancillary restraints under the principles provided for in the European Commission's Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations. However, the Spanish competition authorities have sometimes followed a more restrictive approach than the European Commission on this matter.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Third parties (ie, customers or competitors) have a different role in merger control proceedings than in proceedings relating to restrictive practices and abuses of dominant position. Normal merger control procedure can only be initiated by the notifying party or parties. However, a third party may initiate proceedings by filing a complaint making the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) aware of a notifiable transaction that has not been notified.

As to customers' and competitors' rights in the review process, while they are very limited in a Phase I investigation (ie, complainants may informally approach the authority), they are greater in a Phase II investigation (if opened), where they can become involved in the procedure as 'interested third parties' if they ask to intervene. Moreover, the Spanish competition authorities usually contact and send questionnaires to customers, suppliers and competitors of the notifying parties

and relevant consumer associations in Phase II merger control cases and, sometimes, also in Phase I merger control cases. This is a trend observed during 2019 where the CNMC has increasingly done market testing in Phase I, in cases such as *Cartamundi/Jarden*, *Just Eat/Canary* and *Mémora/Montero*.

The CNMC usually pays close attention to any feedback received from the market while carrying out its assessment.

### Publicity and confidentiality

**30** | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The procedure before the competition authorities is reasonably transparent. The fact of the notification is made public on the CNMC's website within one to three days after the transaction has been filed. Likewise, if the transaction is made subject to a Phase II investigation, a short notice of this event is made public on the CNMC's website. The purpose is that potentially interested parties may become aware of the starting of Phase II proceedings if they want to request leave to intervene and submit comments on the transaction. Finally, once the final decision regarding the transaction is adopted, a non-confidential version is published on the CNMC's website.

To avoid any possible concerns, the notifying party should indicate in its notification which data are business secrets to have them treated as strictly confidential, and it must provide a non-confidential version of the notification form.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

**31** | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Yes, mainly with the EU authorities. The CNMC also cooperates with other antitrust authorities in the context of the OECD and the ICN. In addition, the CNMC interacts with Latin American authorities in the Latin American, Caribbean and Ibero-American competition fora.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

**32** | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the Competition Directorate can be appealed to the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) Council (provided that certain conditions are met), and decisions of the Council can be challenged before the Audiencia Nacional (a Spanish tribunal with national jurisdiction). The government's final decision on merger control proceedings in Phase III investigations may be subject to judicial review by the Spanish Supreme Court. Experience shows limited appeal activity with regard to merger control decisions and unsuccessful outcomes.

### Time frame

**33** | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Although it is difficult to give a time frame, experience has shown that the Spanish Supreme Court's judicial review of government decisions may take between two and four years.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

**34** | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

According to the latest CNMC's Annual Report, in 2019, 88 transactions were cleared by the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC), as opposed to the 83 transactions cleared in 2018. Most of them were unconditionally cleared in Phase I. Four cases were cleared subject to remedies in Phase I (*Lyntia/Negocio Iberdrola*, *Cirsa/GGSQ*, *Cofares/Cofarta* and *MIH Food Delivery Holdings/Just Eat*, all of which included behavioural remedies). No transaction was prohibited and only one was subject to an in-depth Phase II analysis and cleared with remedies in April 2019 (*Quirón/Clínica Santa Cristina*). During 2019, the CNMC also initiated Phase II proceedings in one instance, *Cimsa/Activos Cemex*, which is still pending as at the time of writing. The number of cleared transactions shows a minimal increase in merger control activity compared with 2018.

It is particularly interesting to note that the Phase I remedies offered in all four transactions included behavioural remedies, in line with precedents from previous years, which shows a clear trend towards the use of behavioural remedies in Phase I, whereas the European Commission favours divestments. Similarly, the last Phase II case (*Quirón/Clínica Santa Cristina*) only included behavioural remedies. It is also worth noting that, following what was learned from the *Bimbo/Panrico II* case, in *BP/Petrocorner*, the authority accepted a fix-it-first remedy.

Enforcement action shows that the CNMC has a clear willingness to monitor remedies and this has been a traditional enforcement priority. Back in 2013, the former National Competition Commission fined Telecinco €15.6 million (the highest fine to date in the context of merger control proceedings) for having failed to implement the remedies that were accepted by Telecinco in the *Telecinco/Cuatro* merger. In the same case, in September 2015 and September 2016, the CNMC fined Telecinco €3 million each year regarding further failure to implement the remedies. During 2017 and early 2018, the CNMC has continued to closely monitor compliance with remedies as shown by cases *Telecinco/Cuatro*, *Verifone/Hypercom*, *Redsys/Redy*, *Integra/Codman Neurosurgery Business* or *Dia/Eroski Activos*, where the CNMC has confirmed with a decision to that effect that the parties had complied with the remedies. Then, in 2018, the CNMC opened an investigation in relation to an alleged failure to comply with the commitments undertaken by Repsol when it acquired Petrocat in 2014. Further, in late 2019, the CNMC fined Telefónica €1.5 million for breaching the commitments undertaken in the context of the acquisition of DTS in 2015. In addition, the CNMC has continued to actively prosecute companies for breach of the suspensory obligation applicable to merger control proceedings (ie, closing the relevant transaction prior to clearance).

Although the CNMC investigated eight potential gun-jumping cases in 2016, more recently, gun-jumping cases have decreased. By way of illustration, in 2018 only one formal investigation (*Consenu/Activos Cathisa*), took place, resulting in a fine of €20,000 on Consenu for gun jumping in the acquisition of the waste management services business of Cathisa. Similarly, in 2019, the CNMC only pursued one gun-jumping case, by which it fined Grupo Nufri (a fruit producer) €12,800 for breaching the suspensory obligation in its acquisition of Indulleida.

In the CNMC's Action Plan for 2020, the authority explained that some of the key priorities for 2020 include reinforcing the monitoring of compliance with remedies, an increased supervision of gun-jumping cases, as well as further focus on digital economy markets, especially as regards the acquisition of innovative companies, and transactions concerning companies featuring a high number of users or access to data. Further, the CNMC will focus on the effects of remedies and the effects of acquiring minority shareholdings on competitors.

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

Following the reform of the Spanish competition rules that entered into force from September 2007 to March 2008, Spain's competition law has been in line with the EU rules and has streamlined the authorities responsible for competition enforcement in Spain. However, the competition authority can adopt 'soft law' (guidelines, notices, etc) to assist in the interpretation of key issues relating to Spanish merger control provisions and in fact did so in October 2011 with regard to simplified proceedings.

It is foreseen that the Competition Act will likely be amended in order to transpose the ECN+ Directive on the enforcement powers and resources of competition authorities of the member states (Directive (EU) 2019/1).

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The number of merger filings (86 notifications) made in Spain in 2019 shows a minimal increase in activity, which means that still a healthy number of transactions were filed as opposed to the years prior to the economic upturn when merger control activity in Spain reached historic lows. The enforcement track record shows a mature and consistent approach to merger control scrutiny as most transactions were unconditionally cleared in Phase I and only four cases were cleared subject to remedies in Phase I. No transaction was prohibited and one was subject to an in-depth Phase II analysis, which has been cleared subject to behavioural remedies in early 2019 (*Quirón/Clinica Santa Cristina*).

Recent enforcement shows a stricter approach to Phase I reviews (where market testing and Phase I reviews with remedies have increased) and a willingness to accept behavioural remedies in both Phase I and Phase II. All four cases cleared in 2019 subject to remedies in Phase I included behavioural remedies, which shows the National Markets and Competition Commission also making use of behavioural remedies in Phase I, contrary to the practice of the European Commission, which favours divestments. In addition, the only Phase II case in 2019 only included behavioural remedies. The remedies offered by the parties in those transactions also show that the regulator is willing to address proportionality concerns by accepting behavioural remedies.



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# Sweden

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Swedish merger control is governed by the Swedish Competition Act (the Act), which entered into force in November 2008. As compared with the previous legislation, the changes on merger control were largely intended to bring the Act even further into line with the EU Merger Regulation.

The Swedish Competition Authority (the Competition Authority) has primary responsibility for the administration of the Act. In January 2018, the Competition Authority gained the power to block a transaction, when previously it had been necessary to take such a case to court. Now, a prohibition decision from the Competition Authority can be appealed to the Patent and Market Court, with further appeal to the Patent and Market Court of Appeal.

The Patent and Market Court and the Patent and Market Court of Appeal were both established in September 2016. Previously, orders concerning prohibitions and other sanctions were made by the Stockholm District Court and on appeal by the Market Court (as a result, older case law will reference the previous court system).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Act's merger control rules are based on the concept of 'concentration', which is intended to correspond completely to the concept of a concentration under the EU Merger Regulation. This concept is defined in a general way to allow a dynamic interpretation in line with EU law, including existing, as well as future, case law of the European Court of Justice. More precisely, the Act prescribes that a concentration within the meaning of the Act arises if there is a change of control on a lasting basis when:

- two or more previously independent undertakings merge; or
- one or more persons, already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.

The Competition Authority refers to the European Commission's Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice and its guidance on the concept of concentration under the EU Merger Regulation.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The Act is applicable to all joint ventures constituting a concentration within the meaning of the Act, that is, all full-function joint ventures. The Competition Authority refers to the European Commission's

Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice and its guidance on the concept of full-function joint ventures.

To the extent the creation of a full-function joint venture has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent, that coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of the provisions on anticompetitive cooperation between undertakings.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Act's definition of a concentration follows the relevant rules of the EU Merger Regulation. In short, acquisitions of minority interests are only caught by the merger rules if they involve a de facto acquisition of control.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The Act provides for mandatory notification where:

- the undertakings concerned by the concentration attain a combined turnover in Sweden of more than 1 billion kronor; and
- each of at least two of the undertakings concerned has a turnover in Sweden exceeding 200 million kronor.

If the first but not second threshold is met:

- the Competition Authority has jurisdiction to order the concentration to be notified, even post-closing, where particular grounds exist to do so (ie, risk of substantive competition concerns, see *Easypark/Inteleon* from 2019); and
- parties can make voluntary notification.

When calculating the turnover of the undertakings concerned, two or more transactions that have taken place within a two-year period between the same persons or undertakings are treated as one and the same concentration.

The Competition Authority refers to the European Commission's Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice and its guidance on calculation of turnover and on the concept of undertakings concerned.

If a concentration has a Community dimension (ie, meets the turnover thresholds in article 1 of the EU Merger Regulation), the concentration should instead be notified to the European Commission.



## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Provided the transaction falls within the scope of the Act and the turnover thresholds are met, filing is mandatory. There are no exceptions to this rule.

The parties may also notify a transaction voluntarily where the first but not second threshold is met. As the Competition Authority also has the power to order a notification in this context, a voluntary filing may be advisable where the transaction leads to or augments already high market shares in the Swedish market or a substantial part thereof, or where the parties have vertically overlapping activities and either of the parties has a strong position upstream or downstream. In 2019, four transactions were notified to the Competition Authority on a voluntary basis (though all were in fact cleared unconditionally in Phase I).

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign transactions are, in the view of the Competition Authority, caught by the Act and have to be notified when the turnover thresholds are met. In practice, this means, for instance, that the creation of a full-function joint venture with no, or limited, foreseen activities in Sweden can still be caught by the Act's merger rules if the parent companies meet the thresholds. As long as the thresholds are met, the transaction is presumed to have local effects in Sweden.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The Act contains no special merger rules relating to particular areas of the economy. However, such rules are sometimes contained in sector-specific legislation.

### NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

#### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A notification of a concentration must be made before it is implemented. There are no pecuniary sanctions for not notifying a transaction to the Competition Authority. However, should the Competition Authority become aware of a qualifying but unnotified transaction, it may order the parties to notify, subject to a fine.

Should the Competition Authority find that a completed transaction was not permitted under the Swedish Competition Act (the Act), it retains the right to prohibit the transaction up to two years after the transfer of control bringing about the transaction. Failure to notify brings with it the risk of the transaction being annulled *ex post*.

Filing under the Act can be made as soon as the undertakings concerned can demonstrate to the Competition Authority a good faith intention to implement the concentration. This means that an unsigned copy of the agreement or a letter of intent is normally sufficient as a basis for notification. There are practical advantages to pre-notification contacts with the Competition Authority.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

A transaction should be notified by the merging parties together or the party or parties acquiring control. There are no filing fees.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

From the date of receipt of a complete notification, the Competition Authority has a preliminary period of 25 working days (Phase I) in which to take a decision either stating that there are no grounds for action or that it will initiate a special investigation (Phase II). However, if an undertaking offers commitments to remedy concerns during Phase I, the preliminary investigation period is increased to 35 working days.

After a decision to carry out a special investigation (Phase II), the Competition Authority has an additional three months in which to decide whether the transaction should be prohibited or cleared. The three-month period may be extended provided the notifying parties agree to it or there are compelling reasons for doing so. The decision of the Competition Authority to extend the period can be appealed to the Patent and Market Court.

On average in 2019, Phase I cases were resolved by the Competition Authority within 15 working days and Phase II cases within 81 working days.

Before clearance, no party to the concentration may take any steps to complete the transaction. This standstill requirement can be waived by the Competition Authority under exceptional circumstances. The Competition Authority also has the power to order the parties to the transaction to respect the standstill requirement, subject to a fine. If the Competition Authority clears the transaction before the deadline, the parties to the concentration may complete the transaction.

The Competition Authority has the power to suspend the time limit (stop the clock) if, for example, the parties do not provide requested information in due time. During the preliminary investigation period, the parties may also request that the Competition Authority suspends the time limit for as many days as the Competition Authority deems appropriate. This possibility is available if the parties need additional time to address a competition concern.

#### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Before the Competition Authority has taken a decision to clear a transaction, parties are prohibited, in the absence of express permission, from taking measures to implement the concentration fully or partly. Where necessary to uphold this rule, the Competition Authority can order the parties to respect the standstill period subject to a fine. Without this active step by the Competition Authority, there are no pecuniary sanctions but there is nonetheless the risk of the Competition Authority subsequently deciding not to clear the transaction. In such cases, divestiture of the company or purchased assets (or similar) will be required.

In 2014, a completed, voluntarily notified transaction in the online real estate advertisement sector was blocked (*Swedbank/Svensk Fastighetsförmedling*). In 2019, the Competition Authority ordered a transaction to be notified that had been completed over two months earlier (it was later cleared unconditionally in Phase II – *Easypark/Inteleon*).

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Before the Competition Authority has taken a decision to clear a transaction, parties are prohibited, in the absence of express permission, from taking measures to implement the concentration fully or partly. Where necessary to uphold this rule, the Competition Authority can order the parties to respect the standstill period subject to a fine.



Without this active step by the Competition Authority, there are no pecuniary sanctions but there is nonetheless the risk of the Competition Authority subsequently deciding not to clear the transaction. In such cases, divestiture of the company or purchased assets (or similar) will be required.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Act does provide for an exemption from the standstill requirement on a case-by-case basis. However, this is a general provision, not specific to foreign-to-foreign transactions, and there must be particular reasons to justify such a departure from normal procedure.

#### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The Act does not include any special rules applicable to public takeover bids. However, it provides that the prohibition of a transaction will have no effect on the validity of acquisitions made on a Swedish or foreign stock exchange, on another authorised marketplace or at a public auction. In those cases, the buyer may instead be required to divest what has been acquired.

The Act does not contain any explicit rule similar to that found in the EU Merger Regulation to the effect that the standstill rule does not prevent formal implementation of a public bid, in the sense that the acquirer may formally take over the shares as long as they are not voted on. However, the Competition Authority takes the view that the same principle applies under Swedish competition law. In addition, the parties may apply for an exception to the standstill rule so that the acquirer may vote for the shares if it is necessary to maintain the full value of the investment, provided it would not harm competition.

#### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Filing under the Act requires the use of a specific form. The form must be filled out in Swedish. A convenience translation of the form is available on the Competition Authority's website. The form includes questions on the parties, competitors, market conditions, etc, similar to Form CO requirements for notifications under the EU Merger Regulation.

The information required by the form is relatively extensive. The time necessary for the preparation of the form varies widely from case to case, as does its size, depending mainly on whether the transaction involves any 'affected markets'.

It is sometimes possible to secure, on an informal basis, waivers from the Competition Authority for information confirmed as unnecessary in a specific case. Discussions on waivers may be held during pre-notification meetings. There is no formalised equivalent to the simplified notification form available at EU level for uncomplicated transactions.

A notifying party must formally declare in the filing that all information provided is true, correct and complete. If the Competition Authority considers that the information provided is misleading or deficient in some way, the filing will not be considered to be complete and time will not start to run. During the review process itself, the Competition Authority can request additional information from the parties under penalty of a fine. If necessary, the Competition Authority can stop the clock until the required information is provided.

#### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Upon receipt of a complete notification, the Competition Authority has 25 working days to conduct a preliminary investigation (Phase I). However, if an undertaking offers commitments, Phase I is increased to 35 working days. Before the end of the preliminary investigation, the Competition Authority either has to clear the transaction or decide to initiate a special investigation (Phase II).

If Phase II is launched, the Competition Authority must decide within three months whether the transaction should be prohibited or cleared. The Competition Authority may extend the three-month period by a maximum of one month at a time with the parties' consent, or if there are other compelling reasons.

The Competition Authority has the power to suspend the time limit if, for example, the parties do not provide requested information in due time (ie, to 'stop the clock'). During Phase I, the parties may also ask the Competition Authority to suspend the time limit for as many days as the Competition Authority deems appropriate. This possibility is available if the parties need additional time to address a competition concern.

A prohibition decision or conditional clearance from the Competition Authority can be appealed to the Patent and Market Court and must be ruled upon within six months of receipt (subject to extension). An appeal against a judgment by the Patent and Market Court can be made to the Patent and Market Court of Appeal, which must pass final judgment within three months of expiry of the period for appeal.

No measures may be taken in respect of a transaction, notified or not, when more than two years have passed since the concentration occurred.

Pre-notification contacts are advised and recommended by the Competition Authority, especially for more complex transactions with 'affected markets'. There are practical advantages to pre-notification contacts with the Competition Authority.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Upon receipt of a complete notification, the Competition Authority has 25 working days to conduct a preliminary investigation (Phase I). However, if an undertaking offers commitments, Phase I is increased to 35 working days.

If Phase II is launched, the Competition Authority must decide within three months whether the transaction should be prohibited or cleared. The Competition Authority may extend the three-month period by a maximum of one month at a time with the parties' consent, or if there are other compelling reasons.

The Competition Authority has the power to suspend the time limit if, for example, the parties do not provide requested information in due time (ie, to 'stop the clock'). During Phase I, the parties may also ask the Competition Authority to suspend the time limit for as many days as the Competition Authority deems appropriate. This possibility is available if the parties need additional time to address a competition concern.

There are no set timetables for hearings, requests for information or other measures during the investigation. The Competition Authority may, from time to time, in the course of the investigation send questions to the parties and request additional information, typically coupled with a deadline.

When the notification has been filed, the Competition Authority will normally contact competitors and other third parties listed in the notification and invite comments on the proposed transaction. There is no formal distinction between different categories of third parties. No companies other than the undertakings concerned are treated as parties to the procedure.

The length of time required to obtain a decision varies considerably from case to case, depending mainly on whether the transaction involves any 'affected markets'. However, the Competition Authority seeks to clear uncomplicated cases (those clearly involving no affected markets) before the expiry of Phase I. The Competition Authority has published a goal to clear such cases within 15 working days. On average, in 2019, Phase I cases were resolved within 15 working days and Phase II cases within 81 working days.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Under the Swedish Competition Act (the Act), a transaction shall be prohibited if it would significantly impede the existence or development of effective competition in Sweden as a whole, or a substantial part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The test is harmonised with the EU Merger Regulation.

The Competition Authority's assessment will take account of all relevant factors including, for example, market shares, barriers to entry, buyer power and potential countervailing efficiencies. Where relevant, a 'failing firm' defence would be considered by the Competition Authority.

A transaction may be prohibited only if it does not involve 'the setting aside of essential national interests of security or resources'. This exclusion applies only in very special circumstances.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

In addition to the substantive test for clearance, the Act provides that, to the extent the creation of a full-function joint venture has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent, that coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the rules on anticompetitive cooperation between undertakings.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The Competition Authority will typically consider possible unilateral, coordinated, vertical and conglomerate effects of a concentration when evaluating whether it would significantly impede the existence or development of effective competition in Sweden as a whole, or a substantial part thereof.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Non-competition issues are not part of the review process of the Competition Authority, with the exception that a transaction cannot be prohibited if doing so would jeopardise important national interests of security or resources (a rare exception).

In 2019, the Directors of the Nordic Competition Authorities published a joint article promoting a strict merger control regime, free of political interference, and a critique of the so-called Franco-German proposal to relax merger control rules to facilitate the creation of 'European Champions'.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Act does not explicitly mention economic efficiencies. However, the Competition Authority's 2018 merger control guidance specifies that the parties must at an early stage provide the Competition Authority with verifiable information on potential efficiency gains and counterfactuals to enable it to take economic efficiencies into account.

The Competition Authority refers to the European Commission's Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers and its guidance on the assessment of economic efficiencies.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If the substantive test is met, the Competition Authority can either prohibit the transaction or accept and make binding appropriate commitments from the parties to remedy the concerns identified. Remedies could include an order to divest or to take other pro-competitive action. Any commitments given by the parties may be linked to a fine.

Acquisitions made on a stock exchange or any other recognised market or at an auction may not be prohibited; instead, the disposal of the assets acquired may be ordered.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

As an alternative to prohibiting a transaction, the Competition Authority can accept commitments for the disposal of an undertaking or a business activity in whole or in part or some other measure to address the competition concern identified.

Those commitments may be proposed at any stage during the procedure. The companies concerned normally present such solutions in the form of an undertaking to the Competition Authority. Structural undertakings as well as behavioural undertakings are accepted by the Competition Authority. Compliance with undertakings is often ensured through a fine to be imposed in the event of a breach of the undertaking.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Commitments may be proposed by the parties at any stage during the procedure. In Phase I, if commitments are offered, this initial period is extended to 35 days. In Phase II, an application to extend the time limit is required if a remedy is offered later than three weeks before the end of this in-depth period. The basic conditions applicable to a divestment or any other remedy are, in short, that they are sufficient to eliminate the adverse effects of the concentration.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

This is rare but the Competition Authority has in the past (for example, the mid 1990s) obliged the parties to a foreign-to-foreign transaction to divest assets located outside Sweden to remedy competition issues on the Swedish market.

## Ancillary restrictions

### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

A decision by the Competition Authority to clear a transaction also covers restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the notified concentration. There are no specific guidelines published by the Competition Authority on ancillary restraints, but the preparatory works and Competition Authority's other guidelines indicate that the European Commission's Notice on ancillary restraints shall give guidance in matters concerning such restraints under the Swedish Competition Act.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Customers and competitors (and suppliers in some instances) will be invited to comment on the proposed transaction. No companies other than the undertakings concerned are treated as parties to the procedure.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

All notifications are mentioned together with a brief summary in the Competition Authority's case list, which is publicly available on its website. The Competition Authority also publishes the final decision in each case.

As for confidentiality, whereas the general rule in Sweden is that all documents held by a public authority are in the public domain, rules on confidentiality and business secrets are contained in the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act, which provides that information shall be secret if it relates to a party's business, innovations or research and development, insofar as disclosure could cause the party to suffer injury. There must, however, be particularly strong reasons for refusing full access to the file to a party to the proceedings.

Information provided by the parties during pre-notification contact is covered by absolute secrecy, that is, without the requirement that disclosure could cause injury.

Where the granting of confidentiality has been an issue, the Competition Authority has generally adopted a cooperative attitude in relation to the party requesting confidentiality.

In certain circumstances, the Competition Authority can give a party access to confidential information through a 'data room procedure'. During that process, certain information contained in the Competition Authority's investigation file will be held available at its premises (the data room) to which only a restricted group will have access during a limited period.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The Competition Authority may, where appropriate, contact the European Commission or any national competition authority formally or informally. Since 2004, Sweden has had an agreement with Denmark, Norway and Iceland on cooperation on competition issues. This was revised and extended in September 2017 to include Finland and Greenland. As a result of the agreement, information exchange between the national

competition authorities concerned is facilitated, including in the area of merger control. The national competition authorities hold conference calls and yearly meetings within the framework of the agreement to update each other on current trends and ongoing investigations.

The Best Practices on Cooperation between EU National Competition Authorities in Merger Review were adopted in November 2011 by the EU Merger Working Group.

Under EU merger control rules, the Competition Authority cooperates with the European Commission and the other member states' competition authorities concerning referral cases.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Prohibition and conditional clearance decisions of the Competition Authority can be appealed to the Patent and Market Court. Decisions and orders of the Patent and Market Court may be appealed to the Patent and Market Court of Appeal, but leave to appeal is required. There is also a possibility, subsequent to a decision by any of the above courts, of reviewing the decision, on application of the Competition Authority, where the decision has been based on false information provided by a party. This application must occur within one year of the date of the decision.

The *Arla/Klassiska Ostar*-case is the only transaction to have been prohibited by the Competition Authority since the authority acquired the power in 2018 to take such decisions itself.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

A prohibition or conditional clearance decision can be appealed to the Patent and Market Court. The court has six months from receipt of the appeal to make a ruling. If an appeal is made against the judgment of the Patent and Market Court, the Patent and Market Court of Appeal shall give a ruling within three months of expiry of the period of appeal.

The time limits may be extended by the court if the parties to the transaction agree to it or where there are special reasons for an extension.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Since 1993, the Competition Authority has taken action to prohibit 14 mergers. This somewhat underestimates the degree of regularity with which the Competition Authority may have reached negative conclusions, as other transactions have simply been abandoned on receipt of the draft summons (equivalent to a statement of objections under the pre-2018 system), without the Competition Authority needing to take formal action.

There have also been cases resolved via commitments, avoiding the need for prohibition altogether. Previously rare, a slowly growing number of cases are being cleared with commitments already in Phase I (with one such decision in each of 2018, 2019 and in 2020).

## Reform proposals

### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The Competition Authority received increased powers in January 2018 and can now prohibit a transaction without taking action in court to do so. This power was exercised for the first time in 2019.

To enhance transparency and independence in its decision-making, the Competition Authority has recommended that the Swedish government create a new decision-making body within the authority consisting of the head of the Competition Authority and two other commissioners (Hearing Officers of sorts) to be appointed by the government. Consideration of this proposal is ongoing.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In 2019, the number of transactions notified to the Competition Authority remained largely stable, with 74 notifications (compared to 80 in both 2018 and 2017). The first months of 2020 have indicated a fairly consistent start to the year, with 31 merger filings submitted by early May (similar to 2016, and around five more than the intervening years). This is particularly noteworthy in light of the challenges of the covid-19 pandemic, though much of the related work will already have been in the pipeline before the uncertainty and upheaval kicked in, and longer-term effects on notifications can only be judged next year.

Looking more closely at the main cases behind the numbers in 2019, there were three Phase II cases: two were unconditionally cleared (*Alumeca/Metallservice* and *NEP/HDR*), and one saw the Competition Authority make use for the first time of its relatively new powers to block transactions without going to court (*Arla/Klassiska Ostar*). There was also one conditional clearance in Phase I (*Karo/Trimb*). By early to mid 2020, there has been one unconditional clearance in Phase II (*Easypark/Inteleon*), and one conditional clearance in Phase I (*Gasum/Linde*).

In terms of the review period, the Competition Authority continues to be successful in dealing efficiently with Phase I cases, averaging 15 working days in 2019 (a slight rise from 12 in 2018, explained by a number of complex cases). Typically, cases involving no horizontal or vertical overlaps are almost always dealt with by the Competition Authority in under 15 working days.

On procedural developments, it has become increasingly common in recent years for the Competition Authority to make use of its stop-the-clock powers (either on its own initiative or at the request of the parties). Examples in 2019 to early 2020 include *Unilabs/Praktikertjänst*, *Karo/Trimb*, *Gasum/Linde* and *Easypark/Inteleon*. The *Gasum/Linde* case is particularly interesting in that the clock was stopped for 20 days on the last day of Phase I.

This case concerned Gasum Oy's acquisition of Lidingö Clean Gas Solutions and Nauticor, with initial concerns identified in imports and supply of LNG to industrial customers, and more specifically on Gasum gaining greater control of important infrastructure (terminals). To address this, Gasum offered in Phase I to commit to allowing access by third parties to 380,000 MWh at the target terminal for a period of 10 years on FRAND terms, at a throughput fee and service fee. The clock was stopped not due to a failure by the parties to provide requested information, but rather on agreement as a way to allow more robust testing of the remedies proposed without going into Phase II. A report was prepared by an impartial expert with specific experience from the industry on the commitments offered, giving the Competition Authority the comfort needed to clear the case conditionally in Phase I. This was an unusual and flexible format.



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Four transactions were notified voluntarily to the Competition Authority in 2019, a higher than usual level. This aspect of the Competition Authority's jurisdiction, where it can accept or order a filing in cases where only the first of the two mandatory thresholds is met, means that transacting parties involved in competitively sensitive deals need to think carefully about whether to proceed without filing, or file voluntarily to pre-empt potential interest from the Competition Authority.

This was an issue in the 2019 *Easypark/Inteleon* deal involving mobile payment solutions for car parks. Based on information picked up in a press release issued by the parties, the Competition Authority ordered that the transaction be notified more than two months after closing. The deal was a three-to-two merger with combined market shares in the range of 40 to 60 per cent but it was ultimately cleared unconditionally in Phase II (around seven months after closing). Vertical entry and expansion was deemed likely, timely and sufficient, with some public and private parking operators already creating their own mobile payment solutions.

Of particular note in the last year is the *Arla/Klassiska Ostar* transaction, involving the acquisition by three dairy producers of joint control of Svensk Mjök AB, and thereby of the important cheese trademarks, Präst, Herrgård and Grevé. The Competition Authority blocked the deal in part owing to concerns that the parties would have the opportunity and incentive to offer less favourable terms of access to competitors for the cheese licences. The appeal of the prohibition decision was dismissed by the Patent and Market Court in January 2020 on the basis that an earlier arbitral award – which found that company law had not been followed in the sale itself – meant that the case was hypothetical and the prohibition was repealed as the concentration no longer existed.

Also worth highlighting is *Karo/Trimb*, the only transaction to be conditionally approved in 2019. This case concerned Karo Pharma AB's acquisition of its competitor Trimb Holding AB. The Competition Authority expressed concerns over the creation of a very strong position in products for the treatment of light eczema and rashes. The Phase I deadline was suspended once and consequently extended due to commitments offered to divest the brand Hydrokortison Trimb. This cleared the way for Phase I conditional approval. The Competition Authority approved Evolan Pharma as buyer of the divested trademark.

As Phase II unconditional clearances, *NEP/HDR* and *Alumeca/Metallservice* are also of interest as recent examples of where

preliminary concerns translated into neither commitments nor a prohibition. Viewed together with similar examples in the last few years, this suggests that a Phase II investigation in Sweden does not necessarily mean that unconditional clearance is unlikely.

*NEP/HDR* involved the acquisition of HDR Sweden AB by its competitor NEP Sweden AB, both providers of 'outside broadcasting' (outsourced TV production services for live events). The parties were considered to be close competitors but the case was cleared in part owing to low barriers to entry and interest from foreign companies to enter the Swedish market.

*Alumeco/Metallservice* involved parties active in the metals trading industry. The Competition Authority launched a Phase II review owing to concerns that Alumeco would become dominant in the wholesale supply of aluminium products, and that market shares would be significantly higher than the 10 per cent presented by the parties. Ultimately, the combined market share in Sweden was taken to be around 20 per cent and the deal was cleared, with the scope to buy product from Germany playing a role.

# Switzerland

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Swiss merger control is mainly governed by the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restrictions of Competition (CartA) as well as the Ordinance on the Control of Concentrations of Undertakings (together, the Competition Law). The Competition Law came into effect on 1 July 1996 and was revised in 2004. Further minor amendments have since been made. On 12 February 2020, the Federal Council requested the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research to prepare a partial revision of the CartA, notably to modernise the Swiss merger control procedures.

Merger control is enforced by the Competition Commission (ComCo). The ComCo consists of between 11 and 15 members (currently 12), the majority of whom must be independent experts. It is based in Berne. The cases are prepared and processed by the Secretariat of the ComCo (the Secretariat). The Secretariat is divided into four departments responsible for product markets, infrastructure, services and construction respectively.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Transactions that are subject to merger control are:

- statutory mergers of previously independent enterprises;
- acquisition of control over a previously independent enterprise or parts thereof, including through the acquisition of equity interests or the conclusion of agreements. Acquisitions of minority shareholdings are not subject to merger control, except for any contractual arrangements or factual circumstances conferring factual control on the minority shareholder. However, the ComCo has decided that the acquisition of a minority interest may qualify as an anticompetitive agreement if the enterprises concerned intend to cooperate; and
- acquisition of joint control over an enterprise (joint venture).

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

There are three different types of joint ventures caught by merger control:

- acquisition of joint control over an existing enterprise;
- acquisition of joint control over an existing joint venture if the joint venture performs all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis; and
- creation of a new joint venture if the joint venture performs all the functions of an autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis and if the business activities from at least one of the controlling enterprises are transferred to the joint venture.

Joint ventures for a transitional period are generally not caught by the Competition Law unless the period envisaged is sufficiently long or the term is renewable.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Law defines control as the ability to exercise a decisive influence on the activity of another enterprise by acquiring its shares, or in any other manner. In particular, this ability is deemed to exist if an enterprise is in a position to determine the production, the prices, the investments, the supply, the sales or the distribution of the profits of the other enterprise. Control is also assumed if major aspects of a company's business activity or its general business policy may be decisively influenced. Whether control is actually or potentially, directly or indirectly, de jure or de facto exercised is irrelevant. However, the mere acquisition of a non-controlling minority interest or a representation in executive bodies is not notifiable. In contrast, a board or management representation could confer control if associated with veto rights concerning strategic decisions. Similarly, other rights or contractual arrangements could confer control if they decisively influence the composition, the deliberations or decisions of the executive bodies, needing to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The test applied to mergers is based on turnover. Two turnover thresholds must be reached cumulatively: for the last business year prior to the merger, the enterprises concerned must have reported an aggregate turnover of at least 2 billion Swiss francs worldwide or an aggregate turnover in Switzerland of at least 500 million Swiss francs, and at least two of the enterprises involved in the transaction must have reported individual turnovers in Switzerland of at least 100 million Swiss francs. These monetary amounts are relatively high compared to other jurisdictions. Turnover is calculated on a consolidated basis, but excluding intra-group business.

In the case of insurance companies, the gross annual insurance premiums are taken into account for the purpose of determining the relevant thresholds.

The turnover calculation for banks and financial intermediaries is based on gross income. With respect to the geographical allocation of turnover, the notification form of the ComCo provides that the Swiss turnover of a bank or financial intermediary is calculated based on the income received by the branch or division established in Switzerland.

In general, the test for the geographical allocation of the turnover is the contractual delivery place of a product (place of performance)



and the place where competition with other alternative suppliers takes place, respectively. The billing address is not relevant.

In addition, once the ComCo has established that a specific enterprise holds a dominant market position, every merger transaction, even if the turnover thresholds are not met, involving that enterprise in the market in which it holds a dominant position or in an adjacent market or in a market upstream or downstream thereof is subject to the notification requirement, irrespective of any thresholds. The ComCo does not publish a list of enterprises held to be dominant. In 2014, the Federal Administrative Court held that this provision of the Cartel Act had to be interpreted narrowly. However, in a subsequent recommendation, the ComCo widened the scope of application of article 9, paragraph 4 of the Cartel Act and held that a single economic entity between the joint venture and its mother companies had to be assumed. Hence, to determine whether a notification obligation is triggered, the joint venture and the companies controlling the joint venture are to be considered. However, only if the binding part of a final and non-appealable decision states a market dominant position respectively the abuse of a market dominant position, a notification obligation for future concentrations is triggered. In contrast, no such obligation arises if only the reasoning of a decision holds an undertaking to be market dominant.

Parliament may adjust the turnover thresholds taking account of any change in circumstances and may establish special criteria for the notification of concentrations in certain sectors of the economy. Until now, no such federal decree has been passed.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory prior to completion of the transaction, provided the turnover thresholds are reached or a market dominant position in the meaning of article 9, paragraph 4 of the Cartel Act has been established in a final non-appealable-decision. There are no exceptions to this principle.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The Competition Law is applicable to foreign-to-foreign mergers provided the relevant thresholds are reached with respect to Switzerland. According to the Federal Supreme Court, whenever the turnover thresholds of the Competition Law are met, an effect on the Swiss market is presumed, thus triggering a mandatory pre-merger filing.

In practice, given the relatively high thresholds, it is unlikely that a foreign-to-foreign merger would become subject to Swiss merger control without, at the same time, being subject to the relevant foreign merger control.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

There are no generally applicable Swiss acts (such as catch-all rules in foreign trade legislation) that prohibit or require a specific screening of foreign investments in Switzerland on the basis of national interest, regardless of the industry sector. However, foreign investments in companies engaged in certain regulated industries and sectors in Switzerland might require government permission or approval. For example, special authorisations are required if the merger transaction involves banks or Swiss real estate companies.

In particular, if a bank incorporated under the laws of Switzerland becomes foreign-controlled or if, in the case of a foreign-controlled bank, the foreign holders of a direct or indirect qualified participation in the Swiss bank change, then a new special licence for foreign-controlled banks must be obtained prior to such event. The competent authority

is the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA). When a concentration of banks is deemed necessary for reasons related to creditor protection, namely rescue mergers, FINMA replaces the ComCo, which is given a right of consultation only. However, the notification must still be addressed to the ComCo if the jurisdictional thresholds for notification are met.

As a further example, any acquisition or actions that qualify as an acquisition of residential real estate assets in Switzerland are subject to the Federal Act on the Acquisition of Real Estate by Foreign Persons (Lex Koller) if the acquiring person qualifies as a 'person abroad' under the Lex Koller. Accordingly, the parties of a merger involving a foreign enterprise and a Swiss real estate company (ie, a company whose principal purpose is the holding of real estate in Switzerland and whose assets include a significant portfolio of residential properties in Switzerland) may need to obtain a special permit from the competent cantonal (local) authorities.

Furthermore, special authorisation requirements apply to enterprises holding special rights, such as broadcasting, telecommunication, nuclear energy and air transport licences.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

A filing must be made prior to the completion of the merger. Typically, therefore, a filing will be made after the relevant agreements have been signed, but prior to completion. If a notifiable merger is not filed, the enterprise that was required to file may face a fine of up to 1 million Swiss francs. In addition, the management (individuals) may also be personally fined up to 20,000 Swiss francs. To date, the Competition Commission (ComCo) has imposed several fines on enterprises that did not file or filed a notification too late. In contrast, the managers of such enterprises have not been fined so far. Fines are calculated based on the following objective criteria:

- whether the notification requirement was breached intentionally or negligently;
- importance of the enterprises involved in the relevant market, measured by turnover realised in Switzerland;
- whether prima facie the concentration represents a threat to competition. Such a threat is presumed if the total aggregate market share of the enterprises involved in the concentration is 20 per cent or more (or, if no market shares are combined, the market share of one of these companies is 30 per cent or more); and
- whether the concentration adversely affects effective competition; that is, whether it creates or enhances a dominant market position that eliminates effective competition (without enhancing competition in another market in a way that outweighs the negative effects of the dominant market position).

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In the case of a statutory merger, notification must be made jointly by the companies involved. Where control over an enterprise is acquired, the filing must be made by the enterprise or enterprises acquiring control. If a joint notification is made, the enterprises are required to designate at least one common representative to the ComCo. For a Phase I investigation, there is a lump-sum filing fee of 5,000 Swiss francs. In a Phase II investigation, the Secretariat of the ComCo charges an hourly rate of 100 to 400 Swiss francs depending on the urgency of the case and the seniority of the case handler.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Once notification is complete, there is a first waiting period of a maximum of one month in which the enterprises are not allowed to complete the concentration (provisional ban). The ComCo informs the enterprises concerned of the opening of an investigation within this one month period. If no such notice is given within that time frame, the concentration may be implemented without reservation. The provisional ban does not apply if the ComCo prior to the expiry of the period of one month notifies the enterprises that it regards the concentration to comply with the Competition Law (comfort letter). If the ComCo decides to open an investigation the provisional ban is automatically extended until the end of the investigation. Alternatively, the ComCo at the request of the undertakings, at any stage of the procedure, may provide authorisation to implement the merger for good cause, in particular if the merger otherwise could not be completed or the enterprises would suffer great financial loss.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If an enterprise fails to comply with the provisional ban on closing the merger after notification to the ComCo, the enterprise may face a fine of up to 1 million Swiss francs. In addition, the enterprise may be required to take measures to reinstate effective competition, either by unwinding the transaction, by ceasing to exercise effective control, or by any other appropriate action such as the termination of personnel ties or contractual guarantees to competitors or counterparties. Unlike the breach of the notification requirement, there are no individual sanctions for the management.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

As merger control is applicable to foreign-to-foreign mergers, they are also subject to the ordinary sanctions regime. In fact, the ComCo has already fined enterprises of foreign-to-foreign mergers for breaching the notification requirement (*Rhône-Poulenc SA/Merck* and *Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP)/Paribas*).

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Competition Law does not provide for any specific solutions to remedy Swiss antitrust issues in a foreign-to-foreign merger. Instead, the general remedies outlined above are applicable. To our knowledge, 'hold-separate' arrangements have never been put into practice or accepted by the ComCo in relation to a foreign-to-foreign merger. However, arrangements regarding the voting rights of the shares of a party to the merger have been accepted and practised. If the antitrust issue is merely a local one and therefore does not arise at a European level, it may often be remedied on the basis of competitive arguments submitted in the filing.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The Competition Law does not contain any specific rules regarding public takeover bids. In these cases, the ComCo should be contacted in advance so that it can coordinate its course of action with the Swiss Takeover Board. This is particularly important for hostile bids. Past practice has

shown that in most cases the ComCo will substantially follow the rules of the EU Merger Regulation on public takeover bids. Also, it is possible to request provisional completion specifically in public takeover bids.

### Documentation

## 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The ComCo issues a standard notification form. The notification form basically requires enterprises to provide the following information and materials:

- company name, registered office and description of business activity of parties to the merger;
- a description of the proposed merger, including objectives to be achieved by it;
- turnovers, gross premium revenues or gross income, as the case may be, of the enterprises involved for Switzerland and worldwide;
- information on the relevant product and geographic markets affected, as well as information on the main competitors and respective market shares;
- data regarding new market entries over the past five years in the relevant markets as well as barriers to entry and, in particular, estimates of market entry costs;
- copies of the latest annual accounts and business reports of the enterprises involved; and
- copies of the relevant agreements relating to the merger.

For public tenders, copies of the public tender offer and copies of reports, assessments and business plans made in connection with the merger, to the extent they contain information relevant for the assessment of the merger for competition purposes, must also be supplied.

Depending on the complexity of the case, the preparation of a typical filing may take anywhere between two to six weeks. A filing can be made in any one of the official languages of Switzerland (French, German or Italian). Accompanying documents may also be submitted in English.

For foreign-to-foreign mergers that do not significantly affect the Swiss market but meet the threshold requirements, a simplified notification procedure is available upon application. The ComCo may, for valid reasons, release the applicant from the obligation to provide certain information and materials.

According to article 40 of the Cartel Act, undertakings concerned in concentrations and affected third parties shall generally provide the competition authorities with all the information required for their investigations and produce the necessary documents. Failure to fulfil or incorrect fulfilment of the duty to provide information is subject to fines of up to 100,000 Swiss francs against the defaulting company pursuant to article 52 of the Cartel Act or by fines of up to 20,000 Swiss francs against the defaulting natural person pursuant to article 55 of the Cartel Act. In both cases, it is *inter alia* required that the competent competition authority has issued a binding decision on the duty to provide information, which has not been fulfilled or has not been fulfilled correctly by the addressee of the decision.

### Investigation phases and timetable

## 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

In the first step of an investigation (which is normally the pre-notification phase during which the Secretariat of the ComCo (the Secretariat) reviews a draft notification), the Secretariat usually requests further information from the parties. The enterprises involved in the merger must furnish the ComCo with any additional information that it may

request. In the second step, unless the filing obviously raises no concerns, the Secretariat sends out questionnaires to competitors, suppliers and customers of the enterprises involved. The answers received will usually have an important bearing on the position taken by the ComCo.

If the ComCo decides to open a Phase II investigation, this is published. Usually, in a Phase II investigation, hearings take place and the parties may file further documents and information. Also, the ComCo sends out additional questionnaires to customers, suppliers and competitors in order to deepen the market research and analysis. Finally, when it comes to remedies, close contact is established between the Secretariat and the enterprises involved to define the scope of any undertakings.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The ComCo must notify the enterprises within one month of receiving the complete notification whether it intends to initiate an investigation (Phase I of the procedure). If, within this period, no notification is made by the ComCo, the merger may be completed. In practice, the one-month period can be shortened in less complex filings if, prior to the formal notification, the draft filing is submitted to the ComCo for review, thus enabling the ComCo to communicate its position shortly after formal notification is made.

If the ComCo decides to initiate an investigation (Phase II of the procedure), it must be completed within four months, unless the process has been delayed by the enterprises concerned. The ComCo has no possibilities to prolong Phase I without initiating a Phase II procedure.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The currently applicable substantive test is the CSDP test (creation or strengthening of dominant position). On this basis, a merger is to be cleared based on one of the following two criteria:

- the enterprises involved do not create or strengthen a dominant position eliminating effective competition in the relevant market; or
- competition in another market is enhanced by the merger and such improvement outweighs the harmful effects resulting from the creation or strengthening of the dominant position in the relevant market.

The substantive test as such is not directly affected by special circumstances. For example, a failing company defence is taken into account by the Competition Commission (ComCo) as part of the causality test (ie, the concentration must be causal to the creation or strengthening of the dominant position). According to ComCo's past practice, a failing company defence is possible if one or more parties to the concentration would disappear from the market within a short time without external support, the other parties would absorb most or all of the market shares of the disappearing company, and there is no solution that is less harmful to competition than the proposed concentration.

For compelling public reasons (employment or regional development), a concentration of enterprises that has been prohibited by the ComCo may be authorised by the Federal Council at the request of the enterprises.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The Competition Law does not provide for any specific substantive rules with respect to joint ventures.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The substantive test for clearance in Switzerland is that of market dominance. Applying this test, the ComCo also investigates coordinated effects in cases of oligopolies and unilateral effects. In addition, the ComCo examines conglomerate effects and vertical foreclosure.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

As a rule, the ComCo does not take into consideration non-competition issues in reviewing a merger. However, as the collapse of Swissair and decisions in agricultural markets in particular have shown, political considerations may have some impact on how (swiftly) the ComCo takes its decisions.

In connection with a merger involving banks, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) has the power to clear a merger that it deems necessary for reasons of creditor protection, which take precedence over competition issues. In such cases, FINMA replaces the ComCo, which is given a right of consultation only.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The ComCo takes – to a certain extent – economic efficiencies into account. The ComCo assesses whether and to what extent efficiency gains may positively affect competition and whether such gains are passed on to the consumers. Also, economic efficiency gains in one market may outweigh certain deficiencies of the merger in another.

As an example, (input) foreclosure effects of a transaction could lead to higher consumer prices if a vertically integrated company ceases to supply the downstream markets. However, according to the ComCo, possible efficiency gains of the transaction should be balanced against (input) foreclosure effects, as they could lead to lower consumer prices (see *Goldman Sachs/Altor/Hamlet*).

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

To the extent the enterprises involved do not comply with the order of the Competition Commission (ComCo) prohibiting a merger, the ComCo can take all appropriate measures in order to reinstate effective competition. Those measures include the cancelling of the merger transaction and the termination of control by the acquiring enterprise over the target.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The clearance of a proposed merger may be subject to certain conditions or obligations designed to safeguard effective competition. The law does not specify the types of conditions or obligations that may be attached. Recent cases have shown that conditions and other remedies will generally be discussed by the enterprises concerned with the ComCo. Those remedies could involve divestments or certain behavioural undertakings.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The divestment has to eliminate all material objections of the ComCo to the proposed merger. According to the ComCo, the divestment must be completed within a fixed period. It is not sufficient for the parties to commit to divest 'at the earliest possible stage'. A specific deadline must be offered. In international filings, it is important to coordinate the divestments to be proposed to other merger control authorities involved, namely the European Commission. So far, proposals for remedies have only rarely been offered by the parties in a Phase I investigation.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Remedies have been required in relatively few foreign mergers. In parallel filings with the European Commission, the remedies offered to the European Union were also recognised and accepted by the ComCo.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

In general, the ComCo only deals with ancillary restraints, in particular non-compete obligations that are directly related and necessary to the merger. The case practice of the ComCo, by and large, is in line with the European Commission's Notice on Ancillary Restraints. Other arrangements related to the merger are in most cases explicitly excluded from the clearance decision. If the parties have doubts about the legality of the arrangements not covered by the clearance decision, they have the option to submit the arrangement to the competition authorities for a formal or informal ruling.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In most cases, the Competition Commission (ComCo) will send out questionnaires to customers and competitors soliciting their opinion on a filed merger. However, customers and competitors have no formal procedural rights and the ComCo is neither required to issue questionnaires nor bound by any answers submitted.

If the ComCo decides to open an investigation proceeding (Phase II of the procedure), it publishes the principal terms of the merger and gives third parties the right to state their position with respect to the proposed merger within a certain time limit. Third parties must submit their statements in writing. Since 2008, the ComCo has changed its previous practice so that third-party hearings (of competitors in particular) are in principle held in the presence of the participating enterprises. Third parties also have the right to access the file. On appeal, however, third parties have no such rights. In particular, according to the case law of the Federal Supreme Court, third parties are not entitled to any remedies against the decision of the ComCo to permit or prohibit a merger.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The mere filing of a notification is not made public. However, the decision to open an investigation proceeding (Phase II) as well as the final decision of the ComCo authorising or prohibiting a merger are published both in the Official Federal Journal and the Official Commercial Gazette. As the involvement of third parties in the investigation procedure is limited, there are no specific Competition Law provisions regarding the protection of business secrets. The merging parties are advised to specifically identify sensitive business information and ask the ComCo to keep such information strictly confidential. The ComCo is bound not to disclose any business secrets.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The agreement between Switzerland and the European Union concerning the cooperation on the application of their competition laws provides a framework for a closer coordination of their respective enforcement activities. With regard to merger control, the scope of the agreement includes in particular mutual notifications of merger investigations, the coordination of merger enforcement activities such as aligning the conditions and obligations for the approval of a merger and the exchange of information obtained in merger investigations. The implementation of the agreement was accompanied by an amendment to the Competition Law by which the parties will be informed about and have the right to comment on the ComCo's decision to share the parties' information with a foreign competition authority.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

## 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the Competition Commission (ComCo) are subject to appeal to the Federal Administrative Court. The decision of the Federal Administrative Court is in turn subject to review by the Federal Supreme Court. However, third parties have no right of appeal against merger decisions.

Currently, a decision is pending before the Federal Supreme Court regarding the question whether a decision by ComCo dismissing a merger must be appealed by both merging parties or whether the appeal by just one party is sufficient. According to the Federal Administrative Court's decision under appeal, such a decision must be appealed by both (respectively, all) merging parties.

### Time frame

## 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An appeal against decisions of the ComCo must be filed with the Federal Administrative Court within 30 days of the formal notification of the decision. The duration of this appeal procedure varies, but may well be more than one year.

Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court may be appealed to the Federal Supreme Court within 30 days of the formal notification of the decision. According to recent practice, these proceedings generally take more than one year.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Competition Commission (ComCo) consistently enforces the Competition Law with respect to foreign-to-foreign mergers and has stated that it will more severely penalise companies that fail to notify. The ComCo considers that the sanctions imposed in the past have not been sufficiently effective to deter large international groups.

The ComCo typically focuses in its enforcement policy on domestic mergers. Whereas in international cases, it very often follows the European Commission both in terms of timing and of substance.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

On 12 February 2020, the Swiss government requested the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research to draft a partial revision of the the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restrictions of Competition and to submit it to the Swiss parliament in the fourth trimester of 2020. With this revision, Switzerland would switch from the currently applied CSDP (creation or strengthening of dominant position) to the SIEC test.

This change will notably allow the ComCo to prohibit or take appropriate measures not only for concentrations that eliminate effective competition in the relevant market but also for concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In the past year, the Competition Commission (ComCo) had two important mergers that led to in-depth investigations.

The first merger related to a joint venture between SBB Cargo, Hupac and Rethmann that intended to jointly build a transshipment facility (terminal) for combined transport in the Basel North area, the Gateway Basel Nord (GBN). The ComCo concluded that GBN would have a dominant position in the markets of transshipment of containers, mobile units and semi-trailers for import and export traffic, particularly concerning rail-to-rail and ship-to-rail transshipment. Therefore, the ComCo reviewed in detail if the merger enhanced competition in upstream and downstream markets and if that improvement would outweigh the harmful effects resulting from the creation of a dominant position in the transshipment market (second criteria of the CSDP (creation or strengthening of dominant position) test). According to the ComCo, the upstream and downstream markets would benefit from efficiency gains; in particular, owing to the lower marshalling efforts, the location advantage of GBN, the gateway function and the associated possibility of bundling different traffic flows, the cost reductions by exploiting the possible train length and the great time savings by reducing the standing times of trains and loading units. ComCo concluded that GBN led to cost and time savings in other markets than the transshipment services' market. After ensuring that legal requirements for non-discriminatory access to the terminal and restrictions on the possibility to discriminate between GBN parent companies and their competitors in upstream or downstream markets were in place, the ComCo cleared the merger.

The second merger related to the acquisition by Sunrise of the wired network infrastructure of UPC. With this merger, Sunrise would

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have become the second largest telecom operator in Switzerland. The ComCo examined in detail the concentration to determine if a possible collective dominant position with the first operator Swisscom existed. As a collective dominant position was not established and given the different positions on the market of the merging companies and Swisscom, coordination between the merged entity and Swisscom was unlikely. The ComCo reviewed the position of Sunrise on numerous markets and concluded that the merger had been rather complementary as Sunrise's portfolio was complemented by UPC's cable network infrastructure and would allowed Sunrise become more independent of Swisscom's internet network access infrastructure. In addition, the transaction had the potential for cost savings. In sum, the ComCo cleared the merger. Despite this clearance, commercial reasons led the parties to abandon the transaction.

On 24 June 2019, the Federal Supreme Court issued a decision regarding a joint venture between the subsidiaries of Ticketcorner and Tamedia that was prohibited by the ComCo in 2017. Ticketcorner lodged an appeal against ComCo's decision, whereas Tamedia refrained from doing so. The Federal Administrative Court dismissed Ticketcorner's appeal because Ticketcorner was not entitled to lodge a complaint on its own (ie, without its joint venture partner Tamedia). The Federal Supreme Court quashed this judgment and affirmed Ticketcorner's appeal. Hence, parties to a joint venture are not obliged to jointly appeal against a prohibition decision of ComCo. The case was referred back to the Federal Administrative Court to decide on the merits.



# Thailand

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Merger control in Thailand is generally governed by the Trade Competition Act BE 2560 (2017) (TCA) and relevant regulations.

The Trade Competition Commission (TCC) is in charge of issuing regulations on merger control, reviewing and making decisions on pre-merger filing and post-merger notification, as well as imposing fines and sanctions, such as suspension, cessation or variation of mergers.

The Office of the Trade Competition Commission (OTCC) is in charge of administrative functions of the TCC, monitoring business operators for violations of the TCA, receiving complaints in respect of alleged violations of the TCA and making recommendations to the TCC.

In the case of a dispute of an alleged offence under the TCA, civil claims for damages or appeals of administrative orders issued in connection therewith, the Intellectual Property and International Trade Court and the Administrative Court shall have jurisdiction to decide on those matters.

The application of the TCA also covers state-owned enterprises and public organisations, but exemptions have been provided for duties specified by law or cabinet resolutions for the enhancement of national security, public benefit or the provision of utilities. However, the TCA does not apply to certain industries where merger control is already regulated by specific legislation for that industry (currently, the telecommunications, broadcasting and television, insurance, financial and energy sectors).

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Mergers that are under the jurisdiction of the TCA include:

- amalgamations;
- acquisitions of shares:
  - the acquisition of shares, warrants or other convertibles of 25 per cent, or more of the total voting rights of a listed public company at the end of any date; or
  - the acquisition of more than 50 per cent of the total voting rights of a private company and a non-listed public company at the end of any date. In counting the shares to be acquired by any undertaking: (1) if the acquirer is a natural person, it shall include the acquisition of shares in such business operator by his or her spouse, and (2) if the acquirer is a juristic person, it shall include the acquisition of shares in that business operator by a natural person or a juristic person holding shares in it of more than 30 per cent of the voting rights of that juristic person and by a business operator belonging to the single economic entity; and

- acquisitions of assets: the acquisition of more than 50 per cent of the total value of assets of another business operator relating or connected to the ordinary business operations of that other business operator in the preceding financial year. The scope of assets shall include both tangible assets and intangible assets (eg, leasehold rights or intellectual property rights).

### Exemptions

Mergers between business operators in the same business group that are recognised as a single economic entity are exempt from merger control (ie, pre-merger filing and post-merger notification).

A 'single economic entity' refers to the case where business operators have a relationship in policy or directive power, where:

- 'relationship in policy' means a relationship between two or more business operators whose guidelines, policies or procedures on management, administration or business operations are under the 'directive power' of the same business operator; and
- 'directive power' means the power to control by any of the following means:
  - holding shares with voting rights in a business operator of more than 50 per cent of the total voting rights in such business operator;
  - having the power to control the majority of votes in a meeting of shareholders of a business operator, either directly or indirectly;
  - having the power to control the appointment or removal of at least half of all directors of a business operator, either directly or indirectly; or
  - having the directive power under the first two bullet points at every hierarchical level, starting from the directive power under the first or second bullet point of the business operator who is at the ultimate level of command.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The formation of a joint venture company is not currently regulated by the merger control provisions of the TCA. However, the creation of a joint venture by acquiring an existing business may be deemed an indirect acquisition of shares or assets of the target company.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Mergers that are under the jurisdiction of the TCA are amalgamations, acquisitions of shares and acquisitions of assets that meet the requirements of the TCA. The TCA does not consider other interests.



## Thresholds, triggers and approvals

- 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

### Thresholds for pre-merger filing

Pre-merger filing is required for any merger that results in the creation of either:

- a monopoly, a situation where there is only one business operator in any given market:
  - possessing absolute power over the determination of the price and supply of its products or services; and
  - having a sales turnover of at least 1 billion Thai baht; or
- a business operator having dominant market power:
  - any single business operator having a market share in the previous year of 50 per cent or more and a sales turnover of at least 1 billion Thai baht; or
  - any top-three business operators together having a market share in the previous year of 75 per cent or more and a sales turnover of at least 1 billion Thai baht each (excluding any business operator having a market share in the previous year of less than 10 per cent).

### Thresholds for post-merger notification

Post-merger notification is required for any merger in which the sales turnover of any one business operator, or of all business operators conducting a merger in aggregate, amounts to 1 billion Thai baht or more and that does not cause a monopoly or result in a business operator having dominant market power.

There are no circumstances where pre-merger filing or post-merger notification, as the case may be, is required if the relevant thresholds are not met.

- 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Pre-merger filing and post-merger notification are mandatory. The only exceptions to mandatory filing are mergers for the purpose of business restructuring and reorganisation between a business operator and its affiliates that are part of a 'single economic entity'; or mergers that do not fall within the scope of application of the TCA.

- 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The merger control provisions apply to all economic activity having an effect within Thailand. Currently, albeit unofficially, the OTCC is of the view that the merger control provisions are applicable to foreign-to-foreign mergers to the extent that the relevant business operators have a business presence in Thailand – an operator conducting a merger to carry out business activities in Thailand by itself or through its subsidiary, branch office or representative office. Export of products or services to Thailand directly to customers or end users does not establish a business presence.

- 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The Foreign Business Act BE 2542 (1999) (FBA) is the principal legislation that regulates foreign investment in Thailand and specifies that foreigners may not engage in certain types of business without the relevant approval from the competent Thai authority. Therefore, foreign investors will also need to comply with the provisions of the FBA, as well as those of the TCA.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

- 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

### Pre-merger filings

The business operator must receive approval from the Trade Competition Commission (TCC) before completion of the merger.

If a business operator is required to obtain permission from the TCC before conducting a merger and fails to do so, the business operator will be subject to:

- an administrative sanction – a fine not exceeding 0.5 per cent of the total value of the merger transaction; and
- a civil claim – any person who incurs damage from a violation of pre-merger filing regulations by a business operator may claim for damages.

If a company is subject to an administrative fine as set out above, a director, manager or any person responsible to ensure that the company complies with merger control provisions shall also be subject to the same.

In addition, the TCC may order a business operator to suspend, cease or vary the merger if it has sufficient evidence to believe that such business operator is in violation of the pre-merger filing requirement.

### Post-merger notifications

The merging parties must notify the TCC within seven days after the completion of the merger.

If a business operator is required to notify the TCC after conducting a merger and fails to do so, the business operator will be subject to an administrative sanction, which is a fine not exceeding 200,000 Thai baht and a daily fine not exceeding 10,000 Thai baht throughout the period of the violation.

If a company is subject to an administrative fine as set out above, a director, manager or any person responsible to ensure that the company complies with merger control provisions shall also be subject to the same.

### Precedent cases

There are currently no precedent cases where the TCC held business operators in violation of merger control provisions. However, the TCC has been very active in enforcing the merger control regime, which can be seen from its actions, such as providing opinions to the press about anticipating transactions that it believes would require pre-merger filing, for example, the acquisitions of Tesco Thailand and Bumrungrad International Hospital.

- 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In an amalgamation, the merging entities shall be jointly responsible for post-merger filing, and the new entity shall be responsible for post-merger notification. In an asset acquisition, the acquirer of assets will be responsible, and in a share acquisition, the acquirer of shares will be responsible.

- 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

For pre-merger filing, the TCC must consider an application for a merger within 90 days of its submission. In the case where a decision cannot reasonably be made within 90 days, the TCC may extend this for up to 15 days. A transaction cannot be closed until clearance.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

#### Pre-merger filings

The business operator must receive approval from the TCC before completion of the merger.

If a business operator is required to obtain permission from the TCC before conducting a merger and fails to do so, the business operator will be subject to:

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If a company is subject to an administrative fine as set out above, a director, manager or any person responsible to ensure that the company complies with merger control provisions shall also be subject to the same.

In addition, the TCC may order a business operator to suspend, cease or vary the merger if it has sufficient evidence to believe that such business operator is in violation of the pre-merger filing requirement.

### 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Sanctions apply to foreign-to-foreign mergers that are under the jurisdiction of the Trade Competition Act BE 2560 (2017) (TCA). A precedent on the imposition of sanctions has not yet been set.

### 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

While the authorities have not provided an official statement in support of this, we think that it is possible to put in place either hold-separate or ring-fencing arrangements, or both, to allow merging parties to close a transaction outside Thailand, if this can be done without implementing the merger in Thailand. This should be preconsulted with the Office of the Trade Competition Commission (OTCC) case by case.

## Public takeovers

### 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

There are no special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids. Where public takeovers fall within the TCA's definition of a 'merger', the parties have to comply with the merger control provisions; the parties can, however, make note of merger control clearance as a condition precedent to a public takeover bid.

## Documentation

### 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

#### Pre-merger filings

The documents to be submitted are:

- the application form;
- the merger plan and implementation timeline;
- details of the merging parties and the target company, which shall at a minimum consist of the shareholding structure, voting rights, sales turnover and market share;

- studies and analyses in respect of the merger transaction, which shall comprise:
  - analysis of the shareholding structure and controlling power of merging parties, for the purpose of ascertaining the relationship in policy or directive power before and after the merger;
  - analysis of the product or service market in connection with the merging parties, for the purpose of ascertaining the effects arising from the merger, which shall at a minimum comprise:
    - market structure before and after the merger transaction;
    - market scope;
    - market share of each of the merging parties before and after the merger transaction;
    - the sales turnover of each of the merging parties before and after the merger transaction;
    - the effect of the merger transaction in respect of market concentration, market entry and expansion (taking into consideration the relevant factors, such as government laws and regulations, logistical costs, access to patent rights of existing technologies, or access to raw materials or other resources necessary for production, etc), non-coordinated effects (meaning effects as a result of each of the merged entities gaining profit by increasing prices or a reduction in the quality of the product attributable to a reduction of competition), and coordinated effects (meaning effects as a result of business operators' tendency to jointly increase prices after a merger transaction);
    - the effect on the economy or consumers as a whole and other effects on competition in the market (if any); and
    - efficiencies in the market after the merger transaction; and
  - studies and analyses relating to business-related necessity and benefit in the promotion of business, damage to the economy and consumer benefits as a whole.

#### Post-merger notifications

The documents to be submitted are:

- the notification form;
- a copy of the documents submitted to the Ministry of Commerce, in the case of an amalgamation;
- a copy of the documents submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of a share acquisition by tender offer;
- a copy of the definitive documents relating to the share or asset acquisition (eg, share purchase agreement and appraisal report);
- a copy of the minutes of the executive committee meeting or shareholders' meeting, where the merger transaction is approved, of each of the merging parties, or documents evidencing the parties' intention to enter into the merger transaction;
- other particulars in respect of the merger transaction;
- annual meeting reports and audited financial statements for the preceding year and the previous three years of each of the merging parties;
- a copy of the list of shareholders of each of the merging parties before and after the merger transaction; and
- the power of attorney (if any).

All information and documents submitted to the TCC must be in hard copy in the Thai language (or translated into the Thai language).

Business operators who intentionally provide false or misleading information to the TCC may be subject to criminal penalties under the Criminal Code for the submission of false information to government officials. In addition, approval for pre-merger filing can be revoked by the TCC if it becomes aware of such false or misleading information. Furthermore, any person whose right or interest is adversely affected by

the approval of the TCC may file a case with the Administrative Court for revocation of that approval.

### Investigation phases and timetable

#### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

For pre-merger filing, the process starts when the relevant business operators submit an application to the OTCC. The OTCC will verify the completeness of the application and forward the completed application to the TCC within seven days from the date of receipt of the application. The TCC may require additional information from business operators conducting a merger by issuing a letter requesting information or inviting the applicant to offer clarification; the TCC may serve notices of invitation to relevant business operators or third parties to offer opinions and information in support of the consideration.

For post-merger notification, there is no description of how the TCC and the OTCC investigate a post-merger notification. However, they have the authority to request additional information and clarification. They may also serve notices of invitation to relevant business operators or third parties to offer opinions and information in support of the consideration.

No preconsultations are required before submission of an application for a pre-merger filing or post-merger notification and the TCA does not specify a process for preconsultations. However, business operators may request an unofficial meeting with the OTCC to discuss the applicable merger control processes and the OTCC's initial views and assessment. However, the OTCC may not provide a definitive assessment and the opinion of the OTCC is not binding and is subject to change by the TCC.

#### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

For pre-merger filing, the TCC must complete its consideration of a pre-merger filing within 90 days of submission. When a decision cannot reasonably be made within 90 days, the TCC may extend the period of consideration by up to 15 additional days. There is no provision in the TCA that allows the pre-merger approval process to be expedited.

For post-merger notification, there is no statutory timetable for the TCC to verify the notification.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Trade Competition Commission (TCC) must consider whether the merger:

- is reasonably necessary for the business;
- is beneficial to business promotion;
- poses no serious harm to the Thai economy; and
- has no material effect on the due interest of consumers in general.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

There is no precedent or case study on what theories of harm the TCC will apply or consider. However, from the list of analyses required in the submission of a pre-merger application, it is expected that the TCC will

consider factors, such as the potential for coordinated effects, non-coordinated effects, barriers to market entry, expansion and foreclosure to newcomers.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

There is no precedent or case study on this issue. The TCC must consider whether the merger:

- is reasonably necessary for the business;
- is beneficial to business promotion;
- poses no serious harm to the Thai economy; and
- has no material effect on the due interest of consumers in general.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

There is no precedent or case study on this issue. However, it is expected that economic efficiency will be given prominent consideration in determining whether a merger will satisfy the substantive test.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If a business operator fails to comply with merger control requirements, the Trade Competition Commission (TCC) is empowered to impose fines. In the case where pre-merger filing is required, the TCC may, as well, suspend, cease, rectify or vary the merger.

The TCC is also empowered to set any conditions for approval of the merger.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

It is possible to remedy competition issues, and, in granting approval for a merger, the TCC is empowered to specify the time period and any conditions for compliance. There is no precedent or case study with regard to this issue.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

There is no specific provision, notification, guideline or precedent on this matter.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There is currently precedent where the authority has required remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

There is currently no specific provision, notification or guideline on this matter.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

In considering a pre-merger filing, the Trade Competition Commission (TCC) requested the applicant to provide information about its customers and competitors. The TCC is further empowered to invite any person to provide facts, explanations, advice or opinions. Therefore, customers and competitors may be invited to provide information. In addition, any person suffering damage due to a violation of the Trade Competition Act BE 2560 (2017) (TCA) can initiate an action for compensation from the offender. Therefore, any persons (including customers and competitors) who suffer damage as a result of that violation are entitled to file complaints. Furthermore, the TCA specifically allows the Consumer Protection Board, or organisations or foundations recognised by the Consumer Protection Board, to initiate actions for compensation on behalf of consumers or members of such organisations or foundations, as the case may be.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The TCA does not require any public disclosure of the process.

Confidential information is protected the TCA. Any person who discloses restricted or confidential information concerning a business or operations of a business operator may be subject to imprisonment of a period not exceeding one year, or a fine not exceeding 100,000 Thai baht, or both, if the information was acquired or known as a result of compliance with the TCA. Persons are exempt from the disclosure provision if the information is disclosed in the course of performance of a government service or for the purpose of an inquiry or trial. In addition, if the disclosed information is regarded as a trade secret under the Trade Secrets Act BE 2544 (2001), the offender may be subject to a penalty under the Trade Secrets Act, and required to pay compensation for its misconduct and the injury suffered by the injured party.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Thailand has signed economic partnership agreements with certain countries and those agreements establish collaboration on antitrust issues. Thailand is also a member of the International Competition Network (ICN) for mergers and other competition issues. However, the ICN does not facilitate cooperation in enforcement, only in establishing best practices for enforcement of competition rules.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Trade Competition Commission (TCC)'s orders to suspend, cease, rectify or modify a merger that has not obtained approval; and orders to grant (with conditions) or deny approval of a merger are subject to judicial review. A business operator may file a case with the Administrative Court. Any appeal of a decision of the Administrative Court may be submitted to the Supreme Administrative Court and the determination of the Supreme Administrative Court will be final.



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### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Business operators to whom orders to suspend, cease, rectify or vary a merger, or grant or deny approval of a merger are directed, must file an appeal to the Administrative Court of First Instance within 60 days following receipt of the TCC's decision.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

There are currently no precedent cases where the Trade Competition Commission held business operators in violation of merger control provisions.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

No.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

There are currently no precedent cases where the Trade Competition Commission (TCC) held business operators in violation of merger control provisions. However, the TCC has been very active in enforcing the merger control regime, which can be seen from its actions, such as providing opinions to the press about anticipating transactions that it believes would require pre-merger filing, for example, the acquisitions of Tesco Thailand and Bumrungrad International Hospital.

# Turkey

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation on merger control is the Law on Protection of Competition No. 4054, dated 13 December 1994 (the Competition Law) and the communiqué published by the Turkish Competition Authority (the Competition Authority). In particular, article 7 of the Competition Law governs mergers and acquisitions. Recently, Law No. 7246 on the Amendment to Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition was published in the Official Gazette and entered into force on 24 June 2020 (the Amendment Law).

Article 7 authorises the Turkish Competition Board (the Board) to regulate, through communiqués, which mergers and acquisitions should be notified to the Authority to gain validity. Further to this provision, Communiqué No. 2010/4 on Mergers and Acquisitions Requiring the Approval of the Competition Board (Communiqué No. 2010/4) was published on 7 October 2010, replaced Communiqué No. 1997/1 on Mergers and Acquisitions Requiring the Approval of the Competition Board (Communiqué No. 1997/1) as of 1 January 2011. The Communiqué No. 2010/4 is now the primary instrument for assessing merger cases in Turkey and sets forth the types of mergers and acquisitions that are subject to the Board's review and approval, bringing about some significant changes to the Turkish merger control regime. The secondary legislation has not been revised and new secondary legislation has not been introduced in view of the Amendment Law at the time of writing.

The national competition authority for enforcing the Competition Law in Turkey is the Competition Authority, a legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy. The Competition Authority consists of the Competition Board, Presidency and Main Service Departments. As the competent decision-making body of the Competition Authority, the Board is responsible for, inter alia, reviewing and resolving merger and acquisition notifications. The Board consists of seven members and is seated in Ankara.

The Main Service Departments consist of five supervision and enforcement departments, department of decisions, economic analyses and research department, information management department, external relations, training and competition advocacy department, strategy development, regulation and budget department, and cartel on-the-spot inspections support division. There is a 'sectoral' job definition of each supervision and enforcement department.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Amendment Law amends article 7 of Law No. 4054 and introduces the significant impediment of effective competition (SIEC) test, similar to the approach under the EC Merger Regulation. Under this amendment,

the Authority may prohibit transactions that could significantly impede competition along with those that may create a dominant position or strengthen an existing dominant position in the market. Communiqué No. 2010/4 defines the scope of the notifiable transactions in article 5 as follows:

- a merger of two or more undertakings; or
- acquisition of or direct or indirect control over all or part of one or more undertakings by one or more undertakings or persons, who currently control at least one undertaking, through the purchase of assets or a part or all of its shares, an agreement, or other instruments.

Pursuant to article 6 of Communiqué No. 2010/4, the following transactions do not fall within the scope of article 7 of the Competition Law and therefore will not be subject to the approval of the Board:

- intra-group transactions and other transactions that do not lead to change in control;
- temporary possession of securities for resale purposes by undertakings whose normal activities are to conduct transactions with those securities for their own account or for the account of others, provided that the voting rights attached to such securities are not exercised in a way that affects the competition policies of the undertaking issuing the securities;
- acquisitions by public institutions or organisations further to the order of law, for reasons such as liquidation, winding up, insolvency, cessation of payments, concordat or for privatisation purposes; and
- acquisition by inheritance as provided for in article 5 of Communiqué No. 2010/4.

In addition to the above, the Competition Authority has also introduced Communiqué No. 2017/2 Amending Communiqué 2010/4 on Mergers and Acquisitions Requiring the Approval of the Board. One of the amendments introduced to Communiqué No. 2010/4 is that article 1 of Communiqué No. 2017/2 abolished article 7(2) of Communiqué No. 2010/4 propounding that 'The thresholds . . . are re-determined by the Board biannually'. Through the mentioned amendment, the Board no longer bears the duty to re-establish turnover thresholds for concentrations every two years. To that end, there is no specific timeline for the review of the jurisdictional turnover thresholds set forth by article 7(1) of Communiqué No. 2010/4. In addition, article 2 of Communiqué No. 2017/2 modified article 8(5) of Communiqué No. 2010/4. Together with this amendment, the Board would now be in a position to evaluate the transactions realised by the same undertaking concerned in the same relevant product market within three years as a single transaction, as well as two transactions carried out between the same persons or parties within a three-year period. Lastly, article 3 of Communiqué No. 2017/2 introduced a new paragraph to be included to article 10 of Communiqué No. 2010/4. This newly introduced provision by article 3 of Communiqué No. 2017/2 is similar to article 7(2) of the European Commission Merger



Regulation. At any rate, although there was no similar specific statutory rule in Turkey on this matter, the case law of the Board shed some light on this matter.

### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

According to article 5(3) of Communiqué No. 2010/4, joint ventures are also subject to notification to, and approval of, the Board. The provision of article 5(3) stipulates that joint ventures that permanently meet all functions of an independent economic entity (ie, full function) are deemed notifiable. Article 13/III of Communiqué No. 2010/4 provides that the Board would carry out an individual exemption review on notified joint ventures that emerge as an independent economic unit on a lasting basis, but have as their object or effect, the restriction of competition among the parties or between the parties and the joint venture itself. The wording of the standard notification form also allows for such a review.

### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

Communiqué No. 2010/4 provides a definition of 'control' that does not fall far from the definition of this term in article 3 of Council Regulation No. 139/2004. According to article 5(2) of Communiqué No. 2010/4:

*Control can be constituted by rights, agreements or any other means which, either separately or jointly, de facto or de jure, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking. These rights or agreements are instruments which confer decisive influence in particular by ownership or right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking, or by rights or agreements which confer decisive influence on the composition or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.*

Pursuant to the presumption regulated under article 5(2) of Communiqué No. 2010/4, control shall be deemed acquired by persons or undertakings that are the holders of the rights, or entitled to the rights under the agreements concerned, or while not being the holders of the said rights or entitled to rights under those agreements, have de facto power to exercise these rights.

In short, much like the EU regime, under the Competition Law, mergers and acquisitions resulting in a change of control are subject to the approval of the Board. Control is understood to be the right to exercise decisive influence over day-to-day management or on long-term strategic business decisions, and it can be exercised de jure or de facto. Therefore, minority and other interests that do not lead to a change of control do not trigger the filing requirement. However, if minority interests acquired are granted certain veto rights that may influence management of the company (eg, privileged shares conferring management powers), then the nature of control could be deemed as changed (such as a change from sole to joint control) and the transaction could be subject to filing.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

Communiqué No. 2012/3 on the Amendment of Communiqué No. 2010/4 on the Mergers and Acquisitions Subject to the Approval of the Competition Board (Communiqué No. 2012/3), amends the turnover thresholds that a given merger or acquisition must exceed before becoming subject to notification for the purposes of the Turkish merger control regime. After the enactment of the amendments, the new thresholds are as follows:

- article 7(a) of the Communiqué No. 2010/4: the aggregate Turkish turnovers of the transacting parties exceeding 100 million liras and the Turkish turnovers of at least two of the transacting parties each exceeding 30 million liras;
- article 7(b)(i) of the Communiqué No. 2010/4: the Turkish turnover of the transferred assets or businesses in acquisitions exceeding 30 million liras; or
- article 7(b)(ii) of the Communiqué No. 2010/4: the Turkish turnover of any of the merging parties exceeding 30 million liras and the worldwide turnover of at least one of the other parties to the transaction exceeding 500 million liras.

As seen above, the tests provided under article 7(b) are two separate tests; article 7(b)(i) is applicable only in cases of acquisition transactions (as well as joint ventures) while article 7(b)(ii) is applicable only in cases of merger transactions.

Where the transaction does not meet the thresholds set out above, the transaction would not be deemed notifiable. Furthermore, Communiqué No. 2010/4 does not seek the existence of an 'affected market' in assessing whether a transaction triggers a notification requirement.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Once the thresholds are exceeded, there is no exception for filing a notification cited in the Competition Law or its secondary legislation. There is no de minimis exception or other exceptions under the Turkish merger control regime, except for a certain type of merger in the banking sector.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are caught under the Competition Law to the extent they affect the relevant markets within the territory of the Republic of Turkey. Sales into Turkey may trigger the notification requirement to the extent the thresholds are met. Article 2 of the Competition Law provides the 'effects criteria', pursuant to which the criterion to apply is whether the undertakings concerned affect the goods and services markets in Turkey. Even if the undertakings concerned do not have local subsidiaries, branches, sales outlets, etc, in Turkey, the transaction could still be subject to the provisions of the Turkish competition legislation if the goods or services of such undertakings are sold in Turkey and thus have effects on the relevant Turkish market.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Article 9 of Communiqué No. 2010/4, along with the general items to be taken into account in calculating the total turnover of the parties to the transaction, sets forth specific methods of turnover calculation for financial institutions. Those special methods of calculation apply to banks, financial leasing companies, factoring companies and insurance companies, etc.

Banking Law No. 5411 provides that the provisions of articles 7, 10 and 11 of the Competition Law shall not be applicable on the condition that the sectoral share of the total assets of the banks subject to merger or acquisition does not exceed 20 per cent. The competition legislation provides no special regulation applicable to foreign investments.



## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

##### Deadlines for filing

The Competition Law provides no specific deadline for filing but based on ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law's experience in over 300 merger control filings so far, in light of the 30-calendar-day review period, it is advisable to file the transaction at least 40 to 45 calendar days before closing. Owing to this 30-day review period, Communiqué No. 2010/4 has introduced a much more complex notification form to be used in merger filings, therefore the time frame required for preparation of a notification form will be longer than the duration of preparation under the old regime. It is important that the transaction is not closed prior to the approval of the Turkish Competition Board (the Board).

##### Penalties for not filing

If the parties to a merger or acquisition that requires the approval of the Board realise the transaction without obtaining the approval of the Board, a monetary fine of 0.1 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account) shall be imposed on the incumbent undertakings (acquirers in the case of an acquisition; both merging parties in the case of a merger), regardless of the outcome of the Board's review of the transaction. The minimum fine for 2020 is 31,903 liras and the minimum fine is revised annually through a communiqué published each year.

##### Invalidity of the transaction

Another very important sanction, which is more of a legal character than economic, is set out under article 7 of the Turkish Competition Law and article 10 of Communiqué No. 2010/4: a notifiable merger or acquisition that is not notified to and approved by the Board shall be deemed as legally invalid with all its legal consequences.

##### Termination of infringement and interim measures

The Amendment Law – article 9(1) of the Competition Law – now states that, should the Board find any infringement of article 7, it shall order the parties concerned, by a resolution, of the suitable behaviour that should be followed or avoided to establish competition and of structural remedies, such as the transfer of certain activities, shareholdings or assets. However, the relevant amendment introduces a 'first behavioural, then structural remedy' rule for article 7 violations; therefore, where the behavioural remedies are ultimately considered to be ineffective, the Board will order structural remedies. Undertakings must comply with the structural remedies ordered by the Board in a minimum of six months.

##### Termination of the transaction and turnover-based monetary fines

If, at the end of its review of a notifiable transaction that was not notified, the Board decides that the transaction falls within the prohibition of article 7 (in other words, the transaction creates or strengthens a dominant position and causes a significant decrease in competition), the undertakings shall be subject to fines of up to 10 per cent of their turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account). Managers or employees of parties that had a determining effect on the creation of the violation may also be fined up to 5 per cent of the fine imposed on the respective party. In determining the monetary fines on

the parties, the Board shall take into consideration repetition of the infringement, its duration, the market power of the undertakings, their decisive influence in the realisation of the infringement, whether they comply with the commitments given, whether they assisted the examination, and the severity of the damage that occurred or is likely to occur.

In addition to the monetary sanction, the Board is authorised to take all necessary measures to terminate the transaction, remove all de facto legal consequences of every action that has been unlawfully taken, return all shares and assets if possible to the entities that owned these shares or assets before the transaction or, if such measure is not possible, assign these to third parties, and meanwhile forbid participation in control of these undertakings until this assignment takes place and to take all other necessary measures in this regard.

##### Failure to notify correctly

If the information requested in the notification form is incorrect or incomplete, the notification is deemed filed only on the date when such information is completed upon the Board's subsequent request for further data. In addition, the Competition Authority will impose a turnover-based monetary fine of 0.1 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account) on natural persons or legal entities that qualify as an undertaking or as an association of undertakings, as well as the members of these associations in cases where incorrect or misleading information is provided by the undertakings or associations of undertakings in a notification filed for exemption, negative clearance or the approval of a merger or acquisition, or in connection with notifications and applications concerning agreements made before the Competition Law entered into force.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

In principle, under the merger control regime, a filing can be made by either one of the parties to the transaction, or jointly. In case of filing by one of the parties, the filing party should notify the other party of the fact of filing.

There is no filing fee required under Turkish merger control proceedings.

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The Board, upon its preliminary review (Phase I) of the notification will decide either to approve, or to investigate the transaction further (Phase II). It notifies the parties of the outcome within 30 days of a complete filing. In the absence of any such notification, the decision is deemed to be an 'approval', through an implied approval mechanism introduced with article 10(2) of the Competition Law. While the timing in the Competition Law gives the impression that the decision to proceed with Phase II should be formed within 15 days, the Board generally uses more than 15 days to form their opinion concerning the substance of a notification, and it is more sensitive about the 30-day deadline on announcement. Moreover, any written request by the Board for missing information will restart the 30-day period.

If a notification leads to an investigation (Phase II), it changes into a fully fledged investigation. Under Turkish law, the investigation takes about six months. If deemed necessary, this period may be extended only once, for an additional period of up to six months, by the Board.

## Pre-clearance closing

- 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If a merger or acquisition is closed before clearance, the substantive test is the main important issue for determination of the consequences. If the Board reaches the conclusion that the transaction creates or strengthens a dominant position or significantly impedes effective competition in any relevant product market the undertakings concerned as well as their employees and directors will be subject to monetary fines and sanctions. In any case, a notifiable merger or acquisition not notified to and approved by the Board shall be deemed as legally invalid with all its legal consequences.

The wording of article 16 of the Competition Law envisages imposing a monetary penalty if merger or acquisition transactions subject to approval are realised without the approval of the Board. The monetary fine is 0.1 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account) in Turkey. The liability for fines is on firms that are the acquirers in the case of an acquisition, and on both merging parties in the case of a merger. The minimum fine is 31,903 liras for 2020.

- 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The foreign-to-foreign nature of the transaction does not prevent imposition of any administrative monetary fine (either for suspension requirement or for violation of article 7) in and of itself. In case of failure to notify (ie, closing before clearance), foreign-to-foreign mergers are caught under the Turkish Competition Law to the extent they affect the relevant markets within the territory of the Republic of Turkey.

As an example, in the *Simsmetal/Fairless* decision (dated 16 September 2009, No. 09-42/1057-269), where both parties were only exporters into Turkey, the Board imposed an administrative monetary fine on Simsmetal East LLC (ie, the acquirer) subsequent to first paragraph of article 16 of Law No. 4054, totalling 0.1 per cent of Simsmetal East LLC's gross revenue generated in the fiscal year 2009, because of closing the transaction before obtaining the approval of the Board. Similarly, the Board's *Longsheng* (dated 2 June 2011, No. 11-33/723-226), *Flir Systems Holding/Raymarine PLC* (17 June 2010, No. 10-44/762-246) and *CVRD Canada Inc* (8 July 2010, No. 10-49/949-332) decisions are examples whereby the Board imposed a turnover-based monetary fine based on the violation of the suspension requirement in a foreign-to-foreign transaction.

- 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

Under article 10 of Communiqué No. 2010/4, a transaction is deemed to be 'realised' (ie, closed) on the date when the change in control occurs. It remains to be seen whether this provision will be interpreted by the Competition Authority in a way that provides the parties to a notification to carve out the Turkish jurisdiction with a hold-separate agreement. This has been rejected by the Board so far (eg, the Board's *Total SA* decision dated 20 December 2006 No. 06-92/1186-355, and *CVR Inc-Inco Limited* decision dated 1 February 2007 No. 07-11/71-23), the Board arguing that a closing is sufficient for the suspension violation fine to be imposed, and that a further analysis of whether change in control actually took effect in Turkey is unwarranted.

## Public takeovers

- 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The notification process differs for privatisation tenders. With regard to privatisation tenders, Communiqué No. 1998/4 of the Competition Board was replaced with a new communiqué entitled Communiqué on the Procedures and Principles to be Pursued in Pre-Notifications and Authorisation Applications to be filed with the Competition Authority in order for Acquisitions via Privatisation to Become Legally Valid (Communiqué No. 2013/2). According to Communiqué No. 2013/2, it is mandatory to file a pre-notification before the public announcement of tender and receive the opinion of the Board in cases where the turnover of the undertaking or the asset or service production unit to be privatised exceeds 30 million liras. Further to that, the Communiqué promulgates that in order for the acquisitions to become legally valid through privatisation, which requires pre-notification to the Competition Authority, it is also mandatory to get approval from the Board. The application should be filed by all winning bidders after the tender but before the Privatisation Administration's decision on the final acquisition.

## Documentation

- 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

Communiqué No. 2010/4 has introduced a new and much more complex notification form, which is similar to the Form CO of the European Commission. One hard copy and one electronic copy of the merger notification form shall be submitted to the Board. The notification form itself is revised from Communiqué No. 1997/1; in parallel with the new notion that only transactions with a relevant nexus to the Turkish jurisdiction will be notified anyway, there has been an increase in the information requested, including data with respect to supply and demand structure, imports, potential competition, expected efficiencies, etc. Some additional documents such as the executed or current copies and sworn Turkish translations of some of the transaction documents, annual reports including balance sheets of the parties, and, if available, market research reports for the relevant market are also required. Bearing in mind that each subsequent request by the Board for incorrect or incomplete information will prolong the waiting period, detailed and justified answers and information to be provided in the notification form is to the advantage of the parties.

## Investigation phases and timetable

- 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The Board, upon its preliminary review of the notification (ie, Phase I), will decide either to approve or to investigate the transaction further (ie, Phase II). It notifies the parties of the outcome within 30 calendar days following a complete filing. In the absence of any such notification, the decision is deemed to be an 'approval' through an implied approval mechanism introduced with the relevant legislation. Moreover, any written request by the Board for missing information will stop the review process and restart the 30-calendar-day period at the date of provision of that information.

If a notification leads to a Phase II review, it turns into a fully fledged investigation. Under Turkish competition law, Phase II investigations take about six months. If necessary, the Board may extend this period once by up to six months.

In practice, only exceptional cases require a Phase II review, and based on our firm's experience in over 300 merger control filings so

far, most notifications obtain a decision within 40 to 45 days of the original date of notification. Neither Law No. 4054 nor Communiqué No. 2010/4 foresees a 'fast-track' procedure to speed up the clearance process. Aside from close follow-up with the case handlers reviewing the transaction, the parties have no available means to speed up the review process.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Pursuant to article 10 of the Competition Law, if the Board, upon its preliminary review of the notification, decides to further investigate the transaction, it shall notify the parties within 30 days (from the filing) and the transaction will be suspended and additional precautionary actions deemed appropriate by the Board may be taken until the final decision is rendered. Article 13(4) of Communiqué No. 2010/4 states that if the investigation is decided to be further investigated, provisions of articles 40 to 59 of the Competition Law shall be applied to the extent they are compatible with the relevant situation. Regarding the procedure and steps of such an investigation, article 10 makes reference to sections IV (articles 40 to 55) and V (articles 56 to 59) of the Competition Law, which govern the investigation procedures and legal consequences of restriction of competition, respectively.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test is a SIEC test under the new Amendment Law (article 9(1) of the Competition Law), similar to the approach under ECMR. With this new test, the Competition Authority will be able to prohibit not only transactions that may create a dominant position or strengthen an existing dominant position, but also those that could significantly impede competition. There is no case law or secondary legislation at the time of writing as to how the SIEC test will be applied. In terms of creating or strengthening a dominant position, article 3 of the Competition Law defines dominant position as:

*any position enjoyed in a certain market by one or more undertakings by virtue of which those undertakings have the power to act independently from their competitors and purchasers in determining economic parameters such as the amount of production, distribution, price and supply.*

Market shares of about 40 per cent and higher are considered, along with other factors such as vertical foreclosure or barriers to entry, as an indication of a dominant position in a relevant product market.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

The Turkish Competition Board (the Board) evaluates joint-venture notifications according to two criteria: existence of joint control in the joint venture, and the joint venture being an independent economic entity (ie, having adequate capital, labour and an indefinite duration). In recent years, the Board has consistently applied the test of 'full-functioning' while determining whether the joint venture is an independent economic entity. If the transaction is found to bring about a full-function joint venture in view of the two criteria mentioned above, the SIEC test will be applied. Additionally, under the merger control regime, a specific section in the notification form aims to collect information to assess whether the joint venture will lead to coordination. Article 13/III of Communiqué No. 2010/4 provides that the Board will carry out an

individual exemption review on notified joint ventures that emerge as an independent economic unit on a lasting basis, but have as their object or effect the restriction of competition among the parties or between the parties and the joint venture itself. The wording of the standard notification form allows for such a review as well.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Unilateral effects have been the predominant criteria in the Competition Authority's assessment of mergers and acquisitions in Turkey. That said, in recent years, there have been a couple of exceptional cases where the Board discussed the coordinated effects under a 'joint dominance test', and rejected the transaction on those grounds (eg, the Board's *Ladik* decision, dated 20 December 2005 No. 05-86/1188-340). These cases related to the sale of certain cement factories by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board evaluated the coordinated effects of the mergers under a joint dominance test and blocked the transactions on the ground that the transactions would lead to joint dominance in the relevant market. The Board took note of factors such as 'structural links between the undertakings in the market' and 'past coordinative behaviour', in addition to 'entry barriers', 'transparency of the market' and the 'structure of demand'. It concluded that certain factory sales would result in the establishment of joint dominance by certain players in the market whereby competition would be significantly lessened. Regarding one such decision, when an appeal was made before the Council of State it ruled by mentioning, inter alia, that the Competition Law prohibited only single dominance and therefore stayed the execution of the decision by the Board, which was based on collective dominance. No transaction has been blocked on the grounds of 'vertical foreclosure' or 'conglomerate effects' yet. A few decisions discuss those theories of harm.

Although no transaction has been blocked on the grounds of 'vertical foreclosure' or 'conglomerate effects' yet, in *Toyota/Vive* decision (dated 6 April 2017, No. 17-12/143-63), the Board provided an assessment on the main factors that should be considered for the evaluation of the conglomerate concentrations. This decision is significant because the Board did not focus on conglomerate effects of transactions before, though conglomerate effects have been an important issue for EC in 2017 (eg, *Qualcomm/NXP* and *Bayer/Monsanto*). The transaction concerns the acquisition of sole control over Vive BV by Toyota. While the parties to the transaction submitted that there would not be an affected market since their activities did not horizontally or vertically overlap in Turkey, the Board decided that the transaction would lead to a conglomerate concentration, given that the activities of the parties are complementary and substitute to each other. Accordingly, the Board asserted that foreclosing the market to competitors is realised through unilateral conducts in the form of tying, bundling and other exclusionary behaviours, and in addition to the market shares of the parties, the incentive and the ability to foreclose a market should be considered while assessing the existence of conglomerate effects. Upon its review process, the Board ultimately decided that the market shares of the transaction parties and the market structures of the two relevant product markets would not give transaction parties the market power and ability to foreclose the market and granted an unconditional approval to the transaction. Conglomerate effects were also analysed in scope of the *Luxottica/Essilor* decision (dated 1 October 2018, No. 18-36/585-286) where the Board examined the possible leveraging effect of Luxottica's market power in the market for sunglasses and optical frames for the market for ophthalmic lenses. At the end of its review, the Board conditionally cleared the transaction based on certain structural commitments.

Further to the Amendment Law (article 9(1) of the Competition Law), the new SIEC test allows a more reliable assessment for the unilateral and cooperation effects that might arise as a result of mergers or acquisitions as it focuses more on whether and how much the competition is impeded as a result of a transaction

### Non-competition issues

**22** | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Mergers and acquisitions are assessed on the basis of competition criteria rather than public interest or industrial policies. In view of that, the Competition Authority has financial and administrative autonomy and is independent in carrying out its duties. Pursuant to article 20 of the Competition Law, no organ, authority, entity or person can give orders or directives to affect the final decisions of the Board.

### Economic efficiencies

**23** | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Efficiencies that result from a concentration may play a more important role in cases where the combined market share of the parties exceeds 20 per cent for horizontal overlaps and the market share of both parties exceeds 25 per cent for vertical overlaps. In cases where the market share remains below these thresholds, the parties are at liberty to skip the relevant sections of the notification form on efficiencies. The Board may take into account efficiencies in reviewing a concentration to the extent they operate as a beneficial factor in terms of better quality production or cost savings such as reduced product development costs through the integration, reduced procurement and production costs, etc.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

**24** | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The powers of the Turkish Competition Board (the Board) during the investigation stage are very broad.

Article 9 of the Competition Law provides that if the Board establishes that article 4, 6 or 7 of the Competition Law is infringed, it may notify the undertaking or associations of undertakings concerned of a decision with regard to the actions to be taken or avoided so as to establish competition and maintain the situation before infringement and forward its opinion concerning how to terminate such infringement or the behavioural or structural measures. The new amendment to the Competition Law introduces 'first behavioural, then structural remedy' rule for article 7 violations

Mergers and acquisitions prohibited by the Board are not legally valid and the transaction documents are not binding and enforceable even if the 'closing' is done prior to the clearance.

Pursuant to article 13(5) of Communiqué No. 2010/4, authorisation granted by the Board concerning the merger and acquisition shall also cover the limitations that are directly related and necessary to the implementation of the transaction. The principle is that parties to the transaction should determine whether the limitations introduced by the merger or acquisition exceed this framework. Furthermore, article 13(4) and article 14(2) of Communiqué No. 2010/4 stipulate that in its authorisation decision, the Board may specify conditions and obligations aimed at ensuring that any such commitments are fulfilled.

The Board may at any time re-examine a clearance decision and decide on prohibition and application of other sanctions for a merger or

acquisition if clearance was granted based on incorrect or misleading information from one of the undertakings or the obligations foreseen in the decision are not complied with. In this case, the transaction shall be re-examined by the Board, which may decide on prohibition and application of pecuniary sanctions.

### Remedies and conditions

**25** | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The Board may grant conditional approvals to mergers and acquisitions, and those transactions may be implemented provided that measures deemed appropriate by the Board are taken, and the parties comply with certain obligations. In addition, the parties may present some additional divestment, licensing or behavioural commitments to help resolve potential issues that may be raised by the Board. These commitments are increasing in practice and may either be foreseen in the transaction documents or may be given during the review process or an investigation. The parties can complete the merger before the remedies have been complied with. However, the merger gains legal validity after the remedies have been complied with.

**26** | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Article 14 of Communiqué No. 2010/4 enables the parties to provide commitments to remedy substantive competition law issues of a concentration under article 7 of the Competition Law. The parties may submit to the Board proposals for possible remedies either during the preliminary review or the investigation period. If the parties decide to submit the commitment during the preliminary review period, the notification is deemed filed only on the date of the submission of the commitment. The commitment can be also served together with the notification form. In such a case, a signed version of the commitment that contains detailed information on the context of the commitment should be attached to the notification form.

Strategic thinking at the time of filing is somewhat discouraged through language confirming expressly that the review periods would start only after the filing is made. This is already the current situation in practice, but now it is explicitly stated. The Board is now expressly given the right in Communiqué No. 2010/4 to secure certain conditions and obligations to ensure the proper performance of commitments.

**27** | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

There have been several cases where the Board has accepted the remedies or commitments (such as divestments) proposed to, or imposed by, the European Commission as long as these remedies or commitments ease competition law concerns in Turkey (see, for example, *Agilent-Varian* Decision No. 10-18/212-82 of 18 February 2010, *Cookson/Foseco* Decision No. 08-25/254-83 of 20 March 2008, *Bayer/Monstanto* Decision No. 18-14/261-126 of 8 May 2018 and *Synthomer* Decision No. 20-08/90-55 of 6 February 2020).

### Ancillary restrictions

**28** | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The conditions for successfully qualifying a restriction as an ancillary restraint are exactly the same as those applied in EU competition law. Therefore, a restriction such as a non-competition obligation should be directly related and necessary to the concentration, should

be restrictive only for the parties and proportionate. As a result, for instance, it may be said that a restriction will be viewed as ancillary as long as its nature, geographic scope, subject matter and duration is limited to what is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the parties entering into the notified transaction. The Board's approval decision will be deemed to also cover only the directly related and necessary extent of restraints in competition brought by the concentration (non-compete, non-solicitation, confidentiality, etc). This will allow the parties to engage in self-assessment, and the Board will not have to devote a separate part of its decision to the ancillary status of all restraints brought with the transaction anymore. If the ancillary restrictions are not compliant, the parties may face article 4, 5 and 6 examinations.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Pursuant to article 15 of Communiqué No. 2010/4, the Turkish Competition Board (the Board) may request information from third parties including the customers, competitors and suppliers of the parties, and other persons related to the merger or acquisition. According to article 11(2) of Communiqué No. 2010/4, if the Competition Authority is required by legislation to ask for another public authority's opinion, this would cut the review period and restart it anew from day one.

Third parties, including the customers and competitors of the parties, and other persons related to the merger or acquisition may participate in a hearing held by the Board during the investigation, provided that they prove their legitimate interest.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Communiqué No. 2010/4 introduced a mechanism in which the Competition Authority publishes the notified transactions on its official website, including only the names of the undertakings concerned and their areas of commercial activity. Therefore, once notified to the Competition Authority, the existence of a transaction is no longer a confidential matter.

If the Board decides to have a hearing during the investigation, hearings at the Competition Authority are, in principle, open to the public. The Board may, on the grounds of protection of public morality or trade secrets, decide that the hearing shall be held in camera.

The main legislation that regulates the protection of commercial information is article 25(4) of the Competition Law and Communiqué No. 2010/3 on Regulation of Right to Access to File and Protection of Commercial Secrets (Communiqué No. 2010/3), which was enacted in April 2010. Communiqué No. 2010/3 puts the burden of identifying and justifying information or documents as commercial secrets to the undertakings. Therefore, undertakings must request confidentiality from the Board and justify their reasons for the confidential nature of the information or documents that are requested to be treated as commercial secrets. This request must be made in writing. While the Board can also ex officio evaluate the information or documents, the general rule is that information or documents that are not requested to be treated as confidential are accepted as not confidential.

Lastly, the final decisions of the Board are published on the website of the Competition Authority after confidential business information is taken out.

Under article 15(2) of Communiqué 2010/3, the Competition Authority may not take into account confidentiality requests related to information and documents that are indispensable to be used as evidence for proving the infringement of competition. In such cases, the Competition Authority can disclose such information and documents that could be considered as trade secrets, by taking into account the balance between public interest and private interest, and in accordance with the proportionality criterion.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Article 43 of Decision No. 1/95 of the EC Turkey Association Council (Decision No. 1/95) authorises the Competition Authority to notify and request the European Commission (Competition Directorate-General) to apply relevant measures if the Board believes that transactions realised in the territory of the European Union adversely affect competition in Turkey. Such provision grants reciprocal rights and obligations to the parties (EU-Turkey), and thus the European Commission has the authority to request the Board to apply relevant measures to restore competition in relevant markets.

The Commission has been reluctant to share any evidence or arguments with the Competition Authority, in the few cases where the Competition Authority has explicitly asked for them.

Apart from that, the Competition Authority has international cooperation with several antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions. Additionally, the Competition Authority develops training programmes for cooperation purposes. In recent years, programmes have been organised for the board members of the Pakistani Competition Authority, top managers of the National Agency of the Kyrgyz Republic for Anti-Monopoly Policy and Development of Competition, members of the Mongolian Agency for Fair Competition and Consumer Protection, and board members of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus's Competition Authority. Similar programmes have also been developed in cooperation with the Azerbaijan State Service for Antimonopoly Policy and Consumers' Rights Protection, the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on De-monopolisation and the Ukrainian Anti-Monopoly Committee. These programmes were held according to the bilateral cooperation agreements.

The Competition Authority has also organised the Istanbul Competition Forum in collaboration with UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) since 2019 to discuss debate a wide range of key and emerging competition law issues.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

As per Law No. 6352, which took effect on 5 July 2012, the administrative sanction decisions of the Turkish Competition Board (the Board) can be submitted for judicial review before the administrative courts in Ankara by filing an appeal case within 60 days upon receipt by the parties of the reasoned decision of the Board. Decisions of the Board are considered as administrative acts, and thus legal actions against them shall be taken in accordance with the Administrative Procedural Law. As per article 27 of the Administrative Procedural Law, filing an administrative action does not automatically stay the execution of the decision of the Board. However, upon request of the plaintiff, the court, by providing its justifications, may decide to stay the execution if the execution of the decision is likely to cause irreparable damages and the decision is highly likely to be against the law.



A significant development in competition law enforcement was the change in the competent body for appeals against the Board's decisions. The new legislation has created a three-level appellate court system consisting of administrative courts, regional courts (appellate courts) and the High State Court. The regional courts will go through the case file both on procedural and substantive grounds and investigate the case file and make their decision considering the merits of the case. The decision of the regional court will be subject to the High State Court's review in exceptional circumstances, which are set forth in article 46 of the Administrative Procedure Law.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The time frame for appeal to the Council of State against final decisions of the Board is 60 days starting from the receipt of the reasoned decision. The judicial review period before the Administrative Court usually takes about eight to 12 months. After exhausting the litigation process before the Administrative Courts of Ankara, the final step for the judicial review is to initiate an appeal against the Administrative Court's decision before the regional courts. The appeal request for the administrative courts' decisions will be submitted to the regional courts within 30 calendar days of the official service of the justified (reasoned) decision of the administrative court.

Decisions of courts in private suits are appealable before the Supreme Court of Appeals. The appeal process in private suits is governed by the general procedural laws and usually lasts 24 to 30 months.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

According to the annual Mergers and Acquisitions Status Report for 2018, the Turkish Competition Board (the Board) reviewed 223 transactions in total, including 204 merger and acquisitions, 13 privatisations and four cases beyond the scope of merger control (ie, they either did not meet the turnover thresholds or fell outside the scope of the merger control system owing to lack of change in control) and two information notes.

With regard to 2019, pursuant to the Merger and Acquisition Status Report of the Competition Authority (for the year of 2019), the Board reviewed a total of 208 transactions; these transactions included 204 merger and acquisition transactions and one privatisation, three cases beyond the scope of merger control (ie, they either did not meet the turnover thresholds or fell outside the scope of the merger control system owing to lack of change in control) and two information notes. Among these transactions, two concentrations were taken into Phase II review in 2019, whereas three transactions were granted clearance after the submission of remedies.

In 2019, 115 transactions notified to the Board were foreign-to-foreign transactions, which constitute more than half of the concentrations notified in 2019.

Generally, the Competition Authority pays special attention to those transactions in sectors where infringements of competition are frequently observed and the concentration level is high.

The Competition Authority handles transactions and possible concentrations in the Turkish cement and aviation sectors with special scrutiny. There are a number of ongoing investigations in this sector. It would also be accurate to report that the Competition Authority has a special sensitivity to markets for construction materials. In addition



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to cement, markets for construction iron, aerated concrete blocks and ready-mixed blocks were investigated and the offenders were fined by the Competition Authority.

To the extent that these decisions were also supported by worries over high levels of concentration, it would be prudent to anticipate that the Competition Authority will scrutinise notifications of transactions leading to a concentration in any one of the markets for construction materials.

Additionally, the Competition Authority published a sector inquiry in 2018 for the hazelnut sector and in 2019 for the fair organisation/hosting sector.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The newly introduced Amendment Law (article 9(1) of the Competition Law) aims to embody the Competition Authority's more than 20 years of enforcement experience and bring Turkish competition law closer to EU competition law. It is designed to be more compatible with how the law is being applied in practice and aims to further comply with EU competition law. The most prominent changes introduced by the Amendment Law are:

- the de minimis principle for agreements, concerted practices or decisions of association of undertakings;
- the SIEC test for mergers and acquisitions;
- behavioural and structural remedies for anticompetitive conduct;
- commitments or settlement mechanisms;
- clarification on the powers of the authority in on-site inspections; and
- clarification on the self-assessment procedure in individual exemption mechanism.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

In 2019, major merger control decisions concerning high-value transactions were taken by the Competition Authority.

A notable transaction concluded in 2019 was the Turkish Competition Board (the Board)'s *Nidec/Embraco* decision regarding the transaction concerning the acquisition of sole control of Embraco, the



compressor manufacturing business of Whirlpool Corporation, by Nidec Corporation (18 April 2019, 19-16/231-103). As a result of the Phase I review, the Board took the transaction into Phase II review owing to the potential competition law concerns arising from the transaction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the transaction was approved pursuant to the commitment package submitted to the EU Commission about the divestment of Nidec's own light commercial compressor and household compressor businesses as the Board concluded that the relevant commitments eliminate the horizontal and vertical overlaps in Turkey regarding the sales of household-type reciprocating hermetic cooling compressors, reciprocating hermetic light commercial cooling compressors and sales of condenser units.

Also, the Board conditionally approved the transaction regarding the acquisition of sole control by Harris Corporation over L3 Technologies, Inc (20 June 2019, 19-22/327-145) upon a Phase I review. The Board held that the commitments completely eliminated the overlap between the parties and thus, the transaction did not result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position and did not significantly impede competition. In line with the commitments submitted to the Commission, Harris submitted that it would divest its businesses for night vision devices and image intensifier tube Technologies used in these devices to eliminate the vertical overlap.

# Ukraine

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Asters

## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The Ukrainian merger control legislation includes:

- the Law of Ukraine on Protection of Economic Competition 2001 (the Competition Law);
- the Law on the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine 1993 (the Law on the AMC);
- the Resolution Approving the Regulation on the Procedure for Filing Applications with the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for Obtaining its Prior Approval of the Concentration of Undertakings 2002 (the Concentrations Regulation);
- the Methodology for Establishment of the Monopoly (Dominant) Position of the Undertakings on the Market 2002;
- Guidelines on Calculation of Fines for Violation of Ukrainian Competition Law 2016 (the Guidelines on Fines);
- Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers 2016;
- Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers 2018;
- Guidelines on Definition of Control 2018; and
- Guidelines on the Assessment of Joint Ventures 2019.

The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) is the primary state authority entrusted with ensuring protection of competition; it has powers to investigate and grant or refuse clearances for mergers (concentrations) as well as to investigate and penalise violations of the merger control regime. If the AMC refuses to approve a concentration, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine may overrule the decision.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The Competition Law refers to the term 'concentration', which is defined quite broadly to cover the following transactions:

- 1 the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings, or the takeover of one undertaking by another;
- 2 the acquisition of direct or indirect control over an undertaking, including through:
  - acquisition or lease of the assets of an undertaking (including in the process of its liquidation); or
  - appointments to certain positions (eg, chairperson, deputy chairperson or more than half the members of decision-making or supervisory corporate bodies), etc, if the same persons already hold those positions in other undertakings (ie, cross-directorship);
- 3 the establishment by two or more undertakings of a new undertaking that will independently pursue business activity on a lasting basis, while its establishment does not result in coordination of

competitive behaviour either of its parents or of the new undertaking, on the one hand, and its parents, on the other; and

- 4 the direct or indirect acquisition of participation interests (shares, equity) whereby certain thresholds (25 per cent or 50 per cent of the votes in the highest governing body of the undertaking concerned) are reached or exceeded.

With regard to (2), although it provides only a couple of examples of notifiable transactions, it is in fact a catch-all provision intended to cover acquisitions with respect to any kind of control.

The Ukrainian approach to qualification of transactions is quite formalistic and the AMC usually concentrates on the form of a transaction rather than its substance. For instance, in the case of multiple acquisitions, the AMC requires each acquisition formally qualifying as a concentration to be notified separately. For example, acquisitions of shares in a number of entities from the same seller shall technically be cleared by the AMC through issuing respective number of separate clearance decisions.

The Competition Law also provides for a number of exemptions from the filing obligation; in particular, the following transactions do not qualify as concentrations, meaning that no merger clearance is required irrespective of parties' turnover or asset value figures:

- the establishment of a new undertaking that aims at, or results in, coordination of competitive behaviour either of its parents or of the new undertaking, on the one hand, and its parents on the other (such establishment is generally regarded as concerted practices and may require antitrust clearance);
- the acquisition of participation interests (shares or equity) qualifying as a financial buyer transaction (ie, the shares are acquired by a financial institution for the purposes of further resale within one year (may be extended), provided that the acquirer does not exercise voting rights attached to the acquired shares);
- the acquisition of control over an undertaking or part thereof by a receiver or a representative of a state authority (eg, in an insolvency procedure); and
- intra-group transactions, provided that control relations within the group were established in compliance with the Ukrainian merger control rules.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

Under the Competition Law, establishment by two or more undertakings of a new undertaking that will independently pursue business activity on a lasting basis qualifies as a concentration, unless such establishment results in coordination of competitive behaviour either of its parents or of the new undertaking on the one hand and its parents on the other.

For a long time, the AMC interpreted the above definition quite broadly and almost all joint ventures were regarded as concentrations. However, in September 2019, the AMC published Guidelines

on the Assessment of Joint Ventures, which further clarified applicability of merger control rules to joint ventures. The document further addresses the criteria containing in the Competition law (establishment as a new undertaking, operations on lasting basis, absence of coordination), as well as introduces the full-functionality criterion (ie, the ability to perform all functions of an autonomous economic entity) for joint ventures to be considered a concentration.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Law provides for a very broad definition of control, referring to the ability to exercise decisive influence (including via blocking rights) on the strategic decisions related to the business activity of an undertaking. In particular, control is deemed to exist if an undertaking:

- directly or indirectly holds or manages more than 50 per cent of shares, participation interest, votes, or is entitled to receive at least 50 per cent of the profits of another undertaking;
- ownership to or right to use (eg, lease) of all (or major part of) assets of another undertaking;
- is authorised to appoint the CEO, vice CEO or more than 50 per cent of the members of the supervisory board (the board of directors), the management board or the audit committee (or if the same persons hold positions of CEO, vice CEO, the chairman, the vice chairman or more than 50 per cent of the members of said boards or committee, etc, in two undertakings); or
- otherwise controls another undertaking (eg, through contractual (management) arrangements).

In 2018, the AMC introduced Guidelines on Definition of Control. This document provides further guidance as to the concept of control, in particular:

- distinguishes between negative and positive sole control. Negative control arises where a shareholder has veto rights with respect to strategic decisions, but cannot adopt those decisions independently;
- recognises the difference between de jure and de facto types of sole control. It is explained that, in contrast to de jure control, de facto control may arise because of specific case-by-case circumstances (for instance, a minority shareholder may have decisive influence at the general meeting level, relying on prospective assessment of past shareholder participation and voting patterns); and
- clarifies that veto rights over budget, business plan, strategic investments, appointment of senior management, or activity on certain markets will generally be regarded as control.

The Guidelines further clarify that change in the quality of control occurs in situations where there is a change from sole to joint control or vice versa; or an increase in the number or a change in the identity of controlling shareholders. No changes in the quality of control arise in the case of a switch from negative to positive sole control, or changes in the level of shareholdings of the same controlling shareholders, provided powers they have remain the same.

Standard minority shareholder protection rights (such as veto rights on changes in the statute, an increase or decrease in the capital or liquidation) are generally not regarded as conferring control over the undertaking.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

A transaction qualifying as a concentration requires merger clearance by the AMC if it satisfies the following criteria:

- the combined worldwide value of assets or turnover of the parties to the concentration exceeds €30 million and the value of Ukrainian assets or turnover of each of at least two parties exceeds €4 million; or
- the Ukrainian value of assets or turnover in Ukraine of the target or of at least one of the founders of a new entity exceeds €8 million and worldwide turnover of at least one other party exceeds €150 million.

All figures shall be taken for the last financial year immediately preceding the year of the concentration.

In either case, the parties to a concentration should be considered at their group level. That means that the assets or turnover of the controlling shareholder or controlling seller should still be counted towards the target.

The concentrations falling below these thresholds do not require merger clearance by the AMC. However, the parties may voluntarily file such concentrations, for instance where the thresholds cannot be checked comprehensively or the check requires appreciable efforts.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing is mandatory. Apart from transactions that do not qualify as concentrations, there are no other exceptions.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

An obligation to notify arises if the parties hit the Ukrainian filing thresholds irrespective of the overall effect of the transaction in Ukraine. Thus, even foreign-to-foreign deals having no reasonable nexus to Ukraine and its competitive environment may be caught.

However, pursuant to general provisions of the Competition Law, an argument can be made that application of the turnover or asset thresholds should be qualified by the effects doctrine. Under this interpretation, it may be argued that foreign-to-foreign mergers do not require clearance, if they lack reasonable local nexus and cannot have any anticompetitive effect. Still, this argument runs contrary to the current and past approaches of the AMC in application of merger control rules. The AMC claims that such transactions are subject to clearance as the AMC has exclusive authority to determine whether a particular transaction may or may not impact competition in Ukraine, and verification of such impact is in fact conducted while reviewing a merger case and granting the clearance.

#### 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

In connection with the conflict with Russia, Ukraine introduced sanctions against certain companies. The list includes companies mainly from Russia and Ukraine, including Crimea, as well as several companies from other jurisdictions. The AMC will reject merger control notifications or drop their review (if such notifications have already progressed into Phase I or II) if (1) any of the parties to the concentration (or any individuals or entities connected to them by relations

of control) is on the Ukrainian sanctions list, and (2) a particular type of sanctions applies to a given individual or entity (eg, prohibition on disposal of assets, equity).

Also, foreign companies are subject to certain restrictions (for example, they are restricted from owning agricultural land; also, companies and individuals from Russia and offshore jurisdictions are restricted from owning a stake in Ukrainian television and broadcasting companies) and limitations (eg, a Ukrainian air carrier cannot obtain the Ukrainian air transportation licence if a foreign entity owns 50 per cent or more of carrier's share capital).

In addition, special rules apply to review of the notifications that concern capitalisation and reorganisation of Ukrainian banks – the AMC will review them and grant clearances within 10 days after receipt of the complete set of documents.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There are no deadlines for filing a notification in Ukraine. The only requirement is that the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) clearance is obtained before the implementation of the concentration. It is possible to notify transactions at their early stages where no definitive agreement is reached.

Failure to notify can lead to a fine of up to 5 per cent of the consolidated turnover in the year immediately preceding the year when the fine is imposed, but in practice, the fines in merger cases are considerably lower. The Guidelines on Fines (last revised in 2016) sets basic amounts of fines for violation of competition laws, including for merger cases. Under the Guidelines on Fines, the basic amounts in merger cases are:

- 10 per cent of the turnover on the relevant (and adjacent) Ukrainian markets – for failure to notify a concentration that results in monopolisation or substantial restriction of competition;
- between 510,000 hryvnas (approximately €17,500) and 5 per cent of the turnover on the relevant (and adjacent) Ukrainian markets – for failure to notify a concentration that does not lead to monopolisation or significant restriction of competition or have impact on Ukrainian product markets; and
- between 170,000 hryvnas (approximately €5,800) and 510,000 hryvnas (approximately €17,500) for failure to notify a concentration in case the parties are active on non-overlapping and non-adjacent markets in Ukraine.

When defining the basic fine, the AMC may apply coefficients depending on the effect of violation on competition, social importance of the products, profitability of economic activity connected with violation, which may increase or decrease the fine. Also, in each case, the above basic amounts are subject to possible further adjustment for aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Although the statutory ceiling for a fine (5 per cent of the turnover in the year preceding the fining decision) remains in force, the authority clarified that the maximum theoretical fine can be imposed only in exceptional circumstances to ensure deterrence. The Guidelines on Fines have a recommendatory nature and are non-binding. However, the AMC has publicly committed to follow its rules on setting fines strictly.

The fine may be imposed on the entire corporate group of the offender whose actions or omissions have led to violation of the Competition Law (in practice, on the acquiring party, the founding partners in the case of establishment of a joint venture or the merging entities).

The fining decisions are publicly available from mid July 2015. Since then the AMC has imposed more than 100 fines for failure to notify, closing or integrating activities before clearance. In most cases, the amount of fine did not exceed 510,000 hryvnas (approximately €17,500) and these were likely imposed for implementing non-problematic transactions. The authority publishes only redacted versions of decisions on its website and it is not possible to comprehensively analyse the reasons behind the calculation of a fine.

In terms of trends, the largest fines were imposed in 2019 and amounted to €1.9 million and €1.8 million. These two cases demonstrate significant change in the AMC's approach; before 2019, the highest fines were €500,000 and less.

In addition to the financial penalties, the other drawbacks of non-compliance are:

- potential third-party damages claims (double the amount of actual damages sustained);
- reputational issues (information about the imposed fine, identity of the parties and non-confidential version of decision are published by the AMC on its website);
- possible complications with Ukrainian clearance of future transactions, as the AMC sometimes may scrutinise these more actively; or
- hypothetically, invalidation of the transaction.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The filing is a joint obligation of the participating undertakings, which can mean the acquirer and the target. The controlling seller can also be the applicant on the target's side in a share deal or generally in an assets deal, the founding partners with respect to joint ventures or the merging entities.

The filing fee is 20,400 hryvnas (approximately €700) per one notifiable event (a transaction may require multiple notifications depending on its structure).

#### 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The parties are subject to a standstill obligation. Closing prior to clearance constitutes a violation of Ukrainian merger control rules. The suspension requirement applies globally and Ukrainian merger control rules do not provide for any possibilities to obtain individual derogation or avoid sanctions by carving out Ukraine.

The only exception concerns the tender and bid process where a notifiable concentration should be filed within 30 days after the winner of a tender or bid is announced. However, this provision was originally designed for local privatisation procedures and the standstill obligation still applies.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

The same sanctions apply in case of closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses (even partly) before clearance, as in case of not filing at all. In practice, closing a non-problematic transaction before the clearance, but after the filing was made, is likely to receive a more favourable treatment by the AMC than an omission to notify completely.

**13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?**

Yes.

**14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?**

There are no such solutions. Still, a hold-separate or carve-out arrangement is likely to be treated by the AMC as a mitigating factor when deciding on the amount of a fine.

**Public takeovers**

**15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?**

No.

**Documentation**

**16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?**

The requirements differ depending on the procedure and include:

- For the simplified procedure:
  - description of the transaction structure, indicating transaction stages, and the timeline for their implementation along with the draft or copy of transactional documents; information if the clearance is sought or granted in other jurisdictions;
  - description of the source of financing, indicating terms and conditions and submitting documents to confirm availability of own funds (eg, balance sheet, excerpt from bank account) or to evidence that a financial institution lending funds does not acquire control over the borrower in the result of the financing arrangement (eg, loan agreement);
  - parties' asset and turnover data – globally and in Ukraine for the previous financial year;
  - for all markets – general outline of the parties' activities globally and in Ukraine, indicating Ukrainian subsidiaries and companies active in Ukraine; and
  - for the relevant markets – value and volume-based sales and market share data; indicating competitors and their estimated market shares on overlapping markets.
- For the standard procedure (in addition to the above simplified procedure list):
  - detailed economic analysis of the transaction's effect on the Ukrainian market;
  - information regarding membership in associations; and
  - parties' excerpts from the trade register or similar (notarised and apostilled or legalised).

Furthermore, along with the hard copy of the notification, parties are required to provide a CD with an electronic version (PDF, Word document, etc) of the notification and all documents attached to it.

Documents to be submitted to the AMC should be duly certified and translated into Ukrainian. Confidential information should be properly marked in the notification so that the AMC treats it accordingly.

As regards the missing information in the notification, there may be the following scenarios:

- If the required information is missing from the start: the authority may either request it during the review or issue a declaration of incompleteness within the 15-day preview period and the parties will have to file anew, adding the missing information. In such scenario no sanctions are applied.

- If the parties fail to submit information upon request within Phase II review: the authority may close a merger case without ruling on the essence. The parties, however, may submit a repetitive application.

Also, failure to provide information to the AMC within the specified period or provision of wrong, incomplete or untrue information may result in a fine in the amount of up to 1 per cent of the respective party's turnover in the year immediately preceding the year when the fine is imposed. However, the Guidelines on Fines clarify that the fine for such violation is capped at 136,000 hryvnas (approximately €4,600). This amount is also subject to possible adjustment for aggravating or attenuating circumstances.

Finally, the AMC may reconsider its decision if it was based on materially incomplete or inauthentic information.

**Investigation phases and timetable**

**17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?**

The law does not provide for formal consultations with the authority before notifying a merger, although informal consultations are usually possible. After notifying a merger, the standard review process will include the following steps:

- Preview period. The AMC has 15 calendar days to decide whether the notification is complete and can be accepted for the substantive review (Phase I). If the AMC considers the notification as incomplete, it can be rejected without review on the substance. In such case, the parties would need to file a supplemented notification anew, restarting the process.
- Phase I review. This stage involves a substantive review and assessment by the AMC of whether the concentration can be approved or whether there are potential grounds to prohibit the concentration, in which case Phase II is initiated. The Phase I review period is up to 30 calendar days during which the AMC will either grant clearance or initiate Phase II.
- Phase II review. In case the AMC sees any grounds to prohibit the concentration, it can initiate Phase II review, which involves a close analysis of the transaction and the associated competition concerns, examination of expert opinions and other additional information. The recommended Phase II review period is up to 135 calendar days, which starts on the day Phase II notice is sent to the parties. The parties, however, can request extension of the review period, if necessary, while the AMCs requests also stop the clock.

A fast-track simplified 25-day review procedure is available for transactions where only one party is active in Ukraine or parties' combined shares do not exceed 15 per cent on the overlapping markets or 20 per cent on vertically related markets. The AMC tends to interpret the 15 or 20 per cent threshold quite restrictively and irrespective of whether an overlap occurs on a relevant or non-relevant market.

**18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?**

A standard merger review timetable is as follows:

- Preview period: 15 calendar days;
- Phase I review period: up to 30 calendar days; no prolongation is possible; and
- Phase II review period: three months after receipt by the authority of all requested data (extendable, if additional documents, information or expert opinion are required), but, in practice, shall not exceed 135 calendar days starting from the day that Phase II notice is sent to the parties.

Also, a fast-track, simplified 25-day review procedure is available for transactions reasonably raising no competition concerns.

The authority usually takes the whole of the Phase I review period for review of transactions and adopts the relevant decisions during the last week before the respective deadline. In practice, it is possible to request a faster review, although there is no formal procedure for this.

If prior to or on the date when the Phase I or Phase II period expires the AMC has failed to adopt any decision on the concentration, clearance by tacit consent is deemed to have been granted, although in practice the AMC tends to issue formal clearances.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Pursuant to the Competition Law, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) approves the concentration if it does not lead to monopolisation (achievement or strengthening of a dominant position in the market) or a substantial restriction of competition in the Ukrainian market or a significant part of it. Otherwise, the transaction will be prohibited unless the parties offer sufficient remedies.

The test for dominance is as follows:

- above 35 per cent market share if held individually;
- above 50 per cent if held collectively by two or three undertakings with the largest market shares; and
- above 70 per cent if held collectively by four or five undertakings with the largest market shares.

Under the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers, the following countervailing factors can be considered while reviewing the concentrations:

- likelihood that buyer power would act as a countervailing factor;
- likelihood that entry would maintain effective competition on the relevant markets; and
- 'failing firm' defence.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

As a general rule, the AMC approves the concentration if it does not lead to monopolisation (achievement or strengthening of a dominant position in the market) or a substantial restriction of competition in the Ukrainian market or a significant part of it.

Under the Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, the authority is also required to assess whether the concentration would result in any of the following effects:

- unilateral or non-coordinated effects – whether the merger will eliminate important competitive constraints on one or more firms, which consequently would have increased market power; and
- coordinated effects – whether the merger will change the nature of competition such that firms that previously were not coordinating their behaviour, would have been significantly more likely to coordinate and raise prices or otherwise harm effective competition.

Also, under the Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers, the AMC is required to consider the following potential effects:

- non-coordinated effects:
  - upstream foreclosure (vertical mergers): raising costs of rivals by restricting their access to an important input;
  - downstream foreclosure (vertical mergers): raising costs and reducing revenue streams of rivals by integrating with an important customer in a downstream market to foreclose access to an important customer base; and
  - foreclosure in related markets (conglomerate mergers): reducing rivals' ability or incentive to compete by combination of products in closely related markets to leverage a strong market position from one market to another by means of tying or bundling practices; and
- coordinated effects – possibility that non-horizontal mergers could increase the likelihood of tacit coordination.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The AMC would predominantly consider competition issues. Other considerations may still be used as supporting arguments, although they are unlikely to be decisive.

However, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine may overrule the AMC's prohibition decision when the positive effects of the transaction on the public interest outweigh the negative impact of the restriction of competition caused by the transaction.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The AMC may take into account economic efficiencies when reviewing the notification, although such arguments are unlikely to be decisive. In cases posing serious competition concerns, adequate remedies would nevertheless be required.

However, economic or other efficiencies will be taken into account by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which may still authorise a transaction that has been prohibited by the AMC. Such a decision is possible if the positive effects of the transaction on the public interest outweigh the negative impact of the restriction of competition caused by the transaction, unless this restriction is not necessary for attaining the purpose of the concentration or jeopardises the market economy system.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) can prohibit a concentration if it leads to monopolisation or a substantial restriction of competition in the Ukrainian market or a significant part of it.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

The AMC clearance decision can be made conditional on the parties undertaking to perform, or refrain from performing, certain actions aiming at removing or mitigating the negative impact of the concentration on the



market competition, which may be either structural (for example, divestitures) or behavioural (for example, restrictions on use or management of certain assets or price increases).

Under the Competition Law, if during the Phase II review the AMC sees any grounds for a merger to be prohibited, it shall inform the parties of these grounds and the parties, in turn, can propose remedies to the AMC within a 30-day period (extendable upon the parties' request). Practically, this means that discussions on remedies start at Phase II. Still, offering remedies at Phase I is not prohibited; however, it will most probably automatically bring the case to Phase II, as Phase I review implies the absence of any substantive competition concerns. So, initiation of discussions on remedies with the authority is very unlikely to help avoid Phase II investigation.

In practice, remedies in most cases are behavioural and conditional clearances often include reporting requirements allowing the authority to monitor compliance.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

There are no uniform conditions. The only relevant requirements are that remedies should alleviate competition concerns, be proportionate and supervision of their implementation should be reasonable.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

During the past five years or so, the AMC cleared transactions subject to binding commitments in approximately 2 per cent of cases.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Ancillary restraints are not covered by merger clearance and may require a separate clearance; for example, antitrust clearance with respect to non-compete clauses.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) may involve third parties (competitors, suppliers and consumers, experts, etc) in the merger case review process if the AMC's decision on the notified transaction may significantly affect rights and interests in competition. Third parties may be involved during Phase II. The AMC acts in its full discretion when deciding on the issue; the respective decision is then communicated to the notifying parties.

Third parties can submit their observations, in particular, relating to the notified transaction and its impact on the market. Such observations are then attached to the case as evidence and must be taken into account when the AMC decides on the case. The AMC may request information, documents or opinions from the third parties if it considers such data relevant and necessary for the case assessment. Normally, when issuing such an information or documents request, the authority will indicate the deadlines for provision of the requested data. Non-compliance with a request may result in sanctions for a third party.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Automatic confidentiality does not apply to any information. Confidentiality may be available to the parties on their request. The parties shall provide a grounded justification when applying for the confidentiality, as well as a non-confidential version of the information. If not satisfactorily justified, the parties' confidentiality request will be rejected by the AMC.

The AMC is required to publish short notices regarding its resolutions on the initiation of Phase II review, non-confidential versions of its decisions in merger and concerted practice applications or cases, as well as decisions in cases on competition law violations within 10 working days of the adoption of the resolution or decision.

Currently, the AMC also publishes on its website a short note of the resolution or decision made (with the identity of the parties and the essence of the resolution or decision); notes on decisions are then followed by publication of their non-confidential versions.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Cooperation of the AMC with other competition authorities is usually based on bilateral treaties. Ukraine has entered into such cooperation agreements, among others, with the EU, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia.

The AMC also cooperates with international organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the International Competition Network.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

## 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

If the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) prohibits the concentration, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine may still grant a clearance if positive effects for the public interest outweigh the negative impact of the restriction of competition, unless that restriction is not necessary for achieving the purpose of the concentration or it jeopardises the market economy system. Still, there are no publicly available cases of the Cabinet granting clearance for the concentration that was prohibited by the AMC.

The AMC's decisions can also be challenged in commercial courts. The relevant statement of claim indicating the grounds for invalidation of the AMC decision should be filed to a commercial court within two months from the date of receipt of the decision.

Courts' decisions may further be appealed to the competent appellate instance within a 20-day period. Further, if the appeal is unsuccessful, the claimant may go to a higher cassation court – the Supreme Court of Ukraine (the cassation commercial court).

Because there have been very few AMC prohibition decisions and in each of these cases the authority has thoroughly and deliberately assessed the facts and the potential impact of the transaction on the relevant markets, there have been no instances of successful appeals in merger cases (although not all court decisions are publicly available). Further, there is no public record of successful appeals against the AMC clearance decisions.

Nevertheless, there have been several notable appeal cases (including with respect to the AMC clearance decision in the *Procter &*

*Gamble/Olvia Beta Cleaning Products assets case*) with the definition of the relevant product market as the central and most disputable issue.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Decisions of the AMC can be appealed to the commercial courts within two months upon the receipt of the decision. The new procedural rules governing the review of the case in commercial courts entered into force in late 2017. Now, the consideration of cases in the first instance may last:

- up to 135 calendar days;
- in the appeal – up to 75 calendar days; and
- in cassation – up to 80 calendar days.

However, those terms are not always met because of the courts' heavy workload, insufficient personnel, the necessity of conducting additional investigations, collection of documents and information, etc.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

According to the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC)'s statistics, in 2019, the AMC reviewed 486 merger notifications.

Of these applications, 439 were cleared, 44 were rejected by the AMC or withdrawn by the parties, and in three cases the AMC closed the review without taking a decision. The vast majority of applications did not raise competition concerns and were cleared within Phase I; Phase II investigations were initiated in 20 cases.

Also, during 2018 to 2019 the AMC imposed the three biggest fines in its history for implementing an M&A transaction without prior merger clearance: €500,000, €1.8 million and €1.9 million. This is one of the most notable changes in the AMCs enforcement of merger control.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

In early 2020, several alternative drafts of the amendments to the Competition Law and related regulations were submitted to the Ukrainian parliament (the Drafts). These drafts suggest, among other things, the following changes to the current merger control regime:

- Calculation of the target assets and turnover. Currently, the assets and turnover of the controlling shareholder or controlling seller need to be counted towards the target, although the control link may be lost after closing. Thus, the local filing threshold is often met only formally, for example, by the exiting seller rather than by the target. The Drafts aim to resolve this issue and exclude figures of the seller or shareholder that will cease to control target from the thresholds calculation exercise.
- Introduction of deal value threshold. The Drafts suggest introducing the deal value threshold, whereby a concentration would require clearance if the deal value exceeds €20 million and the target has substantial nexus to Ukraine.
- Increasing filing fees. The Drafts suggest increasing the filing fees for submission of the notification, from 20,400 hryvnas (approximately €700) to 42,500 hryvnas (approximately €1,460) for simplified procedure filings, and to 76,500 hryvnas (approximately €1,460) for those that do not qualify for review under the simplified procedure from 20,400 hryvnas (approximately €2,640) for standard procedure filings.



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- Amendments to the simplified procedure. The Drafts also suggest applying a 25-day simplified procedure to the transactions where:
  - none of the parties to the concentration is engaged in business activities in the same product and geographical market, or in a product market that is upstream or downstream from a product market in which the other party to the concentration engages; or
  - parties submit voluntary filings (ie, where the concentration does not require clearance).
- Ancillary restraints. Currently, ancillary restraints such as non-compete obligations accompanying a merger are often formally regarded as anticompetitive concerted practices requiring a separate clearance. The Drafts suggest the clearance for the concentration would also cover any restrictions that are directly related and necessary to concentration.

Besides the above, the following issues may evolve in the near future:

- Guidelines regarding remedies. The AMC is working on Guidelines on the remedies in merger control cases, which should clarify the procedure of applying the structural remedies (for example, divestitures), as well as the procedure for monitoring compliance with those remedies. No further details are available yet.
- Definition of the relevant market and monopoly position. The AMC presented drafts of the Methodology on the Market Definition and Methodology on Establishment of the Monopoly Position of the Undertakings on the Market. These documents should replace the regulation originally adopted in 2002 and improve the rules on defining the relevant market and establishment of the monopoly position of the undertaking on that market.
- Information required from sellers. Currently, the target is required to disclose detailed information on the controlling shareholder or seller in the notification, although the control link may be lost post-closing. That approach often places an enormous unjustified burden on the notifying parties. This is likely to be fixed in the future.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS****Key developments of the past year**

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

**Record fines for merger control violations**

In April 2019, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMC) imposed the two biggest fines in its history for merger control violations. The first fine amounted to approximately €1.8 million, and the second one – approximately €1.9 million. Both fines concerned acquisitions by large Ukrainian groups of big Ukrainian industrial plants.

**Guidelines on the assessment of joint ventures**

In September 2019, the AMC published Guidelines clarifying the applicability of merger control rules to joint ventures. This document clarified criteria that should be satisfied by the joint venture to qualify as a concentration, namely formation as a newly created entity by two (or more) parties; full-functionality; operation on a lasting basis; and no coordination of competitive behaviour.

# United Arab Emirates

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The relevant legislation consists of Federal Law No. 4 of 2012 concerning the Regulation of Competition (the Competition Law) and its implementing regulations, issued under Cabinet Resolution No. 37 of 2014 (the Regulations). Two more recent Cabinet Resolutions have further clarified the scope of the legislation: Cabinet Resolution No. 13 of 2016, which in particular defines 'dominance' and sets the relevant merger filing thresholds by reference to an at least 40 per cent market share – and Cabinet Resolution No. 22 of 2016, which defines small and medium enterprises (that are exempt from the Competition Law) by reference to number of employees and revenue, and which vary by sector.

The Competition Law and the Regulations establish a comprehensive regime of both merger control and prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position. Responsibility for enforcement lies with the Competition Department of the Ministry of Economy, supported by a Competition Committee, chaired by the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economy.

The Competition Law is still in its early stages. Although the Law was originally published (and officially came into force) in February 2013, the applicable merger filing thresholds, however, only came into force in August 2016 and there remain certain gaps in the legislation, to be addressed separately through further Cabinet Resolutions. At this stage, there is no guidance on how the Competition Law may be interpreted and applied in future. The Competition Law and the Regulations are largely based on EU competition law and reflect many elements of EU and international norms. Pending practical experience and further clarification from the authorities, it may be expected therefore that the Competition Law will seek to follow EU precedent.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

Merger control clearance is required for transactions that result in the acquisition of direct or indirect control through total or partial transfer (through merger or acquisition) of ownership or benefit in assets, equity, shares or obligations from one entity to another.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The Competition Law does not deal explicitly with joint ventures. However, the definition of 'economic concentration' for the purposes of merger control review is very broad and may apply to a broad range of joint ventures. It is not clear whether, in implementing its new merger control regime, the UAE will seek to follow EU precedent in

distinguishing between 'full-function' joint ventures (which are notifiable) and 'non-full-function' joint ventures (which fall to be assessed under the provisions relating to restrictive agreements). This is an area that may receive further clarification as the Competition Law is brought into force and applied in practice.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The Competition Law defines a notifiable economic concentration as 'a total or partial' transfer of ownership rights, resulting in the 'direct or indirect control' of one entity over another, and where the relevant market share thresholds are met. Under certain circumstances, it is possible therefore that acquisitions of minority interests will also be caught. However, there is no set threshold for such partial transfers of ownership rights, and the Competition Law and Regulations also do not contain any definition of 'control'. Consequently, it remains to be seen how this will be applied in practice, and in particular the extent to which the Competition Law will follow EU precedent in this regard.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

According to the Competition Law and the recently published merger filing thresholds, merger control clearance is required for transactions resulting in an at least 40 per cent market share and that may affect competition in the relevant market, in particular by creating or enhancing a dominant position.

The first criterion (ie, the reference to a 40 per cent market share) is in line with neighbouring countries in the region that follow a similar model (noting that the Competition Law also provides that the Cabinet may increase or decrease the applicable market share thresholds in accordance with the evolution of the market). With respect to the second criterion, however (ie, the requirement that the transaction 'may affect competition'), this is more unusual in that it appears to require a substantive competition assessment at the initial stage of deciding whether the deal needs to be notified, and it remains to be seen how this will be applied. It is also not clear whether any increment in market share is required, or whether the threshold may be met by one party alone, even in the absence of any competitive overlap. At this stage it is unclear whether it may be possible to engage informally with the Competition Committee ahead of a transaction, to determine whether or not a filing would be required. Absent further guidance on this issue, it is likely that, in practice, companies exceeding the relevant market share thresholds would need to notify their deal, irrespective of this additional substantive assessment.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

For transactions that meet the notification thresholds, filing is mandatory and suspensory. However, the Competition Law currently excludes from its application a number of economic sectors, in particular telecommunications, financial services, cultural activities, oil and gas, pharmaceutical production and distribution, postal services including express delivery, electricity and water production and distribution, sewage and waste disposal, and land, sea, air and rail transport. Transactions involving companies in these sectors would not trigger a merger notification to the Ministry, although other considerations relating to separate sector-specific regulatory regimes may apply. Transactions involving small and medium-sized enterprises (as defined under Cabinet Resolution No. 22 of 2016), and entities that are either owned or controlled by the government, are also not subject to notification.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

The Competition Law and Regulations apply to all entities operating in the UAE, as well as to activities that take place abroad and have an effect on competition in the UAE.

Foreign-to-foreign mergers are therefore captured in the UAE where the jurisdictional thresholds are met, regardless of the location or nationality of the parties, subject to the local effects test (ie, the parties must operate in UAE markets or engage in activities abroad that have harmful effects on competition in the UAE).

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

In general, foreign ownership of UAE onshore companies is limited to a 49 per cent shareholding. These restrictions on foreign ownership require all UAE companies to have a minimum of 51 per cent ownership by UAE nationals at all times. In certain industry sectors, different foreign ownership restrictions, which further reduce the permitted level of foreign ownership, may be applicable. This general rule is subject to certain exceptions in connection with investors who are nationals of states that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Aside from these shareholding restrictions, there is no separate approvals process for foreign investment in the UAE.

However, sector regulators and other government authorities in the UAE retain a certain degree of discretion to approve or reject proposed transactions affecting the UAE. Sector-specific regulation plays an important role with respect to many industry sectors in the UAE. Thus, for example, while the regulated sectors have been excluded from the scope of application of the Competition Law, investment in these sectors (including in relation to a foreign company operating through a branch in the UAE) will generally require a separate approval procedure to be undertaken with the relevant regulator, in particular to update the company's UAE licences and registration. Considerations in this context will not necessarily or exclusively be competition-related, and sector regulators and other government authorities retain considerable discretionary powers to reject a transaction where they have concerns, including in relation to national security or public policy.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

For transactions that trigger the notification obligation, the Regulations provide that filing must be made at least 30 days prior to the conclusion of the draft contract or agreement bringing about the economic concentration.

It is not entirely clear how this provision relating to a 'draft contract or agreement' will operate in practice, and whether the sale and purchase agreement may in fact be signed, with closing conditional on receipt of competition clearance. Parties may be reluctant to approach the Competition Committee until they have a firm deal, evidenced by a legally binding agreement.

Failure to notify a notifiable transaction may result in fines of between 2 and 5 per cent of the infringing company's annual revenue deriving from the sale of the relevant goods and services in the UAE. Alternatively, where this cannot be assessed, a fine of between 500,000 and 5 million UAE dirhams may be imposed.

The Competition Law also provides that a court may order the closing down of an infringing establishment for a period of three to six months, with the infringement decision published in daily newspapers.

Further, third parties who have been harmed by an infringement may also seek damages.

The Competition Law is still in its early stages, and there have not been any enforcement cases to date.

## 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

The Competition Law and Regulations require that the 'concerned entities' submit a notification for approval of the transaction. Notification is to be made by one entity, authorised to make the filing by the other concerned entities by power of attorney. While the term 'concerned entity' would obviously include the entity or entities acquiring control, and information is also required of the target, it is not clear to what extent responsibility for filing (and any liability for failing to file) may also fall on the business being acquired. This may be clarified in due course through the issuance of further Cabinet Resolutions. The Competition Law and Regulations do not currently mention any filing fees.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Once a notification has been received and all the formal requirements fulfilled, the Ministry will issue a notice to the notifying party confirming that the notification is complete and starting the timetable for review.

From then, the Minister must issue a decision on the concentration within 90 days, which may be extended by an additional 45 days. If no decision is issued during this period, the concentration will be deemed approved.

Notification under UAE merger control law is suspensory, meaning that the parties cannot close prior to clearance.

## Pre-clearance closing

### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Closing before clearance, or any other form of integration before clearance (gun jumping), may result in a fixed fine of between 50,000 and 500,000 dirhams. Other penalties, including the temporary closing down of the establishment for three to six months, or damages claims by affected third parties, may also be applicable. The Competition Law is still in its early stages and there have been no enforcement cases to date for failing to notify, or for closing before clearance.

### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The Competition Law and Regulations do not distinguish between mergers involving local or foreign entities. While there has not been any enforcement practice to date, in the future, it cannot be excluded that sanctions would apply in the context of foreign transactions, where these meet the notification thresholds in the UAE.

### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The Competition Law and Regulations do not distinguish between mergers involving UAE-based or foreign entities, and a transaction that triggers the notification requirement in the UAE should therefore not be closed prior to obtaining clearance, regardless of the location or nationality of the parties.

As there is currently no enforcement practice of the new Competition Law in the UAE, it is not clear whether and to what extent 'hold-separate' or other arrangements, by which the UAE business alone might be made subject to merger clearance in the UAE, may be deemed acceptable by the UAE authorities. These and other possible solutions will need to be tested with the Ministry as competition law and practice develop in the future.

## Public takeovers

### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

Mergers and takeover bids relating to public companies listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange or Dubai Financial Market are subject to discretionary prior approval from the Emirates' Securities and Commodities Authority and to filing with the relevant stock exchange and potentially with other local regulators in the relevant emirate. Stake building in public companies is also subject to discretionary approval.

The Competition Law, however, does not deal specifically with the issue of public takeover bids, and there are therefore no special merger control rules applicable in this context.

## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The procedural requirements for a merger control filing are set out in the Regulations. Notification must be made in Arabic using the official form from the Ministry, and three copies submitted. The following documents must also be appended to the filing, for both the acquirer and the target (including a certified translation of each document that is not originally in Arabic):

- memorandum or articles of association;
- draft share or asset purchase agreement;
- audited financial statements for the past two financial years; and
- details of shareholders and their levels of shareholding.

The notifying parties must also submit a report on the economic dimensions and the competition effects of the concentration. This includes, in particular, a requirement to identify upfront any potential competition issues resulting from the transaction, and to suggest possible remedies.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The timetable for review is 90 days from receipt of a complete notification, which may be extended by a further 45 days. The Competition Law and Regulations do not currently provide for an expedited review process. This may in part be explained by the fact that the merger control regime is intended to apply only to those transactions that, prima facie, are likely to raise competition concerns, therefore making an expedited review less likely. It remains to be seen, however, whether in practice, faster clearances may be obtained.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

Once a notification has been received, a review of the transaction will be undertaken by the Competition Committee, which may hold meetings with the notifying parties and with other stakeholders. The Committee may also seek the views of third parties and other authorities in the UAE.

After it has completed its review (within a maximum 135 days from receipt of the notification), the Competition Committee will submit a report on the transaction to the Minister of Economy, with a recommendation on the appropriate resolution to be issued. As in other jurisdictions, the transaction may be either approved or prohibited, or alternatively approved subject to conditions.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The substantive test for clearance is set out in the Competition Law and the Regulations, which provide that a notifiable transaction will be approved if it shall not affect competition negatively or if its positive economic impact would outweigh any negative effect on competition. The first test is phrased in rather general terms, and for now there is no guidance on how it will be applied in practice; while the second test appears to pave the way for the consideration of efficiencies.

The Regulations further specify the list of criteria according to which the Competition Committee will evaluate the anticipated effects of a transaction on competition. These include factors that are commonly found in other jurisdictions, such as the level of actual and potential competition, the likely impact of the transaction on market concentration (with, specifically, reference being made to the likelihood of the emergence of a 'dominant position' on the relevant market), price levels and barriers to entry. The impact of the transaction on 'innovation, creativity and technical efficiency', as well as its impact on consumers' interests, are also explicitly stated to be taken into account in the merger control assessment.

In addition to the above, other non-competition-related factors may also be taken into account in the merger control assessment. Of particular note is the Regulations' explicit reference, in the merger



control assessment, to the extent to which the transaction will 'contribute to the promotion of investment, exportation or supporting the capacity of national entities to international competition'. Such a clear 'national champions' policy is unusual in the context of existing competition law frameworks, and it remains to be seen how this will be applied in practice – and particularly how this policy factor may interplay with the UAE's other international obligations, for example in the context of its accession to the WTO.

## 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

There is no special substantive test for joint ventures. Unlawful coordination between independent parents may be assessed under the provisions relating to restrictive agreements and practices (article 5 of the Competition Law).

### Theories of harm

## 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The factors set out in the Regulations for the assessment of a notified concentration suggest that the Competition Committee will look beyond the sole question of market shares and dominance, and will take into account a wide range of factors to carry out an economic analysis of the anticipated effects of the merger on competition.

### Non-competition issues

## 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The Regulations specifically envisage that industrial policy, and in particular 'the promotion of investment, exportation or supporting the capacity of national entities to international competition' will be a relevant consideration in the assessment of a notified concentration, where the merger might otherwise lead to a lessening of competition.

Pending application of these rules in practice, however, it is not clear how the Competition Committee will balance such public interest considerations against the potential detriment to competition resulting from the notified transaction.

### Economic efficiencies

## 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

Where a transaction is likely to lead to a lessening of competition, the Competition Law explicitly paves the way for the taking into account of efficiencies, by requiring the Competition Committee to consider whether any positive impact from the transaction may exceed its detriment to competition. Further, the Regulations explicitly provide that 'the potential impact on innovation, creativity and technical efficiency' should be part of this assessment.

However, as there is as yet no practical experience of the Competition Law, the extent to which the Committee is likely to be willing to take these and other efficiencies into account, as well as the related burden of proof on the notifying parties, remains to be determined.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

## 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

Following the review of a notified concentration, the Competition Committee has the power to either prohibit the transaction, or alternatively to approve it subject to conditions. In the latter case, the Competition Law and Regulations further provide that the Minister of Economy may revoke the approval of a concentration (1) if it is found that the circumstances under which the approval has been granted no longer exist, (2) if the parties fail to comply with any commitment on the basis of which conditional approval was granted or (3) if information provided during the review process is shown to have been misleading or incorrect.

While the ability to revoke a competition clearance is common to most other competition law regimes, where the parties either fail to observe agreed commitments or are otherwise shown to have provided false or misleading information, the reference in (1) to a potentially wider change in circumstances is unusual and may warrant further clarification from the authorities.

Further, during the duration of the review process (which can last up to 135 days), the suspension obligation applies, and parties may not take any step towards consummation of the transaction pending clearance.

### Remedies and conditions

## 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. Approval of a transaction may be conditioned on the fulfilment of certain pre-approved remedies. The Competition Law and Regulations do not currently detail whether the Competition Committee is likely to favour only structural remedies, or whether behavioural remedies may also be considered. In addition, the parties are required at the outset, in the notification form, to provide suggested remedies to counter any competition concerns.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Neither the Competition Law nor the Regulations specify conditions or the timing relating to the implementation of remedies.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Not applicable, as there is currently no public record of enforcement practice under the UAE Competition Law, although the Competition Committee is now accepting notifications.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The Competition Law and Regulations do not specifically cover the topic of ancillary restrictions, and so there is currently no guidance on this issue, pending enforcement practice of the Competition Law.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Yes. The Regulations provide that the Competition Committee may seek the views of parties that may be affected by the transaction and other stakeholders, to assist with its review of the transaction. In particular, the Committee may send information requests to such parties (to which they must respond within 15 days), as well as hold meetings with them to seek their views and recommendations on the transaction.

With respect to complainants, the Competition Law and Regulations provide that any concerned person may submit a complaint to the competent authority concerning any violation of the Law. The complaint shall be made in writing, using a form prepared by the Ministry for that purpose, and identifying, in particular, the name of the complainant and respondents, the provisions of the Law claimed to have been violated, as well as relevant facts and evidence to support the complaint. The Committee, on accepting the complaint, shall notify the defendant and all interested parties within 10 days. It is not clear from the Competition Law and Regulations, however, what the time frame is within which complaints may be submitted, in the context of a transaction.

### Publicity and confidentiality

30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The Regulations provide that the Competition Committee will keep a special register of notifications. Where information is to be treated confidentially, the parties must submit a non-confidential summary of the notification, sufficient to clarify the content of the confidential data. It remains to be seen in practice how much detail will be expected in relation to this non-confidential summary.

In addition, the Competition Law explicitly makes it a duty for the Ministry to ensure the confidentiality of information received and reviewed in the context of notifications. Breaches of confidentiality by Ministry personnel are punishable by a fine of 50,000 to 200,000 dirhams.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

As there has been as yet no enforcement practice of the Competition Law, there is no track record of the Competition Committee cooperating with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

Resolutions issued by the Minister, including merger control decisions, may be appealed within 60 days of the decision. The Competition Law and Regulations do not contain further details in relation to the appeals process.



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### Time frame

33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

Resolutions issued by the Minister, including merger control decisions, may be appealed within 60 days of the decision. The Competition Law and Regulations do not contain further details in relation to the appeals process.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The Competition Law is still in its early stages. However, given the relatively long list of current exclusions from the Law, it is to be expected that, in its initial enforcement phase, the Competition Committee will focus on a much more limited number of sectors. Businesses operating in sectors that are not excluded may therefore be particularly at risk.

### Reform proposals

35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

There are currently no proposals to change the legislation, although further clarity is still expected to be provided with respect to a number of practical aspects relating to the implementation of the Competition Law.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

A limited number of notifications have been submitted and cleared by the Competition Committee. There is currently, however, no public record to access the notifications made and clearances issued.

# United Kingdom

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The primary legal basis for merger control in the United Kingdom is the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA), which came into force on 20 June 2003. In April 2014, the EA was significantly amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. In particular, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and Competition Commission (CC) were merged into a single authority, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The CMA's primary duty is to seek to promote competition, both within and outside the UK for the benefit of consumers. Published guidance explains how the provisions work in practice and secondary legislation implements some of the provisions.

The EA establishes an administrative procedure for merger control, which is now solely implemented by the CMA. In limited cases, raising defined public interest issues, the Secretaries of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) or Culture, Media and Sport may also be involved in the decision-making process. Under the general EA merger regime:

- the CMA has a duty to refer mergers (anticipated or completed) for a Phase II review where it believes that there is, or may be, a relevant merger situation that has resulted or may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in the UK. Exceptions to the duty to refer exist in certain circumstances;
- following a reference for a Phase II investigation, the CMA conducts a more detailed analysis to decide whether a relevant merger situation has been or will be created and, if so, whether the situation results, or may be expected to result, in an SLC within any markets within the UK. If the CMA decides that there is an SLC, it must go on to determine how to remedy, mitigate or prevent the adverse effects; and
- different rules are in place for public interest, special public interest and water merger cases.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The EA applies to a 'relevant merger situation', which may be a completed or anticipated merger. The CMA must make a reference for a Phase II review where it believes that there is or may be a relevant merger situation that has resulted or may be expected to result in an SLC. An 'anticipated merger' may be a merger that has been signed but not yet completed, or it may be a merger in contemplation. Where these conditions are met, a reference for a Phase II review must be made unless one of the exceptions to the duty to refer applies or, where appropriate, it may seek and accept undertakings in lieu of a reference from the merging parties.

A relevant merger situation will arise when the following conditions are satisfied:

- two or more enterprises cease to be distinct, that is, are brought under common ownership or control or there are arrangements in progress or in contemplation that will lead to enterprises ceasing to be distinct. Control is not limited to legal control;
- either the merger has not yet taken place, or the merger has taken place not more than four months before the reference is made, unless the merger took place without having been made public and without the CMA being informed of it (in which case, the four-month period starts from the announcement or at the time the CMA is told); and
- the transaction meets certain jurisdictional thresholds (the share of supply or turnover tests).

The EA defines an 'enterprise' as the 'activities, or part of the activities, of a business' that are carried out for gain or reward (it need not therefore be a separate legal entity). CMA Guidance (see Mergers: Guidance on the CMA's jurisdiction and procedure and the Merger Assessment Guidelines) indicates that an enterprise may comprise any number of components, including the assets and records needed to carry on the business and the employees working in the business, together with the benefit of existing contracts or goodwill, or both. A business need not currently be trading to constitute an enterprise. In June 2014, the CMA found, following a legal challenge, that it did have jurisdiction over Groupe Eurotunnel's acquisition of three ferries and related assets previously belonging to SeaFrance (now liquidated). The CMA found considerable continuity between the former SeaFrance services and Groupe Eurotunnel's new services on the same route. The assets in question were considered to form a business that was already geared up to run a ferry service; the situation was thus distinct from buying mere assets in the market. The Supreme Court upheld the CMA's decision regarding the definition of 'enterprise' for the purposes of UK merger control in December 2015.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The creation of a new joint venture, or a shift in control or influence over an existing joint venture, may give rise to a relevant merger situation, provided that the share of supply test or the turnover test is met.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The CMA documents, Mergers: Guidance on the CMA's jurisdiction and procedure and Merger Assessment Guidelines, provide guidance on the meaning of control. Control can comprise any of the following:

- material influence – which arises on the basis of an ability materially to influence another enterprise's policy. This can arise at relatively

low levels of shareholding, perhaps as low as 10 to 15 per cent. Other factors such as board representation, industry standing and contractual relationships between the enterprises involved may also be taken into account. The Court of Appeal upheld a finding that BSkyB's acquisition of a 17.9 per cent stake in ITV gave rise to material influence in the circumstances of the case. This concept can therefore clearly catch transactions that would not be caught by the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). For example, the OFT referred Ryanair's acquisition of a 29.82 per cent shareholding in Aer Lingus Group plc (the European Commission having concluded that it did not have the power to require Ryanair to divest itself of the minority stake under EU merger rules) to the CC in June 2012. The CC reached its decision in July 2013, requiring Ryanair to reduce its shareholding in Aer Lingus to 5 per cent. Its conclusion that the 29.82 per cent shareholding gave material influence was based on a range of factors including, in particular, Ryanair's ability to block special resolutions and the sale of Heathrow slots under the articles of association. This conclusion was reiterated by the CMA in its final decision in June 2015 following an application by Ryanair to the CMA to reconsider its decision based on material changes to circumstances. Following the CMA's final decision, in October 2015, Ryanair withdrew its application before the Court of Appeal regarding the same issue. In 2019, the CMA took jurisdiction over Amazon's intended acquisition of a minority stake (of undisclosed scale, but later announced as 16 per cent) in Deliveroo, which entitled Amazon to appoint one out of eight of Deliveroo's directors and certain other rights. In its Phase I decision to refer the case to an in-depth investigation, the CMA considered that Amazon would acquire material influence over Deliveroo as a result of a number of 'mutually reinforcing' factors, including Amazon's particular industry knowledge and expertise as a shareholder;

- de facto control – the ability to control policy, which may arise on the acquisition of a higher level of shareholding, such as 30 per cent of voting rights; or
- legal control – a controlling interest, unlikely to arise unless one enterprise holds more than 50 per cent of the shares carrying voting rights in the other. In some (exceptional) cases, acquisition of a shareholding in excess of 50 per cent may not give rise to legal control where an agreement with the other shareholders circumscribes the majority owner's rights (see, for example, *Coca-Cola Company/Fresh Trading Limited*, where a shareholding increase from around 20 per cent to above 50 per cent did not give rise to legal control, as the acquirer obtained no additional voting rights (either in the shareholders' meeting or at board meetings)).

A change from material influence to de facto control or legal control, or from de facto control to legal control, can constitute a new relevant merger situation.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The EA provides alternative thresholds based respectively on the share of supply and turnover:

- the 'share of supply' test is satisfied only when the merger itself creates or enhances a 25 per cent share of supply or purchases of any goods or services in the UK (or in a substantial part of it). This is not a market share test and allows a wide discretion in describing the goods or services, which need not amount to relevant economic markets. In 2019, the CMA asserted jurisdiction over the Roche group's acquisition of Spark Therapeutics even

though Spark had generated no sales in the UK. Instead, the CMA's finding of jurisdiction was based on the parties' combined numbers of UK-based employees engaged in research and development activities, as well as the number of UK patents procured from an administrative patent authority; and

- the turnover in the UK of the enterprise over which control is being acquired exceeds £70 million. This is determined by aggregating the total value of the turnover in the UK of the enterprises that cease to be distinct and deducting:
  - the turnover in the UK of any enterprise that continues to be carried on under the same ownership or control (eg, the acquiring enterprise); or
  - if no enterprise continues to be carried on under the same ownership and control (eg, formation of a new joint venture), the turnover in the UK which, of all turnovers concerned, is the turnover of the highest value.

#### 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

Filing in the UK is voluntary. However, a large number of deals are, in practice, notified prior to completion to give the parties legal certainty as, irrespective of a notification, the CMA may commence an investigation on its own initiative and subsequently refer the merger for a Phase II investigation. This carries the risk of remedies being imposed even if the transaction has already been completed. Further, the CMA monitors the market for transactions falling within its jurisdiction that have not been voluntarily notified and has significant interim measures powers, which enable it to prevent or unwind action that might prejudice the outcome of a reference for a Phase II investigation or impede remedial action. The CMA can intervene as soon as it has reasonable grounds for suspecting that it may be the case that arrangements are in progress or in contemplation, but uses interim orders mainly in the context of completed mergers. The CMA stated in its 2018/19 Annual Plan that, to achieve a balanced and targeted approach to investigating non-notified mergers, it will welcome informal briefings from companies to advise on whether a potential merger is likely to come under CMA scrutiny.

Filing must be by merger notice in the form prescribed by statute or by a submission containing the same information.

#### 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

There is no system of mandatory notification in the UK. It is implicit in the jurisdictional criteria that at least one of the enterprises will be active within the UK (although it need not necessarily be incorporated within the UK). These principles apply equally to non-UK companies that sell to (or acquire from) UK customers or suppliers. In assessing whether a firm is active in the UK, the CMA will have regard to whether its sales are made directly or indirectly (via agents or traders) and the extent to which a firm is active at each level of trade. The CMA increasingly adopts a broad interpretation of the required local nexus with the UK, asserting jurisdiction in the *Roche/Spark* case despite the target not having any sales in the UK (see also its decision in *Sabre/Farelogix*).

In June 2013, the Court of Appeal confirmed the CC's jurisdiction over the *AkzoNobel/Metlac* merger on the basis that AkzoNobel had significant influence over its UK subsidiaries, which were carrying on business in the UK, including the setting of strategies and approval of operational decisions and did not itself need to be carrying out commercial activities in the UK.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

The UK does not currently have a domestic legal framework that specifically governs inward foreign direct investment. However, the EA merger regime sets out special rules for mergers involving public interest issues and special public interest cases (including mergers involving certain government contractors that possess information relating to defence and of a confidential nature). Broadly, where the Secretary of State intervenes in a public interest case, that case is considered in light of both competition and public interest issues. Where the Secretary of State intervenes in a special public interest case (ie, one in which the CMA does not have jurisdiction under its normal rules) the outcome of the case is dependent on public interest issues only.

The public interest grounds on the basis of which the Secretary of State may intervene are national security, media plurality, the stability of the UK financial system and new public interest considerations that may be added by the Secretary of State. Since June 2020, the EA also allows the government to intervene on grounds of public health emergency, with changes intended to enable the scrutiny of certain foreign takeovers to ensure they do not threaten the UK's ability to respond to a public health emergency such as the covid-19 pandemic.

Where the Secretary of State issues an intervention notice specifying a 'media public interest consideration', Ofcom is required to report whether it is, or may be, the case that the merger may be expected to operate against the public interest, to assist the Secretary of State in its decision as to whether there is a plurality concern requiring further investigation by the CMA. At the request of the Secretary of State, Ofcom published a measurement framework for media plurality in November 2015. One recent example of an intervention by the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport on public interest grounds is the investigation into the proposed acquisition of Sky plc by 21st Century Fox. In June 2018, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport accepted the CMA's recommendation that the proposed acquisition was not in the public interest due to media plurality concerns and accepted the CMA's recommendation that the most effective and proportionate remedy was for Sky News to be divested to a suitable third party. In 2019, the Secretary of State intervened on grounds of national security in a number of cases, including in December 2019 in relation to two separate transactions in the aerospace industry, namely the proposed merger of Impcross Ltd and Gardner Aerospace Holdings, as well as the acquisition of Mettis Aerospace Limited by Aerostar (a Chinese-established fund).

There is also a special regime for water (and sewerage) mergers. In some circumstances water mergers are subject to mandatory reference to the CMA and are governed by the Water Industry Act 1991 (as amended by the EA and Water Act 2003) and the Water Act 2014. There are currently no special provisions for other regulated utilities (such as electricity, gas, telecommunications or rail), which are subject to the EA merger regime although various regulatory approvals are required for the acquisition of certain regulated businesses and businesses operating in the financial or insurance sector. The Industry Act 1975 confers power on the Secretary of State to prohibit changes of control over an important manufacturing undertaking where the change of control would be contrary to the interests of the UK, although this power has not been used in practice.

In June 2018, the CMA published guidance on changes to the UK merger thresholds for changes of control over enterprises that are active in any of three defined sectors: the development or production of items for military or military and civilian use; quantum technology; and computing hardware. The turnover threshold applicable to such 'relevant enterprises' has been reduced from £70 million to £1 million, and the share of supply test has been broadened to include mergers involving a target with 25 per cent or more share of supply of the

relevant goods and services in the UK (as well as where the merger leads to an increase in the share of supply to, or above, this 25 per cent threshold, which is the requirement for those enterprises not deemed 'relevant enterprises'). The new tests were approved by Parliament and came into force on 11 June 2018. The purpose of these changes is to ensure that the Secretary of State is able to intervene to address any national security-related issues raised by such transactions, and the CMA has stated that the amendments to the jurisdictional thresholds will not result in different treatment of the three defined sectors from a competition perspective.

BEIS is still considering additional long-term reforms to the public interest regime, which are intended to introduce a new notification regime for mergers relevant to national security and critical infrastructure.

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

#### 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

As there is currently no obligation to notify a merger, there are no filing deadlines and no sanctions apply if notification is not made. Where parties do not notify, however, they take the risk that, whether or not third parties complain, the CMA may call in the merger for review and adopt a decision to refer for a Phase II review (within the prescribed period of four months following a completed transaction becoming public or the CMA being informed of it) and that divestment or other remedies could be ordered following an adverse report. In addition, the CMA has the power to take pre-emptive action to preclude conduct that might prejudice the appraisal of a merger.

#### 10 | Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

Despite the voluntary nature of the regime, certain procedural considerations must be taken into account if a decision is taken to notify the transaction.

Filing is by merger notice (or by a submission containing the same information). Any person carrying on an enterprise to which the notified arrangements relate may file a merger notice. It is not necessary for merger notices to be made jointly. A merger notice requires the CMA to decide within a statutory period whether to refer the merger for a Phase II review.

In certain limited circumstances, informal advice may be sought from the CMA prior to notification. The CMA stated in its 2018/19 Annual Plan that, to achieve a balanced and targeted approach to investigating non-notified mergers, it welcomes informal briefings from companies to advise on whether a potential merger is likely to come under CMA scrutiny. The CMA is willing to provide such guidance for good faith confidential transactions giving rise to genuine issues. The parties must be prepared to acknowledge to the CMA any theory of harm that could reasonably lead to a Phase II reference. The CMA will not offer informal advice where there is sufficient guidance already from case precedents, nor will it advise on structuring options for water mergers. As the CMA is unable to consult third parties, any advice given is qualified accordingly and based on the assumption that the information provided is accurate. The CMA is not legally bound by its initial response to informal briefing notes submitted by merging parties. Exceptionally, in 2020, it launched an investigation into Takeaway.com's acquisition of Just Eat after reconsidering its position regarding the transaction to consider in particular whether Takeaway.com would have reentered the UK market were it not for the Just Eat acquisition.



Subject to certain exceptions, any merger that is investigated by the CMA is subject to a fee, which is payable either on publication by the CMA of a reference decision or a decision not to make a reference. For further information, see CMA guidance on its merger intelligence function.

## 11 | What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

The main review periods in an Enterprise Act 2002 (EA) process are as follows:

- Phase I review: a binding 40-working-day period applies;
- consideration of any undertakings in lieu (UILs) of reference for a Phase II review: the parties have up to five working days from receiving a decision that the test for reference for a Phase II review is met (a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) decision) to offer UILs (although they can do so earlier). The CMA has up to 10 working days from the date of its SLC decision to decide provisionally whether to accept the UILs and a total of 50 working days from the date of its SLC decision formally to accept the UILs, which can be extended by 40 working days for 'special reasons', such as needing further consultation with third parties or if the case involves an up-front buyer;
- Phase II review: 24 weeks from the date of reference, with the possibility for the CMA to extend this by eight weeks; and
- implementation of Phase II remedies: the CMA has 12 weeks (extendable by six weeks for special reasons) to accept any final undertakings offered by the parties to obtain conditional clearance.

The possibility exists for a 'fast-track' reference procedure. This may be used upon the request of merging parties in circumstances where there is sufficient evidence that the Phase II reference test is met at an early stage in the investigation. The CMA takes into account its administrative resources and the efficient conduct of the case in deciding whether to agree to the use of the fast-track procedure, and has used this power in five cases so far (BT's acquisition of EE in 2015, the *Ladbroke's/Coral* merger in 2016, the merger between Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and University Hospital of South Manchester NHS Foundation Trust, Tesco PLC's acquisition of Booker Group in 2017 and the proposed merger between J Sainsbury Plc and Asda Group Ltd, which was blocked by the CMA).

Although the EA regime allows parties to close transactions without notifying the CMA, there are, in practice, significant constraints on merging parties' freedom once the CMA starts to review a merger (whether following a notification or on its own initiative). The CMA has powers to impose initial enforcement orders (IEOs) both to prevent further integration and also to unwind any integration that has already taken place.

IEOs can be imposed as soon as the CMA has reasonable grounds for believing that it is or may be the case that arrangements are in progress or in contemplation. The CMA has previously indicated that it is likely to use such powers for anticipated mergers only in relatively rare circumstances and that it will normally make initial enforcement orders in investigations of completed mergers, which will remain in force until clearance or remedial action is taken. However, recent CMA practice has seen it imposing IEOs even prior to closing, although in some cases these are caveated to specifically allow closing to occur (for example in *Google/Looker Data Sciences* and *Viagogo/StubHub*), or designed to take effect upon closing, were the parties to decide to complete the transaction (for example, in *Roche/Spark*).

There are penalties for failing to comply with an IEO. Where the CMA considers that, without reasonable excuse, an IEO has not been complied with, it may impose a penalty of up to 5 per cent of the worldwide turnover of the addressee of the IEO. The CMA has a template

initial enforcement order to which additional restrictions may be added and has released updated guidance on the use of IEOs and derogations in merger investigations (June 2019). The CMA has imposed a number of fines for breaches of an IEO in 2018 and 2019, including two separate fines of £100,000 and £200,000 in the *Electro Rent/Microlease* merger, a £120,000 fine in the *Vanilla/Washstation* merger, a £146,000 fine in the *Nicholls' (Fuel Oils)/DCC* merger, a £300,000 fine in the *Ausurus Group/Metal & Waste Recycling* merger and most recently a £250,000 fine in the *Paypal/iZettle* merger.

If a Phase II reference is made, the EA prohibits, except with the consent of the CMA, any party to a completed merger from undertaking further integration or any party to an anticipated merger from acquiring an 'interest in shares' in another. The CMA will rarely grant its consent. The EA also provides the CMA with power to accept undertakings or to make an order preventing the parties to a merger from taking action that might prejudice the eventual outcome of the merger reference. Any Phase I initial enforcement orders will usually continue in force for the duration of the Phase II inquiry and may be supplemented where appropriate with additional restrictions.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

Merger notification is not compulsory, although constraints on integration may be imposed by the CMA. A person who has sustained loss as a consequence of a breach of a statutory restriction preventing the acquisition of interests in shares or further integration may bring an action for damages. Breach of such a provision is also enforceable by civil proceedings brought by the CMA for an injunction or for interdict or for any other appropriate relief or remedy. Similar provisions apply in relation to any breach of an undertaking or order.

## 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Merger notification is not compulsory in the UK, so sanctions cannot be imposed simply for closing before clearance, unless this has involved breach of a statutory obligation, an undertaking or an order.

## 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The EA regime does not prevent closing prior to clearance. There are some limited restrictions on the powers of the CMA to take enforcement action in relation to foreign companies, but these are narrow and do not appear to have been an impediment to the Office of Fair Trading or Competition Commission previously.

### Public takeovers

## 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

If the merger involves the purchase of a public company that is subject to the Takeover Code, the Takeover Code requires that the bid should lapse if the merger is referred to a Phase II investigation prior to the bid becoming unconditional in other respects. Upon such a lapse, the bidder and the shareholders of the target company will no longer be bound by acceptances of the offer made prior to the reference. The bid may, however, be revived (within a certain time frame) if, subsequently, it is cleared unconditionally by the CMA or the CMA allows it to proceed subject to certain undertakings being given.



## Documentation

### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The company must provide, to the extent relevant, the information set out in the template merger notice, which covers the basic information that the CMA requires about the transaction and the markets involved. The company can either use the prescribed merger notice form, or provide a bespoke submission containing the same information, along with a signed and annotated version of the merger notice, indicating where in the submission the relevant information can be found. Copies of the form and current procedures are available on the CMA's website. In addition to a full description of the transaction and proposed timetable, the merger notice requires information relating to the main products and services supplied by the merging enterprises and estimates of market shares in any UK market. Information on horizontal overlaps, vertical links, entry barriers, buyer power and customer benefits are also relevant. Financial information is also required. In 2017, the CMA published a revised merger notice template following a consultation process. This new template is intended to clarify the interpretation of certain questions and guidance notes and to ensure that information provided is adequate and proportionate in the circumstances of the case (in many cases this took the form of clarifying in what circumstances certain granular data may be required of the parties). In practice, the core requirements of the merger notice have not been affected and for the most part the proposed changes reflect the CMA's existing practice.

The time required to complete a merger notice depends on the complexity of the case and the ability of the parties to collate the relevant information promptly. The CMA will not commence its 40-working-day review period until it is satisfied that the merger notice is complete and, in practice, a series of pre-notification discussions have been completed. The CMA states that it will endeavour to review submissions and revert to the parties within a reasonable time frame, generally within five to 10 working days of receipt (although this can be longer depending on the complexity of the case).

The CMA has the power to impose penalties on merging parties for breach of procedural requirements, including for failure to comply with document requests, or for provision of inaccurate information. For example, in 2017, the CMA imposed a fine of £20,000 on Hungryhouse, during the review of its acquisition by Just Eat, for failing to provide certain documents without reasonable excuse. The information-gathering process employed by Hungryhouse had failed to identify responsive documents, and the CMA found that Hungryhouse should have been aware that this was a substantial risk. In 2019, the CMA imposed a fine of £15,000 on AL-KO for late provision of certain responsive documents to two CMA document requests without reasonable excuse, as well as other fines of £27,000 imposed on Rentokil and £20,000 on Sabre Corporation for similar failures. Under section 117 of the Enterprise Act, it is a criminal offence to supply false or misleading information to the CMA, knowingly or recklessly.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

There is a statutory, 40-working-day Phase I timetable that the CMA must follow. The CMA has the power to 'stop the clock' (eg, in circumstances where the parties have not responded to an information request). The CMA can also use its 'stop the clock' powers in relation to the four-month period that applies to completed mergers. This period may also be extended in certain circumstances. To increase the speed of Phase I review, the CMA's Annual Plan 2018/2019 set a target of approving at

least 70 per cent of less complex mergers within 35 working days and seeks to complete 70 per cent of Phase II cases without an extension to the 24-week statutory deadline. The basic Phase II period is 24 weeks from the date of the Phase I reference and can be extended by eight weeks for 'special reasons'. The CMA's Annual Plan 2018/2019 set out the target of implementing Phase II merger remedies without the need for an extension to the statutory deadline in at least 80 per cent of cases. The statutory deadline is 12 weeks and can be extended by six weeks for 'special reasons'. The CMA concluded a review and consultation of its remedies guidance across Phase I and Phase II mergers, issuing a revised version of its guidance in December 2018.

However, additional time should be factored in outside the statutory periods for pre-notification discussions with the CMA case team, prior to formal submission of a merger notice. The CMA states in its Guidance on the CMA's jurisdiction and procedure that it strongly encourages allowing a minimum of two weeks from submission of a draft merger notice to formal notification, even for straightforward cases, and this can be significantly longer for more complicated cases. Pre-notification discussions from submission of a substantially complete draft merger notice to the start of the statutory timeline take, on average, between four and six weeks.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The EA provides for two phases of investigation. First the CMA carries out a preliminary (Phase I) investigation to decide whether there is or may be a relevant merger situation and there is a realistic prospect that the merger will result in an SLC, in which case, it has a duty to refer the merger for a Phase II investigation. Where a reference is made, the CMA then launches a detailed investigation by an Inquiry Group to consider whether the merger has resulted, or may be expected to result, in an SLC and, if so, how to remedy, mitigate or prevent such effects.

In making its Phase I assessment, the CMA will gather supplementary information from the merging parties and will seek to verify that information with third parties (eg, competitors, major customers or suppliers). The CMA will conduct a 'state of play' meeting and, where competition issues are raised, it will generally meet with the parties to discuss their submissions (an 'issues meeting'). To help the parties prepare for this meeting, the CMA sends an 'issues letter' to the parties to the merger. This will set out the core arguments and evidence in favour of a reference in the case. Following the issues meeting, all of the evidence including the main parties' and any third parties' submissions will be considered within the CMA. Following an internal CMA case review meeting, there is a separate decision meeting at which the case is debated and scrutinised. The final decision is then communicated to the parties to the merger.

The major steps followed in a Phase II investigation are gathering information, issuing questionnaires, hearing witnesses, verifying information, providing a statement of issues, considering responses to the statement of issues, notifying provisional findings, notifying, considering and implementing possible remedies, considering exclusions from disclosure and publishing reports.

All decisions (ie, that a case is not a relevant merger situation or acceptances of undertakings in lieu of a reference), Phase II references and clearance or prohibition decisions are published on the CMA's website, subject to excision of business secrets. The decision will also be announced through the Regulatory News Service.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

The Enterprise Act 2002 (EA) imposes a duty on the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to refer a relevant merger situation for further investigation at Phase II where it has a positive and reasonable belief, objectively justified by relevant facts, that there is a realistic prospect that a relevant merger situation will lessen competition substantially in any market in the UK. The CMA may exercise a discretion not to refer in three circumstances:

- where the market is not of sufficient importance;
- where the substantial lessening of competition (SLC) would be outweighed by benefits to consumers (rare); or
- where the arrangements are not sufficiently advanced or likely to proceed.

Following a reference, the CMA will then conduct a more detailed investigation to determine whether a relevant merger situation has been created and, if so, whether it has resulted, or may be expected to result, in an SLC within any market or markets in the UK for goods or services. Where the CMA concludes that the merger situation has resulted or is likely to result in an SLC, it will have to determine the appropriateness of taking remedial action and the action to take (itself or by others, such as the government, regulators or public authorities).

The CMA merger assessment guidelines provide that a merger may be expected to lead to an SLC where it can be expected to reduce rivalry to such an extent that competitive incentives are dulled, to the likely detriment of customers (eg, through higher prices, or reduced choice, quality or innovation). In making the assessment, the CMA will draw up theories of harm to provide a framework for its assessment and to compare the prospect for competition with the merger against a counterfactual situation without the merger. In assessing whether there may be an SLC, the CMA will generally conduct analysis under the following heads (although not necessarily systematically): definition of relevant geographical and product markets, measures of concentration, horizontal mergers – unilateral and coordinated effects, non-horizontal mergers – vertical effects, efficiencies, entry and expansion and countervailing buyer power. The guidelines and recent cases indicate, however, an increasing reliance on mechanisms for direct analysis of competitive effects in merger cases and a move away from a detailed assessment of market definition (see, for example, *Unilever/Alberto Culver* and *Zipcar/Streetcar*).

Recent cases also point toward an evolution in the CMA's substantive approach in relation to dynamic markets in particular, with an increasing focus on merging parties' internal documents, deal valuation materials and other third-party evidence sources, such as third-party forecasts and analyst reports, as CMA CEO Andrea Coscelli confirmed in a speech in March 2020.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

When a joint venture constitutes a relevant merger situation, the substantive test for clearance will be the same as for any other merger.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

The CMA is concerned about horizontal (unilateral and coordinated), vertical and conglomerate effects of mergers.

In assessing horizontal mergers, the CMA is concerned both with non-coordinated (or unilateral) effects and coordinated anticompetitive

effects. The possibility of coordinated effects has been an issue in a number of merger cases; see, for example, *Knauf Insulation Ltd/Superglass Insulations Ltd* (the Competition Commission (CC) prohibited a merger that would remove an independent competitor in an already concentrated market), *James Budgett Sugars Ltd/Napier Brown Foods plc* (the CC concluded that, although it was likely that coordinated effects were present prior to the merger, the merger did not make coordination significantly more sustainable or effective so an SLC could not be expected), *Taminco NV/Air Products and Chemicals Inc* (the CC cleared a merger that would reduce the number of European players on the market from three to two on the basis that Air Products and Chemicals Inc would in any event withdraw from the market), and *DS Smith Plc/Linpac Containers Ltd* (the CC cleared the merger but, given the level of concern expressed by customers, recommended that further investigation by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) under the Competition Act 1998 and articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union would be justified).

The CMA guidelines indicate that, in its appraisal of mergers, the CMA will also investigate vertical foreclosure effects, that is, mergers that might result in input foreclosure (limiting rivals' ability to compete by deteriorating terms of access to key inputs) or customer foreclosure (limiting access to important customers) leading to an SLC. For instance, in October 2016, the CMA found that the *Intercontinental Exchange, Inc (ICE)/Trayport* merger would lead to an SLC as a result of vertical foreclosure effects (in particular, that ICE would have the ability and incentive to follow a partial input foreclosure strategy) and ordered the divestiture of Trayport. In July 2017, the CMA referred *Tesco plc/Booker Group plc* for Phase II review to investigate, inter alia, possible vertical effects, although the merger was ultimately cleared unconditionally. In August 2019, the CMA concluded, following a Phase II investigation, that the acquisition of Smartbox by Tobii AA has resulted, or may be expected to result in an SLC owing to horizontal competition concerns, and vertical foreclosure concerns with regard to both input and customer foreclosure. Although Tobii challenged the SLC decision and the CMA's decision to require a full divestiture remedy of Smartbox, the CAT largely upheld the CMA's decision, save that it quashed the final report with respect to the CMA's finding of competition concerns relating to partial input foreclosure as it found that the regulator did not have a sufficient evidence base.

In the context of conglomerate mergers, adverse effects principally result from the fact that the merger may allow the merging firms to foreclose competition through tying or bundling or gain increased market power over a portfolio of products.

The CMA has not specifically investigated common ownership concerns as yet, but it is open for it to do so if relevant in a particular transaction. Recent cases suggest that the CMA is increasingly taking a long-term view of potential competition concerns and considering 'loss of innovation' theories of harm, for instance, in *Ladbroke's/Coral*, *Thermo Fisher/Roper Technologies*, as well as more recently in: *Experian/Clearscore*, which was abandoned in February 2019; *Illumina/PacBio*, which was abandoned in January 2020, both following the CMA's Provisional Findings indicating the CMA's provisional concerns regarding a potential substantial lessening of competition; and in *Sabre/Farelogix*, which was blocked by the CMA in April 2020.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

Except for the cases where a special regime applies, the substantive test for clearance is a solely competition-based test.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The CMA may consider economic efficiencies both in Phase I and in Phase II, although it has only rarely accepted that they would outweigh any SLC created by a merger.

When considering in Phase I whether the merger may be expected to lead to an SLC, the CMA may consider what efficiency gains are directly created by the merger and whether such efficiency gains would have a positive effect on rivalry in the market so that no SLC would result. In addition, the CMA may take efficiencies into account where they do not avert an SLC, but will nonetheless be passed on after the merger in the form of customer benefits. In this case, the exception to the duty to refer may apply. The CMA cleared the *University Hospitals Birmingham NHS FT/Heart of England NHS FT* merger in August 2017 at Phase I, despite finding SLCs in various elective specialties. The CMA placed significant weight on advice on probable benefits from the sector regulator, which considered that substantial improvements to patient care were expected. In *Digital Property Group/Zoopla* in 2012, the OFT concluded that the merger would have pro-competitive effects (an increased ability to compete with the largest player in the market), which it analysed within an efficiencies framework; however, it also concluded that the loss of competition would be limited, so it is unclear whether the OFT would have been able to clear the merger anyway, even in the absence of those pro-competitive effects.

At Phase II the CMA may also, when considering whether there is or will be an SLC, consider whether efficiency gains that are directly created by the merger would increase rivalry among the remaining firms in the market. In addition, if the CMA decides that the merger has resulted or will result in an SLC, it can consider relevant customer benefits when deciding on the question of remedies. The CMA cleared the *Central Manchester University Hospitals/University Hospital of South Manchester* merger in Phase II in August 2017 despite finding various SLCs, again drawing on views of the sector regulator relating to the expected benefits.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

If, following a Phase II review, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) concludes by a two-thirds majority of the investigating panel that the merger will have an anticompetitive outcome, it will take steps to remedy, mitigate or prevent the substantial lessening of competition (SLC) and adverse effects resulting therefrom to the extent that such steps are reasonable and practicable. It may take remedial action itself to preserve or restore the status quo, to increase the competition for the merged firms or to prevent possible exploitative or anticompetitive behaviour on the part of the merged firm. Given that mergers are able to complete prior to an investigation by the CMA, in some cases, the remedy imposed may involve unwinding the transaction (such as in *ICE/Trayport*, in October 2016). In February 2019, for the first time, the CMA issued an unwinding order during an ongoing investigation (in relation to certain integration by the parties) even prior to having reached a decision in the *Tobii AB/Smartbox Assistive Technology Limited and Sensory Software International Ltd* merger inquiry. The CMA ultimately prohibited the merger and concluded that Tobii must dispose of Smartbox. The CMA imposed its second unwinding order in August 2019 in relation to the completed acquisition by Bottomline Technologies of Experian Limited's Experian Payments Gateway (EPG)

business. The order, which was imposed by the CMA even prior to the formal launch of its Phase I investigation into the merger, required Bottomline to segregate any flow of confidential information between the two businesses and not to solicit any EPG customers in relation to any product or services competing with EPG. The CMA may also recommend the taking of actions by others.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Undertakings may be offered to remedy any identified adverse competition concerns at both Phase I (to prevent a reference) and Phase II (to remedy any adverse findings the CMA identifies following a reference).

The CMA may only accept undertakings in lieu of reference for a Phase II review in cases where it has concluded that the merger should otherwise be referred for a Phase II review. It has published guidance on the criteria it applies when considering whether to accept undertakings in lieu. Broadly, it will only do so where it is confident that all potential competition concerns it identified would be resolved without the need for further investigation. Consequently, they are only likely to be appropriate where the competition concerns raised are remedied in a clear-cut way and the remedies proposed are capable of ready implementation. The CMA has stated in its guidance that it is unlikely to accept behavioural remedies at Phase I. Recent practice indicates that it is becoming more likely that the CMA will require an upfront buyer, for instance, where the package does not relate to a stand-alone business or where there is only a small number of candidate purchasers. In the calendar year to the end of March 2020, the CMA accepted undertakings in lieu of a reference to Phase II in six cases.

Where a reference is made for a Phase II review, and the CMA finds an anticompetitive outcome, it must determine the appropriateness of taking remedial action and the action to take. In doing so, the CMA must have regard to the need to achieve as comprehensive a solution as is reasonable and practicable to the SLC and any resulting adverse effects. In respect of its own actions, the CMA itself has the choice of seeking undertakings or imposing orders. The CMA's order-making power is broad but limited to the factors set out in the Enterprise Act 2002. The undertakings that can be agreed are not so limited and therefore provide greater flexibility. In each case, the CMA must consider the appropriateness of remedies, their cost and proportionality and effectiveness. In the calendar year to the end of March 2020, the CMA accepted remedies in five cases out of a total of 13 closed Phase II cases.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

Under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, parties have five working days to offer undertakings in lieu (UILs) after receiving the CMA's Phase I reference decision. However, parties may propose UILs at any stage during Phase I. The CMA has 10 working days from the SLC decision to accept any UILs in principle, and a total of 50 working days from its SLC decision formally to accept UILs (subject to one extension of up to 40 working days for special reasons).

At Phase II, there is a statutory deadline of 12 weeks, extendible once by up to six weeks for special reasons, following the CMA's final report, to implement remedies. Within this period, the CMA consults with the main parties and then publishes a draft set of undertakings or order for third-party comment. Once the undertakings or order are finalised, the CMA publishes a 'notice of acceptance of undertakings' or 'notice of making an order'. After this point, any further implementation of remedies passes to a special committee or inquiry group.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The CMA can require the same type of remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers as in domestic mergers, if the merger falls within the CMA's jurisdiction.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

Both an agreement that results (or would result) in enterprises ceasing to be distinct (ie, a merger situation), and any provision of the agreement that is directly related and necessary to the implementation of the merger are exempt from the Competition Act 1998 (see Schedule 1). The CMA's substantive and procedural approach to ancillary restraints generally follows that of the European Commission (it will only give guidance on ancillary status where the case gives rise to novel or unresolved questions).

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) generally gives third parties the opportunity to intervene and frequently relies on the views of such parties for the verification of information. At Phase I, the CMA will actively seek the views of relevant third parties (eg, competitors, major customers or suppliers) and will request third-party views in all public merger situations by means of an invitation to comment notice published through the Regulatory News Service and on the CMA's website. Third parties also have the opportunity to comment on the purpose and effect of any proposed undertakings in lieu of a reference.

Similarly, where a merger has been referred for a Phase II review, the CMA requires information about the markets involved and invites evidence both from main parties and third parties likely to be affected by the merger. Particular third parties may be invited to attend an individual hearing with the case team or, if the CMA considers it appropriate, it may hold a public or joint hearing for third parties.

Third parties may also be able to bring judicial review proceedings to challenge any decision by which they are aggrieved.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The CMA has stated its commitment to transparency while maintaining appropriate confidentiality. Its approach is set out in its statement on Transparency and Disclosure. The fact of a merger notification is published, and third parties are given opportunities to comment. Although meetings and hearings in front of the CMA are generally conducted in private, the CMA may decide to convene at least one public hearing in mergers considered to be of particular public interest, at which third parties are invited to make their views known.

Further, the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA) provides for all decisions to be published (although it is the CMA's policy to give an opportunity to request the excision of confidential information from those decisions) and for details of all undertakings and orders that have been agreed and accepted or imposed under the EA to be recorded in a public register of undertakings and orders that can be found on the CMA's website.

As regards protecting commercial information from disclosure, the CMA has confidentiality obligations under Part 9 of the EA. Account must also be taken of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), which confers a right for an applicant to be informed in writing of whether the public authority (which includes the CMA and sectoral regulators) holds information of the description specified in the request and, if so, to have that information disclosed. Some important exceptions to the duty on the authority to disclose information under the FOIA exist that may protect information provided under the EA (eg, where disclosure would constitute an actionable breach of confidence or is otherwise prohibited under another piece of legislation). Personal data is also subject to the Data Protection Act 1998 (legislation) such as Part 9 of the Enterprise Act (Data Protection) and the General Data Protection Regulation, which sets out rules for processing data relating to living individuals.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The EUMR provides for cooperation between the European Commission and the national competition authorities (NCAs) and the allocation of cases between the European Commission and the NCAs respectively.

As a competent authority in the UK, the CMA receives details of all mergers notified in Brussels. It examines each case, consults other government departments as necessary, and provides the UK's view to DG Competition in Brussels where appropriate. The CMA also represents the UK at hearings convened by the European Commission and attends Advisory Committee meetings.

Further, the EUMR provides for the transfer of cases between the European Commission and the NCAs. The CMA will, if notified of a merger that has been notified to another NCA, send notice to officials in that authority. The case-handlers will then exchange views on the case without exchanging confidential information (the parties can, by waiver, make exchange of confidential information possible). In *Orange/T-Mobile*, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) made an application under article 9 of the EUMR for UK aspects of the case to be remitted from the European Commission to the OFT for consideration. Following discussions with the European Commission and Ofcom, however, it was able to satisfy itself that its concerns were fully met by the remedies offered to the European Commission by the parties and withdrew its request. The CMA also has a right to reject an application to the European Commission for a case to be referred to it under article 4(5) of the EUMR where it would otherwise be subject to UK merger review. In *London Stock Exchange/LCHClearnet*, the OFT vetoed the parties' request for review by the European Commission and instead the case was reviewed by the OFT and the NCAs in Spain and Portugal respectively. The CMA may also, in certain circumstances, refer a case to the European Commission under article 22 of the EUMR (either relating solely to the UK part of a transaction, or jointly with other NCAs) (see, for example, *Amadeus/Navitaire*, referral request by the CMA in September 2015, subsequently joined by Austria, Germany and Spain) where it considers that it would be more appropriately investigated by the European Commission.

Waivers may also be provided by the parties for the CMA to discuss a case with competition authorities in other jurisdictions (outside the EEA), if relevant.

In its Annual Plan 2019/2020, the CMA has stated that, post-Brexit, international cooperation with other agencies will be crucial and that, while it is possible the CMA will not in future be a member of the European Competition Network, the CMA would expect to maintain strong and effective relationships with European competition authorities through new bilateral or multilateral arrangements with the European Commission and EU member states. This is reasserted in the CMA Annual Plan for 2020/21, in which the CMA stated that it



had stepped up its international engagement efforts through strong and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships, and committing to remain active participants in forums such as the OECD, the International Competition Network and the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

The Enterprise Act 2002 (EA) provides the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) with power to review decisions adopted in merger cases. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), or a decision of the Secretary of State, in connection with a reference or possible reference can apply to the CAT. The EA provides that the CAT is to apply 'the same principles as [those] applied by a court on an application for judicial review'.

In a number of cases, a third-party competitor has challenged a decision not to make a merger reference; see, for example, *IBA Health Ltd v Office of Fair Trading (OFT)* (successful challenge to the decision of the OFT in the CAT not to refer a merger between iSoft and Torex to the Competition Commission (CC), upheld on appeal to Court of Appeal), *Unichem v OFT* (the CAT again quashed, at the request of a third-party competitor, a decision by the OFT not to refer a merger to the CC on the grounds that the OFT had failed to test and verify key evidence sufficiently) and in *Celesio v OFT* (application dismissed).

In *Somerfield/Morrisons*, a challenge was made to the CC's decisions that the merger between the parties would result in a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) and that Somerfield should divest itself of certain stores to approved buyers. The CAT held that, in deciding what was reasonable action appropriate for remedying, mitigating or preventing an SLC, the CC had a clear margin of appreciation. In *Stericycle*, the CAT held that the CC had acted reasonably and within its margin of discretion in ordering the parties to the transaction to unwind parts of their integration and in appointing a hold-separate manager. In January 2010, however, the CAT quashed the decision of the CC in relation to *Ticketmaster/Live Nation*; this followed the concession by the CC that the appellant (CTS Eventim) had an arguable case that the CC's procedure had not been fair. In May 2010, the CC cleared the transaction for a second time. In November 2016, ICE appealed the CMA's finding of an SLC in *ICE/Trayport* and its direction to divest Trayport, arguing that the CMA erred in various ways in its assessment and that its direction was ultra vires, irrational and disproportionate. The CAT rejected most of ICE's grounds, upholding only one aspect, that a subsidiary part of the decision was not sufficiently reasoned, and remitting that point to the CMA for reconsideration. The CMA subsequently confirmed its decision on that aspect of the case.

The CC's prohibition of the *Akzo Nobel/Metlac* merger in 2012 was unsuccessfully appealed to the CAT on grounds including that Akzo Nobel was not 'carrying on business in the UK' and then the Court of Appeal, which also upheld the prohibition. Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected in December 2014. In *Groupe Eurotunnel/Sea France*, the parties appealed to the CAT, which quashed the CC's decision imposing remedies and remitted the case to the CC for reconsideration of whether two enterprises had ceased to be distinct. The CMA (succeeding the CC) confirmed the original findings in June 2014 and the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the CC's original remedies.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

An application to the CAT for judicial review must be made within four weeks of the date on which the applicant was notified of the disputed decision, or the date of publication of the reasons for the decision, whichever is the earlier. The cases that have been heard by the CAT under the EA regime have generally been dealt with quickly, within two to five months, and in some cases within a month of the case being registered with the CAT, for example, in *IBA Health Ltd v OFT, Ticketmaster/Live Nation* (following the CC's concession). More recently, in *J Sainsbury Plc and Asda Group Limited v CMA*, the parties' application, which challenged the lawfulness of the CMA's timetable to review the merger, was heard two days after being lodged with the tribunal.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

Between 1 April 2019 and 31 March 2020, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) gave unconditional clearances at Phase I to 38 mergers, accepted undertakings in lieu in six cases and referred 13 cases to Phase II. Of the 13 Phase II reviews that were completed in the same period, three were unconditionally cleared, two were prohibited, five were cleared subject to remedies and three were cancelled or abandoned.

Merger references considered by the CMA over the past few years have related to a broad range of sectors, including supermarkets, hospitals, platforms and consumer products.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

In October 2017, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) published a green paper on possible changes to the current public interest intervention regime. The changes are intended to be implemented in two phases. The short-term reforms came into force in June 2018. These reforms are intended to expand the merger control regime to capture small transactions relating to military and dual-use sectors, computing hardware and quantum technologies. The consultation on the long-term reforms closed in January 2018. These reforms are intended to introduce a new notification regime for mergers relevant to national security and critical infrastructure. In July 2018, BEIS published a White Paper on the proposed new regime, which would also give the government the right to call in for review transactions that could give rise to national security risks. The White Paper closed in October 2018 and at the time of writing, no conclusions have been published.

In February 2019, the CMA's chair, Lord Tyrie, made a number of proposals to BEIS. The proposed reforms include proposals to shift to mandatory notification of mergers above a certain threshold, and introduce a standstill obligation designed to prevent parties from proceeding with the transaction prior to the CMA's approval. The CMA is also proposing that higher or full-cost recovery from merging parties be reconsidered (the CMA states that it currently recovers around half the cost of its mergers work from fees paid by merging parties). Although these reforms have not yet been implemented, the CMA has reasserted in its Annual Plan for 2020/2021 that legislative reform will be necessary to bring about stronger and more flexible competition and consumer regimes, and that it will continue to advocate that new laws be introduced.

In relation to digital markets more specifically, proposals for reform in connection with digital competition were also set out in the March 2019 Furman report on unlocking digital competition, and the

June 2019 Lear report on evaluation past merger decisions in the digital sector. The Furman report, in particular, made the case for the development of a new regulatory regime for digital platforms, and the CMA have stated in their Annual Plan for 2020/2021 that they are actively considering whether there is a need for changes to the existing merger control tools to tackle digital mergers.

In relation to Brexit, the CMA has stated in its Annual Plan for 2020/2021 that it will be working closely with the government to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and seek to ensure that UK's future relationship with the EU best complements the UK competition and consumer regimes, including by pushing for reforms to be introduced which will help the CMA to 'deliver the best outcomes for UK business and consumers from January 2021'.

**UPDATE AND TRENDS**

**Key developments of the past year**

**36** | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

**Focus on dynamic markets**

In its Annual Plan 2019/2020, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) lists as one of its priorities the promotion of better competition in online markets. This emphasis is reasserted in its Annual Plan for 2020/2021, with one of its strategic objectives being to tackle concerns for digital markets and ensuring that any concerns in this space are properly addressed. During 2019 and 2020, the CMA has prioritised the review of mergers in tech-related spaces, as well as other fast-moving, dynamic industries, including pharmaceuticals. The review of such cases has led to several deals being prohibited or abandoned following the CMA's provisional indication that the CMA is likely to prohibit those transactions. These include the prohibited *Sabre/Farelogix*, *Tobii/Smartbox* and *Ecolab/Holchem*, as well as the abandoned *Illumina/PacBio*, *ThermoFisher/Gatan*, *Experian/Clearscore* and *Topcashback/Quidco*. The CMA's CEO Andrea Coscelli said in March 2020 that the use of a more sophisticated range of evidence in reviewing dynamic markets (including internal documents, deal valuation materials and third-party evidence, such as forecasts and analyst reports) has enabled the CMA to build a better understanding of dynamic markets, and that its evolving approach to dynamic markets is a necessary response to the changing realities brought about by such cases.

**Brexit**

Planning for Brexit also continues. Up until the end of 2020, the European Commission will continue to have exclusive jurisdiction over mergers which meet the EU's merger control thresholds (with some very limited exceptions). Post-2021, the UK will become another jurisdiction for international deals covering multiple jurisdictions. In respect of deals that straddle 2020/2021, merging parties can take steps to minimise the risks associated with potential parallel merger investigations, including engaging early with the CMA if there is a possibility of such parallel investigations. The CMA also published guidance in January 2020 relating to Brexit, which considers the impact of the Withdrawal Agreement on the UK's legal framework, as well as the procedures that will apply during the transition period.

**The covid-19 pandemic**

The CMA has recently published guidance on merger assessments during the covid-19 pandemic. While the situation is developing at pace, the CMA notes in its guidance that it is conscious that the pressures brought about by the covid-19 pandemic could have an impact on its merger control work. It notes that its overall substantive approach remains unchanged, and the statutory deadlines that apply to its merger



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control review have not been altered. However, it also considers that certain logistical changes to its processes may apply (eg, site visits are not occurring at present) and also that pre-notification processes may be longer than otherwise, owing to difficulties in obtaining information from merging parties and third parties. In relation to its substantive assessment, the CMA stressed that the pandemic has not brought about a relaxation of the CMA's standards, but acknowledged that it would carefully consider the available evidence on the possible impact of covid-19 on competition in each case. In April 2020, the CMA announced its provisional conclusion that the *Amazon/Deliveroo* deal should be cleared on the basis that Deliveroo would have exited the market absent the investment from Amazon, owing to the negative impact of the covid-19 pandemic. The CMA considered that the exit of Deliveroo would have been worse for competition than allowing the Amazon investment to proceed. The CMA continued to assess the deal, and in June 2020 revised its findings to provisionally conclude that Deliveroo would no longer be likely to exit the market absent the transaction, but that the deal should be cleared since it was not expected to damage competition in either restaurant delivery or online convenience grocery delivery.



# United States

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

Section 7 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914 and amended in 1950, is the principal US antitrust statute governing mergers and acquisitions. Section 7 prohibits acquisitions of assets or stock where 'the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly'. Transactions may also be challenged under section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act as unreasonable restraints of trade or as attempts at monopolisation. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also has the authority under section 5 of the FTC Act to challenge a transaction as an 'unfair method of competition'.

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the HSR Act) was enacted to give the federal agencies responsible for reviewing the antitrust implications of mergers and acquisitions – the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (collectively, the antitrust agencies or the agencies) – the opportunity to review the antitrust issues presented by certain acquisitions of assets, non-corporate interests or voting securities before those acquisitions are completed. Pursuant to congressional authorisation, the FTC, with the agreement of the Antitrust Division, has promulgated detailed and complex rules (the Rules) governing pre-merger notification under the HSR Act. Both the HSR Act and the Rules were amended significantly in February 2001, and the Rules again underwent significant revision in 2005 and 2011. The antitrust agencies also have jurisdiction to investigate and challenge transactions under the US antitrust laws noted above, whether or not they have been notified under the HSR Act and whether or not they have been consummated.

The Antitrust Division has exclusive federal responsibility for enforcing the Sherman Act; the FTC is an independent administrative agency and has exclusive responsibility for enforcing the FTC Act and joint authority (with the Antitrust Division) over enforcement of the Clayton Act. Although both agencies have jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust laws, any given merger or acquisition will be examined by only one of the two bodies. Which agency will concern itself with any particular transaction is decided by informal discussions between the two agencies and can often be predicted (but not with certainty) on the basis of the agency's relative familiarity with the industry or companies involved.

Mergers and acquisitions can, under some circumstances, also be challenged by private parties and by state attorneys general. The risk of a challenge by private parties has been reduced somewhat by court decisions requiring that such challengers demonstrate a threat that the private party challenger will be injured by the anticompetitive aspects of the transaction (rather than, for example, by the new firm's enhanced effectiveness as a competitor). In situations where a private party has standing to challenge a transaction, that party can seek the same remedies (including divestiture) that are available to the government,

although a private party may be subject to certain equitable defences (such as laches and 'unclean hands'), which might protect a consummated transaction from attack.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The HSR Act requires parties to file a formal notification with the Antitrust Division and the FTC – and to wait a specified number of days (30 days in most transactions) while the designated agency reviews the filings – before consummating certain acquisitions of assets, non-corporate interests or voting securities. The HSR Act can apply to any kind of transaction (be it an acquisition of a majority or minority interest, a joint venture, a merger or any other transaction that involves an acquisition of assets, non-corporate interests or voting securities).

Although the term 'assets' is not defined in the HSR Act, the agencies have taken the position that it should be given a broad interpretation similar to that which it has been given by the courts in interpreting section 7 of the Clayton Act. Under these principles, it is clear that acquisitions of assets – within the meaning of the HSR Act – will include acquisitions of both tangible and intangible assets. The acquisition of exclusive patent licences, for example, may require notification.

The Rules define 'voting securities' broadly to include, generally speaking, any security in a corporate entity that either currently entitles the holder to vote for the election of directors, or is convertible into such a security. The acquisition of corporate securities that do not at present possess, or are not convertible into securities that will possess, such voting power is exempt from the HSR Act. Although they are defined as voting securities, the Rules exempt the acquisition of convertible securities, options and warrants at any time before they are converted or exercised. It may, however, be necessary to make a filing before such securities can be converted (provided that the relevant jurisdictional tests are met at the time of conversion).

An acquisition of interests in a non-corporate entity (eg, an LLC or partnership) that confers the right to either 50 per cent or more of the profits or, in the event of dissolution, 50 per cent or more of the assets of the entity is considered to be an acquisition of the underlying assets of the entity. In other words, the Rules do not treat non-corporate interests as 'voting securities', regardless of the voting rights that those interests may have.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

If it involves an acquisition of non-corporate interests or voting securities, the formation of a for-profit joint venture may be subject to the HSR Act. Generally, not-for-profit joint ventures are exempt, although in certain cases they may be reportable. The Rules contain a special provision governing the formation of new corporations and corporate joint ventures (new companies). As a general matter, where two or more

persons contribute to form a new company, and as a result receive voting securities of this new company, the Rules treat the contributing parties as acquiring persons, and the new company as the acquired person. In these cases, the Rules provide a special jurisdictional test based on the size of all contributors and the size of the new company itself.

Additionally, if the acquisition is of interests in a joint venture that is formed as a non-corporate entity, only the acquiring person (if applicable) that will hold 50 per cent or more of the interests in the entity will be subject to HSR reporting obligations. If no acquiring person will hold 50 per cent or more following the acquisition, the formation of the non-corporate joint venture is not reportable.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

The requirement to comply with the HSR Act is not limited to transactions that involve a change of control. As explained in greater detail below, any acquisition that results in the acquiring person holding voting securities of another company valued in excess of US\$94 million (current threshold) may require a filing, even if that amount represents a very small percentage of the total outstanding voting securities of the target. (However, acquisitions of less than 50 per cent of a non-corporate entity are not reportable, and there is a limited exemption for up to 10 per cent of a corporation's voting securities.)

The HSR Rules do include a definition of 'control'. However, this definition is used primarily to determine which companies should be included within the 'acquiring' or 'acquired' persons. The basic principles used in determining if control exists are as follows:

- controlling a corporate entity means either holding 50 per cent or more of its outstanding voting securities, or having the contractual power presently to designate 50 per cent or more of its directors;
- controlling a partnership, LLC, or other non-corporate entity means having the right to either 50 per cent or more of its profits or, in the event of its dissolution, 50 per cent or more of its assets;
- a natural person will never be deemed to be controlled by any other entity or person; and
- controlling a trust means having the contractual power to remove and replace 50 per cent or more of the trustees.

### Thresholds, triggers and approvals

#### 5 | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

The initial determination of whether the notification requirements of the HSR Act may be applicable to a particular acquisition of assets, non-corporate interests or voting securities focuses upon the following jurisdictional issues:

- whether either the acquiring or acquired persons are engaged in US commerce or in any activity affecting US commerce (the commerce test);
- the amount of assets, non-corporate interests or voting securities that will be held as a result of the acquisition (the size-of-the-transaction test);
- where the size of the transaction is US\$376.0 million (as adjusted annually) or less but greater than US\$94 million (as adjusted annually), the magnitude of the worldwide sales and assets of the acquiring and acquired persons (the size-of-the-parties test); and
- whether any exemptions apply to the transaction. The HSR dollar thresholds are adjusted annually to reflect changes in the GNP. The thresholds in this chapter will be in effect from 27 February 2020 until early 2021.

### The commerce test

This requires that either the acquiring or acquired party be engaged in US commerce or in any activity affecting US commerce.

### The size-of-the-transaction test

The size-of-the-transaction test looks at the assets or voting securities that will be held by the acquiring person as a result of a proposed acquisition. In other words, any voting securities or, in some cases, assets held by the acquiring person prior to the transaction, together with those assets or voting securities to be acquired in the acquisition in question, must be considered. Likewise, the acquisition of non-corporate interests of an entity must be aggregated with any interests currently held by the acquiring person in that same entity to determine whether or not the acquiring person holds 50 per cent or more of the entity, thus potentially requiring HSR notification.

An HSR filing is not required in connection with any particular acquisition unless it will result in the acquiring person holding assets or voting securities having an aggregate total value in excess of US\$94 million (as adjusted annually). In most cases, this threshold is cumulative. For example, if an acquirer already owns US\$50 million of voting securities of an issuer, and seeks to acquire US\$45 million in voting securities of that same issuer, the US\$45 million acquisition will result in the acquirer 'holding' voting securities of US\$95 million.

However, while the acquisition of a 50 per cent or more interest in a non-corporate entity is considered an acquisition of the assets of the entity, the value of the interest is not the value of 100 per cent of the underlying assets, but rather only of the percentage interest held as a result of the acquisition.

### The size-of-the-parties test

The size-of-the-parties test does not apply to transactions resulting in holdings valued in excess of US\$376 million (as adjusted annually). For all smaller transactions, the test remains in effect.

The size-of-the-parties test looks at the size of both the acquiring and acquired person and, generally speaking, is satisfied if one party (including all entities in its corporate family) has worldwide sales or assets of US\$18.8 million or more (as adjusted annually), and the other has worldwide sales or assets of US\$188 million or more (as adjusted annually). Sales and assets, as a general rule, are defined as those set forth in a party's last regularly prepared income statement and balance sheet.

'Acquiring person' and 'acquired person' are terms of art under the HSR Act and the Rules. To summarise a complex definition, these terms include not only the entity making the acquisition and the entity being acquired, but also the entire corporate family of which each is a part. Thus, assuming that a corporate family's assets or sales, or both, are US\$188 million or more, a purchase or sale of assets or voting securities by any subsidiary of that corporate family would satisfy the size-of-the-parties requirement under the HSR Act if the other party to the transaction was part of a corporate family that had assets or sales of US\$18.8 million or more (as adjusted annually).

### Exemptions

Once it is determined that a proposed transaction meets the jurisdictional tests described above, the next step in determining if a pre-merger notification filing is required is examining whether the transaction qualifies for any of the exemptions set forth in the HSR Act or the Rules.

There are a variety of such exemptions, each of which excuses certain categories of transactions from the notification and waiting requirements of the HSR Act. For example, the notification requirements do not apply to:

- the acquisition of non-voting securities;
- certain acquisitions of voting securities 'solely for the purpose of investment';
- the acquisition of goods or realty in the ordinary course of business;

- certain acquisitions that require the prior approval of another federal agency;
- stock dividends and splits;
- certain acquisitions by securities underwriters, creditors, insurers and institutional investors; and
- certain financing transactions where the acquiring person contributes only cash to a non-corporate entity and will no longer control the entity after it realises its preferred return.

The FTC has also adopted a specific set of exemptions applicable to transactions involving non-US companies in which the US sales or assets involved are both below certain thresholds (as adjusted annually).

The application of each of these exemptions will, of course, depend upon the particular circumstances of the transaction, and upon the limits and conditions to those exemptions set forth in the HSR Act and the Rules.

Finally, as noted above, transactions that fall below the HSR thresholds or are otherwise exempt from HSR reporting can still be investigated and challenged, even after they are consummated.

## 6 | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

If the threshold requirements described above are met and no exemption is available (such as those described above), filing under the HSR Act is mandatory, that is, the proposed transaction cannot be consummated until the filing is completed and applicable waiting periods, discussed below, have expired. There is no scheme for voluntary filings as such, but parties to non-reportable transactions can bring their transaction to the attention of the agencies.

## 7 | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

In certain circumstances, the acquisition of foreign assets or voting securities of a foreign company is exempt from the pre-merger notification requirements of the HSR Act. The Rules reflect the agencies' views that certain foreign acquisitions may affect competition in the United States, but that pre-merger notification should not be required if there is insufficient nexus with US commerce.

### Acquisitions of foreign assets

The HSR Rules provide that acquisitions of foreign assets by US and non-US companies shall be exempt from the HSR Act unless the foreign assets that would be held as a result of the acquisition generated sales in or into the US exceeding US\$94 million during the acquired person's most recent fiscal year. Even if the acquisition exceeds this threshold (as adjusted annually), the acquisition will nonetheless be exempt if:

- both the acquiring and acquired persons are foreign;
- the aggregate sales in or into the US in the most recent completed fiscal year and the aggregate total assets in the US of the acquiring person and the acquired person are both less than US\$206.8 million; and
- the assets that will be held as a result of the transaction are valued at US\$376 million or less.

### Acquisitions of voting securities of a non-US issuer

With respect to acquisitions of a foreign issuer by a US person, the Rules provide that such an acquisition shall be exempt from the HSR Act unless the foreign issuer (together with any entities it controls) either holds assets in the US valued over US\$94 million, or made aggregate sales in or into the US of over US\$94 million in the most recent fiscal year.

The Rules also make clear that if interests in several foreign issuers are being acquired from a common parent company, the assets and sales of all the target companies must be aggregated to determine whether either of the US\$94 million thresholds described above (as adjusted annually) is exceeded.

With respect to acquisitions of voting securities of a foreign issuer by a foreign person, the Rules provide that such an acquisition shall be exempt unless it confers on the acquiring person control of the target issuer (ie, it is an acquisition that will give the acquiring person 50 per cent or more of the voting stock of the target) and the target, again, either holds assets in the US valued at more than US\$94 million, or made aggregate sales in or into the US of more than US\$94 million in the most recent fiscal year. As with acquisitions by US persons, if controlling interests in multiple foreign companies are being acquired from the same parent company, the US assets and sales of all the target companies must be aggregated to determine whether either of the US\$94 million thresholds (as adjusted annually) is exceeded. Even if either of the US\$94 million thresholds described above (as adjusted annually) is exceeded, the transaction will nonetheless be exempt where:

- both the acquiring and the acquired persons are foreign;
- the aggregate sales in or into the US in the most recent completed fiscal year and the aggregate total assets in the US of the acquiring person and the acquired person are both less than US\$206.8 million; and
- the value of the voting securities that will be held as a result of the transaction is US\$376 million or less.

Finally, if both foreign assets and foreign voting securities are being acquired from the same acquired person, the US sales attributed to both the assets and to the foreign issuer must be aggregated to determine whether the US\$94 million threshold (as adjusted annually) is exceeded.

The Rules also provide an exemption from the requirements of the HSR Act for acquisitions of foreign assets or voting securities where the parent of the buyer or seller is the government of that same foreign jurisdiction.

## 8 | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Certain industries (including banking, telecommunications and media, transport and energy) have special legislation governing mergers and acquisitions. In these industries, approval of other federal agencies may be required for certain transactions. Transactions in some industries may require review by both the antitrust agencies and the agency more specifically charged with overseeing the industry (for example, the Federal Communications Commission for telecommunications mergers). Other industries have certain restrictions on foreign ownership of US assets. Finally, transactions that have national security implications may also require special notification and approval by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (organised within the US Department of Treasury).

## NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE

### Filing formalities

## 9 | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

There is no specific deadline for filing under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the HSR Act). The parties can submit their filings at any time after the execution of a letter of intent (which can be non-binding) or a definitive agreement. However, if a transaction is covered by the HSR Act, it cannot be consummated until

all required filings have been made and the applicable waiting periods have been observed. Additionally, even after filings are submitted, it is a violation of the HSR Act for an acquiring party to take steps that have the effect of transferring beneficial ownership of the target business to the acquirer prior to the expiry of the waiting period. Failure to comply with the HSR Act can result in a fine of up to US\$43,280 per day (as adjusted) and the agencies may seek to unwind a transaction that has been consummated in violation of the HSR Act.

In general, the level of compliance with the HSR Act has been extremely high. In those instances in which a required filing has not been made, or the waiting period not observed, the agencies have not hesitated to seek significant penalties. The agencies have brought at least 20 failure to file cases in the past 13 fiscal years, and obtained fines ranging from US\$180,000 to US\$11 million. In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against ValueAct Capital for failure to make an HSR filing when purchasing over US\$2.5 billion of Baker Hughes and Halliburton voting securities. In not making a filing, ValueAct relied on the investment-only exemption, but the DOJ argued that exemption was not applicable when ValueAct tried to influence the companies' business decisions during the course of their proposed merger. In June 2016, ValueAct agreed to pay a US\$11 million fine. In 2017, Duke Energy Corporation was required to pay US\$600,000 in civil penalties when it acquired Osprey Energy Center from Calpine Corporation before filing the required notification form and observing the required waiting period under the HSR Act. More specifically, the DOJ alleged that, pursuant to a tolling agreement, Duke Energy acquired beneficial ownership of Osprey's business before Duke Energy had fulfilled its obligations under the HSR Act.

In 2019, Canon Inc and Toshiba Corporation were fined US\$2.5 million each in connection with the acquisition by Canon of Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation (TMSC) from Toshiba. The complaint filed by the DOJ on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleged that Canon and Toshiba devised a scheme that 'had no purpose' other than to quickly complete the sale of TMSC and avoid the HSR Act's waiting period requirements. Also in 2019, the DOJ filed suit against Third Point LLC and three funds it manages for failure to file under the HSR Act when the shares of Dow Inc held by the three Third Point funds converted to shares of the newly formed DowDuPont Inc following the merger of Dow Inc and El du Pont de Nemours & Company. The three Third Point funds were required to collectively pay US\$609,810 in civil penalties, and they and Third Point LLC are barred from committing future violations of the HSR Act in connection with corporate consolidations. The three Third Point funds and Third Point LLC were at the time already under federal court order stemming from allegations that they violated the HSR Act in connection with their 2015 acquisitions of voting securities of Yahoo! Inc.

Individual investors are also at risk when not complying with the HSR Act. In January 2017, the FTC charged two individuals in two different cases with violating the HSR Act. In one of the cases, investor Mitchell Rales was fined for failure to file under the HSR Act for acquisitions of company stock post-IPO. The investor's pre-IPO ownership of Colfax Corporation was above 50 per cent, and therefore any subsequent purchase would have been exempt even though the original acquisition of these shares was also exempt from the HSR Act. However, because of the IPO, his holdings, which were valued in excess of the HSR Act threshold, decreased below the control level to approximately 20.8 per cent. Thus, Rales was required to file and observe the HSR waiting period prior to making any post-IPO purchase of Colfax Corporation voting securities. In the second case, the FTC fined Ahmet Okumus US\$180,000 for failing to report his purchases of voting securities in the internet services company Web.com through his hedge fund. Although the Commission found his HSR violation to be inadvertent, it still sought penalties because this was Okumus' second HSR violation in two years. Similarly, in December 2018, the FTC fined

James Dolan, the executive chairman and a director of Madison Square Garden Company (MSG) US\$609,810 for failing to report his receipt in September 2017 of MSG restricted stock units in connection with his compensation. Dolan had filed HSR in August 2016 for the US\$50 million (as adjusted) HSR threshold and was thus permitted under the HSR Act to acquire additional MSG voting securities valued up to the US\$100 million (as adjusted) threshold. The MSG shares received by Mr Dolan in September 2017 resulted in Dolan holding MSG shares valued in excess of the US\$100 million (as adjusted) threshold. This was Dolan's second HSR violation.

## 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

If a transaction is subject to the filing requirements of the HSR Act, buy-side and sell-side parties to the transaction must make separate filings with the antitrust agencies. All acquiring persons that are required to file must pay a filing fee that is calculated according to the total value of the securities or assets to be held as a result of the transaction. The parties may agree to split the fee or even have the acquired person pay the fee. Transactions valued at less than US\$188 million are subject to a filing fee of US\$45,000. Transactions valued at US\$188 million or more but less than US\$940.1 million are subject to a filing fee of US\$125,000. Transactions valued at US\$940.1 million or more are subject to a filing fee of US\$280,000. This fee must be submitted at the time the notification form is filed, or the waiting period will not begin.

## 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

If a transaction is subject to the HSR Act, and a filing is thus required, the acquisition must be delayed for a 30-day period (or, in the case of a cash tender offer or a transfer in bankruptcy covered by 11 USC section 363(b), a 15-day period) while the agencies review it. If the agencies take no action, the transaction may be consummated when the waiting period has expired. The agencies do not issue a formal decision clearing a transaction.

To the extent that a merger is subject to the HSR Act, the initial waiting period generally begins as soon as both parties to the transaction have made the requisite filing with the antitrust agencies. In cases involving tender offers and other acquisitions of voting securities from third parties, the waiting period begins as soon as the acquiring person has made the requisite filing, although the acquired party must file within a prescribed time.

If any deadline for governmental action falls on a weekend or a legal public holiday, the deadline is automatically extended to 11:59pm Eastern Time the next business day.

### Early termination of the waiting period

The parties may request that the antitrust agencies terminate the waiting period before it has run its full course, and the agencies may, at their discretion, grant such requests. It should be noted that when early termination is granted, the agencies are required to publish notice of their action in the Federal Register. This notification only identifies the acquiring person, the acquired person and the acquired entity. None of the confidential business information filed by the parties is disclosed.

### Extension of the waiting period

The agency responsible for reviewing a particular transaction may, before the end of the initial 30-day waiting period, issue what is generally referred to as a 'second request' seeking additional information from the parties to a transaction. The issuance of a second request extends the waiting period to the 30th day (or, in the case of a cash tender offer

or a transfer in bankruptcy covered by 11 USC section 363(b), the 10th day) after the date of substantial compliance with the request for additional information. In some cases, the parties may also withdraw and 'refile' under the HSR Act, which starts a new initial 30-day (or 15-day) waiting period. This voluntary process gives the agency additional time to review the deal and may avoid the need for a second request.

### Pre-clearance closing

#### 12 | What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

A transaction subject to the HSR Act may not close prior to the expiry or early termination of the applicable waiting period. Failure to comply can result in a fine of up to US\$43,280 per day (as adjusted) and the agencies may seek to unwind a transaction that has been consummated in violation of the Act. The agencies have imposed fines for failure to file and observe the waiting period.

In August 2015, the FTC filed a complaint against Third Point LLC and three affiliated hedge funds (collectively, Third Point) relating to their failure to make an HSR filing and observe the waiting period when acquiring Yahoo! Inc (Yahoo) shares in 2011. The complaint alleged that the investment-only exemption was inapplicable because Third Point took certain actions inconsistent with passivity, such as contacting potential Yahoo board members and making statements about proposing directors for Yahoo. Third Point settled with the FTC and the FTC did not seek civil penalties because the violation was inadvertent and it was Third Point's first HSR violation. In another case dealing with the investor-only exemption, in September 2015, Leucadia National Corporation (Leucadia) settled a complaint brought by the FTC, where the FTC argued the investment-only exemption did not apply when as a result of a transaction, Leucadia's ownership interest in Knight Capital Group, Inc converted into shares of a new entity (KCG Holdings) worth approximately US\$173 million. The FTC argued that Leucadia should have made an HSR filing and observed the waiting period, because the investment-only exemption does not apply when an institutional investor acquires voting securities of the same type as any entity included within the acquiring person, and in this instance, both the acquiring and acquired persons were broker-dealers. This was Leucadia's second HSR violation, and it agreed to pay civil penalties of US\$240,000.

In October 2015, Len Blavatnik, an investor, agreed to pay civil penalties of US\$656,000, settling a complaint brought by the FTC for his failure to make an HSR filing relating to his August 2014 acquisition of TangoMe shares worth approximately US\$228 million. Blavatnik previously violated the HSR Act in 2010, and did not consult HSR counsel prior to acquiring TangoMe's shares.

Merging parties may also be fined for 'gun jumping' – taking steps that have the effect of transferring beneficial ownership of the target business prior to the expiry or early termination of the applicable waiting period or periods. In the most recent example of such an enforcement action, in November 2014, a federal court ordered Flakeboard America Limited and SierraPine, both makers of MDF particle board, to pay to the DOJ fines of almost US\$5 million for pre-closing actions that allegedly violated HSR gun jumping and Sherman Act laws under a settlement agreement. Additionally, the Antitrust Division, in January 2010, fined Smithfield Foods and Premium Standard Farms for an alleged gun-jumping violation where Smithfield entered into a merger agreement with Premium Standard and reserved for itself the right to review certain contracts of Premium Standard. The Antitrust Division claimed that the parties violated the HSR Act when Premium Standard submitted three large, multi-year contracts to Smithfield for approval, alleging that this action was sufficient to show that the acquirer had taken 'operational

control' of the target prior to the expiry of the HSR Act waiting period. The parties agreed to pay a US\$900,000 fine.

#### 13 | Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

Unless an exemption applies, sanctions are applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers in the same manner as the sanctions are applied to domestic transactions. For example, in 1997, Mahle GmbH (Mahle), a German piston manufacturer, and Metal Leve, SA (Metal Leve), a Brazilian competitor, were each fined US\$2.8 million for failure to file and observe the HSR waiting period prior to closing an acquisition by Mahle of 50.1 per cent of Metal Leve. Both companies manufactured diesel engine parts through US subsidiaries. In 2019, two companies headquartered in Japan, Canon Inc and Toshiba Corporation, were fined US\$2.5 million each in connection with the acquisition by Canon of a Toshiba subsidiary, Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation (TMSC), a company with operations in the US. The complaint filed by the DOJ on behalf of the FTC alleged that Canon and Toshiba devised a scheme that 'had no purpose' other than to quickly complete the sale of TMSC and avoid the HSR Act's waiting period requirements.

#### 14 | What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

There are no special remedy rules or practices applicable to foreign-to-foreign mergers. If the transaction gives rise to competitive issues in the United States, those issues must be resolved before the transaction can proceed.

### Public takeovers

#### 15 | Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

The Rules contain provisions that are applicable only to tender offers. If the transaction in question is a cash tender offer (or a transfer in bankruptcy covered by 11 USC section 363(b)), the statutory initial waiting period is 15 days (instead of the usual 30 days). If a second request is issued in such a transaction, the waiting period is extended for 10 days (instead of the usual 30 days) after the date on which the acquiring person substantially complies with the request. Also, for any tender offer, failure to substantially comply with a second request by the acquired person does not extend the waiting period. Further, in cases involving tender offers or other acquisitions of voting securities from third parties, the waiting period begins when the acquiring person files. All other aspects of the HSR Act are equally applicable to public and non-public transactions.

### Documentation

#### 16 | What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The Notification and Report Form (the Form) that must be submitted to comply with the HSR Act requires the filing party to provide basic information about its US revenues, corporate organisation and certain minority shareholdings of entities engaged in an industry similar to the target's operations on a worldwide basis, and the structure of the transaction (including the executed purchase agreement or letter of intent), as well as a variety of business documents. In particular, the parties are required to submit all studies, surveys, analyses and reports prepared by or for any officers or directors (of any entity within the filing party)



for the purpose of evaluating or analysing the acquisition with respect to market shares, competition, competitors, markets, potential for sales growth or expansion into product or geographical markets. Documents routinely found to be responsive, and filed by parties, include board and management presentations, confidential information memoranda, synergy and efficiency analyses. Documents need not be formal presentations, and emails may need to be filed if they meet the criteria set forth above.

The antitrust agencies consider these documents highly relevant to their initial evaluation of the antitrust implications of a transaction. The agencies also require submission of certain documents analysing synergies or efficiencies to be achieved in the transaction. Private equity and other investment funds making acquisitions must also include certain activities of 'associates' and portfolio investments that are not 'controlled' by the acquirer but are engaged in an industry similar to the target's operations. (Refer to the FTC's website.)

Unlike, for example, the European Union's Form CO, completion of the Form does not require any discussion or description of the relevant markets or the competitive conditions in those markets. Preparation of the Form can take a few days to a number of weeks, depending principally on whether the company has submitted a filing in the recent past and on how the company organises its data.

An officer or director must certify under penalty of perjury that the information in the HSR form is true, correct and complete.

## Investigation phases and timetable

### 17 | What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

Once the parties to a transaction file their Forms, the FTC will initially review the Forms to ensure that they are complete and comport with the transmittal rules. Then, the two antitrust agencies decide between themselves which one of them will review the transaction beyond the filings themselves and publicly available information. If either the FTC or the Antitrust Division wants to conduct such further review of the transaction, it notifies the other agency and obtains 'clearance'. If both agencies want to investigate the merger, the matter is assigned through an internal liaison process. Often, one of the agencies will have greater expertise than the other with respect to a particular industry or company.

Once a transaction has been assigned to a particular agency, a staff attorney will normally contact the parties' lawyers to ask for additional information. Responding to such a request is not mandatory during the initial waiting period, but a failure to respond may leave the agency with important issues unresolved that may result in the issuance of a formal second request. The FTC and the DOJ have published guidelines listing the types of information and documents that may be useful to provide during the initial waiting period (available on the FTC's website and on the DOJ's website).

Often, the information provided to the agency during the initial waiting period will be sufficient to allow the agency to terminate its investigation. It is not uncommon for the parties to submit some form of letter or 'position paper' to the agency during the initial waiting period, addressing the questions of the agency and explaining in detail why the transaction will not substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. It is also very common for the agency to contact the parties' customers and competitors to obtain additional information regarding the industry, and to interview executives from the merging firms.

For those mergers that continue to raise significant antitrust issues at the end of the initial waiting period, the procedure available to the agencies is to issue a 'request for additional information and documentary material' or, as it is more commonly referred to, a 'second request'. In some cases, the parties may also withdraw and 're file' under the HSR

Act, which starts a new initial 30-day (or 15-day) waiting period. This voluntary process gives the agency additional time to review the deal and may avoid the need for a second request.

A second request is a detailed set of interrogatories and document demands designed to provide the agency responsible for reviewing the transaction with information on issues such as market structure, entry conditions, competition, marketing strategies, and the rationale of the acquisition under review.

Compliance with a second request may be a burdensome and time-consuming task, requiring the parties to a transaction to produce substantial volumes of documents and to answer detailed questions. The burden may be particularly great in cases involving parties located outside the United States, because the rules require all documents submitted in response to a second request to be translated into English.

However, the agencies have implemented a number of reforms to the second request process designed to reduce the burdens associated with compliance by, among other things, limiting the scope of initial document requests and the number of company personnel whose files must initially be searched. Parties often negotiate with the reviewing agency to attempt to further limit the scope of material requested.

Either during the period of compliance, or following the submission of the complete response, it is not uncommon for the agency reviewing the transaction to take the sworn testimony of senior executives of the parties to the transaction. These oral examinations, or depositions, can cover a wide range of issues and are usually designed to explore the rationale for the transaction, entry issues, competitive conditions and other strategic issues. The depositions can be useful vehicles for the parties to put forward their views on the likely competitive impact of the transaction.

Following the parties' compliance with the second request (which can take a number of months), the agency responsible for reviewing the particular transaction must decide whether to let the transaction proceed, or to seek a court order enjoining the transaction, or take other enforcement action for alleged violation of the antitrust laws. Alternatively, the parties and the responsible agency may enter into a 'consent agreement' – a form of settlement that is designed to address the anticompetitive effect that the agency believes may result if the transaction proceeds as planned. If the agency in question takes no action, the parties are free to consummate the transaction at the end of the second 30-day waiting period.

### 18 | What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

As noted, if a transaction is subject to the HSR Act, the closing of the transaction must be delayed for an initial 30-day waiting period (or, in the case of a cash tender offer or a transfer in bankruptcy covered by 11 USC section 363(b), a 15-day period) following the filing of the Form. The parties may request that the antitrust agencies terminate the waiting period before it has run its full course, and the agencies may, at their discretion, grant such requests. If the agency decides to issue a request for additional information and documentary material ('second request'), the applicable waiting period will be extended until the 30th day (or the 10th day in the case of a cash tender offer or a transfer in bankruptcy covered by 11 USC section 363(b)) following substantial compliance with the second request.

Although they have not taken a public position on expediting requests for early termination as a result of economic circumstances, the antitrust agencies have been sensitive to the need to complete investigations of mergers involving distressed firms promptly. The agencies generally grant requests for early termination swiftly for transactions clearly raising no competitive concerns.



## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

As noted earlier, the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions the effect of which 'may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly'. As a general matter, in merger cases, the US federal courts have largely adopted the analytical methodology set out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the antitrust agencies. The previous Guidelines were first released in 1992 to guide the antitrust agencies' determination whether to challenge a horizontal merger and describe their approach to counsel and the business community. The current, revised set was published in August 2010.

The unifying theme of these Guidelines is that a merger should not be permitted if it will create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. The agencies assess market power by analysing whether the merged entity 'is likely to encourage one or more firms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives'.

Under the Guidelines, the likelihood that a proposed transaction will create or enhance 'market power' or facilitate its exercise may be established either by direct evidence of likely anticompetitive effects (or actual anticompetitive effects in cases of consummated transactions) or alternatively by circumstantial evidence. The guidelines recognise the potential for merger efficiencies to enhance competition and benefit consumers. In practice, the agencies have found efficiencies most likely to make a difference when likely adverse competitive effects were not great.

Although the Guidelines have no force of law, they are highly influential in the antitrust agencies' determinations whether to challenge horizontal mergers. The 2010 Guidelines, in particular, downplay the reliance on market definition in the horizontal merger analysis, and provide for certain alternative measurements of anticompetitive effects. Because most horizontal merger investigations in the US are resolved at the agency level, rather than challenged in court, the revised Guidelines provide important insight into how best to address agency concerns.

The Guidelines note that in extreme cases a failing firm defence may be taken into account; however, in practice, these situations are very rare.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

Joint ventures involving competitors that completely eliminate competition between the parties and that are intended to exist for at least 10 years are analysed in the same way as all other mergers or acquisitions. In February 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) approved a joint venture involving three polyethylene terephthalate (PET) resin producers' acquisition of an under-construction PET production facility. The terms of the final order restrict how the joint venture partners can use the assets in the joint venture. Other competitor collaborations are analysed by the agencies pursuant to a framework described in the agencies' 2000 'Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors'.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

Market share analysis is only one method of antitrust analysis in the US. The responsible agency, if it believes that the transaction may raise competitive concerns, will examine all aspects of competition in the relevant markets. In recent years, the agencies have been particularly

concerned about transactions that have combined competitors that sell products or services that are especially close substitutes for each other, which could give rise to unilateral effects, as well as the possibility of coordinated effects. (See the agencies' 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines for a more detailed discussion of unilateral and coordinated effects.)

Elimination of potential competition – where one of the merging firms is about to enter the relevant market – has also been a concern, particularly in pharmaceutical mergers. Following a long line of FTC challenges involving future competition, Roche Holding AG and Spark Therapeutics Inc were able to consummate a merger that had been subject to an extensive 10-month investigation into whether the merger would lessen potential competition in the US market for haemophilia A therapies. The FTC allowed the deal to proceed after determining that the evidence 'did not indicate that Roche would have the incentive to delay or terminate Spark's developmental effort for its hemophilia A gene therapy, or that the acquisition would affect Roche's incentives regarding [its haemophilia treatment drug] Hemlibra.'

Prior challenges involving future competition include the FTC's July 2018 settlement claiming Amneal Pharmaceuticals' acquisition of an equity stake in Impax Laboratories Inc would likely harm future competition in US markets for seven generic pharmaceutical products, which required divestitures and licensing arrangements. In January 2017, the FTC claimed Mallinckrodt plc harmed competition when its subsidiary Questcor Pharmaceuticals Inc acquired the US rights to Synacthen Depot, a potential competitor to Questcor's HP Acthar Gel product. Mallinckrodt agreed to grant a licence to develop Synacthen Depot to a licensee approved by the FTC and to pay a fine of US\$100 million. In March 2015, the FTC challenged Impax Laboratories Inc's US\$700 million acquisition of CorePharma LLC. To settle the FTC's charges that the acquisition would be anticompetitive, the parties agreed to divest CorePharma's generic pilocarpine tablet line (used to treat dry mouth) and its generic ursodiol tablet line (used to treat cirrhosis and gall bladder diseases). The FTC was concerned that the acquisition would reduce the number of future suppliers in these two drug markets. In November 2014, the FTC challenged Medtronic Inc's US\$42.9 billion acquisition of Covidien plc, alleging that the acquisition would be anticompetitive because both companies were developing drug-coated balloon catheters. At the time there was only one company supplying the product and Medtronic and Covidien were the only companies with products in clinical trials. Medtronic agreed to divest Covidien's drug-coated balloon catheter business to The Spectranetics Corporation.

Vertical concerns are less common, but a number of transactions have been subject to the consent decrees, which the agencies based on vertical theories (see, for example, the *Ticketmaster/Live Nation* acquisition, the *Comcast/NBC Universal* joint venture, and Google's acquisition of ITA Software).

Finally, conglomerate theories or 'portfolio effects' have not, as such, been a genuine source of concern to the antitrust agencies in recent times.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

The antitrust agencies can seek to enjoin only transactions that violate certain substantive antitrust statutes (section 7 of the Clayton Act, section 5 of the FTC Act, and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). While there has been some recent movement to incorporate non-competition factors in merger analysis, the agencies have often pointed out that they do not and cannot consider such factors in their merger reviews.

## Economic efficiencies

### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The Horizontal Merger Guidelines clarify how the antitrust agencies analyse and evaluate claims that mergers will result in efficiencies and lower prices. The FTC chairman was quoted in 1997 as saying that presentation of efficiencies from a merger 'won't change the result in a large number of cases, [rather they will have] the greatest impact in a transaction where the potential anticompetitive problem is modest and the efficiencies that would be created are great'.

The Guidelines' discussion of economic efficiencies can be summarised as follows:

- they explain the relevance of efficiencies in merger analysis;
- they indicate that the agencies will only consider those efficiencies that are 'merger-specific'; that is, efficiencies that could not be achieved by the parties in the absence of the merger;
- they make it clear the parties to a merger will have to substantiate any efficiency claims by 'reasonable means'. Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague or speculative; and
- they clarify the types of efficiencies that are more likely to be accepted by the agencies. For example, reductions in production costs that are achieved through a consolidation of underutilised manufacturing facilities are more likely to receive favourable consideration than are efficiencies relating to procurement, management or capital costs.

In sum, the Guidelines' discussion of efficiencies provides a useful clarification of the issue and makes explicit the actual practice of the agencies in recent years. The Guidelines do not necessarily, however, hold out the promise that merging parties are likely to encounter less vigorous merger enforcement in the United States as a result of presenting robust evidence of merger efficiencies. By way of example, in October 2016, the proposed merger between Penn State Hershey Medical Center and PinnacleHealth System was abandoned by the parties after a Circuit Court remanded the case, and directed the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction even though the parties presented 'considerable evidence' to show that the merger would produce pro-competitive effects.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The antitrust agencies have the power to subpoena documents and information in a merger investigation. In addition, the agencies have the authority to seek an injunction in federal court prohibiting completion of a proposed transaction. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may also bring an administrative proceeding to determine the legality of a merger or other transaction. The agencies do not have the authority to preliminarily enjoin a transaction themselves; but if a court preliminarily enjoins a transaction, both agencies may seek a permanent injunction from the court. In addition, the FTC may issue an order, following administrative trial, permanently enjoining the transaction. As a practical matter, however, parties usually abandon a transaction if a preliminary injunction is issued. Mergers and acquisitions can, under some circumstances, also be challenged by state attorneys general and private parties.

In May 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued to block the proposed acquisition of Dean Foods Company by Dairy Farmers of America Inc, alleging that the proposed acquisition threatened to lessen competition substantially in the market for fluid milk. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring the divestiture of three

fluid milk processing plants, which the parties agreed to undertake to consummate the transaction.

In March 2020, the DOJ sued to block the proposed merger of United Technologies Corporation and Raytheon Company, alleging that the proposed merger likely would substantially lessen competition in the markets for design, development, production, and sale of military airborne radios and military GPS systems. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring the parties to divest Raytheon's military airborne radios business and UTC's military GPS business to BAE Systems, Inc, or an alternate acquirer approved by the United States. The parties agreed to divest the businesses and consummated the transaction in April 2020.

In February 2020, the FTC issued an administrative complaint and authorised an action to block the proposed merger of Jefferson Health and Albert Einstein Healthcare Network, alleging that the proposed merger likely would substantially lessen competition for inpatient acute rehabilitation services in the Philadelphia area in the United States. The proposed transaction remains pending, and an administrative trial is scheduled to begin in September 2020.

In February 2020, the DOJ sued to block the proposed acquisition of the Plastics Division of DS Smith plc by Liqui-Box Inc, alleging that the proposed acquisition likely would substantially lessen competition for packaging products used to supply dairy, post-mix, smoothie and wine bag-in-boxes in the United States. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring Liqui-Box to divest all of DS Smith's bag-in-box product lines that overlap with product lines offered by Liqui-Box in the United States. The parties undertook the divestitures and closed the acquisition in February 2020.

In January 2020, the DOJ sued to block the proposed merger of ZF Friedrichshafen AG and WABCO Holdings Inc, alleging that the proposed merger likely would substantially lessen competition for steering gears used on large commercial vehicles in North America. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring the divestiture of WABCO's entire US steering systems business. Pursuant to the settlement, WABCO entered into an agreement to sell its steering technology business.

In November 2019, the FTC issued a final order upholding the administrative law judge's May 2019 decision that the consummated acquisition of FIH Group Holdings by Otto Bock resulted in anticompetitive harm in the microprocessor prosthetic knee market in the United States. The final order required that the merger be unwound.

In October 2019, the DOJ sued to block the proposed acquisition of International Dehydrated Foods LLC and American Dehydrated Foods LLC by Symrise AG, alleging that the proposed acquisition likely would substantially lessen competition for chicken-based food ingredients manufactured and sold to food manufacturers in the United States. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring Symrise to divest its manufacturing facility in Banks County, Georgia, to proceed with the proposed US\$900 million transaction.

In September 2019, the FTC issued an administrative complaint and authorised an action to block the proposed acquisition of Stewart Information Services by Fidelity National Financial, alleging that the proposed transaction likely would significantly reduce competition for title insurance sales. The parties decided to abandon the transaction.

In September 2019, the District Court entered a final order giving effect to the October 2018 settlement between the DOJ and CVS Health Corporation and Aetna Inc. The DOJ alleged that the proposed merger likely would substantially lessen competition between the parties for individual Medicare Part D prescription drug plans in 16 regions in the United States. The settlement required the parties to divest Aetna's Medicare Part D prescription drug plan business for individuals to proceed with the US\$69 billion merger.

In August 2019, the DOJ sued to block the proposed acquisition of Farelogix Inc by Sabre Corporation, alleging that the proposed acquisition likely would substantially lessen competition for airline booking services. The District Court denied the agency's request to block the merger, but the parties abandoned the transaction in May 2020 after the UK Competition & Markets Authority found the transaction unlawful under UK competition law.

In July 2019, the DOJ sued to block the proposed merger between Nexstar Media Group Inc and Tribune Media Company, alleging that the proposed transaction likely would substantially lessen competition in the sale of broadcast television spot advertising to advertisers interested in reaching viewers in several designated market areas. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring the parties to divest broadcast television stations in thirteen markets. Pursuant to the settlement, the parties divested certain stations and entered into a final judgment with the DOJ in February 2020.

In June 2019, the DOJ brought suits to block two proposed mergers. One suit alleged that the proposed merger between Quad/Graphics Inc and LSC Communications Inc would likely substantially lessen competition for magazine, catalogue and book-printing services, and resulted in the parties' decision to abandon the transaction. The other suit alleged that the proposed merger of Harris Corporation and L3 Technologies Inc likely would substantially lessen competition for US military-grade image intensifier tubes in the United States. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring the parties to divest Harris's night-vision business. Pursuant to the settlement, the parties announced a divestiture of Harris's night vision business and entered into a final judgment with the DOJ in October 2019.

In June 2019, the Eighth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction issued by a District Court in December 2017 to block the proposed acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic by Sanford Health. The FTC alleged that the proposed acquisition likely would significantly reduce competition for adult primary care physician services, pediatric services, obstetrics and gynaecology services, and general surgery physician services in the greater Bismarck and Mandan metropolitan area. The parties abandoned the transaction in July 2019.

In May 2019, the DOJ sued to block the proposed acquisition of Bemis Company Inc by Amcor Limited, alleging that the proposed acquisition likely would substantially lessen competition for three types of heat-seal, coated medical packaging products. The agency simultaneously filed a proposed settlement requiring Amcor to divest several manufacturing facilities and other assets. The parties divested such assets and entered into a final judgment with the DOJ in September 2019.

If the responsible agency believes that all relevant information has not been provided in the parties' filings or in the parties' response to a request for additional information, the applicable waiting period will not commence until all information has been provided. The FTC has recently challenged the sufficiency of an acquirer's responses to a second request (which led to a temporary settlement with the agency and, ultimately, abandonment of the transaction).

Failure to comply with any provision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the HSR Act) may result in a fine of up to US\$43,280 for each day (as adjusted) during which the person is in violation of the HSR Act. The agencies have imposed very substantial fines (up to US\$11 million) on parties for completing transactions without observing the requirements of the HSR Act. The agencies may also seek injunctive relief to prevent a violation of the HSR Act.

In addition, if a transaction has been completed in violation of the HSR Act and is believed to violate the antitrust laws, the agencies may seek to undo the transaction through an action in the district court. This would be more likely where the agency believes the acquisition also violated the substantive merger laws.

Finally, the antitrust agencies have jurisdiction to investigate and challenge transactions that fall below the HSR Act notification thresholds, even after they are consummated. They have challenged more than 30 such transactions since December 2008, in industries including pharmaceuticals, medical diagnostics, medical devices, chemical additives (oxidates), educational marketing databases, voting machines and food processing.

In January 2014, the DOJ filed suit against Heraeus Electro-Nite Co LLC (Heraeus), challenging its September 2012 acquisition of substantially all the assets of Midwest Instrument Company Inc (Minco) in a transaction that was not reportable under the HSR Act. Both Heraeus and Minco supplied sensors and instruments to measure and monitor the temperature and composition of molten steel. The complaint alleged that Heraeus engaged in the transaction to eliminate its closest competitor (with about a 35 per cent market share) after its market share had been reduced from approximately 85 per cent to approximately 60 per cent. The complaint further alleges that the acquisition eliminated the competition between the two parties, creating a near monopoly. The parties agreed to a settlement, and in the final judgment filed in April 2014, Heraeus was required to sell all the Minco assets to a divestiture buyer and take other actions designed to restore the competition that existed prior to the transaction.

In April 2013, the FTC filed a complaint against Graco Inc and a simultaneous consent decree based on two acquisitions Graco made of competitors in the 'fast set equipment' (FSE) market in 2005 and 2008 (neither deal required an HSR filing). In prior challenges to consummated mergers, the agencies usually required the divestiture of assets sufficient to replicate the competitor that was acquired. However, these options were not available in the Graco matter because the acquired companies had been fully integrated into Graco's operations, and separation was no longer possible. This prompted the FTC to adopt a settlement that incorporates some novel elements. In particular, Graco agreed to settle a private litigation it had brought against another competitor and license certain technology to that competitor. In addition, Graco is prohibited from retaliating against distributors that carry competing FSE products or from entering into exclusive contracts with its distributors or from offering to its distributors 'loyalty discounts' above certain levels.

In October 2012, the FTC filed a complaint and simultaneous consent order in *the matter of Magnesium Elektron North America Inc (MEL)*. The complaint alleged that MEL's non-reportable US\$15 million acquisition of Revere Graphics Worldwide Inc (Revere) in 2007 resulted in a merger-to-monopoly because the two companies had been the only two suppliers in the market for magnesium plates for photo engraving. The consent decree required MEL to divest the Revere photoengraving products acquired through the transaction.

## Remedies and conditions

### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

If the agency responsible for a given transaction determines that the transaction may harm competition in a relevant market, the parties and the agency may attempt to negotiate some modification to the transaction or settlement that resolves the competitive concerns expressed by the agency. The most common form of such a settlement is a consent order, pursuant to which the acquiring company agrees to divest a certain portion of its existing assets or a portion of the assets it will acquire.

In the context of certain acquisitions, the antitrust agencies have indicated that, before they enter into a consent order, the parties must identify an acceptable buyer for the businesses that are to be sold and must enter into a definitive divestiture agreement with such

a buyer (with the buyer being approved by the responsible agency). Furthermore, consent orders require that the divestiture be completed within a fixed period of time. If the divestiture is not completed within this period, a trustee can be appointed to complete the divestiture.

The Antitrust Division, in June 2011, released a revised version of the Antitrust Division's Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, which is intended to provide guidance to Antitrust Division staff in their work analysing proposed remedies for mergers, including structural (divestment) remedies, conduct (behavioural) remedies, and 'hybrid' or combination remedies. FTC's guidance on negotiating merger remedies is also available. The FTC studied its merger remedies from 2006 to 2012, and in January 2017 released its findings. The evaluation covered 50 FTC merger orders involving divestitures of ongoing businesses and limited packages of assets, in horizontal and vertical mergers. (See the FTC's Merger Remedies Report.)

In May 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a proposed final judgment with a District Court requiring Novelis Inc to divest Aleris Corporation's entire aluminium automotive body sheet operations in North America to proceed with the proposed acquisition. The final judgment followed the DOJ's March 2020 victory in its first-ever binding arbitration. The terms of the arbitration agreement between the government and the parties required Novelis to agree to divest Aleris's aluminium automotive body sheet operations in North America if the agency prevailed in arbitration.

In April 2020, the FTC entered into a consent order with Axon Enterprise Inc and Viewu LLC, requiring the parties to rescind the non-compete and non-solicitation provisions of their consummated acquisition. The agency alleged that the acquisition likely would substantially lessen competition for body-worn camera systems.

In November 2019, the DOJ settled with BB&T Corporation and SunTrust Banks Inc with respect to their proposed merger. The DOJ alleged that the proposed merger would have anticompetitive effects in the provision of banking products to consumers. The settlement required that the companies divest 28 branches across North Carolina, Virginia and Georgia.

In July 2019, the DOJ settled with T-Mobile and Sprint with respect to their proposed merger. The DOJ alleged that the proposed merger likely would substantially lessen competition for retail mobile wireless service. The settlement required a divestiture of Sprint's prepaid business and of certain spectrum assets to Dish Network Corp, and the provision of several cell sites and retail locations to Dish.

In May 2019, the FTC settled its charges that the proposed merger of Tronox Limited and National Titanium Dioxide Company likely would substantially lessen competition for chloride-process TiO<sub>2</sub> in North America. Under the terms of the settlement, the parties agreed to divest National Titanium Dioxide Company's North American TiO<sub>2</sub> assets within 30 days of the acquisition date.

The agencies have required divestitures in a number of other recent transactions, including the following: Fresenius Medical Care and NxStage Medical (April 2019, pharmaceutical products); Penn National Gaming and Pinnacle Entertainment (February 2019, gaming, lodging entertainment); Agilent Technologies and Varian Inc (October 2018, scientific products); and CRH plc and Ash Grove Cement Company (March 2018, building materials).

In June 2017, the DOJ entered into a consent decree with The Dow Chemical Company and El DuPont de Nemours & Co, requiring them to divest multiple crop protection and two petrochemical products to proceed with their proposed US\$130 billion merger. The DOJ claimed that the parties were two of only a handful of chemical companies that manufacture certain crop protection chemicals and that vigorous competition between them had benefited farmers through lower prices, more effective solutions and superior service, which would be lost if the merger was allowed to proceed.

In December 2017, the DOJ settled with CLARCOR Inc and Parker-Hannifin Corporation with respect to their merger, which was consummated in February 2017 after complying with the HSR filing and waiting period requirements. The DOJ alleged that prior to the merger the parties were the only suppliers of a certain aviation fuel filtration system and filter elements to US customers, with the only other manufacturer of such products being located in Germany. The settlement required that Parker-Hannifin divest this business.

Behavioural remedies may also be imposed, though they have been uncommon in practice. However, the imposition of such remedies, which are often uniquely tailored to the merger concerned and require detailed monitoring, has been on the rise where mergers may present vertical foreclosure issues.

In December 2018, the FTC settled its charges that Northrop Grumman's acquisition of Orbital ATK likely would provide Northrop with the ability and incentive to harm competition for missile contracts. Under the terms of the settlement, Northrop agreed to make its solid rocket motors and related services available on a non-discriminatory basis to all competitors for missile contracts and separate the operation of its SRM business from the rest of its operations with a firewall. The settlement also allows the Department of Defense to appoint a compliance officer to oversee Northrop's conduct related to the settlement.

In May 2018, the FTC settled its charges that a proposed merger between two companies providing air ambulance transport services in Hawaii was likely to lessen competition. Under the terms of the settlement, AMR Holdco agreed to sell the business in question and enter into a Monitor Agreement pursuant to which the parties' divestiture, asset maintenance and other obligations would be monitored.

In July 2013, the FTC challenged General Electric Company's US\$4.3 billion acquisition of the aviation business of Avio SpA, alleging that the acquisition gave GE the ability and incentive to disrupt the design and certification of an engine component designed by Avio for rival aircraft manufacturer Pratt & Whitney. GE and Pratt & Whitney were the only engine manufacturers for Airbus's A320neo aircraft and competed head-to-head for A320neo sales. Avio was the sole designer for the accessory gearbox (AGB) on the Pratt & Whitney engine for that Airbus aircraft. As a condition to the transaction, the FTC prohibited GE from interfering with Avio's design and development work on the AGB for the Pratt & Whitney engine, and from accessing Pratt & Whitney's proprietary information about the AGB that was shared with Avio.

In April 2011, the Antitrust Division allowed Google Inc's acquisition of ITA Software Inc to proceed on condition that Google continues to license and improve ITA's travel software product, which was used by airfare comparison and booking websites. Google's acquisition of ITA was considered to be its first step towards entering the online travel search market, and the Antitrust Division expressed concern that Google's ownership of ITA's software would give the former the incentive to foreclose competitors' access to ITA or significantly reduce the quality of the software available to them.

In January 2011, the Antitrust Division required that Comcast and General Electric's NBC Universal business (NBCU), as a condition of a joint venture between Comcast and NBCU, provide online video distributors (OVDs) with access to their video programming on terms comparable to those given to traditional multichannel video programming distributors. Conditions also included prohibitions on restrictive licensing practices, which serve to limit distribution of content to OVDs, and retaliation against any other content provider for providing programming to an OVD.

In January 2010, the Antitrust Division imposed, as a condition of the merger between Ticketmaster and Live Nation, which combined the country's primary ticketing service provider and largest concert promoter, certain 'anti-retaliation' restrictions, prohibiting the merged firm from retaliating against any concert venue owner that chooses



another firm's ticketing or promotional services. The conditions included allowing former Ticketmaster clients to retain a copy of ticketing data generated while they were Ticketmaster clients. The Antitrust Division also imposed a 'firewall' preventing the merged firm from using information obtained from its ticketing business in its promotions and artist management businesses. The Antitrust Division's settlement expired in January 2020, and in December 2019, the DOJ began the process of asking the court to clarify and extend by five-and-a-half years the final judgment entered in 2010. Despite the prohibitions in the 2010 final judgment, the DOJ claims that Live Nation repeatedly and over the course of several years engaged in conduct that violated the final judgment.

## 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

In fashioning an acceptable divestiture, the agencies' goals are to eliminate the competitive problems raised by the transaction, find a buyer that can effectively and rapidly 'step into the competitive shoes' of the divesting party, and ensure that the buyer has all the assets necessary to enable it to be an effective competitor. In this regard, the Federal Trade Commission has published a helpful guide to its divestiture process entitled 'Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions' and a Statement of the Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies. The Department of Justice has also issued its Policy Guide to Merger Remedies.

In April 2018, the FTC settled its charges that the proposed merger between Red Ventures and Bankrate would harm competition in the market for third-party paid referral services for senior living facilities. Under the terms of the settlement, the parties agreed to divest Caring.com no later than six months after the acquisition and provided transition services to an FTC-approved buyer.

## 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The range of remedies are the same for domestic and foreign transactions. In most transactions, remedies involve the divestiture of certain assets, a business line or intellectual property (or a combination thereof) of one of the parties that overlaps in the geographic or product market of the other party. Sometimes, one party is required to license certain intellectual property to a third-party competitor (or potential competitor). The agencies do not discriminate between foreign-to-foreign mergers and those involving domestic undertakings when imposing remedies, so long as the requisite anticompetitive effect in the United States is found.

### Ancillary restrictions

## 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The HSR review process does not result in affirmative 'clearance' or 'approval' of a transaction or any ancillary arrangements. Instead, if the agencies decide not to challenge a transaction, the applicable waiting period expires and the parties are free to close the transaction. The agencies retain the legal right to challenge the transaction or any ancillary arrangements in the future, although, as a practical matter, this is not very likely.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

## 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Complainants (customers, competitors or others) have no formal rights to participate in the Hart-Scott-Rodino process. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, the agencies are very likely to contact a broad group of interested parties if a transaction presents possible competitive issues. The agencies often rely on information provided by such parties (particularly from customers) in deciding whether to challenge a particular transaction. Both agencies' procedures, however, provide for third-party participation before a settlement is made final: at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) there is a period for public comment, and the Department of Justice must follow the procedures of the Tunney Act providing notice and an opportunity to file views. Under certain limited circumstances, private individuals, as well as foreign and state governments, may sue in federal court for damages or injunctive relief based on violations of the Clayton Act or the Sherman Act.

### Publicity and confidentiality

## 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, the information contained in the Form, as well as the fact that the Form has been filed, is confidential and may be disclosed only to Congress or pursuant to an administrative or judicial proceeding. The same is true of information submitted in response to a second request.

However, if early termination is requested and granted, notice of the fact of early termination will be published in the Federal Register and on the website of the FTC. In addition, if the responsible agency interviews third parties in connection with the transaction, the practical impact may be to make public the existence of the transaction.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

## 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

The United States' efforts to cooperate with other antitrust authorities during merger investigations continue to increase. The United States has entered into various cooperation agreements with jurisdictions such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Peru and the European Union that allow competition authorities to share certain information relating to antitrust investigations. Cooperation can also occur without an agreement. International enforcement efforts may be further assisted by the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (IAEAA), which authorises the Antitrust Division and FTC to enter into written agreements with foreign antitrust enforcement authorities to exchange otherwise confidential investigative information in situations where such exchange is in the public interest. The IAEAA also authorises the domestic enforcement agencies to collect evidence in the United States on behalf of foreign antitrust authorities. The United States is party to an antitrust-specific mutual legal assistance agreement with Australia, authorised by the IAEAA.

In addition, the United States has entered into memoranda of understanding with Russia, China, India and Korea to facilitate exchange of policy developments and best practices and provides for cooperation on competition law enforcement matters as appropriate.

When dealing with merger reviews with international dimensions, parties or third parties may provide the agencies with waivers

of confidentiality to enable cooperating agencies to discuss confidential information and analyses. In September 2013, the antitrust agencies issued a model waiver of confidentiality for parties and third parties to use in transactions involving concurrent review by non-US competition authorities and a set of frequently asked questions to accompany the model waiver.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

If the agency responsible for reviewing a transaction determines that the transaction would violate the US antitrust laws, and if an acceptable consent arrangement cannot be negotiated, the agency may apply to a federal court for a preliminary injunction blocking the acquisition. The agencies are not required, however, to seek preliminary relief. Failure to seek such relief does not preclude the agency's challenge at a later time.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the agency has to persuade a court that it has a 'probability of success on the merits' of its anti-trust claims. The merits will be adjudicated in a subsequent trial before the court or in an Federal Trade Commission (FTC) administrative proceeding. The preliminary injunction action may be essentially a 'mini-trial', during which the agency and the parties submit evidence to the court on the antitrust issues. In some instances, the trial on the merits and the preliminary injunction motion have been combined in an action for a permanent injunction.

If the responsible agency obtains an injunction from the district court prohibiting the transaction, the parties may appeal to the court of appeals for the circuit in which the district court is located. If the court of appeals denies the appeal, the parties may petition the Supreme Court to hear the case. It is rare for the Supreme Court to accept such an appeal.

In March 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prevailed in a first-of-a-kind arbitration, which resolves the civil antitrust lawsuit filed by the DOJ in September 2019 challenging Novelis Inc's proposed merger with Aleris Corporation. Prior to filing the complaint, the Antitrust Division reached an agreement with defendants to refer the matter to binding arbitration if the parties were unable to resolve the United States' competitive concerns with the defendants' transaction within a certain period of time. Fact discovery proceeded under the supervision of the district court. Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, following the close of fact discovery, the matter was referred to binding arbitration to resolve the issue of product market definition. A 10-day arbitration hearing was conducted, and as a result of the arbitration, Novelis was required to divest Aleris's entire aluminium auto body sheet operations in North America.

In June 2018, the US District Court, despite objections from the DOJ, ruled that AT&T could acquire Time Warner without any conditions, in a decision emphasising that vertical integration is often procompetitive and lawful. The case was the first time in 40 years that a court heard a fully litigated challenge to a merger proposing to combine companies at different links in the same supply chain. The DOJ argued that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the video programming and distribution market by enabling AT&T to use Time Warner's 'must-have' television content to raise its rivals' video programming costs, therefore harming consumers with increased prices. However, the judge ruled that the government failed to prove that the transaction would violate the antitrust laws.

In March 2017, the FTC sued to block the merger of Advocate Health Care Network and NorthShore University HealthSystem, alleging that the combination would create the largest hospital system in the North Shore area of Chicago. The FTC alleged that the combined entity

would control more than 50 per cent of the general acute care inpatient hospital services in the area. While the District Court denied the FTC's initial request for a preliminary injunction, the Seventh Circuit reversed, and after further proceedings, the District Court granted an injunction and the parties abandoned the merger.

In 2014, the Sixth Circuit reviewed and upheld an FTC hospital merger decision and order, which challenged ProMedica Health System's (ProMedica) acquisition of rival St Luke's in 2010 (the parties are two hospital providers in Toledo, Ohio). In January 2011, the FTC challenged the transaction arguing that it was anticompetitive and would raise prices for consumers and ordered a divestiture of St Luke's. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the FTC's analysis and upheld its decision and order. In 2015, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

### Time frame

#### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The usual time frame for a resolution of an agency's application for an injunction to block an acquisition is approximately three to six months. An appeal to a court of appeals of an injunction blocking the transaction may be heard within a few months of the grant of that injunction. As noted above, it is rare for the Supreme Court to accept an appeal of a court of appeals decision.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The agencies have been active in their enforcement of the merger laws in recent years. Numerous transactions have resulted in divestiture agreements or court challenges. In addition, the agencies have become more active in making informal enquiries to the parties for further information during the initial Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the HSR Act) waiting period. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice provide annual reports on their enforcement actions, which are available online.

The agencies have required divestitures or other conditions, or both, through settlements, in a number of cases in recent years involving technology and information databases, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and clinics, telecommunications services, energy, media, supermarkets, agriculture, and scientific research and measurement devices. It appears that technology, telecommunications and media, and products and services related to the healthcare industry will, in particular, continue to be enforcement priorities.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The most recent significant amendments to the HSR Rules were in 2005 when the FTC amended the rules regarding the application of the HSR Act to non-corporate entities (partnerships, LLCs, etc). Dollar thresholds in the HSR Act and the Rules are adjusted annually to reflect changes in the GNP. In July 2011, the FTC released significant amendments to the Form, which streamline several items within the Form. The FTC more recently finalised some additional changes to the HSR Rules, the most significant of which would apply to licensing transactions in the pharmaceutical industry. Refer to the FTC's website to confirm the currently applicable thresholds and for notice of any potential changes to rules.

In 2013, the FTC formally adopted a change to its pre-merger rules that essentially codified the existing informal practice of withdrawing



and refiling HSR notifications. The purpose of a 'pull and refile' is to effectively restart the initial 30-calendar-day waiting period and allow the agencies additional time to complete a review of a transaction without being forced to issue a second request to obtain additional time. The new rule specifies that an acquirer can withdraw and refile a notification within the second business day of withdrawal without paying a new filing fee. While an acquirer can withdraw and refile multiple times, the proposals make clear that an acquirer can refile without paying a new fee only once.

In June 2016, the FTC announced an increase in the maximum civil penalties it may impose for violations of the HSR Act. The maximum civil penalty for HSR violations increased from a daily fine of US\$16,000, to a much larger fine of US\$40,000 per day, which was adjusted to US\$43,280 in January 2020. These higher maximum civil fines apply to violations that predate the effective date. The agencies annually adjust for inflation their maximum civil penalty threshold every January.

As of 2016, rule changes allow for HSR filings to be submitted on DVD (but see below regarding procedures during the covid-19 pandemic). The notification form and instructions were also updated in September 2016 and July 2018, and in September 2019 the FTC further amended the rules and the HSR notification form and filing instructions to incorporate the new 10-digit North American Product Classification System (NAPCS) codes introduced by the Census Bureau. Mandatory reporting of NAPCS codes began on 25 September 2019.

Owing to the covid-19 pandemic, beginning 17 March 2020, the FTC implemented a temporary e-filing system for submission of HSR filings. Guidance for filings during the pandemic can be found on the FTC website.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil antitrust lawsuit challenging the merger between T-Mobile and Sprint in July 2019, along with a proposed settlement that would resolve the Department's competitive concerns. The attorneys general for the states of Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas each joined in the DOJ's proposed settlement. Separately, the request of New York, California and a minority group of states to enjoin the proposed transaction nationwide was denied. The FCC also approved the transaction, with certain commitments as a condition of approval. Under the terms of the settlement, T-Mobile and Sprint had to agree to divest a number of businesses, brands, spectrum and other assets. T-Mobile was also required to provide Dish Network Corp with robust access to the T-Mobile network for seven years while Dish transitions the business and builds out its 5G network.

On 10 October 2018, the DOJ, along with the offices of five state attorneys general, filed a civil antitrust lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the proposed transaction between CVS Health Corporation and Aetna Inc. At the same time, the DOJ and plaintiff states filed a proposed settlement, which the Court entered in September 2019. The settlement required the parties to divest Aetna's Medicare Part D prescription drug plan (PDP) business for individuals to proceed with their US\$69 billion merger.

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# Vietnam

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## LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION

### Relevant legislation and regulators

#### 1 | What is the relevant legislation and who enforces it?

The most important legislation regulating merger control is the Competition Law effective as of 1 July 2019 (the 2018 Competition Law). The 2018 Competition Law replaced the law that was effective between July 2005 and June 2019 (the 2004 Competition Law).

Two decrees implement the 2018 Competition Law:

- Decree 75 sets out administrative penalties for violations. Decree 75 became effective on 1 December 2019; and
- Decree 35, effective from 15 May 2020, sets out guidance on key aspects of an economic concentration, including the definition of control, filing thresholds and standards for assessing the competitive impact of a transaction.

The government will soon issue a third decree to set up a new competition law authority, namely the National Competition Commission (NCC). The NCC will replace and take over the functions of the two former authorities, namely the Vietnam Competition and Consumers Protection Authority (which is empowered to review and make decisions on the clearance of economic concentrations and to investigate alleged violations of competition laws) and the Vietnam Competition Council (which is empowered to hear and make decisions on cases investigated by the Vietnam Competition and Consumers Protection Authority). As used herein, VCA means the competent competition authority of Vietnam.

### Scope of legislation

#### 2 | What kinds of mergers are caught?

The 2018 Competition Law regulates economic concentrations in the following forms:

- mergers of enterprises (defined as the transfer by one or more enterprises of all its lawful assets, rights, obligations and interests to another enterprise and, at the same time, the termination of the business activities or the existence of the merging enterprises);
- consolidation of enterprises (defined as the transfer by two or more enterprises of all their lawful assets, rights, obligations and interests to form one new enterprise and, at the same time, the termination of the business activities or the existence of the consolidating enterprises);
- acquisition by an enterprise of shares or ownership interests or assets of another enterprise (defined as the purchase by one enterprise of all or part of the capital contribution or assets of another enterprise sufficient to control or govern the acquired enterprise or any of its trades or business lines); and

- joint venture between enterprises (defined as two or more enterprises together contributing a portion of their lawful assets, rights, obligations and interests to form a new enterprise).

The 2018 Competition Law contains a catch-all provision covering 'other forms of economic concentration in accordance with laws'. There is no further guidance on this. However, as an enterprise is defined to include foreign companies operating in Vietnam, it is possible that an economic concentration may arise on the basis of a business cooperation contract between independent enterprises without creating a new entity.

#### 3 | What types of joint ventures are caught?

The definition of a joint venture under the 2018 Competition Law broadly covers all types of joint ventures between two or more enterprises (including 'greenfield' joint ventures). Unfortunately, the law is silent on important questions, such as whether:

- there needs to be joint control;
- the joint venture should be full-function, including whether it:
  - needs to be autonomous in terms of operation; or
  - is established on a lasting basis; and
- the joint venture needs to operate in the same relevant market as either of the parties.

#### 4 | Is there a definition of 'control' and are minority and other interests less than control caught?

There is a definition of 'control' in the context of acquisition transactions only. An acquirer will be deemed to have control over the target company or a business line of the target company if it:

- acquires more than 50 per cent of the charter capital or the voting shares of the target;
- acquires the right to own or use more than 50 per cent of the assets of the entire business or one business line of the target; or
- has the right to make decisions regarding any of the following in respect of the target:
  - (either direct or indirect) appointment or removal of a majority of or all the directors, the chair of the members council, or the CEO or general director;
  - amendment of the charter; or
  - important business activities, those being the organisation of the business operation, business lines, the geographic scope of the operations, the mode of doing business, adjustment of the scope of the business and the business lines and the forms and methods of raising, allocating and utilising capital.

The law is unclear on whether the minority protection rights of a shareholder would constitute 'control'. As Decree 35 is relatively new, there are no precedents or guidance available yet.

**Thresholds, triggers and approvals**

**5** | What are the jurisdictional thresholds for notification and are there circumstances in which transactions falling below these thresholds may be investigated?

An economic concentration will be notifiable if it exceeds one of four thresholds (based on the fiscal year preceding the transaction):

- 1 the combined market share of the parties;
- 2 the cash value of the transaction (applicable to onshore transactions only);
- 3 the total assets of one of the parties (or, arguably, the total assets of all the parties combined) (on a group-wide basis) in Vietnam; or
- 4 the total turnover of one of the parties (or, arguably, the total turnover of all the parties combined) (on a group-wide basis) in Vietnam.

The applicable thresholds are set out in the table below.

Sectors	Turnover	Assets	Transaction value	Combined market shares
Insurance	10 trillion Vietnamese dong	15 trillion Vietnamese dong	3 trillion Vietnamese dong	20% or more in the relevant market in Vietnam
Securities	3 trillion Vietnamese dong	15 trillion Vietnamese dong	3 trillion Vietnamese dong	20% or more in the relevant market in Vietnam
Credit institutions	20% or more of the total turnover of credit institutions in Vietnam	20% or more of the total assets of credit institutions in Vietnam	20% or more of the total charter capital of credit institutions in Vietnam	20% or more in the relevant market in Vietnam
All other sectors	3 trillion Vietnamese dong	3 trillion Vietnamese dong	1 trillion Vietnamese dong	20% or more in the relevant market in Vietnam

The turnover and assets thresholds mentioned in (3) and (4) refer to a 'group company', which is defined under Decree 35 as 'a group of enterprises which are under common control by one or more of the enterprises in the group or which are under the common management'.

The law is silent with regard to whether only the market shares of the direct parties to the transaction (as opposed to the market shares calculated on a group-wide basis) would be taken into account when it comes to determining whether the market share threshold test has been met. However, in precedent filings under the 2004 Competition Law, the competent competition authority (VCA) took into account the market share on a group-wide basis, and the same approach may be expected to continue to apply.

The law is not clear on whether the turnover and assets thresholds will apply to each party to the economic concentration or on a combined basis of all the parties participating in the economic concentration. A prudent interpretation would be taken into account both scenarios.

The VCA may launch an investigation into a transaction that does not meet the filing thresholds if it receives a complaint, or there are signs that the transaction (despite not being notifiable) has the effect of significantly restraining competition within three years of the closing date of the transaction.

**6** | Is the filing mandatory or voluntary? If mandatory, do any exceptions exist?

The filing is mandatory if a transaction (regardless of whether it is onshore or offshore) constitutes an economic concentration, and it meets one of the applicable filing thresholds. The law contains no exception.

However, article 1 of the 2018 Competition Law states that the law regulates 'economic concentrations that affect or are likely to affect a restraint of competition in the Vietnamese market'. One potential interpretation is, therefore, that an economic concentration transaction that does not affect and is not likely to affect competition in the market in Vietnam would not be covered by the 2018 Competition Law. Assessment of whether there is an effect or a likely effect on the Vietnamese market would need to be done on a case-by-case basis.

**7** | Do foreign-to-foreign mergers have to be notified and is there a local effects or nexus test?

Foreign-to-foreign mergers must be notified in Vietnam if the relevant conditions are met.

**8** | Are there also rules on foreign investment, special sectors or other relevant approvals?

Yes, in respect of onshore transactions. Foreign investors must obtain approval from the Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) of the province where the target company is located when investing in Vietnam if the relevant conditions are met. For instance, foreign investors must obtain an investment registration certificate (which technically serves as permission for the investment in Vietnam) before applying for an enterprise registration certificate to incorporate a new joint venture company in Vietnam.

In addition, for a foreign investor to acquire a majority stake in a Vietnamese company, it must take steps to register its intention and obtain approval for the acquisition from the DPI.

The licensing authorities have broad discretion in reviewing the applications. In practice, the authorities may take into account certain national security interests, public interests or domestic market protection measures during the licensing process, especially in sensitive sectors, such as oil and gas, infrastructure and energy, banking and financial services.

In addition, there are foreign ownership shareholding caps in various investment sectors in Vietnam.

**NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE TIMETABLE**

**Filing formalities**

**9** | What are the deadlines for filing? Are there sanctions for not filing and are they applied in practice?

If an economic concentration is notifiable, the parties must make the filing before the consummation of the transaction. In practice, the competent competition authority (VCA) tends to accept that the deadline for the parties to make the filing is before the completion of their proposed transaction (rather than the signing of the transaction agreements).

If the parties fail to make the filing, they may each be exposed to an administrative fine of up to 5 per cent of the total turnover of each party (but not the turnover of its group companies) in the relevant market in Vietnam in the fiscal year prior to the year of the closing of the transaction. Depending on the specific violations, the parties may also be exposed to additional administrative sanctions, such as the confiscation of proceeds from the breach of the competition law and revocation of the relevant certificate or licence of the parties.

## 10 Which parties are responsible for filing and are filing fees required?

It is the responsibility of all the parties participating in the economic concentration to make the filing. All the parties must complete the notification form and are liable for the truthfulness and accuracy of the information and documents submitted.

There are no filing fees.

## 11 What are the waiting periods and does implementation of the transaction have to be suspended prior to clearance?

Where a notification is required, the parties must wait for a clearance to be issued before closing or implementing the transaction.

The VCA will carry out the review of a filing in three stages.

- Checking the completeness of the documents: seven business days after the receipt of a filing, the VCA will issue a written confirmation on the completeness of the file. If the file is incomplete, the VCA will issue a written request for the parties to supplement the relevant documents and information within 30 days from the date of the request. If the parties cannot supplement the required documents within this 30-day period, the file will be returned to the parties.
- Preliminary review: the VCA will carry out the preliminary review of the file within 30 days from the date that the VCA issues a written confirmation on the completeness of the file. After this 30-day period, the VCA will issue a clearance decision or a written decision that the transaction is subject to an official review. If the VCA does not respond during this 30-day period, the parties are allowed to implement the transaction.
- Official review: the official review of the file will take up to 90 days from the date the VCA issues a written decision that the file is subject to an official review, which may be extended for an additional 60 days in complex cases, as determined by the VCA.

### Pre-clearance closing

## 12 What are the possible sanctions involved in closing or integrating the activities of the merging businesses before clearance and are they applied in practice?

If the parties implement a notifiable transaction before obtaining clearance, they are liable to an administrative fine from 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent of the total turnover of each party (but not at the group level) in the relevant market in Vietnam in the fiscal year preceding the year of the violation.

There is no reported case in which the VCA has applied a sanction on any such gun-jumping conduct.

## 13 Are sanctions applied in cases involving closing before clearance in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

If the parties implement a foreign-to-foreign notifiable transaction before obtaining clearance, they are liable to an administrative fine from 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent of the total turnover of each party (but not at the group level) in the relevant market in Vietnam in the fiscal year preceding the year of the violation.

## 14 What solutions might be acceptable to permit closing before clearance in a foreign-to-foreign merger?

The parties might consider lodging a written consultation letter to the VCA for permission to close pending clearance. The VCA will have discretion to decide whether to grant permission.

### Public takeovers

## 15 Are there any special merger control rules applicable to public takeover bids?

No.

### Documentation

## 16 What is the level of detail required in the preparation of a filing, and are there sanctions for supplying wrong or missing information?

The parties must submit the following documents, among other things, in a filing:

- a prescribed form describing the proposed transaction and the details of the parties;
- a draft economic concentration agreement or term sheet, a memorandum of understanding or a draft summary of the terms of the proposed transaction;
- copies of the incorporation certificates or equivalent documents of each party;
- audited financial statements of each party for the two consecutive fiscal years preceding the economic concentration;
- a list of the affiliates of each party;
- a list of the products and services provided by each party;
- the market share data or a report of each party for the two consecutive years preceding the economic concentration;
- a plan for addressing any possible restraint of competition as a result of the economic concentration; and
- a report on the assessment of the positive impact of the economic concentration.

The authority may request additional documents and information. Submission of inaccurate information may expose the parties to an administrative fine of up to 50 million Vietnamese dong.

### Investigation phases and timetable

## 17 What are the typical steps and different phases of the investigation?

The VCA will carry out a three-stage review of the filing that includes:

- the checking of the completeness of the filing documents within seven business days after the receipt of a filing;
- preliminary review of the file within 30 days from the date the VCA issues a written confirmation on the completeness of the file; and
- if the transaction does not pass the test in the preliminary review, the official review, which may take up to 150 days.

There is no requirement for pre-notification consultation. However, in practice, where there are strong grounds for the parties to believe that their transaction has no impact on the Vietnamese market, the parties may consider submitting a consultation letter to the VCA seeking an opinion regarding notification. There is, however, no guarantee that the VCA would respond to the consultation letter or that the response would be obtained in a timely manner. The parties will only proceed with the official filing if the VCA so requires in responding to the consultation letter.

## 18 What is the statutory timetable for clearance? Can it be speeded up?

The statutory timetable for the three-stage review is up to 180 days, plus seven working days from the date the parties submit the filing to the VCA until the issuance of the clearance decision.

The statutory timetable may be shortened if the parties provide detailed information or documents of the proposed transaction to the VCA and quickly respond to the VCA's inquiries.

Besides the required documents for the filing, the parties should consider submitting any clearance decisions issued by the competent competition authorities in other jurisdictions (eg, the European Union, Japan and the United Kingdom) for the VCA's consideration to speed up the process.

In practice, it often takes up to six months for the VCA to review and make a decision on a transaction.

## SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT

### Substantive test

#### 19 | What is the substantive test for clearance?

Under the 2018 Competition Law, an economic concentration is prohibited if it causes or is likely to cause a significant restraint of competition in the Vietnamese market. To assess this, the competent competition authority (VCA) will consider the following matters:

- the combined market share of the parties before and after the economic concentration;
- the extent of the concentration in the relevant market before and after the concentration, which is assessed to determine the danger of creating or strengthening the market power of the enterprises involved and the ability to increase coordination between the enterprises in the relevant market;
- the relationship of the parties in the chain of production, distribution and supply of a specific type of good or service, which is assessed to determine the ability of the parties after the economic concentration to create superior competitive advantages as compared to other competitors, aimed at preventing or excluding competition from accessing the market;
- overall consideration of the competitive advantage brought about by the economic concentration in the relevant market, based on advantages regarding the product characteristics, the production and distribution chains, financial capacity, the brand name, technology, intellectual property rights and other advantages of the enterprise after the economic concentration;
- the ability of the enterprise to increase prices or profit margins after the economic concentration;
- the ability of the enterprise after the economic concentration to exclude or prevent other enterprises from accessing or expanding the market; and
- other specific factors in the relevant industry or sector that directly influence or significantly change the results of the assessment of the materiality of the restraint on competition of the relevant economic concentration.

In its preliminary review, the VCA will issue a clearance for the transaction in one of the following cases:

- the combined market share of the parties proposing to participate in the economic concentration is less than 20 per cent in the relevant market;
- the combined market share of the parties proposing to participate in the economic concentration is 20 per cent or more in the relevant market, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the enterprises competing in the market post-economic concentration is less than 1,800;
- the combined market share of the parties participating in the economic concentration is 20 per cent or more in the relevant market, the HHI in the market post-economic concentration is above 1,800, and the increase in HHI is less than 100 points; or

- the market share of the parties participating in the economic concentration that have a relationship with each other in the chain of production, distribution and supply of a specified type of good or of which the business lines provide mutual inputs or provide ancillary support to each other is less than 20 per cent in each relevant market.

#### 20 | Is there a special substantive test for joint ventures?

No.

### Theories of harm

#### 21 | What are the 'theories of harm' that the authorities will investigate?

There is as yet no jurisprudence on this.

### Non-competition issues

#### 22 | To what extent are non-competition issues relevant in the review process?

There is no indication in the law or guidance of any non-competition issues that must be considered in the review process; however, the authority may consider those issues in sectors where the government has a policy of protection of the domestic market (or state companies in it) or there are concerns about national security or public interest.

### Economic efficiencies

#### 23 | To what extent does the authority take into account economic efficiencies in the review process?

The 2018 Competition Law explicitly permits the VCA to consider the economic efficiencies of a transaction when reviewing a filing. In doing so, the VCA will look into the positive impact of the transaction on:

- the development of the relevant industry or sector;
- the development of science and technology;
- the promotion of the development of small and medium-sized enterprises; and
- the competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises in the international market.

However, the law is silent on the extent to which the economic efficiencies would affect the final decision of the VCA on an economic concentration.

## REMEDIES AND ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

### Regulatory powers

#### 24 | What powers do the authorities have to prohibit or otherwise interfere with a transaction?

The competent competition authority (VCA) has the power either (1) to prohibit the transaction or (2) to approve it subject to conditions.

If the parties fail to comply with the decision of the VCA in (1), each party participating in the economic concentration may be exposed to an administrative fine of between 1 per cent and 5 per cent of its total revenue in the relevant market in Vietnam in the preceding fiscal year, as well as other sanctions (including the forced unwinding of the transaction or monitoring by the competent state authorities for a certain period in respect of sale and purchase prices or other aspects of the economic concentration).

If the parties do not fully comply with the conditions set out in the conditional clearance in (2), they may each be exposed to an

administrative fine of between 1 per cent and 3 per cent of its total revenue in Vietnam in the preceding fiscal year in the relevant market.

### Remedies and conditions

#### 25 | Is it possible to remedy competition issues, for example by giving divestment undertakings or behavioural remedies?

Yes. The VCA can issue a conditional clearance. It may impose the following conditions:

- division, separation or divestment of part of the equity interest or assets of the parties;
- monitoring of the purchase or selling price of goods, services or other transaction conditions in contracts signed by the relevant parties after the economic concentration;
- other measures to minimise the restraint on competition in the market; and
- other measures for enhancing the positive impact of the economic concentration.

#### 26 | What are the basic conditions and timing issues applicable to a divestment or other remedy?

The divestment or other remedies are new provisions introduced under the 2018 Competition Law. There is no detailed guidance or precedent in practice. As such, it would be dictated by the authority on a case-by-case basis when it grants the conditional clearance.

#### 27 | What is the track record of the authority in requiring remedies in foreign-to-foreign mergers?

The relevant provisions entered into force in July 2019, and there have not yet been any relevant decisions.

### Ancillary restrictions

#### 28 | In what circumstances will the clearance decision cover related arrangements (ancillary restrictions)?

The law is silent on this question. As such, it would be dictated by the authority on a case-by-case basis when it grants the clearance.

## INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES OR AUTHORITIES

### Third-party involvement and rights

#### 29 | Are customers and competitors involved in the review process and what rights do complainants have?

Yes, the competent competition authority (VCA) can seek the views of any enterprise or individual (eg, customers and competitors) about the proposed economic concentration to assist with its review of the transaction.

In addition, any concerned person (eg, customers and competitors) may lodge a complaint to the VCA if it thinks that its lawful rights and interests have been infringed as a result of a breach of the provisions of the 2018 Competition Law. The complaint must be made in writing using a prescribed form issued by the VCA, and it must be submitted together with supporting evidence.

The VCA will then consider the complaint to decide whether to investigate the case or not.

### Publicity and confidentiality

#### 30 | What publicity is given to the process and how do you protect commercial information, including business secrets, from disclosure?

The VCA must publish its clearance decisions (although, in practice, this has not always been respected by the VCA) and it may redact the confidential information (if any) before the publication. There is no prescribed form for the clearance decision. In practice, the decision normally states the names of the parties, a basic description of the transaction and the conclusion of the VCA.

The VCA also has a right to annually publish its activities on its website, and it may describe some of the notified economic concentrations in its annual report (eg, a brief description of the transaction as set out in the notification form and the decision of the VCA).

Despite the right to publish information, the VCA has an obligation to keep confidential the information and documents provided by the relevant parties and individuals in accordance with the law.

The parties are recommended to expressly state in the notification form which information is confidential and should not be disclosed to any third party or the public without prior consent.

### Cross-border regulatory cooperation

#### 31 | Do the authorities cooperate with antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions?

Under the 2018 Competition Law, the VCA will coordinate with the relevant antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions in respect of the legal proceedings to promptly discover, investigate and deal with any practice showing signs of breach of competition law. The scope of coordination in competition legal proceedings includes consultation, exchange of information, documents or other appropriate activities of international cooperation in accordance with Vietnamese laws and international treaties of which Vietnam is a member.

In practice, the VCA, has taken into account the view of competition authorities in established jurisdictions (such as the European Union) when it deemed it to be appropriate.

## JUDICIAL REVIEW

### Available avenues

#### 32 | What are the opportunities for appeal or judicial review?

If one of the parties to an economic concentration or a third party disagrees with a decision of the competent competition authority (VCA) on the filing of the economic concentration (the VCA decision) and has grounds to believe that the VCA decision is unlawful or directly infringes its rights and lawful interests, the person (complainant) will be entitled to file a complaint (the first complaint) to the head of the VCA within 90 days of receiving, knowing or being informed of the VCA decision.

If the complainant does not agree with the decision of the head of the VCA on the first complaint, it can file a second complaint to the Ministry of Industry and Trade within 30 days of the date of receipt of the first complaint (extendable to 45 days, applicable to remote areas with difficult travel conditions).

Alternatively, at any time within one year of the receipt of the VCA decision and regardless of whether the complainant has made the above-mentioned complaints to the head of the VCA or the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the complainant may initiate an administrative lawsuit before a competent court in Vietnam to request the judicial review and nullification of the VCA decision. In that case, any pending review process by the head of the VCA or the Ministry of Industry and Trade will be suspended.



## Time frame

### 33 | What is the usual time frame for appeal or judicial review?

The head of VCA must review the first complaint and issue its decision within 30 days of the date of its receipt (extendable to 45 days in complex cases and to 60 days in complex cases in remote areas with difficult travel conditions).

The Ministry of Industry and Trade must issue its decision on the second complaint within 45 days of its receipt (extendable to 60 days in complex cases and up to 70 days in complex cases in remote areas with difficult travel conditions).

An administrative lawsuit can be tried before a trial court or an appellate court as well as through cassation procedures. The time frame of the proceedings will depend on the complexity of the case.

## ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

### Enforcement record

#### 34 | What is the recent enforcement record and what are the current enforcement concerns of the authorities?

The enforcement of the merger control regime has been very limited, although our expectation is that enforcement activity will increase over time.

According to the annual reports of the competent competition authority (VCA) and its reports on economic concentration, 42 transactions were notified to the VCA between the effective date of the 2004 Competition Law (ie, 1 July 2005) and the end of 2019. Most of these transactions were between foreign-invested companies incorporated in Vietnam or between foreign companies. There were at least three major offshore transactions reported where all the relevant parties were foreign entities.

Apart from the *Grab/Uber* transaction, we are not aware of any case where the VCA has blocked any transaction or has imposed any administrative fines on any party for failure to do the filing.

### Reform proposals

#### 35 | Are there current proposals to change the legislation?

The 2018 Competition Law has been in effect since 1 July 2019. The government is still drafting implementing regulations.

## UPDATE AND TRENDS

### Key developments of the past year

#### 36 | What were the key cases, decisions, judgments and policy and legislative developments of the past year?

The most significant change introduced in the new merger control regime is that it has moved away from a simple market share test and applies a broader economic assessment of the market power of the parties and the competitive impact of the transaction.

A notable case recently handled by the competent competition authority (VCA) was the investigation (under the former 2004 Competition Law) of the transaction between Grab and Uber in 2019. The VCA concluded that the transaction failed to make the filing required by law and that the transaction itself exceeded the prohibited market share threshold. In particular, the VCA opined that the transaction was an economic concentration because Grab acquired the entirety of the assets of Uber Vietnam and, therefore, had control over all the business activities of Uber in Vietnam. The VCA identified the relevant markets of Grab and Uber in Vietnam as the market providing intermediary services connecting passengers and drivers of cars under nine



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seats on a software and switchboard basis in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Accordingly, the combined market shares of Grab and Uber (for the fiscal year 2017) in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were 44.1 per cent and 82.68 per cent respectively. As a result, according to the VCA, the transaction between Grab and Uber should be prohibited under the 2004 Competition Law as the combined market share of the parties exceeded 50 per cent in the relevant market.

This case was then transferred to the Vietnam Competition Council (VCC) for hearing. The VCC in its decision dated 11 June 2019 did not agree with the conclusion of the VCA and decided that the transaction did not constitute an economic concentration, so there should not be any violation of the competition law. The VCC explained that although Grab acquired the assets of Uber and had control over Uber, Grab did not have any voting rights over any part of the Uber's group company as required under the implementing decree of the 2004 Competition Law. Therefore, the transaction did not constitute an economic concentration under the 2004 Competition Law regime.

The VCA subsequently lodged an appeal against this decision of the VCC on 25 June 2019. This case is ongoing, and the final outcome is not available yet.

The *Grab/Uber* case is unprecedented in the 15 years of enforcement of the competition law regime in Vietnam. It was the first time the VCA publicly concluded that a transaction was in violation of the law and must be prohibited. It shows the VCA's proactive role in investigation and also in defending its view before the VCC. Regardless of the future outcome of the case, the case may signal a more robust enforcement of the competition law in the years to come.

# Quick reference tables

These tables are for quick reference only. They are not intended to provide exhaustive procedural guidelines, nor to be treated as a substitute for specific advice. The information in each table has been supplied by the authors of the chapter.

Albania	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system: the filing of a notification with the Albanian Competition Authority is mandatory in cases where the applicable turnover thresholds are met.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Concentrations have to be notified within 30 days from the date of entering into the merger agreement or the agreement pursuant to which a controlling interest is acquired, or from the date of publication of the public offer to purchase or exchange shares.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	A preliminary proceeding (Phase I) applies where a merger is unlikely to lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the relevant market. The Authority has to decide on the merger within two months of the working day following the confirmation of receipt of a complete notification. Since June 2016, a fast-track proceeding is available. An in-depth (Phase II) proceeding applies where the transaction gives rise to concerns regarding a dominant position being created or reinforced. The Authority must investigate the case and issue a decision within three months from the start of such Phase II proceeding (which can be extended by up to one month). If within these time limits, the Authority does not issue a decision, the concentration is deemed to be approved.
Substantive test for clearance	The Authority assesses whether the concentration may lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the market or a part thereof, especially by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position on the relevant market.
Penalties	If the undertakings that are required to notify the merger fail to duly file within the set time limits (late filing), the Authority may impose fines of up to 1 per cent of their annual turnover in the last completed business year. If the undertakings concerned close the transaction prior to clearance, the Authority may impose fines amounting to up to 10 per cent of each participating undertaking's previous annual turnover.
Remarks	Although the Albanian merger control regime is still a rather young regime, it has experienced a clear increase in activities by the Authority in enforcing merger control law (and competition law in general).

Australia	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Australia's merger filing system is voluntary.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	As Australian merger filings are voluntary, there are no specific notification triggers or filing deadlines. However, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's Merger Guidelines indicate that it expects notification where the products of the merger parties are either substitutes or complements, and the merged firm will have a post-merger market share greater than 20 per cent in the relevant market (but this is not a safe harbour).
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	For informal merger reviews, there are no statutory deadlines. Many mergers are 'pre-assessed' expeditiously, often within two to four weeks. If the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission decides that a public review is necessary to assess a merger, the review will typically take a further six to 12 weeks. Complex mergers that require a statement of issues are likely to take an additional six to 12 weeks, but this time varies depending on a range of factors. For merger authorisations, there is a statutory deadline of 90 days, which can be extended with the applicant's consent. If the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has not made a decision by the deadline, it is taken to have declined the application.
Substantive test for clearance	Informal merger reviews are assessed against the standard in section 50 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010: whether the acquisition will have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. Merger authorisations will be granted if the acquisition either does not substantially lessen competition in a market; or if the likely public benefit from the acquisition outweighs the likely public detriment, including any lessening of competition.
Penalties	The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has standing to seek injunctions to prevent potential mergers it considers are likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission may also seek other remedies at the Federal Court following an acquisition including damages, divestiture, an order declaring the transaction void, and pecuniary penalties to a maximum of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• for individuals, A\$500,000; and</li> <li>• for corporations, the greater of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A\$10 million;</li> <li>• three times the value of the benefit obtained directly or indirectly by a body corporate that is reasonably attributable to the contravening conduct; or</li> <li>• where the value of that benefit cannot be readily calculated, 10 per cent of the annual Australian turnover of the body corporate and its related bodies corporate.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Remarks	Although merger clearance in Australia is voluntary, the law is vigorously enforced by the ACCC. Where parties choose not to make a voluntary merger notification to the ACCC, it is not uncommon for the ACCC to contact the parties seeking information to enable the ACCC to determine if the transaction is likely to raise competition concerns.

Austria	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system, based on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• turnover thresholds; and</li> <li>• specific legal definitions for transactions constituting notifiable concentrations.</li> </ul>
Notification trigger/filing deadline	A merger must be notified prior to its completion if, in the last business year: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the combined worldwide turnover of all undertakings concerned exceeded €300 million;</li> <li>• the combined Austrian turnover of all undertakings concerned exceeded €30 million; and</li> <li>• the individual worldwide turnover of at least two of the undertakings concerned each exceeded €5 million.</li> </ul> <p>Even where these thresholds are met, mergers are exempt from the notification obligation where the domestic turnover of only one of the undertakings concerned exceeded €5 million and where the worldwide combined turnover of the other undertakings concerned did not exceed €30 million.</p> <p>Note: a merger must be notified in any case if: the combined worldwide turnover of all undertakings concerned exceeded €300 million, the combined Austrian turnover of all undertakings concerned exceeded €15 million, the value of consideration exceeds €200 million and the target is active in Austria to a significant extent.</p> <p>It is possible to file a pre-merger notification even prior to the signing of the relevant agreement, provided the parties have, in principle, agreed on the structure and timing of the transaction and intend to enter into this agreement in the foreseeable future. There is no filing deadline but mergers subject to merger control must not be completed before clearance.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: four weeks from filing (six weeks in the case of extension upon request by the notifying party; legal amendment of 2013). Stage 2: five months from receipt by the Cartel Court of a request of Stage 2 proceedings (six months in the case of extension upon request by the notifying party; legal amendment of 2013).
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the merger will create or strengthen a dominant market position.
Penalties	The Cartel Court can impose on each party that has intentionally or negligently violated the standstill obligation a fine in the amount of up to 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover achieved by that party in the last business year.
Remarks	Acquisitions of 25 per cent or more of the shares of a company are subject to merger control even if they do not confer sole or joint control on the acquirer. Special rules for media mergers, both as regards the calculation of turnover and the substantive test for clearance. Special rules also for calculation of turnover of banks and insurance companies. Bank exemption – temporary acquisitions by financial institutions are exempted from merger control subject to certain conditions. Due to the two-level authority system (with the statutory parties having a right to appeal against court decisions), long stop dates need to be carefully considered for (potentially) problematic cases.

Belgium	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system. The form of notification is the special form similar to Form CO and made in French or Dutch.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Combined Belgian turnover over €100 million and at least two of the parties have an individual Belgian turnover of at least €40 million. A concentration must be notified and cleared prior to its implementation.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1 decisions must be adopted within 40 working days. Stage 2 decisions must be made within an additional 60 working days. If the parties offer commitments in order to meet competition concerns, the first phase can be extended by 15 working days and the second phase by 20 working days.
Substantive test for clearance	Whether a concentration would 'significantly impede effective competition' on the Belgian market or on a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	A fine of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where the notifying parties obstruct merger control investigations (eg, by providing incorrect or incomplete information). Where parties implement the concentration without clearance, a fine of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover in the preceding financial year can be imposed.

Bosnia and Herzegovina	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Signing of the respective agreement, the announcement of a public offer of shares or an acquisition of control – 15 days.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: 30 days from the issuance of the certificate of completeness for (1) the approval of the concentration or (2) initiation of Stage 2. Stage 2: 3 months from the initiation of Stage 2, possible extension by an additional 3 months.
Substantive test for clearance	Concentration resulting in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position that may restrict competition in the market.
Penalties	Failure to notify within due time: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a fine of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover of the undertakings concerned, realised in the business year preceding the concentration; and</li> <li>• a fine of between 5,000 and 15,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks for the responsible individuals.</li> </ul> <p>Closing a concentration without obtaining prior clearance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a fine of up to 10 per cent of the parties' total turnover in the year preceding the closing; and</li> <li>• a fine of between 15,000 and 50,000 Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible marks for the responsible individuals.</li> </ul>

Brazil	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system for mergers, acquisitions, consolidations and joint ventures that produce an effect in Brazil and meet the double turnover legal threshold.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	There is no deadline for filing in Brazil, but transactions cannot be closed or implemented before clearance. The notification with CADE should be made preferably after the signing of the binding document.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Simple and ordinary cases that are not challenged by the General Superintendence do not go to CADE's Tribunal and are approved at the General Superintendence level. Complex cases that are challenged by the General Superintendence are first reviewed by the General Superintendence and then sent to CADE's Tribunal for analysis and decision. Clearance time has been in an average of 15 days for simple cases, and can take six or more months for complex ones (up to 240 plus possible 60- or 90-day extensions). In complex cases, pre-filing meetings with the authority are not only welcome but required.
Substantive test for clearance	The law provides for both dominance and substantial lessening of competition tests, though the former has implicitly been more used by CADE. CADE can approve transactions, despite any anticompetitive effects, if the merger achieves the following results: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• an increase in the productivity or competitiveness;</li> <li>• an increase in the quality of goods and services; and</li> <li>• contribution to efficiency and technological and economic development.</li> </ul> <p>Additionally, a relevant part of these results must be shared with the consumers.</p>
Penalties	Pecuniary penalty that may range from 60,000 to 60 million reais: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the act being null and void; or</li> <li>• administrative proceeding if the deal is considered harmful to competition.</li> </ul>
Remarks	CADE has stated in the decision of the <i>Cisco/Technicolor</i> merger review (Merger Review No. 08700.009018/2015-86) that CADE will not accept carveouts of the Brazilian assets as a means to avoid gun jumping. We welcome the publication of CADE's Resolution No. 16, which establishes that the analysis of fast-track cases will not surpass 30 days, and Resolution No. 17 sets forth rules on the 'associative agreements' and the memorandum of the understanding signed between CADE and the Central Bank deals with each agency's jurisdiction in merger control cases involving the banking sector. In July 2019, CADE's Tribunal approved Resolution No. 24 of 2019, which replaces Resolution No. 13 and establishes procedural aspects for gun-jumping investigations and the notification of transactions the submission of which is not mandatory. It also sets forth the criteria for the calculation of gun-jumping fines based on CADE's practices, including aggravating factors (eg, timing, severity of conduct and intent). On the same date, CADE approved Resolution No. 25 of 2019, which provides for the formal aspects and standards for the Commissioners of CADE's Tribunal to write and present their votes on cases before they are read during CADE's hearing sessions.
Bulgaria	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory and voluntary.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The entry into an agreement, the publication of a bid or the announcement of acquisition of control as a result of trading in exchange traded securities, but before the undertaking of actual actions to accomplish the concentration. No filing deadline.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Phase I: three + 25 working days (possibility to extend by up to 20 working days). Phase II: four months (possibility to extend by up to 40 working days). Information requests stop the clock. The deadlines are instructive.
Substantive test for clearance	The creation or strengthening of a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded. A clearance is possible despite the creation or strengthening of dominance, where significant efficiencies resulting from the transaction outweigh any potential negative effects.
Penalties	Up to 10 per cent of the annual turnover of the infringer.
Canada	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Notification is mandatory for transactions that exceed certain thresholds. However, the Competition Act's substantive jurisdiction extends to mergers of any size that have an effect on the Canadian marketplace, whether involving domestic parties or purely foreign-to-foreign mergers.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	No filing deadline. Where advance notification is required, parties may file at any time after reaching an agreement or letter of intent. However, transactions may not be completed during mandatory no-close periods.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	A mandatory 30-day no-close period is triggered by submission of a notification. If the Commissioner issues a supplementary information request, submission of the required responses will trigger a further no-close period that expires 30 days after both parties have responded.
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially in a relevant market.
Penalties	The criminal penalty for not filing a mandatory notification is a fine of up to C\$50,000, as well as the possibility of an additional penalty of up to C\$10,000 per day for closing a transaction prior to the expiry of a waiting period. Remedies for an anticompetitive merger include prohibition of a proposed merger, dissolution or divestiture.
Remarks	The acquisition of control of a Canadian entity by a non-Canadian will also require notification and possibly review and approval under the Investment Canada Act.

China	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Notification is mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<p>Notification is required for any transaction that constitutes a 'concentration of undertakings' if one of the following notification triggers is met:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The total worldwide turnover of all parties to the transaction exceeded 10 billion yuan and the PRC turnover of each of at least two parties to the transaction exceeded 400 million yuan in the preceding financial year.</li> <li>• The combined PRC turnover of all parties to the transaction exceeded 2 billion yuan and the PRC turnover of each of at least two parties to the transaction exceeded 400 million yuan in the preceding financial year.</li> </ul> <p>There is no filing deadline.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Stage 1: 30 days from the notification being declared complete by SAMR.</p> <p>Stage 2: 90 days from the date of SAMR's decision to initiate further review of the transaction with the possibility of extension by another 60 days.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the concentration has or is likely to have 'the effect of eliminating or restricting competition'.
Penalties	SAMR may order the undertakings to cease the implementation of the concentration, dispose of shares or assets, or transfer businesses within a given time limit and adopt other necessary measures to restore the market situation to that before the implementation of the concentration. SAMR may also impose a fine of a maximum of 500,000 yuan.
Remarks	SAMR may order the undertakings to cease the implementation of the concentration, dispose of shares or assets, or transfer businesses within a given time limit and adopt other necessary measures to restore the market situation to that before the implementation of the concentration. SAMR may also impose a fine of a maximum of 500,000 yuan.
Colombia	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<p>Merger control is triggered whenever the transaction entails the acquisition of competitive control between parties engaged in the same economic activities or value chain, and exceed an economic threshold of approximately US\$16 million in operating income or total assets. No specific deadlines for filing are established in the law. However, the parties must obtain clearance before closing the transaction.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>For a notification proceeding (ie, when the parties market shares are below 20 per cent in all the relevant market), SIC has 10 business days to issue an acknowledgement of receipt.</p> <p>For a prior approval proceeding, once the parties have submitted all the required information, SIC has (1) 30 business days to decide the proceeding in Phase I; (2) three months from the time all the information for Phase II has been provided; or exceptionally (3) SIC may reset the three-month period for one time only through a second Phase II information request.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	<p>SIC assesses whether a transaction produces an 'undue restriction on competition'. In this analysis, the following aspects are reviewed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevant market definition (product and geographic market).</li> <li>• Quantitative assessment, including market shares, concentration, asymmetry and dominance indexes.</li> <li>• Qualitative assessment, including barriers to entry and buyer power.</li> <li>• Potential anticompetitive effects.</li> </ul>
Penalties	<p>For gun jumping, SIC could impose the following sanctions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Against the parties, fines up to 100,000 monthly legal wages (approximately US\$27 million for 2020) or 150 per cent of the revenue obtained from the infraction, whichever higher.</li> <li>• Against individuals, fines up to 2,000 monthly minimum legal wages (approximately US\$600,000 for 2020).</li> <li>• Additionally, SIC may order the reversion of the transaction, if there is evidence that it generated an undue restriction on competition.</li> </ul>
Remarks	<p>In Colombia, all of the parties to the transaction (including the seller) may be fined if they fail to notify the transaction before SIC.</p> <p>There are special provisions for cases involving financial entities and aeronautical matters, which are covered by the respective regulatory authorities; each of those sectors is under special surveillance and transactions have to meet sector-specific conditions.</p>

**Costa Rica**

Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Five days after closing.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Thirty days after the information is complete (special complexity cases may be extended up to 60 days).
Substantive test for clearance	Anticompetitive effects analysis. Analysis of potential anticompetitive effects of the transaction. If such anticompetitive effects exist, the Commission analyses the potential efficiencies generated by the transaction and determines whether they offset the anticompetitive effects. Market dominance, coordinated effects and vertical foreclosure are among the issues considered.
Penalties	Up to approximately US\$200,000.

**Croatia**

Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The notification has to be submitted to the CCA prior to the implementation of the concentration and following the conclusion of the merger agreement on the basis of which control or decisive influence will be acquired or following the publication of the invitation to tender.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	In Phase I, the CCA has 30 days to clear the concentration. If no decision has been adopted after the expiry of the waiting period, the concentration is deemed to be cleared in Phase I. Should the authority enter into Phase II proceedings, the final decision regarding the concentration must be taken within three months (which may be extended by an additional three months). If no decision is taken prior to the expiry of the waiting period, the concentration is presumed by law to be approved in Phase II.
Substantive test for clearance	The CCA assesses whether the intended concentration would significantly impede effective competition in the market, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	In the case of a breach of the merger control rules, the CCA may impose fines ranging between 1 and 10 per cent of an undertaking's total annual turnover realised in the preceding business year, depending on the type of breach.

**Cyprus**

Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system for concentrations of major importance.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	No filing deadline exists but a concentration cannot partially or entirely be implemented without notification and clearance while the CPC can order the partial or complete dissolution of a concentration that was not notified and was implemented.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Clearance is notified within one month to the notifying undertakings, as of the date of the notification or the date at which additional information is received by the CPC, of which the period can be extended by 14 days. In the case where a full investigation will be conducted (Phase II), the Service has three months to submit its report to the CPC and the latter has four months from such submission to issue its decision as to the compatibility of the concentration, by which time the parties must also be notified.
Substantive test for clearance	A concentration, which creates or strengthens a dominant position in the affected markets within Cyprus, shall be declared incompatible with the requirements of the competitive market. In reviewing a concentration as to its compatibility with the competitive market, the CPC takes into account the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the structure of the affected markets;</li> <li>• the market position of the participants;</li> <li>• the economic power of all the undertakings in the market;</li> <li>• any barriers of entry to the affected market;</li> <li>• the interests of the intermediate and end consumers of the products and services; and</li> <li>• the alternative sources of supply of the products and services that are traded in the affected markets and of their substitutes.</li> </ul>
Penalties	Partially or completely putting into effect a concentration without prior approval carries a fine of 10 per cent of the total turnover of the notifying undertakings in the financial year immediately preceding the concentration, in addition to a fine of up to €8,000 for each day that the infringement persists. Implementing a concentration without conforming to a condition imposed by the CPC carries a fine of 10 per cent of the total turnover of the notifying undertakings in the financial year immediately preceding the concentration, in addition to a fine of up to €8,000 for each day that the infringement persists. A fine of up to €50,000 may be imposed for a failure to provide requested information or clarifications, or for providing misleading or inaccurate information.



Czech Republic	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	There is no deadline for filing the notification, but the concentration may not be implemented unless and until it has been approved by the Office. The notifying party may file the notification as soon as the legally binding transaction documents have been signed. The notification may even be submitted prior to the signing of the relevant transaction documents, provided the parties have, in principle, agreed on the structure and timing of the concentration.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Phase I: 30 days (in case of a simplified procedure, 20 days). Phase II: up to five months. Where remedies are proposed, extension of the above deadlines by 15 days.
Substantive test for clearance	The Office assesses the notified concentrations against a test that basically corresponds to the 'substantial impediment to effective competition' test under the EU Merger Regulation. The Office shall prohibit implementation of concentrations that would significantly impede competition on the relevant market. A significant impediment to competition can be caused particularly by the creation or threat of a dominant position. The Act presumes that a concentration will not have as its result the significant impediment of competition where the aggregate market share of the parties to the concentration on the relevant market does not exceed 25 per cent.
Penalties	Fine up to 10 million Czech koruna or 10 per cent of the net turnover. Measures necessary to restore effective competition on the relevant market, particularly demerger obligations.
Denmark	
Voluntary or mandatory system	In Denmark, there is a mandatory system if the merger meets the thresholds.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Concentrations falling within the thresholds must be notified to the DCCA after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	The time frames (Phases I and II) are inspired by article 10(1) and (3) of the EU Merger Regulation. The DCCA may approve a concentration before the expiry of the initial investigation (Phase I), which is 25 days from the receipt of the notification. The 25 days can in some circumstances be extended to 35 days. The DCCA cannot prohibit a concentration within Phase I but may initiate an in-depth investigation (Phase II) if there are serious doubts regarding the concentration's compatibility with the Competition Act. The Phase II investigation lasts for 90 days but can, in some circumstances, be extended to 110 days.
Substantive test for clearance	The DCCA will assess whether the concentration significantly impedes effective competition (SIEC). If it does not, the merger will be cleared.
Penalties	For failing to notify a merger to the DCCA, the undertakings can receive fines. The merging undertakings can also receive fines if they implement a merger prior to the approval.
Remarks	Pre-notification consultation with the DCCA is important. A lot of mergers are approved following a simplified procedure.
Ecuador	
Voluntary or mandatory system	The Antitrust Law includes mandatory economic concentration notifications when established thresholds are exceeded, as well as informative notifications.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The Antitrust Law requires that economic concentration notifications be filed within a period of eight calendar days from the date of agreement execution. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 30 per cent of the market</li> <li>• 78.8 per cent of prior year's turnover</li> </ul>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Sixty working days from the date the SCPM notifies that it has received the submitted notification. The SCPM may suspend the term for up to 60 calendar days. Furthermore, the initial term of 60 working days may be extended for up to 60 working days, as an exception. In total, up to six months.
Substantive test for clearance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Structure of the defined relevant market.</li> <li>• Concentration indexes.</li> <li>• Barriers to entry.</li> <li>• Efficiencies analyses.</li> <li>• Supply and demand structure.</li> <li>• Benefits for or detriments to the consumer that the concentration and competitive pressures could cause.</li> <li>• General interest.</li> </ul>
Penalties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 per cent of the breaching economic operator's total turnover in the fiscal year prior to the year the fine is imposed for having filed an economic concentration notification beyond the legally defined time period.</li> <li>• 10 per cent, for executing an economic concentration operation when notification is mandatory, before the operation is notified to or authorised by the SCPM.</li> </ul>

**Egypt**

Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory post-closing obligation. No exemption as long as conditions are met. Purely informative, no approval or clearance is sought or granted.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Thirty calendar days from closing.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Not applicable.
Substantive test for clearance	Not applicable.
Penalties	Criminal fine up to 500,000 Egyptian pounds for failure to notify and up to 1 million Egyptian pounds for intentionally providing false information.

**European Union**

Voluntary or mandatory system	European Merger Control Regulation. Mandatory system. Form of notification: special form. Form CO. Detailed information on the parties (turnover, business sectors, groups), the merger proposal, the affected markets, competitors and customers in any of the EU official languages. Short Form CO can be used in certain circumstances for mergers raising no issues and Form RS is applicable for pre-notification referral requests by the notifying parties.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Combined worldwide turnover over €5 billion and EU-wide turnover of at least two parties over €250 million unless each of the parties achieves more than two-thirds of the EU turnover in one and the same state;</li> <li>• combined worldwide turnover over €2.5 billion;</li> <li>• EU-wide turnover of at least two of the undertakings over €100 million each;</li> <li>• combined turnover in each of at least three member states over €100 million; or</li> <li>• a turnover in each of those three member states by each of at least two of the undertakings over €25 million unless each of the parties achieves more than two-thirds of the EU turnover in one and the same state.</li> </ul> <p>Filing must be made prior to implementation. The filing can be made prior to the conclusion of a binding agreement so long as the parties intend in good faith to enter a binding agreement.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Stage 1: 25 working days from notification or 35 working days from notification where the parties have submitted commitments intended to form the basis of a clearance decision.</p> <p>Stage 2: 90 working days, plus 15 working days where commitments have been offered after the 55th day. Possibility of 20-working-day extension.</p> <p>Suspension effects: suspension of transaction until final decision with limited exceptions for public bids.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	Whether a merger will significantly impede effective competition in the EEA or a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. In addition, the cooperative aspects of full-function joint ventures are appraised in accordance with the criteria of article 101(1) and (3) TFEU. Broadly, economic benefits must outweigh the detriment to competition.
Penalties	<p>Failure to file or implementation before clearance: fines of up to 10 per cent of parties' turnover.</p> <p>Failure to provide information or supply of incorrect, incomplete, misleading information: fines of up to 1 per cent of parties' turnover (in certain circumstances).</p> <p>Failure to comply with a condition or obligation imposed by decision: fines of up to 10 per cent of parties' turnover. Possible revocation of clearance decision (for breach of obligation) and order for dissolution or other measures (for breach of condition).</p> <p>Implementation contrary to a prohibition Commission decision: fines of up to 10 per cent of parties' turnover and possible order for dissolution of the merger or other measures.</p> <p>Periodic penalties of up to 5 per cent of average daily aggregate turnover payable for each day that certain infringements persist.</p>
Remarks	Special rules for the calculation of thresholds for banks and insurance companies.

**Faroese Islands**

Voluntary or mandatory system	It is a mandatory system where mergers must be filed if the thresholds are met.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The notification must be made no later than one week after the conclusion of the agreement, the merger is publicly notified or the acquisition of control.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Within 30 working days of the Faroese authorities' receipt of a complete filing submission, the Competition Council will notify the participating undertakings if further investigations are required, or alternatively whether the merger can be approved. If the authorities have not given this notification within the 30-day time limit, the authorities can no longer annul the merger. The Competition Council must make its final decision within 90 working days of the above-mentioned notification being sent to the participating undertakings. This deadline can be extended by up to 20 working days when commitments are proposed, and again by up to 20 working days with the parties' consent.
Substantive test for clearance	Section 15 of the Faroese Competition Act applies the substantial impediment of effective competition (SIEC) test.
Penalties	Fines can be received for failure to notify a merger or if the merger is implemented before clearance.

Finland	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the parties exceeds €350 million and the aggregate turnover in Finland of at least two of the parties exceeds €20 million. Filing must be made prior to implementation. The filing can be made as soon as the parties demonstrate with sufficient certainty their intention to conclude a concentration.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	The FCCA must either approve the concentration or initiate an in-depth investigation within 23 working days of the filing of the complete notification (Stage 1). If the FCCA decides to initiate an in-depth investigation, it must within 69 working days (or 115 working days with the permission of the Market Court) of such decision either approve the concentration or request the Market Court to block it (Stage 2).
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the concentration may significantly impede effective competition in the Finnish market or a substantial part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	Fines of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of the relevant undertaking(s) may be imposed. In addition, the Market Court may order the concentration to be dissolved or annulled (eg, by requiring the undertakings concerned or assets brought together to be separated or by requiring the cessation of the joint control).
Remarks	Foreign-to-foreign mergers are caught where the relevant jurisdictional thresholds are met.
France	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Compulsory system. Form of notification: no special form. Similar type of information but less detailed than Form CO. In French.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Main thresholds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• combined worldwide turnover over €150 million;</li> <li>• at least two of the undertakings concerned each achieved turnover in France over €50 million; and</li> <li>• the concentration does not have an EU dimension.</li> </ul> Thresholds specific to the retail sector: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• worldwide combined pre-tax turnover of over €75 million;</li> <li>• at least two of the undertakings concerned each achieved in the retail trade sector in France a turnover exceeding €15 million; and</li> <li>• the concentration does not have an EU dimension.</li> </ul> Thresholds specific to the French overseas territories: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• worldwide combined pre-tax turnover of over €75 million;</li> <li>• at least two of the undertakings concerned each achieved a pre-tax turnover exceeding €15 million (or lowered to €5 million in the retail trade sector) in at least one (but not necessarily the same) French overseas department or community; and</li> <li>• the concentration does not have an EU dimension.</li> </ul> Filing: No time limit for notification; but in any event sufficiently in advance of completion, as French merger control has a suspensive effect.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	First phase: 25 working days for the Authority, plus five working days for the Minister to possibly ask the opening of a second phase; review is automatically extended by 15 working days if remedies are proposed, and it can also be further extended by up to 15 working days if the notifying party requests a 'stop the clock'. The Authority may also stop the clock if it is not provided with relevant information. Second phase: 65 working days for the Authority, plus 25 working days for the Minister to possibly decide the case. Second phase may be extended by up to 20 working days if remedies are proposed/modified after the first 45 days of the second phase, and can also be further extended by up to 20 working days if the notifying party requests a 'stop the clock'. Eventually, it can be extended with no limit of time by the Authority if the notifying party or a third party fails to provide in due time requested pieces of information. In a nutshell: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the first stage will normally last between 25 and 60 working days; and</li> <li>• the second stage will normally last between 90 and 130 working days, and even longer with no time limit in the event of failure to provide information.</li> </ul> Suspension effect: suspension until clearance (possibility of a derogation upon request).
Substantive test for clearance	Substantial lessening of competition with particular emphasis on the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position. The authorities also examine whether the operation creates or reinforces purchasing power, placing suppliers in a state of economic dependency.
Penalties	Failure to file or implementation before clearance: for corporate entities, 5 per cent of their turnover in France; for individuals, €1.5 million.
Remarks	Special rules for press and audiovisual sectors, banks and insurance companies. Foreign investments are generally unrestricted but some of them in strategic sectors are subject to declaration or prior authorisation. Foreign-to-foreign mergers are subject to notification if the French relevant turnover thresholds are met.

## Germany

Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system.
Notification trigger/ filing deadline	<p>Notification trigger:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the concentration does not have an EU dimension; and</li> <li>• combined worldwide turnover of all parties is over €500 million; and</li> <li>• either (1): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• at least one party has turnover of over €25 million in Germany; and</li> <li>• another party has turnover of over €5 million in Germany;</li> </ul> </li> <li>• or (2): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• one party has turnover of over €25 million in Germany, but neither the target nor any further participating undertaking has a turnover in Germany exceeding €5 million;</li> <li>• the value of consideration for the transaction is over €400 million; and</li> <li>• the target is active in Germany to a significant extent.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>No notification is required if thresholds in (1) are met but one party to the merger achieved less than €10 million worldwide turnover (in the case of the target including the seller and its affiliates provided that the seller controls the target and, in the case of the acquirer, including its affiliates).</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Stage 1: one month from notification.</p> <p>Stage 2: four months from notification (extension possible if merging parties consent). Extension by one month, if merging parties submit remedies proposals.</p> <p>Suspension effects: suspension until clearance (possibility of a derogation upon request for important reasons).</p>
Substantive test for clearance	Whether a merger will significantly impede competition, in particular if it will create or strengthen a dominant market position (statutory rebuttable presumptions of dominance) which is not outweighed by improvement of market conditions on other markets (balancing clause).
Penalties	For incomplete, incorrect or late notification and completion before clearance, fines of up to €1 million or, in the case of undertakings, of up to 10 per cent of their total worldwide group turnover in the preceding business year. If the transaction is completed before clearance, it is also regarded as invalid until final clearance is given.
Remarks	Special rules for calculation of thresholds in cases of goods traded only as well as for the publishing and broadcasting sector and for credit and other financial institutions and insurance companies. In addition to merger control proceedings, there are special regulatory procedures for certain strategic sectors, banks and insurance companies. Post-completion notice is required 'without undue delay' after completion of the notified merger.

## Greece

Voluntary or mandatory system	Filing is mandatory, in Greek.
Notification trigger/ filing deadline	Pre-merger filing: combined aggregate worldwide turnover of at least €150 million and aggregate turnover in Greece for each of at least two participating undertakings exceeding €15 million. Filing within 30 calendar days of signing of a binding agreement.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Stage 1: one month from notification.</p> <p>Stage 2: two additional months. Implementation is prohibited until issuance of the Commission's decision.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	A concentration must not substantially restrict competition in the Greek market, especially by way of creating or reinforcing a dominant position.
Penalties	Pre-merger filing: in case of failure to file, fines ranging from €30,000 up to 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover may be imposed by the Commission. In case of early closing, fines range from €30,000 up to 10 per cent of the aggregate turnover.
Remarks	Special provisions for acquisition of major holdings in companies in traditionally regulated sectors (ie, banking, insurance, media, telecommunications, etc).

## Greenland

Voluntary or mandatory system	It is a mandatory system where a merger must be filed if the thresholds are met.
Notification trigger/ filing deadline	A merger must be filed after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>The Competition Tribunal must make its decision on the substance within 40 working days (Phase I) from the receipt of a complete notification. It will decide to either approve the concentration or initiate further proceedings. In the latter case, the Competition Tribunal must make a final decision within 90 working days (Phase II) after the expiry of the original 40 working days. These time limits may be extended with up to 20 days if the undertakings propose new or revised commitments at a late stage (ie, fewer than 20 days remaining of the original deadline). The deadline is only extended with as many days required to provide 20 days for the assessment of the new or revised commitments. The deadline can also be extended with up to 20 days on request by the parties or with the parties' consent.</p> <p>Whether the concentration significantly impedes effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. In addition, the cooperative aspects of full-function joint ventures are appraised in accordance with the criteria applying to anticompetitive agreements.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	The substantive test for clearance is to assess whether the concentration significantly impedes effective competition (SIEC). If it does not, the merger will be cleared.
Penalties	For failing to notify a merger, the undertakings can receive fines. The merging undertakings can also receive fines if they implement a merger prior to the approval.

Hong Kong	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Voluntary apart from the mandatory requirement under the Takeovers Code, which requires that an offeror of a potential mandatory general offer seeks the prior consent of the CA in relation to the 'change' of a carrier licensee before it triggers an obligation to make a mandatory general offer.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	There is no financial trigger for notification. There is generally no requirement for pre-notification except in a situation involving a mandatory general offer.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	There is no formal timeline for clearance. The Competition Ordinance only stipulates that the competition authority may only commence an investigation of a merger within 30 days after the day on which the competition authority first became aware, or ought to have become aware, that a merger has taken place; if the competition authority reasonably believes that a merger contravenes the Merger Rule, it must apply to the Tribunal for an order within six months of the day on which the merger was completed or the competition authority became aware of the merger (whichever is later).
Substantive test for clearance	The substantive test to be applied is whether the merger has, or is likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in Hong Kong.
Penalties	There are no specified sanctions for not filing, because the merger control regime is voluntary in general. However, the competition authority may apply to the Tribunal for an order to unwind a completed merger or to prohibit a proposed merger, if it has reasonable cause to believe that the merger will likely contravene the Merger Rule. In the case of a mandatory general offer involving the 'change' of a carrier licensee, failure to obtain the CA's prior consent before triggering the mandatory general offer may result in disciplinary action under the Takeovers Code. Possible sanctions include issuance of a public apology, public censure, and requirements on the company involved, licensed representatives and registered institutions not to act or implement the merger or acquisition.
Remarks	The merger control regime at present only applies to transactions where an undertaking that directly or indirectly holds a telecommunications carrier licence is involved. It is anticipated that the regime might be extended to more or all sectors in the future.

Hungary	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Filing is mandatory in the case of mergers that reach the jurisdictional thresholds. Filing is voluntary in the case of mergers that do not reach the jurisdictional thresholds, but may be subject to the GVH's investigation.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	No deadline for filing, but the merger cannot be implemented without the GVH's permission. Mergers above the statutory threshold must be notified.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Fast-track review: eight days. Stage 1: 30 days (including fast-track review). Stage 2: four months (including Stage 1).
Substantive test for clearance	The SIEC test is applied.
Penalties	The GVH may block the transaction and impose fines.
Remarks	Sector-specific rules apply to mergers in the media, energy, telecom and financial sectors.

Iceland	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The CA shall be notified of a merger before it takes effect but after the conclusion of an agreement on the proposed merger, the public announcement of a takeover bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest in an undertaking.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: 25 working days. Stage 2: up to 90 working days.
Substantive test for clearance	The substantive test for clearance is whether the merger impedes effective competition by creating or strengthening an individual or collective dominant position or otherwise significantly impeding effective competition.
Penalties	A merger falling within the regime shall not take effect while it is being examined by the CA. Any violation of this can be subject to fines of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of the preceding business year of any undertaking or association of undertakings involved in the violation.

India	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	A combination would be required to be notified to the CCI, and receive approval from the CCI prior to closing.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Phase I: 30 working days from receipt of notification excluding 'clock stops' for responding to information requests. This can extend to 45 working days if the CCI reaches out to third parties. Phase II: up to 210 days from receipt of notification. Where modifications are proposed in Phase II, the time may be extended up to an additional 60 working days.
Substantive test for clearance	Combinations that cause, or are likely to cause, an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India are void.
Penalties	The CCI has the power to impose a penalty of up to 1 per cent of the total turnover or value of assets, whichever is higher, of the proposed combination. In addition, in the event the CCI believes the transaction will have or be likely to have an AAEC in India, the transaction will be treated as void, and all actions taken in pursuance of the void transaction shall also be void. In such a case, the CCI also has the power to unwind the transaction, though this has not happened to date.

## Ireland

Voluntary or mandatory system	<p>The Irish merger control regime is a mandatory system and no exceptions exist. The mandatory obligation to notify arises where, for the most recent financial year:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the aggregate turnover in the state of the undertakings involved is not less than €60 million; and</li> <li>• the turnover in the state of each of two or more of the undertakings involved is not less than €10 million.</li> </ul> <p>Section 18(3) of the Act provides for voluntary notification of a merger that does not meet the jurisdictional thresholds. The CCPC can request parties to potentially problematic mergers that fall below the relevant financial thresholds to voluntarily notify mergers under section 18(3).</p>
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<p>The notification must be made prior to the merger or acquisition being put into effect. The notification may be made in the following circumstances:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• one of the undertakings involved has publicly announced an intention to make a public bid or a public bid is made but not yet accepted;</li> <li>• the undertakings involved demonstrate to the CCPC a good faith intention to conclude an agreement or a merger or acquisition is agreed; or</li> <li>• in relation to a scheme of arrangement, a scheme document is posted to shareholders.</li> </ul>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>A Phase I clearance determination must be issued by the CCPC within 30 working days of the submission of a full and complete filing by the merging parties (the 'appropriate date'), unless either the CCPC has used its power to 'stop and restart the clock' by issuing a formal request for information, or where the parties and the CCPC negotiate remedies to 'ameliorate the effects of the merger', which extends the Phase I period to 45 working days.</p> <p>A Phase II clearance determination must be issued by the CCPC within 120 working days of the appropriate date, unless the CCPC has used its power to 'stop the clock' by sending a formal request for information, or where the parties and the CCPC negotiate remedies to 'ameliorate the effects of the merger', which extends the Phase II period to 135 working days.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	<p>Section 20(1)(c) of the Act provides that the substantive test for assessment of competition issues is 'whether the result of the merger or acquisition would be to substantially lessen competition in markets for goods or services in the State' (the SLC test).</p>
Penalties	<p>Under section 18(9) of the Act, wilful and knowing failure to notify a merger or acquisition that is caught by the jurisdictional thresholds is a criminal offence punishable by fines of up to €250,000, plus €25,000 per day for a continued breach. The CCPC does not have legal powers to impose a fine itself; instead the CCPC can recommend that the Director of Public Prosecution initiate a prosecution in the Irish Courts. Liability attaches to the undertaking itself and/or the 'person in control' of an undertaking. Section 18(11) of the Act provides that the 'person in control' of an undertaking is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• in the case of a body corporate, any officer of the body corporate who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention;</li> <li>• in the case of a partnership, each partner who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention; or</li> <li>• in the case of any other form of undertaking, any individual in control of that undertaking who knowingly and wilfully authorises or permits the contravention.</li> </ul>
Remarks	<p>The revised thresholds have resulted in a significant reduction in merger notifications in 2019. As of 20 June 2019, 16 mergers had been notified to the CCPC, a 68 per cent reduction as compared to the same time period in 2018.</p>

## Italy

Voluntary or mandatory system	<p>Mandatory system. Form of notification: special form. Detailed information similar to the EU Form CO. In Italian.</p>
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<p>Combined turnover over €498 million in Italy and turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings involved in Italy over €30 million. No filing deadline; no standstill obligation. Pre-notification procedure is available but not required for all transactions. It is necessary to notify the transaction prior to implementation: the IAA, when opening a Phase II investigation, has the power to order the suspension of a notified concentration pending approval if it raises serious competition concerns.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Phase I: 30 days (15 days for public bids) from notification. Phase II: 45 additional days (extendible by a further 30 days where the information provided is materially incomplete). As a general rule, the transaction can be implemented after notification (not suspensory).</p>
Substantive test for clearance	<p>Whether the merger will create or strengthen a dominant position in the national market in a way that threatens to eliminate or reduce competition to a considerable and lasting extent. De facto the same test under the EUMR is applied.</p>
Penalties	<p>Failure to file: fines of up to 1 per cent of the notifying parties' worldwide turnover in the last fiscal year. Implementation before clearance: no penalties. If parties implement the transaction notwithstanding a prohibition decision or non-compliance with conditions imposed in a Phase II clearance decision, the IAA may impose fines of between 1 and 10 per cent of the turnover of the businesses concerned.</p>
Remarks	<p>Special provisions in the electricity and gas, defence, broadcasting, telecommunications and film distribution sectors and for banks and insurance companies. In addition, special powers granted to the government (golden share rules) applicable to M&amp;A transactions relating to assets in key industries, such as defence and national security, energy, communications and transportation.</p>



Japan	
Voluntary or mandatory system	It is a mandatory system.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Different thresholds apply depending on the transaction structure. For example, for share acquisitions exceeding the threshold of either 20 per cent or 50 per cent stake, the acquiring group must have Japanese turnover of over ¥20 billion and the target group (excluding the seller) over ¥5 billion. No filing deadline, apart from the suspensory obligation until clearance.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	30 calendar days from formal submission of filing for Stage 1. Once Stage 2 is triggered, the later of 120 days from the date of the FTC's acceptance of the notification or 90 days from the date of submission of the additional materials or information.
Substantive test for clearance	Merger Guidelines elaborate on the items considered by the FTC, but are generally consistent with other major jurisdictions.
Penalties	Gun jumping is subject to a criminal fine of up to ¥2 million.
Kenya	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory notification system.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	There are no notification triggers under the Act, nor is there a filing deadline. Nevertheless, the merging parties are prohibited from implementing the merger without the Authority's approval.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	The Authority has up to 180 days after the submission of a merger notification form to determine whether to approve the proposed merger, or approve it with conditions or reject it outright.
Substantive test for clearance	The Authority applies both the substantial lessening of competition and the public interest tests.
Penalties	Any person who fails to comply with the Part IV notification and approval requirements commits an offence and is liable, upon conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding 10 million Kenya shillings or both. The Authority may also impose a financial penalty for an amount not exceeding 10 per cent of the preceding year's annual turnover in Kenya of the offending undertakings.
Liechtenstein	
Voluntary or mandatory system	In general, there is no specific national legislation regarding merger control in Liechtenstein. The Liechtenstein Authority (ie, the Office of Justice) is authorised to apply merger control. For merger control on a supranational level in Europe, the basic provisions are contained in the EEA Agreement and Annex XIV to the EU Merger Regulation. Additionally, the provisions of Protocol 4 on the functions and powers of the EFTA Surveillance Authority in the field of competition do apply (Protocol 4 to the Agreement between the EFTA states on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice).
Notification trigger/filing deadline	There is no special merger control legislation in Liechtenstein; however, the EU Merger Regulation is directly applicable. According to the provisions of the EU Merger Regulation, a transaction can be notified prior to the conclusion of a binding agreement. Once an agreement has been entered into, or a bid launched, there is no deadline or recommended period in which the parties must file a notification. However, the notification of the concentration needs to be made before its implementation.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Within 25 working days of when the notification is made, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) or the European Commission must reach a decision where the parties submit commitments (remedies) to resolve competition issues. In case of serious doubts, the competent authority will commence investigations; the period of this investigation is 90 working days.
Substantive test for clearance	The principle is that the activities of the EU and its member states should be conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition. Concentrations significantly impeding effective competition in the common market or a substantial part of it are prohibited in accordance with the provisions of the EU Merger Regulation.
Penalties	Companies failing to suspend implementation of a merger pending examination or that put into effect a merger that is prohibited by the ESA or the European Commission are exposed to fines.
Remarks	There is no specific national merger control, antitrust or cartel legislation in Liechtenstein. It is unlikely that a national merger control legislation will be implemented in the near future in Liechtenstein.

## Malaysia

Voluntary or mandatory system

Both regimes are voluntary.

Notification trigger/  
filing deadline**Notification trigger****Aviation services sector**

- Combined turnover in Malaysia in the preceding financial year of at least 50 million ringgit; or
- combined worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year of at least 500 million ringgit.

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

Proposed horizontal M&amp;A:

- At least one party is a licensee in a dominant position; or
- M&A would result in the proposed merged or acquired firm obtaining a dominant position (post-M&A market share of 40 per cent or more).

Completed horizontal M&amp;A:

Merged or acquired entity is a licensee in a dominant position.

Proposed non-horizontal M&amp;A:

At least one of the parties is a licensee in a dominant position.

Completed non-horizontal M&amp;A:

Merged or acquired entity is a licensee in a dominant position

**Filing deadline****Aviation services sector**

Anticipated mergers:

- When merger parties have bona fide intention to proceed with anticipated merger;
- details of the anticipated merger are available; and
- anticipated merger has been made public or may be made public by MAVCOM.

Completed mergers:

At any time.

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

Notification and assessment:

Parties are encouraged to submit transactions prior to completion. However, this is not mandatory. MCMC may even assess M&amp;A that proceeded prior to the issuance of the M&amp;A Guidelines.

Authorisation of conduct:

MCMC allows licensees to apply before, during or after submitting an assessment application pursuant to the M&amp;A Guidelines; however, parties are encouraged to apply prior to engaging in any conduct that may be construed to have the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition.

Aviation services sector:

On a case-by-case basis.

Clearance deadlines  
(Stage 1/Stage 2)

Communications and multimedia sectors:

Phase I assessment: within 30 days of receipt of valid Form 1.

Phase II assessment: will commence within 10 business days from the date of receipt of a valid Form 2. Indicative time frame for completion is 120 business days from the date of commencement.

Substantive test for  
clearance

Both regimes use the 'substantial lessening of competition' test.

**Aviation services sector**

Up to 10 per cent of worldwide turnover of the enterprise over period of infringement.

Non-compliance of guidelines can lead to fines of up to 1 million ringgit or 5 per cent of annual turnover.

Penalties

**Communications and multimedia sectors**

Criminal penalties: fine of up to 500,000 ringgit, imprisonment up to five years, or both.

A person may further be liable to a further fine of 1,000 ringgit for every day or part of a day during which the offence is continued after conviction.

Malta	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Filing of a notification of concentrations, for which there is an administrative filing fee of €163.06, must be done within 15 days prior to their implementation and following: the conclusion of the relevant agreement; the announcement of the public bid; or the acquisition of a controlling interest.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: six weeks, but can be increased to two months if after notification and not later than the end of the fifth week the undertakings concerned submit commitments. Also, until the end of the fifth week, the undertakings concerned may request suspension of periods for three weeks to discuss a new commitment proposed but which would be granted at the discretion of the DG. Under the simplified procedure, duration of Stage 1 is four weeks instead of six weeks. Stage 2: four months but suspension for a period of up to one month may be requested by the undertakings concerned when they submit commitments, and the request will be generally acceded to. But concentration is suspended only during Stage 1.
Substantive test for clearance	The DG will consider: the need to maintain and develop effective competition in the Maltese market; the geographical and product markets and potential competition from other undertakings; whether the business or part of the business of a party to the concentration has failed or is likely to fail; the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power; the alternatives available to suppliers and users and their access to supplies or markets; any legal or other barriers to entry; supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services; the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers; the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition; and the nature and extent of development and innovation in a relevant market.
Penalties	Penalties for failure to file a notification before implementation are a fine of between €1,000 and €10,000; and penalties for breaching the mandatory waiting period are up to 10 per cent of the turnover of the undertaking that benefits from the transaction.
Remarks	There are no bills or amendments to the law in the pipeline, though one may envisage an amendment to the Control of Concentrations Regulations and the Maltese Competition Act aimed at increasing the thresholds, which are currently set at low parameters that are easily exceeded even where the effect on competition may in fact turn out to be negligible.

Mexico	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory. Filing fee of approximately US\$9,000
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Monetary thresholds met. The transaction must be notified before closing. Mandatory waiting period upon notice by the agency. Main monetary thresholds: consideration above approximately US\$75 million. For the Mexican component of the transaction; acquisition of 35 per cent or more of target's assets or stock and target's sales or assets in Mexico above approximately US\$75 million; or combined sales or assets of parties of approximately US\$200 million and target size of over approximately US\$35 million.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Fast-track: 15 days. Stage 1: approximately 35 days. Stage 2: from 60 to 155 days.
Substantive test for clearance	Lessening, impairing or preventing competition.
Penalties	Up to 5 per cent of the parties' turnover in Mexico for failing to notify. The agency may order divestitures or behavioural remedies.
Remarks	No waiting period or freeze orders. Closing, only after the COFECE or IFT issues its final resolution.

Morocco	
Voluntary or mandatory system	The filing is mandatory.
Notification trigger/ filing deadline	<p>The notification of a concentration must occur when:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the combined aggregate worldwide pre-tax turnover of all of the undertakings or groups of natural or legal persons parties to the concentration is equal to or more than 750 million dirhams;</li> <li>the aggregate Morocco-wide pre-tax turnover of at least two of the undertakings or groups of natural or legal persons concerned by the concentration is equal to or more than 250 million dirhams; or</li> <li>the undertakings that are parties to the concentration, or that are the subject of the concentration, or the undertakings that are economically linked to them, have generated altogether, during the previous calendar year, more than 40 per cent of the sales, purchases or other transactions on a national market of identical or substitutable goods, products or services, or on a significant part of such market.</li> </ul> <p>The notification should take place as soon as the parties concerned are able to present a sufficiently concrete file to allow the investigation of the case.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Phase I: the Competition Council assesses the concentration within 60 days of the notification.</p> <p>If the parties offer commitments during Phase I, the 60-day deadline may be extended by 20 days. In case of particular necessity, parties may ask the Competition Council to suspend the deadline of the examination of the transaction for a maximum of 20 days.</p> <p>Phase II: the Competition Council assesses the transaction within 90 days.</p> <p>If the notifying parties offer commitments less than 30 days before the end of the 90-day deadline, the deadline will then expire 30 days after the reception of the commitments.</p> <p>The 90-day deadline may also be suspended at the request of the parties for up to 30 days in case of particular necessity.</p> <p>This deadline may also be suspended by the Competition Council, in particular when the notifying parties have failed to provide it with requested information or to inform it of the occurrence of a new material event. The time limit resumes when the cause of the suspension has been addressed.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	The substantive test for clearance is whether the planned concentration is likely to infringe competition, notably by creating or strengthening a dominant position or a buying power that places suppliers in a position of economic dependency.
Penalties	<p>The sanctions for not filing are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>for legal entities responsible for filing: a fine that amounts to a maximum of 5 per cent of the pre-tax turnover made in Morocco during the last fully closed financial year, increased, when applicable, by the turnover made in Morocco during the same period by the acquired company; and</li> <li>for natural persons responsible for filing: a fine of a maximum amount of 5 million dirhams.</li> </ul> <p>Upon failure to file a notification, the Competition Council also compels the parties, subject to a daily penalty payment, to notify the operation, unless they revert to the previous state of affairs.</p>
Remarks	Law No. 104-12 of 30 June 2014 on free pricing and competition and Law No. 20-13 of 30 June 2014 relating to the Competition Council, which transfer the merger control function to the Competition Council, have taken effect after the appointment of the new Competition Council's president and members, which occurred in November and December 2018.
Netherlands	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system. Form of notification: Standard form. In Dutch.
Notification trigger/ filing deadline	<p>Combined worldwide turnover exceeding €150 million and at least two undertakings each with turnover in the Netherlands exceeding €30 million.</p> <p>Filing deadline: complete notification prior to merger becoming effective. Special thresholds apply to concentrations in the insurance and healthcare sectors.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Phase I: Four weeks.</p> <p>Phase II: 13 weeks (subject to suspension should the authority require additional information).</p>
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the concentration significantly impedes effective competition in the Dutch market or any part thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	<p>Failure to file or implementation before clearance: transaction void plus fines of maximum €900,000 or 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover (whichever is higher).</p> <p>Incorrect or incomplete information: fines of up to €900,000 or 1 per cent of the worldwide turnover (whichever is higher).</p>
New Zealand	
Voluntary or mandatory system?	Voluntary, but the New Zealand Commerce Commission prioritises enforcement against non-notified mergers that may substantially lessen competition.
Notification trigger/ filing deadline	Filing and clearance must be undertaken pre-closing. The New Zealand Commerce Commission has 'concentration indicators' over which it recommends a filing be considered.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Target time frame is 40 working days from filing, but the New Zealand Commerce Commission can request extensions. The average time frame is approximately 60 working days, but this will depend on complexity and opposition.
Substantive test for clearance	The New Zealand Commerce Commission must be satisfied that the merger will not have, or would not be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.
Penalties	Up to NZ\$500,000 for individuals and up to NZ\$5 million for companies.
Remarks	Special rules can apply to certain industrial sectors (telecommunications, banking).

North Macedonia	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The participants are obliged to notify the Commission prior to the implementation of a concentration and following the conclusion of the merger agreement, or the announcement of the public bid on the purchase or the acquisition of the controlling interest in the charter capital of the undertaking.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: 25 business days. Stage 2: 90 business days.
Substantive test for clearance	A concentration, that would significantly prevent, restrict or distort efficient competition on the market or its significant part, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position of the participants, is non-compliant with the provisions of the LPC.
Penalties	Failure to notify is a misdemeanour penalised by a fine amounting to up to 10 per cent of the value of the aggregate annual income of the undertaking (respectively its group) made in the business year preceding the year when the misdemeanour was committed. In addition to the fine, the Commission for misdemeanour matters may impose to the legal person a temporary ban on the performance of specific activity for between three and 30 days, and to the natural person a ban on the performance of an occupation, activity or duty for between three and 15 days.
Remarks	The average duration of procedures in 2018 in which the Commission approved concentrations was 20 business days.
Norway	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory notification for concentrations where the undertakings concerned exceed certain turnover thresholds. No particular rules for foreign-to-foreign mergers. Combined threshold is 1 billion kroner annual turnover in Norway. Individual threshold is 100 million kroner annual turnover in Norway.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	No deadline for filing. As long as the transaction is not implemented, it is entirely up to the parties when to submit the notification. The notification can be submitted as early as desired by the parties, as long as the content requirements can be fulfilled, and as soon as the parties are ready to go public.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	After receipt of a notification the NCA has 25 working days to give notice that intervention may take place (Phase I) and then another 45 working days to present a reasoned draft prohibition decision or accept and make binding remedies presented by the notifying party or parties (Phase II). The parties have 15 working days to comment on a draft prohibition decision and the NCA then has another 15 working days to render such a decision.
Substantive test for clearance	The NCA shall intervene against concentrations that significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The NCA investigates possible unilateral, coordinated, vertical and conglomerate effects of the concentration. The NCA takes into account substantiated efficiencies that benefit consumers, are merger-specific and verifiable.
Penalties	Infringement of the prohibition against implementation of the transaction (automatic suspension) may lead to significant fines. The same goes for infringement of a final decision of intervention. The NCA may issue a fine of up to 10 per cent of the undertaking's global turnover.
Remarks	Some amendments to the Norwegian Competition Act also applied as of 1 July 2016, including the change of the substantive test for clearance of mergers to that of the EUMR.
Pakistan	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	As soon as agreement is reached in principle or a non-binding letter of intent is signed.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: Most mergers are cleared at this stage. The CCP has 30 working days to examine a merger application from the time of its filing. No decision in 30 working days means the merger is cleared. Stage 2: Few merger issues reach this stage. If the CCP raises concerns, then Stage 2 begins after the conclusion of the 30-working-day period for Stage 1. Stage 2 involves its own 90-working-day period for review. No decision in 90 working days of Stage 2 (or 120 working days overall) means the merger is cleared. The CCP will issue a show-cause notice and provide the opportunity of a hearing before passing any adverse order, interim or final.
Substantive test for clearance	Substantial lessening of competition by creating or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	Prohibition, unwinding the merger, including interim orders to protect competition. Fines of up to 10 per cent of turnover or 75 million Pakistani rupees.
Remarks	No penalty has ever been imposed in merger-related cases since the CCP's inception in 2007.

**Poland**

Voluntary or mandatory system	If a concentration meets the statutory thresholds and no exemptions apply, the notification is mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	There is no official deadline for filing. The parties are obliged to notify their intention of the concentration, which means that the notification has to be filed before implementation. There is a bar on closing.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	The authority has one month to issue its decision for simple case in Stage 1. Complex cases may enter into the second stage, which gives the OCCP an additional four months to complete the review.
Substantive test for clearance	The OCCP clears a concentration that does not result in significant impediments to competition in the market, in particular, by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the market (in practice, the SIEC test applies).
Penalties	If an undertaking has implemented a concentration without regulatory clearance, the general principle is that the OCCP may fine the undertaking by way of a decision, with the fine not to exceed 10 per cent of the revenue earned in the accounting year preceding the year within which the fine is imposed.

**Portugal**

Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory notification.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Combined market share in Portugal higher than 50 per cent;</li> <li>• combined market share in Portugal equal to or higher than 30 per cent and lower than 50 per cent, provided that the individual turnover in Portugal of at least two participant undertakings exceeds €5 million; or</li> <li>• combined turnover in Portugal of more than €100 million, provided that the individual turnover in Portugal of at least two participant undertakings exceeds €5 million.</li> </ul> <p>Two or more concentrations made within a period of two years among the same individuals or legal entities, which considered individually would not be subject to prior notification, are deemed as a sole concentration subject to such prior notification when the set of concentrations reaches the turnover figures set out above. Notification must be filed after the conclusion of the agreement and before their closing or, whenever relevant, after the date of disclosure of the preliminary announcement of a public takeover bid or of an exchange offer or the date of disclosure of the announcement of the acquisition of a controlling shareholding in a listed company, or, in the case of a public procurement procedure, after the definitive award of the contract and before the closing.</p> <p>When the participant undertakings show serious intent to conclude an agreement or, in the case of a public takeover bid or of an exchange offer, the undertakings show public intent to carry out the offer, the concentration may be notified before the above deadlines. Projected concentrations may be the object of pre-notification assessment by the Authority.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Phase I: within 30 working days of the notification's effective date (extendible, notably, if requests for additional information are made), the Authority shall clear the concentration (with or without conditions or obligations) or initiate an in-depth investigation. Lack of decision is deemed as clearance.</p> <p>Phase II: within 90 working days, counted as of the effective date of the notification (extendible, notably, if requests for additional information are made), the Authority must authorise the concentration (with or without conditions or obligations) or prohibit the concentration. Lack of decision is deemed as clearance.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	Concentrations falling within the scope of the Act are forbidden if they create significant impediments to competition in the Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it, in particular if such impediments result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	<p>Penalties are applied within a sanctioning procedure launched by the Authority, which shall be subject to the opportunity principle, pursuant to which the Authority may, on public interest grounds, grant different degrees of priority in respect of the matters it is called to assess.</p> <p>Failure to file: fines up to 10 per cent of the turnover in the year preceding that of the decision; periodic penalty payments up to 5 per cent of the average daily turnover in the year preceding that of the decision, applied per day.</p> <p>Violation of obligation of suspending transaction until clearance: fines of up to 10 per cent of the turnover in the year preceding that of the decision.</p> <p>Non-compliance with decision that prohibited the transaction or that approved it with conditions or obligations attached: fines up to 10 per cent of the turnover in the year preceding that of the decision, legal transactions being null and void.</p>
Remarks	Filing subject to fees. Obligation of suspending transaction may be derogated by the Authority.

**Romania**

Voluntary or mandatory system	The filing of a notification with the RCC is mandatory, provided the thresholds are met.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The notification has to be submitted to the RCC prior to the implementation of the concentration.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Phase I – 45 days as of the effective date.</p> <p>Phase II – five months as of the effective date.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	The RCC assesses whether the intended concentration would significantly impede effective competition in the market, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	<p>In case a merger is implemented before a clearance decision is received, the RCC may impose a fine of between 0.5 and 10 per cent of the undertaking's total annual turnover in the preceding financial year.</p> <p>In addition, the RCC may order measures aimed at restoring efficient competition in the relevant market.</p>



Russia	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system. Free form of notification, standard form for disclosure of certain information, in Russian.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	No filing deadline but prior to the completion of transaction if: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all companies within the acquirer's group and the target's group &gt; 7 billion roubles and the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all companies within the target's group &gt; 400 million roubles; or</li> <li>the aggregate turnover on a worldwide basis of all companies within the acquirer's group and the target's group &gt; 10 billion roubles and the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all companies within the target's group &gt; 400 million roubles; and</li> <li>for joint venture agreements between competitors operating in the territory of Russia: the aggregate book value on a worldwide basis of all parties to the agreement (and their respective groups) exceeds 7 billion roubles or their aggregate turnover on a worldwide basis exceeds 10 billion roubles for the calendar year preceding entry into the joint venture agreement.</li> </ul>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Two-stage process. Statutory waiting period at Stage 1 is 30 days from submission of all necessary documents, and at Stage 2, another two months. Either at Stage 1 or Stage 2, conditions for clearing the transaction may be issued. Suspension effects: completion prior to clearance is prohibited. The transaction may be challenged by the antimonopoly authority if completed before clearance.
Substantive test for clearance	Would the transaction constitute or strengthen a dominant position of a legal entity? Does (or may) it cause limitation of competition in a market? Positive social and economic effects from the transaction are taken into consideration.
Penalties	Failure to submit a pre-acquisition filing 300,000 roubles to 500,000 roubles (on legal entities) and 15,000 roubles to 20,000 roubles (on managers).
Remarks	Special rules apply to certain Russian law-specific types of transactions and to transactions with 'financial entities' (eg, banks, securities dealers and brokers, insurance companies, non-governmental pension funds, share investment trusts, leasing companies, credit consumer unions) and natural monopolies (eg, gas and oil pipeline distribution, electric power transmission, rail transport, services provided at transport terminals, public electronic and postal communications providers) as targets.

Saudi Arabia	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Creation of an establishment with a dominant position (ie, an establishment that is in a position to influence the prevailing price of a specific commodity, product or service through controlling at least 40 per cent of the total supply of that commodity, product or service in Saudi Arabia). Notification must occur at least 60 days prior to implementation.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	The Competition Council has 60 days to inform a notifying party whether the transaction is under review, or whether the transaction has been blocked. If the Council has informed the notifying party that the transaction is under review within the 60-day deadline and has not cleared the transaction within that period, the Council will have an additional 30 days to conduct its review.
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the transaction will lessen competition in Saudi Arabia. No guidance is given on how the substantive test interacts with the 'dominance' jurisdictional test.
Penalties	Failure to notify: fines of up to 10 per cent of sales, capped at 10 million Saudi riyals (to be doubled in the case of recurrence). Other sanctions may also be imposed.
Remarks	In its assessment, the Council is required to consider whether the notified transaction can be justified by reason of 'public interest', as well as economic efficiencies where it appears from other factors that the transaction is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition. There is, however, no guidance on what constitutes 'public interest' for these purposes.

Serbia	
Voluntary or mandatory system	The filing of a notification with the Commission is mandatory in cases where the applicable jurisdictional thresholds have been met.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The merger notification must be submitted to the Commission within a period no later than 15 days after the triggering event (ie, the signing of the agreement, the announcement of a public offering, the announcement of the start or end date of a public takeover bid or the acquisition of control (whichever occurs first)). The filing may already be submitted once the parties have a serious intention to conclude the relevant agreement (ie, they sign a letter of intent, or announce their intention to make a public offer for the purchase of shares in an undertaking).
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	After submitting the complete filing, the Commission will decide either in one month (in Phase I) or within four months from the decision to initiate in-depth proceedings (Phase II).
Substantive test for clearance	The Commission assesses whether the notified concentration will lead to a significant prevention, restriction or distortion of effective competition, in particular, if it will result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the relevant market. In addition to a test of dominance (over 40 per cent market share), the Commission will consider anticompetitive effects that could potentially arise out of a concentration (eg, loss of current and potential competition, unilateral effects resulting from horizontal mergers, joint dominance, conglomerate effects, vertical effects).
Penalties	For late filing, the Commission may impose on the notifying party a procedural penalty in the range of €500 to €5,000 per day (but capped at a maximum of no more than 10 per cent of the total annual turnover of that undertaking). For failure to file and breach of the suspension obligation the Commission may impose a fine of up to 10 per cent of the total annual turnover of the responsible undertaking generated in Serbia in the preceding financial year (protective measure). Moreover, it may also order to dissolve the concentration, sell shares, terminate a contract, or take other measures necessary to re-establish the status as before implementation of the concentration (measure of de-concentration).

## Singapore

Voluntary or mandatory system	Voluntary.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Notification encouraged where: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the merged entity will have a market share of 40 per cent or more; or</li> <li>the merged entity will have a market share of between 20 and 40 per cent and the post-merger market share of the three largest firms, that is, the concentration ratio of three largest firms (CR3), is 70 per cent or more.</li> </ul> Mergers involving small companies where the turnover in Singapore in the financial year preceding the transaction of each of the parties is below S\$5 million and the combined worldwide turnover of all of the parties is below S\$50 million will be unlikely to raise competition concerns.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Phase I review: approximately 30 working days. Phase II review: approximately 120 working days.
Substantive test for clearance	Whether a merger has resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition within any market in Singapore for goods or services.
Penalties	Financial penalty of up to 10 per cent of turnover in Singapore for each year of infringement for such period, up to a maximum of three years for an infringement that was committed intentionally or negligently. Directions at the discretion of the Commission include directions to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>prohibit an anticipated merger from being carried out or dissolve or modify a merger in such manner as the Commission may direct;</li> <li>dispose of operations, assets or shares;</li> <li>enter into legally enforceable agreements; or</li> <li>provide a performance bond, guarantee or other form of security on such terms and conditions as the Commission may determine.</li> </ul>

## Slovakia

Voluntary or mandatory system	The filing of a notification with the AMO is mandatory in cases in which a concentration meets the applicable jurisdictional thresholds.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	There is no explicit filing deadline. However, in any event the concentration has to be notified to the AMO prior to its implementation (ie, before any rights or obligations resulting from a concentration are executed). Inter alia, the notification can be filed with the AMO already prior to the conclusion of a formal merger agreement.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	If the concentration does not require an in-depth analysis due to the identification of competition law concerns, the AMO issues a decision within 25 working days of the receipt of the notification (Phase I proceedings). In cases that require an in-depth analysis, the AMO may initiate in-depth proceedings within 25 working days from the receipt of the notification (Phase II proceedings). Once the AMO has initiated Phase II, it must issue a decision within 90 working days. Requests for information stop the clock. At the request of the parties or with their consent, the AMO may also prolong the Phase I and II periods, even repeatedly, by a total of up to 30 working days at a maximum. The AMO may request the parties to propose conditions (commitments) within 30 working days upon delivery of such request. This effectively stops the clock, that is, the above-described Phase I and II review/decision-making periods are not in effect until the parties submit their proposed commitments or the expiry of the 30-day period (whichever occurs first).
Substantive test for clearance	The AMO examines whether the concentration will not significantly impede effective competition in the relevant market, in particular due to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position (SIEC test).
Penalties	In the event of failure to notify the concentration or failure to comply with the standstill obligation, the AMO may impose a fine of up to 10 per cent of the undertaking's worldwide turnover generated in the preceding business year; or up to €330,000 on an undertaking that generated a turnover not exceeding €330 or has not achieved any turnover, or when its turnover cannot be calculated.

## Slovenia

Voluntary or mandatory system	The filing of a notification with the CPA is mandatory in cases where the applicable jurisdictional thresholds have been met.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	A merger notification has to be submitted to the CPA no later than 30 days after the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of a public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest (whichever of these triggering events occurs first). If the CPA requested the parties to provide a notification of the concentration because their combined market share in Slovenia exceeds 60 per cent, the merger notification has to be submitted no later than 30 days from receipt of this request.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	In the event the concentration does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the Slovenian competition law rules, the CPA must issue its decision within 25 working days of the receipt of a complete notification (Phase I). In cases that raise serious doubts as to their compatibility with the Slovenian competition law rules, the CPA initiates Phase II proceedings within 25 working days of receipt of a complete notification. Once the CPA has initiated Phase II, it must issue a decision within 60 working days from initiating such proceedings. If the parties propose remedies, the deadline for issuing the Phase I or II decision is extended by an additional 15 working days.
Substantive test for clearance	The CPA assesses whether the intended concentration results in a significant impediment of effective competition within the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, or on a substantial part of it, in particular due to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
Penalties	In the case of a failure to notify the concentration within the filing deadline (or failure to notify the concentration at all), the CPA may impose fines of up to 10 per cent of the annual turnover generated by the undertakings concerned in the preceding business year. In addition, a fine of between €5,000 and €10,000 may be imposed on the responsible persons of such undertakings and (if applicable) a fine of between €3,000 and €5,000 on a natural person already controlling at least one undertaking. If the nature of the infringement of the filing obligation is particularly serious, a fine of between €15,000 and €30,000 may be imposed on the responsible person of a legal entity, and (if applicable) a fine of between €10,000 and €15,000 on a natural person already controlling at least one undertaking.

South Africa	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	N/A.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Small and intermediate mergers – 60 business days. Large mergers – 40 business days, extensions of 15 business days at a time.
Substantive test for clearance	(1) Whether the merger results in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in any relevant market, which cannot be outweighed by technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive factors, and (2) the effect of the merger on certain public interest grounds.  <b>Penalties</b> The merger parties may face the following sanctions for failing to notify an intermediate or large merger: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• an administrative penalty of up to 10 per cent of annual turnover in South Africa and exports from South Africa during the preceding financial year; and</li> <li>• being ordered to sell any shares, interest or other assets it has acquired pursuant to the merger (ie, divestiture) and any provision of an agreement to which the merger was subject may be declared void.</li> </ul>
Penalties	N/A.
Spain	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system. Form of notification: special form. Detailed information similar to Form CO. In Spanish. Short notification for straightforward cases is also available.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Combined turnover in Spain of over €240 million and at least two parties have turnover of over €60 million each; or</li> <li>• combined market share in Spain (or in a 'defined' market within Spain) of 30 per cent or more, unless the turnover in Spain of the target or the target's asset value does not exceed €10 million and the individual or combined market share of the parties does not amount to 50 per cent or more in any 'affected market' in Spain or in any 'defined' geographical market within Spain.</li> </ul> <p>Filing prior to completion.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: one month, extended by 10 days if commitments offered. Stage 2: two months, extended by 15 days if commitments offered. If no unconditional clearance, the Ministry of the Economy has 15 days to decide whether to request government intervention. If it does, the government has one month to make a decision. Suspension until clearance.
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the notifiable concentration might prevent the maintenance of effective competition in the whole or part of the national market.
Penalties	Failure to file: fines up to 1 per cent of the turnover of the relevant undertaking if (1) the parties fail to file a concentration carried out through a public takeover bid in Spain within statutory deadline; or (2) the parties fail to file a concentration upon ex-officio request by the CNMC. Implementation before clearance: fines of up to 5 per cent of the turnover of the relevant undertaking. Non-compliance with relevant final decision: fines of up to 10 per cent of the turnover of the relevant undertaking and potential daily penalties of up to €12,000 per day of delay.
Remarks	If the Ministry of the Economy requests the government's intervention at the end of Stage 2, the government's decision is based on general public policy and general interest criteria.
Sweden	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system, with voluntary notification possible below the thresholds for mandatory notification.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Before a change of control on a lasting basis.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Phase I (25 days, extended to 35 days in case of commitments). Phase II (three months).
Substantive test for clearance	Significant impediment of effective competition in Sweden as a whole or a substantial part thereof (as under EU law).
Penalties	No pecuniary sanctions for gun jumping unless expressly stated in a decision by the Competition Authority, but ex post prohibition is possible.
Remarks	Swedish merger control is harmonised with EU merger control to a significant extent.

Switzerland	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory filing.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Turnover of 2 billion Swiss francs worldwide or 500 million Swiss francs in Switzerland and turnover of at least two enterprises involved of 100 million Swiss francs in Switzerland. Prior to completion of merger.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Stage 1: one month (clearance or opening of investigation). Stage 2: four months (investigation).
Substantive test for clearance	No dominant market position created or enhanced liable to eliminate effective competition. Improvement of competition in other markets outweighing dominant market position.
Penalties	Penalty up to 1 million Swiss francs. Fine of up to 20,000 Swiss francs (on the individual manager).
Remarks	Special approvals for: banks; acquisition of Swiss real estate companies; companies holding special concessions or licences.

Thailand	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Pre-merger filing is required for any merger that may result in a monopoly or a business operator having dominant market power (one business operator having a market share of 50 per cent or more; or one of the top three business operators who having a market share of 75 per cent or more in aggregate, excluding any business operator having a market share of less than 10 per cent or a sales turnover of less than 1 billion Thai baht). Transactions requiring pre-merger filing must receive approval from the TCC before closing. Post-merger notification is required for any merger where the sales turnover of any one business operator or of all business operators conducting a merger in aggregate, amounts to 1 billion baht or more. Notifications must be submitted within seven days from the date of closing.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	For pre-merger filing, the TCC must complete its consideration of an application within 90 days of filing. If the TCC is unable to complete its consideration within this period, the TCC may extend the period by up to 15 additional days. For post-merger notification, there is no statutory timetable for the TCC to verify the notification.
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the merger: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• is reasonably necessary for the business;</li> <li>• is beneficial to business promotion;</li> <li>• poses no serious harm to the Thai economy; and</li> <li>• has no material effect on the due interest of consumers in general.</li> </ul>
Penalties	Failure to file pre-merger filings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• administrative sanction – a fine not exceeding 0.5 per cent of the total value of the merger transaction; a director, manager or any person responsible for the operation of the company shall also be subject to the same penalty;</li> <li>• civil claim – any person who incurs damage from a violation of pre-merger filing requirement by a business operator may claim for damages; and</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the TCC may issue an order to a business operator to suspend, cease or vary the merger if it has sufficient evidence to believe that such business operator is in violation of the pre-merger filing requirement.</li> </ul> Post-merger notifications: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a fine not exceeding 200,000 Thai baht and a daily fine not exceeding 10,000 Thai baht throughout the period of the violation; and</li> <li>• a director, manager or any person responsible for the operation of the company shall also be subject to the same penalty</li> </ul>
Remarks	The merger control provisions came into force in Thailand in December 2018. Interpretation and application of the laws, by the authorities, with regard to certain criteria and requirements for pre-merger filing and post-merger notification, are still unclear.

Turkey	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	No filing deadline. Final and executed version of the transaction document requested. No closing before approval.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	Thirty days following a 'complete' notification. Waiting period of six months with the possibility of a further six months' extension in the case of a Phase II investigation.
Substantive test for clearance	Dominance test: creation of a dominant position or strengthening of an existing dominant position as a result of which, competition is significantly decreased in any market for goods or services within the whole or a part of the country.
Penalties	Realisation of a notifiable transaction without the approval of the Competition Board: turnover-based monetary fine of 0.1 per cent of the turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision (if this is not calculable, the turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account). The minimum fine for 2020 is 31,903 liras. Liability for fines is on the acquiring firm in the case of an acquisition or on both merging parties in the case of a merger. Moreover, a notifiable transaction, not notified to and approved by the Competition Board shall be deemed as legally invalid with all its legal consequences. If the Board concludes that a non-notified notifiable transaction would have been prohibited had it been notified, fines of up to 10 per cent of turnover generated in the financial year preceding the date of the fining decision will be incurred (if this is not calculable, the turnover generated in the financial year nearest to the date of the fining decision will be taken into account). Managers or employees of parties that had a determining effect on the creation of the violation may also be fined up to 5 per cent of the fine imposed on the respective party.

Ukraine	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<p>A transaction qualifying as a concentration requires AMC merger clearance if in the last financial year immediately preceding the year of the concentration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the combined worldwide value of assets or turnover of the parties to the concentration exceeds €30 million and the value of Ukrainian assets or turnover of each of at least two parties exceeds €4 million; or</li> <li>Ukrainian value of assets or turnover in Ukraine of the target, or of the seller of the assets, or of at least one of the founders of a new entity exceeds €8 million and worldwide turnover of at least one other party exceeds €150 million.</li> </ul> <p>All figures shall be taken for the last financial year immediately preceding the year of the concentration. In either case, the parties to a concentration should be considered at their group level. That means that the assets or turnover of the controlling shareholder or seller should still be counted towards the target.</p>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Preview period: 15 calendar days. Phase I review period: up to 30 calendar days. Phase II review period: up to 135 calendar days.</p> <p>Also, there is a fast-track simplified 25-day review procedure for transactions where:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>only one party is active in Ukraine; or</li> <li>parties' combined shares do not exceed 15 per cent on the overlapping markets or 20 per cent on vertically related markets.</li> </ol>
Substantive test for clearance	No monopolisation or substantial restriction of competition in the Ukrainian market or a significant part of it.
Penalties	<p>Statutory maximum fine for pre-clearance closing or closing without clearance is up to 5 per cent of the consolidated turnover in the year immediately preceding the year when the fine is imposed.</p> <p>In practice, according to the Guidelines on Fines, the actual fines in merger cases are lower.</p>
Remarks	The Ukrainian merger control regime is extraterritorial, in some cases excessively: the AMC claims jurisdiction over transactions reasonably lacking sufficient local nexus.
United Arab Emirates	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory; however, a number of exclusions currently exist (for companies operating in certain sectors, government-owned or government-controlled entities, and for small and medium-sized enterprises).
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Forty per cent market share thresholds, as well as a preliminary assessment as to whether the transaction is likely to affect competition in the UAE. Filing must be made at least 30 days prior to the conclusion of a draft contract or agreement bringing about the transaction (unclear whether this allows for the signing of a legally binding share purchase agreement).
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Initial review period of 90 days, may be extended by a further 45 days.</p> <p>The Law does not provide for any expedited review process.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the transaction will negatively affect competition, or whether there may be economic benefits that would outweigh the detriment to competition.
Penalties	<p>Fine of between 2 and 5 per cent of sales in the UAE, or alternatively 500,000 to 5 million UAE dirhams for failure to notify.</p> <p>Fine of 50,000 to 500,000 dirhams for implementing the transaction before clearance (gun jumping).</p> <p>Closing down of an infringing establishment for three to six months.</p> <p>Possibility for affected third parties to seek damages.</p>
Remarks	Although the Competition Law is now officially in force, certain gaps in the legislation and considerable uncertainty in its application remain. Companies doing deals in the UAE that are likely to meet the 40 per cent market share threshold will need to consider carefully whether to make a merger control filing, and if so how to approach the Ministry, in the absence of any formal filing process or of any public record of decisions to date.
United Kingdom	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Voluntary system. Form of notification: CMA's prescribed form. In English.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	The turnover in the United Kingdom of the enterprise being taken over exceeds £70 million or combined share of supply in the UK of 25 per cent created or enhanced. Filing: no formal time limit.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	<p>Stage 1: 40 working days.</p> <p>Stage 2: 24 weeks (can be extended for eight weeks for special reasons).</p> <p>Suspension effects: ability to impose 'hold-separate' obligations on mergers at either stage.</p>
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the merger will result in a substantial lessening of competition in the UK or a substantial part of the UK.
Penalties	<p>Failure to file: no penalties.</p> <p>Implementation before clearance: no penalties, unless in breach of a statutory prohibition, undertaking or order.</p> <p>Non-compliance with orders for the production of documents or information: penalties.</p>
Remarks	Special provisions for cases involving national security, media mergers, government contractors, water mergers or mergers necessary to protect financial stability.

United States	
Voluntary or mandatory system	Mandatory system. Each party must submit a filing. Filing fee (paid by acquiring person) is between US\$45,000 and US\$280,000, depending on size of the transaction.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	Must satisfy the commerce test, size-of-parties test (for deals valued between US\$90 million and US\$359.9 million) and size-of-transaction test, and not qualify for an exemption. No filing deadline.
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	30-day initial waiting period (15 days for all-cash tender offer or sale in bankruptcy). Can be shortened by early termination or extended by issuance of a second request. Stage 2 period ends on the 30th day after compliance by all parties with the second request (in the case of a cash tender offer, Stage 2 ends on the 10th day after compliance by the acquiring person with the second request). Transaction suspended until waiting periods have been observed.
Substantive test for clearance	Whether the transaction may substantially reduce competition or tend to create a monopoly.
Penalties	Failure to file: fine of up to US\$42,530 per day; divestiture can be required. Transaction cannot be implemented prior to clearance. Same penalties apply if transaction is consummated before approval.
Remarks	Special rules can apply to certain industrial sectors (telecommunications, banking).

Vietnam	
Voluntary or mandatory system?	Notification is mandatory if an economic concentration meets the filing thresholds.
Notification trigger/filing deadline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Filing thresholds are based on the combined market share of the parties; the value of the transaction (applicable to onshore transactions only); the total assets of one of the parties (or, arguably, the total assets of all parties combined) (including affiliates) in Vietnam; or the total turnover of one of the parties (or, arguably, the total turnover of all parties combined) (including affiliates) in Vietnam. Different threshold values apply to transactions in different sectors.</li> <li>Filing must be made before closing a notifiable transaction.</li> </ul>
Clearance deadlines (Stage 1/Stage 2)	The VCA will carry out the review of a filing in three stages. The statutory review process may take up to 180 days, plus seven working days from the date the parties submit the filing to the VCA until the issuance of the clearance decision.
Substantive test for clearance	<p>An economic concentration is prohibited if it causes or is likely to cause a significant restraint of competition in the Vietnamese market. The substantive test will be based on the:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>combined market share of the parties before and after the economic concentration;</li> <li>extent of the concentration in the relevant market before and after the concentration;</li> <li>relationship of the parties in the chain of production, distribution and supply of a specific type of goods or services;</li> <li>competitive advantage of the parties after the concentration;</li> <li>ability of the parties to increase the prices or profit margin after the economic concentration; and</li> <li>ability of the parties to exclude or prevent other enterprises from entering or expanding the market.</li> </ul>
Penalties	Each party to a prohibited transaction could be exposed to an administrative fine of 1 per cent to 5 per cent of its total revenue in the relevant market in Vietnam in the preceding fiscal year.
Remarks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The competition law in general and the merger control regime in particular are relatively new in Vietnam, with limited enforcement practice. However, with the introduction of the 2018 Competition Law, it is expected that enforcement will be more robust in the foreseeable future.</li> <li>In the new regime, the government has moved away from the old market share test but applies a broader economic assessment of the market power of the parties and competitive impact of the transaction. This is more in line with international practice.</li> <li>The evolving legal framework and the lack of enforcement precedents result in difficulty in predicting the view of the VCA in the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the law.</li> <li>In addition to the black-letter law, the parties should consider other market and economic factors around a transaction as well as the government's policy in respect of the relevant market when making a filing decision.</li> </ul>





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